14 *Amour fou* – mad love

Dawn Ades and Michael Richardson

Mad love – *amour fou* – is the surrealist concept, or notion, that has probably gained the greatest popular currency, so much so that when it is spoken about it is usually in ways that would not be recognized by the surrealists. And apart from Breton's account of a 1930s ecstatic love affair, which he chose to call *L'Amour fou*, we don't very often find the term in surrealist work, and other surrealists like Benjamin Péret and Alain Joubert have preferred to speak of 'sublime' or 'absolute' love.

Mad love is difficult to pin down and there are probably as many concepts of love in surrealism as there are surrealists. We find quite divergent notions about love apparent in the work of Joë Bousquet, Octavio Paz, André Pieyre de Mandiargues, Gherasim Luca, Nelly Kaplan, Joyce Mansour to name just a few … . What is extraordinary is the persistence of love as a theme throughout surrealist work. Perhaps all we can do within the limitations of our discussion is trace a trajectory of how they came – or how Breton came – to the idea of mad love.

Perhaps we should begin by considering how love came on to the agenda as a major surrealist preoccupation, since it doesn't seem to have been there from the beginning. Love is hardly a Dadaist concern and it doesn't seem to have played a significant part in the gestation of surrealism.

No, they started off with attitudes more typical of the avant-garde of the time: a refusal of conformity and a determination to live according to their desires, committed to open relationships and free love without examining the consequences.

Yet there is within surrealism, from the very outset, a questioning, or a doubt, not simply about the reality of the world, that positivist world that assumes that the perceptible realm is all that exists, but also of one's own

presence within the world. And, in 1924, along with the first issue of *La Révolution surréaliste*, they issued a series of 'calling cards', one of which declares that 'if you love LOVE, you will love SURREALISM'.

We know that at the time Breton and Aragon were immersed in reading Hegel and Schelling, whose theories were in many ways instrumental in problematizing issues about personal identity that had been brewing within surrealist circles. Coming to these thinkers with little philosophical baggage, the surrealists were free to interpret them in their own terms. This philosophical encounter seems to have marked them above all with a realization that reality is not concretely present but is always mediated: something has existence not in itself but only by being recognized by its other. Thus it becomes almost axiomatic in surrealism that one's existence is always tied to some sort of a shadow. From this it follows that freedom is not freedom of choice but rather a matter of overcoming the alienation of being by means of placing oneself into harmony with necessity. This perhaps constitutes the starting point for their questioning of the nature of love.

So, love, sex and the erotic become fundamental preoccupations, not least in the ways they relate to each other, in a sequence of publications with dramatically different perspectives through the 1920s and 1930s which attempt to lay bare the theoretical grounds for their attitudes to love.

Breton's encounter with Nadja at the end of 1925 was a turning in the road whereby ideas in formation about personal identity and the elusiveness of the 'self' coalesce around the erotic relation and love itself, even if there is very little eroticism, and no mad love, at least from Breton's perspective, in the book he published in 1928.

But it gave a tangible recognition to the perception that our sense of self – and of reality as well – is to be found not within ourselves but only in relation to our surroundings and interactions with others. Nadja is the catalyst – whether in her own self or in what Breton projects on to her, we perhaps can't separate the one from the other – for reflections that until then were evanescent, implicit in the experiments in communication (automatism, sleep sessions and so on) and in what they had taken from their readings of Freud, Hegel and Schelling as well as – crucially – from their own sexual relationships. The disturbing apparition of Nadja seems also to provide a focus for responses to Rimbaud's demand for love to be reinvented, or the crisis in sexual relations announced by Villiers de l'Isle-Adam in *The Future Eve*.

Yes, this crisis seems to have become significant within discourse at the end of the nineteenth century, revealed not only in Rimbaud and Villiers, but also apparent in Nietzsche, Jarry, Lautréamont and many others, as well as in the sexology of Kraft-Ebbing, Hirschfeld and Havelock Ellis that had lain dormant for a couple of decades, awaiting Freud's detonation of the time bomb they had primed. Moreover, as the surrealists' own lives became more complicated so did belief in love as the supreme state of being become established as a principle, one to be both affirmed and questioned. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s interrogations of sex and sexuality and insistence on love alternate.

Sex comes first, with the *Recherches sur la sexualité* that begin on the evening of 27 January 1928 and continue on several dates until 6 May, in which the surrealists get together to discuss their own sexual behaviour (see Pierre 1992).[1] They appear to have started casually, as a game of truth prompted by a crisis in Breton's life, although when the first two sessions were published in issue 11 of *La Révolution surréaliste* they were given a scientific character, an approach following lines indicated by Hirschfeld or Havelock Ellis. Yet this was compromised from the beginning by the fact that no women participated.

We already see here a tension that frequently emerges in surrealist research between a will towards scientific objectivity and the personal determinations that have led to the research being undertaken in the first place.

A tension they didn't necessarily want to resolve …

No, not if it meant that the one would disqualify the other. So when Pierre Naville objected that the discussions should not be published unless given greater scientific objectivity, especially by involving women, Breton responded that this would inhibit discussion, allowing the men to hide their penchants behind literary sublimations, so defeating the whole object of the exercise (see Naville 1977*: 145–9).*

Which suggests that the *Recherches* resulted from Breton's personal crisis rather than being a particular group concern. Actually, in reading them there is a question of how seriously some of the others took them.

As scientific documents, Naville was right that they are seriously deficient. We are given no introduction, no setting of agendas or objectives, no foreplay, one might say. Breton just plunges in: 'A man and a woman make love. To what extent does the man take account of the woman's pleasure? Tanguy?' Which doesn't seem to please Tanguy: 'why ask me first?'

This focus on the physical aspect of sex remains pretty constant throughout the discussions, from which love, or any aspect of the emotional relationship with the woman (since all of the participants are men[2]) is almost excluded. Bearing in mind the Hegelian argument that reality is always mediated by relation with an Other, this separation of sex from love is curious.

Yes, Breton insists that 'the whole point of this investigation is, in love, to establish what part belongs to sexuality' (Pierre 1992*: 85–6*)*. We should remember that at the beginning of 1928, he was in the midst of complicated amorous involvements involving a whole gamut of emotions. Three months earlier he had embarked upon a tortuous love affair with Suzanne Muzard, by all accounts an extremely sensual and sexually demanding woman. A month before he convoked the other surrealists to discuss sexuality, Suzanne had left him for the writer Emanuel Berl, with whom she was then in Morocco. This had followed a long troubling affair with Léona Delcourt (Nadja) and a painful rejection by the aristocratic ice maiden Lise Meyer. His marriage to Simone – who seems to have been as much a sister as a wife to him – was also coming apart. At the time, apparently still unbeknown to Breton, she was conducting an affair with Max Morise (the person charged with recording the sexuality discussions!).*

Simone accepted the surrealist principle of openness in amorous relations, but kept her liaison with Morise secret from Breton, who bitterly reproached her when he found out, considering that this secrecy (and not the affair itself) broke the pact of their relationship. In a letter to her cousin Denise Lévy of January 1926 she reflected upon a failed love affair with Roland Tual, as well as on Breton's various liaisons, that 'I've always noticed a strange and almost monstrous trait in me in regard to the most dominant concept of love, namely that I'd prefer to see a man I love be in love with a woman I esteem, in lieu of not loving at all' (S. Breton 2005: 238). The relations with Nadja and Meyer had not greatly troubled her, but she had no esteem for Suzanne Muzard, as she related in a later (September 1928) letter to Denise: 'Yet I know that this woman will do everything I've been careful to avoid doing, which is that she will try to monopolize him completely, at the expense of everything André represents in the world, of everything he is able to do' (S. Breton 2005: 241). For both Simone and Denise, the politically and socially revolutionary sides of surrealism were extremely important – even constituting an essential aspect of Simone's commitment to Breton – and she feared Suzanne was intent upon steering him away from it.

Breton does seem to have lost his head over Suzanne – if Nadja provided the catalyst for the surrealists to question issues of identity connected to the sexual relation, the appearance of Suzanne led to a crisis of sensibility that almost resulted in a complete break-up of the group. This truly was 'mad love', although not in the way that Breton would theorize it a decade later.

It was a period in which surrealism really concretized itself as a moral sensibility. A crisis followed, in which the surrealist group was torn apart, as the majority of his old comrades abandoned Breton. This split, generally attributed to political differences in the literature, was certainly as much about affective relations, as Breton was later to say himself.

Yes, Simone was too popular within the group for her break-up with Breton not to cause ructions.

At the same time, too, Breton's closest comrades, Aragon and Éluard, were in the midst of amorous crises of their own.

The extent to which sexuality troubles the mediated relation could hardly be more starkly illustrated and seems clearly to have been the motivation behind the Recherches *at a time when several of them were feeling bruised, and Breton himself was suffering from feelings of rejection and insecurity. Perhaps, too, this explains Breton's reluctance to involve women in the discussions – the issues were too raw.*

Yet several did object to the absence of women, which seemed to them ludicrous given the centrality in their discussions of the notions of reciprocity and equality in sexual relations. Aragon in particular held that as men and women had equal rights in 'physical love' the latter's absence invalided the discussion. From today's perspective, they reveal remarkable ignorance about female sexual responses.

We should remember that they were taking place when the notion of 'sexuality' – established by late Victorian sexologists and elaborated by Freud – was still in its infancy. What is most remarkable is how they address sex almost as a discourse, in some ways anticipating Foucault in this respect.

Still they have been strongly criticized in recent literature for the attitudes displayed towards homosexuality.

Yes, but we should be careful not to impose our own standards onto an earlier era, especially about something that has since been so radically transformed,

notably by the advent of gay liberation and gay pride, as to be almost completely different from how it was understood in the twenties. Moreover, what they were discussing was not actually homosexuality but 'pederasty', a word – and indeed to a great extent a practice, since it involved a whole set of attitudes and values no longer associated with homosexuals – with no contemporary currency, making it very difficult for us today to understand what was at issue for them. In fact, at times they seem to be arguing at cross purposes, as if the meaning of the term had not yet been fixed.

To an extent the same thing must be true for the discourse about women. In scant evidence we have of how women responded to the *Recherches*, Marcel Duhamel recounts Youki Fujita saying that they just ought to get laid more often, while Georges Bataille tells us that surrealism had fascinated Colette Peignot but the *Recherches* repelled her, although he doesn't say why.

Youki Fujita's presence in the surrealist milieu actually provoked further moral soul-searching. At the time the girlfriend of Marcel Noll, she was the separated wife of the famous Japanese painter Fujita, from whom she had acquired expensive tastes. Noll was the group's treasurer and, desperate to satisfy her, he purloined the group funds. It didn't do him any good, as she rejected him for Robert Desnos, a contributory factor in the expulsion of Desnos from the group as he was accused of stealing her away from Noll. Noll himself vanished from the scene, never to be heard from again.

Thus the question that would appear in the following year's enquiry into love: how would you judge someone who went so far as to betray his convictions to please the woman he loves?

Love for the surrealists would always be – exclusively – affective. Issues around the idea of the encounter were also central to the surrealist attitude and tended to interpose between the sexual relation and love.

Actually, in excluding love (and in fact eroticism) from the *Recherches*, the participants seem almost to be prefiguring the distinction Bataille would later make between 'eroticism' as a fundamental human attitude and 'sexuality' as a purely animal instinct (might this even have been the basis of Bataille's assertion of this distinction?).

Another element is the profusion of extraordinary erotic texts that appear during 1928 and 1929. In this period we see the publications of Bataille's Histoire de l'œil, *Aragon's* Le Con d'Irène, *Desnos's* La

Liberté ou l'amour*, Péret, Aragon and Man Ray's* 1929 *and Péret and Tanguy's* Les Rouilles encagées*, as well as Dalí and Buñuel's films* Un Chien Andalou *and* L'Âge d'or.

And they issued a tract 'Hands Off Love' in support of Charlie Chaplin, at the time embroiled in a sensational divorce case. The first screenings of *L'Âge d'or* were also accompanied by a manifesto extolling love.

The version of the Recherches *published in* La Révolution surréaliste *ends with a note, 'to be continued' but instead it was replaced in the next issue with the* Enquiry on Love*. Was this a change of direction, or had the separation of sexuality and love been a temporary strategy responding to acute personal issues?*

The *Enquête* cast the net of interlocutors quite widely, including not only surrealists and fellow-travellers, but many writers and intellectuals and even magazines and reviews of all political complexions while the *Recherches* were confined to a small group of intimates, intended to debate sexuality through dialogues. The *Enquête* is more exploratory, seeking opinion rather than frankness.

The word love, amour*, is there qualified with an adjective, 'admirable', to lift it out of the associations rejected by the surrealists (filial, divine or patriotic love) and to make it clear that it concerns the total attachment to another human being, body and soul, as well as to contrast it with 'sordid life'.*

Yet the final question, asking whether one believes in the triumph of admirable love over sordid life, brings forth generally ambivalent responses, the most interesting of which is that of Maurice Heine, who points out that life is not necessarily sordid and love not necessarily admirable, but that the death of love would inevitably lead to making life sordid. Breton himself is one of the few to respond unequivocally in favour of admirable love, but does so only obliquely, in words 'signed' by Suzanne Muzard but under Breton's name.

There is something mysterious about this strategy. Are the words really Suzanne's, or are they those he wanted to hear from her? Suzanne herself was later to say that 'Breton overflattered his loves: he moulded the woman he loved so that she should correspond to his own aspirations and thus become, in his eyes, an affirmed value (in Jean 1980*: 190).*

Breton appears to have been attracted to women of contrary sensibilities, the composite of which would have constituted his ideal

woman. Suzanne seems to have epitomized the ideal of the independent woman at the time: sensual and unfettered by conventional morality, but still imbued by the sense that woman's destiny is to be loved, indeed to be loved madly.

Perhaps a peculiarly French attitude, which we find in many films of the thirties.

Maybe not so much a French attitude as a specifically Parisian one, which women like Simone and Denise, coming from Jewish families in Strasbourg and with a strong German influence, don't share.

A feature of the surrealists' attitude towards women is that they assume an equality that isn't there. That is, that they treat women as equals, blind at many levels to the profound inequality that is so inbuilt into their social circumstances that they cannot see it. This shouldn't surprise us: no matter how critical of our circumstances we can never elude the standards of our time.

We are speaking as if the surrealists only ever comprised men as members of the group, and this was not the case. Women were always involved but rarely made their voices heard, at least, until the 1940s.

An incident from the affair with Nadja haunted Breton: her attempt to cause the car he was driving to crash by pressing her foot on his on the accelerator and trying to cover his eyes with her hands 'in the oblivion of an interminable kiss'. Needless to say, he tells us, he didn't yield to this desire but later realized that this was the test of love. Had his and Nadja's feelings been truly reciprocal – 'love in the sense I understand it – mysterious, improbable, unique, bewildering, and certain …' wouldn't they have chosen life?

Doesn't Breton himself say the contrary: 'I feel less and less capable of resisting such a temptation in every case'? Wouldn't the 'interminable kiss' precisely be the supreme moment when life and death are no longer perceived as contradictions, the motive point of all surrealist activity? Love, in surrealism is often in league with death, asserting life only in its relation to death. Isn't Bataille's perception that eroticism is 'assenting to life up to the point of death … eroticism is assenting to life even in death' a key here?

From Breton's perspective, perhaps. But if Nadja had loved him, would she have demanded such a token of esteem? Wouldn't death at that moment have been the triumph of sordid life over admirable love?

Maurice Blanchot (1993: 417) was later to note that '[i]n the relation thus offered neither [Breton nor Nadja] encounters what they encounter: André Breton is for her a god, the sun, the dark and lightning-struck man close to the sphinx; for him she is the genie of the air, inspired-inspiring, she who always departs.'

Suzanne Muzard would say that 'Love is a trap for lovers in quest of the absolute', something that, unlike Nadja, resolutely didn't interest her and perhaps, despite appearances, wasn't what Breton was really seeking.

Breton recounted that his vision of sexual desire took shape at eighteen years of age when viewing the paintings of Gustave Moreau, especially his representations of faces and eyes, and continued to haunt his image of the ideal woman and embody his notion of love.

Was he then always seeking the same woman, or himself? Or does what he was seeking go beyond such an inane correlation? What is striking is how different the various women he was involved with were, as though what he was looking for was some sort of composite, an image, in the medieval sense of a being who would come into existence through the process of being desired.

He addresses this early in *L'Amour fou*, written in 1934: in a kind of mental theatre he imagines two symmetrical rows, the men dressed in black and women in light clothes. The men would all be himself, the faces of the women only one face – that of the latest woman loved. This text was driven by the need to reconcile the idea of 'unique love' with prevailing social conditions, to prove that a solution was likely to be found outside the usual logical routes. Written a few days before the encounter he describes in ecstatic terms later in *L'Amour fou* with the woman who became his wife, he says that 'I've never ceased to believe that … love is the greatest purveyor of solutions of this kind, as well as being in itself the ideal meeting point and fusion of these solutions' (Breton 1987: 42, translation modified). Breton recognized a similar if less dramatic conception of the problem, that of 'love for a unique being' in the Romantic poets, Shelley, Nerval and Arnim. But perhaps for him it was more a question of a love that overwhelms all other considerations, is beyond reason.

Perhaps, therefore, 'mad love' isn't quite right, in that 'madness' requires reason to define itself against. Wasn't he rather searching for something outside the dichotomy between reason and madness?

Yes, which brings us back to the fact that love is not a matter of choice, nor even of attraction, whether mutual or not, but a confrontation with destiny, in which it is love itself that overwhelms the lovers, something Breton seems to perceive in *L'Âge d'or*, the only film, he writes, that exalts 'total love as I envisage it' (Breton 1987: 78).

In many ways, the final section of L'Amour fou*, written to his daughter to be read by her in 1952 when she will be sixteen, is the most extraordinary in the book, a paean to life at a time when he felt his own hanging 'by the slightest thread' (*Breton 1987*: 117) but anticipating the day when this Dawn (Aube), the product of love, will herself one day be 'madly loved'.*

For Breton, unique love is really a quest, a constant search rooted in the temporary magic of an encounter with a being in whom, each time, Breton placed his hope. Simone – Lise – Nadja – Suzanne – Jacqueline – Elisa – Nelly – Joyce, this procession of women loved by Breton, never exclusively but always responding to some imperative of his sensibility …

But we've been talking almost exclusively about Breton …

Yes, we should be careful not to congeal surrealism at a specific time and place, or tie it to the emotional needs of one person. Moreover, the surrealists have returned to look collectively at various aspects of the dynamics of love and the sensual relation in a range of enquiries issued over the years: the encounter (1933), striptease (1957), erotic representations (1961), eroticism (1971) and sensual pleasure (2004). Examination of the complexities of love runs throughout Buñuel's films, culminating in *That Obscure Object of Desire* (1978), in which the ambivalences of the amorous relation and the contradictory desires it unleashes are laid bare.

And Nelly Kaplan makes direct reference in her films, such as Plaisir d'amour *(1990), to the conflicts between male and female attitudes to love and erotic pleasure, often with considerable humour. She plays with gender stereotypes, as does Joyce Mansour in her poetry, and incorporates seamlessly in* Nea *(1976) scenes of same-sex desire.*

We should also say a word about Georges Bataille, in whose work we might find another notion of love, albeit one that is submerged and difficult to bring to the surface. The publication of Bataille's *Eroticism* in 1957 was a significant moment in the history of surrealism, concretizing certain ideas that had been implicit or half-formed for some time and inspiring the 1959/60 International Surrealist Exhibition, devoted to 'Eros'.

As noted earlier, Bataille's essential contribution was to make explicit the distinction between sexuality (as a pure animal instinct) and eroticism (as a play of human sensual experiences), and for the perception that the moment of orgasm offers us a glimpse of the supreme point of surrealist endeavour when momentarily life slips into death and contradictions are resolved.

But we are moving away here from the concept of mad love – there are so many attitudes to love within surrealism that we would need to write a whole book about them – and their histories – if we were to explore it properly.

Yes, and as we noted at the beginning, Benjamin Péret preferred to speak of 'sublime love', which differs significantly from Breton's mad love while Alain Joubert has recently criticized both notions from a surrealist perspective, preferring to speak of 'absolute love'. Joubert argues that neither mad love nor sublime love satisfies what is implicit within the surrealist demand, that is a transformation of being through the encounter with an other, a physical and spiritual union in constant metamorphoses. Breton, in contrast, remained content with the transformative possibilities of the encounter, contemplating the precipice and unprepared to plunge into the depths of an absolute love in which the individual identities of both lovers are dissolved. Péret, too, is dazzled by the precipice, which is implied by the use of the word 'sublime', and unlike Breton is still to some extent under the sway of a doomed Romantic desire for transcendence.

Perhaps we might leave the last word to Hegel, as quoted by Octavio Paz: 'Love excludes all oppositions and hence it escapes the realm of reason. It makes objectivity null and void and hence goes beyond reflection. In love, life discovers itself in life, devoid now of any incompleteness' (1996: 133).

Notes

1 They were resumed in 1930 and then continued sporadically and in a rather perfunctory way until 1932.
2 Women do participate in the later dialogues but not in a particularly enlightening way. The most interesting female intervention comes in the sixth conversation, from an anonymous 'Y' (who we believe is almost certainly Youki Fujita), but she really only asks questions rather than answering any.

16 The object

Krzysztof Fijalkowski

Popular understanding of surrealism has usually confined its territory to domains beyond the physical: dream and the unconscious, myth and imagination, poetry and the image. From this it can be a short step to critiquing the movement – as some did from the beginning – as mired in idealism, escapism and mystification. But from the outset surrealists themselves took care to present their engagement not as an evasion of concrete reality, but as a more profound and dynamic apprehension of it, one that might recalibrate our relationship to everyday experience in the face of the social, intellectual and material structures that have left humanity bereft and imprisoned.

The *First Manifesto* opens with exactly this problematic: 'Belief in life, in what is so precarious about life, that is *real* life, being so much taken for granted, finally results in this very belief being lost. Man, that definitive dreamer, each day more dissatisfied with his fate, looks around with dismay at the objects he is propelled to use and that indulge his listlessness' (Breton 1988: 311; see also 1969: 3).[1] Freudian psychoanalysis had already raised this tension between the material and the immaterial as it probed the relationship between the hidden realm of latent desires and anxieties, repressed memories or deep-seated but invisible drives, and their outward and measurable manifestation as actions, behaviours or neurosis. Efforts to collaborate with communists and anarchists also situate surrealism, consisting predominantly of poets and artists, as a theatre of practical action, not vicarious contemplation, of concrete rather than abstract convictions, with at least part of its philosophical position anchored in the resolutely materialist thought of Marx and Engels.[2]

An intensified interest in the object from the early 1930s onwards, in critical texts, analytical games, documentary images and above all in a thirst for finding, making and displaying unexpected objects, may partly have been a riposte to those who viewed surrealism as a movement of

aesthetes and idealists. Yet scholarship has only recently recognized surrealism's objects as a major research concern, for a time at least, of the movement itself when Breton announced that 'it is essentially on the *object* that the more and more clear-sighted eyes of surrealism have remained open in recent years', clarifying that in this context 'I take the word *object* in its broadest philosophical sense' (1969: 257–8).

But the word 'object' – in its English and French derivations stemming from the Latin verb *obicere*, to throw in the way or against, to obstruct – far from delivering the stable, compliant body we normally expect of it, designates an awkward and potentially unsteady concept with a number of distinct meanings and derivatives. As such, while philosophers have distinguished between objects as physical entities and as intellectual constructs, in general philosophy has had difficulty getting to grips with what, as Henry Laycock suggests, is so general as to resist definition in simple terms (Laycock 2010), and surprisingly few have tackled its problems in detail. Our commonplace sense of the word usually refers to physical entities, and most frequently to artificial bodies within a spectrum of things large enough to be seen, small enough to be held or manipulated; a degree of volume, resistance and stability over time is usually assumed (see for example Moles 1972). The term's conceptual value, however, should not be ignored. This is of concern in the investigation of objects of knowledge – including anything that can be brought to the mind – or with the pairing of the object with the subject in order to understand the relation between the self and its interactions. Considerations of the object frequently adopt this relational emphasis: linguistics distinguishes between syntactical objects and subjects, while taxonomy concerns itself with the naming, ordering and ranking of objects in order to grasp their operations within systems or classifications.

By and large, surrealism has been interested predominantly in the first of these categories – in physical, conventionally perceivable bodies, even if it tends by the very nature of its enquiries to destabilize and render ambivalent this physicality and status. For one thing (as in the sort of visual philosophy exemplified by René Magritte, for example, operating across the borders between object, image and language), it frequently points to problems posed by conventional distinctions between showing, designating or classifying an object and that object itself. Surrealism might also be seen as a vast and potentially limitless repository of both existing and possible objects: as representations in texts, artworks, photographs or films; as the focus for individual or collective analysis and games; as the subject of discovery, collection and interpretation through the category of the *trouvaille* or 'found

object'; and lastly through the deliberate construction of new objects in which existing forms are either perturbed or combined in defamiliarizing ways (the *objet surréaliste* properly speaking). Taken as a whole, and in the light of a significant number of critical or poetic texts broaching the theme of the object, this multiple perspective produces a rather diffuse and speculative set of approaches rather than a concise and coherent theory. In each case, while the actual or potential materiality of the object in surrealism guarantees its pertinence, this object also tends to present an open, mobile category of being, one in process rather than fixed in its meanings: an enigma, a doorway.

While it rarely conceived or presented experimental activity around the object in conventionally philosophical terms, what is in play for surrealism can be seen as a branch of ontology, albeit one that never aims to construct a definitive system of knowledge, and in which the central problem is above all that of identity, whether of an object, an individual or a collectivity. This dynamic around problems of identity is summed up succinctly in another of Breton's opening lines, this time at the beginning of *Nadja*: 'Qui suis-je?' – an untranslatable play on words that asks not only 'who am I?' but also 'whom do I follow?': the focus of desire lies in the riddle of who each of us might be or become, in terms of an otherness that is always both real/concrete and imaginary/conceptual. The common accusation that surrealism objectifies what should be treated as a subject – above all the persons and bodies of women – tends to ignore the problem that while the very category of 'object' is multiform and constantly under negotiation, its fate is also bound to the subject in a flux of affirmations, negations and becoming.

This emphasis on an 'objective' seam within surrealism is testified by two major concepts. Breton's notion of objective chance emerged in the late 1920s as the matrix of external and internal forces in the relationships between subjective desire and objective (frequently object-borne) encounters. Black humour, another concept developed by Breton over the 1930s, was identified in its earliest iterations as *humour objectif*, a term originally coined (rather loosely) in Hegel's *Aesthetics* to designate how Romantic art forms were able to engage subjective values in external objects, and presented by Breton in the course of a lecture on surrealism and the object in 1935 in terms of 'the contemplation of nature in its accidental forms' (1969: 267). More circumstantially, the Czechoslovak surrealist group considered, in the pressurized years following the Second World War, replacing the very term 'surrealism' with that of 'objective poetry'. Objective chance, objective humour, objective poetry: all share (in English as in French, and to a degree in Czech) a triple meaning of 'objective' in a way that inflects the

surrealism of the 1930s onwards with a particular set of priorities: to be object-like or invested in objects; to be rigorous and eschew prejudice; and to be oriented towards specific outcomes.

Surrealism's objects

From the outset, surrealist practice – notably automatic writing – produced representations of unfamiliar and destabilizing objects belonging to a world of fantastic literature, fairy tales or the bric-a-brac of dreams, that retained just enough of an echo of their more tangible everyday cousins to be believable (of which Lautréamont's oft-cited 'chance encounter on a dissecting table between a sewing machine and an umbrella' is no doubt the most familiar avatar). Freud in the *Interpretation of Dreams* had noted how the mechanisms of displacement and condensation could relocate objects to new contexts or produce hybrid forms; Breton described one such dream object, a book incorporating a wooden statue, recommending the production and circulation of dream objects to 'help to demolish those concrete trophies which are so odious, to throw further discredit on those creatures and things of "reason"' (1978: 26). Texts in *La Révolution surréaliste* frequently tested the charge generated by blocking and reassigning the original intentions of practical objects: 'Any discovery changing the nature or destination of an object or a phenomenon constitutes a surrealist act', declared the preface to the inaugural issue. A few pages later Louis Aragon's account of the Concours Lepine – an annual trade fair for inventions and gadgets – proposed that, in the light of its often ridiculous but startling results, invention itself 'can be summarized as the establishment of a surreal relationship between concrete elements and its mechanism of inspiration'. Such inventions – whether practical or preposterous – represented the point where philosophy met poetry since 'the concrete is the final moment of thought, and the state of concrete thought is poetry', where (in contrast to either scientific or 'vulgar' knowledge) genuine philosophy insists that objects and ideas be concrete not abstract. This triangulation between thought, inspiration and the concrete stands in opposition to categories of reality: 'since it denies the real, philosophical knowledge first and foremost establishes a new relationship between its materials: the unreal [*l'irréel*]' (Aragon 1924: 23). Such early texts show the object present from the outset as a key marker in surrealism's quarrel with established categories of reality and reason; by December 1926 *La Révolution surréaliste* was advertising a series of editioned surrealist snow globes and an imminent exhibition, catalogue and definition of surrealist objects.

That it took another five years before any such definition or display became possible suggests that either the time wasn't then ripe or, just as importantly, that the conceptual research the problem demanded had yet to reach fruition. For the Parisian group, the period 1926–30 was characterized by debates and quarrels around political adherence, social action and – above all for this particular issue – the status of surrealism's place and role in the everyday material world. By the end of the decade the movement had emerged as a much broader coalition of artists and thinkers as well as writers, but had lost much of its early, rather rose-tinted curiosity about, for instance, features of contemporary urban space like advertising and commodities (inherited from Apollinaire and de Chirico). The move towards communism brought with it an increased (if still partial) familiarity with the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Hegel, whose thought began to impart surrealist texts with greater awareness of how political and economic realities underpinned the material world.

The object's place in a system of value and symbolic exchange thus became a central precept; at stake in this encounter was the question of utility. Rather than the ordered department store, Breton found in the disarray of the local flea market a privileged site for discovering an unexpectedly poetic meaning clinging to objects that had fallen out of current systems of function, value and exchange (as though to propose a kind of 'psychoeconomic' equation shadowing Marx's distinction between use- and exchange-value in the commodity): 'I go there often, searching for objects that can be found nowhere else: old-fashioned, broken, useless, almost incomprehensible, even perverse – at least in the sense I give to the word' (Breton 1960: 52). The interruption or deflection of an object's initial purpose and commodity value, then, provided the key to its rescue, unlocking something dormant within it. 'Here as elsewhere, the mad beast of *use* must be hunted down' (Breton 1972: 279, translation modified), Breton would write of surrealism's objects a decade later, with the French term *usage* indicating both utility and the sense of custom or convention. The homes of surrealists started to fill with flea-market finds alongside the books and contemporary or tribal artworks adorning the walls; Breton's studio at 42, rue Fontaine became the epitome of a surrealist domestic space crammed with things and resembling something between a *Wunderkammer* and an alchemist's lair.

The development of the concept of objective chance would inflect this interest into a more fully formed theory of the *trouvaille*, eventually defined in terms not just of its availability for reverie or wonder, but of its potential as a response from the external world to the inner workings of Eros. While this might be imagined as a generalization of anthropologist

Marcel Mauss's theory of gift exchange as social communication, for Breton the latency of any object as an emissary from the external world, cut free of the human agency that first plotted its destiny, is keyed not to social or ritual values but to deeper drives: 'any piece of flotsam and jetsam within our grasp should be considered a precipitate of our desire' (1972: 283). The fullest exposition of objective chance comes in Breton's *Mad Love*; central to it are two accounts in which the pursuit of objects portends the arrival of a lover – Breton's future wife Jacqueline – foretold years before in an automatic poem. The book's third section, first published in shorter form as 'Equation of the Found Object', is a detailed analysis of two discoveries made at Saint-Ouen market by Breton and the sculptor Alberto Giacometti: a carved wooden spoon and a slatted metal visor respectively (Breton 1987: 25–38). Giacometti is drawn to an ominous form that turns out to be part of a gas mask from the First World War. Its deathly intimations help Breton understand Giacometti's compulsion to obtain the mask as directly related to his current difficulties in resolving a major work, entitled precisely *The Invisible Object*. In it, the hands of an immobilized and elongated standing female figure reach out in a gesture of entreaty as if to cup the missing object of the work's title. But while this sense of absence or loss pervades both the work and its affective origins – Giacometti, like Breton, was suffering emotional distress in his personal life – it also marked the sculpture's process, where a sense of psychopathological blockage prevented the artist from completing the figure's face and bringing closure to the piece.

The encounter with the mask seemed to provide the missing element of a puzzle, overcoming trauma and enabling completion of the work (whose eventual head actually bore little resemblance to the find), prompting Breton to note that 'the finding of the object serves here exactly the same purpose as the dream, in the sense that it frees the individual from paralyzing affective scruples, comforts him and makes him understand that the obstacle he might have thought unsurmountable is cleared' (Breton 1992: 700; 1987: 32). Yet, despite Breton's optimism, the status of the 'found' object is not so easily assigned, given that the exchanges he has witnessed have to do with losing as much as finding, with absence as much as presence: *The Invisible Object* turned out to mark Giacometti's farewell to surrealism. Is the 'invisible object' here an intellectual enigma, present yet imperceptible – read as a gap – between the figure's hands (its alternative title is *Hands Holding the Void*)? Is it displaced to the mask, whose slatted visor closes off sight and invites inner vision? Is it the figure itself, the object of Giacometti's longing; or is he, fragile in his affective paralysis, *her* missing object? Things are complicated

when we notice that some versions of the sculpture, including the one illustrated in *Mad Love*, place a conical form suggestive of a bird's head or animal skull on the platform beside the figure, echoing the deathly message of the mask and linking back to the troubling category of what the artist termed 'disagreeable objects', as though to return to the originary resistance of the *ob-ject*, the thing thrown against the senses.

Breton's account continues with a parallel analysis of *his* found object, a 'slipper-spoon' (its wooden handle ends in a miniature carved shoe that also becomes the spoon's 'heel') that he reads, in answer to Giacometti's mask under the sign of Thanatos, as a bearer of erotic and life-affirming motivations in the face of loss. The analysis takes two years, taking in fairy-tale narratives (Cinderella's slipper), psychoanalytic interpretation (gendered and erotic readings of the carving), biographical details and an eye for the minutiae of events and places. An earlier section of *Mad Love* had already linked the *trouvaille* to the categories of the marvellous and convulsive beauty, seeing the distance between an anticipated object of desire and its possible final form as a register of the object's potential for wonder and revelation, hoisting an elected item out of its mundane context: 'what is delightful is the dissimilarity existing between the object wished for and *the object found*. The *trouvaille*, whether artistic, scientific, philosophic or as useless as anything, is enough to undo the beauty of everything beside it' (Breton 1992: 682; 1987: 13, translation modified).

Breton's characteristic optimism that the signs of desire moving towards fulfilment can be offered to the individual by the gifts and objective encounters of the external world resonates through many surrealist representations and realizations of magnetized or perturbed objects, even if in many a sense of disquiet or humour comes to the fore. Jan Švankmajer, sensitive throughout his research to the object's secret lives, its tactile messages and capacity for betraying its owners, tracks the object between pathos, slapstick and fear in stop-motion animations such as *The Flat* (1968), in which a hapless protagonist is assailed on all sides by mere things. Jacques Bureau, a member of the wartime Main à plume surrealist group in Paris, invoked his incarceration in Fresnes prison in 1943 for a moving text intended for a special issue of a journal devoted to the object. 'The Nail' describes in intimate detail how a personal relationship with something found in a cell might open a dialogue when the customary relationship between subjects and objects is restaged:

> Speaking of objects is not easy. One must have lived with them outside the rules that tie them to us in misfortune. We keep them

> enslaved and they are, for us, devious enemies. We will need resolutely to strike up an understanding with them: to learn from them, and then teach them. … We misunderstand the reality of the object because we live amongst too many of them, and give them divided attention. … But live for weeks, months, every day, every night with just one of them, the drabbest and humblest of them. *Live alone for an entire four months with a nail*, and you will understand.
>
> (Bureau 2008: 252–3)

The idea that the object might enter into dialogue with the subject, becoming the focus for a process that combined chance, pleasure and revelation, had already come to a head within the Parisian surrealist group early in the 1930s, and here again Giacometti motivated its development. His tabletop sculpture *Suspended Ball* (1930–31), in which an incised sphere hangs from a cage in such a way that it could be made to rub along a recumbent crescent shape in a gesture simultaneously erotic and threatening, strongly affected the group. Noting the combination of concrete and psychosexual or dreamlike forces at work, Salvador Dalí proposed a collective game in which participants constructed informal assemblages from found materials and gathered them for analysis. The resulting Symbolically Functioning Objects were presented in issue 3 of *Le Surréalisme au service de la Révolution* – though they constituted only the first of six categories of what was now termed the 'surrealist object' (Dalí 1998b: 135). While *Suspended Ball* was seen as operating in the discipline of sculpture, an attraction of the Symbolically Functioning Object was its non-art status, closer to the everyday items from which it was composed than to plastic or aesthetic concerns, though surrealist objects would soon be presented in gallery contexts. Dalí's article comprised a theoretical text and brief interpretations, with the objects illustrated several pages further on. Made of diverse, often unassuming, materials – gloves, a shoe, a bicycle saddle, tobacco – their analysis, particularly in the case of Dalí's own explicitly sexualized assemblage, tended to point to anxieties and desires in ways that both keyed the results to psychoanalytic orthodoxy and tended to generate either rather limited and predictable readings, or else equivocal and uncertain ones. Breton himself would later declare his relative dissatisfaction with the results in comparison to the spark of the *trouvaille*:

> without hereby intending to formulate the least reservation over their explosive power or their 'beauty', I think I can say that they offer interpretation a less considerable scope, as might be expected, than objects that are less systematically determined in this

> direction. … No doubt in the end such objects, too specific in conception, too personal as they are, will always lack the astonishing power of suggestion with which some nearly ordinary objects by chance find themselves endowed.
>
> (1990: 55, translation modified)

The object in crisis

Notwithstanding this concern, the experiment helped trigger a trend for surrealist assemblage from the 1930s onwards, within the French group and further afield (especially in Belgium, Britain, Romania and Spain), and resulting in some of the movement's most iconic and immediate visual works. Surrealist exhibitions increasingly featured objects in their displays, eventually placing them in ambitious installations that gave the visitor the sense of stepping into a materialized dream. Exhibitions in Paris and London (1936 and 1937) devoted entirely to the object advertised the significance of the theme, and encouraged the extension of its scope and theorization, but also marked the beginnings of a process that saw what had initially been experimental or analytical activity tipped into the art market and – more worryingly – the domain of advertising and design. Shop window design, to cite but one discipline, would adopt 'surreal' juxtapositions of goods, mannequins and environments as a default style for the next decade. Not until much later, in the exhibition *L'Écart absolu* of 1965, would the Parisian group draw up coherent critiques of consumer society and its objects (by which time the fad for a 'surreal style' had itself become outmoded).

Located in the Galerie Charles Ratton, a space normally reserved for the display and sale of tribal artefacts, the *Surrealist Exhibition of Objects* of 1936 brought together well over a hundred exhibits. The presentation – works on the wall or atop plinths but most strikingly in glazed cabinets – deliberately mixed up the different categories of objects the small catalogue strove to distinguish: newly created surrealist assemblages sat alongside mathematical models, tribal carvings, found items and natural specimens. Just as importantly, the group developed an accompanying issue of the art journal *Cahiers d'Art* on the theme of the object, featuring photographic reproductions and several significant texts, in particular Breton's 'Crise de l'objet'. This essay begins by tracing parallels between key periods of poetic and scientific discovery – the height of Romanticism, for example, and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry, 'an event which shook to its very foundations the edifice constructed by Descartes and Kant and "opened up" rationalism, so to speak' (Breton 1972: 275). The late nineteenth century, on the other hand, brought together the 'transcended contradictions' of Lautréamont and

Rimbaud alongside the development of a generalized geometry resolving Euclidean and non-Euclidean theories, resulting in 'a total disruption of sensibility by routing all rational habits, erasing the distinction between good and evil, expressing strict reservations about the hegemony of the *cogito*, and revealing the marvellous of everyday life' (275). Contemporary scientific and artistic thought thus share a relationship to the real:

> in either case, the real, confused for too long with given data, splinters in every direction possible and tends to become a component of the possible. By applying Hegel's dictum that 'everything real is rational, and everything rational is real', one may well expect to see the rational follow precisely in the footsteps of the real, and it is certainly true that, today, reason goes so far as to propose the continuous assimilation of the irrational, a process during which the rational is required to remould its own image constantly.
>
> (276)

The object, then (thus far not broached by the text but present in the accompanying illustrations of striking geological specimens) participates in a dynamic process in the history of sensibility whereby reality, reason and the rational unfold through a series of dialectical crises and resolutions. The crisis of the object portends a deeper (perhaps perennial but now fundamental) crisis of thought, brought to a height in the contemporary age's urgent 'desire to objectify' (277). Surrealism's own object interventions are cited as instances where irrational or unconscious disruptions of the concrete realm act as advance signals of the anxiety of contemporary intellectual life. Surrealism's objects, in Paul Éluard's phrase, participate in a 'physics of poetry', laboratory research in which the everyday forms in the 'hateful regime' of common sense are subjected to a stripping away of use and convention, playing upon the tension between contrary realities and their reconciliation so as to unlock 'latent possibilities' and concrete transformations (279). Whether found or made, these newly liberated forms 'succeed in achieving a separate identity simply through a change of role' (280).

The final French phrase Breton adopts here, *mutation de rôle*, indicates not simply a shift in purpose, but a 'change in job', a transfer of responsibilities: this object, no matter how much the markers of consumer and social utility encoded within it may have been scrubbed out, nonetheless continues to function – albeit now predominantly on a symbolic, affective and intellectual plane. This important distinction – that surrealism's objects don't so much aim to cancel utility as reassign it, blocking the customary and mercantile values inscribed in it in order

to provoke a latent, non-rational purpose – had recently been echoed by other surrealists. Georges Hugnet's text 'L'Objet utile' in the previous issue of *Cahiers d'Art* insisted that 'there are no useless objects. Those that might seem so merely prove the poverty of our conception of the real': each object 'is a knowledge of the self in relation to the real. It functions as we do' (Hugnet 2005: 135). Roger Caillois, in the essay 'Spécification de la poésie', had already argued that utilitarian function is never a full explanation of the object's form: 'in other words the object always overflows the instrument. Thus it is possible to discover in each object an irrational residue determined amongst other things by the unconscious intentions of the inventor or technician' (Caillois 2015: 268). Claude Cahun's essay 'Beware of Domestic Objects', published alongside 'Crisis of the Object', began to sketch the role of the irrational in the politicized terms of labour and consciousness:

> we need to discover, manipulate, *tame*, make for ourselves irrational objects in order to appreciate the specific or general value of those we have in front of our eyes. This is why, in certain respects, *manual* workers would be better placed than intellectuals to grasp their meaning, if it were not that everything in capitalist society, including communist propaganda, did not turn them away from it.
>
> (Cahun 2002a: 540)

A notable inclusion in the 1936 Ratton show was Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades, differentiated from the *objets surréalistes* in the catalogue but clearly seen within the same body of enquiry. Though the first ready-mades predated surrealism by a decade, their action of deflecting utility by placing commercial objects in a gallery environment to induce a conceptual jolt in their value was read as an avatar of the surrealist object's challenge to use and exchange. The act of isolating and removing an object from its location, however, might function equally well in the framework of other approaches. Examining what he termed the *objets bouleversants* (disruptive objects) in Magritte's work, Paul Nougé stressed the object's subversive value in its separation from the world:

> Here the fundamental operation appears to us to be *isolation* and one might go so far as to suggest a kind of law: once isolated, the charm of an object is a direct result of its banality. … Moreover, the subversive power of an isolated object is a direct result of the intimacy of the relations it maintained up to that point with our body, with our mind, with ourselves.
>
> (Nougé 1980: 239)

Changing the vision, position, scale or context of any daily object can provoke a fresh consciousness that might enable the individual to 'go where he has never been, feel what he has never felt, think what he has never thought, be what he has never been'.

The difficulty, certainly among many of the most successful surrealist assemblages, was the extent to which the surrealist object's role as a conceptual stake, as a harbinger of crisis, might speak louder than its power to disorient through the more transient mechanisms of humour and the absurd. Dalí's contribution to *Cahiers d'Art*, 'Honneur à l'objet', cites Plato, Socrates, Epicurus, Lucretius, Anaxagoras, Marx, Feuerbach and Chinese philosophy as character witnesses in a 'paranoid-critical' argument collapsing together several divergent concerns, a move that shores up an otherwise rather indistinct argument yet also destabilizes the philosophical underpinnings of the object world through proliferation. One of Dalí's contributions to the Charles Ratton exhibition was a *Monument to Kant* combining a base bearing an inscription from the *Critique of Practical Reason*, a tall scaffold displaying a number of fountain pens, and a bottle. The artist described another of his works in the show as a *machine à penser*, and though he was apt to appropriate philosophical ideas in a partial and unorthodox manner, the sense that each of his objects was intended to operate as a shifting nexus of conceptual reflection comes across repeatedly in his writings.

But what kind of 'crisis' do surrealism's objects enact or suffer? The implication of Breton's text is that the object's crisis is a physical manifestation of a deeper intellectual one, but the choice of vocabulary is significant. For one thing, it hints at the most obvious sense of material anxiety in recent times: the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash, a global financial crisis undermining consumer trade throughout the early 1930s in a way that highlighted everyday tensions between commodity, economy and labour. For Breton, a former medical student familiar with psychoanalytic theory, the idea of crisis would also have had echoes of a psychiatric emergency. Charcot's analysis of hysteria, for example, charts the stages of the *grande crise hystérique* as a sequence of individual crises, something medical science would define in terms of a pathological breakdown, whereas for surrealism this portent of imminent collapse heralds something more equivocal: a point of divergence (the word 'crisis' itself derives from the Greek for 'decision').

Dalí's repeatedly reviewed taxonomies of the object in his writings, like the revised lists of object categories issued by the group over the course of the 1930s, point to the object's role not just as a 'thought machine' but as an agent in an unfolding crisis of knowledge. Attempts by surrealists to classify and systematize the object ever more precisely

ultimately have the reverse effect of blurring and rendering increasingly ambiguous the possibility of a coherent and stable order of objects as a system of knowledge, or as the material evidence of philosophy's desire for concrete determination. Just as potently, Dalí was liable to present the object as a lure for thought, dragging the mind away from manifest representations into the wormholes of tiny details. In this way, his analysis of a found nineteenth-century photograph of two women outside a shop immediately leads the viewer away from the main scene down to an apparently insignificant bobbin lying in the gutter, read by Dalí as a breakdown of the Kantian external object at the point where space becomes metaphysical (Dalí 1935). For surrealism, he seems to hint, the distinction between material phenomena in the external world and the qualities of the Kantian *Ding an sich*, unknowable and hidden from sight, becomes problematized and instrumentalized.

The object's ability to act as a lure for the subject, to draw it out in acts of ritual, memory, divination and sorcery, is given its most troubling expression in surrealism by the experiments conducted by the Bucharest surrealists in the midst of the Second World War, in particular Ghérasim Luca's *The Passive Vampire* – a narrative ruled and sometimes overwhelmed by 'objects, those mysterious suits of armour beneath which desire awaits us, nocturnal and laid bare, those snares made of velvet, of bronze, of gossamer that we throw at ourselves with each step we take, hunter and prey in the shadows of forests' (2008: 71). Drawing on the experience of a game in which players offered found items to each other, Luca traces the object's secret, sometimes malevolent, action on its finder or user. The heteroclite assemblages Luca makes, analyses and illustrates act as waymarkers on a journey into the hidden correspondences between desire, interpersonal relationships and a world in which forces beyond current dimensions of knowledge make us the victims rather than masters of their realm. Subject and object circle and act upon each other in the dialectic the Bucharest group termed 'knowing through not-knowing', a mutual assured destruction of all values and understanding. Decades later, Annie Le Brun would echo this reciprocal gamble of subject and object in the play of identity, chained together in an unfolding drama of shattering and becoming against the backdrop of the enigma of being:

> While the merely perceived object masks the void through its neutral presence or tends to be confounded with it, the privileged object imposes itself upon us as a touchstone of the void, acting to open up a horizon between interior psychic reality and external reality on which the threat of a separation that is overcome but not

> repressed becomes the guarantee of the freedom of play. … Never identical to itself, the object invites us to discover one by one the symbolically functioning pieces of the puzzle of our identity.
>
> (Le Brun 1976: n.p.)

Notes

1 Like many of Breton's books, the *Manifesto* begins with a complex, almost untranslatable, passage. Here, with 'Tout va la croyance à la vie qu'à la fin cette croyance se perd', he is playing upon a French proverb 'Tant va la cruche à l'eau qu'à la fin elle se casse' ('you'll break your jug if you keep throwing it in the water') which figuratively means 'Don't push your luck' or 'I can only take so much'. Breton is making a distinction between the unsatisfactory *real life* that is given to us and taken for granted, and the *true life* that becomes possible if we examine its foundation (see the discussion of this point in Breton 1988: 1344).

2 Complicating this position, though beyond the scope of this chapter, is the significance for surrealism of the thought of Berkeley, both as an antecedent of Hegel but also in his concept of 'immaterialism' (see Ades 1992: 132–5).