Cultural Diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU

STUDIES IN EU REFORM AND ENLARGEMENT

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Edited by Dieter Fuchs and Hans-Dieter Klingemann

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Preface and introduction

Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs

This volume owes its existence to the 'Wider Europe, Deeper Integration? Network of Excellence,' co-funded by the European Commission within the Sixth Framework Programme. The lifetime of the project, which was coordinated by Wolfgang Wessels, Cologne University, extended from November 2005 to the end of May 2009. Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Sciences Po Paris) and Dieter Fuchs (University of Stuttgart) organized the current volume. They were asked to contribute to the general theme of 'Democracy, Legitimacy and Identities: Citizens in the Construction of Europe' (Work package V) with a specific focus on 'EU enlargement, cultural diversity and national identity' (Team 12). Klingemann and Fuchs recruited a team of young, aspiring social scientists coming from various universities: the University of Amsterdam (Catherine E. de Vries), the Free University Berlin (Andrea Schlenker-Fischer), the University of Bordeaux (Isabelle Guinaudeau), Corvinus University of Budapest (Judit Kis Varga), the University of Maastricht (Christine Arnold), Oxford University (Julia De Clerck-Sachsse), Sciences Po Paris (Olivier Ruchet, Vincent Tiberj), the University of Stuttgart (Christian Schneider), and the University of Zurich (Simon Bornschier). Judit Kis Varga and Vincent Tiberj participated in most of the team's activities, but, for different reasons, were not able to contribute a chapter to this volume. Christine Arnold, Catherine de Vries and Christian Schneider joined the project in a later phase.

The team met four times at Sciences Po Paris in Dijon (9–11 December 2005; 24–26 November 2006; 2–3 November 2007; 23–24 April 2009), and twice each at the Foundation for European Studies – European Institute in Lodz (30 March–1 April 2006; 21–24 February 2007) and the Social Science Research Centre Berlin (23–24 May 2007; 23–24 April 2008).

The volume we now present has been defined as the group's major product right from the beginning. After intense discussions at the initial meeting in Dijon four basic assumptions were agreed upon: (1) The development of a European identity and a common European culture is a prerequisite for European integration; (2) European identity and a common political culture will not develop rapidly but emerge slowly; (3) In the current historical phase, we can observe the beginnings of a European identity and a common

European culture, both of which are developing as an interdependent process; (4) European identity and culture, and national and regional identities, are not exclusive, rather, they are complementary. Dieter Fuchs and Andrea Schlenker presented a background paper summarizing the theoretical approach and clarifying major conceptual issues at the EU-Consent: Work package V Conference in Lodz in April 2006. The subsequent team meetings focused on the discussion of the individual chapter drafts. The conceptual framework that had been developed earlier on helped to structure the debate and integrate the three broad themes of the volume: EU legitimacy, European identity, and the relation of EU legitimacy and European identity under the condition of cultural diversity between European nations.

The high degree of coherence of the contributions to this volume owes much to the time the team spent together and the *genius loci* of the meeting places. This is particularly true for the workshops that took place at Sciences Po Paris, Dijon campus. Lukas Macek, directeur de 1er cycle est-européen de Sciences Po à Dijon 'Europe Centrale et Orientale,' and his staff proved to be generous hosts. Much has been said about the social functions of comparative research. Team 12 will certainly not forget the excellent cuisine and the wonderful wines of Burgundy, and the Maison Millière at rue de la Chouette, in particular. Thanks also go to Maria Karasinska-Fendler, leader of Work package V, and the European Institute of the Foundation for European Studies in Lodz. The two team meetings held in Lodz on the coat-tails of the Work package V conferences will be remembered for the proverbial Polish hospitality. Last but not least, we want to gratefully acknowledge the hospitality offered by the Social Science Research Centre Berlin.

EU-Consent provided an ideal support structure for the project. Special thanks go to Gaby Umbach and Funda Tekin of the Network's Cologne headquarters and to Vincent Morandi and Linda Amrani, responsables administratifs at Sciences Po Paris' Centre d'Études Européennes. Without their help we would not have managed to live up to the European Commission's reporting standards.

For professional assistance in the editorial work we appreciate the services of Nora Onar; Gudrun Mouna and Helene Rädler prepared the manuscript with competence and care.

Wolfgang Wessels and many other colleagues of the Network of Excellence have been generous with their advice and counsel. We want to say thank you to all of them.

Two babies were born and four dissertations finished during the 48 months our team worked together. We add this volume as the last of this project's happy events.

January 2011

PART I

Theoretical framework

1. Cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU: A review of the debate

Olivier Ruchet

> There is nothing more difficult to execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to administer, than to introduce a new system of things: for he who introduces it has all those who profit from the old system as his enemies and he has only lukewarm allies in all those who might profit from the new system.
> (Machiavelli, *The Prince*, VI, 94)

The question of the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) has largely been triggered by what Philippe C. Schmitter once described as 'the growing dissociation between territorial constituencies and functional competences'[1] that characterizes in part the project of European integration. The question has yielded a vast literature over the years, particularly since the publication of the Tindemans report in 1975.[2] In this report, for the very first time, the distance between the citizens and the institutions of the European Communities was acknowledged and presented as a source of tension for European integration.[3] Since then, the literature, academic and otherwise, has developed in impressive proportions. This chapter presents the different moments and debates of this literature, from portraying the European Union as a 'superstate' beset by a strong and multifaceted democratic deficit, to revisionist accounts of the legitimacy question brushing aside such concerns. The chapter argues that these debates, centred in large part on institutional disputes about the legitimacy of an intergovernmental organization, too often overlook the critical dimension of cultural diversity and its political consequences for the governance of an international body – an issue that has become all the more significant after the recent waves of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.

The first part of the chapter offers a brief historical overview of the debates on the democratic legitimacy of the European Economic Community/European Union (EEC/EU), from the early exchanges to the latest instalment in the debate, which focuses on the notion of politicization of European decision and policy making. Then, a diachronic presentation of the debates, as well their main protagonists and the most contentious exchanges and arguments, are presented in the

second part. The chapter reviews the numerous successive attempts to model and characterize the European polity, from a federal or quasi-federal system to a so-called 'regulatory polity', and presents the most recent exchanges on the contentious desirability to effect a politicization of decision-making procedures in the EU. In a third part, the chapter suggests that the cultural diversity that exists among European citizens is often insufficiently considered in the models presented just above, including in the current exchange on politicization. For one thing, these models mostly remain at the level of normative, institutional theory, and often tend to overlook the social-psychological side of legitimacy. They thus fail to adequately take into account the notion of popular support for the European Union in discussions around the question of identity.

What is more, they often overlook the several dimensions of diversity among European citizens and publics, which might prove to constitute an additional challenge for the proper democratic functioning of the European Union. As the chapter underscores, traces of this debate have emerged among political theorists over the past few years, with promising normative discussions on the EU, and can also be found in research on the values and attitudes of European citizens. On this basis, the chapter concludes that empirical research along these lines should open up new perspectives on European identity and legitimacy, grounding this identity and legitimacy in the rich context of citizen diversity.

1.1 THE SEVERAL DIMENSIONS OF LEGITIMACY

Most studies of legitimacy ascribe at least two dimensions to the notion: a normative, institutional dimension, and a sociological perspective, presented as one fundamental aspect of the concept. Hence, in David Robertson's *Routledge Dictionary of Politics*, legitimacy is defined both as a normative and as an empirical concept in political science. Robertson's definition can be summarized as follows: (1) Normatively, to ask whether a political system is legitimate or not is to ask whether the state, or the government, is entitled to be obeyed; (2) Empirically, legitimacy serves to measure how a regime comes to be seen by a majority of its citizens as entitled to require their obedience.[4]

Likewise, in his works on the democratic deficit, Joseph Weiler draws a distinction between the two components of legitimacy – one formal and the other one social – which parallels Robertson's definition. For Weiler, formal legitimacy corresponds to legality, that is to say, 'that democratic institutions and processes created the law on which the European Union is based'.[5] Social legitimacy, on the other hand, does not take procedures into account, 'but implies a broad social acceptance of the system'.[6] Similarly, Bellamy and Castiglione argue that legitimacy 'possesses an internal and an external dimension, the one linked to the values of the political actors, not least to the

European peoples, the other to the principles we employ to evaluate a political system and assess its effects for outsiders as well as insiders' (Bellamy and Castiglione 2003, p. 8; see also p. 10). While the internal dimension of legitimacy reflects the subjective perceptions of citizens, the external dimension is said to be evaluated against more objective criteria. Fuchs (Chapter 2 of this volume) makes a similar differentiation. Fuchs differentiates between objective and subjective legitimacy and furthermore integrates subjective legitimacy in a somewhat broader concept of political support. In this concept, legitimacy is only one type of support besides others. This analytical categorization is very fruitful and demonstrates the appeal of the distinction to think about the nexus of European identity and legitimacy.

Therefore, it would probably appear insufficient to carry out the analysis of the democratic legitimacy of a given regime or political community, including the European Union, by focusing only on the external or objective aspect of legitimacy. The level of acceptance of European institutions and decisions by citizens is indeed critical to the reality of their democratic integrity, regardless of whether, one can add, their perceptions are correctly informed. As Bellamy and Castiglione note: 'Rightly or wrongly, most of the electorates of all member states believe significant powers have been ceded to EU institutions and either wish them returned to domestic control or desire a strengthening of European control' (ibid., p. 17). To view the possibility of a problem of democratic legitimacy as only linked to the way institutions are designed and function in relation to one another significantly diminishes one's ability to understand what is at stake in the debate over the democratic deficit, and why that debate emerged in the first place. This fact makes it all the more important to design research that will endeavour to measure the values and attitudes of European citizens towards the European Union and its different actors and institutions, so as to be better able to assess their respective levels of support and legitimacy.

1.2 A SHORT HISTORY OF THE DEBATE ON THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT/LEGITIMACY DEFICIT

Historians of the EU have shown that its image among Europeans has changed over the years. According to Paul Magnette, the sources of the legitimacy of the European project have historically been teleological and indirect.[7] Indirect, first, because legitimacy was based on the relationship between national governments and their citizens, not between the institutions of the European Community (EC) and the citizens, for whom European integration has been experienced almost as a form of foreign policy. The logic was thus both indirect and intergovernmental, which is exemplified by the way European citizenship was conceptualized and created in the Maastricht treaty.[8]

European Community legitimacy also has its roots in a teleological vision insofar as European integration was conceived of as the best way to guarantee peace and prosperity in Europe. This legitimacy was largely based on the belief that the outputs would be sufficient to vindicate the usefulness of the EC and therefore its existence, and the support expected from EU citizens was proportional to the gains they were supposed to receive from integration. As opposed to a 'government by the people', the EC was rather conceived of as a 'government for the people' (see Scharpf 1999). Popular participation and decision were replaced by expertise, efficacy and technocratic decision (see Gillespie and Laffan 2006, p. 138). A first crisis of legitimacy was, therefore, bound to happen when the outputs proved insufficient to compensate for the weakness of the (popular) inputs, or, in other words, when the economic advantages of the EC would no longer suffice to offset the absence of popular involvement in the decisions made.

The turning point occurred in the 1970s, when, for a combination of reasons, the foundations of the teleological legitimacy of EC institutions started to shake: the economic crisis led to the realization that the common market was not in itself sufficient to trigger economic growth. Both the normalization of East-West relations – the perception that a war was becoming less probable in Western Europe – as well as the time that had elapsed since the Second World War, made the necessity of European integration to guarantee peace and the security of member states less obvious. In addition, the debate shaped over the context of negotiations for enlargement to the UK, Ireland and Denmark: these negotiations were largely conducted behind closed doors, by representatives of the executives, which elicited a certain sense of imbalance (see Olivi and Giaccone 2007, chapter 5). The very first scholarly articles on the theme of democracy in the EU were written then, notably a piece by Phillip Allott published in the *Common Market Law Review* (Allott 1974). The expression 'democratic deficit' was coined by David Marquand in 1979, in a book entitled *Parliament for Europe* (Marquand 1979). In this book, Marquand, a pro-Europe Labour Member of Parliament (MP) who was an advisor to his mentor Roy Jenkins at the European Commission in 1977/78, called for a revamping of European institutions by way of which a parliamentary Europe would replace the 'technocratic Europe' in order to proceed towards a European Union.

European leaders at the time were not oblivious to these developments, and they quickly responded. Leo Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium, issued his famous report in December 1975. Tindemans called for a new mode of conviction, that would still be based on the outputs, but would be tied to more immediate, more concrete, and more visible elements: 'In democratic countries the will of governments alone is not sufficient for such an undertaking [the *rapprochement* between the peoples of Europe]. The need for it, its advantages and its gradual achievement must be perceived by everyone so that

effort and sacrifices are freely accepted. Europe must be close to its citizens'.[9] Tindemans' idea was to insert Europe in the daily lives of citizens by allowing European institutions to make decisions in areas beyond those mentioned in the treaties, and by granting the European Parliament some right of initiative. Part of the effort imagined by Tindemans consisted in addressing the need for the EEC to talk to the citizens, and not only to the workers and consumers of Europe, in order to foster a sense of a European identity.[10] Parallel to this effort occurred the institutionalization of the European Council, aimed at vindicating the visibility of the institutions, as well as the decision to have the European Parliament directly elected by universal suffrage. Yves Mény notes that it is this decision that actually triggered the first large wave of claims about the democratic deficit: the European Parliament started to resemble a national chamber, and comparisons could be made, in which European institutional and power sharing mechanisms did not live up to the standards set by their national counterparts (Mény 2003, p. 400).

European citizens, however, were generally unconcerned with that early academic debate, and the aforementioned series of endeavours undertaken in the mid-1970s were actually met with some early successes, as the general level of support for EEC institutions grew from 50 per cent to 70 per cent between the 1970s and the late 1980s, in spite of the economic crisis. At that point, however, the trend reversed its course, and support fell to 47 per cent by 1996 (Magnette 2000, pp. 184–85). The moment of the Maastricht treaty, indeed, marked a further erosion of material or output legitimacy, and the visible attempts to promote legitimacy only made its absence more obvious (see Follesdal 2006, pp. 152–53). While the EU clearly became increasingly more present, it was deemed incapable of solving the real problems identified in public opinion polls: unemployment, crime and trafficking. As Andrew Moravcsik points out, those areas often fall beyond the actual remit of EU institutions (Moravcsik, 2001a, p. 119, among others; see below) – but this is not what matters here: what does matter, again, is the perception among European citizens that the EU is or has become a heavy and unresponsive technocracy that is not properly addressing their most pressing needs. It is true that the democratic deficit measured in opinion polls does not only affect the EU: it occurs in a context in which state action in general is perceived as lacking solutions. Yet this element hardly constitutes an argument in favour of the democratic legitimacy of the EU. It only relativizes its originality.

The recent attempts engaged both in the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice and by the Prodi and (to a lesser extent perhaps) Barroso commissions to soothe the democratic deficit by insisting on the social chapter, on transparency, on discourses on rights with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc., have certainly not borne fruit, yet, and interest in EU affairs has not caught on among EU citizens – the low voter turnout at the European elections of 13

June 2004, where participation fell to 45.5 per cent for the EU as a whole[11], and again in June 2009, with a turnout rate across the EU of 43.24 per cent – and failed referenda in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 as well as in Ireland in June 2008 – can serve as paradigmatic examples of the phenomenon. As it appears today, the level of support for the EU has stabilized to a rather modest majority of citizens, with 53 per cent of polled citizens declaring that they consider their country's membership of the EU a good thing, and 57 per cent declaring they thought their country had on balance benefited from membership, according to the latest available Eurobarometer results.[12]

1.3 THE ORIGINAL NO DEMOCRACY THESIS, AND A FIRST WAVE OF RESPONSES

The original academic formulations of the thesis according to which the EU lacked elements of democratic legitimacy touched upon both institutional and social-psychological perspectives: on the one hand, the institutions of the EU would create an imbalance in the decision-making procedures and would present limited and suspect accountability credentials: in this view, the increase of powers and prerogatives of the EEC and then EU has not been matched by an increase in the democratic accountability of decision makers nor by an increase of the input of the European publics – through their representatives – in the decision-making process. This position is well encapsulated by a formulation of Andrew Geddes, in a study of European migration policies: 'By doing so, a form of dissociational democracy is created within which both access to, and use of, channels of political participation are severely restricted' (Geddes 1995, p. 214).

On the other hand, the absence of a European 'demos' or 'people' would almost logically sap the very foundations and possibility of democracy at the EU level. Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix offer a useful summary of this 'standard version' of the Democratic Deficit posture, which they detail in five points:[13] First, integration is said to have led to an increase in executive power and to a concomitant decrease in national parliament control. In the EU, executive actors tend to dominate the European level, and at the same time they are beyond the control of national parliaments, and can make decisions in Brussels mostly beyond their power of scrutiny.[14] Therefore, the effect of European integration is seen as a net decrease of the position of legislative actors against executives. This phenomenon is sometimes described as the 'de-parliamentarization' of national political systems (see Chryssochoou 1998, p. 362).

Second, this phenomenon described at the national level also applies at the European level, with the European Parliament still too weak, in the balance of power against the Council of Ministers, despite many reforms, including the introduction and subsequent extension of co-decision in different areas

of decision making. Indeed, a significant portion of EU decisions, in budget matters as well as in policy areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy, are still being made under the consultation procedure.[15] In addition, while the European Parliament may veto the governments' choice for the President of the Commission, the governments continue to set the agenda, and the Parliament may only react to their decisions. Third, despite the substantial growth in the prerogatives of European Parliament, European elections remain very insufficiently 'European': they are fought at the national level, on the basis of national lists and (in the vast majority of cases) national political parties, and they are experienced by voters and often presented in the media as 'second order national contest', whereby the popularity of the government in place at the national level is being sanctioned, rather than a given project of government for the EU informed by a particular ideological orientation. This would tend to explain the high level of protest vote and the fragmentation of results at European elections. In addition, the lack of a direct link between the results of European elections and the policy direction taken by the EU gives one of the keys to understanding the decreasing levels of participation at European elections since their inception in 1979.

Fourth, again despite this election of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the reforms that have bolstered the powers of this institution, the EU remains somewhat remote and too far from voters: its (technocratic) decision-making mechanisms, the framing of its agenda, and the ways in which its different actors are involved remains too different from the domestic elements and the (political) modes of decision making which the voters are used to apprehending at the national level. As a consequence, European citizens do not understand the EU, they cannot identify with it, which causes profound problems of democratic legitimacy, compounded by the problems of linguistic and cultural diversity which make political communication only harder. This position has led to numerous studies making different claims about bringing the EU closer to the people, to ensure that the integration process is no longer a purely elite-driven endeavour, but addresses and incorporates the views of ordinary Europeans. This has inspired campaigns favouring institutional openness and transparency in European institutions, to an insistence on subsidiarity, as well as to the strengthening of regional representation in Brussels.

Alongside this argument on technocratic decision making, there is another claim that objects to the granting of decision-making prerogative to non-majoritarian, unelected bodies: 'In the literature and in the discourse on European integration, "democratic deficit" is also used as a label to denote a set of problems that arise whenever important policymaking powers are delegated to politically independent bodies, such as independent central banks and regulatory authorities', notes Giandomenico Majone.[16] Drawing from Robert Dahl's notion (referring to Plato) of 'guardianship', Philippe C. Schmitter (2000, p. 87) describes

the same realities by which 'all existing democracies depend on the presence in their midst of nondemocratic institutions that deal with specific issues in confidential and authoritative ways that remove them from close scrutiny by representatives or the public as a whole'. Calling these developments 'an embarrassing side issue', Schmitter goes on to recommend that the notion of the democratic control of these 'independent regulatory agencies' be given some serious attention before their structure and prerogative are congealed beyond acceptable oversight.

Finally, despite the aforementioned reforms, and as a result of the different institutional impediments mentioned above, the original 'no democracy' thesis suggests that the decisions made at the European level do not correspond to the voters' actual preferences: there is, it is claimed, a 'policy drift' that makes it so that outcomes favour the positions and preferences of neo-liberal, corporate actors – neo-liberal regulatory framework for the single market, monetarist framework for the European Monetary Union (EMU), etc. – opposed by voters at the national level, and which they would also oppose at the European level if they were offered a chance to do so. This so-called 'social democratic' critique has a second versant in which the role of private actors and interest groups in EU decision making is denounced as too dominant in the decision-making process, and also skewed in favour of business interests and multinational firms which have greater incentives to organize at the European level, at the cost of the more diffuse interests of other groups and actors like consumers or trade unions.

To this list we can then add a sixth point related to the socio-psychological perspective on the deficit: the so-called 'no demos thesis'. Because there is no common demos in the EU, there is no civic 'we-ness', no sense of common identity among Europeans, no unity in the body of citizens making the political community, without which responsible or accountable representative government is not deemed to be possible (see Chryssochoou 2008, p. 363). This is problematic, as this civic we-ness is necessary for the political system to function properly, for government and majority rule to be effective and accepted, for consent to be granted, and political obligation to be accepted by the citizens. The creation of European citizenship at Maastricht was meant to address this problem, but, according to critics, its derived character and its limited reach have placed clear limits to its potential for change. At the moment, many surveys and studies assume a certain lack of European civic identity.[17] This begs a series of interesting questions. What would be needed for European demos formation? To transform the EU from 'democracies' to 'democracy', the positive feelings of the members towards one another and towards the EU need to be strong, and there should be a common desire to 'shape democratically the future of a plurality of interrelated people' (Chryssochoou 2008, p. 364), with the development of democratic self-consciousness of citizens, the adherence to shared democratic values, a high shared public awareness of the

transnational polity. Different authors insist on different solutions and criteria. Here, the question of European diversity, and the need to adapt the institutions to this strong pluralism, is also a central question, even though the implications of this diversity are rarely pursued or analysed for their own sake, as I shall point out below.

1.4 THE REVISIONIST THESES: MAJONE, MORAVCSIK

In 'The Myth of Europe's "Democratic Deficit"', Andrew Moravcsik presents another version of the original no democracy thesis, broken down into six propositions that he then endeavours to debunk (see Moravcsik 2008). He speaks of a series of 'myths', ascribing the following traits to the EU:

1. The EU as encroaching superstate: the EU is a powerful superstate encroaching on the power of nation states to address the concerns of their citizens.
2. The EU as runaway technocracy: the EU is an arbitrary, runaway technocracy operated by officials subject to inadequate procedural controls, such as transparency, checks and balances, and national oversight.
3. The EU as electorally unaccountable: EU decisions are made by unelected officials not subject to meaningful democratic accountability.
4. Referendum defeats signal public dissatisfaction: negative referendum results in places like France, the Netherlands and Ireland expressed the fundamental dislike or mistrust of European citizens for the EU and its policies.
5. Low participation causes public distrust and dissatisfaction: European institutions are disliked because they do not encourage mass public participation. More public participation would enhance the EU's popularity and public trust.
6. EU institutions stifle legitimate political participation: voters fail to participate actively and intelligently in European politics because existing EU institutions disillusion or disempower them. Institutional opportunities should be created to increase participation.

Against this perception of a democratic deficit in the EU that comes in many guises, several authors have responded with arguments that question the validity of these analyses, both in terms of the analytical framework mobilized to conduct the analysis, and in terms of the indicators used and normative expectations projected on the EU – against the idea that, as a future state, 'federal', 'super' or otherwise, the EU needs to satisfy a number of democratic requirements, they object that the EU will remain an entity that deals with a limited

range of domains and policy areas, and that as such it need not justify to the same credentials as a regular state would. This argument is both analytical and normative (it is understood that the EU 'should' not develop beyond this alleged 'constitutional settlement' in the future), and pretends to be founded on a careful empirical analysis of the remit and functioning of European institutions.

First among these authors, Giandomenico Majone claims in a seminal study entitled *Regulating Europe* (Majone 1996; see also Majone 1998) that the EU is first and foremost an economic and regulatory community, 'which produces Pareto-improving policies for its citizens' (see Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007, p. 4). In order to avoid threatening the added value and benefits brought about by these policies, independent regulatory agents rather than elected parliaments or politicians must be entrusted with wide levels of independent decision-making powers – this is the idea of the 'regulatory state' defended by Majone. The policies undertaken at the EU level, or most of them (here comes a first crack, as well as a first sense that the limited model evaluated here might have been superseded with new dimensions in integration), are aimed to address and redress possible 'market failures', which could occur in the domains of competition policy, removal of trade barriers, or monetary policy. In order to be effective, these decisions *must* be taken in a 'non-democratic' fashion, removed from the theatre of majoritarian politics played out in parliament (ibid.). Were these decisions to fall within the remit of parliaments, an undue politicization of the issues would most probably ensue, likely undermining their Pareto-efficient effects, which would, in turn, have negative repercussions on the EU output and legitimacy would suffer. We go back to this notion of politicization below. The definition of the EU as a regulatory polity, then, and the subsuming of its activities under the heading of regulation, is meant to rebuke several possible lines of attack of the no-democracy thesis, be they based on participation, accountability or access. In this line of argument, there is no democratic deficit nor any problem of legitimacy in the EU, because there is no need for democracy or democratic legitimacy in the first place. Andrew Moravcsik develops a similar, but somewhat more nuanced and complex, argument.

In a series of articles published between 2001 and 2008, Moravcsik claims that the most fundamental error made by those who describe the EU as authoritarian, despotic, or – at least – as illegitimate, is one of perception – hence the idea of the myths he endeavours to debunk: they view the EU as a superstate, or at least as a superstate in the making, while all it really is, is a multi-level, regulatory polity.[18] That is to say: 'The EU bureaucracy is in fact tiny, leaderless, tightly constrained by national governments. … The EU lacks nearly every characteristic that grants a modern European state … its authority.'[19] Indeed, Moravcsik convincingly states that the EU has very little power to 'tax, spend, or coerce', and has no police forces and only an embryonic army (Moravcsik

2001a, p. 119; see also ibid. 2001b, pp. 165–70). Supranational officials can achieve very little on their own, and they are the objects of intense scrutiny. In addition, Moravcsik adds, not only is the EU weak, but the little powers it has are properly subjected to appropriate checks and balances. Scrutiny, transparency in decision making[20], the necessity to obtain large majorities (over 70 per cent of the weighted votes for decisions taken under qualified majority voting in the Council, a larger majority than is needed to amend the US Constitution, notes Moravcsik), and government by consensus all combine to make the EU 'less corrupt and more transparent than any national government in Europe' (Moravcsik 2001a, p. 120) and should hence alleviate the fears of despotism in Brussels. Furthermore, Moravcsik explains – controversially perhaps, once again – that the legal scope of the EU is actually limited to the project of creating a single market for goods, services and capital in Europe: 'For 50 years European integration has been, above all else, a functional adaptation to economic interdependence' (ibid. 2001b, p. 178). It is therefore not destined to encompass the same kinds of comprehensive constitutional mandates as those possessed by the nation states: this notion constitutes the essence of what Moravcsik labels the 'constitutional settlement' (ibid., p. 163).

According to Moravcsik, the EU is thus not a state, but merely a 'limited constitutional polity'. Following this logic: 'Non-majoritarian decision making is not only more efficient, but it may better represent the median voter than does a more participatory system' (Moravcsik 2000, p. 7). Beyond a certain normative reading of the trajectory of European integration, this claim corresponds to a particular reading of constitutionalism in which limitations on direct accountability can be justified normatively as providing more satisfactory outcomes, and in which, as long as the different areas of government are all ultimately under the control of voters, there should be no expectation that 'all such functions be imminently under such control' (ibid.). Eventually, according to the logic of Moravcsik's argument: 'If we adopt *reasonable* criteria for judging democratic governance, then the widespread criticism of the EU as democratically illegitimate is unsupported by the existing empirical evidence' (ibid. 2003a, p. 79; emphasis added).

Moravcsik claims that the EU's reach *will* remain within the boundaries of what he calls a 'constitutional compromise' in the future – the 'logical endpoint of European integration' (ibid. 2001b, p. 163) – and will not infringe on the prerogatives of national governments: 'Perhaps the major functional tasks that could optimally be carried out at a regional level – liberalization of movements in goods, services, and factors of production, … and economic regulation closely connected with trans-border externalities … – are already launched' (ibid.). Again, this analysis amounts to a static vision of integration, which corresponds to Moravcsik's methodological orientation and espousal of liberal intergovernmentalism. This posture leads Moravcsik to discount

all purchase that theses related to the lack of access or participation in EU decision making might represent: 'We cannot draw negative conclusions about the legitimacy of the European Union from casual observation of the non-participatory nature of its institutions' (ibid. 2003a, p. 95). Surprising at first, this assertion can seem logical: within the remit of the EU, for Moravcsik, issues either (a) lack salience, and then do not draw a strong level of interest from voters in the first place or (b) are better wielded by semi-autonomous authorities. This corresponds, Moravcsik asserts, to a modern trend towards delegated policy-making and non-majoritarian institutions, and should not raise concerns about a lack of democratic legitimacy in the EU, as 'most of this decline in the influence of parliaments is generally believed to have little or nothing to do with European integration, but instead with the increasing technical, political, and logistical complexity of modern governance' (ibid. 2001b, p. 183). Eventually, Moravcsik thus falls back upon a perspective close to Majone's: 'Limitations on majoritarian decision-making may be normatively justifiable, broadly speaking, if they increase the efficiency and technical competence of decision-making; guarantee political, cultural or socioeconomic equality – rights – against majority decisions; or offset imperfections in representative institutions' (ibid.). In sum, the EU does not do much, its institutions and modes of decision making are heavily controlled and need to pass elevated thresholds. What is more, national governments are heavily present in the decision-making process, making a case for indirect legitimacy.

1.5 RECENT REJOINDERS: THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS CONTINUES, OR THE POLITICAL DEFICIT THESES

Despite Moravcsik's claims, the way the powers of the EU are circumscribed is not entirely clear-cut: if it is true that the EU does very little directly in the domains of health care, redistribution or education, these policies at the national level are nevertheless heavily affected by the formation of the European market. Social dumping crises, etc., and, more directly, European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings on the free movement of people, have contributed to entrench – and perhaps to justify – the impression on the part of some citizens that the political choices clearly formulated at the national level were being overruled by European orientations that the mass of the citizens do not understand:[21] they do not grasp where these decisions came from, nor how they could change them.[22] Therefore, the idea that the problem of the democratic legitimacy of the EU simply derives from a misreading of what the EU does seems insufficient. Along with Majone and Moravcsik, some authors have proposed new readings on the EU, with refined takes on democratic governance, grounded in the more complex forms of governance, multi-level, etc., found in contemporary political communities, that go beyond traditional parliamentarism

and authorize a posteriori procedural requirements. Nevertheless, again, these methods have done fairly little to assuage the perception of a democratic deficit: these new modes of governance are merely elite-driven, and cannot make up for the lack of participation and the lack of cognitive resources on the part of the citizens, which lead to apathy.

According to Simon Hix, as we saw earlier, this disconnect is the primary source of concern, and main justification of the idea of a democratic deficit: the alleged gap between the policies the citizens want and the ones they actually get. Hence, the analyses proposed by Moravcsik and Majone mostly miss the mark: it is not a procedural requirement that would be missing, but rather a substantive one: 'there is no electoral contest for political leadership at the European level or over the direction of the EU policy agenda', notes Hix.[23] As a result of the lack of connection between the choices expressed by the voters in national and European elections, and the policy outcomes at the EU level, 'the EU is a democratic system in a procedural sense, not in a substantive sense' (ibid.). As a result, claims Hix, while the EU, contrary to what some of its most ardent critics assert, 'has all the procedural elements of democracy, in terms of representative institutions, free and fair elections, and checks-and-balances on the exercise of power', it is still, because of the absence of the alleged substantial content of democracy, embodied in the political struggle over control of the agenda, 'a form of enlightened despotism' (Hix 2008, p. 85).

Building up from this diagnostic, Hix calls forth a certain politicization of the process of decision making in the EU. This claim, and the several sharp responses it has received, is at the origin of the newest episode in the debate on the democratic legitimacy of the EU. Hix proposes to introduce politics into the three main institutional bodies of the EU, so that, 'by aligning the political positions of the three institutions, increased level of visibility, better understanding on the part of the citizens, and eventually more support and identification' might follow (ibid., pp. 108–9). The fear of politicization, expressed by Moravcsik and Majone, is deemed overblown by Hix, who notes that existing checks and balances should be sufficient to allow more political struggle while not jeopardizing the project of integration itself. This process of politicization is supposed to be articulated around four main domains. First, a 'return to political parties at the centre of democratic life' (ibid., p. 112). In this framework, decision making would insist on the left-right political battles, which the citizens understand and with which they can identify. Political contestation is presented as both inevitable and highly desirable, because it allows to 'overcome institutional gridlock, … produce a mandate for reform'. It is in the clash of ideas that political innovation and progress emerge, argues Hix, pursuing the legacy of John Stuart Mill. What is more, when there is competition, there is a clear winner, who then has a mandate to make decisions, while the losers of the day can accept

the decisions because they were associated in the process, and might have a chance of winning the next election. As such, an influx of left-right politics at the EU level that would bolster leadership might also, according to Hix, be beneficial as it might increase the legitimacy of the EU by tackling the very problem of substance. In order to do so, the recent reforms of the EU that have increased the prerogatives of the European Parliament (EP), went in the right direction, but more would now be needed.

Hix delineates the contours of possible reform that could 'encourage political competition and alliances emerging inside each of the main institutions: a competitive party-system in the EP, left-right voting patterns in the Council (clearly visible as far as the legislative side of the Council is concerned), and a more party-political and partisan commission, in line with the existing EP majority' (ibid., p. 155). Interestingly, Hix claims that such politicization would not require a massive overhaul of the institutions of the EU, nor would a new constitutional text or major reform treaty be needed. Quite the contrary, this process could rekindle with the type of integration that was the trademark of the reforms pursued by the 'founding father of the EU': a policy of 'little steps' that would make possible incremental reform, notably in order to 'allow the majority of the EP to set the internal agenda of the EP', 'to open up the legislative process inside the council' 'and to have a more open contest for the commission president' (ibid. 2006, p. 2).

Hix's proposal was meant to be provocative, and in this respect it has been successful. It has received a number of responses, starting with a scathing critique addressed by Stefano Bartolini who denounced the high risk of politicization which, in a rather unsettled political community such as the EU, where Eurosceptic forces can at any moment gather strength and mobilize against the very regime of the EU, partisan arguments could well extend to constitutional issues, and thereby go beyond the healthy exchange of political ideas imagined by Hix. According to Bartolini, politicization 'would create tensions that cannot be managed' (Bartolini 2006, p. 30, see also p. 44). Bartolini cautions that the triple form of partisan alignment within the EP, the Council, and the Commission heralded by Hix would 'generate permanent divided government', given the different timing and composition of these institutional bodies. Therefore, 'partisan cooperation problems would add to inter-institutional coordination problems, rather than solve them'. These tensions would only be made more threatening if the large pockets of anti-European feelings and distrust among Europeans were not solved before the introduction of the left-right cleavage. In addition, explains Bartolini, 'politicization may generate excessive hopes which will be frustrated later, and widen the gap between normative expectations and reality' (ibid., p. 30). Hence, Bartolini questions Hix's approach, his method and his tools to tackle the problem of democratic legitimacy in the EU.

Paul Magnette and Yannis Papadopoulos have also published a response to Hix, which takes a different tack. They claim that Hix is mistaken in his diagnostic: it is, they write, 'not clear that left-right dimension has already started to appear and that the EU is moving towards polarization. And then even if it were the case, the very nature of the EU implies that cooperation and compromises are indispensable' (Magnette and Papadopoulos 2008, p. 21). Therefore, the application of the political principle of winners and losers is ill adapted to fit the institutions, purposes and ethos of the EU, and it would be difficult to force such a fit with the small steps promoted by Hix. What is more, Magnette and Papadopoulos point to the fact that Hix's linking of politicization with the alleviation of Euroscepticism is oversimplistic, notably as 'Euroscepticism also has a social base (the losers of modernization), not linked to the accountability deficit of the EU' (ibid., p. 22).

1.6 THE IDENTITY VARIABLE AND THE QUESTION OF BOUNDARIES: ADDING ONE FACET TO THE DEBATE

While the provocative call formulated by Simon Hix to infuse political struggle into the working of EU institutions seems destined to undergo further refinement, what is certain is that the notion of participation, and by extension the subjective element of legitimacy, which the revisionist accounts of the democratic deficit essentially attempt to sweep under the carpet, have emerged as possibly the most daunting challenge to the EU in the years to come. Andrew Moravcsik, in his latest article on the topic, actually mentions citizen perceptions and attitudes towards the EU (see Moravcsik 2008, pp. 335–7). Nevertheless, it seems that the traditional studies on the democratic legitimacy of the EU have quite often neglected the dimension of participation and, when this dimension has indeed been included, then the diversity of the EU as a possible challenge for participation and for the construction of a political community recognized by its members has only received very little interest. The question, however, is actually quite urgent, and can be approached in several manners. First, as the following chapters of this volume make vividly clear, a number of studies set out to produce measures of the attitudes of the citizens of Europe, partly in order to show that there were indeed some convergences and a European identity, premise to a possible future European demos (see also Fuchs and Klingemann 2002). The results of these studies, and the patterns of convergence that they often underscore, are positive signs in this direction. These efforts go hand in hand with some studies in political theory that have attempted to reconcile the linguistic and cultural diversity among the peoples of Europe with the possibility for democratic politics.

Most famously, Jürgen Habermas and his followers have defended the view that this diversity ought to be overcome thanks to the adhesion to a form of constitutional patriotism on the part of the citizens (for a general presentation, see Habermas 2001). Based on the assumed common political culture shared by most Europeans, this constitutional patriotism would function as a sort of 'overlapping consensus' leading to shared political attachments, and by way of doing so would break the historical link between republicanism and nationalism, and shift the loyalty of citizens away from prepolitical entities such as the nation, the family or the ethnos, and towards the fundamental principles enshrined in the basic law (see Baumeister 2007, p. 485). This process of decoupling allows for the creation of bonds of solidarity among diverse populations, and is deemed necessary in the context of European integration. As Habermas explains: while 'for historic reasons, in many countries the majority culture is fused with the general culture that claims to be recognized by *all* citizens, … this fusion must be dissolved if it is to interact on equal terms within the *same* political community' (Habermas 1998, p. 408, quoted in Baumeister 2007, p. 485; see also Habermas 2001). Another desired effect of the form of deliberative agreements that lead to the *Verfassungspatriotismus* called forth by Habermas is that of legitimation through procedures. The consensus sought is supposed to be arrived at through a bargaining process where each party involved may accept the common decision for reasons of his or her own. This way, as Andrea Baumeister suggests, Habermas 'closes the gap between formal, procedural legitimacy and substantive, rational acceptability by insisting that "legitimate procedures *themselves* depend on rational discourse and reasoned agreement"' (Baumeister 2007, p. 488). It remains to be seen, however, to what extent Habermas's constitutional patriotism may successfully tackle the challenge of the cultural diversity present in the EU. The model relies on a sharp distinction between political integration, on the one hand, and cultural integration. The role of the multinational state, then, consists in integrating and socializing all the citizens into the shared political culture, without, however, imposing one given particular privileged culture or cultural form of life. The possibility of this neat disjuncture between politics and culture, however, might seem overenthusiastic. In a different context, Patchen Markell has noted that the political culture of a community was itself constituted of many prepolitical elements such as 'the symbols, songs, events, dates and people who capture our political imagination; the patterns and structures of civil societies; the vocabularies of political analysis and polemic; the "natural fantasies" that "circulate through personal/collective consciousness" – all these and more constitute a cultural inheritance that the *demos* did not choose' (Markell, 2001, p. 52, quoted in Baumeister 2007, p. 490). Therefore, even the most civic-based political cultures are also based on culturally marked symbols and stories, and are far from being simply and uniquely founded on

rational principles. As a result, embedded in the political culture of any nation are ways and habits that inevitably discriminate against new members and hinder their claims for recognition and their ability to make their voices heard.[24] At the very least, then, there exists a tension at the core of the constitutional patriotism defended by Habermas, which he insufficiently acknowledges, and which makes its implementation in a political community as diverse as the European Union somewhat perilous: 'Ultimately Habermas' optimism about the prospect of building a genuinely shared political culture underestimates the challenges that cultural diversity poses for the idea of a shared collective identity and political consensus' (Baumeister 2007, p. 494). Maybe the solution could be a political decision to engage in a substantive project of nation building in order to construct the bonds of solidarity that are missing at the European level – but such an endeavour would ride roughshod over the foundation of Habermas' model and his decoupling of political and cultural attachments.

In a recent series of articles, some of which were turned into a book (see Kraus 2006, 2008), Peter Kraus takes stock of the conundrums of cultural diversity for the legitimacy of the EU, and he offers a very promising, empirically grounded yet normatively rich analysis of the possible avenues to solve (perhaps simultaneously) both the problems of the biased recognition of certain minorities and of deficient legitimacy in the EU, which, he notes, are mutually reinforcing. Kraus' proposals are of special interest insofar as he situates them in the current intergovernmental dominance in EU decision making, and he is keenly attentive to the practical consequences of cultural, and in particular linguistic, diversity for the EU.[25] In a nuanced analysis, Kraus takes a direction directly opposed to Habermas' proposal to wage the transcending of diversity on an overarching constitutional patriotism that would sediment political bonds of solidarity: Kraus notes that the recent European 'constitutional moment' has failed, evacuating the hopes for 'grand' constitutional making as a solution to the challenges of diversity and legitimacy. Conversely, he advocates a form of 'second-order' constitutional politics, operating at micro-levels of integration and offering the citizens renewed avenues for collective self-determination. Attuned to diversity, this process explicitly follows the ideas proposed by Karl Deutsch, who argued that political integration should be praxis-driven, and founded upon processes of social mobilization. For Kraus, by multiplying the opportunities for European citizens to engage in 'materially understandable collective experiences of communicating and of acting together' (Kraus 2006, p. 221), this process will potentially remedy the shortcomings of the creation of a common European identity conducted from above. Thereby, 'a constitutional politics of this kind can provide a basis for a transition from the permissive consensus to a more reflexive collective involvement in the process of European integration' (ibid.). This work towards more substantive experiences of common citizenship are ultimately presented as a 'soft, that is, normatively sound' alternative to the

now obsolete 'grand master plan', product of protracted constitutional nego-
tiations which could not solve the predicament of finding the proper bases for
large-scale political communication within the EU (see Kraus 2006, p. 222 and
2008, pp. 195–8). By making more space for identities in the legitimacy debates,
this realization should open fruitful avenues in new and innovating ways to deal
with cultural diversity through a redefinition of the bases of a thicker common
European citizenship based on participation, which could address the criticisms
waged by authors such as Andrew Geddes cited earlier in this chapter. At least,
the terms of the debate on democratic legitimacy and European diversity seem
much more judiciously framed in this light.

1.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has defended two claims. First, while they are generally useful and
well-informed, studies on democratic legitimacy solely based on institutional
analyses have a limited reach, and need to be completed by empirical stud-
ies. Beyond the normative criteria of legitimacy always appears a problem of
measurement. In order to go beyond the argument between the proponents and
opponents of the democratic deficit thesis, it is thus useful to go back to the rough
ground, so to speak, and engage in empirical analysis.[26] This volume aims to
continue on this already existing path: it seems particularly fecund to use these
empirical studies, including citizen and value surveys, in order to reconcile stud-
ies of the social psychological side of attitudes towards the EU with normative
elements. Second, in the current literature on the EU's democratic legitimacy, the
particular diversity of the European demos/demoi is rarely fully considered, and
its implications only superficially analysed – which has led to a certain lack of
empirical research on the question.[27] Such research is emerging in other contexts
(see Kymlicka and Banting 2006), but there is as yet not enough transnational
analysis available. This seems to offer a rich ground for political theory, which,
taking stock of the complexities of European integration and of the diversity of
European publics, can certainly articulate new responses to the insightful ques-
tions and challenges articulated by Peter Kraus in his recent studies.

   Eventually, a dialogue on the re-composition of European diversity and citi-
zenship might bring the European union to a new and different form of associa-
tion, as called forth by James Tully: 'It would be an association resting on the
democratic practices of integration of its diverse members and thus always open
to new voices, responsive and creative experimentation, and renewal as a shared
way of life – a living democracy' (see Tully 2006, p. 2 and 2008). In this process,
normative political theory may enhance the mutual trust of the members of a
political community, as David Easton suggested: 'Insofar as political philoso-
phy does seek to persuade members of a system of the existence of a verifiable

objective common good, it does serve with respect to its possible political conse-
quences, as a response that may aid in the growth of diffuse support.'[28] Starting
from below, and with a constant regard to the opportunities offered to the citi-
zens and to their attitudes towards the project in construction, such theory might
contribute to bring the EU closer to its motto: 'Unity in diversity'.

NOTES

1. Schmitter (2000, p. 15).
2. European Union. Report by Mr Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76.
3. In a famous quote, Tindemans suggests that 'there is a distinct divergence of views between public opinion and those who fulfil a political role in their respective countries'. He then adds that, 'Public opinion is extremely sceptical on the will to establish a genuine European Union and solve the real problems of the day at European level.' See European Union, Report by Mr Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76, p. 5.
4. Robertson (2003, pp. 278–9) notes that 'in recent social science considerable attention has been paid to a so-called "crisis of legitimacy", by which is meant the increasing difficulty Western states have in justifying themselves, because their only appeal is to utilitarian socio-economic rewards which they are incapable of sustaining'.
5. Quoted in Nugent and Paterson (2003, p. 107).
6. Nugent and Paterson (2003, p. 107). Andrew Scott (2003, p. 100) notes that most authors who have written on the democratic deficit identify the issue as 'involving the two-sided coin which has "erosion of national sovereignty and identity" on one side, and "the problem of legitimating EU governance by *reference* to nation-state criteria (or offering new criteria) on the other side"' (italics in the original).
7. Magnette (2000, pp. 173–95). This section follows the argument provided by Magnette in this book. Paul Gillespie and Brigid Laffan note that in 1973, at the Copenhagen summit, a 'Declaration on European Identity' had been adopted by the heads of state and government. Agreed upon at the time of the first enlargement, this declaration was 'an official attempt to foster a European identity [which] reflected both the desire to strengthen political Europe and aspirations to promote Europe as a global force' (see Gillespie and Laffan 2006, p. 133). Gillespie and Laffan also note that 'the "Declaration on European identity" found little resonance among the wider public' – a thread typical of the beginnings of integration. Indeed, it is mostly forgotten today. Yet, it is useful in that it shows the inter-est in the dimension of identity from a relatively early moment in integration, preparing the ground for the development of a 'community of values' and for the moment when the 'politics of participation and belonging' would be added to the 'politics of interest'. See also Kraus (2008, pp. 43–5).
8. And by the way the national link was emphasized again in the treaty of Amsterdam.
9. European Union. Report by Mr Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium, to the European Council. *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76, p. 26.
10. See Part IV of the report, entitled 'A Citizen's Europe', in which Tindemans details reforms on the protection of fundamental rights and consumer rights, and devotes a section to the protection of the environment. The Tindemans report did not directly result in specific reforms, however, and after being discussed through 1976 and 1977, it was then shelved and mostly abandoned. If it was influential, it was merely in bringing these issues to the fore, and in setting the stage for reforms that would be passed in later years. See Olivi and Giaccone (2007, pp. 142–4).
11. And a paltry 26.6 per cent of eligible voters in the new member states that had joined the EU a month earlier.

12. See Eurobarometer 72, conducted in October/November 2009, p. 10. Accessed at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb72/eb72_en.htm. The results have been stable over the past two years on aggregate (see notably Eurobarometer 70 and 71).
13. The following passage summarizes the ideas expressed in Follesdal and Hix (2006, pp. 534–7).
14. This point should be somewhat relativized, however, with some countries following the Danish example in setting up strong parliamentary committees on European affairs.
15. This situation is bound to evolve with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009.
16. See Majone (2005, p. 37). As we shall see below, Majone goes on to argue that these developments are not unique to the EU, but on the contrary are common to contemporary western democracies: 'These problems, far from being unique to the EU, are increasingly important at all levels of government as the shift from the interventionist to the regulatory state gains momentum throughout Europe' (ibid.).
17. Another viewpoint is proposed by Fuchs et al. (2009). On the basis of an elaborate empirical analysis their study concludes that currently there exists a pronounced European identity, nonetheless it remains an open question how resistant it is.
18. The expression was originally coined by Giandomenico Majone. See for instance Majone (1998, pp. 5–28). On the other hand, a fairly extensive literature subsequently developed around the idea of an alleged threatening 'superstate in the making', most prominently announced by Larry Siedentop (2000) in a book called *Democracy in Europe*, which remains one of the most vibrant exposés of the 'no-democracy' thesis.
19. Moravcsik (2001a, p. 119). Moravcsik here directly addresses Siedentop's thesis in a book review.
20. This element itself is certainly hotly debated, and the numerous recent reforms aimed at bolstering the publicity of the debates in the Council of Ministers, at least as far as legislative matters are concerned, would indicate that transparency is yet to be deemed satisfactory by the actors of EU institutions themselves.
21. See the revolving debate about the percentage of national legislation 'dictated by' or 'derived from' Brussels, sometimes fixed as high as 80 per cent (more sober academic studies tend to offer figures closer to 30 to 40 per cent).
22. A feeling of dispossession often mentioned to account for the declining levels of participation at elections to the European Parliament since 1979.
23. Hix (2008, p. 77). A parallel argument is made in Follesdal and Hix (2006, section V, pp. 552–6).
24. For a longer discussion on this point, see Baumeister (2007, p. 490–4).
25. See Kraus (2008, chapters 3, 4 and 5 in particular). See also, on the same topic, Kymlicka (2001) who claims that for ordinary citizens, (democratic) politics has to be experienced 'in the vernacular'. See also Benhabib (2002). For thought-provoking studies of how diversity might constitute a challenge to bonds of solidarity in multicultural settings, see the collection of essays in Kymlicka and Banting (2006).
26. This effort seems to run parallel to the proposal set forth by Virginie Guiraudon and Adrian Favell to delineate work towards a sociology of the EU. See Favell and Guiraudon (2009). Their piece, unfortunately, appeared too late to be discussed further in this paper.
27. See Bellamy and Castiglione (2003) on this issue.
28. Easton (1965 p. 319, fn3), quoted in Follesdal (2006, p. 172).

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2. Cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU: A theoretical framework

Dieter Fuchs

2.1 OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM

Ever since the European Community (EC) was established, questions have been raised concerning the legitimacy of the new political entity and its subsequent transformation. The debate over legitimacy can be subdivided into three phases (Holzinger 2005, p. 90). These phases differ in terms of *who* has placed the legitimacy question on the agenda and *how* this is done. During the first phase, which lasted until the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), the legitimacy question was debated exclusively by political elites. For, even in the days preceding Maastricht, the development of the EC was characterized by a successive 'pooling … and delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions' (Rittberger 2005, p. 5). Yet the transfer of sovereignty was not accompanied by the institutionalization of mechanisms of democratic accountability and control comparable to those which existed in EC member states. This led political elites to raise questions regarding a democratic deficit and a legitimacy deficit in the new intergovernmental regime. The debate never reached the public sphere, however, nor did it become relevant to the field of scientific research. The dominant perception of public and scholarly actors was that the EC derived its legitimacy from its successful performance in securing peace in Europe and the increase in economic welfare for all member states. Another source of legitimacy postulated in this phase was indirect democratic legitimization of the EC due to the mediating presence of the democratic member states.

This situation changed after the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) which ushered in the second phase of the legitimacy debates. When the treaty came into effect, the European Community (EC) became the European Union (EU), a turning point in the process of European integration. Ever since, we have witnessed the transformation of an intergovernmental regime into a supranational regime with far-reaching competences. The transfer of sovereignty, ensuing from this point in time, reached a new quality in comparison to the first phase. The

binding decisions taken at the EU level have had an increasing impact on the lives of citizens of member states and a stronger effect on matters of distribution. This has led to a politicization of the EU and the increased salience of questions regarding legitimacy and a democratic deficit in public and scientific debates (Beetham and Lord 1998; Majone 1998; Scharpf 1999, 2009; Schmitter 2000; Moravcsik 2002, 2008; Bellamy and Castiglione 2003; Lord 2004; Follesdal and Hix 2006; Follesdal 2006; Hix 2008; Thomassen 2009). This development is also reflected in the increase of articles in newspapers and academic journals concerning these two issues (cf. Rittberger 2005, pp. 28f.).

The third phase, which followed only a few years later, was triggered by an academic debate. This debate added a further dimension regarding the legitimacy and democratic deficits by asking whether and to what extent a European demos requires a concomitant European identity to guarantee the democratic legitimation of the institutions of the EU and its decision making. These questions were and remain extensively and controversially debated (cf. Weiler 1995; Kielmansegg 1996; Offe 1998; Höreth 1999; Scharpf 1999; Zürn 2000; Cederman 2001; Habermas 2001, 2004, 2008; Decker 2002; Cerutti 2003, 2008; Delanty 2003; Meyer 2004; Kraus 2006, 2008; Baumeister 2007; Kaina 2009). They have also been spurred by the EU's eastward enlargement and the possibility of Turkey's accession to the EU which further brought into focus the questions of Europe's borders and European identity and made it a prominent topic of public debates.

The necessity of European identity is vastly undisputed in the mentioned debate about European identity; rather, the empirical possibility of achieving such a collective identity is often disputed. National identity, which emerges from a shared history and is thus deeply rooted in common experience, is perceived as the main obstacle to the emergence of a post-national collective European identity. The question thus is whether a European identity can emerge which is compatible with national identities and which simultaneously has sufficient weight to be relevant for the actions of actors of the EU. The question has been addressed by Peter A. Kraus (2004, p. 40) in his assertion that: 'The issue of diversity involves one of the main challenges that the political integration of Europe has to confront at its present stage.' Ultimately, it appears that multi-cultural diversity *within* the nation-states is not as much of a problem as multi-national diversity *between* the member states of the EU.

In the following section, I will develop a two-part theoretical framework for the analysis of the legitimacy of the EU and European identity. First, I will seek to conceptualize the legitimacy of the EU and European identity – two concepts which are thematically at the heart of this book. I will then specify a theoretical model to account for the emergence of these two attitudes.

My point of departure is the claim that '[t]here is hardly a shortage of contributions to the debate about the European Union's (EU) democratic legitimacy'

(Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007, p. 1). The same applies to European identity. However, many contributions are marked by elements of conceptual weaknesses. To address such gaps, this contribution will elaborate alternative suggestions for the conceptualization of legitimacy of the EU and European identity. It contends that the greatest problem regarding the legitimacy debate lies in the unsettled relationship between normative and empirical arguments and the blurry demarcation between the two. Similarly, the most striking problem with regard to the identity debate lies in the absence of a theoretically substantiated notion of collective identity which would simultaneously allow for operationalization and thus be capable of guiding empirical research.

Last but not least, a controversial and scientific debate focuses on the emergence of a range of attitudes regarding legitimacy and identity. A vast variety of different concepts to capture different aspects of the complex evolution of attitudes towards legitimacy and identity have been developed in this debate. In the subsequent section, a theoretical model which synthesizes and bundles the plethora of factors relevant to attitudinal considerations is also presented.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY OF THE EU

The attribution of legitimacy to the EU depends primarily on the applied concept of legitimacy. In a survey article entitled 'The Legitimacy Deficits of the EU', Andreas Follesdal (2006) identifies a series of differentiated conceptions of legitimacy which prevail in ongoing discussions about the EU. Through recourse to the core meaning of legitimacy these manifold meanings can be reduced. The core meaning can be captured in the following formulation: the legitimacy of a political system consists of its justifiability based on good reasons (Habermas 1992; Rawls 1993). With regard to the discussions about the EU, it is this notion which provides the foundations for a conception of legitimacy predicated on 'legitimacy as justifiability' (Follesdal 2006, p. 447). Since good reasons serve to justify a political regime, they must be of normative character and hence raise a contra factual validity claim. One central dimension of the multidimensional legitimacy concept articulated by David Beetham and Christopher Lord (1998, p. 9) is therefore 'normative justifiability'. Drawing on their notion and its invocation by Follesdal (2006, p. 447) I will use the label *normative legitimacy* to denote a particular understanding of legitimacy.

Yet to do so, two issues must be clarified: Firstly, *which* norms shall be used to evaluate a political regime, and secondly, *who* shall be entitled to employ such norms. I will begin by addressing the first of the two questions: Which norms or values with normative character form the content of the legitimacy concept?

In Western societies, at least, political regimes are evaluated by broadly accepted standards of democratic norms and values. In order to determine the content of good reasons, the starting point of Fritz Scharpf (1999, p. 6) is therefore the basal democratic norm of 'collective self-determination'. He makes the distinction between 'government *by the people*' and 'government *for the people*' (Scharpf 1999, p. 6) and in line with this differentiation he develops two types of legitimation. On the one hand, *input-oriented legitimization* is defined as follows: 'Political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the "will of the people" – that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community' (ibid.). On the other hand *output-oriented legitimization* reflects a condition in which: 'political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question' (ibid.). This distinction has the charming feature of parsimony and is intuitively plausible with regard to representative democracies. It focuses on the relationship between the political choices of the governing and the political preferences of the governed and assigns these factors to the input and output side of the political process, respectively.[1]

In Scharpf's conceptualization then, collective self-determination primarily refers to the extent that people's preferences are considered on the input and output side of the political process. However, he neglects the role of institutions as a vehicle via which collective self-determination can and should be realized. According to Robert A. Dahl (1989, 1997), popular sovereignty[2] is institutionalized through elections in representative democracies. This institution displays a number of relevant characteristics. First, those who govern must be selected through the process of competitive elections ('elected officials'); second, these elections must be 'free, fair, and frequent'. This guarantees *authorization* by the governed on the one hand, and *accountability* of the governing towards the governed on the other hand. In order to ensure that popular elections are meaningful and not merely a formal procedure, Dahl (1989, 1997) further states that various political rights must be guaranteed. He mentions 'freedom of expression', 'alternative sources of information' and 'associational autonomy'. According to Dahl, elections and political rights form the basic dimensions which are characteristic of a liberal democracy. This assumption is broadly shared in the field of democratic theory and democracy research (see, among others, Sartori 1987; Beetham and Lord 1998; Diamond 1999; Merkel et al. 2003; Morlino 2004).

On the basis of the preceding discussion, the contents of normative legitimacy can be defined in more detail. A regime is democratic and thus legitimate if competitive and periodical elections as well as certain political rights are effectively institutionalized, and if the authorization of governing through the people and the accountability of the governing towards the people is ensured.

Having addressed the question of which norms and values can be employed to evaluate the legitimacy of a regime, we may turn to the second question:

Who uses these norms and values to evaluate a regime? The assumptions about normative legitimacy presented so far have been developed by theoreticians. They specify standards of legitimacy and define a regime as legitimate once these standards are met. This notion of legitimacy is detached from the perspective of citizens and may be called *objective legitimacy* – a concept I have used in another context (Fuchs 2010). By way of contrast, *subjective legitimacy* rests upon the beliefs of the citizens. For, it is the citizens themselves who decide which normative standards they obtain in order to evaluate a regime and who apply such standards for regime evaluation. These attitudes of the citizens are relevant if one takes a functional perspective, as Scharpf (2009, p. 173) for instance demands, since: 'any discussion of legitimacy in the multilevel European polity needs to start from a functional perspective'.

The functional viewpoint emphasizes the voluntary compliance of citizens with decisions taken by the governing, or, in more general terms, the persistence and the functioning of a regime. This depends primarily on the subjective attribution of legitimacy on the part of citizens, and not on considerations of legitimacy on the part of theoreticians and political elites.[3] David Easton (1965, 1975) provides a well differentiated concept of political support and in various analyses about the legitimacy of the EU a number of authors refer to Easton (among others, Gabel 1998; Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2007; Wessels 2007; Thomassen 2009). Yet, I would argue that the reception of Easton's theory in these works is quite limited. Without digressing into a detailed discussion of the matter, I would like merely to state that two aspects of Easton's theory still need to be addressed. The first regards the distinction between *trust* as a dimension of diffuse support on the one hand and specific support on the other hand. The second is related to the specific meaning of legitimacy within the frame of the broader concept of political support. To address these two dimensions, I will briefly elaborate upon the concept of political support as articulated by Easton. I will then provide my adaptation of the concept so as to be able to apply it to the EU.

As is rightly known, Easton (1965, 1975) distinguishes between three objects of a political system, namely, political community, the regime and political authorities. With regard to attitudes towards these objects, he distinguishes between specific and diffuse support. *Specific support* refers to political authorities and is based on the perceived rewards of short-term outputs. *Diffuse support* mainly refers to political community and regime and is independent of the aforementioned short-term outputs. Easton goes on to differentiate between two dimensions of diffuse support for a regime: legitimacy and trust. *Legitimacy*, he argues, 'reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere' (Easton 1975, p. 451). *Trust*, on the other hand, 'will be stimulated by the experiences that

members have of the authorities over time' (Easton 1975, p. 448). Over time, these experiences are detached from authorities and ascribed to the regime.

Hence, legitimacy rests upon the belief of citizens that a regime corresponds with their own norms and values. By way of contrast, trust covers the generalized evaluations of the performance of a regime. The latter is particularly relevant in the case of the EU. This is because the political elites of the EU did not justify the EU on the grounds of a plethora of specific outputs but rather on the basis of fundamental and long-term achievements such as the creation of peace in Europe and, above all, economic prosperity for its members. Diffuse support of political community is described by Easton (1965, p. 185) as a '*sense of community*' and 'we-feeling' or 'feeling of belonging together'.

The first column of Table 2.1 denotes the varieties of political support according to Easton. The second column contains the constructs which may be operationalized on the basis of available data sets. Regarding Easton's typology some adjustments must be noted. First, and in line with our discussion

Table 2.1   Types and constructs of political support

Types of political support (Easton)	Constructs of political support	Sub-constructs of political support[a]
Political community		
Sense of community (diffuse support)	Identity (expressive reasons)	• European identity • Cultural threat
Regime		
	Integration ideals (normative reasons)	• Political integration • Economic integration
	Generalized support (unspecific)	• Support of the EU • Trust in EU institutions
Legitimacy (diffuse support)	Legitimacy (normative reasons)	• Democracy
Trust (diffuse support)	Effectiveness (instrumental reasons)	• Utility • Efficacy
	Understanding (cognitive reasons)	• Transparency
Political authorities		
Specific support		

Note: [a] The indicators of sub-constructs can be taken from Table 9.1 in Fuchs, Chapter 9 in this volume.

about the EU, the notion of 'sense of community' is now referred to as 'identity' (Delanty 2002; Bruter 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Kantner 2006; McLaren 2006; Eder 2009). Easton's 'trust', meanwhile, is labelled here as 'effectiveness' (Lipset 1981), the purpose being to avoid confusion with the notion of trust used in the field of social capital research (Putnam 1992).

With regard to regime support, moreover, three constructs are listed which are not derived from Easton's typology. 'Generalized support' refers to an overall evaluation of the regime which is abstracted from concrete reasons and therefore is unspecific. 'Integration ideals' are normative ideas concerning the degree and the type of integration of the EU with regard to economic and political perspectives. Such a construct is meaningful since the EU – contrary to nation-state regimes – is not a finalized entity with a highly integrated institutional structure. Rather, the EU is subject to a constant process of change and its final outcome is unclear. The third construct which has been added is 'understanding'. Here it is assumed that support for the EU depends on whether and to what extent the EU is transparent to its citizens; that is, the citizens understand the EU and understand how the EU is organized as well as how it functions (Janssen 1991; Karp et al. 2003; Binzer Hobolt 2005; McLaren 2007; Mössner 2009).

Beneath the constructs – and in brackets – the types of reasons underlying the respective type of support are listed. Reasons are identified in accordance with the assumption of theories of social and cognitive psychology which state that attitudes of people towards objects are a consequence of considerations or reasons (Zaller 1992; Lupia et al. 2000). For the specification of the category 'reasons', for example, I draw on the universal modi of orientation towards objects set forth by Talcott Parsons (1951), namely, expressive, normative, instrumental and cognitive orientations.

The third column lists sub-constructs, namely constructs which are actually used in the empirical analysis (see Fuchs: Explaining support for European integration: An attitudinal model, in this volume).

Some of the six constructs feature two sub-constructs. With regard to identity, these sub-constructs are 'European identity' and 'cultural threats'. European identity refers to the degree in which citizens feel positively attached to the community of Europeans. The category of cultural threats, by way of contrast, signifies negative feelings in which national identity is thought to be threatened by subordination to European identity. This could be manifested in fear, for instance, of loss of meaning of one's own language.[4] Integration ideals, meanwhile, are differentiated into political and economic integration. The predominant tension with regard to 'political integration' regards the options of supranational government versus national sovereignty. 'Economic integration', on the other hand, entails the option between market liberalism versus social democracy.[5]

One of the two sub-constructs of effectiveness is 'utility', which refers to the long-term and fundamental achievements of the EU, that is, to what Easton refers to as trust. The other sub-construct is 'efficacy' which measures the subjective perceptions of the citizens with regard to the extent they believe the EU can be influenced in order to positively impact the interests of their own country or person.

Legitimacy is operationalized as the level of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU; the sub-construct to capture this dimension is therefore labelled 'democracy'. The sub-construct relevant to understanding, on the other hand, is labelled as 'transparency' which refers to subjective understanding of the institutions and processes of the EU.

A detailed description of all sub-constructs and their indicators which measure these, as well as index constructions which are used in the causal analysis for the explanation of European integration and support of the EU, can be taken from another contribution in this volume (see Fuchs, Explaining support for European integration: An attitudinal model, in this volume). That contribution also offers the results of a factor analysis which determines that the theoretical assignment of indicators to constructs is empirically tenable; this, in turn, makes it possible to assert whether citizens actually differentiate between the various constructs.

2.3 THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Conceptualization

The question of European identity has been the subject of intellectual debates ever since the early 1950s (Cerutti 2001). More recently, however, two major developments have led to the issue becoming a matter of public and scientific concern. One was the transformation of the EU into a supranational regime – a process inaugurated by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The Treaty raised the question of the self-perception of the EU and hence the finality of its transformation. Second, the eastward enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, as well as discussions about Turkey's potential candidacy for accession, raised questions about the borders of the EU as a regime and 'Europe' more broadly. Such debates spurred a plethora of considerations regarding the defining features of the EU from an internal perspective and how it distinguishes itself from an outside perspective.

The prominence of the topic of European identity in scientific discussions is evident in the enormous number of renowned publications on the subject. Nonetheless, consensus concerning the definition of the concept European identity has never been achieved. The lack of such consensus can be attributed

to – among other things – the ambiguity of the concept of collective identity and the fact that European identity is merely a specific form of collective identity. Hence, these uncertainties regarding the basic category of collective identity in its various manifestations have strongly influenced the ambivalence which characterizes the concept of European identity.

In a review article about the notion of identity, Roger Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) come to the conclusion that the concept is both imprecise and contradictory and as such that it may be discarded. I believe this conclusion is somewhat exaggerated and an overreaction. Identity, in general, and collective identity in particular, are – like all concepts in social science – heavily contested. In my opinion, four strategies can be applied to avoid ambiguity and to ensure an adequate theoretical foundation for the concept.

The first strategy essentially differentiates between the normative and the empirical perspective. The second strategy furnishes the concept with analytical value. The third entails an alignment of the concept to relevant theoretical studies. The fourth considers the operationalization of the concept, in order to conduct a systematic empirical analysis. In the following segment of this chapter, all four strategies shall be elaborated. In so doing, I will offer an operational definition of European identity.

To a large extent, the controversy over European identity rests upon an essential misunderstanding. Many authors try to address the question with reference to the *essential* nature of European identity. But while their answers vary, ultimately they are merely normative conceptualizations and will therefore always be controversial. It is therefore necessary to differentiate an empirical perspective from this normative one. An empirical perspective would inquire into the extent that members of the collectivity of Europeans actually consider themselves as Europeans and what they believe being European entails. Michael Bruter (2005, pp. 4–5) refers to the first normative approach as a 'top-down' perspective and to the latter empirical approach as a 'bottom-up' perspective.

If one endorses the necessity of the latter, one must acknowledge that the analytical value of the concept of collective identity lies in its function for a political regime. For this reason, a number of authors consider affirmation of European identity a prerequisite for successful legitimization of the EU and, ultimately, the Union's prospects for survival (Beetham and Lord 1998; Scharpf 1999, 2009; Strath 2002; Habermas 2004; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Cerutti 2008; Kaina 2009). This basic supposition is connected to three relatively concrete assumptions. The first is that a political regime is all the more persistent the more strongly the members of the regime's community believe the regime to be an expression of their self(ves). The second is that the acceptance of the majority principle and majority decisions is only plausible if the overruled minorities consider themselves part of the same community to which the majority also belongs. Third, decisions involving redistribution can

only be accepted when both the beneficiaries and the losers in these decisions subjectively belong to the same community.

One can assume that European identity is not a matter of dichotomy, that is, that it is not a question of whether a European identity exists or not. Rather, it needs to be understood that identity varies between weak and strong. As both Scharpf (1999) and Cathleen Kantner (2006) argue, the degree to which a sense of collective identity is necessary depends on the degree of European integration. A low degree of European integration would require a weak European identity and vice versa.

This function of European identity has only been theoretically contended. Thus far, it has not been empirically confirmed and is presumably not confirmable. Yet, in almost all social scientific analysis of European identity, the relevance of the concept is considered more or less explicitly with regard to its functional value. This means that given the dearth of empirical evidence, one cannot rule out that successful legitimization of a regime and the concomitant durability of the regime depends on a rational basis – be this based on instrumental or normative rationality. In the following section, I will take as my starting point the premise that European identity is functionally required.

Meanwhile, and as noted above, a third strategy – seeking to avoid the concept's innate controversies – can be found in the many studies and works focusing on the creation of a theoretical basis for the concept. In this respect, one fact is quite clear: almost all theoretically guided analyses of European identity rest upon social psychological approaches and especially on the concept of social identity (for this concept, see Taijfel 1981; Turner et al. 1987; Oakes et al. 1994; Abrams and Hogg 1999; Brewer 2001). That said, space constraints mean that I cannot describe all such approaches here (cf. Kohli 2000; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Fuchs et al. 2009; Kaina 2009). Instead, I want to roughly sketch some basic assumptions and ideas, focusing in particular on the elaboration of a problem which to date has been left open in the debate.

According to social psychological theories, social identity is part of a person's self-concept and refers to the psychological link between individuals and social groups (Taijfel 1981; Abrams and Hogg 1999; Herrmann and Brewer 2004). It becomes part of the self-concept through the cognitive assignment of the individual to a social group and through the emotional significance of this assignment.

This mechanism – in which association with a group is evaluated positively – was elaborated by John C. Turner et al. (1987) who refer to it as the meta-contrast principle. It rests upon subjective perceptions of similarities among the members of a group and the perceived differences to other groups. Through comparison of the similarities and differences between the own group and other groups, a demarcation between inside and outside is performed. This, in turn, is crucial for deciding who is included and who is excluded.

Marilynn B. Brewer (2001, p. 119) extends the term social identity by adding the notion of *collective identity*:

> social identity theory is primarily concerned with a process by which such group-self representations are formed rather than the meaning attached to specific group identities. Thus, it is useful to make a further distinction between social identity as identification with a collective and collective identity as the norms, values, and ideologies that such identification entails.

I will return to this differentiation between the two levels of identification – with a collective on one hand, and the contents of such an identification on the other – at a later point in this analysis.

Martin Kohli (2000, p. 117) makes a further specification: 'The term "collective identities" refers to the categorical end of the continuum: to those social identities that are based on large and potentially important group differences'. I will use the term 'collective identity' in this sense, namely, as a formulation which encompasses the identity of a large collective such as national community or the community of Europeans.

I would like to summarize the analysis once again and present it in simplified terms (Table 2.2). In line with Herrmann and Brewer (2004, p. 6), I distinguish between 'cognitive, evaluative, and affective meaning' of the collective identity and this will be done on the two levels which are included in the definition by Brewer (2001). The relatively more important level is the first, which describes a subjective assignment of individuals to a collective and an affective attachment to this collective. In sociological theories these affective attachments are referred to as *we-feeling* or the *feeling of belonging together* (Easton 1965; Weber 1972; similarly, Scharpf 1999; Cerutti 2008). Only on the basis of this we-feeling can the function of the concept of collective identity be fulfilled.

Yet, the we-feeling cannot be content-free. It rests upon the subjective assertion of similarities and the positive evaluation of these similarities. Thus, the

Table 2.2   Dimensions of collective identity

	Cognition	Affect/Evaluation
Level 1	Subjective assignment to a collective	Affective attachment to the collective. We-feeling/feeling of belonging together
Level 2	Subjective assumption of shared similarities within a collective	Positive evaluation of assumed similarities

second level comes into play. Here, the perceived similarities are the reference point for the demarcation between in-group and out-group; they also settle the question of who belongs to the collective and who is excluded. The matter of which similarities are perceived and eventually lead to a we-feeling requires empirical clarification. Similarities do not have to be so close as to be identical, but a significant empirical consensus between individuals' criteria will lead to a resilient we-feeling. This would not be the case if there was extremely strong variance in individuals' feelings and preferences. For, in moments of conflict or crisis, this strong variance could become evident and could lead to an erosion of the we-feeling.

In social psychological theory, the assignment of social identity as part of a person's self-concept situates identity at the micro level of individuals. However, if the analytical value of the concept depends upon its function in providing support for a regime, then a leap from the micro to the macro level is required. In short, the identity in question must be the collective identity. In other words, it is not the social identity of individuals that is meant but the identity of a collective. The question therefore is how to get from the micro to the macro level.

Here, the paradigm of political culture provides a bridge (Fuchs 2007). Similar to collective identity, political culture ultimately rests upon psychological facts and processes. The basic political attitudes of citizens form the starting point for the empirical reconstruction of the political culture of a country. These are localized at the micro level, and by applying two mechanisms – 'aggregation' and 'distribution' – they shift to the macro level. In the first step, the individual attitudes of citizens are aggregated, while in the second step the distribution of attitudes is determined. This distribution can be considered as characteristic of the political culture of a country.

I will apply these two mechanisms regarding the dimensions of collective identity, as differentiated in Table 2.2, and I suggest two operational definitions. Therein I differentiate between extensity and intensity. The first refers to the cognitive dimension and the second to the affective, respectively the evaluative, dimension. The two operational definitions are as follows:

1. The higher the degree of subjective assignment to the collective of Europeans (extensity) and the stronger the affective attachment to this collective (intensity), the stronger the sense of European identity.
2. The higher the degree of perceived similarities between the members of the collective of Europeans (extensity) and the more positive the evaluation of these similarities (intensity), the stronger the sense of European identity.

Both definitions refer to the attitudes of citizens of European member states. The first definition refers to level 1 as identified in Table 2.2, the second to

level 2. From a functional perspective, the first definition is relatively the more important. The definitions contain psychological constructs which can be measured in surveys (see Fuchs, Explaining support for European integration: An attitudinal model, in this volume). Insofar as this measurement is representative of the collective of Europeans and of national collectivities, then the two mechanisms of aggregation and distribution can be employed. The distribution then expresses the macro phenomenon of the collective identity of Europeans or the identity of a national collective.

Problems of European Identity

In the following section, three problems with regard to the discussion of European identity will be briefly discussed: the substantive content of European identity; the question of demarcation of out-groups; and the relationship between European identity and national identity.

Most of the studies of European identity assume that it cannot follow the pattern of national identities. National identities are the result of long-term historical processes which include dramatic positive and negative experiences. These are all stored in the collective memory of the nations. Such dramatic experiences include conflicts and wars between European nation states. As such, national identities provide an unsurpassable backdrop to European identity. The possibility of European identity displaying the same degree of common historical experience and cultural cohesion as national identities, and indeed of displacing such identities, is unthinkable. Therefore, certain basic political value orientations rather than common history are considered to be a potential basis of European identity, spurring many theorists to posit European identity as a *political identity* (Fuchs 2000; Cerutti 2003; Habermas 2004; Meyer 2004). Furio Cerutti (2008, pp. 6–7) provides a handy definition by declaring:

> In its *core definition*, political identity is the overarching and inclusive project that is shared by the members of the polity, or in other words the set of political and social values and principles in which they recognize themselves as a we … a degree of homogeneity in the *political* culture (say an orientation favoring liberal democracy) is needed as a precondition, while a convergence of the entire cultural world (language, religion, morality, images of the world and forms of everyday life … is not [italics as in the original].

This definition provides a substantial basis for European identity by defining it as a shared political culture based upon the values of liberal democracy.

Regardless of the question whether European identity is actually a political identity, the question of the strength and capacity of such a collective identity needs to be raised. Can perceived similarities between political value

orientations – and according to Cerutti these are the values of liberal democracy – engender a we-feeling which fulfils the function of European identity? Habermas (1998, 2004) assumes this is the case with reference to the term of *Verfassungspatriotismus* (constitutional patriotism).[6] A competing position is that of the communitarians who assume that any such collective identity would need to be constituted by *republican patriotism*. This position assumes that the legitimacy of a political regime and its persistence rests upon strong evaluations which emerge from the experiences of a shared history (Taylor 1985). According to this approach political values are by far too weak if they are not rooted in the pre-political cultural similarities which emerged in historical contexts. In my opinion, a solution to this controversy in theoretical terms alone is not possible. Further evidence must be provided in the form of empirical findings to ascertain any trends in the future development of European identity.

The second problem is that of demarcating the collective of Europeans vis-à-vis the outside. This discussion is strongly influenced by normative considerations. Against the backdrop of the wars between European nation states and conflicts across the world motivated by ethnic claims, it is often thought undesirable to pursue demarcation from others. In his concept of political identity, Cerutti (2008, pp. 5–6) accordingly excludes 'four fairly common usages' which include the following: 'identity is not based primarily on *exclusion*, and Huntington's view [namely that] "we know who we are when we know whom we are against" is an oversimplification, and a distorting one at that. It means taking a pathological development' [italics as in the original]. On the other hand, Cerutti (2008, p. 6) points to the fact that 'distinction between us and the others' is necessary, 'otherwise identity vanishes into diffusiveness'. In this regard, the values of liberal democracy pose a problematic point of reference since they are universalistic values. Cerutti (2008) addresses the possibility of a particularized interpretation of universalist values in the specific historical contexts of European countries and an identity demarcation on this basis. Habermas (2004) takes this one step further and sees European interpretations of these values as a possible way of demarcating European identity from the United States. Yet, it remains an open question whether such a particularized interpretation of potentially universalistic values is powerful enough to enable identity demarcation and the constitution of a distinctive collective identity. This is particularly the case if collective identity is to be one which includes mass publics and not only elites.

Kohli (2000, pp. 127f.) proposes a different and less normative type of demarcation. In his formulation, the differentiation is between a negative past and a positive future:

> Another and possibly more important way of affirming a European identity is offered by identity construction which makes the difference between the negative

> past and the positive future … Europe does not need an external enemy because it has an internal one: its nationalistic past. In this sense, there is indeed a battle between European and national identity.

However, it seems rather dubious that this temporally located difference is sufficient for identity demarcation. This at least applies if one considers demarcation from the perspective of sociological and social-psychological theories.

In my opinion, the problem of demarcation cannot be avoided if one believes in the necessity of a stable and resilient European identity. This also includes the concrete achievement of consensus as to who does *not* belong to the collective of Europeans. This demarcation needs to be cognitively transparent and sufficiently condensed in the eyes of ordinary citizens to be constitutive of a European identity.

The third problem lies in the relationship between European identity and national identities (McLaren 2002; Westle 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Bruter 2005; Duchesne and Frognier 2008; Fuchs et al. 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009; Kaina 2009; Risse 2010). National identities developed over a long period of time and are deeply rooted in the national histories of the countries in question. Therefore, they represent a more profound collective identity than that to which European identity could ever aspire. Hence, it is necessary to raise the question of how the relationship between national and European identity can be theoretically understood and empirically determined. Are national identities and European identity conflicting or complementary? According to social psychological theories, all collective identities of modern societies are multiple identities (Turner et al. 1987; Abrams and Hogg 1999; Stryker and Burke 2000; Brewer 2001). As such, European identity and national identity should be compatible. This is the case, for instance, if one understands national identities as nested identities which integrate various geographic and political levels ranging from home town to region and nation, to, eventually, 'Europe' (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, p. 8). The relevant empirical findings show that many citizens of the EU have a multiple identity – which positively connects European and national identity (Westle 2003; Kaina 2009; Fuchs 2010).[7] However, this finding does not solve the problem entirely. It cannot be excluded that the complementary relationship between national and European identity is only given until the question of European identity is not politicized and hence potential conflict constellations between the two identities are not mobilized. In the case of a potential conflict between national and European identity, it is probable that the national identity would be more salient and this, in turn, could lead to an erosion of European identity.

Such problems with regard to analysing European identity make it apparent that the discussion over the concept is far from finalized. Social psychological approaches to social and collective identity and the sociological approaches of

social and political community as set forth by Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (2009) are valuable but not sufficient. This is particularly the case for the question of the emergence of European identity. According to Checkel and Katzenstein (2009, pp. 213–14), the emergence of national identity as instructive for the emergence of European identity is limited: 'The history of nation-states or state-nations does not provide useful material for analyzing the emergence of a collective European identity. European identity politics are not like those in a cultural nation, where processes of cultural assimilation precede political unification.' In the debate over European identity, this assessment is widely accepted (see, among others, Delanty 2002; Lacroix 2002; Cerutti 2003, 2008; Meyer 2004; Bruter 2005; Kaina 2009; Risse 2010). Given that the emergence of national identity is not very instructive for the emergence of European identity, the question of how European identity can develop becomes deeply urgent. In the following section, a theoretical model for the emergence of European identity is presented. In so doing, I will attempt to integrate the most relevant determinants elaborated in the discussion thus far. Support for the EU is defined as a further dependent variable, since its emergence and fostering follow a similar logic.

2.4 THE CONSTRUCTION OF MASS OPINION TOWARDS THE EU AND A EUROPEAN IDENTITY

The theory by John R. Zaller (1992) about 'The nature and origin of mass opinion' is, in my view, an adequate theoretical basis for the specification of a model for the construction of mass opinion towards the EU and towards European identity. At the very beginning of his study, Zaller (1992, p. 14) notes that his theory relates to political attitudes that are beyond the immediate experiences of citizens and thus beyond their full personal understanding. It is precisely these attitudes which are relevant for the question of support for European identity and the EU. The EU is an object which is rather distant from the everyday lives of citizens and most citizens have only little information about the EU. Hence, for its citizens, the EU is a fuzzy object which is marked by low salience (Janssen 1991; Diez Medrano 2003; Gerhards 2003; Castano 2004).

Given that mass opinions are marked by cognitive fuzziness and low salience, Zaller (1992, p. 14) argues that they are predominantly a construction of political elites:

> I refer in the course of this book to the 'information carried in elite discourse about politics' … I will be referring to the stereotypes, frames of reference, and elite leadership

cues that enable citizens to form conceptions of and, more importantly, opinions about events that are beyond their full personal understanding.

I will begin the elaboration of the schematic model as presented in Figure 2.1 by describing the constructs (in bold print) Zaller sets forth in his theory. Following this, I will discuss my amendments which are marked in italics.

For Zaller, the starting point of the construction of mass opinion is the discourse of political elites. In this sense, he formulates the objective of his study: 'The aim of the book is to show how variations in this elite discourse affect both the direction and organization of mass opinion' (Zaller 1992, p. 14). This is because the discourse of political elites is mediated by the mass media into persuasive and cueing messages. The *persuasive messages* of elite actors are ones which seek to convince citizens to position themselves in line with elite positions on various political issues. *Cueing messages* 'are the second type carried in elite discourse' and 'consist of "contextual information" about the ideological or partisan implications of persuasive message. The importance of cueing messages is that … they enable citizens to perceive relationships between the persuasive messages and their political predispositions, which in turn permits them to respond critically to the persuasive messages' (Zaller 1992, p. 42).

The transition from the system level – which is assigned to elite discourse – to the individual level is made by the *exposure and reception* of messages of political elites on behalf of the citizens. A differentiation between the two forms of perception of messages is made since exposure is only the necessary but not the sufficient precondition of reception. Reception requires a more or less strong degree of explicit attentiveness. The decisive determinant for exposure and reception is political awareness:

> *Political awareness*, as used in this study, refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics <u>and</u> understands what he or she has encountered. … The key to political awareness, then, is the absorption of political communications. Political awareness denotes intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs as against emotional or affective engagement or no engagement at all (Zaller 1992, p. 21).

Related to the definition of political awareness, Zaller (1992, p. 42) formulates the so-called RECEPTION AXIOM: 'The greater a person's level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend – in a word, to receive – political messages concerning the issue.'

With the exposure and reception of messages by political elites, it has not been decided how citizens react to these and whether they accept or reject them. On the one hand, both are decided on behalf of the structure and content

a) This model is based on the theory of Zaller (1992); Zaller's constructs are in bold print; amendments to Zaller's constructs are in italics.

Figure 2.1   Model of the construction of mass opinion towards the EU and European identity[a]

of political campaigns with conflicting streams of persuasive messages (Zaller 1992, pp. 266–67). These conflicting messages limit the intentional construction of mass opinion of political elites. That is to say, mass opinion is not to be understood as a mere reflex towards a message. If competing messages are selected, there exists some degree of freedom to choose between messages on the part of individuals. On the other hand, the relevant determinants for the model as put forth by Zaller (1992, p. 23) concern acceptance or rejection of elite messages in terms of *political predispositions*:

> by which I mean stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives … predispositions are at least in part a distillation of a person's life-time experiences, including childhood socialization and direct involvement with the raw ingredients of policy issues, such as earning a living, paying taxes, racial discrimination, and so forth.

The influence of political predispositions depends on the extent of contextual information which citizens may have in order to convert predispositions into preferences for one message. Therefore, the model in Figure 2.1 addresses the effect of cueing and framing messages (I will discuss the latter below) on political predispositions; these, in turn, are mediated by political awareness. With regard to acceptance or rejection of messages, Zaller (1992, p. 44) formulates his RESISTANCE AXIOM: 'People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between the message and their predispositions.'

In the next step of the model, Zaller makes an interesting change of perspective and this is presumably based on his experiences with survey research. He focuses on the method of *how* attitudes of individuals can be measured via surveys. The *survey_responses* to indicators, which serve to record the respective attitudes, are also – but not only – determined by the *accessibility* of considerations of individuals concerning the surveyed subject matter. In terms of accessibility, he postulates the ACCESSIBILITY AXIOM: 'The more recently a consideration has been called to mind or thought about, the less time it takes to retrieve that consideration or related considerations from memory and bring them to the top of the head for use' (Zaller 1992, p. 48).

In line with this, Zaller (1992, p. 49) defines the RESPONSE AXIOM: 'Individuals answer survey questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them.' In the last step of the model, the survey responses are aggregated and the distribution of these aggregated responses is the mass opinion of a collective. In our case, this would be the support of the EU and the identity of the collective of Europeans.

Here, some differentiations and amendments to the model by Zaller shall be made. As mentioned before, these are marked in italics in the model shown in

Figure 2.1. Three amendments refer to the internal structure of the model for the construction of mass opinion by Zaller and three refer to the restriction of choices by contextual factors on the part of the elites as well as on behalf of citizens. In order to illustrate these amendments, data from recent empirical studies from research about the EU are provided.

The first amendment introduces a further category of messages which are labelled *framing messages*. These differ systematically from cueing messages. According to Zaller (1992, p. 42), the cueing messages refer to cues which are partisan and ideological positions; these are linked to persuasive messages. From the perspective of individuals, such cues are merely shortcuts and this means they are effective mechanisms for the simplification of complex facts (Popkin 1991). A persuasive message is accepted if it corresponds with an individual's party preference or an individual's ideological position (left/right). Such shortcuts require only a low degree of cognitive prerequisites, because merely persuasive messages need to be linked with cueing messages.

In contrast to this, a frame provides an interpretative or ideational package: 'a *frame* can be seen as a delimited ideational package' (Polletta and Ho 2006, p. 191). The definition by Entman (1993, p. 52) refers mainly to the process of the application of frames, that is:

> To frame is to *select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem defini- tion, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for this item described* [italics as in the original].

James N. Druckman (2001, p. 228) makes an important analytical differentia- tion of frames. He distinguishes between *frames in communication* and *frames in thought*. The first refers to the frames which are generated in elite discourses and are sent out by elites. Applying the terms used in our model, these would be the framing messages. The latter refers to the individual and the individual's 'internal structure of mind', that is, the frames which are given in the memory of an individual and which are activated by framing messages. An empiri- cal analysis of how European issues are framed by political elites (frames in communication), has recently been presented by Ursula Meiser (2010). In contrast, the empirical study by Diez Medrano (2003) analyses how Europe is framed by citizens (frames in thought).

The reception of framing messages by citizens and the application of frames for the acceptance or rejection of a persuasive message is cognitively more demanding than simply applying a shortcut. Kriesi (2005, p. 8), in a study entitled 'Direct democratic choice' which is in line with studies from social psychology (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Chaiken and Trope 1999), differentiates between 'two qualitatively different paths of individual opinion formation …: a heuristic and a systematic path. *Systematic* opinion formation is essentially *argument-based*,

while heuristic opinion formation is essentially based on *shortcuts* which do not make any reference to substantive arguments' [italics as in the original].

In his analysis, Kriesi (2005) empirically shows that the citizens of Switzerland make use of the argument-based strategy and that it is applied by a notable number of individuals for direct democratic choices.

A relevant determinant for the argument-based strategy on the macro level is the intensity of the campaign. At the micro level, the degree of political awareness is decisive. Kriesi (2005, chapter 4) argues that awareness, in turn, is determined by *motivation* (general political interest) and *competence* (level of education). These determinants of political awareness are already rudimentarily mentioned by Zaller (1992) but they are systematically elaborated and developed in Kriesi's (2005) analysis.

The model by Zaller (1992) assumes that the individual determinants for the acceptance or rejection of messages sent by political elites are only political predispositions. In line with the model of socialization for the construction of European identity presented by Herrmann and Brewer (2004, p. 14), the model in Figure 2.1 includes the additional determinant of *everyday experiences*. These are detached from the discourse of political elites and form a separate source of opinion formation. The relevance of everyday experiences for political choices of individuals has been demonstrated in electoral research by the concept of retrospective voting (Fiorina 1981).

The elite discourse and the related construction of mass opinion cannot be put in a closed context; instead, they are influenced by contextual factors. One of these contextual factors refers to the discourse of political elites. The most relevant actors disseminating elite discourses are political parties (Marcussen et al. 1999; Ray 2003). Steenbergen and Marks (2004) have come to the conclusion that discourse in the party systems of EU member states is marked by a two-dimensional structure. The first dimension is economic. It focuses on the distinction between low regulation (market liberalism) and high regulation (social democracy). The other dimension is of a political and cultural nature. On the one hand, it addresses the conflict between supranational governance and national sovereignty, and on the other hand it focuses on the distinction between European identity and national identity. Ray (1999) similarly concludes that there is a two-dimensional space of the conflict between parties in his analysis of party programmes.

This two-dimensional conflict structure can only become effective if the respective persuasive and cueing messages are sent by the parties. According to the analysis of Bornschier (in this volume), this was particularly the case with populist parties of the extreme left and the extreme right. As long as the bigger parties of the political middle and the moderate left and right do not politicize European questions and a more or less strong European consensus exists, then these conflict structures remain latent and the political elites tend

to send good 'news and symbols' (Bruter 2005). A differentiated analysis of political party contestation over Europe in the mass media has been recently presented by Paul Statham and Ruud Koopmans (2009). Their discourse analysis of Euro-critical claims in newspapers of seven important EU member countries confirms, to a large extent, the thesis of an 'inverted U' pattern of support for Europe. That means more precisely that Euro-sceptical claims can primarily be discovered among parties of the radical left-wing and the radical right-wing. In contrast Euro-sceptical claims are highly underrepresented in parties of the political centre. The Conservatives in Britain are a significant exception.

This situation can be changed by *critical events* and this is the first contextual factor which is introduced in the model. These are events which have massive consequences for the societies of the EU member countries and hence they have to be addressed by the mass media and the elite discourse. These events can lead to a fundamental restructuring of positions taken by elite actors and the respective opinions of the citizens. Some authors assume that the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon may have been such critical events with negative consequences for the support of the EU. Looking at the political development and empirical findings, however, this could not be proven. The extent to which the current financial crisis may be such a watershed event likewise needs to be assessed via empirical analyses.

According to Habermas (2001, 2004, 2008), the draft of a European constitution had the potential to serve as such a critical event with positive consequences.[8] That it did not do so is explained by Habermas with reference to the lack of politicization preceding the constitutional agreements. In his view, only a discursive opinion-formation process (diskursive Meinungs- und Willensbildung) about a European constitution initiated by the elites and involving the participation of citizens could have resulted in cognitively unambiguous and affectively grounded attitudes to the EU and towards a European identity. To what extent this assessment is plausible will not be discussed in this study. It merely serves to illustrate the potential role of a critical event.

The second contextual factor is *political institutions*. Therein lies the assumption that the institutional structure of a country impacts the structure of political conflict as well as the expectations of the citizens towards their state. For instance it can be assumed the degree of the institutionalization of the welfare state impacts the social standards for the evaluation of the EU which are applied by the citizens as well as by political elites. In their estimation of 'conditional models of mass-elite linkages' of support for European integration, Marco R. Steenbergen, Erica E. Edwards and Catherine E. de Vries (2007) show that both the electoral context and party system attributes can systematically influence the mass-elite linkage. The multi-level analysis by Hooghe and Marks (2005) provides evidence that there is a systematic effect of institutional context factors on support for European integration.

According to Lepsius (1999), not only the political institutions of the individual nation states but also the institutional structure of the EU impact the attitudes of citizens towards the EU and a European identity. Lepsius (1999) assumes that the emergence of a collective identity – such as European identity – depends upon the fact that value orientations and rationality standards of the citizens are institutionalized in the regime. Only if this is given can the commonalities in value orientations and rationality standards become cognitively perceptible to citizens and then they can precipitate into the citizens' behavioural norms. For Lepsius (1999) then, so long as a process of institutionalizing value orientations and rationality standards has not been pursued by the EU regime, the emergence of a European identity is very unlikely.

The third contextual factor is collective memory, which refers to the substance and structure of political conflict as well as to the political predispositions of citizens (see Figure 2.1). The collective memory of a nation is determined by national history.[9]

Collective memory is not a psychological phenomenon according to Aleida Assmann (2006, pp. 216ff.). Rather, it is based on societal memories which are manifested in texts, monuments, symbols and other signifiers (Assmann 2006, pp. 216–7). These expressions of collective memory provide an enormous variety of potential information about the history of a country which can only be selectively accessed. The plethora of potential information is referred to as storage memory (Speichergedächtnis) and selection from this memory by actors is referred to as functional memory (Funktionsgedächtnis) (Assmann and Assmann 1994; Heinrich 2009). The substance selected by functional memory is communicated to the individual in the process of socialization and thus becomes internalized (Heinrich 2009). In a somewhat metaphorical vein, Assmann (2006, p. 218) declares this as follows: 'Collective national memory … is receptive to historical moments of triumph and defeat, provided they can be integrated into the semantics of a heroic or martyriological narrative.' The model presented in Figure 2.1 does not include the differentiation between the two types of collective memory in order to avoid overloading the model in terms of complexity. Hence, the model merely includes the comprehensive category of collective memory. However, only functional memory (Assmann and Assmann 1994) has factual implications on the discourse of political elites and the political predispositions of citizens. In order to emphasize this aspect once more: the functional memory poses a situational selection of memories taken from the storage memory which is fed by documents, literature, symbols, etc.

Surely it can be assumed that the collective memory of elites is more differentiated from and more easily retrievable than that of average citizens. However, this does not exclude the fact that deep-seated memories of citizens provide more or less diffuse elements of collective memory and political predispositions.

According to Bornschier (in this volume), such predispositions in the form of anti-European resentments were mobilized by the populist parties of the extreme left and the extreme right. Bornschier's results confirm that at the level of party supporters there is indeed an inverted U-curve, as Statham and Koopmans (2009) discovered through their media analysis.

In elaborating the model, two aspects were excluded. The first concerns the significance of the mass media. In the model given in Figure 2.1, this is limited to the messages radiated by the discourse of political elites. Research about mass communication has come to the conclusion that the mass media are not only a sender of messages which other actors have created, but the media itself works as a generator of messages. The status of the mass media for the construction of attitudes towards Europe and European identity was one of the issues of the discussion about the European public sphere (Gerhards 1993; Eder and Kantner 2000; Risse 2010).

A second neglected aspect is the direction of the cueing and framing. The model is based on the assumption that mass opinion about the EU and a European identity is predominantly a construction of political elites. Steenbergen et al. (2007) show that under specific structural and situational preconditions the elites can also be influenced by the masses.

Neither aspect was considered in the model presented here. This was in order to clarify the predominant impact structure and to ensure that the model is not marked by over-complexity.

The presented model sets forth the most relevant factors for the emergence of mass opinion towards the EU and to European identity and elaborates causal relationships between such factors based on various studies. By means of this model, I have attempted to address the claim of Checkel and Katzenstein (2009) that the emergence of European identity can only be explained by complex analytical approaches which take into account different analytical levels and diverse methods. To comprehensively and empirically test such a complex model is on the brink of impossibility. But it is possible to make individual aspects of the model subject to empirical studies. Some of the more or less recent studies have been mentioned throughout the explication of the model. The model can also be utilized to put empirical findings into a theoretically meaningful order. Furthermore, it can be used as a heuristic for the identification of research deficits and for the specification of research designs.

NOTES

1. The elaborate differentiation between 'will of the people' (input side) and 'common welfare' (output side) and the tensions raised by the distinction cannot be discussed in detail in this paper. Scharpf (1999, 2009), however, provides further insight to the matter.

2. In line with democratic theory, I employ the notion of popular sovereignty instead of collective self-determination.
3. The differentiation between objective and subjective legitimacy resembles that of internal and external legitimacy by Bellamy and Castiglione (2003) and that of normative and social legitimacy by Follesdal (2006). See also Cerutti (2008) and Thomassen (2009).
4. The concept of European identity is described more closely in the following section.
5. For these two dimensions see Steenbergen and Marks (2004) and Ray (2007).
6. For constitutional patriotism also see Delanty (2002) and Lacroix (2002).
7. Also see the contributions of Schlenker-Fischer as well as Fuchs and Schneider, in this volume, which present new empirical findings.
8. Habermas does not use the term 'critical event', but in my opinion it can be applied to his argumentation.
9. The relevance of national history for the construction of Europe was analysed by Risse (2010) for a selection of EU countries.

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PART II

European identity, national identity and support
for the EU

3. Support of the EU and European identity: Some descriptive results

Dieter Fuchs and Christian Schneider

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The objective of this contribution is to provide a contemporary survey of empirical findings concerning the concepts at the heart of this book: support for the EU and European identity. In order to take into account the different population sizes, the survey is based on a weighted aggregate of the citizens of the EU member states. Some of the analyses are also separately conducted for the member states. The only database which allows for such an empirical survey is the Eurobarometer and it is accordingly upon this that our findings are based.

The presentation and discussion of the empirical findings is guided by the following controversial questions with regard to support for the EU and European identity:

1. Has support for the EU by its citizens declined ever since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) came into effect?
2. Has citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU increased since the Treaty of Maastricht?
3. Is Euroscepticism a widespread phenomenon within the EU?
4. Does a European identity currently exist among the citizens of the EU?
5. Is the relationship between European identity and national identity complementary or conflicting?

3.2 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUPPORT OF THE EU

Generalized Support for the EU

The first question is: Has support for the EU by its citizens declined ever since the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) came into effect?

A vast number of analyses assume such a decline exists; among these we find the contributions to a special edition of *Acta Politica* edited by Liesbet

Hooghe and Gary Marks (2007) as well as the analyses by Simon Hix (2008) and Viktoria Kaina (2009) – to mention a few. The failed constitutional referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland can also be considered as evidence in support of the thesis. Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton (2007) describe this trend of declining support for the EU as the 'post-Maastricht blues' and postulate that the Treaty of Maastricht was a decisive turning point in assessments of the EU in which evaluations turned for the worse.

Both the analysis by Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) and the analysis by Kaina (2009) make use of a Eurobarometer indicator which asks respondents whether the membership of the respondent's country in the EU is considered 'a good thing; a bad thing or neither good nor bad'. Since the question is formulated in a very general manner and therefore an unspecific evaluation is made by the respondent, this indicator serves to measure generalized support for the EU (cf. Fuchs, Chapter 9 in this volume). A second frequently used indicator poses the question whether or not the respondent's home country benefited from EU membership. The wording of the question hints at an instrumental cost–benefit calculation. However, one can argue, and show by means of a factor analysis, that this indicator serves to provide an overall evaluation of the EU (Niedermayer 1991, 1995; Kaina 2009).

Based on the two aforementioned indicators, Figure 3.1 depicts the development of support for the EU from 1992, when the Treaty of Maastricht came into effect, to 2009. The time series are made for the weighted aggregate of the EU member states as given at the respective point in time; that is, the analysis takes into account the waves of enlargement. Hence in 1995, twelve member states were considered (EU-12), whereas between 1995 and 2004 EU-15, between 2005 and 2007 EU-25, and between 2007 and 2009 the EU-27 are considered. This procedure is based on the conviction that the functioning and further development of the EU requires a community upon which the regime of the EU rests at the given point in time.

To exclude the possibility that the development of support for the EU is influenced by the changing composition of the EU, Figure 3.2 shows the trend for the EU-12 from 1992 – the time of the Treaty of Maastricht – over the entire time period. The percentages in Figure 3.2 include missing values in order to provide the most realistic assessment of the support of the EU.

Neither time series provides evidence in favour of the post-Maastricht blues thesis. A decline in the support of the EU after Maastricht can be noted. However, the decline begins shortly after 1990, which the time series presented by Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, p. 42) shows. A relationship between this fact and the Treaty of Maastricht can only be established if one asserts that discussions about Maastricht had been held prior to the treaty coming into effect and that these discussions impacted the attitudes of citizens. This seems very unlikely, given the fact that European questions display a low degree

Notes:

Questions: 'Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY's) membership of the European Union is/would be a good thing/a bad thing/neither good nor bad?'

'Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?'

[a] Weighted aggregate of EU member states at the time.

Source: Eurobarometer 37-72.

Figure 3.1 Support of the European Union since Maastricht[a] (%)

Notes:
Questions: 'Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY's) membership of the European Union is/would be a good thing/a bad thing/neither good nor bad?'
'Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?'
[a] Weighted aggregate of EU-12 member states (including East Germany).

Source: Eurobarometer 37-72.

Figure 3.2 Support of the European Union since Maastricht[a] (%)

of attention to EU-level developments and the fact that politics are of minor importance to the average citizen. The empirical finding of a decline in support of the EU in the 1990s compared to the 1980s is based on the peak of positive support in the year 1990. At that point in time, support achieved a value which remains unparalleled. The political constellation – the fall of the communist systems in Eastern Europe – sparked a euphoria which impacted many political attitudes. Furthermore, the lowest measured value of support in the time series by Eichenberg and Dalton (2007, p. 42) was in 1981, that is, long before Maastricht was on the agenda.

A further argument against the notion of post-Maastricht blues is the development of support over the entire time span between 1992 and 2009. A decrease in support can only be noted until autumn 1996. Afterwards, the relatively strong fluctuations make it difficult to determine a trend for the time series. However, it may be noted that the fluctuation between 40 per cent and 50 per cent has shifted upward to a span between 50 per cent and 60 per cent. If a trend is to be postulated at all then, it is a positive rather than a negative one, since these results speak for an increase in support for the Union.

It is therefore clear that the empirical record is not compatible with the thesis of post-Maastricht blues. The thesis assumes that the transformation from an intergovernmental to a supranational regime, which was initiated by Maastricht, has decisively impacted the support for the EU of its citizens and has led to an increase of Euroscepticism. Since the Union's transformation through Maastricht has been fortified through the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007), one would likewise expect a further decrease of support for the EU. Looking at the empirical findings in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the case is rather the contrary. Apparently, the citizens' perception and evaluation of the EU is guided by other criteria to those of political and scientific elites. This discrepancy between the assumptions theoretically postulated by elites and the factual attitudes of citizens also plays a decisive role in the empirical analysis in the following section.

Satisfaction with the Democracy in the EU

The second question is: Has citizens' dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU increased since the Treaty of Maastricht?

We would like to briefly elaborate the thesis before discussing the empirical results. Changes of evaluative standards are considered to be a relevant reason for the assumed attitudinal change of the citizens towards the EU after Maastricht. The aforementioned transformation from an intergovernmental regime to a supranational regime with far-reaching competences has deeply changed the basis of legitimacy of the European regime (Beetham and Lord 1998; Blondel et al. 1998; Katz and Wessels 1999; Thomassen and Schmitt

1999). An indirect legitimization mediated by the nation-state is according to this thesis no longer sufficient. Consequently, the citizens of the post-Maastricht EU increasingly evaluate the EU according to standards which are applied to the democracy of the respective nation-state. One of these standards concerns the extent to which a regime meets the normative requirements of a democracy. The change of evaluative standards has a crucial effect. That is, the democratic deficit, which always existed in the EU, becomes apparent to the citizens only against the backdrop of the EU's transformation into a supranational regime; this in turn results in a deficit of legitimacy.[1]

A series of Eurobarometer surveys contains the question about 'satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the European Union' and this is considered an adequate indicator for the assessment of legitimacy by the citizens. This indicator serves to determine how citizens actually evaluate democracy within the EU. This evaluation is a subjective assessment of legitimacy by the citizens and not an objective one by elites (for the differentiation between subjective and objective legitimacy cf. Fuchs: Cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU: A theoretical framework, in this volume). Figure 3.3 describes the time series of the weighted aggregate of the EU member states at the time and Figure 3.4 describes the time series for the weighted aggregate for EU-12.

According to these time series, a decline in satisfaction with democracy is only detectable between 1993 and 1998. After 1998, the satisfaction with democracy has been increasing and since 2001 the share of satisfied citizens outnumbers those who are dissatisfied. This accounts for both time series. A continuous increase of satisfaction with the functioning of the democracy of the EU can be noted since mid-2004 and the number of dissatisfied citizens wanes.

The time series presented in Figures 3.1 to 3.4 disprove the thesis of declining support of the EU. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a declining level of satisfaction with democracy.

Having conducted an analysis of attitudinal trends on the part of the citizens of the EU, we shall now analyse the contemporary situation in closer detail.

3.3 THE CONTEMPORARY STATE OF SUPPORT OF THE EU

Generalized Support of the EU

The third question is: Is Euroscepticism a widespread phenomenon within the EU?

This question can be answered by analysing the distributions which are shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. These tables depict support of the EU with regard to the two indicators used for the two time series. The percentages are provided for the weighted aggregate of EU-27 as well as for the individual member states.

Notes:

Questions: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?'

'And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?'

Comment: Percentages of respondents who answered 'very satisfied', 'fairly satisfied' (= satisfied) or 'not very satisfied', 'not satisfied at all' (= not satisfied).

[a] Weighted aggregate of EU member states at the time.

Source: Eurobarometer 37-72.

Figure 3.3 Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the European Union since Maastricht[a]

Figure 3.4   Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the European Union since Maastricht[a]

Table 3.1 shows that 52.3 per cent of EU citizens consider the membership of their home country in the EU a 'good thing' and Table 3.2 that 55.2 per cent believe their home country has profited from their membership in the EU. There is no such thing as a clear criterion or benchmark that states which percentage of critical attitudes towards the EU has to be reached in order to claim Euroscepticism. However, if only 15.6 per cent of the citizens consider the membership of their home country in the EU 'a bad thing', then one cannot speak of a wide-spread Euroscepticism. The number of citizens who do not believe that the membership of their home country in the EU has been profitable is somewhat higher (32 per cent). This finding could be traced back to the fact of dichotomized response categories, that is, indecisive responses could not be made. Nevertheless, the number of positive responses clearly outweighs the number of negative responses and hence the evidence calls into question the widespread thesis of Euroscepticism.

The comparison of the individual countries shows that significant differences between the countries can be noted. The number of citizens who believe that the membership of their home country in the EU is 'a good thing' varies between 22.2 per cent (Latvia) and 78.2 per cent (Netherlands). In only two countries the number of negative responses ('a bad thing') outweighs the number of positive responses ('a good thing'), namely Latvia and the UK.

A similarly high variance between the countries can also be noted for the question of the benefit which a respondent's country draws from membership in the EU. The perceived benefit is lowest among the citizens of Bulgaria (30.8 per cent), Hungary (34.2 per cent) and the UK (35.5 per cent), whereas the citizens of Ireland (81.4 per cent) and Denmark (76 per cent) consider EU membership most beneficial. Strikingly, the number of responses suggesting the country in question had 'not benefited' from membership is higher than that of the 'benefited' responses for four of 27 EU countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and the UK.

Various factors can be considered to explain the differences between the countries. Certainly, the question of who materially benefited from the EU membership (e.g., Ireland) and who was disappointed by their EU membership (e.g., Bulgaria) could provide an explanation. However, long-term factors, such as the structure of political institutions within the home country and, above all, national history should also be taken into account (see, for example, Figure 2.1 in Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume). Which factors factually determine the positive or negative responses would have to be clarified in a systematic analysis, which is not an objective of this analysis.

Satisfaction with Democracy in the EU

How satisfied are the citizens with democracy in the EU?

Table 3.1   Support for the EU: EU membership (%)

| Country | EU Membership is | | | |
	... a good thing	... neither good nor bad	...a bad thing	*don't know*
Austria	41.2	32.9	21.9	4.0
Belgium	67.2	21.7	10.0	1.1
Bulgaria	39.1	43.9	10.3	6.7
Cyprus	53.8	27.2	18.7	0.4
Czech Republic	43.0	42.1	13.0	1.9
Denmark	65.7	19.3	13.3	1.7
Estonia	59.2	30.7	6.9	3.2
Finland	48.5	31.5	18.2	1.9
France	51.2	26.9	18.3	3.7
Germany	60.6	24.7	10.8	4.0
Greece	44.1	40.7	14.8	0.4
Hungary	32.6	41.3	22.6	3.6
Ireland	69.5	15.0	8.1	7.4
Italy	42.9	32.0	19.2	5.8
Latvia	22.2	48.3	25.9	3.7
Lithuania	54.7	26.9	12.9	5.5
Luxembourg	76.0	14.5	7.9	1.6
Malta	48.6	28.8	17.6	5.0
Netherlands	78.2	13.9	6.5	1.4
Poland	56.6	29.0	8.3	6.1
Portugal	45.2	20.8	20.5	13.5
Romania	67.0	21.3	6.1	5.6
Slovakia	63.3	29.3	4.5	2.9
Slovenia	55.7	34.0	9.4	0.9
Spain	63.4	19.9	10.1	6.6
Sweden	57.3	23.9	17.6	1.2
UK	28.6	32.5	32.7	6.2
EU-27[a]	52.3	27.4	15.6	4.7

Notes:
Question: 'Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY's) membership of the European Union is ... a good thing/a bad thing/neither good nor bad? a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, don't know.'
[a] Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 71 (2009).

Table 3.2   Support for the EU: Member state's benefit (%)

Country	Our country has…		
	…benefited	… not benefited	don't know
Austria	43.9	42.4	13.7
Belgium	70.4	25.6	3.9
Bulgaria	30.8	43.8	25.4
Cyprus	58.9	35.7	5.4
Czech Republic	61.4	28.5	10.1
Denmark	76.0	17.6	6.4
Estonia	75.5	18.2	6.3
Finland	56.0	35.2	8.8
France	53.0	34.8	12.2
Germany	56.4	33.5	10.1
Greece	68.1	27.7	4.2
Hungary	34.2	55.0	10.8
Ireland	81.4	9.0	9.6
Italy	41.7	40.9	17.4
Latvia	34.5	55.7	9.8
Lithuania	68.4	16.5	15.0
Luxembourg	74.4	18.3	7.3
Malta	59.8	23.4	16.8
Netherlands	75.4	17.0	7.7
Poland	70.0	15.4	14.6
Portugal	54.2	28.8	17.0
Romania	68.2	15.0	16.9
Slovakia	77.3	11.5	11.2
Slovenia	71.2	24.2	4.6
Spain	62.8	24.3	12.9
Sweden	52.6	32.4	14.9
UK	35.5	50.5	14.1
EU-27[a]	55.2	32.0	12.7

Notes:
Question: 'Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUNTRY) has benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?'
[a]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 71 (2009).

Table 3.3   Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU (%)

Country	Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU				
	very satisfied	fairly satisfied	not very satisfied	not satisfied at all	don't know
Austria	7.0	40.2	33.0	13.0	6.8
Belgium	5.5	60.2	24.3	4.8	5.3
Bulgaria	12.1	25.4	11.2	10.8	40.5
Cyprus	10.4	35.2	21.0	5.2	28.2
Czech Republic	5.5	53.0	24.6	4.3	12.6
Denmark	7.0	55.6	26.1	3.5	7.8
Estonia	3.7	48.8	20.8	3.1	23.6
Finland	2.4	34.5	45.1	11.6	6.4
France	3.3	45.6	27.4	6.8	16.9
Germany	6.8	45.3	32.7	6.8	8.4
Greece	9.6	46.9	29.3	11.7	2.5
Hungary	4.3	48.3	23.8	5.5	18.1
Ireland	11.5	46.2	11.2	5.9	25.2
Italy	6.8	41.6	30.4	7.6	13.6
Latvia	6.6	47.5	17.7	3.4	24.9
Lithuania	5.6	41.6	20.1	2.7	29.9
Luxembourg	7.8	46.6	26.5	9.0	10.2
Malta	12.6	43.2	16.6	9.0	18.6
Netherlands	1.5	41.8	41.4	6.6	8.8
Poland	8.3	56.9	11.7	3.3	19.8
Portugal	5.7	39.8	32.1	4.8	17.6
Romania	8.0	42.3	16.0	6.8	26.9
Slovakia	3.2	43.1	31.3	6.6	15.8
Slovenia	4.6	55.2	25.1	5.2	9.9
Spain	12.2	51.8	11.1	2.9	22.0
Sweden	3.0	41.6	31.6	7.2	16.7
UK	2.3	30.7	25.6	13.5	27.9
EU-27[a]	6.5	44.8	25.2	7.1	16.5

Notes:
Questions: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)? very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not satisfied at all, don't know.'
'And how about the way democracy works in the European Union? very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not satisfied at all, don't know.'
[a]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 68 (2007).

Table 3.4   Satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU and in own country (correlations[a])

Country	Correlations[a]
Austria	.508
Belgium	.586
Bulgaria	.174
Cyprus	.549
Czech Republic	.652
Denmark	.347
Estonia	.506
Finland	.485
France	.576
Germany	.658
Greece	.602
Hungary	.417
Ireland	.649
Italy	.660
Latvia	.425
Lithuania	.449
Luxembourg	.601
Malta	.723
Netherlands	.444
Poland	.397
Portugal	.665
Romania	.144
Slovakia	.562
Slovenia	.649
Spain	.735
Sweden	.477
UK	.479
EU-27[b]	.521

Notes:
Questions: 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY)?'
'And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?'
'Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY's) membership of the European Union is/would be a good thing/a bad thing/neither good nor bad?'
[a]   Pearson's r, all values are significant at the 99.9 per cent level.
[b]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 68 (2007).

If we assume that the EU is factually marked by a democratic deficit, then the comparatively high degree of satisfaction (51.3 per cent very satisfied and fairly satisfied) with the functioning of democracy in the EU for the weighted aggregate of EU-27 compared to the relatively low degree of dissatisfaction (32.3 per cent not very satisfied and not at all satisfied) is rather surprising (see Table 3.3). Doubts may be raised as to whether the evaluation of democracy of the EU can be considered an independent attitude, which is based on the perceptions of the structure and processes of the regime of the EU. The relatively high number of respondents who answered 'don't know' hints at this direction. A further clue could be that the factor of satisfaction with democracy in the EU has virtually no effect on the explanation of European integration and generalized support for the EU (see also Fuchs, Chapter 9 in this volume). According to Fuchs (2003) and Kritzinger (2003), many citizens generalize the satisfaction with democracy in their home country into satisfaction with democracy in the EU due to their lack of knowledge about the EU. The satisfaction with democracy in the home country is used as a substitute or proxy for the evaluation of satisfaction with democracy in the EU. An empirical finding favouring generalization can be found in Table 3.4, which shows that very strong and highly significant correlations can be found between the two attitudes.

3.4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

European Identity

The fourth question is: Does a European identity currently exist among the citizens of the EU?

The concept of European identity is discussed in Fuchs, (Chapter 2 in this volume). In this contribution, the following operational definition of identity is provided: 'The higher the degree of subjective assignment to the collective of Europeans (extensity) and the stronger the attachment to the collective is (intensity), the stronger the sense of European identity.'

An adequate measurement of European identity – and national identity – can be conducted via the question provided in the Eurobarometer: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel (a) to your country (b) to Europe? Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not attached at all.'

Since European identity focuses on the collective of Europeans the stimulus in the question should have been 'Europeans'. We assume that respondents do not clearly differentiate between 'Europe' and 'Europeans'. Another question is whether the identification with Europe is just another measurement than that of the identification with the EU (Citrin and Sides 2004; Caporaso and Kim 2009). It

Table 3.5   Attachment to Europe (%)

| Country | Attachment to Europe | | | | |
	very attached	fairly attached	not very attached	not attached at all	don't know
Austria	16.9	42.3	33.8	5.5	1.4
Belgium	27.6	47.8	20.0	4.5	0.1
Bulgaria	20.8	42.7	22.9	8.8	4.8
Cyprus	5.6	32.2	44.0	17.6	0.6
Czech Republic	19.9	53.6	20.7	4.3	1.5
Denmark	38.4	43.6	16.5	1.1	0.5
Estonia	12.4	36.5	38.3	11.6	1.3
Finland	21.3	48.7	25.2	4.2	0.7
France	17.0	45.8	27.8	8.8	0.6
Germany	21.6	49.7	25.0	3.0	0.7
Greece	10.7	37.0	39.1	13.2	0.0
Hungary	47.9	39.9	10.3	1.4	0.5
Ireland	19.7	42.6	25.1	9.5	3.1
Italy	18.5	51.4	25.5	3.4	1.2
Latvia	14.3	39.4	33.5	11.1	1.7
Lithuania	12.7	33.3	40.9	11.1	1.9
Luxembourg	37.6	44.0	14.8	3.0	0.6
Malta	31.0	40.2	24.0	3.4	1.4
Netherlands	19.3	39.4	33.2	7.5	0.6
Poland	25.8	54.3	15.2	2.3	2.4
Portugal	16.0	46.7	31.3	5.3	0.7
Romania	25.3	42.9	25.6	3.3	2.9
Slovakia	13.4	51.2	30.3	4.3	0.7
Slovenia	21.5	43.5	28.6	4.9	1.5
Spain	23.9	44.5	24.8	4.9	2.0
Sweden	29.9	48.8	18.0	2.5	0.9
UK	11.5	40.9	32.7	13.6	1.2
EU-27[a]	20.3	46.6	25.9	5.9	1.3

Notes:
Question: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel (a) to your country; (b) to Europe, very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not attached at all.'
[a]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 67 (2007).

can be empirically proven that the meanings which citizens associate with the two objects differ. Thus, the two concepts – attachment to Europe and attachment to the EU – measure different attitudes (Bruter 2005; Kaina 2009). The direct question for the attachment to Europe measures the attitude which is included in the operational definition and hence one can speak of a face validity of the indicator. The validity of the indicator can be verified by a factor analysis in which this indicator, together with the indicator 'proud to be European'[2], form one factor. In this regard, both feature high factor loading (see Fuchs, Chapter 9 in this volume).

Figure 3.5 shows that 20.3 per cent of all EU citizens feel very attached and 46.6 per cent are fairly attached to Europe. In total then, 66.9 per cent of the respondents feel an attachment to Europe, whereas 31.8 per cent cannot claim a feeling of attachment. Given the premise that first, this indicator validly measures European identity and second, that the operational definition of European identity is tenable, then it can be concluded that there currently exists a European identity. The open question is: How do European identity and national identity relate to one another?

European Identity and National Identity

The fifth question is: Is the relationship between European identity and national identity complementary or conflicting?

Before systematically addressing this question, we shall analyse the distribution and development of the two types of collective identity. Table 3.6 lists the percentages of attachment to Europe and the respondent's home country.

The first relevant finding for our question is the attachment professed to the respondent's home country. Both for the aggregate of EU-27 and for the individual country this attachment is very pronounced. The average for all European citizens shows that 90.6 per cent feel attached to their own country. Second, attachment to Europe is significantly lower (66.9 per cent) – a difference of 23.7 percentage points. This difference is comparatively even more distinct if only intense attachment ('very attached') is considered.

The two time series in Figure 3.5 show that this difference between the attachment to the own country and to Europe has existed over the entire time span between 1995 and 2007.

Data for the periods before 1995 and after 2007 were not available for the two time series of Figure 3.5. Nonetheless, the data are sufficient to cover 12 years and show the basic trend. The degree of attachment to the respondent's home country varies only slightly over time and always moves around the extremely high value of 90 per cent. Unlike this, attachment to Europe is relatively lower over the entire time span. However, there is no decrease, but an increase of the attachment to Europe from 1995 to 2007. Hence, the post-Maastricht blues thesis is more or less also disproven by this result.

Table 3.6   Attachment to Europe or own country (%)

Country	Attachment to...[a]			Intense attachment to...[b]		
	Europe	Country	Difference	Europe	Country	Difference
Austria	59.2	94.2	35.0	16.9	52.4	35.5
Belgium	75.4	84.5	9.1	27.6	42.8	15.2
Bulgaria	63.5	95.5	32.0	20.8	73.4	52.6
Cyprus	37.8	94.4	56.6	5.6	60.6	55.0
Czech Republic	73.5	92.0	18.5	19.9	40.7	20.8
Denmark	81.9	97.2	15.3	38.4	79.7	41.3
Estonia	48.9	94.7	45.8	12.4	65.0	52.6
Finland	69.9	96.3	26.4	21.3	65.2	43.9
France	62.8	92.1	29.3	17.0	54.4	37.4
Germany	71.3	87.7	16.4	21.6	40.7	19.1
Greece	47.7	97.5	49.8	10.7	77.4	66.7
Hungary	87.8	96.0	8.2	47.9	75.9	28.0
Ireland	62.3	95.0	32.7	19.7	61.4	41.7
Italy	69.9	90.6	20.7	18.5	43.5	25.0
Latvia	53.7	91.3	37.6	14.3	65.7	51.4
Lithuania	46.1	92.5	46.4	12.7	62.1	49.4
Luxembourg	81.6	92.4	10.8	37.6	60.6	23.0
Malta	71.2	95.8	24.6	31.0	73.0	42.0
Netherlands	58.7	83.2	24.5	19.3	42.8	23.5
Poland	80.1	97.4	17.3	25.8	67.3	41.5
Portugal	62.7	95.9	33.2	16.0	60.5	44.5
Romania	68.2	93.5	25.3	25.3	52.3	27.0
Slovakia	64.6	93.1	28.5	13.4	44.4	31.0
Slovenia	65.0	95.1	30.1	21.5	60.4	38.9
Spain	68.4	90.7	22.3	23.9	52.2	28.3
Sweden	78.6	94.7	16.1	29.9	60.9	31.0
UK	52.4	86.1	33.7	11.5	52.2	40.7
EU-27[c]	66.9	90.6	23.7	20.3	51.4	31.1

Notes:
Question: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel a) to your country b) to Europe? very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not attached at all, don't know.'
[a]   Percentages of respondents who answered 'very attached' and 'fairly attached'.
[b]   Percentages of respondents who answered 'very attached'.
[c]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 67 (2007).

Notes:
Questions: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their village, to their town or city, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to … your country/Europe? very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not attached at all'.
Comment: Percentages of persons who answered 'very attached' and 'fairly attached'.
[a]   Weighted aggregate of EU member states at the time.

Source: Eurobarometer 43-67.

Figure 3.5   Attachment to own country or to Europe[a] *(%)*

   The described difference between European identity and national identity is not very surprising. National identity in the individual member states of the EU has grown over a long period of time and is deeply rooted among citizens. One of the questions in the scientific debate is therefore over the need to specify the relationship between the two types of collective identity – are they conflicting or complementary?[3]

   This question can be answered on the basis of a typology of collective identity (see Table 3.7).

   The typology is based on two analytic steps. In the first, two positive answer categories are merged ('very attached' and 'fairly attached'), as are two negative ones ('not very attached' and 'not attached at all'). This creates two dichotomized variables. In the second step, the two dichotomies' variables are combined. Four types of collective identity result: (1) 'multiple identity' includes all respondents who feature an attachment to their nation as well as to Europe; (2) 'national identity only' refers to those respondents who feature an exclusive attachment to their own nation and none to Europe; (3) 'European identity only' is the aforementioned vice versa; (4) 'no collective identity' is given if the respondent is attached neither to his or her nation nor to Europe.

   With regard to the matter of compatibility or complementarity in national and European identities, the most relevant finding as shown in Table 3.7 is that 63.8 per cent of EU citizens possess a multiple identity and only 25.8 per cent feature an exclusive national identity. Hence, for two-thirds of all the respondents the two types of collective identity are complementary and only for approximately a quarter of the respondents are collective identities conflicting (for complementary relationship between national and European identity see also Westle 2003; and Kaina 2009).

   Most analyses of European identity to date have referred to emotional attachment to the collective of Europeans. The question of what the substantive source of this attachment may be, however, remains an open question. A content-free attachment is rarely possible. The Eurobarometer does not provide any sufficient and valid indicators for the content of European identity. However, as a substitute, one could possibly consider the question: 'In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that go to make up a European identity?' The respondents received a list of seven elements and Table 3.8 shows the percentages in which the individual elements were chosen.

   The element which was chosen most commonly by far is 'democratic values' (40.8 per cent), which is followed by a group of four elements which show a varying percentage between 26.6 per cent and 21.6 per cent: geography 26.6 per cent, social protection 26.4 per cent, common history 22.5 per cent, common culture 21.6 per cent. For the two other elements the percentages fall steeply.

Table 3.7   Collective identities among Europe's citizens (%)

Country	multiple identities	national identity only	European identity only	no identity	don't know[b]
			Type of identity[a]		
Austria	58.7	34.3	0.6	4.7	1.5
Belgium	67.6	16.8	7.8	7.7	0.1
Bulgaria	62.5	28.7	1.0	2.9	4.9
Cyprus	37.0	56.8	0.8	4.8	0.6
Czech Republic	71.1	19.4	2.4	5.6	1.5
Denmark	80.9	16.1	1.1	1.5	0.5
Estonia	48.1	45.6	0.8	4.3	1.3
Finland	68.5	27.3	1.4	2.0	0.8
France	60.6	30.9	2.1	5.7	0.6
Germany	66.5	20.6	4.8	7.4	0.8
Greece	46.9	50.6	0.8	1.7	0.0
Hungary	85.2	10.3	2.6	1.4	0.5
Ireland	60.9	32.0	1.4	2.6	3.1
Italy	67.6	22.2	2.2	6.7	1.3
Latvia	52.3	37.5	1.4	7.1	1.8
Lithuania	44.6	46.1	1.5	5.8	2.0
Luxembourg	78.0	14.0	3.6	3.8	0.6
Malta	69.4	25.2	1.8	2.2	1.4
Netherlands	52.8	30.1	5.9	10.6	0.6
Poland	78.7	16.6	1.3	0.9	2.5
Portugal	61.3	33.9	1.4	2.8	0.7
Romania	65.5	25.3	2.5	3.5	3.2
Slovakia	63.1	29.5	1.6	5.0	0.8
Slovenia	63.9	29.7	1.1	3.8	1.5
Spain	65.4	23.5	3.0	6.1	2.1
Sweden	76.4	17.5	2.2	2.9	1.1
UK	48.5	36.7	3.9	9.6	1.3
EU-27[c]	63.8	25.8	3.1	6.0	1.4

Notes:
Question: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel a) to your country b) to Europe? very attached, fairly attached, not very attached, not attached at all, don't know.'
[a]   The categories of the attachments 'to country' and 'to Europe' are dichotomized for both variables ('very attached' and 'fairly attached' vs. 'not very attached' and 'not attached at all'). The dichotomized variables are combined, creating a typology with four types of collective identity.
[b]   All respondents who answered 'don't know' did so with reference to either national or European attachment.
[c]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 67 (2007).

Table 3.8   Elements of a European identity (%)

Country	Democratic values	Geography	Social protection	Common history	Common culture	Entrepreneurship	Religious heritage	Don't know	None/There is no European identity (spontaneous)	Others
Austria	44.0	27.7	31.2	26.3	27.3	5.6	9.1	2.0	7.1	0.5
Belgium	52.1	19.5	32.5	19.0	21.6	19.1	6.9	3.1	3.0	0.7
Bulgaria	37.0	36.5	23.6	21.5	26.1	8.3	5.7	11.0	2.2	0.2
Cyprus	53.9	22.0	32.3	18.8	29.5	8.9	13.7	5.1	2.2	0.0
Czech Republic	43.5	19.4	31.4	23.9	21.5	12.0	5.4	5.9	3.9	0.1
Denmark	72.6	12.9	34.2	24.2	20.3	10.8	5.2	2.6	2.2	0.2
Estonia	33.9	23.5	29.8	21.3	23.2	19.6	5.6	10.6	0.8	0.5
Finland	48.3	27.1	33.6	21.2	21.3	13.8	10.1	1.7	2.8	0.3
France	47.8	34.5	21.1	25.4	22.9	14.3	6.6	3.9	2.6	0.0
Germany	52.1	19.3	35.0	23.6	20.2	7.6	7.7	5.2	3.9	0.2
Greece	32.4	47.1	20.5	21.5	22.0	10.2	8.0	0.8	6.9	0.6
Hungary	36.9	24.0	23.4	35.2	25.6	8.0	7.5	7.6	3.7	0.5
Ireland	32.1	33.9	23.8	27.0	24.8	8.8	7.6	11.9	3.3	0.5
Italy	39.5	18.8	24.9	22.6	28.5	14.7	9.5	6.3	3.7	0.1
Latvia	26.3	49.8	21.3	18.7	13.8	19.1	5.7	5.8	2.5	0.2
Lithuania	43.5	14.4	46.7	9.6	17.3	14.3	4.1	13.4	1.2	0.4
Luxembourg	49.6	20.4	34.9	26.0	18.7	7.0	7.2	5.3	3.8	0.6
Malta	51.0	24.2	32.4	11.6	21.8	5.0	14.4	10.0	1.0	0.0
Netherlands	54.8	32.1	27.7	20.1	16.5	11.8	7.8	5.1	1.6	0.4
Poland	26.1	21.6	14.1	25.8	26.5	17.6	14.4	11.8	2.0	0.5
Portugal	25.6	19.1	18.4	20.6	19.0	7.0	5.1	25.8	2.1	0.6
Romania	29.9	24.2	25.8	32.6	20.9	8.8	12.6	12.3	2.2	0.6
Slovakia	37.5	36.4	28.5	27.2	21.1	9.8	11.3	4.6	0.8	0.4
Slovenia	33.4	40.3	20.3	27.9	17.9	15.5	6.9	2.2	6.1	1.8
Spain	29.2	36.4	9.9	30.0	28.7	8.8	4.5	7.1	3.5	2.9
Sweden	79.4	16.8	44.1	14.1	13.6	8.8	3.6	2.3	2.3	0.6
UK	34.8	21.1	18.6	17.9	20.9	3.9	8.0	13.5	14.4	1.1
EU-27[a]	40.8	26.6	26.4	22.5	21.6	11.5	8.5	7.8	3.6	0.6

Notes:
Question: 'In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that go to make up a European identity?' Two answers could be given.
[a]   Weighted aggregate of EU-27 member states.

Source: Eurobarometer 71 (2009).

How far this empirical finding provides conclusive information about the substantial basis of European identity is open for discussion. On the one hand, the share of respondents who answered with 'don't know' is relatively low and this indicates that the respondents are capable of answering this question. Furthermore, the percentages of the individual elements seem plausible. On the other hand, this indicator has two inherent weaknesses. First, for the closed question, the respondents receive a list of seven elements. Hence, the number of possible meanings ascribed to the EU is limited and the probability of shared associations is enhanced by the format of the question. Second, it is questionable whether the respondents understand the stimulus 'European identity', i.e., grasp what is theoretically meant by it and provide their answers in light of this knowledge. According to social psychological theories (Turner et al. 1987), the substantial basis upon which individuals assign themselves to a collective is based on the subjective assumption that there are shared similarities between members of the collective. The indicator in Table 3.7 does not consider this or at best measures it indirectly. This suggests that further research is needed as to the substantial base of European identity.

3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The empirical findings presented in this chapter allow for a relatively clear answer to the questions posed in the introductory section:

- After the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) neither a trend of erosion for the support of the EU nor an increase in dissatisfaction with democracy in the EU can be identified. Since 1997, both attitudes rather show a trend towards increasing support for the EU and increasing satisfaction with democracy in the EU. The thesis of the post-Maastricht blues cannot be maintained by our data.
- Currently, we cannot speak of widespread Euroscepticism with regard to either generalized support of the EU or in terms of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in the EU. We derive this conclusion from the distribution of percentages: 52.3 per cent of the citizens of the EU consider the membership of their own country to be a good thing and only 15.6 per cent consider it a bad thing. Furthermore, 51.3 per cent are satisfied with the functioning of the democracy in the EU and only 32.3 per cent are dissatisfied. The latter result is all the more remarkable since there is an objective democratic deficit in the EU.
- Currently, a European identity can be said to exist. After all, 66.9 per cent of Europe's citizens feel an attachment to Europe. For 63.8 per cent, an attachment to Europe as well as to the respondent's own nation can

be noted and hence these respondents display a multiple identity. For the relative majority, the citizens of Europe consider European identity and national identity to be compatible.

In conclusion and against the backdrop of the empirical results outlined in this analysis, there is no apparent crisis with regard to citizens' relationship with the EU. Yet in the scholarly debates, a number of theoretically plausible arguments have been developed which argue that there is decreasing support for the EU and its democracy, and that European identity – if it exists at all – is very weak. This suggests that there is a gap between citizens' perceptions and those of political and scientific elites. Whether the empirically detected attitudes of the citizens towards the EU are enduring – they display after all low centrality and embeddedness – remains an open question.

NOTES

1. For discussion about the democratic deficit and the legitimacy deficit of the EU, see Beetham and Lord (1998); Majone (1998); Scharpf (1999, 2009); Schmitter (2000); Moravcsik (2002, 2008); Bellamy and Castiglione (2003); Lord (2004); Follesdal (2006); Follesdal and Hix (2006); Hix (2008); Thomassen (2009).
2. In this case, the stimulus object is 'European' and not 'Europe'.
3. For the discussion about national and European identity, see McLaren (2002); Westle (2003); Citrin and Sides (2004); Bruter (2005); Duchesne and Frognier (2008); Fuchs et al. (2009); Hooghe and Marks (2009); Kaina (2009); Risse (2010).

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4. Multiple identities and attitudes towards cultural diversity in Europe: A conceptual and empirical analysis

Andrea Schlenker-Fischer

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The self-proclaimed aim of the European Union is 'Unity in diversity'. However it is not yet clear what actually unites European citizens[1] except for institutional and economic cooperation. The lack of a 'European demos' is usually decried. Still, there are signs of a considerable sense of identification with Europe, which goes hand in hand with a heightened awareness that the emergence of a European demos does not necessarily mean the disappearance of national attachments. As literature in the field of social psychological research suggests, individuals hold multiple identities (Brewer 1993, 2001). This is as true in the political as in the social realm. Study after study has affirmed that it is possible and not at all unusual for citizens to identify with several territorial communities simultaneously – to feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish and European at the same time (Llera 1993; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; on multiple identities in Belgium see, for example, Billiet et al. 2003; in general: Duchesne and Frognier 1995, 2008; Laffan 1996; Marks 1999; Bruter 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004).

While identification with Europe is increasing among elites and ordinary citizens alike (Risse 2004, p. 270), attachment to one's country has remained stable in general (Citrin and Sides 2004, p. 169). Yet are we witnessing a uniform trend across all member states? Given the prevalence of the nation-state as the arena of public discourse and as the frame of shared representations for collective identities, it comes as no surprise that citizens in member states differ widely in the extent to which they simultaneously identify with Europe and the nation (ibid., p. 168; see also Fuchs et al. 2009). What influences the emergence of multiple identities or the coexistence of national and European identities? Are specific ways of constructing national identity more amenable than others to the simultaneous development of a European identity? These questions touch upon the subtle ways in which national identity is framed and

politically mobilized in relation to European integration (Fuchs et al. 1995; Kriesi et al. 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999; McLaren 2001, 2002; Risse 2001; Carey 2002; Bruter 2003; Hermann et al. 2004; on Britain: Usherwood 2002; on Denmark: Buch and Hansen 2002). Countries vary widely in this respect, not least because debates over European integration may be more or less politicized in different states.[2] In some contexts, national identity may exist alongside, or even reinforce, a sense of European identity and support for European integration. In others, national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the EU threatens national institutions, weakens the national community and undermines national sovereignty (Risse 2001). 'Political events and discourse may – or, in some countries, may not – construe for individuals that national identity is contradictory with support for European integration. In short, national identity is profoundly shaped by politics' (Marks and Hooghe 2003, p. 24).

A similar story can be told about perceptions of European integration as representing a cultural or economic threat. McLaren (2002) stresses that opposition to European integration taps into deep-seated fears.[3] Yet, the salience of such fears varies widely across countries. The link between fears and perceptions of European integration is not automatic but mobilized during political conflicts. In short, national identities as well as cultural and economic fears are interpreted and constructed differently in diverse national contexts (Marks and Hooghe 2003, p. 25). A main source of insecurity may be Europe's immense cultural diversity. As McLaren puts it, '(a)ntipathy toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization … but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures' (2002, p. 553).[4] The question of how to cope with difference lies at the heart of European integration. Each member state has its own approach and experience in this respect. The way cultural diversity is dealt with is a good indicator of the way national identity is constructed in a specific political community. This becomes evident in the ways ethnic minorities – which emerged either out of historical processes of nation-building, or as a result of growing international migration – are included. Given the obvious cultural heterogeneity of the European Union, the inclusion of cultural 'others' into national identities may impact people's identification with 'Europe'.

Bearing all this in mind, this chapter sets out to answer two empirical questions. First, to what extent do multiple identities with respect to the national and European levels exist in different member states and what is the relationship between the two levels of identity? Second, are differences between countries related to the ways respect for cultural diversity figure into a society's understanding of its national community? Determining factors which influence the compatibility of national and European level identities is crucial for sketching the possible trajectory of the EU with regard to the identity dimension of

integration. I hypothesize that the national way of framing 'us-them' relations with regard to intra-state 'others' like cultural minorities or immigrants potentially influences this compatibility; that is, the way the national community is constructed with respect to cultural diversity within a country influences citizens' readiness to identify with a broader community characterized by high cultural diversity such as Europe. This hypothesis is grounded on the assumption that the relation between different identities is influenced by the way each is constructed. Since this can happen in very different ways, I first develop a conceptual framework which distinguishes between different conceptions of community based on the underlying code of identity construction. For the national level, I differentiate between three such codes: a (primordial) ethnic, a (traditional) republican and a (universalistic) liberal code which are taken to correspond to a nationalist, a multi-nationalist and a post-nationalist approach to European identity.

To test this hypothesis, I build upon the discussion in chapter one of this volume by first briefly recapitulating the fundamental characteristics of collective identities and assessing the different codes by which they are constructed. This allows me to differentiate between various conceptions of national communities, and address concrete expectations concerning the compatibility of national and European identities. The empirical part of the chapter looks at the 15 old member states using Eurobarometer data from 2000 and 2003. I classify these member states according to their citizens' orientations towards cultural diversity and immigrants. The extent of identification on the national and European level in these countries is then analysed, as well as correlations between identity patterns and citizens' attitudes towards cultural diversity.

4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Codes of Collective Identity Construction

A collective, political or cultural identity does not consist simply of the sum of its single identities, but is the result of a collective process; individuals define themselves as a group with reference to a third party (see Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume). Collective identity thus has a relative and dialectic nature which is underlined by the need for demarcation. Boundaries divide the factual diversity of interaction processes and social relations, marking inside from outside, stranger from commoner, friend from foe (see Barth 1969). Boundary drawing automatically involves processes of inclusion and exclusion – the construction of in- and out-groups. The building of collective identity is also about shared representations of a group, an active process of shaping and creating an image of what the group stands for and how it would like to be seen by

others. Collective identities represent the achievement of collective efforts to define cognitively what the members have in common and locate the boundaries of the collectivity. They further signify that this cognitive operation has been endowed with emotional meaning.[5] This underlines the widely accepted insight that collective identities are socially constructed. Yet, how exactly they are constructed is of crucial importance. I opt for a macro-sociological constructivist approach (Giesen 1993; Eisenstadt 1995; Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995). This underlines that agreements on the internally unifying commonalities and externally separating boundaries are reached by codes or frames drawn from the social context and known to all the members of the group. Codes in this context are inside-outside differentiations which tie up a number of elementary and early learned differences in a way that influences behaviour (Giesen 1999, p. 26). A precondition of the construction of boundaries is symbolic differentiation, but the very act of thus representing difference triggers real consequences. Ultimately, such codes help us to recognize differences in the fluidity and chaos of the world.

Giesen proposes an ideal typical map of codes of collective identity in order to make the logic of boundary drawing visible (ibid., p. 27). He differentiates between three codes depending on the way the boundary is drawn and the mode of boundary maintenance. His codes are also based on the structure of internal relations, conceptions of the outside world, and the treatment of strangers. He calls these primordial, traditional, and universalistic codes.[6] *Primordial* codes attribute the basic difference between 'us' and 'them' to original and supposedly unchangeable differentiations connected to those structures of the world we regard as given and not subject to changes through discourse, exchange or choice (ibid, pp. 32–7). Primordiality focuses on gender, generation, family ties, ethnicity and race in order to draw the boundary between inside and outside. Physiognomy and origin, as well as gender and descent, are thought to be sound bases of collective identity since they underline within all diversity natural sameness and similarity. The price of the natural equality and homogeneity of members is the radical difference attributed to outsiders. The boundaries of primordial communities are not only exclusive and stable but sharply drawn. This difference is usually associated with a perception of outsiders as inferior and dangerous.

Traditional forms of collective identity, on the other hand, are based on knowledge of implicit rules of conduct, traditions and social routines which mark the boundaries of the collective (ibid., pp. 42–8). The difference between us and them is tied to the difference between the continuity of routine and the extraordinary. Collective identity is not represented by an external reference such as nature or divinity, but by routines, traditions, memories and the institutional or constitutional arrangements of the community. These elements are exempt from argumentation or debate and constructed by rituals of

remembrance. Communal identity and boundaries are secured by the continuity of routines and traditions – something which is possible so long as foreigners or outsiders are not too numerous. 'Others' may in time become a part of the community through gradual assimilation and participation in traditions.

Universalistic codes are based on a particular idea of redemption or *parusie* (ibid., pp. 56–62). But secularised movements also display this kind of logic. Consider the universalistic underpinnings of the Enlightenment or socialism, as well as movements which espouse an absolute belief in modernisation, emancipation or reason.[7] Universalistic communities regard all outsiders as potential members. There is however a difference between the categorical possibility of redemption, which is valid for everybody, and the factual consciousness of being redeemed, which is only valid for members of the community. That is why universalistic constructions of collective identity are basically intolerant towards outsiders. Violence, however, is only the last and regrettable means of inclusion. More appropriate are pedagogy, missionary activities and persuasion. That said, in order to draw boundaries, there is usually an internal stratification into centre and periphery (see Eisenstadt 1979).[8]

These codes are ideal types. Empirically collective identities, such as national or European identities, are always a unique combination of primordial, traditional and universalistic codes. Still, the relative importance of a particular code does make a difference in the ways individuals and groups relate to other identities. Recognising this enables us to move beyond the rather simple statement that individuals hold multiple social identities to the more interesting question of how exactly these multiple identities relate to each other. People generally learn to balance their multiple memberships and roles (Stryker 1980). Still, individual strategies to manage multiple identities depend on the configuration of collective identities since they demand attention, commitment and active support (Peters 1993, p. 12). The ways different levels of identity intersect can be conceptualized in at least three ways (Herrmann and Brewer 2004, p. 8).

If the basic collectives are separate or exclusive, the individual can order its collective identities to different domains such that they are not activated at the same time. If several identities are exclusive, however, but not separable, the relationship between them is likely to be very conflictual.[9] Identities can also be cross-cutting or overlapping. In this configuration, some, but not all, members of one identity group are also members of another identity group.[10] The most complementary identities are ones which are nested or embedded in the other, conceived of as concentric circles like a Russian Matryoshka doll. An individual commits to one dominant group identity and subordinates other identities to the primary identification in a hierarchical manner. The more abstract the dominant identity, the more it can nest other identities in an inclusive fashion.[11] This ordering of identities is thought to be harmonious and mutually supporting

or reinforcing.[12] Legally, this image is institutionalized in the conception of European citizenship according to which every citizen of a nation-state that is a member of the European Union is automatically a European citizen.

The different forms of identity construction have distinct effects on the compatibility of the resulting collective identities. Primordial identities can be nested in traditional identities, but traditional identities can also be nested in a universalistic identification without too much contradiction. The inverse, however, is not possible. Universalistic codes are by definition able to incorporate diverse elements so long as they are compatible with or assimilate to the basic universalistic idea. Once this condition is fulfilled strong identities at either the national or the European level can be mutually reinforcing.

Conceptions of National Community

Such codes of identity construction inform different conceptions of national community. This chapter distinguishes between a (primordial) ethnic, a (traditional) republican, and a multi-ethnic as well as a (universalistic) liberal code. Each concept prescribes different commonalities and boundaries and, consequently, different configurations of identities.

When the dominant code for a political community is close to the primordial ideal type, membership is tied to common ancestry. This is evident in the 'ius sanguinis' rule for acquisition of citizenship. A primordially framed community is characterized by a strong need for intra-ethnic solidarity and suspicion of outsiders. Boundaries are sharply drawn and newcomers rarely admitted to the in-group.[13] Empirically this applies best to political communities in which one ethnic group has implemented its values and traditions in the institutional order without recognizing cultural differences. This is usually called an ethnic nation (Greenfeld 1999). Ethnic minorities or immigrants living in such systems have to assimilate, if possible, or are discriminated against; they are hardly accepted as legitimate members with equal rights within the political community. Constant exclusion from the body politic is, however, difficult to justify and uphold if the political system in question adheres to democratic principles.

Somewhat less assimilation is necessary if the political community is defined in traditional terms. The constitution of such a political community is based on a sense of common societal foundations. This still implies many cultural commonalities, especially a common political culture and heritage, and a strong in-group identity with high expectations of solidarity and identification with a commonly held conception of the good life, at least in the public sphere. But this model is not based on common descent. The boundaries are permeable, thus outsiders can become members by gradual assimilation subscribing to a common will based on specific traditions and habits of the

community in question. Diversity can thus be included in a limited way only, by emphasizing the political rather than the social dimension of equality and rights. This is how classic republicans conceive of the political community (for example, Arendt 1958; Taylor 2002).[14]

In addition to this mono-cultural variant of a traditional code, there are multi-cultural variants. This entails a loosening of ties between the different ethnic groups and regions which constitute the polity, as was the case in classic empires or federations of states with weak control structures. Political power and governance is largely shaped by the local and cultural diversity of subnational units. There is, nevertheless, considerable difference between one large and a number of small traditions. This makes community building possible in spite of a high degree of diversity (see Giesen 1999, pp. 49f.). If traditional authorities and cultural particularities are highly valued, this kind of community construction involves principles of multi-cultural pluralism and group rights. A 'corpus of cultural rights' is thus added to civic, political and social rights. If a common framework of political power-sharing nevertheless exists, we can speak of a multi-cultural national community which is close to consociational ideas (for example, Lijphart 1977).[15]

If democratic systems subscribe more to universalistic codifications of collective identity, they emphasize principles of abstract justice as constituting a reasonable common good. This approach goes beyond the somewhat libertarian idea that democratic governance is a matter of majority rule or the sum of individual wills. Yet it is also opposed to the notion that the common good is an expression of a cultural entity as in classic republicanism.[16] Rather, it comes close to liberal conceptions of political community (Rawls 1971).[17] A liberal political community usually propagates a universalistic outlook

Figure 4.1   Models of national community with respect to cultural diversity

founded on the basic liberal values of individual autonomy and equality of opportunity. In this conception, the identity of a political community depends primarily on legal principles, and not on any general ethnocultural way of life (see Habermas 1994).[18] This view is deliberately tailored to include cultural diversity and allows for greater acceptance of immigration. Individuals are usually the only legal subjects entitled to rights, but group rights can be justified in order to overcome discrimination. The aim is not, as in multi-cultural approaches, to secure or even promote cultural communities as such, but rather to trumpet the autonomy of the individual. All four models of national community can be located on a continuum of inclusion/exclusion, that is, with respect to their code of identity and boundary construction.

Expectations for the European Level

These models were developed with reference to national political communities and their treatment of cultural diversity. However, they can also be imagined on the transnational level. The assimilative republican as well as the individualistic liberal approach to political community building are inclusive. Republican inclusivity, however, is somewhat more limited. It would admit newcomers to the European Union, but envisage their membership as contingent upon assimilation to a European cultural project. By way of contrast, a universalistic, inclusive approach would conceive of the EU as a civic entity based only on post-national, liberal values. This would imply that the inclusion of any country subscribing to these values is possible. Meanwhile, a segregationist multi-cultural approach to 'Europe' would entail leaving national particularities and identities untouched. Intrusion into such fields by the Union would be minimal, justified only when there is no conflict with national priorities. For a multi-culturalist vision of Europe to be inclusive towards other countries, the parameters of common ground need to be renegotiated. New compromises may be reached, but only if the considerable tendency for immobilism, opposition to change and resistance to the inclusion of new members are overcome.

   Given the cultural diversity which characterizes Europe it is almost impossible for primordial considerations as in the ethnic model to predominate on the European level. The idea of Europe as a hegemonial empire can hardly serve as the basis for a European identity, not least because of reservations from the outside world. Official European policy appears to combine universalistic and traditional codes. The EU is, after all, a self-proclaimed civic community which respects and promotes its cultural diversity. Political decisions are taken on the European level only after respecting the subsidiarity rule. Thus the competences of member states are safeguarded as far as possible – an element of traditional modes of community construction (in a multi-cultural variant). However, the fundamental values basic to the whole project of European

integration are essentially universalistic.[19] This, in turn, makes the Union open to new members. In order to enhance the self-proclaimed aim of 'unity in diversity' the European Union employs symbols that represent the cultural diversity of its member states that are nonetheless united. This is exemplified in the flag which includes a star for each original member state, and the anthem which mentions Europe's cultural diversity.[20] Exploration of the ways the Union is represented as a traditional, but also universalistic, enterprise would be a promising field of inquiry. The focus of this chapter, however, is on the way the national identities are framed and the impact of such representations on the compatibility of national and European level identifications.

Codes of construction do not have to be the same on all territorial levels. However, as a first take on the question of compatibility we can assume that by habit and convenience they are more often than not similar on the national and European level. This might strengthen the hypothesis that constructions at the national level impact the potential for identification on the European level. Therefore the extent to which people identify with Europe might be influenced by the way they frame their national identity. That is, national and European identities are compatible to different degrees depending on the way the national political community is framed with respect to cultural diversity. More concretely, referring to the aforementioned models of national community I posit the following hypotheses:

1. To frame even national level unity in primordial terms is already difficult given the diversity of most polities. At the European level then, it is hardly thinkable. Thus, if cultural diversity within a political community is rejected, cultural diversity within the EU will be rejected as well. A primordial framing of national community is therefore presumed to be linked to anti-European sentiments or a lack of European identification. Both identities exclude one another and a weak and *nationalist* approach to European identity is probable.
2. A traditional way of framing the national community – either in its republican or in its multi-culturalist variant – is not threatened by European integration under certain conditions, namely when national boundaries are respected as an expression of traditional collectives, and the EU is conceived of as a Europe of fatherlands. Such a *multi-national* approach to European identity can be more or less inclusive, with no obvious consequences for the extent of identification at the European level. For this frame, I therefore hypothesize a medium European identity since political and cultural boundaries of the nation-state are still relevant and only conditionally compatible with a European identity.
3. If the national community is framed in liberal terms, collective identities on different territorial levels are most likely to be compatible, since

the universalistic foundations of individualistic values is compatible with a *post-national* conception of political community at the European level. Thus, if both national and European level identifications subscribe to the liberal logic, the European level of identity is likely to be strong, and the national level nested therein. These hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2   Hypothesized approaches to European identity and its strength in relation to the models of national community

4.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Classification of Countries

It is important to reiterate that the models of national community discussed above are ideal types which on the one hand serve to frame national identity and on the other concretely inspire different institutions and policies towards immigrants and cultural diversity. Nation-states' policies regarding citizenship are accordingly influenced by the code which underpins their understanding of national identity. Several authors have classified countries as approximating one of the models of national community discussed above according to their policies (Castles 1995; Kleger and D'Amato 1995; Safran 1997; Greenfeld 1999; Weldon 2006). There are, however, a number of substantive and methodological problems with classifying countries in this fashion. First, many countries actually display elements of more than one ideal type (Castles 1995,

p. 306). For example, countries may have special policies towards immigrants from specific countries, family members of current citizens, and asylum seekers or refugees. Furthermore, the proper understanding of the nation-state and expectations of citizenship are contested in every country. Second, it is difficult to obtain empirical evidence to distinguish the ideal type of specific countries because this evidence draws on documentation of official policies towards immigrants, which are by nature often contradictory and incomparable. They also change over time, making it difficult to decide which overall frame of national identity is the most salient. This leads to an even more serious problem inasmuch as we assume there are straightforward relationships between institutions and policies on the one hand, and orientations and identification patterns on the other. Though this macro-micro link has been found to exist on many occasions, I opt for a more direct path to shed light on the relationship between different orientations and patterns of identification.

I accordingly do not classify countries by their official citizenship regime and cultural policies but by the empirical orientation of citizens towards cultural diversity and immigrants. This means that citizens' mode of identification with the nation-state is observed from the specific perspective of how they relate to the 'other'. These orientations are assessed by measuring the population's evaluation of multi-cultural society (diversity is good for society and adds to one's country strength), their insistence on cultural conformity of migrants (immigrants have to adapt to customs, have to give up their culture, or are never fully accepted) as well as attitudes towards rights for immigrants and repatriation policies (naturalization should be easy, immigrants should have the same rights, the state should provide more help, all immigrants should be repatriated, etc.).[21]

The data suggest that overall there is not much resistance to multi-culturalism in European societies. In 2003, nearly two thirds of Europeans (65 per cent) evaluate cultural diversity as positive and almost half (49 per cent) consider it added value to their country's strength. However, a vast majority (81 per cent) insist that immigrants should adapt to the nation's customs. At the same time, just over a quarter (28 per cent) thinks minority groups in general should have to give up their cultural habits. On average, there is little opposition to granting civil rights to legal migrants. Two thirds (66 per cent) of the Europeans surveyed think migrants should have equal rights and a comparable majority (70 per cent) believes more legal help should be given to immigrants to ease the process of integration into their new society (for detailed percentages of each member state and each attitude, see Table 4.8, Appendix 1).

Factor analysis shows that the nine indicators mentioned above represent two separate attitude dimensions. The first dimension expresses the degree to which cultural diversity is accepted with reference to the extension of rights to minorities and immigrants. The second dimension represents the degree to which assimilation is expected from immigrants (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1   Acceptance of minorities and immigrants and expectations of assimilation

	Component	
	1	2
Q1405 IMMIGR VIEWS: LEGAL HAVE SAME RIGHTS	**0.683**	-0.124
Q1409 IMMIGR VIEWS: LEGAL MORE INTEGRATION	**0.707**	-0.082
Q1701 ATT TW MINORITIES: GOOD FOR SOCIETY	**0.689**	-0.228
Q1703 ATT TW MINORITIES: ADDS TO STRENGTH	**0.672**	-0.137
Q1806 IMMIGRANTS: EASY BECOME NATURALISED	**0.595**	-0.056
Q1407 IMMIGR VIEWS: ADAPT TO NAT CUSTOMS	-0.007	**0.554**
Q1704 ATT TW MINORITIES: GIVE UP CULTURE	-0.141	**0.712**
Q1712 ATT TW MINORITIES: NEVR FULLY ACCEPT	-0.187	**0.682**
Q1810 IMMIGRANT: SEND BACK INCL CHILDREN	-0.166	**0.643**

Notes:
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Number of cases: 16 082, Missing cases: listwise deletion.

Source: Eurobarometer Survey no. 59.2, fieldwork 2003.

The dimensions combine in different ways. National differences allow for the classification of countries according to the typology of models of national identification developed above: (1) a primordial frame of national identity is characterized by a rejection of multi-cultural society, integration policies and extension of rights to minorities. It is also associated with an expectation of assimilation (- +); (2) In contrast, republicans evaluate multi-cultural society and integration policies more positively, though they also expect assimilation (+ +); (3) The liberal concept is characterized by a positive evaluation of multi-cultural society and integration policies, while assimilation is not expected (+ -). Given the data base, it is unfortunately impossible to clearly identify a multi-cultural frame of national identity. This would require indicators measuring citizens' attitudes towards explicit group rights. I therefore drop this differentiation. Figure 4.3 shows the location of countries according to the specific combinations of factor scores in this two dimensional space, with liberal countries in the lower right corner, republican polities in the upper right, and ethnic states in the upper left corner. This makes it possible to classify the countries and relate them to expectations about their stance on European identity (Table 4.2).

Respondents in countries that are typically classified as ethnic nations – Germany, Austria and Belgium – do in fact display orientations which

Notes:
Missing cases: Listwise deletion.
The higher the score for factor one, the more acceptance of minorities and immigrants.
The higher the score for factor two, the higher the expectations of assimilation.

Source:　Eurobarometer Survey no. 59.2, fieldwork 2003.

Figure 4.3　Country differences (factor scores, mean)

correspond to the primordial way of framing national identity. While minorities are not exactly embraced in both eastern and western Germany, the expectation to assimilate is considerably lower in the West (see Figure 4.3). Yet, the weighted aggregate for the whole of Germany is sufficient to classify it as a country that subscribes to an ethnic logic for national identity. Greece was another country where respondents overwhelmingly reject cultural diversity. Historically a country of emigration, Greece today is experiencing an influx of immigrants. The issue has accordingly gained in social and economic salience in the last decade (Fakiolas and King 1996). This is because the country was generally believed to be ethnically homogeneous, and its citizens were not used to the idea of permanently settled non-European foreigners (Blinkhorn and Veremis 1990). France is located at the margins between an ethnic and a

Table 4.2 *Classification of countries by citizens' acceptance of minorities and immigrants and assimilation expectations, and expected attitudes towards national and European identity*

National identity frame	Acceptance of minorities and immig.	Expectations of assimilation	Countries	Expected attitudes towards national and European identity
	Dimensions			
Liberal				*Post-national*
	+	–	Luxembourg	National and
	+	–	Denmark	European identity are
	+	–	Sweden	embedded
	(–)	–	Finland	
	(–)	–	Italy	Strong European identity
Republican				*Multi-national*
	+	+	Spain	National and
	+	+	Portugal	European identity
	+	+	Ireland	are compatible
	+	+	Netherlands	in a limited way/ conditionally
				Medium European identity
Ethnic				*Nationalist*
	–	+	Austria	National and
	–	+	Germany	European identity
	–	+	Greece	exclude one another
	–	+	Belgium	
	–	+	France	Weak European
	–	(–)	United Kingdom	identity

Note: Signs in brackets ( ) are marginal classifications.

republican frame which is in line with Guinaudeau's finding in this volume that both currents of national identity are in evidence (Chapter 5 in this volume). Yet, the pattern in this survey tips the scales in favour of an ethnic classification for France. Interestingly, the factor score for the United Kingdom is slightly negative for expectations of assimilation, but it is far less than in any clearly liberal country. Indeed, the score for acceptance of minorities and immigrants is almost as negative as in Austria. I therefore venture to classify the United Kingdom as a country that subscribes to an ethnic logic in contradiction to its

liberal reputation.[22] I do so making the caveat that my results must be read with reference to the degree of multi-culturalism already attained in British society. After the devolution of its Empire and due to its liberal entry policies for citizens of the Commonwealth as well as for labour migrants from new member states, the UK has long been exposed to immigration. Vertovec (2007), for one, speaks of 'super-diversity', above all in London. Social acceptance of white immigrants is usually higher, however, and British integration discourse is centred on race relations (Joppke 1999).

The two Iberic countries and Ireland clearly show a republican pattern, even if one might have expected a more liberal one. A surprising position is also occupied by the Netherlands. This country long served as a prototype of multi-culturalism. But in recent years a rather republican approach has become evident in light of major policy changes since the murder of a filmmaker critical of Islam, Theo van Gogh, as well as in a context of political turmoil at the turn of the century. The current data show that Dutch citizens also expect a rather high degree of assimilation from immigrants, though once assimilation has taken place more mild expressions of cultural diversity are welcome and full and equal rights are extended to migrants. Thus a republican frame seems to prevail. Citizens in Finland and Italy very slightly reject cultural diversity but expectations of assimilation are so low that it seems legitimate to classify them as liberal countries. Citizens in the other two Scandinavian countries, Denmark and Sweden, as well as in Luxembourg, show a clear liberal pattern. Thus their orientations are consistent with their countries' official, liberal frame of national identity.

Extent of European Identity

To what extent do citizens identify with Europe and to what extent with their own nation – either exclusively or simultaneously? Again in 2003, 43 per cent of citizens in the 15 old member states of the European Union describe themselves in terms of their nationality only. However, a majority (54 per cent) feel they belong both to their own nation and to Europe. More specifically, 3 per cent feel that they are Europeans only, 6 per cent feel that they are Europeans first and citizens of their own country second, while 45 per cent feel that they are first citizens of their own country and then citizens of Europe. It therefore appears that for a majority of Europeans a self-description in terms of nationality as well as in terms of Europeanness is not mutually contradictory. Rather, they go hand in hand.

The empirical results nevertheless reveal substantive differences between countries. The proportion of people who describe themselves as European is highest in Luxembourg and Italy (72 per cent each), followed by Spain (69 per cent). In Luxembourg, 15 per cent of the population feels European only,

and about the same proportion (14 per cent) see themselves first as Europeans and second as Luxembourgers. Luxembourg is the only country where a primary identification with Europe is widespread. In contrast, only 36 per cent of Britons describe themselves as European at any level. Citizens in (ethnic) Greece share this pattern, but also a majority of the (liberal) Finns and the (republican) Portuguese. In Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 the results are grouped by the prevailing frame of national identity in the respective member state.

| Ethnic countries | Republican countries | Liberal countries |

Note: Question: 'In the near future, do you see yourself as a) nationality b) nationality and European c) European and nationality d) European only?' (Q.43).

Source: Eurobarometer Survey no. 60.1 – Fieldwork Oct. – Nov. 2003, Percentage 'don't know' not shown.

Figure 4.4   Political identities: Self-description by country (percentages)

As specified in Chapter 1, subjective identification with a collective based on cognition is just a first step towards the construction of a collective identity. It represents a cognitive operation – often related to the salience of the object of identification. A second and somewhat stronger criterion of a collective identity is the emotional attachment to the collective. Two indicators are available from the Eurobarometer 60.0 which measure emotional commitment: attachment to Europe, and pride in being a European (Figures 4.5 and 4.6). Considering the distribution of responses, attachment to Europe is overall quite strong. Almost six citizens out of ten (58 per cent) claim to feel very or fairly attached to Europe. Thirty-nine per cent feel they are not very attached, or even not attached at all. Yet, the percentage of citizens attached to Europe remains relatively low as compared to attachment towards other levels of identification (e.g., country, town, village and region). Overall, 92

per cent of citizens claim to be very or fairly attached to their country, 89 per cent to their town or village and 88 per cent to their region.

Large differences exist between member states with respect to degree of attachment to Europe (Figure 4.5). More than three quarters of citizens in Luxembourg express a high degree of attachment, followed by 73 per cent among Danes and 72 per cent among Swedes. At the opposite end, only 29 per cent of Dutch respondents[23] and 41 per cent of the British feel attached to Europe. Likewise, Greek respondents show less attachment than the EU average.

Note: Question: 'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to d) Europe.' (Q.46).

Source: Eurobarometer Survey no. 60.1– Fieldwork Oct. – Nov. 2003, Percentage 'don't know' not shown.

Figure 4.5   Feeling attached to Europe (percentages)

Pride is another indicator of an emotional commitment to a collective. The sense of national pride is widespread in member states of the European Union (85 per cent on average). In eight of the 15 member states, more than nine out of ten citizens are very or fairly proud of their nationality. In Greece, Finland and Ireland this feeling is strongest (96 per cent in each), and in Germany it is weakest (66 per cent, with 71 per cent in the eastern part of Germany).[24] With respect to European pride, a high number of Europeans are proud to be European. Sixty-one per cent of respondents feel very or fairly proud to be European, and only 28 per cent do not feel very proud or any pride at all. This form of emotional identification is even stronger than attachment to Europe. Yet, as Figure 4.6 shows, pride in being European is again a feeling that varies widely by country.

Note: Question: 'Would you say you are proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?' (Q.45).

Source: Eurobarometer Survey no. 60.1, fieldwork Oct – Nov. 2003, Percentage 'don't know' not shown.

Figure 4.6   Pride in being European (percentages)

The sense of pride in being European is highest in Italy, where over four out of five citizens (81 per cent) feel this way. They are followed by three quarters of the Irish, and 74 per cent of the Spanish. In contrast, less than half of Brits and Germans feel very or fairly proud to be European. Brits are in fact those who identify least with Europe. This result is in line with the hypothesis regarding an ethnic frame of national identity for Britain, as well with the country's well-known penchant for Euroscepticism.[25]

Considering the initial criteria, the results are quite remarkable. This is not because attachment towards one's own nation and national pride is, on average, stronger than corresponding attitudes towards Europe. But, the overall high degree of emotional attachment to Europe is noteworthy. Fifty-eight per cent of respondents feel attached to Europe, and 61 per cent are proud to be Europeans. In spite of country-specific differences, this widespread emotional commitment to both the nation and Europe signifies that across the old member states it is possible to simultaneously identify with the national and the European community. These seem to be rather complementary multiple identities which individuals are able to support simultaneously. This is especially true for countries classified as liberal. Here emotional identification with Europe is slightly stronger than in ethnic or republican countries.[26] But the differences in European identification between groups of countries – ethnic, republican and liberal – are neither large nor systematic. This means

that with respect to the extent of European identity in old member states, the initial hypotheses can only be partly confirmed. It is all the more necessary to evaluate more fully the concrete compatibility of identification with the nation and Europe by asking if there are differences between ethnic, republican and liberal countries in the degree to which national and European identities are reconcilable on the individual level.

Compatibility of Multiple Identities

Based on data from 2003, it appears that 60 per cent of citizens from the 15 old member states feel attached to both the nation and Europe, as compared to 33 per cent who exclusively identify with the nation (exclusive European identity is at 2.1 per cent and no attachment to either level is at 5.3 per cent) (see Table 4.3). This pattern is even more visible when the new member states are included in 2004 with results of 66 per cent dual identification and only 26 per cent exclusive national identity (Fuchs et al. 2009, p. 101).

Table 4.3   Attachment to the European Union and to one's country (EU-wide) (percentages)

	Attached to nation	Not attached to nation
Attached to Europe	60.3	2.1
Not attached to Europe	33.3	5.3

Source: Eurobarometer Survey no. 60.1, fieldwork Oct. – Nov. 2003.

A harmonious relationship between national and European identity is also evident in cross-tabulation of national and European pride. Except for Greece, all four countries with the highest level of national pride – Finland, Ireland, Italy and Spain – are among those where up to three quarters of respondents are also proud to be European citizens. In general, there is a positive and significant correlation between national pride and pride in being European (see Table 4.4). This suggests that emotional commitment to both levels of identity is mutually reinforcing. This relationship is represented in Figure 4.7 which also highlights differences between countries. The United Kingdom, again, is the strongest outlier in that national identification does not go hand in hand with European identification at all.

Overall, the hypotheses regarding different models of national community are neither totally confirmed nor can they be totally rejected. In some of the country groupings, there is a stronger relationship between European identity and how citizens frame feelings towards their national community. For

Figure 4.7   Dual emotional identification by country

instance, most citizens who identify with Europe live in liberal countries. They do not, however, compromise on their national identity. In fact, they seem to be accustomed to dual identification with the nation and Europe as both identification patterns have strong covariance.[27] This pattern is most pronounced in Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark and Italy. Citizens in Finland, which is on the border between espousing a liberal and a republican understanding of national identity, show somewhat less dual identification. On average, 70 per cent of citizens in liberal countries display simultaneous identification with the national and the European as compared to almost 55 per cent in republican countries and only 47 in ethnic ones (Table 4.4). Thus, our expectation regarding liberal countries is quite strongly confirmed. That is, in countries where there is the greatest receptivity to cultural diversity, we find the strongest European identity and sense that national and European identities are compatible. The liberal model of national community thus does appear to trigger a positive and mutually reinforcing relationship with European identity. Here then, is considerable room for a post-national community based on liberal, individualistic values.

   The hypothesis regarding the republican model likewise seems to be fairly well confirmed. Countries classified as republican have, as expected, a mixed record. European identity is medium and to a limited extent correlated to national identity. Identification with both the national and the European level

Table 4.4   Correlates of multiple attachments to nation and Europe

Frame of national identity	Country	Attachment to nation & Europe (%)	Pearson's R (attachment to nation & Europe)	Pearson's R (national pride & European pride)	Pearson's R (national identity[a] & European identity[b])
Liberal	Luxembourg	74.4	0.40	0.35	0.31
	Sweden	72.7	0.35	0.37	0.40
	Denmark	72.5	0.22	0.37	0.29
	Italy	67.7	0.28	0.37	0.28
	Finland	62.5	0.22	0.35	0.27
	Average	**70.0**	**0.29**	**0.36**	**0.31**
Republican	Spain	66.3	0.28	0.42	0.26
	Portugal	63.4	0.19	0.21	0.19
	Ireland	60.0	0.20	0.13	0.23
	Netherlands	28.5	0.29	0.37	0.37
	Average	**54.6**	**0.24**	**0.28**	**0.26**
Ethnic	Austria	65.7	0.40	0.54	0.39
	Belgium	62.7	0.29	0.36	0.27
	Germany W.	61.2	0.39	0.57	0.53
	Germany E.	59.7	0.43	0.43	0.45
	France	55.9	0.20	0.38	0.21
	Greece	49.9	0.16	0.16	0.08
	United Kingdom	40.1	0.16	0.08	0.08
	Average	**47.1**	**0.29**	**0.36**	**0.28**
	EU 15	60.3	0.27	0.36	0.28

Notes:
All correlations are significant on the 0.01 level (two-sided).
[a]   National identity: index built from national pride and attachment to country.
[b]   European identity: index built from European pride and attachment to European Union.

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1, fieldwork 2003.

is quite common in republican Spain and Portugal, while a little less in Ireland. The republican emphasis on emotional aspects of national belonging and its more communitarian orientation appears to extend to European identity, if only in some cases and in a limited manner. The question of whether or not a republican outlook translates into a high degree of identification with Europe most probably depends on how the relationship between the nation and the European Union is imagined. Since we could not include the image of the European Union in this analysis, we do not know precisely how republican frames are projected onto European identity. But we can perhaps assume that a multi-national community for the EU level is imagined. The Netherlands again takes an outlier position here. While the respective strength of the identification shows covariance, only a small percentage (28 per cent) of citizens identify with both political communities. But just one year later 55 per cent of Dutch citizens show dual attachment to the nation and Europe (Fuchs et al. 2009, p. 102). This finding is not as low as in the dataset used in this chapter, but it is among the lowest results for West European countries. The results are also extreme in another respect. Namely, of the 25 member states of the European Union in 2004, the Netherlands has the highest percentage of people (almost 11 per cent) who identify neither with the nation nor with Europe. The Dutch thus seem to be rather reluctant to identify with any collectivity – contradicting normative expectations associated with a republican frame.

The group of countries classified as 'ethnic' is internally the least consistent. Citizens in these countries do not follow a single pattern, and dual identification ranges from 66 to 40 per cent. Greece and the UK seem to support the hypothesis that ethnic nations are averse to the prospect of an even more multi-cultural political community at the European level. As expected, in these countries correlations are very low, and a nationalist approach to the European Union prevails. Yet, French and Belgian citizens with strong national identification do not show resistance towards a European identity. In fact, two other ethnic countries clearly contradict the hypothesis in that for both Austria and Germany national and European identification go hand in hand. As such, an exclusive framing of national community does not automatically bring about an impasse between national and European level identifications. Yet again it is an open question how the European political community is imagined. It is possible that different codes are applied to the different, that is national and European, levels. A more universalistic code for the European level could embed a more primordial one on the national level. Another possibility is that the rejection of outsiders is simply delegated to the higher level of the EU. European identification would then be associated with resistance to (non-European) multi-culturalism, while ethnocentrism on the national level would be paired with Eurocentrism on the European level. Citizens would then differentiate between different kinds of immigrants, considering those from

other European countries as insiders, and those from non-EU countries as outsiders.[28] This hypothesis is in line with the findings of Fuchs and his colleagues on Eurocentrism (1995). The results are summarized in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5   Country classification and results

National identity frame	Countries	European identity	Compatibility between national and European identity
			Results
Liberal	Luxembourg	Strong	High
	Sweden	Strong	High
	Denmark	Strong	High
	Italy	Strong	High
	Finland	Medium to strong	High
Republican	Spain	Strong	Medium to high
	Portugal	Medium	Medium
	Ireland	Medium	Medium
	Netherlands	Weak to medium	High
Ethnic	Austria	Medium	Medium to high
	Belgium	Medium	Medium
	Germany	Medium	High
	France	Weak	Medium
	Greece	Weak	Low
	United Kingdom	Weak	Low

What about correlations on the individual level between attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigrants on the one hand, and different identification patterns on the other? Fascinatingly, it appears that European identity is consistently more linked to such attitudes than national identity (see Tables 4.6 and 4.7 as well as Table 4.9 in Appendix 3). That is, national identity appears to be constructed with reference to many variables and not exclusively with reference to attitudes towards cultural homogeneity; by way of contrast, there may be fewer referents in the construction of a European identity. This may be because the concept of nation is extremely diverse in European countries and animated by manifold mythical, historical, social, cultural and political references. Compared to these factors, the concept of a European identity might fall short. Given Europe's obvious cultural diversity, accepting this fact seems to be a constituent characteristic of European identity. As such, the stronger correlations between European identification patterns and attitudes towards

cultural diversity may indicate a tendency to conceive of European identity in inclusive terms; that is, a post-national European identity seems to prevail among those who identify with Europe.

The findings are backed up by another general pattern indicated by strong correlations. Namely, the more individuals in all countries perceive immigrants to be a threat, the more national and European pride tend to be mutually exclusive ($r = 0.28$ to 0.47). This is corroborated by the fact that the more citizens agree with the statement that immigrants contribute a lot to one's country,

Table 4.6 The association of attitudes towards immigrants and European identity

	Attitudes towards immigrants[a] & European identity[b] Pearson's r	Attitudes towards immigrants & National identity[c] Pearson's r
Belgium	-0.22**	n.s.
Germany West	-0.21**	0.08**
Germany East	-0.21**	n.s.
Austria	-0.13**	0.17**
Greece	n.s.	0.09**
France	-0.27**	0.08**
Spain	-0.12**	0.12**
Portugal	-0.14**	-0.09**
Ireland	-0.13**	n.s.
Great Britain	-0.25**	n.s.
Netherlands	-0.16**	0.08*
Luxembourg	-0.16**	n.s.
Italy	-0.25**	0.07*
Denmark	-0.18**	0.17**
Finland	-0.12**	n.s.
Sweden	-0.06*	0.07*

Notes:
*   The correlation is significant on the 0.05 level.
**   The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level.
a   Index built from the attitudes that immigrants are a threat and that they contribute a lot.
b   Index built from European pride and attachment to European Union.
c   Index built from national pride and attachment to nation.

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1 (2003).

Table 4.7   Correlates of European pride and attitudes towards cultural diver-sity and immigrants (EU-15)

Indicators	Pearson's r
European pride and limits to multi-cultural society	-0.51*
European pride and opposition to civil rights for migrants	-0.64**

Notes:
*   The correlation is significant on the 0.05 level.
**   The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level.

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1, 2003.

the more national and European pride are compatible (r = 0.42 to 0.28). To feel threatened by the 'other' thus significantly reduces the compatibility of national and European identity in all countries. Similarly, those who appreciate cultural diversity are most prone to have multiple identities.

4.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that a majority of citizens living in the old member states of the European Union identify with the nation-state and Europe simultaneously. More often than not, even strong emotional commitment to the nation-state is compatible with strong commitment to Europe. Therefore, European identity should not be conceptualized in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one's loyalty to national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) and people can feel that they belong to both without compromising either. 'Country first, but Europe, too' is the dominant outlook in most EU countries (Citrin and Sides 2004, p. 173), and people do not perceive this as contradictory (Risse 2004, p. 249; see also Marks and Hooghe 2003). This makes it possible to conclude that the European polity does not require a 'demos' to replace national identities with a European identity (Risse 2004, p. 270). Rather, national and European identities can co-exist and complement each other. This can take two basic forms, however, namely identification with a multi-national Europe, and identification with a post-national Europe (see also Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). For while the structure of the European political community continues to be framed by multi-national arrangements which afford considerable power to individual member states, the European Union increasingly equates 'Europeanness' with distinctly post-national, civic and liberal values. Boosting European consciousness of such normative

commonalities might, in turn, help foster the emergence of a European demos (Risse 2004, p. 270). However, identification with Europe is rendered difficult by the lack of clear boundaries. In different political contexts, Europe's 'others' are perceived in geographical terms (other regions of the world and their culture, politics, religion, etc.), in historical terms (the continent's own past of militarism and nationalism), or in social terms (the 'enemy within', e.g., xenophobia) (ibid.; see also Fuchs et al. 1995; Cederman 2001; Strath 2004; Checkel et al. 2009).

This chapter focused upon such social constructions of boundaries with reference to internal 'others'. The way 'others' are perceived fundamentally influences the social fabric of a political community and differs in each member state in light of their respective and unique experiences of nation building. The idea of an ethnic nation draws strongly on a primordial code with exclusive consequences for immigrants and ethnic minorities; traditional elements form a specific political culture associated with assimilationist republican nations; and liberal nations are supposedly the most universalistic and inclusive. These frames of collective identity form different reference points to which political actors and citizens can refer in their political discourse and identification processes. They can also draw on each vision's symbolic repertoire to frame their understanding of European identity as nationalistic, or as a multi-national image of a Europe of fatherlands, or as a post-national European community.

The findings show that the considerable differences between countries in the extent and compatibility of national identities with a European identity (however conceived), are indeed partly related to the way 'us-them' relations and cultural diversity are perceived within the national community. More liberal attitudes towards national community in a given country, thus greater openness to cultural diversity and immigrants, appear to accompany stronger identification with Europe and greater compatibility between national and European identities. As expected, the (traditional) republican code of national community construction triggers mixed results and an overall medium attachment to Europe. The group of ethnically framed countries showed the least consistent results. While the patterns found in Greece and the United Kingdom confirm the hypothesis, a majority of Germans and Austrians reject cultural diversity on the national level but national and European pride are still mutually reinforcing. Thus, a (primordial) ethnic way of framing national community does not necessarily go hand in hand with a nationalist attitude towards the European Union.

This is an interesting result demanding further interpretation. It may be that citizens of one and the same nation-state have very different outlooks (see also Guinaudeau in this volume). An alternative explanation might be that even though the classification utilized here enables us to grasp the dominant way of framing national community with respect to cultural diversity, these

orientations are not the sole and decisive aspect influencing the way individuals identify with political communities. Factors on other levels are also relevant – on the individual level to be sure, but also on the level of political institutions and with regard to meso-level actors and structures (for example, parties, national cleavages and socio-economic structures). Still, the results confirmed that attitudes towards 'outsiders' on the national level correlate with identification processes on the European level to a considerable extent. This suggests two alternative interpretations of those cases in which national community is ethnically framed but national and European identification are compatible: either the boundary of the collectivity is simply enlarged to include all EU members as belonging to the same primordial community, with non-EU immigrants as the 'other'; or different construction codes are used for the national and EU levels: a primordial frame for the national, and a more universalistic code for the European. People do not necessarily use the same codes of collective identity construction on each level. We cannot, however, address this question conclusively without analysing the way the European community is imagined. The fact that European community could be envisaged in a variety of ways – as a federal state, for example, or as a federation of states – may be a factor in the inconsistent results.

In contrast to the analysis here, it might be plausible to expect different degrees of compatibility between national and European identity depending on the image of the European Union – exclusive (nationalist), co-existent (multi-national) or embedded (post-national). This could entail a fourth way of conceptualizing the relationship between the national and the European. Risse (2002), for example, develops a 'marble cake' model of multiple identities in which the various components of an individual's identity are seen to mesh and blend into one another. Thus, someone's self-understanding as a German would inherently contain aspects of Europeanness and an Austrian identity could not be disentangled from European identity. This speaks also of a possibility of replacing ethnocentrism with Eurocentrism, with negative consequences for non-European immigrants. Yet the most important implication of such a 'marble cake' model is that European identity might mean different things for different people.

As such, it is necessary to further analyse which code of collective identity construction is actually used on the European level and how such a European Union is imagined in relation to the nation-state. Any country-specific results would be revealing and lack thereof would even broaden the possibility of further development in the construction of a European identity. Another avenue for investigation is perceptions of difference within the European Union in order to assess the extent of Eurocentrism. Who is the internal 'other' on the European level? Do Europeans differentiate between immigrants from other member states and those from third countries? Or does the inclusion of other

Europeans even trigger cosmopolitan attitudes? Fears about the emergence of an exclusive 'fortress Europe' are not unfounded. Yet, most of the evidence in this chapter as well as in the literature so far underlines a universalistic post-national way of framing European identity. The emergence of such a post-national political identity might be a precondition for a feeling of belonging to the community of human beings. It might not be overly optimistic to expect that people who already combine national and European identity could add further levels, such as an identity as a responsible world citizen. This would reduce the drawing of cultural boundaries, and strengthen mutual understanding and tolerance. In conclusion, the empirical reality that European citizens espouse a multiplicity of identities poses difficulties in terms of research design, but opens spaces for the construction of ever larger and multiple identities.

NOTES

1. For the sake of simplicity, I employ a restricted understanding of Europeans in this article, only encompassing citizens of the European Union.
2. For example, referenda on membership in the EU or on major EU treaties and their campaigns increase the salience of European issues and limit the capacity of political parties and their leadership to control the debate (Leduc 2001).
3. In general, emotional commitments can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects, particularly when other cognitive frames of reference do not apply transparently (Chong 2000).
4. McLaren (2002) analyses the degree to which citizens fear cultural diversity and cultural degradation as a result of European integration.
5. Collective identity formation is thus an essential part of community-building which is additionally a matter of collective agency. That is why the concept captures a critical conjunction of social identity and collective actions in the political arena and is a key concept to investigate identity politics. See Brewer (2001, p. 119) as well as Schlenker-Fischer (2009, pp. 67–82) on political community.
6. Here Giesen builds on the work of Edvard Shils (1975) albeit with somewhat different focus; the formulation is also an elaboration of his own earlier distinction between primordial, conventional and cultural codes (Giesen 1993, pp. 48ff.).
7. See, for example, the work of Eric Voegelin (especially 1956).
8. Revolutionary universalistic communities have repeatedly committed rituals of sacrifice in the name of building a better world. Examples include Stalin's purges or the Jacobin terror. Great empires – and in some respects the United States today – have often displayed a similar expansive dynamic which is legitimized as being based on a cosmic and transcendent order, the upholding of which is said to be in the interest of all.
9. The possibility of separating out identities pertaining to different domains or spheres of life is inherent in the liberal idea of differentiating between the private and the public sphere. Cultural matters and identities are assumed to belong to the private domain, while in the public realm only political interests and identities are appropriate and legitimate. However, in the real world social and political identities are seldom neatly separable and conflicts of interests or loyalty regularly emerge.
10. Cross-cutting identities can have the effect of either increasing the inclusivity of the social identity of an individual – by including all members of the involved identity groups – or of narrowing the group identification by including only those that have overlapping group memberships in common. If the claims of the different groups are not in conflict with each other, the additive strategy is relatively easy, only limited by restraints of time and attention.

If, however, the claims are incompatible, the management of combined identities becomes more problematic and strenuous (see Brewer 2001, p. 122). Usually it is assumed that in a large pluralistic society multiple criss-crossing of social identities has a stabilizing effect (see, for example, Lipset 1959), but these alternatives show that multiple cross-cutting identities can be a source of both increased stability and increasing fractionalism.

11.   Such a relationship assumes that the contents of the different identities are compatible. As such, the image of a Russian Matryoshka doll is not entirely correct in that every outer circle contains more than one inner circle. Especially in the European context, there is no such thing as a centre, but an outer European frame which contains many centres.

12.   Neofunctionalists in particular hoped that the creation of a superordinate common identity would promote tolerance and foster better relations among national subgroups (Deutsch 1954; Haas 1964).

13.   For further details of a similar typology, see Schlenker-Fischer (2009, pp. 151–9).

14.   They furthermore assume that strong identification with the common good and solidarity among members go along with the norm to participate in the political community. State structures are not very encompassing since the citizens themselves are active and self-responsible. Given our focus on cultural diversity this aspect is less crucial in this study.

15.   The basic idea is more the co-existence of autonomous cultural entities under one umbrella. However, one has to be conscious about the gap that lies between the protection and recognition of cultural entities as traditional communities on the one hand, and their conception as primordial entities on the other. The more the sub-units are defined in primordial terms, the more they become rigid and irreconcilable. As such, conflicts between defenders of primordial identities are often destructive. This is the reason why consociational approaches are not particularly participatory and emphasize elite representation and negotiations of compromises in order to integrate different ethno-cultural communities in one political community.

16.   I depart here from Giesen's conception. His elaboration of a universalistic identity in the political realm also incorporates many republican ideas with his reference to the 'volonté générale' and the priority of public aims over the promotion of private wealth and consumption (see Giesen 1999, p. 65). Liberal and republican conceptions have certainly many aspects in common, but for analytical clarity we should keep them separate.

17.   This comes close to what is usually referred to as a civic type of nation (for example, Greenfeld 1999).

18.   The specific way of implementing universalistic values serves as an identification pole, captured in the term 'constitutional patriotism'.

19.   There is, for example, no reference to God in the draft constitution.

20.   This can be regarded as an attempt to recompensate the thus far dominant consociational elements in the construction of the EU. For, at least until Maastricht, European integration can be regarded as an elite project, the legitimacy of which was based on the compromises national representatives had negotiated.

21.   For exact wording of the indicators and detailed percentages of the Eurobarometer 59.1 see Appendix 1. This particular Eurobarometer asked questions which effectively highlighted such orientations, whereas national and European identity patterns are better surveyed in Eurobarometer 60.1 from 2003.

22.   Given the UK's position nearest to zero in both dimensions, an alternative would be to refuse to classify it and to treat it as a sui generis case. Yet, in order to stay within the classificatory logic, I stick to my dividing line of the respective signs of the factor scores, quite conscious of the marginality of the classification.

23.   This result for the Netherlands is an outlier. It is not in line with results from other datasets (for example, Eurobarometer 2004: 60 per cent) nor with results for the other indicators, such as European pride. I therefore do not attribute to it much relevance.

24.   The 'don't know' response also reaches its highest in Germany (10 per cent in comparison with an EU-15 average of 3 per cent). However, in order to interpret these numbers one has to recognize that every question concerning collective pride is delicate in Germany because of its historic legacy.

26.   Euroscepticism is another concept which is not necessarily related to the extent of European identity or the compatibility of European and national identity. The Danes are an example

here with a strong European identity and still a critical stance on the current European integration process, rejecting the proposal for a European Constitution in 2008.
26. This is not the case for cognitive categorization as being European which might be explained by differences in saliency in these countries which are less important for deeper emotional identification processes. In general, the different indicators of collective identification do not always display similar patterns.
27. Overall, correlations between the two forms of collective pride are stronger than between attachment to the different territorial levels.
28. Distinguishing between different kinds of immigrants is unfortunately not possible with the existing datasets.

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APPENDIX 1

Wording of the indicators used from the Eurobarometer (Survey no. 59.2):

Evaluation of Multi-cultural Society

- It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures (Q.17.1)
- (COUNTRY'S) diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths (Q.17.3)

Attitude Towards Assimilation and Access

- Immigrants should adapt to the (NATIONALITY) customs (Q.14.7)
- In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture (Q.17.4)
- People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society (Q.17.12)
- Legally established immigrants from outside the European Union should be able to become naturalized easily (Q.18.6)

Evaluation of Integration Policies

- Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as the (NATIONALITY) (Q.14.5)
- (OUR COUNTRY) should do more to help immigrants integrate into (NATIONALITY) society (Q.14.9)
- All immigrants, whether legal or illegal, even those who were born in (OUR COUNTRY), should be sent back to their country of origin (Q.18.10)

Table 4.8 *Population's attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigrants (percentages)*

	Diversity good for society	Diversity adds to strength	Adapt to customs	Give up culture	Never fully accepted	Easy naturalization	Same rights	More legal help	Send back all
Belgium	54.2	37.4	90.2	36.9	48.7	38.9	49.4	57.1	24.6
Denmark	66.3	61.2	85.0	23.5	50.2	32.8	80.4	84.5	11.2
Germany W	57.3	38.9	83.3	25.1	40.9	32.1	53.0	65.5	23.1
Germany E	50.6	33.3	85.0	34.7	46.5	33.4	58.7	60.9	26.0
Greece	33.6	24.2	73.2	28.3	51.5	47.5	64.1	69.4	27.3
Italy	67.2	43.4	70.6	16.1	34.6	42.9	76.1	71.3	20.3
Spain	73.2	55.0	88.3	34.7	40.4	48.4	78.4	77.6	21.0
France	71.0	57.4	83.3	30.2	49.9	43.7	64.1	61.1	24.1
Ireland	74.4	56.8	65.6	30.4	47.1	49.2	68.6	65.5	27.4
Luxembourg	76.8	62.5	89.2	11.5	43.3	46.7	58.1	62.8	17.0
Netherlands	69.7	53.5	91.1	30.5	41.4	39.9	78.0	75.6	23.2
Portugal	64.8	53.9	82.3	30.4	40.0	44.1	76.2	75.3	24.5
Utd. Kingdom	68.1	56.6	82.7	28.3	43.8	37.3	54.2	55.6	20.6
Finland	67.7	54.8	84.0	17.4	29.5	35.3	68.2	75.2	17.1
Sweden	81.8	51.3	77.8	19.9	38.7	38.5	78.3	87.0	8.0
Austria	55.5	49.5	62.1	45.1	46.8	45.3	54.2	70.1	27.2
EU	64.5	49.1	80.6	28.0	43.2	41.1	66.4	69.7	21.5

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 59.2, fieldwork 2003.

APPENDIX 2

Figure 4.8   Clustering of ethnic, republican and liberal countries

APPENDIX 3

Table 4.9   Correlates of national and European pride in relation to attitudes towards immigrants

Country	Pearson's R		
	National pride & immigrants are a threat	European pride & immigrants contribute a lot	Attachment to EU & immigrants contribute a lot
Belgium	0.08*	0.22**	0.14**
Denmark	0.13**	0.12**	0.13**
Germany West	0.17**	0.20**	0.18**
East	0.02	0.16**	0.16**
Greece	0.10**	-0.02	-0.00
Italy	0.06**	0.15**	0.11**
Spain	0.07**	0.17**	0.10**
France	0.12**	0.16**	0.18**
Ireland	0.02	0.21**	0.14**
Luxembourg	0.07	0.09**	0.07
Netherlands	0.03	0.13**	0.14**
Portugal	-0.11**	0.22**	0.19**
United Kingdom	0.10**	0.21**	0.23**
Finland	0.03	0.17**	0.12**
Sweden	0.07*	0.10**	0.10**
Austria	0.12**	0.14**	0.13**
EU-15	0.08**	0.18**	0.14**

Notes:
*   The correlation is significant on the 0.05 level (two-sided).
**   The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (two-sided).

Source: Eurobarometer Survey 60.1, fieldwork 2003.

5. National and European identity: The case of France

Isabelle Guinaudeau

5.1 INTRODUCTION

> Between 'the spectre of Turkey', which in plain language refers to Muslims, and the unfortunate Polish plumber, foreigners have been asked to stay at home. Le Pen is xenophobic, it's his business, but that the leaders of the left should carry out a campaign in this area, like Chirac in 2002 on insecurity, one would have thought such xenophobia unthinkable...[1].
>
> (Serge July, editorial in *Libération*, the day after the 2005 French referendum on the European Constitution)

The persistence of national identities is often considered the principal cause of what many deem a weak European identity; it is also cited as the source of Euroscepticism more broadly. Indicatively, the French rejection of the European Constitution in a 2005 referendum was widely interpreted as being rooted in a strong French national identity.[2] This diagnosis presupposes that identity is an essential determinant of political support – a plausible relationship theorized by Weber (2005) and Easton (1965). It also assumes that there is a tension between national and European identity.

This second assumption is far from self-evident and is hotly debated by social psychologists, political scientists and sociologists. Social psychologists today agree on the basic compatibility of multiple identities. As Turner et al. (1987) have shown, every individual has multiple identities in different degrees of abstraction. These identities become salient in specific situations (see also Thoits 1983; Stryker and Burke 2000). A large number of studies have verified this finding with regard to European and national identities, concluding that the co-occurrence of both levels of identity is possible and even widespread (Smith 1993; Marks 1999; Duchesne and Frognier 2002; Bruter 2003; see also Schlenker-Fischer, Chapter 4 in this volume on multiple identities for further details). According to this view, multiple identities correspond to specific political and territorial units which may overlap, that is, identification with a nation that is also part of the European Union (EU).

Yet this conceptualization is contradicted by various empirical observations. Certainly, a univocal European identity has not emerged, belying predictions of the 1950s. In more and more countries, we encounter nationalistic populist parties which challenge the EU. Many authors further point out that the representation of interests at the European level remains largely a prerogative of national governments (for example, Andeweg 1996, p. 65). In addition to these empirical objections, a number of authors believe national identities to be important obstacles to the emergence of a European identity. McLaren (2002, p. 555) in particular argues that European citizens are 'socialized to accept the power and sovereignty of the nation-state' and thus perceive the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the European level as a political and cultural threat. These controversies highlight the necessity of a new and more differentiated approach to the complex relationship between national and European identities.

Examining Turner et al.'s theory of social identity more closely, we see that there are also limitations to the compatibility of identities; multiple identities, Turner argues, are only possible if they do not challenge, threaten or exclude one other. This means that they should be integrated into a hierarchic system of attitudes (Turner et al. 1987, p. 67). If Europe is conceived as a broader level of identification including or complementing the national level, European and national identities would go well together. If, however, European integration is perceived as an intrusion in national affairs and a threat for national identity, both identities would exclude one other. It seems to us that it is too reductive to assess the existence of a basically positive or negative relationship between national and European identity since we expect the perception of the existence of a European level of identification as completing or as threatening the national one to vary according to the type of national identity. Which types of identity can be distinguished beyond generalized national identity and what assumptions can we make with respect to compatibility with European identity?

Traditionally, research on nationalism distinguishes two main conceptions of the nation (Meinecke 1908; Wehler 2001, p. 51). The first, called *Kulturnation*, is of a particularistic or cultural type and emphasizes the importance of ascriptive factors like language, ethnicity or historical background for belonging to the national community. The second concept is of a more universalistic and voluntary type and has been called *Staatsnation*. It is constructed on a political basis. This typology is broadly accepted in the analysis of nationalism and provides – in its multiple variations – the framework for a great number of studies (Brubaker's (1992) is among the most famous). It also provides a useful basis for our analysis insofar as the cultural and the political types of national identity are not considered to be equally compatible with a European identity. The cultural conception of nation is mostly expected to be

incompatible with other types of identity insofar as some of its traditional and basic elements – for example, mother tongue, ancestry – are deterministic and imply a strong exclusion of and a demarcation from outgroups. As McLaren puts it in her socialization hypothesis, the inclusion of the national community in a broader frame – such as the European – is likely to be perceived as a challenge or even as a cultural threat since it implies agents should identify with some of the outgroups that are excluded at the national level. By way of contrast, the political type of national identification is more likely to be compatible with a European identity because of its universalistic nature. The only necessary condition is the perceived compatibility of national and European political orientations. This differentiation of the relation between national and European identity according to Meinecke's typology is presented in Figure 5.1.

Type of national identification
- Political/voluntaristic vs. ⟶ Perception of the EU as a threat for the national community or as an additional identity ⟶ Perceived compatibility between national and European identity
- cultural/intrinsic

Figure 5.1   Determinants of the compatibility between national and European identity

It is necessary, moreover, to disaggregate a given national identity to better understand the relationship between national and European identity. This calls for case studies of various EU member countries. Country-specific investigations are better suited to take into account the historical development of the various conceptions of national identity. Type and intensity of national identity is never a constant. Rather, it is a variable fluctuating over the course of time as an object of the identity strategies of different social and political groups. Case studies can improve the understanding of how citizens frame national identity. They allow us to differentiate between specific types of national identity developed by distinct groups at different periods in time. It would be ideal to have such case studies for all EU countries and to formulate hypotheses on this basis. This is the only way to take the dynamic character of national identities into account as well as to acquire a sense of the degree of variation between individuals and sub-groups within the same nation – elements which are too often hidden by figures aggregated at the country level.

This analysis will only deal with the French case to demonstrate the many possibilities associated with this approach. France constitutes a very interesting case. This country is widely considered to represent a strong, historically defined national identity, not least due to its early experience of state formation and centralization. France thus boasts very old and widely accepted symbols

of national pride such as the *Académie Française* which was founded as early as 1635. Yet, France is not only relevant for our theoretical concerns because of the strength of its national identity. The country is also widely held to be a classical case of a nation of the 'political' as opposed to 'cultural' type. A case study of France thus represents an occasion to reflect on this deep-rooted national construct and, potentially, to focus on the relationship between this type of national identity and the European level of identity. For, France has obstructed a number of attempts to further European integration in recent years.[3] The negative outcome of the 2005 referendum in particular was interpreted by many observers as the result of a particularly French nationalistic attitude. An in-depth study of the French case will enable us to show the degree to which France is really characterized by *a weak European identity and a strong national identity* and *which relation exists between French national and European identities* by taking into account the specificity of the conceptions of national identity among French citizens.

By asking these questions, this analysis seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the relationship between national and European identity. For this purpose, we will not only consider generalized national identity, but also two alternative concepts of national identity. In addition, we hope to profit from a historical analysis of the emergence of a more culturally based conception of national identity on the one hand, and a more politically based conception on the other. The French conceptions of the nation will first be examined in historical perspective in order to formulate specific expectations about the compatibility of French and European identity (section 5.2). Next, we test these historically derived expectations empirically, using the ISSP (International Social Survey Programme) 2003 national identity survey as data (section 5.3). We then discuss the empirical findings. In the final part of this chapter, we present a synthesis of the analysis, draw further conclusions about the nature of national and European identity, and open up perspectives for further research (section 5.4).

5.2 FRANCE – A POLITICAL NATION? NATIONAL IDENTITY AS A HISTORICAL AND INDIVIDUAL VARIABLE

Since Meinecke's *Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat*, much research on nationalism contrasts the French and the German conceptions of the nation to illustrate two types of orientation. The distinction between two conceptions of the nation is based on a historical and theoretical argument. The political and voluntaristic concept of nation was first proposed by French authors like Emmanuel Sieyès at the end of the eighteenth century, and Ernest Renan and

Fustel de Coulange a century later. In this respect, the 'French conception' of nation can be traced back to Emmanuel Sieyès' brochure *What is the Third Estate?* in which the author defined the nation as 'a body of associates, living under a common law, and represented by the same legislature' (Sieyès 1988, p. 40). This point of view diverged strongly from the then widespread conception of a nation as determined by language, ethnicity and history. Sieyès' argumentation is clearly influenced by Rousseau's definition of the nation as a product of the 'general will'. To quote Sieyès: 'What is the will of a nation? It is the result of individual wills as nation is the union of individuals' (Sieyès 1988, p. 167). This voluntaristic approach, which was revived by Renan and Fustel de Coulange, is of crucial importance since it allows the integration of new citizens on a voluntary basis. The 'French conception' of nation is thus characterized by a vigorous universalism. French patriots often considered their nation as the principal source of progress and expansion of democratic values in the world and did not distinguish 'France' from the Republic.

Due to its voluntarism, egalitarianism and universalism, French national identification was often described as an 'open' or 'soft nationalism' or even as 'just patriotism'. Our causal model relates the political type of national identification to the issue of compatibility of French and European identity. In this respect, it seems as if the political type of national identification would not support a rejection of the European Constitution because it does not suggest an exclusive national identity. Rather, the rejection of the referendum suggests that using the concept of the *Staatsnation* to characterize French national identity is an oversimplification which does not capture certain elements of the national identity. Indeed, the historical analysis of the emergence of the French understanding of nation shows that the conception of nation *à la* Sieyès – originally only one point of view among others – was taken as 'the French nation model' only because of the victory of the revolutionaries in 1789 and the need to legitimize later political pretensions. National ideas were lumped together with the ideas of the democratic movement and used as a strategy to legitimize the claims of the bourgeoisie and the abolition of the nobility. Subsequently, the 'French conception' played a crucial role in the justification of France's foreign policy. Its universalistic dimension was used to legitimize Napoleon's military campaigns in Europe and the colonization during the Third Republic as a *mission civilatrice*. After the Franco-Prussian War, the definition of the nation as a 'daily plebiscite' was certainly the best argument which could be set against Germany's claim to Alsace-Lorraine. This instrumentalization of the conception of nation developed by Sieyès should give us reason to doubt the simple equation of France and *Staatsnation*. Are there other ways for French citizens to define their national identity?

A more accurate historical examination of the development of French national identity shows that both types of concept of what nation means always

existed side-by-side. Noiriel (1992) demonstrates that a cohabitation of a political, voluntaristic and universalistic nation which transcends particularisms on the one hand, and a more deterministic, organic nation anchored in traditions on the other has been a reality since the eighteenth century. Boulainvilliers (1658–1722) argued that the pre-eminence of the members of the nobility was justified by their belonging to the Frankish race which overwhelmed the Gaul. This aristocratic definition reduced the nation to a social group defined by bloodlines, the nobility. Half a century later, Malby criticised this conception, opposing the aristocratic exclusiveness and the idea to argue that all those living on French soil should be part of the nation. The tension between the two approaches to the nation remained salient even after the decline of the importance of the nobility; that is during the Third Republic, the Vichy Regime, and after the Second World War. An exhaustive presentation of all French theories and doctrines concerning national identity is not possible here. However, even a brief look at the past is sufficient to show that Meinecke's reduction of France to the status of a 'Staatsnation' as defended by Sieyès and Renan cannot be upheld.

Another type of nationalism becomes visible at regular intervals, especially at times of political, economic or moral crisis such as the defeat of 1870, the Dreyfus Affair, the First World War, the world economic crisis of the 1930s, the Second World War, decolonization and today in a France increasingly challenged by unemployment. This nationalism is infused with pessimism and feeds people's fears by presenting the future of France as threatened by decadence, conspiracy and immigration. This view leads to a conception of the French nation which is exclusive and relies on the affirmation of clear boundaries. Such a demarcation could not take place if the nation was understood as a universal *Staatsnation*. Consequently, nationalist populist right-wing parties and the social groups which support them have demarcated the French nation according to various criteria of the cultural type such as ethnicity and religion.

This second doctrine of French national identification is often associated with the profound crisis that France has undergone after the defeat of 1870 and which resulted in a major national trauma. At that time, the country was confronted with considerable economic and demographic problems. In the course of this crisis, the former universalistic ideals were easily abandoned by some theoreticians who catered to national particularism and tried to justify this notion by new theories of national belonging. Hyppolyte Taine (1866) underlined for instance the importance of three factors: *milieu* (geographic and climatic variables), *race* (in the biological sense) and *moment* (state of intellectual knowledge). More generally, social scientists became interested in heredity approaches and the concept of *race-résultat* ('result-race') became popular. Since it was difficult to argue that there was ethnic homogeneity in France, nationalists asserted that the French race was formed in the Middle Ages and had remained the same since. This argumentation, based on biology

and history, allowed these figures to defend a new determinism and to justify racism and anti-semitism (Noiriel 1992, p. 25). More and more laws were proposed to protect France against spies and the invasion of foreign workers. Populist ideas in this genre were remarkably successful politically.

This new nationalism was defended by various organizations[4], newspapers, politicians and academics: among the best known examples are Paul Déroulède, Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, three very active and famous nationalists who aligned themselves against Dreyfus and tried to further develop Taine's ideas. All three authors denounced passionately the revolutionary political conception of the nation which – they believed – led to the destruction of the natural order and of traditional structures for the impossible purpose of creating a new order *ex nihilo*. Barrès, for one, defined nationality as the acceptance of racial, geographic and historical determinism (Barrès 1925, p. 10). The influence of positivism is even more visible in the writings of Maurras who saw himself as a 'racist' in the deterministic and 'traditionalist conception of historical race rather than in the zoological sense' (Noiriel 1992, p. 25). The belief that national allegiance is determined meant these nationalists rejected the possibility of assimilation of new members. Thus, foreigners and Jews were denied citizenship and made responsible for French political, economic and moral woes. They were, in short, stigmatized as dangerous elements for the national community.

This argumentation became prominent again during the world economic crisis of the 1930s (Vavasseur-Desperriers 2000, pp. 92–3). A major anti-semitic campaign accused Jews of representing a political, social, economic, and even biological threat. Foreigners and Jews alike were widely considered to be the source of France's economic problems such as unemployment, so that successive laws were adopted in the name of French workers to protect them from foreign competition. A multitude of nationalist groups, leagues and parties[5] were created during this period, although their importance remains a matter of controversy as they were unable to seize power. The invasion of France by the Nazis in 1940 presented the members of these groups with a dilemma. On the one hand, the downfall of the Republic constituted a unique occasion to realize their authoritarian conception of the state. On the other hand, their nationalism was not compatible with the acceptance of defeat by Germany and even less with the occupation of French territory. Consequently, the period between 1940 and 1945 is characterized by a wide range of attempts to legitimize nationalism, both by the Vichyists and by the Resistance movement. As the discourses held by Pétain and the exclusion laws of August and October 1940 show, the Vichy regime was strongly influenced by a 'cultural' conception of nation.

Since 1945 a number of organizations and parties continue to defend an organic and determinist view of the nation, from the *Front National* (FN) (since

1972) and the *Mouvement Pour la France* (MPF) (since 1994) to the movement *Renouveau Français* (since 2005). All these organizations call for an end to immigration which is associated with a threat to French culture. The FN and the MPF both defend the principle of *jus sanguinis* and seek to cast doubt on the principle of *jus soli*. The two parties propose to suppress dual citizenship and claim the importance of filiation. They argue that naturalization should follow 'assimilation' or 'francization' with a probation period during which the applicants must prove their knowledge of the French language and laws to become eligible for civil service.[6] *Renouveau Français*, for example, describes itself as a 'nationalist' movement and aspires to rehabilitate French civilization, military power, morality, Christianity, cultural, spiritual and physical identity, economic prosperity and security.[7] On its website, several texts seek to define French unity on the base of factors such as ethnicity[8] and Christianity[9], speaking of the crucial importance of cultural criteria for *Renouveau Français*.

An exhaustive presentation of the whole spectrum of conceptions of nationality developed in France over the course of its history is not possible here. We have made it clear, however, that the construction of the French nation was not legitimized by political arguments alone. Even a brief look at French history shows that the concept of what constitutes French national identity has been controversial. The discourses and doctrines surveyed suffice to show that the view that France is a political nation is a reduction of the way French elites define and French people perceive their nation. For, French nationalists also have long used cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic arguments. It is therefore necessary to go beyond affirmations of the general relationship between aggregated national identity and European identity to differentiate hypotheses about the compatibility of French and European identities at the sub-national level.

We cannot infer with ultimate precision from the two types of national identity described above that the one is compatible with other levels of identification and the other one is not. The degree of exclusivity of national identities is not intrinsically determined by its positive referents and our historical review shows that negative referents may play a more decisive role.[10] Cultural referents were indeed also defended by people proposing a relatively open national identity, such as Ernest Renan, the main theorist of the political type of nation who underlined that the nation was also a community of memory and that the object of the 'plebiscite' was a spiritual and material legacy. On the other hand, there is no reason why advocates of a political position could not be exclusive. Republican ideology, for instance, was taught in the primary schools of the Third Republic as a French national specificity. However, the culturally based type of national identity which constantly challenged the political one is traditionally and broadly considered less compatible with other identities, since its basics – for example, language, ancestry, parental origin, country of birth –

constitute quite deterministic criteria which favour a process of strong demarcation of national identity and exclusion of 'others'. The parallel development of a European identity including some of these outgroups may be improbable.

Historical analysis can neither show the distribution of citizens holding one of the two different views of national identity nor assess the empirical compatibility of either type with a European identity. In the following section, we will use empirical data to address the question of the impact of the French national identity on the European level of identity by evaluating the *distribution* and the respective *potential for exclusivity* of the two types of national identity in France.

5.3 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The database used to test our expectations consists of the 2003 survey of the *International Social Survey Programme*. The survey focused primarily on national identity and therefore contains indicators needed to define the types of national identity as described above. The analysis will demonstrate whether or not France can really be characterized by a lack of European identity. The extent, sources and degree of exclusiveness of French national identity will then be measured. The final part of the analysis will discuss results on the relationship between national and European identity.

A Lack of Identification with Europe?

As mentioned in the introduction, France's presumed Euroscepticism is widely attributed to a lack of European identity. To measure whether the identification of French respondents can really be considered weak, we used a classical item asking respondents how close they feel to Europe (Q.2(d) in ISSP 2003). On a scale from 1 (not close at all) to 4 (very close), French respondents feature an average score of 2.6 which is – in line with the aforementioned assumptions – relatively low in comparison to other European countries, most of which have a higher average score – the highest score is reached in Hungary, with 3.6. A look at the distribution (Figure 5.2) reveals that the average score for France hides a remarkably polarized situation, with over 35 per cent of the respondents in the extreme categories.

Still, since the majority (55 per cent) of French respondents at least feel close to Europe, one cannot speak of a European identity being absent. However, French citizens appear to be much more divided with regard to their European identity than other European citizens. We will examine whether this divide is due to different degrees or different types of national identity vis-à-vis counterparts in other European polities.

Figure 5.2   European identity

Intensity of Feelings of National Identity: To what Extent do French People Identify with their Nation?

The intensity of generalized feelings of national identity is measured by an index combining the following two questions: 'How close do you feel to France?' (Question Q2(c) in ISSP 2003) and 'How proud are you of being French?' (Question Q.16 in ISSP 2003).[11] The distribution confirms the assumption that French citizens are characterized by a relatively strong generalized national identity. Indeed, about 90 per cent of the respondents score at least 5 on a scale from 1 to 7.[12] Before we clarify whether strength of national identity feelings is related to the polarized distribution of European identity, we will specify the descriptive by analysing to what extent French national identity can be characterized as aligning with one or the other of the two historically derived types (cultural vs. political nation).

Type of National Identity: How do French People Imagine their Nation?

We have operationalized generalized national identity by combining French responses to questions regarding the levels of national pride and perceived closeness to the national community. This does not yet cover the differentiation of national identity into the two types suggested by Meinecke. We try to capture this distinction by combining two summary indicators out of a set of nine items, including questions about objects of national pride and what is important for being truly French.[13] A principal component analysis with all items was performed to check the dimensionality of the items selected. The results can indeed be interpreted in relation to the two types as proposed by Meinecke (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1   Sources of national identity (Rotated Component Matrix)

	Component	
	1	2
Important: have French ancestry	.801	
Important: born in France	.732	
Children: right to become citizen	.687	
Child born abroad: right to become citizen	.640	
Important: to be a Catholic	.624	
Important: able to speak country language	.378	.296
Proud of: political influence in world		.797
Proud of: way democracy works		.779
Important: respect of political institutions – law	.240	.519

Notes:
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization (Eigenvalues over 1, absolute values were suppressed under .2).

The first factor explains 29.8 per cent of the variance and corresponds to a culturally based type of national identity while the second factor explains 18.4 per cent and reflects the more politically based type of national identity. The cultural type combines people identifying with French ancestry and French parents, the French language and Catholicism, who consider the country of birth decisive for national belonging. The political type of national identity is linked to democracy, political institutions and law, and pride about France's role as an actor in the world. In this way, both types of national identity, identified by Meinecke, can be operationalized

and factor scores may be used to evaluate their relative importance among French citizens and their respective impact on European identity.

A first impression of the relative importance of each type of national identity for the generalized measure of French national identity can be obtained by regressing generalized French national identity by the two types of national identity.[14] As expected, the two types of national identity are positively related and explain almost 17 per cent of its variance. Both indicators contribute independently. However, politically based national identity (.340[***]) has a stronger impact than the culturally based one (.236[***]). This suggests that the politically based national identity is the modal value in France – which can be illustrated by Figures 5.3 and 5.4, which display the distribution of both types of national identity in France.

The results allow us to confirm theoretical predictions and to consider in a more subtle light the questions raised by our historical observations. Compared to other European countries[15], France has a relatively low average of culturally

Figure 5.3   Distribution of the factor score for the cultural type of national identity

based national identity. Although some countries like Sweden have a still lower average, numerous other European countries – especially Poland, Hungary, Portugal and Austria – appear to have a much stronger culturally based national identity than France. In contrast, the politically based national identity is particularly widespread in France, which features the second strongest level among EU countries (after Great Britain). Thus, even if France cannot be categorically labelled a nation 'of the political type', this is the dominant understanding of national identity. That said, distributions indicate that French respondents are characterized by a rather high polarization between the two types of national identity. The majority of respondents locate themselves in the middle of the scale but there are also more extreme cases as is the case in other countries. This confirms again the view that French citizens are polarized when it comes to national identification. This attests to the value of country-specific analyses. The next step of the analysis inquires into the impact of generalized national identity as well as of the two differentiated types of European identity.

Figure 5.4   Distribution of the factor score for the political type of national identity

Are French and European Identity Compatible?

The descriptive analysis reveals a relatively polarized picture of national and European identity in France. Does a strong national identity imply a weak European identity? Is this the case only for certain types of national identity? Is it possible to explain the polarization of French citizens as to European identity by the co-existence of different types of national identity?

A first important result is that generalized national identity – operationalized with the indicators presented earlier – is positively correlated to European identity. French national identity therefore basically does not represent a barrier to the development of a European identity. That the correlation (.173[***]) is not very high further speaks to the necessity of differentiating the national identity according to type.

The differentiation of national identity into a political and a cultural type clearly improves the causal model. The regression of European identity with both types of national identity explains 10.6 per cent of the variance and shows a significant positive effect of the political type (.264[***]), as opposed to the culturally based national identity which has a negative impact on European identity (–.194[***]). This result confirms our hypothesis that there is no systematic relationship between generalized national and European identity. Respondents linking their national identity to politics tend to identify with Europe, in contrast to those who mainly base their national identity on culture. According to this result, the culturally based national identity has a stronger potential for preventing the emergence of a European identity than the political one. Given the greater importance of the political type of national identity in French society, this result suggests that the French national identity should not be thought as a major barrier to the development of a European identity.

Only the less prominent type of national identity, the one based on culture, constitutes a barrier to the development of a multi-layered identity encompassing both national and European identity. A politically based national identity is supportive of coexistence with a European identity, while a culturally based national identity tends to be more exclusive and constitutes an obstacle to the emergence of a European identity. Given these results, the overall positive correlation between the level of national and European identities is not surprising. Its modest level is probably due to the distortion caused by citizens holding an exclusive culturally based national identity.

5.4 CONCLUSION

The previous conceptual discussion and empirical findings contribute to the debate on the compatibility of national and European identity, primarily by

giving deeper insight into the specific French case. The country case study allowed us to go beyond the generalized concepts usually analysed and to make some observations on the distribution of French citizens as well as the variance which exists in ways of 'imagining' the French nation. The descriptive analyses confirmed the utility of conceptual differentiations, revealing that France is very polarized with respect to both types of national identification as well as with regard to the intensity of European identity.

The historical review of French conceptions of national identity revealed that the often encountered description of France as a political type of nation is an oversimplification. However, the empirical analysis indicates that the political definition of nation has indeed a much wider reception in France than the cultural definition. Another French specificity consists in the highly disseminated distribution of respondents as to the type of national identity. As such, the conceptual distinction between political and cultural national identity proves particularly useful in the case of France.

All this suggests that it is problematic to claim there is a basically positive or negative relationship between national and European identities in light of the multiple ways of identifying with the nation. This insight goes beyond French specific findings, and may be parlayed in further research. If cross-national comparisons sometimes detect clear national patterns – which can be explained by the impact of the political culture of the country and sometimes by specific mobilizations and campaigns of the national political leaders – inter-individual variations within the country should also be taken into account. This constitutes a strong argument in favour of further case studies dealing with other European countries.

Moreover, the analysis sheds a more nuanced light on the claim that France is increasingly Eurosceptic – especially of the rejection of the European Constitution – due to the persistence of a strong French national identity. For, if the results broadly confirm that French citizens display a relatively high level of national identification, the empirical findings indicate that only the cultural type of national identity tends to be incompatible with a European identity. The fact that only a minority of French citizens appear to uphold a cultural national identity suggests that national identity alone cannot be held accountable for the rejection of the Constitution by a majority of French voters.

The importance of the identification with political reference objects on the national level, which have a historically and empirically wider amenability to compatibility with political referents on other territorial levels, stands as an invitation to explore other plausible explanations for the perceived incongruence of the French and European projects. For the compatibility of political referents depends on their substance. The intense debates which took place before the referendum on the European Constitution suggest that several conceptions of the EU compete with one another (Percheron 1991). It would

be interesting, for instance, to inquire as to whether the argument that the European Constitution and the EU in general are 'too liberal' – a central argument during the 'No' campaign in 2005[16] – can be interpreted as a defence of French Republicanism or rather as an economic concern. What is clear is that national political cultures do play a role in shaping citizens' evaluation of the European project.

NOTES

1. Original text: 'Entre le spectre turc qui désignait sans ambages les musulmans, et le malheureux plombier polonais, les étrangers ont été invités à rester chez eux. Le Pen xénophobe, c'est son fonds de commerce, mais que des dirigeants de gauche fassent campagne sur ce terrain comme Chirac en 2002 sur l'insécurité, on croyait cette xénophobie-là impensable...'
2. See, among others, Jean-Marie Colombani (2005); Pierre Nora (2005); Nicolas Weill (2005); B. Cerquiglino (2006).
3. The history of European integration is marked by various episodes in which French recalcitrance to cooperate was perceived as resulting from a strong national identity: the positioning against the development of the European Defence Community, the 'Empty Chair' crisis in 1965/6, the negative issue of the 2005 referendum… Nonna Mayer (1996) analyses for instance the impact of French national pride on the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.
4. These organizations often took the form of leagues – like the *Ligue des Patriotes*, the *Ligue antisémitique* and the *Ligue de la patrie française* – but also of labour unions like *Les Jaunes*, who defended class collaboration to maintain national unity.
5. Among others, *Solidarité Française* and Jacques Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français*.
6. See *Mouvement pour la France*, http://www.pourlafrance.fr/projet_immigration.php and *Front National*, http://www.frontnational.com/doc_prop_identite.php.
7. See *Renouveau Français*, http://www.renouveaufrancais.com/.
8. See *La formation du peuple français* which tries to contest the characterization of France as 'the nation with 100 peoples' by minimizing the importance of the Latin and German invasions and pointing out that the composition of the French population has remained stable since the Middle Ages.
9. See *Origines de la France et tradition spirituelle*.
10. The stigmatization of outgroups appears to be the most important criterion for distinguishing the modalities of national identification as proposed by Renan and Barrès or later the Gaullists and Le Pen. Thus, we can plausibly assume that individuals and groups that construct their national identities primarily by stigmatizing outgroups will not tend towards inclusiveness towards these outgroups, even on a more abstract level such as the European one. The decisive element for the compatibility of national and European identities seems to be the degree to which the national identity is constructed against 'others'.
11. Q. notations refer to the question codes in ISSP codebook.
12. This result can be replicated on the basis of other recent databases like the Eurobarometer 62.0 (2004) and the Flash barometer 2006.
13. The exact questions ask respondents what is important for being truly French (1: not important at all, up to 5: very important): Q. 3 (a) to have been born in France, Q. 3 (d) to be able to speak French, Q. 3 (e) to be a Catholic, Q. 3 (f) to respect French political institutions and law, and Q. 3 (h) to have French ancestry. Other items ask respondents how proud they are of France (1: not proud at all, up to 5: very proud) in: Q. 5 (a) the way democracy works and Q. 5 (b) its political influence in the world. Eventually, two questions measure indirectly the importance of having French parents and being born in France for being French by asking citizens how much they agree to the following statements: Q. 15 (a): Children born in France of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become French citizens; (b) Children

born abroad should have the right to become French citizens if at least one of their parents is a French citizen.

14.	To avoid problems of multicollinearity, the independence of both types of national identity was verified with a Pearson's correlation test (R = .00).

15.	The database unfortunately does not allow us to compare the French distribution with the distribution within all European countries, since the ISSP 2003 survey was conducted in only the following 17 countries of the EU: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.

16.	The slogans 'against the liberal EU' or against this 'too liberal Constitution' were among the most widespread in French demonstrations against the constitutional treaty. Whether the Constitution was too liberal or not was also discussed in a lively fashion in French newspapers (see, for example, Hervé Nathan (2005); Jean-Louis Andreani (2005); Claude Imbert (2005).

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Internet Resources

Fustel de Coulange, L'Alsace est-elle Allemande ou Française, réponse à M. Mommsen: http://www.bmlisieux.com/curiosa/alsace.htm
Front National: http://www.frontnational.com/doc_prop_identite.php
Mouvement pour la France: http://www.pourlafrance.fr/projet_immigration.php
Renouveau Français: http://www.renouveaufrancais.com/

PART III

Attitude formation towards the EU

6. Deliberation and the process of identity formation: Civil society organizations and constitution making in the EU

Julia De Clerck-Sachsse

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The Convention on the Future of Europe, for some the EU's very own Philadelphia, poses a certain paradox: hailed as a more democratic and open process and dedicated (at least in words) to reaching out to Europe's citizens, it left people across the Union either unaware of, equivocal about, or even opposed to its work.[1] Rather than fostering a sense of belonging among EU citizens and giving them a text with which to identify, the constitutional impasse after negative referenda in France, the Netherlands and Ireland plunged the Union into an identity crisis. Even today, as the Lisbon Treaty has been ratified, some key questions about the Union's *finalité* remain: What does the EU stand for? Where is it going? And how will its citizens live together? In this context, debates about a European identity are as salient as ever.

Ironically, the constitutional project which provoked this public crisis of confidence was designed to harness popular support and to give the EU a more legitimate basis by revisiting key institutional questions, making the design of the European project more transparent and providing an underlying normative narrative to guide further integration. The process of treaty revision was treated as an explicit effort at constitution making and great emphasis was placed on public participation from the inception of the process.[2] In order to achieve this, special initiatives were designed to involve civil society and the Convention's proceedings were made accessible to the public. The Convention was to break with the EU tradition of top down legislation, and infuse the process of constitution making with an element of democratic legitimacy.

Similar assumptions about the relevance of constitution making for the mobilization of a political community, an increased sense of identification with the polity and, in turn, an increase in the legitimacy of the European polity can

be found in deliberative democracy theories, perhaps most prominently in the work of Jürgen Habermas (2001, p. 5). For Habermas, the process of constitution making in the EU bears much promise for the construction of a European political identity. His theory argues that the constitutional process would spark the mobilization of civil society, piquing a broad public debate about the nature and purpose of European integration (ibid., p. 17). This process of communicative interaction is to foster a sense of common identity among citizens. Civil society organizations (CSOs) – voluntary organizations that defend a common purpose – are assigned a prominent role in this process. They are seen as platforms for public debate, giving citizens the opportunity to make their voices heard, and filtering these from the private into the public sphere.[3]

This chapter analyses the question of whether or not the assumptions about the identity-building potential of CSOs are confirmed by the experience of the EU's constitutional Convention. It accordingly considers the process and pre-conditions under which a European identity might emerge. The empirical inquiry into the question of whether CSOs can foster the emergence of a European identity is based on interviews with 35 CSOs in Berlin, Brussels, London, Madrid and Paris, as well as with members of the European Convention, public officials in the European Commission, regional representations, journalists and academic observers.

CSOs are seen to fulfil two functions in particular which are relevant to the emergence of a European identity. First, they are believed to Europeanize public debate by encouraging deliberation among citizens across borders. Second, it is thought that CSOs provide platforms for direct civic participation in the political process, thereby mobilizing and socializing them into the political system. In the EU context CSOs are therefore often seen to act as intermediaries between national and European spheres of political action. Both of these functions are important prerequisites for the emergence of a European identity, the former because it allows for an exchange between citizens and raises awareness about key political questions, the latter because it provides a sense of ownership of the European political process which often appears far removed from citizens' everyday life.

The argument in this chapter proceeds as follows. The first part outlines assumptions in theories of deliberative democracy pertaining to the contribution of CSOs to identity formation and democratic legitimacy in the EU. Deliberative democracy theories are important not only because they are used in many academic analyses of civil society in the EU, but also because similar assumptions underlie the institutional justification for involving civil society in their work. A second part seeks to establish whether the promise of civil society actually holds in the light of empirical evidence. It does so by first analysing the institutional framework of the Convention's civil dialogue and, subsequently, the case of the work of European CSOs during the Convention.

A third and final part offers some reflections about the opportunities and limitations of CSOs in fostering a European identity.

6.2 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, CIVIL SOCIETY AND IDENTITY

Even the first generation of scholars theorizing European integration believed a sense of identity was paramount for the progress of integration. For Karl Deutsch 'integration is a matter of mutual sympathies and loyalties, of "we feeling", trust and mutual considerations, of political identification in terms of self images and interests' (Deutsch et al. 1957, p. 36). This means that in addition to fulfilling certain legal standards, the legitimacy of European political authority also depends on a degree of mutual identification among citizens as part of the same political community (Easton 1965, p. 185; Beetham and Lord 1998, p. 29). Given that the EU is a diverse polity which combines peoples with heterogeneous ethnic and historical backgrounds a common European identity can only be a political one.[4]

It is in this context that theories of deliberative democracy have entered the debate on European identity. Theories of deliberative democracy focus on political *process* rather than on a common history or culture as the basis for the emergence of a common political identity. For Habermas communicative interaction among citizens, based on reasoned arguing about political aims in the public sphere, is a fundamental basis for democratic governance (Habermas 1990, pp. 14–26). Deliberation thus presupposes certain normative standards, such as equality and reciprocity. Rather than public bargaining about exogenously given preferences, the process of deliberation allows for the formation of common preferences not through compromise but through the mutual interpenetration of ideas and values. If this does not necessarily create consensus, it can 'lead to a common horizon, a common and shared field of contestation' (Peters 2005, p. 106). Such a common background is deemed necessary for the emergence and vitality of a public sphere.

In deliberative democracy theories, the public sphere is assigned a central role for political coherence of the system even though it is not directly linked to decision-making processes. Calhoun has emphasized the role of the public sphere in developing a common identity. He argues that 'participation in the public sphere integrates people into discourses and projects and collective understandings that connect them to each other' (Calhoun 2003, p. 8). Since identities and communities are continuously re-constructed and re-defined, the openness of public discourse is a first step towards creating novel bonds and identifications in deliberative democracy theories. In other words, political projects do not need to wait for a deeply ingrained common identity to develop

so long as they are driven by some sense of common purpose. As such, proce-
dural norms generate over time a sense of attachment and solidarity among
citizens that inform their common identity (Habermas 2001; Calhoun 2003).

Given that they do not presume a primordial value consensus, shared ethnic-
ity, or culture as the necessary cement for a sense of belonging, theories of
deliberative democracy have been particularly attractive for conceptualizing
identity formation in diverse societies. The concept of constitutional patriotism
is especially helpful when conceiving the glue holding together a post-national
community like the EU. It argues that a feeling of solidarity can develop on
the grounds of a common commitment to civic values within a polity.[5] Justine
Lacroix (2002, pp. 950–951) has developed the idea of constitutional patrio-
tism with specific reference to the European context, arguing that a shared
political culture can develop without the ties of national community. O'Flynn
(2006), moreover, applies such assumptions about the capacity of deliberation
to foster common identities in the context of divided societies. He argues that
deliberative procedures can help secure legitimate governance even in societ-
ies that are in a state of public strife or deeply divided along ethnic or religious
lines by building a sense of common identity. A deliberative approach to iden-
tity would also be promising in the context of the EU where, albeit not neces-
sarily deeply divided, a variety of national societies exist all of which have
more or less strongly developed national identities.

The problem with this conception of identity is how to identify the specifi-
cally European dimension of a political system based on procedural norms
and universal values. Indeed, this is a weakness in the Habermasian theory,
which sometimes falls back on a dichotomy between inherited values and
historical traditions (for example in the case of Europe and America) rather
than relying on the force of deliberation alone (Habermas and Derrida 2003).
However, this does not mean that universal values cannot provide the basis for
a distinctly European identity per se. Indeed, the distinctiveness of a European
identity stems not so much from their values as from the belief that the EU
is the adequate frame for pursuing common projects. Nicolaïdis envisages a
collective of peoples that share a culture of mutual respect for each other's
difference and a common commitment to a shared European political project
(Nicolaïdis 2004, pp. 101, 102). She therefore suggests speaking of European
demoi instead of a single European *demos*.

Europeanness, in this view, is the commitment to work together despite
cultural and political differences towards a common goal. To put it more
concretely, a Belgian might identify with an Italian more than with a
Norwegian not because they share more common values, but because they
are involved in common *projects* such as a common currency or student
exchange programmes through membership in the European Union. Through
this they can come to appreciate not only their commonalities but also respect

and perhaps even appreciate their differences. Such a culture of 'democratic tolerance'[6], however, necessitates a social basis where principles of trust and mutual recognition can flourish. This is why Habermas emphasises the importance of a European political culture (Habermas 2001).

Civil society becomes relevant in the context of the debate on how the social foundation for shared projects can develop. Civil society is of course a much-contested concept.[7] The definition employed in this chapter is based on ideas of deliberative democracy which locate civil society as an intermediary space between state, the economy and the private sphere where citizens organize voluntarily to commonly shape public life. As such, it forms a central element of the public sphere (Habermas 1996, p. 367).

However, in actually existing democracies the presumed demarcation of civil society from both the economic and the state sphere is difficult to sustain since these spheres often interact and intertwine (Walzer 1995, p. 19). Regardless of the fluidity of such boundaries, however, the basic conception of civil society as an intermediary sphere is appropriate as it captures political actors that cannot be assigned to either the state or economic sectors (e.g. non-profit, non-governmental organizations). While civic associations interact with and participate in the spheres of government and market, they do not form part of these spheres to the extent that they actually wield political power or generate economic profit (ibid.). Since in liberal democracies political power is seen to lie ultimately with the people, they exercise political influence as organized civic interests and proliferators of public opinion. Garcia highlights the central importance of a European civil society for identity formation in the EU: 'Europe will exist as an unquestionable political community only when European identity permeates people's lives and daily existence. This will require a truly European civil society' (Garcia 1999, p. 15).

More concretely, the emergence of a strong civil society bears two specific promises. First, CSOs are seen to Europeanize the political life of the EU, by fostering public deliberation across borders. Second, CSOs are regarded as forces of political socialization and mobilization inasmuch as they furnish platforms for political participation. By enabling citizens to interact in common political projects, they connect EU politics to lower levels of national and regional politics. As such, they are regarded as important agents in overcoming the democratic gap between the EU and its citizens and are intimately involved in the emergence of a European identity.

The role ascribed to civil society in deliberative theory, therefore, rests upon the assumption that the political conditions for deliberation exist, such as a vibrant public sphere and a deliberating parliament that takes up debates from the general public.[8] These same conditions are also crucial for the link between civil society and identity formation. In the EU, both these preconditions are only present to a limited extent. Moreover, given the multi-level

and multi-centre nature of the EU, European civil society must be active on multiple levels of governance. This is at once the greatest potential and the greatest challenge for CSOs in the EU. The fluid and open nature of these groups enables them to connect several spheres of political engagement and to draw supporters across national borders. As will emerge from the empirical analysis below, however, being present on multiple levels can also be a considerable structural challenge for CSOs.

6.3 CONSTITUTION MAKING, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT FOR THE EU?

The Convention with its emphasis on civil society participation provides a particularly fitting example for examining civil society's possible contribution to the emergence of a European identity. Not only did the Convention make a specific effort to include CSOs, the project of constitution making is thought by some to be inherently connected to the mobilization of civil society and debate in the public sphere. According to radical constitutional theory, the Convention might be the starting point for an ongoing process of deliberation about the nature of a polity in constant evolution, setting in stone the normative boundaries of a political community (Shaw 2002, p. 47). Constitution making in this understanding can be regarded as a social practice, as well as a legislative exercise, because it entails deliberation about core principles of political life.[9] This notion of constitutionalism builds upon an understanding of the public sphere as a space for generating a European identity through public deliberation in civil society (Habermas 1996, p. 370).

The inherent connection of constitutional politics and public mobilization is a prominent feature in Bruce Ackerman's work on the American constitution. Ackerman develops the idea of 'constitutional moment' as a defining point in the process of constitution making, which entails the extensive mobilization of public debate on the constitutional future of a polity thereby elevating everyday politics to a higher constitutional level (Ackerman 1991b). With regard to the European context, Habermas contends that a European constitution could serve as a catalyst for the emergence of European civil society. According to him, 'the process of constitution-giving is in itself a unique means of boundary transcending communication' (Habermas 2003, p. 238, translation J.DCS). A wide-ranging political debate across Europe about a constitution, according to Habermas, would have a politicizing effect on civil society in the EU. This, in turn, would foster deliberation in the public sphere thereby contributing to the development of a shared political identity. The process of constitution making thus becomes 'a sociological means by which the very notion of a political community may be mobilised' (Walker 2003).

The idea that the Convention represents such a constitutional moment for the EU has been developed among others by Walker who argues that the Convention signifies a new dimension of constitutional politics in the EU (ibid.). To him the draft Constitutional Treaty could be seen to 'provide a lasting reference point of mobilization of public and political argument'. He therefore argues for the Convention to be considered a constitutional moment *ex post*. Thus, while he is critical as to the degree of mobilization in civil society which occurred during the Convention, he nevertheless believes the Convention could come to be regarded as a 'momentous event' in the long term (ibid., p. 12). For Closa (2005, p. 411) the act of constitution making has equal significance, providing the starting point of a process of constitutional deliberations out of which, over time, a constitutional patriotism for the EU might arise.

However, the optimistic view of the constitutionally inclusive role for civil society does not go unchallenged. Christodoulidis argues that the inclusion of civil society in the constitutional process risks undermining its anarchic potential for democratic renewal within the polity as well as reducing its capacity for the ongoing contestation of politics. Instead of democratizing EU governance, he fears that civil society organizations would be co-opted into acting as agents of legitimation (Christodoulidis 2003, pp. 404–5). If civil society were indeed fostered from above rather than representing a true expression of citizens' political interests, this would also severely undermine the capacity of civil society organizations to sustain a common political identity. A closer look at the Convention's civil dialogue thus seeks to clarify whether the 'constitutional optimism' about civil society in the EU is justified (de Búrca and Walker 2003, p. 391).

The empirical analysis of how CSOs operate in the EU political arena seeks to test the two core assumptions elaborated above about the promise of European civil society to foster a European identity outlined above: it first asks whether CSOs really encourage *deliberation* among citizens across borders? This would imply that they operate in a political system that allows for deliberation and that their own working methods are geared towards deliberation. A second question is whether CSOs actually connect the national and EU levels by providing a platform for *civic participation*? This would imply that CSOs are active on the national level and mobilize political involvement in EU affairs.

6.4 THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 'LISTENS' TO CIVIL SOCIETY

As a first step we need to consider whether the Convention provided a framework allowing CSOs to foster deliberation and link the debate to publics in the

member states. The Convention made an explicit effort to appear receptive to civil society. It gave one of its vice-chairmen, former Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, the mandate of responsibility for the dialogue with civil society. Two initiatives were conceived that concerned the involvement of CSOs: the Forum website – which ran alongside the Convention – and a two-day hearing with CSOs in the Convention plenary in June 2002.

The Forum website was set up as an interface for the contributions of civil society with the dual purpose of informing the public about current debates in the Convention, as well as encouraging direct contributions to the Convention.[10] Over sixteen months the Forum received 795 contributions from about 500 organizations.[11] These were divided into four categories: political and public authorities, academic institutions and think tanks, socio-economic organizations, and civil society and NGOs. The latter category generated by far the largest number of contributions with 563 comments.[12] This suggests that NGOs were most actively engaged in the 'civil dialogue'.

The Forum was conceived as a means to widen the debate on the future of Europe beyond the constraints of the Convention and the immediate 'Brussels bubble'. A website, however, has only limited capacity to stimulate public debate, let alone provide a context for deliberation. This was all the more true given that there was little feedback on the contributions. Position papers were published on the site, but it was left to Convention members to decide whether or not to take note. Only once, in the run-up to the June 2002 hearings, was a summary produced and distributed to Convention members.

To be sure, a webpage is open to all and therefore allowed for participation from a wide range of associations. However, it is not necessarily an effective way to encourage a spirit of public participation. On the contrary, some organizations expressed the feeling that they were relegated to a webpage while the real work was going on elsewhere. The resources to deal with these contributions effectively were not provided, which meant very few participants received feedback on their contributions and did not feel that their positions were taken into account. This created the impression among CSOs and academic observers alike that rather than a dialogue or an exchange, the Forum was a one-way street. Very few organizations saw this web portal as a valuable way to influence the Convention or indeed to enter into an exchange, be it between organizations or with the Convention.

A more visible initiative was the arrangement for public hearings for civil society organizations on 24 and 25 June 2002. During these hearings speakers had an allotted time slot of no more than a few minutes. Consequently, contributions were limited to a sequence of manifesto points, rather than enabling an exchange with the Convention. Most of the statements did not engage directly with the Convention's work and made no reference to concrete

policies, but rather rehashed general and predictable postulates (for example, the environment sector wanted better recognition of environmental rights in the Constitution).[13]

A hearing for civil society (rather than an exchange of views) was bound to encourage the kind of memorandum-reading roll-call that followed. For example, CSOs were not encouraged to interact directly with the working groups that dealt in detail with the intricacies of policy design, even though they had explicitly voiced this wish during the hearings.[14] No setting was provided in which deliberation between the different participants as well as between participants and members of the Convention could take place. There was therefore little opportunity for common positions to emerge.

Moreover, the Convention's failure to mobilize public participation beyond Brussels was heavily criticized. The press lamented the absence of any Eurosceptic movements at the hearings and questioned the claim of Brussels-based 'umbrella organisations'[15] to represent the views of 'millions of citizens' (Hort 2002; Zechini 2002). Instead, they often portrayed the hearings as a case of 'Brussels talking to Brussels', reinforcing rather than redressing the impression that EU politics is a game of insiders far removed from the everyday lives of citizens. This suggests that the Convention's initiatives were geared towards input *from* rather than interaction *with* civil society. It was the demand for legitimation and not public participation that guided the idea of 'listening to civil society' (Pérez-Solórzano Borragán 2007).

The Convention framework – although it provided some opportunities for civic participation – proved unable to stimulate the wide-ranging engagement of civic groups due to the little space for exchange of opinions or feedback. As a result neither public deliberation nor Europe-wide public engagement was encouraged. Similar to the Convention on the Charter of Fundamental Rights which preceded the constitutional convention, the political will and the infrastructural requirements for fostering a broad exchange with civil society actors were lacking (Kvaerk 2007). As such, the idea that a process of constitutional deliberation would spread beyond the confines of the Convention to civil society proved largely unfounded.

6.5 LOOK WHO'S TALKING!

The challenges of involving civil society, however, go deeper than a mere organizational failure on the part of the Convention. Difficulties in mobilizing all sectors of civil society could also be linked to a shortcoming in the political socialization of European civil society itself. This section therefore analyses how far CSOs active at the EU level are actually able to provide opportunities for public deliberation and participation.

To illustrate the analysis with concrete examples, three case studies of civil society participation extracted from interviews with 35 organizations are presented here. The cases revolve around the work of the Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG), a network of Brussels-based NGO umbrella organizations which are themselves made up of national organizations, Democracy International, an issue-specific organization comprising several European NGOs campaigning for direct democracy, and lastly a national organization, Attac France, which was particularly active during the ratification phase.[16] Considering how these movements mobilized in order to engage (or not) with the Convention and the project of a European Constitution will throw some light upon how CSOs operated in the Convention context. However, the general conclusions about the capacity of CSOs to foster a European identity are based on the interviews with all 35 organizations.

6.6 A PLATFORM FOR EUROPEANS

The Civil Society Contact Group (CSCG) was formed to connect several Brussels-based umbrella organizations and to coordinate their campaigns surrounding the Convention. The CSCG is made up of four main sectors: environmental, social, human rights and development NGOs. Each of these is composed of a large number of individual NGOs, among them prominent organizations such as Amnesty International and Greenpeace. The Contact Group also comprises the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) as an observing member.

The CSCG was founded as a reaction to the constitutional Convention. It was set up in February 2002 in order to build a 'structured relationship' between civil society and the Convention and to encourage 'broad, deep and regular consultation' by bringing together civil society organizations from across Europe and giving them a platform for interaction with the Convention.[17]

The activities of this network were subsumed in the *Act4europe* campaign, designed specifically to connect citizens across Europe in the 15 member states and the accession countries and to inform them about the work of the Convention. A further goal was to give citizens an opportunity to become involved in the constitutional debate. Ultimately, the aim was to build a transnational network of communication, providing at once a platform for interaction as well as a source of information and education on the work of the Convention. In addition to organizing debates and coordinating activities at the Brussels level, the CSCG became involved in the production of downloadable toolkits suggesting effective strategies for civil society groups on how to interact with the Convention.[18]

The group further encouraged the drafting of joint positions as well as local, national and European campaigns – some by the specific interest sectors, and others as a joint initiative between different sectors of the platform.[19] Especially noteworthy is the Contact Group's effort to involve NGOs in the accession countries in the campaign, thereby broadening its scope to include the 'new Europe'. Training seminars informing NGOs on the workings of the Convention and possibilities for civil society input were organized in Romania and Estonia.[20] Moreover, a special conference on 'civil dialogue' in the accession countries was organized together with the Commission in Budapest, Hungary on 23 and 24 June 2003. The CSCG was also present at the European Social Forum in Paris, thus building a link to a section of European civil society which was not involved in the official dialogue with the Convention.

The Contact Group interacted with the Convention by posting assessment reports to the Forum website, participating in the civil society hearings, and submitting policy recommendations directly to the chairman of the council.[21] It continued to operate after the conclusion of the Convention by producing NGO toolkits for interaction with the Rome Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), as well as promoting campaigns pushing for the acceptance of the Draft Constitution in the Member States. CSCG members also participated in talks in Brussels concerned with fleshing out some of the policy proposals of the draft Constitution, most notably the article on participatory democracy.[22]

An evaluation of CSCG activities shows that it engaged in activities that fostered both deliberation and participation. First, by bringing together CSOs from various sectors of the Brussels NGO world it encouraged deliberation across sectoral interests to reinforce a common perspective of European civil society on constitutional reform. Second, in order to encourage participation, it provided toolkits for national NGOs, especially in the candidate countries, and organized conferences and workshops on how to engage with the Convention. Representatives of the member organizations of the CSCG generally held a positive impression of the body's work. The network was seen to have added a more structured framework for cooperation among civil society groups in Europe, as well as providing a means of interaction with the Convention. The CSCG also actively sought to enhance the means for participation in the constitutional process. Its campaigns can be seen as a genuine effort to contribute to the political socialization of civil society on the EU level as a basis for a European political identity.

Yet, the CSCG experience also displays many of the limitations common to Brussels-based organizations which are well connected within the political microcosm of EU-Brussels, but which often lack the connection with the 'grassroots'. Indicatively, corresponding national contact groups – which focused specifically on the Europeanization of civil society at the national level – could only be set up in Estonia, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom as support

in other member states was lacking.[23] Even where grassroots activities were planned response was lukewarm at best. As the director of one CSCG member organization explains: 'We failed to really engage the broader membership. This reflects the general problems of civil society to get engaged. We tried but failed on that critical point of transmitting the debate to the national level.'[24]

The inability to connect several levels of the EU polity also impaired the degree to which deliberation could develop its integrative potential. While workshops held both locally and in Brussels gave the opportunity for deliberation among Brussels-based groups and a few well-connected campaigners or academics, there was little room for deliberation cutting across national borders or across several sectors of organized interests. In this respect, the absence of a deliberative forum (in the form of media debates or public events) for civil society parallel to the Convention in Brussels and, most importantly, in member states was strongly felt. CSOs believed that without the necessary infrastructure they could do very little to encourage widespread deliberation. CSOs like the CSCG, therefore, struggled to organize such fora themselves or to encourage the media to report on their activities.

Another important limitation in the CSCG's work was perhaps the attitude of CSOs themselves to its activities. Given that even the usually well-resourced Brussels offices of NGOs tend to be short on staff and other resources, many NGOs seeking to get their message across had to choose between focusing on mobilizing a broader public and engaging directly with the Convention (often through informal channels). Deliberation and public participation were therefore not always the priorities of NGOs who saw the Convention as a welcome opportunity to get their particular interests across rather than engaging in a broader debate.

While the *Act4europe* campaign was successful in mobilizing at the European level, its achievements were more limited at the national level. The success of the Contact Group in widening the debate beyond the immediate Brussels circuit was therefore reduced. As we have seen, this has to do with the political context and infrastructure set by the Convention. It was also a function of the motivations of CSOs themselves, which sometimes preferred to go it alone, far away from the public eye, in order to maximize their political impact. The effectiveness of such a strategy is well demonstrated in the next example.

6.7 CITIZENS FOR 'MORE DEMOCRACY'

Democracy International (DI) represents a Europe-wide network of NGOs campaigning for direct democracy in Europe, and, in particular, for a referendum on the European Constitution. DI has its origins in a national organization,

the German 'Mehr Demokratie' (More Democracy), which was founded in 1988 to promote direct democracy in Germany and beyond. Democracy International itself, however, was created in the context of the Convention to promote the campaign for a Constitutional referendum in all EU Member States.[25] During the Convention the network consisted of 250 NGOs from all member states as well as the accession countries. These groups campaigned individually at the national level, but united to form a concerted campaign at the Convention (Kaufman et al. 2004, p. 5). According to its website, the purpose of DI is to provide an 'international coordinating agency for the direct democratic strivings of these citizens' movements, at the European and later at the international level'.[26]

While the organization ran several campaigns concerned with direct democracy and the European referendum in particular, its biggest success was the inclusion of an Article on the European Citizens' Initiative (formerly Article 46.4) in the Draft Constitution on a right of initiative for European citizens. This section of the Article on participatory democracy in the Draft Constitution (now article 11 of the Lisbon Treaty) gives European citizens the right to suggest the introduction of new legislation to the European Commission. It has been hailed as one of the major democratic innovations of the draft treaty, incorporating a direct participatory element into the text and opening the possibility for future Europe-wide initiatives concerning EU policies. As such, it could serve as an important instrument for encouraging deliberation and political participation across borders in the EU (Warleigh 2006).

According to Convention members, DI was 'highly professional' in its work.[27] The group was able to establish direct contact with Convention members, mostly through personal presence at the Convention. The active support of Jürgen Meyer, MEP, was an important asset. With his help DI was able to win over a large number of other Convention members to their cause (altogether 72), including the French Conservative MEP Alain Lamassoure who, together with Meyer, backed the inclusion of the initiative amendment in the Convention.[28]

The inclusion of this article in the Draft Constitution was something of a surprise success. While the right of initiative had always formed part of the Democracy International agenda, the initial emphasis of the campaign had been on a European referendum for the Constitution. When plans to secure a Europe-wide referendum were blocked by the Convention's Presidium, the decision was taken to push further for an article on direct citizens' initiative. Part of the success story of Article on a Citizen's Initiative was related to timing. The article had encountered some previous resistance from Convention members. They feared that this measure would make the policy-making procedure more incremental by inviting proposals that were marginal to the EU's policy agenda.[29] However, when the article amendment was put on the table

in the last weeks of the Convention the existing consensus was seen as too precious to risk for squabbles over an article that was not perceived as central by most members.

DI's campaign demonstrates how smaller NGOs focused their actions specifically on influencing the Convention to achieve a specific interest rather than on mobilizing broader public deliberation or participation. The group bypassed the official hearings, describing them as a 'photo opportunity' which served only to legitimate decisions that had already been taken. Instead, representatives worked informally by negotiating with the convention members during breaks in their sessions. 'Dialogue with civil society' in this case worked most effectively on an interpersonal level, rather than within the framework designed by the Convention planners or through instigating a wider public debate. In this respect, DI did not focus on the promotion of participative mechanisms or deliberation, nor did they specifically seek further Europeanization of the debate during the Convention. Ironically, in order to include a specific article on civic participation in the draft treaty, the group focused on lobbying in Brussels rather than wider public mobilization. This was true for a majority of the CSOs interviewed, especially national and issue specific groups. As such, most organizations engaged in the constitutional debate did not see it as their role nor did they believe they had the capacity to mobilize a wider public debate or foster a sense of Europeanness. They perceived themselves more as representatives of certain groups or issues which they seek to include in EU decisions. However, given that the Citizens' Initiative for which DI lobbied can be seen as an important potential instrument for stimulating both wider civic participation and cross-national deliberations, their impact on the formation of a European identity can be evaluated as indirect and post hoc.

6.8 EUROPE – AN ALTERNATIVE VISION

Attac France presents an example of civil society raising its voice to debate the European Constitution with little direct engagement with the Convention. While Attac France submitted a position paper to the Forum together with other European Attac branches, most of its activities were focused on the debate at home. At the time of the Convention two sites of the constitutional debate outside of Brussels were the European Social Fora in Florence 2002 and Paris 2003. The European Social Forum (ESF) is an annual forum for anti-globalization movements in Europe. It is a sister movement to the World Social Forum which was born in the storm of protests that accompanied the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) Summit in Seattle. These groups seek to define an alternative approach to liberal market globalization and have become

increasingly prominent in the international political arena, fuelling the growing debate on a global civil society.

Taking place on its home turf, the second ESF, which took place from 12 to 15 November 2003 in Paris, was a focal point for Attac France. Social movements such as the Social Forum and the organizations which participate in them are of the utmost relevance for the conceptualization of transnational civil society. Membership in NGOs like Attac, one of the most vociferous participants at the ESF, is constantly rising at a time when membership in political parties is in steady decline. The conference – which brought together over 100,000 people – fused the atmosphere of an alternative rock concert with that of a political event and thus contrasted starkly with perceptions of the Convention hearings.

Given that the ESF fell in the period of the Convention, the critique of 'Brussels' provided a guiding theme for the event. A special plenary session was devoted to the European Convention and a large number of seminars and workshops dealt with the issue of a European Constitution and the Convention.[30] The positions voiced publicly at the ESF criticised the idea of a prospering democracy in Europe.[31] According to Jacques Nikonoff, President of Attac France: 'Brussels is hostile to Europe and too dependent on the United States of America' (Mönninger 2003). 'Brussels Europe' was largely derided as a neo-liberal venture that left no room for a social dimension. Moreover, plans to extend the EU's security and defence policy were interpreted as a threat to a truly pacifist Europe. Instead, an alternative Europe of social solidarity was outlined, which was heavily infused with Marxist rhetoric.

However, in terms of concrete policy proposals the ESF fell short of innovative initiatives. While the need for an alternative Europe was raised time and again the question of how to conceive this model of 'alter-Europeanism' remained elusive. This is also true for the national debate in France where Attac was one of the most prominent advocates of the 'No' campaign. While the decision to participate in the referendum campaign split the organization (20 per cent of its members left because they opposed the involvement in a political campaign) the initiatives conceived by Attac enjoyed resounding popularity.[32]

The example of Attac France shows that there is a European public rejecting Brussels and its institutions, yet engaging with the idea of a Europe-wide solution to the problems of welfare, immigration and the effects of globalization. It demonstrates that the Constitution was not just an issue for those 'Europhiles' who are already socialized in the Brussels political environment. Instead, we can perceive a public that is increasingly diversified in its engagement with European issues. Attac was very active at the regional and local levels, organizing numerous debates in market squares and town halls. It was highly successful in tapping into a diffuse anti-European sentiment and rallying people behind the 'No' campaign.

Attac also incorporated an element of Europeanization in its campaign by rallying volunteers from other European countries to argue for a French 'Non' in local events. Introducing European speakers to a mostly national debate can be seen as an explicit effort to Europeanize the national debate on the European Constitution. France's electorate, it was argued, was given a mandate to cast a vote for those people in Europe who had not been given this opportunity by their own governments. As one Attac activist from Germany explains: 'For us the idea of bringing non-French people to the 'Non' campaign was to demonstrate that the French are not alone in their doubts about the Treaty. And that they have the chance to represent also other people(s) with their vote who are not given the chance to voice their opinion in a referendum.'

One of the explicit aims of Attac is the creation of a 'European public sphere', something they see as essential for a better-informed and more balanced debate on European politics. In particular the ESF was presented as a real opportunity for the development of such a public sphere (McLeish 2003). Although designed as a strategy to develop an alternative network of communication rather than engagement with the EU institutions, it resonates with the type of network building undertaken by the Civil Society Contact Group. Attac France was very successful in mobilizing people and giving them an opportunity to participate in debate. It staged hundreds of local initiatives and also introduced a European dimension by recruiting volunteers from other member states as speakers in the French debate. The manifold events of the ESF in Paris were also very well attended and small discussion groups formed around coffee tables and the many exhibition stands set up by participating organizations.[33]

Nevertheless, and belying its bid to develop the 'public sphere', debate at the Forum largely fell short of deliberative standards. When one pro-European raised his voice during a meeting, he was shouted down by the mass of participants, and the organizers did not intervene to let him have his say.[34] It seemed that opinions that ventured away from the 'alternative' mainstream were not welcome at the Forum. There was thus little room for a critical exchange of contrasting viewpoints. Rather than building new identities Attac seemed mostly concerned with the reaffirmation of its own identity as part of the European *alter-mondialiste* movement.

Moreover, while the ESF provided a platform for critical perspectives on EU policies, the lack of resonance this had in Brussels or even the national media severely constrained the 'communicative power' that civil society holds in the Habermasian understanding. Policy makers as well as many Brussels-based NGOs were largely unaware of the ESF and its demands. Given the nature of many of the issues voiced at the forum, most prominently the demand for a more social Europe – a key factor in the French no vote on the Constitutional Treaty – this was perhaps a crucial failure.

6.9 THE CONVENTION AND CIVIL SOCIETY: CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT OR MERE CONSULTATION?

From this overview of the way organized civil society mobilized in reaction to the Convention, it emerges that civil society in the EU has more dimensions than taken account of in the civil dialogue of the Convention. By opting to include mostly CSOs firmly established in Brussels rather than broadening the wider political debate and engaging more critical segments of civil society, like Attac, the Convention followed the path of consultation of 'interested parties' already well established by the European Commission.

Initially a mechanism for including the voice of the so-called 'social partners', consultation procedures were subsequently widened to include an increasing number of actors (Smismans 2003; Greenwood 2007a, pp. 116–55; Kohler-Koch 2007, pp. 255–71). This form of consultation was not presented in connection with debates on a democratic deficit of participation or deliberation, but featured in accounts of the EU as a pluralist or corporatist system (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Lobbying or 'interest intermediation' rather than deliberation was at the forefront of academic analyses, and efficiency rather than 'participative democracy' was the desired outcome (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Kohler-Koch 1997; Magnette 2005; Greenwood 2007a).

Only in the 1990s, when the debate on the democratic deficit proliferated, did arguments about deliberation, a European demos, and identity enter the civil society discourse of academics and the EU institutions. This was the case, for example, with the White Paper on European Governance (2001) which highlights the importance of civil society for democratic European governance. In fact, one of the working groups charged with preparing the document specifically referred to the importance of a public sphere.[35] In the final document, however, the emphasis was clearly on consultation rather than deliberation.[36]

The same can be argued for the experience of the Convention. While there was much talk of being 'closer to the citizens', the Convention in effect did little to encourage widespread participation or, indeed, deliberation on constitutional questions. The focus on Brussels-based organizations, moreover, failed to establish a link between the national and EU spheres. The Europeanization of the debate was therefore already circumscribed by the framework of the Convention. As a result, the Convention remained remote from public sentiment on the project for a European constitution. This came to haunt the Convention and member state governments in the Dutch and French referenda.

The inability to encourage deliberation and public participation is not solely a failure of the Convention. While the EU system seems to encourage lobbying rather than public debate, this is often also a conscious choice of organizations and part of how they understand themselves. As one UK organization

explains, 'we consciously avoided getting involved in any general debate on the future of the EU. We had very specific objectives to obtain and concentrated on lobbying for those.'[37] Indeed, as the above analysis demonstrates, civil society organizations in Brussels had considerable difficulties connecting with their national members and fostering interest in the European debate. This is attested to by a Eurobarometer poll – conducted shortly before the presentation of the Convention's work at the Thessaloniki Council – according to which 55 per cent of European citizens had not even heard of the Convention or its efforts to draft a European Constitution.[38]

CSOs thus did not achieve broad public awareness of the Constitutional project. Rather, large umbrella organizations like the Civil Society Contact Group which were most prominent in the constitutional debate often suffered from the same democratic deficit as EU organizations. Reasons for this included their geographic distance from grassroots constituencies and their modes of operation. Smaller organizations, like Democracy International, on the other hand, opted for direct interaction with the Convention by targeting individual members rather than raising awareness for their cause through public debate. This was also the case for many national organizations. Broad public deliberation was therefore not an aim that most CSOs pursued.

This also had considerable implications for the possibilities of CSOs to provide platforms for public participation and to Europeanize public consciousness by linking national and EU levels of debate. Most CSOs see their role much more as one of influencing decision makers directly rather than mobilizing a wider public. While they see the need for a wider debate on European issues and a closer identification of citizens with the political process in Brussels, they assign these responsibilities to the media, the national legislative process, or political parties. The example of Attac France is a special case, because of the critical approach it took to the Convention overall and the high level of domestic debate in France which contrasted with other states where referenda were held.[39] Despite its claims to foster a European public sphere, however, even Attac was unable to provide the framework for a balanced exchange of views. The assumption that CSOs sustain the formation of a common political identity among EU citizens by fostering a more deliberative and Europeanized policy debate and furnishing opportunities for direct civic participation in the political process therefore must be qualified with regard to an assessment of the Convention.

The shortcomings found in the analysis of the Convention need to be embedded in three more general observations. First, the definition of civil society which was employed by the Convention is much broader than that used by deliberative democracy theorists. It includes private business and for-profit organizations, and even regional and local political representations (such as the German *Länder*).[40] This means that CSOs, particularly those involved in

the constitutional debate, are not necessarily a good proxy for the normative ideal of civil society as it is conceived in deliberative theories of democracy. Caution should be applied therefore in transposing assumptions about civil society and a constitutional moment uncritically to the EU context.

A second point to be aware of is the problems that arise from transferring theories drawn up in the national context to the EU level. It has been demonstrated that the assumptions about the identity forming and mobilizing potential of civil society in deliberative democracy theories which have informed much of the recent enthusiasm about civil society are premised on the fulfilment of particular conditions. In this paper two factors, the ability of CSOs to foster deliberation as well as to encourage wider public participation, have been underlined as crucial for the formation of a common identity. Deliberation, while seen to foster a sense of identity, also relies on an already existing degree of mutual respect as well as the willingness to interact in a common debate. Deliberative democracy theories are further conceived in the context of the nation state and require a liberal parliamentary democracy that is responsive to citizens' demands as a starting point for their normative theory. Most crucially perhaps, they rely on the existence of a public sphere and an active culture of open political debate.

In the EU, however, a public sphere is only in its nascent stage, and debate mostly takes place within elite circles (Schlesinger and Kevin 2000, pp. 206–29; Risse 2003). Political parties, moreover, are much more weakly developed at EU level, and debates in the European Parliament are often geared around compromise rather than controversy, which would capture public attention. This also has repercussions for the ability of CSOs to encourage wider participation in EU affairs. Only a small group, which is usually already socialized into the EU political circuit, is actually affected by the work of European CSOs, while local members often remain focused on the national level.

Third, when pondering the particularities of the European system, it is also important to consider the special circumstances under which civil society participation was conceived in the EU in the first place. Initially the inclusion of CSOs, or 'interested parties' as they were then called, was precisely to develop a system of 'democratic governance' that would present an alternative rather than reinforce the system of parliamentary representation (Magnette 2005, p. 174). The Commission therefore fostered the emergence of Brussels-based organizations in order to develop an alternative basis of legitimation to that of the European Parliament. Under the heading of democratic governance, it proposed a system of expert governance that has also been analysed widely in the academic literature.[41] To be sure, the focus on specific policy issues and individual access to policy makers portrayed by CSOs in the Convention has its roots in this practice. In contrast to the assumptions in deliberative democracy theories, the Convention made rather different functional demands on

CSOs, expecting them to give input to the policy debate in Brussels rather than communicating outwards and mobilizing debate in the public sphere. In order to set the context for the kind of public mobilization through civil society envisaged in deliberative democracy theories and recent policy discourse, more structural change in the EU's approach towards CSOs would be needed than a mere shift in rhetoric.

The example of CSO involvement in the Constitutional Convention shows that both the framework established by the Convention and the capacities of CSOs themselves were ill suited to foster deliberation on Constitutional issues and broader participation in the constitutional debate. Instead, CSOs chose to maximize their effect on the policy process with lobbying strategies that have been pursued by private interest groups in the EU for decades (Richardson 2007). Rather than as a resource of identity, these groups can be regarded as organized interest groups, even if the interest they defend is often a public good such as environmental protection, a more social Europe, or direct democracy.

While the contribution of organized interests to European integration and policy making has long been recognized (Haas 1958; Streeck and Schmitter 1991; Mazey and Richardson 1993; Kohler-Koch 1997; Eising 2007), this form of political participation does very little to stimulate a political identity since it focuses on individual decision makers and bypasses the debate to citizens in the public sphere. In following a lobbying strategy, CSOs therefore risk the same problems of democratic deficit that currently plague European institutions rather than providing a means to remedy it. The Convention's civil dialogue, therefore, can be described as a move towards a more pluralist but still elitist system of interest representation at best and as mere rhetoric at worst.

6.10 CONCLUSION

This chapter explored the question whether the inclusion of civil society organizations in the process of EU constitution making can contribute to the development of a European identity. Theories of deliberative democracy argue that a strong civil society is a crucial foundation for the process of public deliberation which informs the formation of political identity. Deliberating about a common constitutional future has been assigned particular prominence in the process of identity formation. The concept of the 'constitutional moment', moreover, implies the mobilization of broad sections of civil society to debate their common political future. All this would generate a feeling of common identity, which in turn would contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the new constitution.

For many observers the process of constitution making in the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–03) seemed to bear the promise of such a

constitutional moment for the European Union. Indeed, the openness of the Convention and the explicit effort to secure participation of civil society organizations gave rise to the expectation of a wide public debate on EU politics. However, no such broad debate unfolded and rather than receiving broad public support, the draft constitution was rejected by the French and the Dutch.

This chapter has demonstrated that both the institutional framework created by the Convention and CSOs themselves were ill suited to the task of fostering the emergence of a European identity. The Convention structure was clearly geared towards receiving input rather than enabling exchange. CSOs moreover, rather than providing the context for popular participation and deliberation which could have laid the foundation for such an identity, focused on promoting specific interests or ideas. Network building was confined to a few organizations in Brussels, and those who focused on the mobilization of a wider public often engaged in an exclusionist rhetoric of 'us' versus 'them'. Instead of giving impetus to public engagement with the EU and its politics, the participation of CSOs in the Convention followed a long-established pattern of 'consultation of interested parties'. While they can give useful input to the policy debate, such consultations are far from developing a political culture of public participation and deliberation from which a common European identity could spring. In order to achieve this, EU policy making would need to undergo more structural changes (for example deeper anchoring of European issues in the national political debate). CSOs could be helpful in this context; however, political parties and the media would also be crucial in achieving this task.

In the light of the Convention experience, the optimism about the capability of CSOs to provoke a constitutional moment and foster a European identity needs to be reconsidered and qualified. The civil dialogue of the Convention had little parallel with the kind of constitutional moment envisaged in much of the literature on civil society and deliberative constitution making. While CSOs may have much 'identity potential' as the source of transnational deliberation, there is no evidence that empirical reality measures up to the assumptions outlined in democratic theories of deliberation. The lack of a public sphere in which constitutional discourses could unfold and the lack of commitment or inability on the part of CSOs to mobilize a wider public that could sustain such a discourse mean that the idea of a European constitutional patriotism emanating from civil society for now remains confined to theory rather than practice.

NOTES

1. According to Convention on the Future of Europe Flash Eurobarometer, 142 (2003), 55 per cent of European citizens had not even heard of the Convention or the efforts to draft a European Constitution. The draft Constitution was rejected in national referenda by the

French and the Dutch, with majorities of 55 per cent of voters rejecting the treaty in France (with 69 per cent turnout) and 61.5 per cent of voters in the Netherlands (with a 63.3 per cent turnout). More recently the Lisbon Treaty, which salvaged most of the Constitution's legal substance, was rejected in a referendum in Ireland by 53.4 per cent of votes (with a turnout of 53.1 per cent).

2. The project of drafting a European constitution is of course not the beginning of the constitutionalization of the EU through treaty revision which has been an ongoing process. See for example Weiler (1999).

3. Jürgen Habermas (1995, p. 367). The Habermasian societal model consists of a centre (the state) and a periphery (the private sphere). These two spheres are connected by a third and intermediary sphere (the public sphere).

4. Beetham and Lord (1998, pp. 45, 58); Dieter Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume.

5. See for example Habermas (1992). The idea of constitutional patriotism was first developed by Starnberger (1990, p. 199).

6. In the context of the constitutionalization of the EU, Weiler (2001, pp. 54–71) speaks of constitutional tolerance.

7. See for example Cohen and Arato (1998) as a good overview of the debate. On European Civil Society see for example Smismans (2006) and Knodt and Finke (2005).

8. Habermas (1996, p. 371) speaks of the communicative power of civil society to formulate public opinion which in turn is to influence parliament.

9. James Tully cited in J. Shaw, 'Process, Responsibility, and Inclusion in EU Constitutionalism', *European Law Journal*, 9/1 (2002), p. 47.

10. See the Convention website on: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/index_en.htm.

11. See the Convention website on: http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/index_en.htm. The exact number of organizations is rather disputed in the literature. An internal evaluation document of the Commission lists 483 organizations (on 23 June 2003) while studies by Maurer et al. (2005, p. 209) and Kvaerk (2007, p. 161) work with 498 and 528 respectively. A possible explanation for this confusion may be that the database compiled by the Commission lists several organizations twice and also some organizations which in their own reckoning never actually contributed (the database upon which this research is based does not count the double entries of CSOs). This may be because some umbrella organizations entered submissions in the names of their members as well as their own, or that CSOs simply did not remember having made a contribution to the website.

12. http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/doc_16_502.en.cfm#bottom.

13. Report by the Chairman on Seville meeting with the European Council, Note on the Plenary Session of 24 and 25 June 2002, CONV 167/02.

14. Ibid. Note that some working groups did in fact invite experts to their sessions, including also some representatives of CSOs. However, this was restricted to a few well-known and well-connected individuals.

15. Umbrella organizations are federations of several NGOs on the European level, usually according to a special policy field. There are, however, also umbrella organizations that are networks of networks, hence combining several issue-specific EU level groups into one organization. A prominent example of this is the European Social Platform founded in 1996. Given their geographical closeness and their claim to speak for millions of members at once they are the preferred interlocutors of EU institutions.

16. Attac is a social movement with organizations in many European countries; however, given that they are all independent rather than sub-groups of a transnational head office, Attac France is regarded here as a national organization.

17. Act for Europe website, http://www.act4europe.org/code/en/civi.asp?Page=2&menuPage=2.

18. Act for Europe website, www.act4europe.org.

19. Act4europe, 'First Interim Report to Foundation Open Society Institute (FOSI)', http://act4europe.horus.be/module/FileLib/FIRSTINTERIMREPORTOSI1.pdf, pp. 3–4.

20. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

21. Letter by the Civil Society Contact Group to Valerie Giscard d'Estaing, concerning an article for participatory democracy, 13 March 2003; see also http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/index_en.htm.

22. Interview with the director of a member organization of the Civil Society Contact Group, Brussels, 4 February 2004.
23. Act4europe, 'First Interim Report to Foundation Open Society Institute (FOSI)', http://act4europe.horus.be/module/FileLib/FIRSTINTERIMREPORTOSI1.pdf, pp. 3–4.
24. Interview with the director of a member organization of the Civil Society Contact Group, Brussels, 12 March 2008.
25. Interview with Michael Efler, Head Office, Democracy International, Berlin, 9 December 2003.
26. http://mehr-demokratie.de/bu/english/di.htm.
27. Interview with former Convention member and MEP, European Parliament, Brussels, 4 February 2004.
28. Interview with Alain Lamassoure, Brussels, 4 February 2004 and Jürgen Meyer, 10 May 2008.
29. Interview with former Convention member and MEP, European Parliament, Brussels, 3 February 2004.
30. European Social Forum Conference Programme, Paris, November 2003, and http://www.fse-esf.org/.
31. Opening session of the European Social Forum, Paris, La Vilette, 12 November 2003 (author present).
32. Interview with member of Attac France, Paris, April 2008.
33. Participant observation, ESF, Paris, November 2003.
34. Ibid.
35. White Paper on European Governance, Work area no. 1, Broadening and enriching the public debate on European matters, 'Report of Working Group on Broadening and enriching the public debate on European matters' (Group 1a), Pilote: N.J. Thogersen, Rapporteurs: B. Caremier and J. Wyles, June 2001.
36. 'European Governance: A White Paper', COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25 July 2001.
37. Interview with the director of a human rights NGO, London, 2 April 2008.
38. 'Convention on the Future of Europe', Flash Eurobarometer, 142 (2003).
39. In Luxembourg and Spain there was no comparable public interest in the Constitutional Treaty.
40. The EU institutions are somewhat hesitant to define civil society. Usually the definition elaborated by the Economic and Social Committee (Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on 'The role and contribution of civil society organisations in the building of Europe', Brussels, September 1999, CES 851/99 D/GW) is used, which features for example in the White Paper on European Governance (COM (2001) 428 final). However, while political organizations are included in none of the definitions of civil society, they nevertheless participated in the civil dialogue conceived by the Convention.
41. See for example Cohen and Sabel (1997, pp. 313–34); Magnette (2006, pp. 23–41).

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APPENDIX

CSOs interviewed (in alphabetical order)

1.   Abogacia Española, Brussels/Madrid.
2.   Act4europe, Civil Society Contact Group, Brussels.
3.   Amnesty International, Brussels.
4.   Attac, EU AG, Hamburg.
5.   Attac France, Paris.
6.   Land Bayern, Munich (An interview with this representative was included because, even though regional representations or those of the German Länder do not qualify as 'civil society' in any academic definition, they are frequently included in the civil dialogue).
7.   BOND, London.
8.   Bundesverband der freien Berufe, Brussels/Berlin.
9.   Centre for European Reform, London.
10. Citizenship Action Service, Rome.
11. Confederación Empresarial Española de la Economía Social (CEPES), Madrid.
12. Convention des Étudiants, Sciences Po, Paris.
13. Democracy International.
14. Deutsche Caritas, Brussels.
15. Deutscher Juristinnenbund, Berlin.
16. Deutscher Sport Bund, Brussels.
17. Eurochambres, Brussels.
18. Eurocities, Brussels.
19. Europa Jetzt, Berlin.
20. European Citizen Action Service, Brussels.
21. Europe 2020, Paris.
22. Eurostep, Brussels.
23. Fondation Robert Schuman, Paris.
24. French Sport Association, Brussels/Paris.
25. Jeunes Européens, Paris.
26. Justice, London.
27. Mehr Demokratie, Berlin.
28. Nôtre Europe, Paris.
29. Open Society Institute, Brussels.
30. Oxfam International, Brussels.
31. Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid.
32. Social Platform, Brussels.
33. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin.
34. World Wildlife Fund EU Office, Brussels.
35. World Wildlife Fund Greece, Athens.

7. National political conflict and identity formation: The diverse nature of the threat from the extreme left and extreme populist right

Simon Bornschier

7.1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, scepticism towards the European Union (EU) among European publics has become increasingly apparent. The failure of the constitutional treaty to gain majority support in France and the Netherlands has marked the definite end of the 'permissive consensus' among European publics that allowed European integration to proceed apace since the late 1950s. Yet, the precise nature of the recent surge in Euroscepticism remains poorly understood. Little genuinely comparative work has been undertaken to assess whether opposition to European integration primarily reflects national idiosyncrasies or if there are common patterns across countries.

In this chapter, I put forward two hypotheses. First, I suggest that opposition to European integration can be economically or culturally motivated, with divergent consequences for the prospect of a European identity. A first form of Euroscepticism is related to the perception that *market building in the EU* has committed national governments to a liberalizing thrust in economic policy making which endangers the achievements of national welfare states. Consequently, as long as 'positive integration' does not prevail over 'negative integration' (Scharpf 1996), citizens with strong state interventionist attitudes will oppose further efforts at European integration. This form of opposition affects support for the European regime, but does not necessarily contradict the development of a European sense of identity.

A second source of opposition is *culturally and politically based*, and reflects a more fundamental concern with the establishment of a supranational European polity. The integration process diminishes the autonomy of the nation state and establishes a new political community in which collectively binding decisions are taken. Both aspects clash with the orientations of citizens

who hold what I call traditionalist or communitarian conceptions of community. These citizens believe that politics at the national level should remain autonomous and should prevail over decisions taken at the EU level. Such a conception of community is incompatible with the sense of European identity that is a prerequisite to the functioning of the enlarged European Union, as suggested in Chapter 1 of this volume.

The second key hypothesis advanced in this chapter is that the potential for politicization of European integration – a potential which has been called a 'sleeping giant' by van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) – is exploited to a far greater degree by national parties than is often assumed. One of the key obstacles to understanding how national and European conflicts relate has been the misconception that political space at the national level is structured by a one-dimensional left-right dimension. If this assumption was ever warranted, it certainly is no longer. For, the rise of the New Left and the subsequent counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right has brought a new cultural conflict to the core of Western European party systems (Bornschier 2005, 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006). As I will argue, the basic structure of conflict across the old members of the Union is such that politicization of the integration process is likely. In fact, the two types of opposition to the European project derive from distinctive positions regarding the traditional state-market cleavage on the one hand and the new value divide prevalent in national party systems across Western Europe on the other hand.

Whether or not contrasting attitudes regarding European integration are actually mobilized, however, depends on the strategic choices of political parties. In this respect, I argue that the configuration of national party systems is crucial. This is because the major parties tend to be internally divided regarding the integration issue. As such, the full mobilization of economic and cultural forms of opposition to European integration depends on the existence of a split both within the left and within the right of the political spectrum. In particular, I expect the cultural dimension of resistance to the EU will be mobilized only in those party systems where a party of the extreme populist right is present.

While prior research on party positions at the aggregate level has found that economic and cultural views at the national level are related to party stances on European integration (Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks et al. 2006), this chapter makes at least four additional contributions. First, it offers a more elaborate theoretical explanation as to why the new cultural line of conflict prevalent in Western Europe is related to European integration. Second, it draws attention to the differing implications of the two logics of rejection – economic and cultural – for the formation of a European identity, and, consequently, the future of the integration process. Third, it takes a closer look at conditions in national contexts which determine whether opposition to the EU is mobilized or not. As it turns out, the

pattern detected by Marks et al. (2006) does not apply to Scandinavia, Portugal and Greece, and thus cannot represent the general state of affairs. Fourth, the analysis does not focus on the positions of political parties, but on the potential for voter contestation of European integration, a potential which parties may or may not mobilize. When we encounter citizen orientations regarding the EU that are structured by partisanship, we may conclude that parties have effectively mobilized opposition against European integration.

The chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I depict how the major dimensions of conflict in Western European party systems have been transformed in recent decades and how this leads to something of a 'natural association' between national and European political preferences. Furthermore, I discuss how the configuration of national party systems impinges on the mobilization of opposition to the EU. In the second section, I use Eurobarometer data from the mid-1990s to empirically determine the dimensions underlying citizen orientations regarding the EU. As it turns out, three forms of Euroscepticism are discernible across the 15 old member states, two of which correspond closely to the economic and cultural logics of rejection depicted above. In the second section, I proceed to investigate to what degree parties have mobilized opposition to the European project. The results show that cultural opposition has been more strongly mobilized, and primarily in those countries where the extreme populist right has achieved an electoral breakthrough. The final section presents a re-analysis of the cultural and economic dimensions underpinning European citizens' views after the 2004 eastward enlargement. Here, I test the claim that scepticism regarding EU enlargement is likely to play into the economic dimension of opposition to the EU.

7.2 NATIONAL POLITICAL CONFLICT AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Until recently, models of conflict in the European Union have used the left-right dimension of conflict to derive hypotheses on the relationship between ideological oppositions at the national level and positions regarding the EU (see the overview in Steenbergen and Marks 2004). Together with the finding that opposition to European integration comes from both the extreme left and extreme right, they have concluded that the issue fits uneasily into the structure of national conflicts (for example, van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). A different picture emerges, however, if political space is conceived as structured by an economic and a cultural dimension of conflict (Kitschelt 1994; Bornschier 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006).

As with the national political space, attitudes towards the European Union are likely to be structured by at least two dimensions. On the one hand, market

integration is a highly political process in that the desired degree of re-regulation at the European level depends on preferences regarding the welfare state and economic liberalism. On the other hand, the integration process has important cultural and political implications. It establishes a new political community that competes with the established national community for democratic decision-making competence. This entails a loss of national autonomy that at least some citizens are likely to resist. While a first generation of research has focused on narrow economic cost-benefit factors in circumscribing resistance towards European integration, more recent studies have emphasized the important role of identity in determining support for the EU (McLaren 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2004).

As I will argue, potential conflict over European integration grounded in economic preferences and in citizens' identities corresponds to disputes that also play an important role in national politics. While this is relatively straightforward in the case of economic conflicts, it also applies to the cultural domain. In fact, the cultural conflicts prevalent in party oppositions in Western Europe are closely related to cultural issues and anxieties raised by European integration. The next step is therefore to present a brief picture of the nature of cultural conflicts in the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe.

7.3 THE RISE OF THE NEW CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN LIBERTARIAN-UNIVERSALISTIC AND TRADITIONALIST-COMMUNITARIAN VALUES

In the aftermath of 1968, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and lifestyles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s brought such issues onto the political agenda, resulting in a two-dimensional structure in Western European party systems (Kitschelt 1994). Cutting across the 'old' distributional axis, a cultural line of conflict between libertarian and authoritarian values came to structure the attitudes of voters.[1] On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism gave rise to the establishment of Green parties and a transformation of Social Democratic parties early in the 1980s. But if a counter-potential to the libertarian New Left movements was evident early on in Western publics (Sacchi 1998), it took longer to become politically manifest. Essentially conservative, its underlying values and goals were more diffuse, and their political expression therefore depended to a greater extent on political leadership.

In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries succeeded in putting new issues on the political agenda that have proven highly conducive to collective identity formation and consequently to political mobilization. Despite their diverse origins, these parties have converged on a

programme that involves two elements. First, the populist right challenges the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and questions the legitimacy of political decisions predicated on universalistic values. The populist right, moreover, has promoted new issues and developed new discourses such as an anti-immigration stance. This does not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2004) has called 'differentialist nativism' or 'cultural racism'. It represents a counter-vision to multi-cultural models of society. In adopting a programme that includes these two elements, the populist right now occupies one of the poles of a new line of conflict that may be labelled libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian. In other words, right-wing populist parties seem to have converged around a platform that makes this party family represent the counter-pole to the libertarian left (Bornschier 2010).

The opposition between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values is, at heart, a conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of an ongoing philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians who respectively uphold individualist and communitarian conceptions of the person. Communitarians such as Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) argue that universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions within an established community and therefore run the risk of becoming oppressive. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge the fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception of the self is misconceived. Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a (more or less modest) communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles advocated by Rawls (1971). Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the concept of 'cultural differentialism', claiming not the superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions. This discourse, in turn, has proved highly influential for the discourse of right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000; Minkenberg 2000). Immigration is directly linked to the emergence of such discourse since the inflow of people from other cultural backgrounds endangers the cultural homogeneity that thinkers of the New Right as well as exponents of right-wing populist parties seek to preserve. Equally present in communitarian thinking and the discourse of the populist right is a defence of the primacy of politics over abstract normative principles.

Right-wing populist parties since the 1990s can be distinguished from other parties with reference to three common characteristics: (1) situation at the traditionalist-communitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (2) espousal

of a populist anti-establishment discourse in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and established parties; and (3) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties (Bornschier 2010). Empirically, the defence of cultural tradition and the rejection of multicultural society propagated by the populist right form one pole of the new division structuring the political space in a number of Western European countries. Cultural liberalism and the individualistic and universalistic conceptions of community advocated by the New Left form the opposing pole (Bornschier 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006).

7.4 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL CONFLICTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL AND THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The rising importance of the supranational EU polity in political life in Europe establishes a new political community within which collectively binding decisions are taken. Citizens holding libertarian-universalistic values will probably not find this threatening. First of all, they are characterized by a cosmopolitan outlook and, secondly, they will support the 'exportation' of the democratic principle to the European level, where a substantial part of political decision making now takes place. For those adhering to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, on the other hand, the situation is different. For them, European integration further threatens the autonomy of the national political community that these citizens already see as endangered by the application of universalistic principles on the part of autonomous state agencies such as constitutional courts. Consequently, the populist right has been quick to seize the political potential of the argument for the *primacy of autonomous national politics* vis-à-vis obligations arising from European integration.

This cultural or identity-based logic of opposition to the EU is closely related to what may be called the *political logic* of right-wing populist mobilization. Such logic is a consequence of the fact that EU states' commitment to liberalize capital flows and trade limits their policy repertoire and thus can call into question their legitimacy (see Mény and Surel 2000; Scharpf 2000; Offe 1996). As Huber and Stephens show, partisan effects on a whole array of welfare state indicators vanished in the 1980s when 'governments found themselves with dramatically fewer options' (Huber and Stephens 2001, p. 221). Furthermore, many governments have explicitly justified unpopular measures in economic and social policy making by referring to the structural imperatives of EU integration and globalization. A case in point was the obligation to fulfil Maastricht requirements in order to participate in the European Monetary Union. Thus, it has been easy for actors of the populist right to denounce the 'cartelization' of the established

parties of the left and right which share a pro-European consensus and allegedly no longer differ in their policies. Although European integration originally was an important issue only for certain right-wing populist parties (for example, the Swiss People's Party), its close association with the libertarian-universalistic as opposed to traditionalist-communitarian preferences has led other members of this party family to oppose the integration process as well. Accordingly, during the 1990s, European integration increasingly gained prominence in the discourse of other members of the right-wing populist party family such as the French Front National and the Austrian Freedom Party (Bornschier 2010).

The association between positions along the *state-market cleavage and opposition to the EU* is even more straightforward than is the case with regard to cultural opposition. Conceptions of social justice and the relative importance of the state or the market in economic regulation are highly relevant here. After all, the policies pursued at the European level are heavily oriented towards the economic domain. Thus, attitudes towards deregulation at the national level, re-regulation at the European level, and the degree of harmonization desired in social and fiscal policy are presumably related to positions regarding the traditional state-market cleavage. Support for European economic policies then is a function of economic preferences at the national level and structured by established political alignments. As such, the extreme left's opposition to the EU is the mirror image of its opposition to economic liberalization and the potential threat it poses to national welfare states (Kriesi et al. 2006). It has been argued, however, that the European project is no longer neo-liberal in essence, and instead follows a model of 'regulated capitalism' (Marks et al. 2006, p. 164). While there is some truth to this position, the crucial point is how voters with strongly state interventionist preferences evaluate EU policies. I will make this an empirical question.

That said, the limited degree of knowledge most citizens have of policies pursued at the European level may still impede a close relationship between preferences in national politics and attitudes with respect to the EU. However, given rising levels of information and citizen involvement at the European level, diverging conceptions of the aims of European integration and of the policies pursued at the European level could be disputed in a representative democratic system at the European level. In other words, a rejection of the EU that stems from dissatisfaction with its economic policies does not represent a principled opposition to the integration process.

7.5 THE MOBILIZATION OF OPPOSITION AGAINST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

As such – and contrary to the argument presented by Taggart (1998) and partially endorsed by Marks et al. (2006) – the resistance of the extreme

left and populist right has clear ideological foundations and does not stem from their outsider status within national political competition. Rather, it is the extreme position of these parties within their party systems that makes it easier for them to take a clear position on the question of European integration than for the large mainstream parties which are internally divided on the issue (Franklin et al. 1996; Bartolini 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006). This is also due to the fact that most mainstream parties mobilize along both of the economic and political dimensions of conflict that structure national party competition[2] which may result in contradictory positions regarding European integration. As Marks et al. (2002, p. 587) point out, conservative parties can be expected to strongly support economic integration, while opposing further efforts at political integration due to their concern for national sovereignty. Social Democrats represent the mirror image of Conservatives, since they are much more sceptical regarding economic integration than they are with regard to the project of founding a supranational polity that potentially could engage in Europe-wide market regulation. Right-wing populist parties do not face this dilemma because they mobilize only along one of the two national lines of competition, namely the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension. Furthermore, they can define their policy stances without prolonged internal debate due to their hierarchical internal structure which has allowed them to quickly take a clear and negative position regarding European integration (Bornschier 2010).

In the following section, the dimensions underlying citizens' orientations regarding the EU are analysed to test the hypothesis that these dimensions are related to the conflicts that prior research has shown to prevail in national politics. I then proceed to verify the hypothesis that the structure of national party systems conditions the mobilization of political potentials created by European integration.

7.6 THE DIMENSIONALITY OF ORIENTATIONS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN UNION

A study of the relationship between national conflicts and orientations regarding the European Union must come to terms with a paucity of appropriate data. Ideally, our data source would include orientations regarding (a) the state-market and the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimensions of competition at the national level, (b) the economic and cultural implications of European integration, and (c) respondents' national party preference. Most cross-national surveys, however, either allow a measurement of respondents' positions regarding the relevant conflicts at the national level, or feature detailed questions regarding attitudes with respect to

European integration, but not both. Since it has been shown elsewhere that the state-market and the new cultural dimension structure political competition in Western Europe (Bornschier 2005, 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006), I focus exclusively on citizens' orientations regarding the EU in the further analysis. In a second step, these orientations will be related to national party preferences.

The data source used is the Eurobarometer 44.2bis 'Megasurvey' from 1996. While these data have the disadvantage of being rather dated and of covering only 15 EU member states, they offer a battery of detailed questions pertaining to respondents' fears associated with European integration. Furthermore, the large sample size of around 65,000 respondents is an advantage. Levels of non-response to single items are quite high in these surveys and the large sample boosts the number of respondents who declare they would vote for the relatively small parties of the extreme populist right and of the extreme left. Furthermore, because the theoretical background of the patterns of conflict I have set out is specific to Western Europe, it makes sense to disregard the new EU member states in East Central Europe. This hypothesis is corroborated by the analysis of Marks et al. (2006), who find that the relationship between party positions along the European and national dimensions differs significantly between Eastern and Western Europe.

Table 7.1 shows the results of a rotated principal component factor analysis using a battery of 16 items that tap respondents' fears associated with the European Union. These questions offer the most detailed information regarding citizens' orientations vis-à-vis the EU, and I have used most of the available items. Among those excluded, a few questions pertain to the fear that small states will lose power and that decisions in the EU are imposed by the big countries. These questions do not appear comparable across countries, since they are likely to be assessed differently in large and in small member states.

The analysis reveals three clearly distinct factors. The *first factor* taps cultural or identity-based fears associated with European integration. *Loss of identity and culture* and of the perception that the EU endangers the existence of respondents' nations are important features of this syndrome. The factor is also related to fears of rapid change, or of the possibility that people in the EU are too different to get along well, or of concern that the EU imposes too much central control. Leaving aside for a moment the second factor, the fears underlying the *third factor* are economic in nature. They pertain to the future of national welfare states, to taxes, and to the transfer of jobs to other member countries of the EU. Conforming to expectations, the first and the third factors bear some resemblance to the prime lines of opposition at the national level. The first, cultural dimension appears closely associated with the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian conflict discussed in the preceding section. The third factor is related to the state vs. market dimension, or, put differently, the antagonism between support for the welfare state and economic liberalism.

Table 7.1   Rotated factor analysis of citizens' perceptions of fear associated with the European Union, 1996

	Cultural dimension	Enlargement dimension	Economic dimension
Loss of identity	0.75	0.10	0.18
Nation no longer exists	0.72	0.11	0.19
Loss of language	0.67	0.19	0.01
Too rapid changes	0.52	0.15	0.34
People too different	0.44	0.31	0.25
Too much central control	0.41	0.13	0.32
Costs eastward enlargement	0.03	0.70	0.24
Rich countries pay	0.07	0.67	0.15
Foreign workers from EU	0.21	0.60	0.15
Countries joining EU	0.29	0.61	0.04
Massive imports	0.33	0.49	0.22
Border controls removed	0.42	0.47	-0.01
More taxes	0.13	0.17	0.71
Social security	0.24	0.08	0.67
Economic crisis	0.14	0.26	0.53
Transfer of jobs	0.15	0.39	0.46
Eigenvalues			
- before rotation	5.0	1.2	1.005
- after rotation	2.7	2.6	2.0
R-square (after rotation)	16.8%	16.2%	12.2%
N		37 947	

Note: The reduction of the number of cases as compared to the original sample size is due to very large numbers of respondents choosing the 'don't know' response category. Given that the answer categories are 'rather afraid', 'rather not afraid' and 'don't know', the latter category could also be assigned a neutral value. This alternative recoding of missing values, however, does not affect the results markedly.

Source: Eurobarometer 44.2bis

The *second factor*, meanwhile, is not clearly associated with national conflicts, and taps fears concerning the consequences of the eastward enlargement of the Union, above all in terms of increased economic competition. While the removal of borders figures into the cultural, as well as on the enlargement factor, it is interesting to note that the immigration of workers from other EU countries does not seem to represent a cultural threat but is clearly associated with economic fears regarding the enlargement process. With the eastward enlargement no longer on the agenda in the European Union of 27 member states, what used to be scepticism against enlargement may now feed into the economic and cultural dimensions, and may contribute to the latter's salience. This hypothesis is tested using more recent survey data in the final section of this chapter.

Because the factor analysis is based on all 15 EU member countries, it may hide large differences in the average positions and in the degree of polarization within national publics along the three dimensions just discussed. Consequently, the potentials constituted by fears regarding the process of European integration may vary across countries. Figure 7.1 presents box plots showing the distribution of respondents along the three dimensions in each country. Negative values indicate stronger fears, and countries are arranged according to the position of the median citizen. On the one hand, the results do not reveal very strong contrasts with respect to the *polarization* of public opinion. In other words, the differing views regarding European integration suggest that a potential for the politicization of the issue seems to exist throughout Western Europe. At the same time, the results indicate that national publics differ rather strongly in their *median position*. This is particularly true with respect to the cultural dimension.

If we assume that governments have generally been friendly towards European integration, then a particularly strong *potential for cultural opposition* against the EU appears to exist in Portugal, Ireland and Greece. Cultural fears are also widespread in the British public, but since the major parties are also not very Europhile, the potential for parties challenging the mainstream to invoke anti-EU rhetoric is not necessarily large. Furthermore, while the median citizen in Belgium and France does not reveal strong cultural fears, the rather polarized nature of public opinion in these countries suggests that certain segments of the populace are more sceptical. Consequently, it is plausible to assume a rather large potential for parties challenging the pro-European mainstream. In Denmark, a smaller group of citizens who strongly fear European integration seems to exist. With respect to the *enlargement and economic dimensions*, France, Belgium and Greece again stand out for their rather sceptical publics. Additionally, a number of countries that exhibited little cultural Euroscepticism reveal stronger fears related to the economic dimension (Spain) or the enlargement dimension (Luxemburg) or both (Germany).

Figure 7.1   Distribution of respondents along the cultural, economic and enlargement dimensions in the 15 old EU member states

Overall, however, the economic dimension seems to constitute less of a potential for contestation of the integration process than the cultural dimension. The enlargement dimension, on the other hand, also reveals significant potential for politicization.

The preceding section advanced the hypothesis that no fundamental incompatibility is to be expected between citizen orientations vis-à-vis the EU and national cleavage dimensions. As the empirical analysis has revealed, this is the case at least for two of the three dimensions underlying respondents' orientations regarding the EU. Accordingly, the structure of national conflicts does not preclude a politicization of the EU along the economic and cultural dimensions. This may actually be the reason for what Mair (2000) has called the 'limited impact' of European integration on national party systems, namely the near absence of parties that are exclusively concerned with the issue of European integration. On the other hand, whether or not voters are given a meaningful choice regarding the future of the integration process very much depends on the configuration of the national party system.

7.7 THE MOBILIZATION OF OPPOSITION AGAINST EUROPEAN UNIFICATION BY NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES

The next step is to assess how far the dimensions found to underlie citizens' orientations regarding the European Union have been mobilized by political parties. This question will be approached by positioning party electorates in the political space formed by the economic and cultural EU-dimensions, using respondents' scores from the factor analysis carried out in the preceding section. The analysis thus focuses on the mobilization of cultural and economic fears associated with European integration, and leaves aside for the moment the question of enlargement. I will return to this dimension in a later section.

As I have argued, the ideological basis of party positions regarding the economic and cultural dimensions of integration is rooted in national conflicts, that is, the traditional state-market cleavage on the one hand, and the new cultural division between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values on the other. Contrary to the purely historical cleavage approach taken by Marks and Wilson (2000), however, I argue that positions regarding the EU cannot solely be deduced from parties' cleavage position, but are a result of their ideological credentials in interaction with the strategic context of competition in the party system. *The mobilization of economic and cultural opposition against the integration project thus depends chiefly on the configuration of the party system*. While this mobilization is likely to occur through reciprocal mass-elite linkages between parties and their constituencies

(Steenbergen et al. 2007), it is important to acknowledge – in line with the perspective developed by Kriesi et al. (2006) – that a differentiation in parties' programmatic 'offer' opens the way for genuine *realignments* based on the EU issue, within both the left and right ideological blocks.

The mainstream parties of the left and right have generally been favour-able to the integration process. This is because they have been in government often and have participated in the making of the European polity, commit-ting them to a pragmatic stance. Economic and culturally driven reservations regarding the EU can only find expression where there is a division within the political right as well as within the political left. In particular, the mobiliza-tion of the cultural or identity-based fears connected to the EU depends on the existence of a right-wing populist party. Strategically, the populist right faces no dilemma as long as it does not participate in government, since its clear and decisive position along the new cultural divide makes it easy to adopt cultural Euroscepticism. On the political left, however, and in light of the strong commitment of the major Social Democrat and Socialist parties to the integration process, an alternative party must exist for economic fears to become a determinant of partisan alignments. I expect this to be the case where a Communist or extreme left party exists (or a socialist party as an alternative to the social democrats exists as in the Netherlands). Extreme left parties are defined here as being located at the state-interventionist extreme of the party spectrum along the state-market cleavage. If party electorates are located in the two-dimensional space of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU, three patterns emerge, which I discuss in turn.

7.8 COUNTRIES WITH SIGNIFICANT RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES

In a first group of countries, the cultural dimension has been more strongly mobilized due to the efforts of a successful right-wing populist party which rallies voters who perceive European integration as a cultural threat. This is the case in France, Austria and Belgium (see Figure 7.2). Along the horizon-tal axis, voters to the left feel economically threatened, while those on the right do not. This reflects the hypothesis that state interventionist attitudes are related to economic fears stemming from European integration, while those with economically liberal attitudes should not perceive such a threat. Along the vertical axis, respondents at the top end do not feel culturally threatened by the integration process, while those towards the bottom of the axis feel strongly threatened.

In France, Austria and Belgium, voters of the extreme right differ mark-edly from those supporting other parties in their position along the cultural

dimension of European integration. This location corresponds to the extreme position this electorate typically occupies on the libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian dimension of conflict at the national level (see Bornschier 2005, 2010). That said, there are also some differences among the three countries. France, for one, presents something of the master case, in which cultural *and* economic fears have been mobilized by different political actors although cultural anxieties have been mobilized more intensively. For, as shown in Figure 7.1, both potentials are rather strong in France. It is not the small groupings on the extreme left, however, but the much larger Communist party that receives votes from citizens who feel particularly threatened in economic terms. This is consistent with prior findings using French data, indicating that within the left, the communists mobilize voters who feel economically threatened by European integration, while the Socialists receive support from those who are economically leftist but do not feel threatened by the EU (Bornschier 2008).

The results show that a similar division exists within the right in France: those who vote for the Front National are concerned with the cultural implications of European integration and differ strongly from those who support parties of the mainstream right. Note that the Front National's voters do not stand out for their economic fears related to the integration process, indicating that the party's mobilization is almost purely cultural. The populist right faces some competition in the cultural domain, however. On the one hand, small independent groupings and spin-offs of the right differ from the mainstream right in this respect. Furthermore, the voters of the extreme left, contrary to expectations, stand out just as much for their cultural as for their economic fears. However, and in marked contrast to the Front National's quite substantial share of the vote, only 2 per cent of respondents declare that they would vote for one of the formations of the extreme left. Furthermore, the position of the extreme left is not consistent with analyses of later elections, which show a rather centrist location of this electorate with regard to the EU (Bornschier 2010).

In Austria, voters of the Freedom Party also clearly stand out for their cultural anxieties. While they also represent the part of the electorate that feels most threatened in economic terms, these voters are more distinct from supporters of other parties in their cultural rather than in their economic orientation. That said, the economic potential for opposition to the EU being more compelling than the cultural one (as shown in Figure 7.1) the Austrian Freedom Party seems able to rally economic Eurosceptics as well. Its mobilizing power is no doubt bolstered by the absence of a split within the left bloc. Preferences for the other parties are weakly structured by orientations regarding the EU, although what differences we do observe are in line with expectations: voters of the left are more concerned with loss of social security than conservatives or supporters of the Liberal Forum. The Greens rally

Figure 7.2   The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – France, Austria and Belgium

voters who are not particularly concerned with either of the two threats, which is consistent with their libertarian-universalistic profile along the national dimensions of competition (see Dolezal 2005; Kriesi et al. 2006). Finally, those who declare they would cast a blank ballot in a general election also stand out for their opposition to the process of European integration, indicating a political potential not mobilized by the Freedom Party.

The Belgian case is not very different from the Austrian, with the right-wing populist Vlaams Blok clearly mobilizing cultural perceptions of threat related to European integration. Contrary to Austria, party electorates differ more strongly along the cultural dimension.[3] The Greens, who are generally the group of voters with the most consistent libertarian-universalistic outlook in Western Europe (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2010), also feel least threatened by European integration in cultural terms. They form the counter-pole to those supportive of the Vlaams Blok. No party seems to specifically mobilize economic perceptions of threat, though those who vote for the populist right are also rather concerned with economic aspects of European integration. Meanwhile, the major parties' electorates do not differ much in their orientations.

7.9 PREDICTABLE POSITIONS, BUT FEEBLE POLITICIZATION IN THE MAJORITY OF STATES IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE

In a second group of countries, party electorates' views align more or less as expected, but differ far less vis-à-vis one another with regard to the aforementioned countries. This pattern is found in the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, Spain and Italy. Figure 7.3 shows the configurations in three of these countries. In none did a significant right-wing populist party exist in the mid-1990s, and no party has attracted a sizable number of voters who feel culturally threatened by the EU. Nor have economic fears been strongly mobilized in these countries. Let us discuss the examples of Germany, the Netherlands and Italy in turn.

In Germany, the electorates of the major parties are quite close to one another.[4] The left-wing PDS, on the other hand, attracts the vote of those who most strongly see the achievements of the welfare state as endangered by European integration. As we have seen earlier, the potential for mobilizing economic rather than political malaise towards the EU is quite strong in Germany. Overall, as the hypothesized relationship between the state-market cleavage and the economic dimension of European integration would lead us to expect, those who vote for parties of the right feel less of an economic threat than those who vote for the left. In the cultural domain, those who support the Free Democrats and Ecologists feel least threatened, while voters of Christian Democratic Union parties perceive somewhat more of a threat. The extreme right attracts voters who are quite distinct from those of the other parties in exhibiting strong identity-related fears. However, this electorate is much smaller than that of the populist right in other countries. Because of their outmoded programme and their ties to the fascist past, the parties of the extreme right are highly unlikely to attract more than the hard core of xenophobic authoritarians (Bornschier 2010).

Figure 7.3   The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

In the Netherlands, the positions of most parties are also rather centrist. The configuration shows that the Euroscepticism that became manifest in the recent rejection of the constitutional treaty has not been stirred by political parties. The quite marginal extreme right-wing Centrumdemokraten take an unexpected position and do not attract voters preoccupied with a loss of national identity due to European integration. Contrary to successful parties of the extreme right, which mobilize along the cultural dimension (Bornschier 2010),

the voters of the Centrumdemokraten stand out for their economic orientation regarding the EU. A number of (fundamentalist) protestant and pensioners' parties occupy the position we would expect from a right-wing populist party, but these parties do not fit in this category and have a rather limited appeal.

The case of Italy, finally, suggests an interesting point of variation within this second group of countries. First of all, we notice that while economic perceptions of fear are not very pronounced, voters of the Rifondazione Communista nonetheless feel more of a threat from economic integration than other voters. This underlines the hypothesis that a split within the left opens the way for differentiation along the economic dimension. Interestingly, while party electorates lie close to one another, we note that those in favour of the left-wing PDS are less sceptical regarding the economic implications of European integration than those supporting mainstream parties of the right such as the Christian Democrats and Forza Italia. This is a pattern characteristic of Southern Europe also to be found in Spain and Portugal: the mainstream right's electorate perceives more of an economic threat than voters of the left. It is noteworthy, however, that this phenomenon is limited to countries in which electorates differ little along the economic dimension.

Overall, despite differing attitudes in the populace, the countries in this group lack a modern right-wing populist party which could mobilize cultural fears related to European integration. As far as the economic dimension is concerned, the crucial condition for the mobilization of economic Euroscepticism actually exists in a number of countries. The German, the Italian, the Dutch and the Spanish party systems all exhibit a split within the left and one component attracts voters who express some concern about economic integration. At the same time, the voters of the PDS, the Rifondazione Communista, the Dutch Socialists and the Spanish Izquierda Unida are not very distant from those of other parties. This could change, however, should issues related to European integration gain a more prominent role in these countries.

7.10 CULTURAL OPPOSITION FROM THE LEFT: SCANDINAVIA, PORTUGAL AND GREECE

In the countries discussed so far, the hypothesis of a rather close association between national dimensions of conflict and dimensions of contestation with regard to the EU was generally supported. In the Nordic and in two Southern European countries, however, party positions differ from this prediction. Figure 7.4 shows voter configurations in Sweden, Denmark and Portugal. In these countries, as well as in Finland and Greece, a split within the left exists and (at least) one component rallies ideologically distinct voters with respect to their orientations regarding the EU. In Scandinavia, the dominance of the class cleavage and

the low electoral threshold has allowed various small communist and left-social-ist parties to emerge, allowing political formations such as the Danish Red-Green Unity List to campaign against European integration (Klingemann 2005, pp. 267–74). However, contrary to the cases discussed so far, these party systems feature leftist parties that mobilize not only economic but also cultural percep-tions of threat related to European integration. The United Democratic Coalition (an alliance between Communists and Greens) in Portugal and the Communist party in Greece attract voters who stand out above all for their cultural fears. (Figure 7.4 shows the example of Portugal.) The electorates of the other major parties, on the other hand, hardly differ in their position.

The Scandinavian pattern differs even more fundamentally from those found so far. In general, supporters of right-wing parties – conservative and liberal – stand out for being much less concerned with the cultural implications of European integration than voters of the left. The position of Left parties in Sweden and Finland and of the Red-Green coalition in Denmark suggests that the two dimensions are more strongly related than elsewhere. For these voters, economic and cultural Euroscepticism go hand in hand. In fact, in an analysis of party positions regarding the accession referenda in Scandinavia, Jahn (1999) shows that conservative and liberal parties' pro-market orientation translated into an unambiguously approving stance towards the EU. The Social Democrats' location along the state-market cleavage, on the other hand, suggests an ambigu-ous position characterized by internal divisions. However, as many left-wing parties, they have switched to positive stances regarding the Union since state interventionist economic policies no longer appear feasible at the national level, and instead require an EU-wide approach (Johansson and Raunio 2001).

In a region where international cooperation has long been regarded as a threat to national sovereignty, and where the parties of the right do not mobilize in defence of national sovereignty, opposition to the EU is mobilized by unlikely candidates like New Left and – with the exception of Finland – Green parties. In fact, Jahn's (1999) analysis shows that parties that have historically been left-ist, urban and ecologist, or post-materialist oppose European integration, while all parties that are materialist and urban-based supported accession, including the Social Democrats. Left-Socialist parties in Scandinavia have a tradition of being opposed to European integration due to their pacifist orientation, their rejection of central control, and the perception of the EU as a 'capitalist' project (Christensen 1996; Jahn 1999), just as Ecologist parties fear that the EU dilutes environmental standards (Jahn 1999; Johansson and Raunio 2001).

Knutsen's (1990; 1995, p. 484) analysis of materialist-postmaterialist value orientations shows that the Left Party and the Ecologist party in Sweden, as well as the Green and Socialist parties in Denmark, stand out for their post-materialist electorate. Figure 7.4 shows that they also attract those voters who feel most strongly threatened by the EU in cultural terms. The association

Sweden

Denmark

Portugal

Legend

Sweden

left: Left Party (Vaensterpartiet); *sd:* Social Democrats; *ecolo:* Greens; *centre:* Centre Party; *lib:* Liberal People's Party; *cons:* Moderate Conservative Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet); *cd:* Christian Democrats; *newdem:* New Democracy

Denmark

red-green: United Red-Green; *socialist:* Socialist People's Party; *sd:* Social Democrats; *cdem:* Centre Democrats; *rad:* Social Liberals (Radikale Venstre); *cons:* Conservative People's Party; *cpp:* Christian People's Party; *lib:* Liberals (Venstre); *pp:* Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet)

Portugal

unitdem: United Democratic Coalition; *socialist:* Socialist Party; *socdem:* Social Democrats (a centre-right party); *csd:* Centre Social Democrats (a christian democrat party); *blank:* would vote blank

Figure 7.4   The structuring of economic and cultural orientations regarding the EU by party choice – Sweden, Denmark and Portugal

between economically leftist and culturally protectionist positions found in this analysis further suggests that citizens' national identity in these countries is heavily stamped by the uniqueness of the Scandinavian welfare state (see also Raunio 2007). Indeed, even if social policy were to become more strongly regulated at the European level, this would not guarantee the level and universalistic character of social protection prevalent in these countries. Thus, as non-government parties, Left-Socialist and Green parties have been able to

mobilize both economic and cultural fears. An analysis based on the European Election Study 2004 (data not shown here) shows that the Eurosceptic 'June Lists' that ran in the 2004 European elections in Denmark and Sweden drew heavily on voters who supported the Social Democrat or the Socialist party in the last general election.

The Danish configuration further qualifies the hypothesis concerning the mobilization of opposition against European integration by right-wing populist parties. In fact, the voters of the Fremskridtspartiet (Progress Party) are not located in an extreme position along the cultural dimension. This may have to do with the deviance already found in other Scandinavian countries. Namely, the cultural line of conflict at the national level seems to be related differently to culturally based evaluations of the EU than in continental European countries. However, the finding may also reflect the fact that the Scandinavian Progress Parties – like the Centrumdemokraten in the Netherlands – are not unequivocal members of the right-wing populist party family (on this debate, see Mudde 2007). In 1995, Pia Kjærsgaard left the Progress Party and founded the Danish People's Party which is considered to be a member of the right-wing populist party family. It will accordingly be interesting to see whether the Danish People's Party will begin to mobilize citizens exhibiting culturally motivated Euroscepticism, as is the case with other exponents of this party family. This analysis will have to await more recent data. In Sweden, meanwhile, a right-wing party mobilizing cultural Euroscepticism existed in the 1990s. New Democracy was short-lived, however, and is considered a neo-liberal populist as opposed to a right-wing populist party by Mudde (2007, pp. 47–8). Moreover, by openly supporting membership of the EU (Jahn 1999, p. 586), the party's profile went against the grain of its voters' Eurosceptic orientations (see Figure 7.4).

What clearly emerges from the various cases discussed here is the necessity to differentiate within the group of extreme right parties, and in particular the older parties from the most recent exponents, which I have termed (extreme) right-wing populist. Only this sub-group of the wider extreme right party family, as defined at the outset of this chapter, has an appeal broad enough to gain more than marginal voter shares (Bornschier 2005, 2010). Furthermore, opposition to the EU only seems to be an integral part of this sub-group's programmatic profile.

7.11 THE DIMENSIONALITY OF EUROPEAN ORIENTATIONS AFTER THE 2004 EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

With the accession of ten new member states in 2004, the fifth enlargement of the EU has brought the largest number of new members into the Union

thus far. What is the dimensionality of orientations regarding the EU now that the enlargement is off the agenda, at least for the immediate future? In this final section, I probe into the structure of attitudes after this round of enlargement using Eurobarometer 62 from 2004. Because none of the Eurobarometer surveys after the mid-1990s provide both detailed information on citizens' attitudes regarding the EU and their national party preferences, this brief analysis is solely concerned with the dimensionality of EU orientations.

The items used in the following analyses come from a battery of questions identical to the one used in the prior analysis which pertain to respondents' fears regarding European integration. Because of the more limited number of items as well as the much smaller sample as compared to the analysis of the mid-1990s, a one-dimensional structure emerges. This most probably is related to a propensity for respondents to answer questions about their fears rather uniformly due to the design of the question battery.[5] As noted in Table 7.1, the same tendency existed in 1996, with the first dimension explaining most of the variance before the solution was rotated. Because it seems plausible that the one-dimensional structure of orientations is at least partially a result of the design of the battery of questions and, since the Eigenvalue of the second factor is barely below 1, it makes sense to enforce a two-dimensional solution in order to compare these results with those found in 1996. Out of consideration for comparability regarding the 1996 results, I exclude the new member states. Furthermore, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 present the results for the Scandinavian and other 12 countries separately in order to assess some of the hypotheses developed in the preceding section.

The results of the factor analysis for 12 of the 15 old member states presented in Table 7.2 reveal a cultural and an economic dimension structuring attitudes regarding the EU. The economic dimension is unrelated to questions of identity and instead centres on fears regarding the welfare state, the transfer of jobs to other countries, and economic crises. The cultural dimension is stamped above all by fears pertaining to national identity and language, although some economic items show secondary loadings on this factor, above all the preservation of the national welfare state. Nonetheless, there is a clear correspondence in these countries between the two dimensions found to structure competition in national party systems across Western Europe and the orientations of citizens vis-à-vis the European integration process.

The analysis of the mobilization of the cultural and economic potentials in the Scandinavian countries in the preceding section suggested that citizens may see European integration as a threat for their identity because economic integration endangers their distinctive type of welfare regime. A separate factor analysis of the orientations of citizens in Sweden, Denmark and Finland lends support to this hypothesis, as the results in Table 7.3 show. In these three countries, fears regarding the national welfare state as well as economic crises in

Table 7.2   Rotated factor analysis of citizens' orientations regarding the EU in twelve member states, excluding the Scandinavian countries, 2004

	Economic dimension	Cultural dimension
Loss of identity	0.19	0.82
Loss of language	0.09	0.84
Social security	0.59	0.40
Transfer of jobs	0.77	-0.01
Pay more and more	0.68	0.28
Economic crisis	0.63	0.30
Eigenvalues		
before rotation	2.61	0.93
after rotation	1.85	1.69
R-square (after rotation)	30.8%	28.2%
N	10 161	

Source: Eurobarometer 62

Table 7.3   Rotated factor analysis of citizens' orientations regarding the EU in Sweden, Denmark and Finland, 2004

	Cultural/welfare dimension	Economic competition
Loss of identity	0.81	0.08
Loss of language	0.75	0.07
Social security	0.63	0.32
Economic crisis	0.63	0.28
Transfer of jobs	0.02	0.86
Pay more and more	0.30	0.70
Eigenvalue		
before rotation	2.51	0.96
after rotation	2.05	1.42
R-square	34.1%	23.7%
N	2 609	

Source: Eurobarometer 62

general are associated not with the economic but with the cultural dimension. The economic dimension, on the other hand, is more narrowly defined than in the rest of Western Europe. It is characterized by attitudes regarding economic competition – namely, the fear that jobs may be transferred to other countries – and the apprehension of having to pay more and more for the EU. Interestingly, fears pertaining to the welfare state are only weakly related to this economic competition dimension.

The analysis thus reveals differences in the structure of attitudes regarding the European Union depending on the national context. Most notably, the pattern found in Scandinavia is specific. In light of the distinctiveness of the Scandinavian welfare regime, it is quite plausible that commitment to their system of social protection forms an integral part of the national identity of Scandinavians. On the other hand, despite the fact that parties of the extreme left mobilize cultural fears in Portugal and Greece, these countries do not differ from the rest of continental Europe in the structure of their citizens' orientations, as a separate factor analysis for the Southern European countries reveals (results not shown here). This makes sense since the welfare regime in these countries is close to the continental European or Christian Democratic type, and not to the universalistic Scandinavian model.

7.12 CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this chapter has revealed three sources of potential opposition to European integration in publics across the 15 old member states. Two of these – an economic and a culturally or identity-driven form of Euroscepticism – are theoretically related to the dimensions of conflict prevalent at the national level. Consequently, we may expect national parties to seek to mobilize voters along these lines. A third field of potential mobilization against the EU became salient in the mid-1990s in light of scepticism on the part of some citizens towards eastward enlargement of the EU. With the question of enlargement more or less off the agenda for the time being, an analysis of citizen orientations in 2004 confirmed that distinctive economic and cultural dimensions which structure citizen attitudes vis-à-vis the European Union can be distinguished.

It was the fusion of economic and cultural Euroscepticism in referendum campaigns that led to the defeat of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, and which has put a halt to the integration process. For the most part, however, the two motives for opposing the EU are mobilized by different political parties and also have strongly diverging implications for the future of the EU. The culturally or identity-based resistance to European integration is theoretically closely related to traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of

community. These conceptions have been constructed and mobilized by right-wing populist parties, who see cultural pluralism as a danger to the distinct cultural traditions of national communities, and supranational integration as a threat to the autonomy of the traditional political community. Thus, divergence in perceptions of cultural threat deriving from European unification mirror the conflict between libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values, which prior research has shown to be one of the two most important dimensions of opposition in a number of Western European countries, namely in France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany and Britain.

While many citizens lie somewhere in the middle ground between universalistic and communitarian understandings of community, the traditionalist-communitarian conception in its extreme form seems incompatible with a European identity that implies the emergence of a post-traditionalist political community. Hence, citizens holding such values may well support a Europe of nations, but they are unlikely to accord legitimacy to an EU that, since Maastricht and the eastward enlargement, increasingly impinges on individuals' lives, as well as on the distribution of resources (as discussed in Chapter 1). In other words, the scepticism of citizens holding strongly traditionalist-communitarian values vis-à-vis the EU is likely to be fundamental.

On the other hand, different perceptions of fears related to social security and the transfer of jobs to other member countries mirror attitudes about the extent of market regulation at the European level that citizens desire. The resulting potential for political conflict thus reproduces the state-market cleavage at a higher level. In national politics, distributive conflicts have proven much more amenable to political compromise and pacification than cultural conflicts, which are often of an either-or nature. To the extent that parties take up voters' contrasting positions on this issue, this conflict can be processed by democratic institutions at the national and EU levels, and a legitimate compromise may be achieved. The prerequisite for the acceptance of majority decisions that have redistributive effects and impinge on the distribution of life chances, however, is the existence of a European identity that creates a certain degree of solidarity between citizens living in different member countries of the EU.

In terms of the mobilization of potential economic and cultural resistance to European integration, three patterns emerge. In a number of countries – namely the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and Italy – contrasting attitudes regarding the EU remain weakly mobilized, and the differences in European outlook between electorates correspondingly small. In the mid-1990s, this also applied to Britain, although the Conservatives mobilized Euroscepticism later in the decade (Kriesi and Frey 2008). It also has to be borne in mind that the UK Independence Party has been highly successful at least in the 2004 European elections. Despite the feeble degree of polarization, a potential for the representation of contrasting attitudes regarding the EU exists in these

countries since the national and European dimensions prove to be related. In fact, the attitudes party electorates take concerning the two European dimensions of conflict are those that we would predict in knowledge of their positions concerning the two national dimensions of conflict. With the exception of Britain, the major parties in these countries have not mobilized on the issue of European integration, however, either because they are internally divided or because no political actor has politicized the issue in the national arena.

Where alternatives to the established major parties of the left and right exist, however, contrasting attitudes regarding the integration project have been mobilized. That said, electorates do not differ in outlook to the same degree in all of these cases. This hypothesis has been strongly confirmed both for economic and for culturally based opposition to the EU. A split within the left ideological bloc has permitted left-wing parties to mobilize economic Euroscepticism in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy, as well as in Sweden, Finland and Denmark. While the mobilization of economic opposition remains modest to date, the cultural dimension has been mobilized far more strongly in those cases where right-wing populist parties have achieved an electoral breakthrough. In this distinct group of countries, parties of the populist right rally voters who are distinct by virtue of their culturally based scepticism regarding the EU. This is the case of those supporting the French Front National, the Austrian Freedom Party and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium. The mobilization of these parties is likely to represent the most intense threat to the formation of a European identity. Furthermore, in the French case, where a split exists both within the left and within the right, and where both dimensions have been politicized rather strongly, the economic logic of mobilization of the Communists and the cultural mobilization logic of the Front National are clearly distinguishable.

While these results are in line with expectations, a third group of countries features left-wing parties whose voters are characterized both by economic and by cultural fears associated with European integration. This suggests that the two orientations may go hand in hand for certain groups of voters. In Denmark, Sweden and Finland, this is part of a more general specificity inasmuch as cultural fears are generally more widespread among the voters of the left than among voters of the right in Scandinavia. As such, and in contrast to theory-based expectations, the cultural dimension at the national level and cultural orientations regarding the EU are related inversely to the pattern found in the rest of Western Europe. In other words, cultural liberalism is associated with cultural Euroscepticism which seems to derive from the perception that universalistic and Green values can be more effectively defended at the national than at the EU level. Thus, the European project may be viewed differently in the various national contexts. Furthermore, those who believe their economic interests are better protected by national welfare states than through

supranational integration may also develop an identity-based Euroscepticism. Contrary to opposition towards European integration which stems from traditionalist-communitarian conceptions of community, however, this is not necessarily a principled stance against the EU. Rather, it is a matter of whether these fears will be tempered if EU membership and economic integration prove to be compatible with the variety of national welfare regimes that exist in Europe.[6] Finally, the mobilization of cultural Euroscepticism by extreme left-wing parties in Portugal and Greece merits further research.

NOTES

1. Following Kitschelt (1994) as well as Flanagan and Lee's (2003) usage, I use the term 'libertarian' to denote a culturally liberal position compatible with an interventionist state, and not as an all-embracing call for a minimal state, as is the case for Nozick (1974).
2. Bornschier (2010) presents empirical evidence for this in France, Germany and Switzerland.
3. The position of the Communists and of the Volksunie makes the economic dimension appear quite polarized as well; these positions are somewhat unexpected, and it has to be kept in mind that these are miniscule formations.
4. I do not differentiate between Western and Eastern Germany; the results from an analysis excluding Eastern German respondents do not differ significantly from those for unified Germany.
5. The battery starts with the question, 'Concerning the building of Europe or the EU, are you currently afraid of…', followed by the list of specific objects. Respondents answer the question for one object after the other, and the choice is between 'currently afraid', 'not currently afraid' and 'don't know'.
6. The 'varieties of capitalism' perspective (Hall and Soskice 2001) suggests this is the case.

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8. Making the polity: Exploring the linkage between European citizens' and political elites' preference for European Union public policy

Catherine E. de Vries and Christine Arnold

Many political commentators believe the European Union (EU) is currently experiencing a deep democratic crisis. Ordinary citizens are said to feel disempowered – unable to use democracy to further their interests. Indicatively, though one goal of the European constitutional treaty was to bring EU institutions closer to the citizenry, it failed to appeal to French, Dutch and Irish voters. Their rejection of the Treaty has led some scholars to suggest that the reason citizens are turning away from the EU is its unresponsive technocratic bureaucracy and democratic deficit.

The trouble with these debates is that the concept of the democratic deficit is often invoked without being empirically quantified. This can be problematic. For instance, others question the very existence of a democratic deficit and assert that the public does have an impact on EU policy makers. These optimists claim that the responsiveness of EU institutions is amply demonstrable (Majone 1998, 2006; Moravcsik 2002). By way of contrast, sceptics claim that there is 'no demos' and that European institutions are non-responsive (Weiler et al. 1995; Follesdal and Hix 2006). Obviously, both sets of scholarly conclusions cannot be true. It may be that the source of this discrepancy is the underspecified definition of democratic deficit and the fact that scholars have yet to empirically quantify the concept of political representation (Crombez 2003).

The objective of this chapter is to provide a preliminary analysis of political representation in the EU. This is done through an examination of the linkages between citizens' preferences and party positions regarding European legislation. We utilize the basic notion of political representation as defined by Bernhard Wessels (1999, p. 137):

> Representation is a complex phenomenon. It has been addressed from a variety of angles and dimensions and through different normative lenses. The smallest common denominator in normative terms, though, is that in a democracy there

should be some match between the interests of the people and what representatives promote.

In empirical terms this means that the basic requirement for representative democracy is a certain degree of congruence or linkage between the policy preferences of parties and voters, and policy output.

Extant empirical work on political representation in the EU has focused on cueing effects (Carrubba 2001; Ray 2003; Steenbergen et al. 2007). There have also been a number of comparisons of citizens and European political elites, particularly Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (see Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000; Hooghe 2003). Still other studies have examined differences between aggregate public opinion and the extent of aggregate EU policy making (Franklin and Wlezien 1997). This chapter develops this work further by drawing attention to the triangular linkage between EU legislation, citizens' preferences, and political party positions regarding policy making at the EU level. To further refine previous work, it looks not only at preferences regarding overall EU policy making, but also at policy making in specific policy areas (see also Arnold and Franklin 2006). Finally, it explores variation in citizens' and parties' preferences regarding EU legislation across countries and different types of parties. In essence, we address the following two questions: To what degree do citizens and parties hold congruent opinions about the extent and content of EU legislation?; and: Does the extent and content of EU legislation reflect the policy preferences of citizens and parties?

To answer these questions, we employ public opinion data from Eurobarometer surveys, expert data on party positions, and information about EU legislation from the *Official Journal* of the EU. Analysis of these sources points to two main findings. First, we show that citizens and party elites do appear to agree on the overall extent of EU policy making. Aggregate public opinion and party positions track quite strongly with the aggregate level of EU legislation. Yet, there is much less congruence when the focus is on the specific content of EU legislation, for example, legislation in specific policy areas. In such areas, citizens' and parties' policy preferences are not closely mirrored by the EU legislation enacted in those very fields. As such, this study provides a mixed assessment of the extent of political representation in EU politics. While citizens' and parties' preferences do not appear to provide much political guidance for EU legislation in specific policy areas, they do appear to play a role as far as the overall volume of EU legislation is concerned. Hence, this study has important implications for our understanding of political representation within the EU context, as well as for our understanding of the democratic deficit often attributed to EU politics.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we review previous work regarding linkages between public opinion, elites and EU public policy to develop some

expectations regarding the triangular relationship. Next, we discuss the data and the way the research was operationalized. In a third step, we present our empirical findings. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our results for political representation in EU politics.

8.1. EXPLORING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CITIZENS, POLITICAL PARTIES AND EU PUBLIC POLICY

The notion that European and national party elites are increasingly out of touch with their constituents is widespread both in academic and popular debates. Pro-European political elites seem to have been overly eager to pursue further integration over and above the desires and preferences of citizens. As a consequence, many argue that policies adopted at the EU level are not supported by a majority of European citizens. Some cite the predominantly neo-liberal character of the single market and the monetarist framework of the European Monetary Union (EMU) as examples of a policy drift away from voters who, on average, favour a stronger, regulated, more social Europe. As a result, concerns about the quality of democratic guidance in EU policy making have become more prevalent.

At the same time, it has been pointed out that we lack empirical evidence on the quality and degree of democratic guidance in the EU (Crombez 2003). This leads Liesbet Hooghe (2003, p. 282) to conclude that the divide between elite and public opinion reveals 'a case where conventional wisdom rests on a weak empirical base'.

The dearth of empirical studies is partly due to a scarcity of data, especially on elite preferences and EU policy making. A number of studies deal with citizens and elites, but they usually focus on only a part of the elite, employ very different questions, and do not include an evaluation of actual EU policy making (see Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Egeberg 1999; Hug and König 2002; Aspinwall 2002; Trüdinger 2009). Moreover, many studies regarding citizen-elite linkages focus on a comparison between public opinion and European political elites. In assessing the linkage between citizens and elites in the context of EU policy making, it may prove more useful to compare citizens' preferences to those of national party elites than to the positions of MEPs. This is because national representatives are of crucial importance in EU policy making; they shape the course of integration in the Council of Ministers and the European Council. Moreover, national ministers participating in the Council are not held accountable by the European Parliament (EP), but rather by their national parliaments. Hence, despite the recent increase in the power of the EP, its position between Commission and Council is still rather weak. Most decisions at the European level are made

without its direct consent, typically through consultation rather than co-decision procedure. Moreover, the EP is unable to perform the central function of a parliament, namely control the executive – or even hold it accountable.[1] Against this backdrop, it is useful to examine the linkages between citizens and national party elites when exploring political representation in EU politics.

Work by Schmitt and Thomassen is an exception to the above-mentioned scholarly work on citizen-elite linkage, since it provides an extensive picture of citizen-elite linkages regarding EU policy making. In several studies, the authors compare citizens' and MEPs' – and sometimes even national MPs' – preferences regarding EU policy making (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 2000). One of the findings of this work is that citizens and elites appear to be 'living in two European different worlds' with regard to their EU public policy preferences (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, p. 181). This is to say, political elites are generally much more supportive of the process of European integration and the transferring of policy making authority to the EU level (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997, 1999). Moreover, although preferences regarding EU policy making across different policy areas diverge greatly between voters and candidate MEPs, agreement between voters and party elites is apparently much more extensive when it comes to their preferences regarding the integration process as a whole (Schmitt and Thomassen 2000).

A study by Liesbet Hooghe (2003) refines this work by examining the public-elite divide over a large range of policy areas. Her findings indicate that elites and public preferences are rather similar when it comes to Europeanizing high-spending policies such as health, education or social policy. However, the public is on average more in favour than elites of a more strongly regulated and social Europe (that is, more supportive of employment, social policy, cohesion policy, environment, and industrial policy at the EU level). Elites, on the other hand, want to expand EU legislation in those policy areas in which it is thought that functionalist benefits of the integration process will accrue (that is, currency, foreign policy, Third World aid, immigration, environment and defence).

We are thus able to infer two basic hypotheses. First, on average party elites will be more in favour of moving legislation to the EU level than citizens. Second, party elites' and citizens' preferences for EU legislation will diverge across different policy areas. This may mean that citizens favour policies at the EU level which protect them from the expanding and deepening of the common market, whereas elites favour EU legislation in policy areas that allow for functionalist benefits. It is worth noting, however, that none of the aforementioned studies examine the scope (that is, the extent and content) of EU public policy. Hence, the question remains: Does the actual scope of EU legislation reflect the preferences of citizens and parties? The answer to this

question is crucial inasmuch as political representation can only be said to exist if there is some degree of congruence between voters' and parties' positions on one hand, and EU legislation on the other.

This chapter explores the triangular linkage between citizens' policy preferences, party positions and EU legislation. We proceed in several steps. First, we explore the extent of linkage between public opinion and political parties to examine the two basic hypotheses proposed above. In addition, we examine the variation in these linkages across countries and different types of parties in order to provide a more complete picture of the congruence (or lack thereof) between citizens and elites regarding EU policy making. We then proceed to break from previous work to examine the congruence between citizens' and parties' preferences with regard to the extent and content of EU policy making, on the one hand, and the actual scope of EU legislation, on the other. This last step allows us to judge the extent to which political representation is taking place in EU politics.

8.2 DATA AND MEASUREMENT

In assessing political representation in the context of EU politics, we examine citizens' policy preferences, party positions regarding EU policy making, and EU legislation. Consequently, we have to provide a measure for each of these three elements.

In order to obtain party positions regarding EU policy making we rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (Ray 1996; Hooghe et al. 2002). These data consist of surveys on the orientations of national political parties towards European integration in the EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg) for the years 1984, 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2002. The surveys for each of these years include a general question on the position on the European integration process of a given party's leadership. This question ranges from 1 ('strongly opposed to European integration') to 7 ('strongly in favour of European integration'). The survey also includes a more specific question on the positions of national political parties on a range of EU policies. However, this question was only included in the 1999 and 2002 surveys. We use both of these questions as a measure of parties' preferences regarding EU legislation.

When it comes to the policy preferences of citizens, we rely on Eurobarometer (EB) surveys for the same years as covered in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). Each year the EBs were conducted twice and we use the average between the spring and autumn EBs. The EB surveys also include a more general EU preference variable and a specific variable measuring the extent to which citizens favour a transfer of policy competence from the national to the EU level in an array of policy areas. The latter measure is not ideal for

capturing citizens' preferences regarding EU legislation as it may also tap into citizens' preferences for further political integration within the EU. That being said, the questions clearly focus on specific areas of policy making and we find extensive differentiation in the support for EU involvement across policy areas. In light of this latter finding, we feel confident that the items tap into different aspects of citizens' preferences of policy making within the EU rather than provide a general measure of opinion on political integration within Europe.

The general EU preference is operationalized using a question in which respondents were asked if EU membership is 'good', 'bad', or 'neither nor' with respect to their country. In order to measure a respondent's policy preference, we look at five policy areas which coincide with those obtained from CHES. These are common currency, (un-)employment, environment, asylum, and foreign policy. Thus, the areas covered in the expert survey match the data available from the public opinion surveys.

Regarding EU legislation, we use the public records of the *Official Journal* of the EC/EU and measure the number of directives and regulations issued each year. We follow Franklin and Wlezien (1997) in ignoring other entries in the *Official Journal* as associated with either preparation or implementation rather than as involving legislation (Thompson 1989, p. 18). The total number of EU regulations and directives from 1984, 1989, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2002 amounts to 43,939 items of legislation.

The next step entails attributing a particular policy area to each item of legislation. To do so, we used the 'subject' field employed to identify a legislative act by the database we had employed – Lexis Nexis. Such a 'subject' field was available for the vast majority of directives and regulations. That said, in around 30 per cent of all cases the database did not provide a subject line. For such cases, we used the policy area identified in the 'keywords' field. By thus supplementing our analysis of the subject line with the keywords line, we were able to code 96 per cent of the legislation into policy areas.

We then proceed to create a dictionary in order to attribute to a policy area all terms from the subject line, or if need be, all terms from the keywords line. The matching of terms to policy areas is done on the basis of information contained in the Eurovoc database.[2] Eurovoc is a multilingual thesaurus covering the policy fields in which the European Communities are active. The advantage of the Eurovoc thesaurus is that it provides a structured list of expressions intended to represent in an unambiguous fashion the conceptual content of documents. As such, it can provide a useful taxonomy for the semi-automatic classification of a large volume of documents. The quality of the thesaurus is assured by the fact that it appears to be extensively used by European and national institutions. As an indexing system it is used by the European Parliament, the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, national and regional parliaments in Europe and national governmental departments.

8.3 ANALYSES AND RESULTS

Do citizens and elites see eye to eye when it comes to EU policy making? Or, to put it differently, is there a linkage between voters' and parties' policy preferences regarding EU legislation? Table 8.1 provides an overview of the mean correspondence between voters and parties regarding the extent to which each prefers that a given policy area be transferred to the European level. In order to arrive at a correspondence measure, we construct party dyads, that is, the aggregate party voter positions and aggregate party positions (see Thomassen 1976; Dalton 1985). The aggregate party positions can be obtained by using the CHES of 1999 and 2002 (only these years include questions regarding party preferences for EU legislation in specific policy areas). Aggregate party voter positions were obtained by taking the mean preference of voters intending to vote for a particular party in the next parliamentary election. However, the 2002 EB survey did not include a question pertaining to intended vote. As a result, we could only create party dyads for 1999. For this year, the correspondence measures were constructed by subtracting the aggregate party voter position from the aggregate party position. Consequently, positive values indicate that parties are more supportive of policy making at EU level, while negative values indicate that voters are more supportive of EU legislation.

The results show that on the whole parties are slightly more supportive of policy making at the EU level than their constituents. However, considerable

Table 8.1   Party-voter correspondence on preferred EU legislation, by policy area

Policy area	Mean party-voter correspondence
Common currency	-0.07
(Un-)employment	0.09
Environment	0.16
Asylum	0.15
Foreign policy	-0.11
All policy areas combined	0.05

Notes:
Table entries signify the correspondence between parties' preferences for the extent of EU legislation per policy area minus the mean preference of voters intending to vote for these particular parties in the next parliamentary election by policy area.
Positive values indicate that parties are more supportive of policy making at EU level, while negative values indicate that voters are more supportive of EU legislation.

Sources: Eurobarometer Survey 52.0; Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 1999.

variation exists across different policy areas. Whereas parties are clearly more in favour of EU policy making in the areas of employment, environment and asylum, voters are more in favour of policy making at the EU level in the fields of common currency and foreign policy.

In addition to variation across policy areas, we found that there is considerable cross-country variation in voters' and parties' preferences regarding EU policy making (see Table 8.2). The results for France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands are especially noteworthy as voters in these countries are on average more supportive of EU legislation than the parties by whom they are represented. In all other countries parties are on average more supportive of EU legislation than their constituents.

Table 8.2   Party-voter correspondence on preferred EU legislation, policy area and country

Country	Common currency	(Un-) Employment	Environment	Asylum	Foreign policy	All
		Mean party-voter correspondence				
Austria	0.02	-0.06	0.21	0.28	0.06	0.10
Belgium	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.07	-0.09	0.03
Denmark	-0.06	0.20	0.18	0.15	-0.05	0.08
France	-0.25	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03	-0.29	-0.13
Finland	-0.04	0.15	0.45	0.31	-0.12	0.15
Germany	-0.04	0.01	0.01	0.17	-0.07	0.02
Greece	0.17	0.12	0.48	0.29	0.20	0.25
Ireland	-0.47	-0.11	0.24	0.27	-0.26	-0.07
Italy	-0.14	-0.03	0.09	0.05	-0.17	-0.04
Netherlands	-0.23	0.12	-0.18	-0.07	-0.34	-0.14
Portugal	0.09	0.18	0.42	0.35	-0.29	0.15
Spain	0.12	0.19	0.11	0.19	-0.03	0.12
Sweden	-0.11	0.16	0.47	0.25	0.00	0.15
United Kingdom	0.19	0.28	0.41	0.37	0.06	0.26

Notes:
Table entries signify the mean distances between parties' preferences for the extent of EU legislation per policy area minus the mean preference of voters intending to vote for these particular parties in the next parliamentary election by policy area and country.
Positive values indicate that parties are more supportive of policy making at EU level, while negative values indicate that voters are more supportive of EU legislation.

Sources: Eurobarometer Survey 52.0; Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 1999.

The findings so far are in line with previous work and indicate that parties are on average more supportive of EU policy making than their constituents. However, this pattern does not hold across all Western EU member states. In 1999, French, Irish, Italian and Dutch voters were on average more supportive of EU policy making than their political parties. This finding may be surprising in light of the fact that three of these four countries' publics rejected the Constitutional Treaty. However, it must be remembered that the study dates from 1999. For, as Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) have shown, the rise of scepticism towards European integration is a fairly recent phenomenon especially in founding member states.

An additional way to capture the linkage between voters and parties is to determine the correlation between the aggregate party and party voter position. This measure is often labelled policy or issue congruence (see for example, Converse and Pierce 1986 or Miller et al. 1998). Table 8.3 provides the correlations between parties and voters on preferences regarding EU policy making for specific policy areas.

The results show that while party and voter positions are almost always related (with the exception of environmental policy), these correlation coefficients are on average rather weak. The highest coefficient is between party and voter preferences on common currency policy. It amounts to 0.46 and is significant at the $p \leq 0.01$ level. These results corroborate work by Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) comparing European elites and voters which demonstrated that political representation across policy areas is quite weak. Parties only

Table 8.3   Party-voter congruence on preferred EU legislation by policy area

Policy area	Pearson's R
Common currency	0.46**
(Un-)Employment	0.25**
Environment	0.03
Asylum	0.27*
Foreign policy	0.20*
All policy areas combined	0.32**

Notes:
Table entries are Pearson's R correlation coefficients between parties' preferences for the extent of EU legislation per policy area and the mean preference of voters intending to vote for these particular parties in the next parliamentary election by policy area.
*   Significant at $p \leq 0.05$ level (two-tailed).
**   Significant at $p \leq 0.01$ level.

Sources: Eurobarometer Survey 52.0; Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 1999.

partially represent their constituents when it comes to preferences regarding the content of EU policy making.

This being said, there may be significant variation across political parties. Consider, for example, outspoken Eurosceptic parties which may well be in touch with their support base when it comes to EU preferences. Table 8.4 explores differences across parties. By means of an Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) analysis we account for the variation in party-voter correspondence in EU policy making preferences of parties and voters (that is, party-voter correspondence). Table A.1 in the Appendix provides an overview of the operationalizations of the indicators used in this analysis. The analysis uses Huber-White robust standard errors in order to correct for heteroskedasticity in the data. We also tested for but found no evidence of multicollinearity.

The model – which explains, *inter alia*, party-voter correspondence regarding the preferred extent of EU legislation – reveals that the preferences of voters for opposition parties are more accurately represented by those parties. By way of contrast, there appears to be less correspondence between the preferences of voters who back the ruling party and ruling parties' positions. As such,

Table 8.4   Explaining party-voter correspondence on preferred EU legislation

Predictors	Estimates (b)	
Government party	-0.45*	(0.17)
Niche party	0.95**	(0.21)
EU position	-0.18**	(0.05)
Extremity in EU position	-0.13	(0.10)
Left-right position	0.04	(0.04)
Constant	1.81**	(0.09)
F	7.58**	
Adj. R^2	0.30	
N	110	

Notes:
Table entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
All predictors were standardized around their means.
*   Significant at $p \leq 0.05$ level (two-tailed).
**   Significant at $p \leq 0.01$ level.

Sources: Eurobarometer Survey 52.0; Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 1999.

voters' preferences with regard to EU policy making are more closely mirrored by the opposition than by parties in government. This finding is not surprising in light of the fact that ruling parties are often constrained in their positionality vis-à-vis the EU and are more likely to see the benefits of increased integration as they take part in the process. Opposition parties, on the other hand, have more room to manoeuvre with their constituents (see Sitter 2001, 2002; Crum 2007). Another important finding is that niche parties, that is, parties belonging to the green, communist, or nationalist party families, exhibit higher correspondence with their voters (for the concept of niche parties, see Meguid 2005, 2008; Ezrow et al. 2010). This is in line with the idea that niche parties will be more responsive to their supporters than to the mean voter, especially when it comes to issues outside the dominant socio-economic paradigm (Kitschelt 1994; D'Alimonte 1999; Ezrow et al. 2010). Niche party elites who are willing to shift their policy orientations towards the mean voter position run the risk of being perceived as pandering or 'selling out'. Corroborating this, a recent study demonstrates that while mainstream parties such as Conservatives, Christian or Social Democrats, and Liberals are oriented towards the median voter, niche parties are more in tune with their party voters (Ezrow et al. 2010).

Another important finding is that while left-right positioning as such has no effect on party-voter correspondence regarding EU policy making, their views on the EU do matter (see Table 8.4). The results indicate that parties which are more Eurosceptic show higher levels of correspondence with their voters in terms of preferences towards EU policy making. As such, EU issue extremity, that is, portraying a clear pro- or anti-EU stance, does matter for understanding variation in party-voter correspondence with regard to EU policy making. Overall, the findings show that while on average political representation across policy areas is rather weak, substantial variation exists across parties. While some parties – that is, mainstream government parties – only partially represent their constituents when it comes to preferences regarding the content of EU policy making, others – namely opposition and niche parties – are in touch with their base.

How does the actual extent and content of EU public policy fit into this picture? And to what extent are voters' and parties' preferences mirrored in EU legislation? Figure 8.1 provides three types of information regarding EU legislation, public opinion and political parties. It gives an overview of the actual extent of EU legislation, that is to say, the number of directives plus regulations (values in figure times 100) between 1984 and 2002. It also graphs the movement of public opinion across this same period. The line labelled public opinion signifies the percentage of EU citizens that prefer policy making to be handled at the European level. Finally, it provides the aggregate position of political parties in 1999 and 2002 across the EU-15 (excluding Luxembourg) with regard to the preferred level of policy making at the European level.

Note: The values represented in this figure provide three types of information regarding 1. EU legislation: the actual extent of EU legislation (that is, number of directives plus regulations) x 100; 2. Public Opinion: the percentage of EU citizens across the EU-15 that prefer policy making to be handled at the European level (this percentage is obtained by aggregating the specific percentages of EU citizens' preferences regarding policy making in specific policy areas); 3. Political Parties: the percentage of political parties across the EU-15 that prefer policy making to be handled at the European level (this percentage is obtained by aggregating the individual percentages of political parties regarding policy making in specific policy areas).

Sources: EU Legislation: Official Journal of the EU; Public Opinion Eurobarometer Surveys; Political Parties: Chapel Hill Expert Surveys.

Figure 8.1   Comparison of the preferred and actual extent of EU legislation

The main finding in Figure 8.1 is that aggregate public opinion tracks quite strongly with the aggregate level of EU public policy. This finding confirms recent work by Arnold and Franklin (2006) (also see Franklin and Wlezien 1997) on political responsiveness. They find that when voters want more policy in a certain area, policy makers do respond (after a lag of a year or so), and when they want less, policy makers likewise respond. The pattern portrayed in Figure 8.1 provides no indication of the direction of causality between voters' and parties' preferences for EU public policy and actual EU legislation, but it does show that these preferences track reasonably well with the overall extent of EU policy making.

What if we disaggregate these figures by policy area? Table 8.5 provides an overview of the actual extent of EU policy making and the preferences of voters and parties by policy area. The values in this table represent the ranking of actual EU legislation per policy area as well as the ranking of the extent of

Table 8.5 Comparison of the preferred and actual extent of EU legislation by policy area

	1984		1992		1996		1999			2002		
	EU legislation	Public opinion	EU legislation	Public opinion	EU legislation	Public opinion	EU legislation	Public opinion	Political parties	EU legislation	Public opinion	Political parties
Agriculture	1		1		1	8	1	7		2	6	6
Asylum				4		6	9	5	3	9	7	2
Common currency		1		5		7	9	2		6	3	5
Competition policy	7		7		6	4	5			8		
Defence		4		6		10	6	8		10	8	
Environment	5	2	5	2	5	3	3	4	1	5	2	1
Foreign policy	3	7	4	1	3	1	2	1	4	3	1	3
Health/welfare	6		3	8	4	11	4	9		4	5	
Poverty	9	6	7		8		8	3		6	4	
Trade	4	5	2		2	2	1			1		
(Un)Employment	9	3	6	7	9	5	7	6	2	8	9	4
Value added tax	8		5	3	7	9	5			7		

Notes:
The values in this table represent the ranking of actual EU legislation per policy area as well as the extent of EU legislation per policy area as preferred by the general public and political parties.
Bold values indicate the policy area in which most EU legislation is made respectively preferred.

Sources: EU Legislation: Official Journal of the EU; Public Opinion Eurobarometer Surveys; Political Parties: Chapel Hill Expert Surveys.

EU legislation per policy area as preferred by the general public and political parties. Grey shaded values indicate the policy area in which most EU legislation exists or is preferred by the public and political parties. Even a quick glance at these results reveals that considerable differences exist between the actual extent of EU policy making in specific areas and the preferences of voters and parties in this respect.

EU legislation takes place predominantly in the areas of agriculture and trade, and to a lesser extent foreign policy. Until recently, almost two thirds of EU legislation concerned agriculture. This should come as no surprise to EU experts. Interestingly, however, contrary to common opinion we hardly see the move from an 'economic Europe' to a more 'political Europe' when it comes to EU legislation. Quite the contrary, recently we have witnessed a sharp increase in trade policy.

This pattern in the content of EU legislation does not neatly map onto public opinion and party preferences regarding EU legislation. Table 8.1 revealed that citizens' and parties' preferences regarding EU legislation are different. While citizens are most in favour of a Europeanization of foreign policy, parties tend to prefer that environmental policy be handled at the EU level. When we compare this with the results presented in Figure 8.1, it becomes clear that although aggregate public opinion moves with the aggregate level of EU public policy, citizens' and parties' preferences for the content of EU policy making are not necessarily mirrored by the extent of EU legislation in specific policy areas.

Overall, these preliminary results demonstrate that while the triangle of political representation between citizens, parties and policy may be intact in the case of aggregate preferences and actual EU legislation, it seems to break down when we disaggregate these relationships by policy area. These initial findings thus provide a mixed assessment of the extent of political representation in EU politics.

8.4 CONCLUSION

This chapter has addressed the question of if and to what degree citizens and parties hold congruent opinions about the extent and content of EU legislation. The answer to this question is undoubtedly of great significance for our understanding of Europe. The questions of political representation and the EU's democratic deficit are considered to be among the most pressing political questions in Europe today. If governments are to increase their commitment to the deepening and widening of European integration, they must address these

outstanding questions regarding legitimacy and accountability. They must do so not least because these factors also affect the quality of democracy in each member state. To date, scholarly research – and empirical research in particular – has not fully examined the extent to which democratic governance in the EU fails the test of responsiveness to public demands. This chapter seeks to make an initial contribution to this field of endeavour.

The chapter has three main findings. First, with some exceptions, parties are on average more supportive of EU policy making than their constituents. Second, a look at policy areas shows that while party and voter positions are almost always related – with the exception of environmental policy – correlation coefficients are on average rather weak. The highest coefficient is between party and voter preferences on common currency policy. Our results corroborate previous work by Schmitt and Thomassen (2000) comparing European elites and voters, which demonstrated that political representation across policy areas is limited. Parties only partially represent their constituents when it comes to preferences regarding the content of EU policy making. More generally, parties are clearly more in favour of EU legislation in the case of employment, environmental and asylum policy, while voters are more in favour of legislation at the EU level in the case of common currency and foreign policy.

Third, our analysis of the linkage between voters' and parties' policy preferences revealed that party-voter distance regarding the preferred extent of EU legislation indicates – among other things – that the preferences of voters for opposition parties regarding EU public policy are more accurately represented than the preferences of voters for ruling parties. Thus, while mainstream government parties may only partially represent their constituents when it comes to their position on EU policy making, opposition or niche parties are more closely in touch with their base. This may be because opposition and niche parties have more room for manoeuvre with their constituents.

Some of the findings of this chapter are based on a small number of data points. In future research, it might be beneficial to see how more data points could be added to the dataset. Importantly, this would entail extending the data points we have employed for the party preferences. One way this could be done is by coding national party manifestos issued for European Parliament elections and deriving from these a measurement of party preferences. Another possibility might be to use roll-call votes of the European Parliament. Here too we would have an indication of the position of parties on a range of policy areas. Both forms of data collocation would give us insight into party preferences across time. The advantage of such a strategy would be that more rigorous quantitative techniques such as time-series analysis would then become possible.

NOTES

1. Note that the EP has substantial room for agency when it comes to the appointment of the European Commission.
2. Available from http://europa.eu/eurovoc/, accessed 31 May 2009.

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APPENDIX

Table A.1 Description of variables used for analysis presented in Table 8.4

(In-)Dependent Variables	Description
Party-Voter Correspondence regarding EU legislation	The correspondence between voters' and aggregate parties' preference regarding the extent of EU legislation in five different policy fields. Results of a factor analysis indicate that the correspondence between voter and party preferences on the five different policy areas underlie one common dimension tapping into party-voter correspondence regarding EU legislation (the results of this analysis are available upon request from the authors).
Government Party	Dummy variable indicating if the party was in government during the year prior to the election. Information obtained from the 1999 Chapel Hill Expert data on party positioning regarding European integration (standardized around its mean).
EU Position	EU position is measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 'strongly opposed to European integration' to 7 'strongly in favour of European integration'. The measure is obtained from Chapel Hill Expert data on party positioning regarding European integration (standardized around its mean).
Extremity in EU Position	EU extremism is measured as the absolute distance between a party's EU position and that of the median party. A party's and the median party's EU position were operationalized using an EU position scale from the Chapel Hill Expert data ranging from 1 'strongly opposed to European integration' to 7 'strongly in favour of European integration' (standardized around its mean).
Left-right Position	Left-right position is measured on a ten-point scale ranging from 1 'left' to 10 'right'. The measure is obtained from Chapel Hill Expert data on party positioning regarding European integration (standardized around its mean).
Niche Party	Dummy variable indicating if a party belongs to the green, communist or nationalist party family. Information obtained from the 1999 Chapel Hill Expert data on party positioning regarding European integration (standardized around its mean).

9. Explaining support for European integration: An attitudinal model

Dieter Fuchs

9.1 INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the 1990s, scientific interest in explaining support or rejection for European integration has soared. This development has at least two causes. First, following the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), a number of European Union (EU) member states have conducted referenda concerning European issues and in some of these referenda citizens have rejected the agreements forged by political elites. Second, many observers assert that there has been an increase in Euroscepticism since Maastricht (cf. contributions by Hooghe and Marks 2007 published in a special issue of *Acta Politica* on 'understanding Euroscepticism'). Thus, even if we do not reflect upon the degree to which Euroscepticism has spread and increased,[1] it is clear that over the course of time European integration has become politicized to an extent that no longer allows for it to be conducted as an elite project. Rather it requires the support of the citizens. The question then is why do citizens support or reject European integration?

The question has been addressed by a plethora of studies and 'yet there is no scholarly consensus on the answer' (Hooghe and Marks 2005, p. 420). This may be partly due to the fact that extant studies draw on different explanatory strategies. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2005) have sought to further the discussion by pursuing a synthetic approach which aggregates the most relevant 'families of explanation'. A similar approach can be found in Lauren McLaren's works (2007; cf. also 2006).

The following analysis will also specify and empirically test a model for explaining support for European integration. It will differ significantly, however, from an important aspect of the analyses developed by Hooghe and Marks and by McLaren. The explanatory model which will be proposed is a pure attitudinal model. For, in order to fully grasp support for or rejection of European integration – which is the objective of the special issue compiled by Hooghe and Marks (2007) – one needs to discover and scrutinize the factors which affect the emergence of attitudes towards European integration. Such

factors are subjective and hence located at the level of attitudes. Hooghe and Marks (2005, 2007) as well as McLaren (2007) do recognize this and use subjective calculations. Yet they do not consistently take such factors into account in their models. For example, the dimension 'economic calculation' developed by Hooghe and Marks (2005, pp. 434–5) considers on the one hand two subjective perceptions of the economic aspect of citizens' preferences vis-à-vis European integration. On the other hand their economic indicator also contains social structural factors such as occupation, income and education. McLaren (2007, pp. 245, 247) too employs these three social structural factors. A specification of macro as well as subjective indicators is also pursued in the model developed by Catherine de Vries and Kees van Kersbergen (2007). However, with regard to the effects of macro-indicators one can at best speculate about subjective calculations. It is a known fact in the field of attitudinal research that there is a difference between objective situations and subjective perceptions and that the latter is not simply determined by the former. Yet, there are also intervening variables between objective factors and subjective perceptions. Personality factors, for instance, have an impact on individual attitudes. A further category of variables – which raises questions about calculations made on the subjective level – is included in the country dummies which McLaren (2007, pp. 245, 247) has incorporated into her explanatory model. Country dummies merely serve as wild cards for unknown effects which occur in any given country.

Hence, it is the objective of the following analysis to explain support for European integration through subjective predictors. A further dependent variable is specified in addition to support for European integration, namely generalized support for the EU. This variable encompasses attitudes towards the EU as a whole, whereas European integration refers to citizens' preferences regarding the development of the political structure of the Union, implying a perspective of the future. Both attitudes correlate quite strongly with one another. However, the causal direction is unclear. Generalized support for the contemporary EU can influence attitudes towards further European integration. Yet, it could also be that the integration ideals have an effect on generalized support for the contemporary EU. In light of the unclear causal structure, it seems reasonable to separate the two types of attitudes and to clarify in empirical terms the factors via which they are individually determined. The explanation of these two dependent variables will be as comprehensive as possible and consider all categories of predictors which have been identified as relevant in this literature to date and which are available in the form of indicators in our dataset.[2]

The attitudinal model does not claim to provide a complete explanation of the dependent variables. The subjective reasons for citizens' support for or rejection of European integration and the EU are influenced by factors such as elite and media discourses, party competition and specific institutional and

historical factors which obtain in the individual countries. An explanatory strategy which integrates both the attitudinal level as well as the background factors requires complex modelling which involves theoretically founded hypotheses about the effects of the background factors and macro variables on the attitudinal variables. Currently, such modelling is provided only in a rudimentary fashion and its empirical validation would be very laborious. In any case, this complex modelling requires that subjective predictors be determined comprehensively, and their individual explanatory power can be detected empirically.

Analysis will proceed in four steps. First, the theoretical constructs will be specified and operationalized. Second, an exploratory factor analysis will ascertain the extent to which differentiation between the constructs and the assignment of indicators to these constructs seems empirically tenable. Third, the explanatory model will be drafted and tested by means of a multiple regression analysis. Fourth and finally, a summary and discussion of the empirical findings will conclude the analysis.

9.2 SPECIFICATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES

The theoretical framework of this volume has already dealt with a conceptualization of the attitudes towards the EU (cf. Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume). David Easton's (1965, 1975) concept of political support and approaches to cognitive psychology (Zaller 1992; Lupia et al. 2000) form the basis for this approach of which I will only briefly address the most relevant aspects.

Two dimensions of dependent variables are distinguished. The first relates to generalized support for the EU, that is, attitudes which are abstracted from specific aspects of citizen's preferences and are therefore considered unspecific (see Table 9.1). This dimension encompasses two constructs, namely support for the EU and trust in EU institutions. The first refers to the EU as a whole and the latter to its institutional structure. Support for the EU is measured by three indicators. The first captures a citizen's assessment of whether his/her own country's membership of the EU is a good or bad thing. The second is an evaluation of the image of the EU on a scale running from very negative (scale value 0) to very positive (scale value 5). The third asks whether or not dissolution of the EU would be regretted.[3] Trust in EU institutions refers to the four most relevant institutions of the EU and the indicators inquire as to whether one trusts them or not.

None of the indicators for the two constructs contain a concrete evaluative standard and are thus generalized. As such, this analysis does not consider the commonly used indicator concerning benefits which accrue to one's own country as a result of EU membership since this indicator explicitly aims to capture utilitarian calculations.

Table 9.1   Constructs and indicators of the attitudes towards the EU

	Constructs	Indicators[a]
	Integration ideals (normative primacy)	
I.	Supranational government/ national sovereignty (Political integration)	1. European political union 2. European policy decision-making 3. Further European integration
II.	Market liberalism/social democracy (Economic Integration)	————————
	Generalized support (unspecific)	
III.	Support for the EU	1. Country's membership is a good thing 2. Positive image of the EU 3. Would regret dissolution of the EU
IV.	Trust in EU Institutions	1. Trust in the European Union 2. Trust in European Parliament 3. Trust in European Commission 4. Trust in European Council of Ministers
	Reasoned support	
	Effectiveness (Instrumental reasons)	
V.	Utility	1. Political stability 2. Economic stability 3. Personal safety
VI.	Efficacy	1. Country's voice in the EU at present 2. Country's voice in the EU in the future 3. Personal voice in the EU
	Legitimacy (Normative reasons)	
VII.	Democracy	1. Satisfaction with democracy in the EU
	Identity (Expressive reasons)	
VIII.	European Identity	1. European pride 2. Attachment to Europe
IX.	Cultural threats	1. Our language being used less 2. Loss of national identity and culture
	Understanding (Cognitive reasons)	
X.	Transparency	1. Information about EU institutions 2. Understanding the EU

Note: [a] Question wording and index construction, see Appendix.

The second dimension of the dependent variables encompasses integration ideals. Unlike member states, the EU is not an integrated political system which has completed its development. Rather, the question of further integration is constantly being debated and two perspectives on integration can be distinguished (Steenbergen and Marks 2004; cf. also Kriesi et al. 2006). On the one hand, there is political integration in which the choice is between supranational government and national sovereignty; on the other, there is economic integration in which the alternatives are market liberalism and social democracy. The two constructs may be labelled respectively.

However, the database upon which this analysis is based does not provide indicators for economic integration. The analysis is therefore restricted to political integration. Political integration (supranational government/national sovereignty) will be measured with the help of three indicators. First, the respondents must state whether they are for or against the evolution of the European project into a political union. The second indicator is an index which adds up the respondent's opinion towards 27 policies, inquiring whether the respondent believes that decisions concerning these policies should be jointly made by member states and the EU, or by the respondent's country only. This index is able to achieve a relatively direct measurement of the alternative between supranational government and national sovereignty. The third indicator is based on respondents' approval of the European monetary union, a common foreign policy, a common defence and security policy, and a constitution for the European Union.

Attitudes of citizens towards these two integration ideals – the political and the economic – as well as towards the two forms of generalized support can be understood as choices. We follow the proposition of Lupia et al. (2000, p. 1): 'to explain why people make certain choices, it is necessary to understand that *choice is the product of reason*' [italics as in the original]. A similar line of argumentation can be found with Zaller (1992, p. 40), who uses the notion of 'consideration' which he defines as 'any reason that might induce an individual to decide a political issue one way or the other'. In my analysis, attitudes emerging from specific reasons shall be referred to as reasoned support (see Table 9.1). Following basic *modi* of orientation towards objects (instrumental, normative, expressive and cognitive), four categories of reasons will be distinguished upon which rest the various constructs of reasoned support.

Effectiveness is based on instrumental or utilitarian considerations. An object is assessed in light of the benefits which accrue to the respondent's country or the respondent him/herself. Effectiveness contains two elements. The first, utility, refers to the benefits for one's own country and its citizens stemming from three basic and long-term goods delivered by the EU, namely, political stability, economic stability and the provision of personal safety. The second measure, efficacy, refers to the impact of one's own country or the self

on decisions made in the EU. The question is whether the assessment of efficacy rests upon instrumental or normative reasons. Instrumental reasons would be given if the 'country's voice in the EU' is considered the means to the end of realizing political preferences on the level of the EU. Normative reasons for the support of the EU would be given if the criteria for answering the question were either, if one's own country has the same weight in the EU as all the other countries or if the participation of the respondent is relevant at all. I assume that the evaluation of efficacy is based on instrumental and not normative reasons.

Legitimacy, meanwhile, is understood as 'subjective legitimacy' (cf. Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume). This means that belief in the legitimacy of a political system is based on the perceptions of citizens concerning the extent to which the system's institutional structure is congruent with their value orientations. Hence, legitimacy does not rest upon instrumental reasons; rather it is based on normative considerations. In public and scientific debates, it is often argued that because of the transformation of the EU into a political system with a supranational character, the EU is assessed by the normative standards of democracy. The indicator for the construct 'democracy' accordingly inquires into satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU. An indicator for legitimacy is missing in the analyses by Hooghe and Marks (2005) as well as that of McLaren (2007). In contrast to these analyses, the approach of Robert Rohrschneider (2002) involves a measurement of democratic norms as a relevant determinant of support for European integration.

Hooghe and Marks (2005, pp. 420, 422ff.) consider identity to be one of the most relevant 'families of explanation' (cf. also McLaren 2007 and de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007). Throughout the social-psychological literature, there is a differentiation between personal identity on the one hand, and social and collective identity on the other. Within the context of this analysis, only collective identity is relevant since it refers to the extent of the attachment felt by members of a collective to the collective. Here, the collective in question is the collective of Europeans (cf. Fuchs, Chapter 2 in this volume). Identity entails two constructs. The first relates to a set of positive feelings towards Europe (European identity), the second refers to a set of negative feelings in which the EU is perceived as a cultural threat (cultural threats). Positive feelings regarding European identity are measured by an inquiry into the degree to which a respondent is proud to be European, as well as by the intensity of their attachment to Europe. The indicator 'Europe' does not directly refer to the collective of Europeans. However, the fact that a respondent's sentiments vis-à-vis 'Europe' are embedded in his/her attachment to the collective of Europeans becomes apparent in the factor analysis (see the following section). According to the factor analysis, the two indicators form one factor and both indicators individually load highly on that factor and have no side-loadings on other factors.

The second construct regarding identity is associated with cultural threats – an entirely different perspective on collective identity. This construct was introduced to the discussion by McLaren (2002) as a reference point regarding national identity. The indicators measure threats which respondents perceive to be salient in the context of the construction of a European polity. The first indicator involves the fear that one's language will lose its relevance, while the second indicator inquires into the fear of losing national identity and culture.

The suggestion that cognitive factors have an impact on attitudes towards the EU has been brought forth by Ronald Inglehart (1970). He labelled this variable 'cognitive mobilization' and it has been used in subsequent analyses as a determinant of support for the EU (Janssen 1991; Karp et al. 2003; McLaren 2007; Mössner 2009). In these studies, cognitive mobilization is constructed by the general political interest and the level of education. In contrast to this, I have considered two indicators which directly refer to the EU. One of them asks the respondent for subjective information about the most relevant EU institutions[4] and the second measures their understanding of how the EU works. The respective construct will be labelled transparency and this dimension of reasoned support will be considered as understanding (see Table 9.1).

In the following section, an exploratory factor analysis is conducted in order to ascertain whether the differentiation of theoretical constructs is empirically tenable on the one hand and on the other whether the theoretical assignment of the indicators to the constructs is empirically appropriate.

To conclude this section, some subjective indicators will be briefly addressed which are *not* included in my analysis. In line with theoretical and empirical works (Zaller 1992; Druckman 2001; Steenbergen and Jones 2002) Hooghe and Marks (2005) assume that the attitudes towards the EU are constituted via cues of political elites and they postulated that a third 'family of explanation' ought to be cue theory. Hence, they include variables such as left-right and party preferences in their analysis, which they refer to as political cues. Both can be cues for citizens, however, only under certain circumstances. According to Zaller (1992), cueing messages are sent out by political elites via the mass media. It thus remains an open question to which degree such cues are factually sent and to which degree they are perceived and internalized by the public. Currently, the EU is rarely politicized in the party systems of its member states. This implies that at least the bigger parties and the parties of the political centre send few cueing messages about the EU. Hence, the likelihood that citizens receive these cueing messages of political elites is relatively low. An exception can be noted in some countries, however, for populist parties of the extreme left and, to an even greater extent, for populist parties of the extreme right (de Vries and Edwards 2009; cf. also de Vries and Arnold, Chapter 8 in this

volume). Parties of the extreme right have always attempted to mobilize anti-European resentment by addressing issues such as threats to national identity resulting from immigration and the loss of national sovereignty due to the expansion of EU competences. This, nonetheless, only matters for parties at the extreme edges of the political spectrum and not for parties of the political centre or parties of the moderate left or right wing. In this sense, party preference in general and left-right cannot be considered as a meaningful measurement of a political cue.

The analysis by McLaren (2004) contains two so-called 'proxies', namely, trust in national institutions and satisfaction with national democracy. She draws up considerations which have been elaborated in previous analyses (Caldeira and Gibson 1995; Anderson 1998; Fuchs 2003; Kritzinger 2003). The assumption is that citizens have only very little information about the EU and that the EU is less salient for them than the familiar political system of their own country. This may result in generalizing attitudes from the national level to the level of the EU. However, there is some evidence to suggest that both variables (trust in national institutions and satisfaction with national democracy) have practically no direct effect on the level of support for European integration (Fuchs 2010). As such, and in favour of parsimony in the explanatory model, the proxies will not be considered.

9.3 EXPLORATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INDICATORS

In Table 9.1 indicators were provided and in the following section these will be reduced to dimensions, or, in technical terms, factors or components that are extracted in the analysis which is a principal component analysis. The analysis will be conducted by taking the Eurobarometer 62.00 from 2004 as the database. A weighted aggregate of the EU-25 has been compiled.

All six constructs of reasoned support, which are simultaneously the independent variables for the explanation of support for political integration and support for the EU, are reduced to one component by the factor analysis: utility (1. component), efficacy (7. component), democracy[5] (3. component), European identity (6. component), cultural threats (2. component) and transparency (4. component). For efficacy the attitude towards one's 'country's voice in the EU in the future' is a component of its own. Hence, the present perspective and the future perspective are distinguished. Both indicators of transparency load on one factor, but 'understanding of the EU' also loads on the component of efficacy. This is plausible, since one can only assess the relevance of one's own voice within the EU if a minimal understanding of the institutional setting and the decision-making procedures of the EU is taken as given.

Table 9.2 Dimensions of attitudes towards the EU (factor analysis)[a]

Constructs and indicators	Components (dimensions)								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Supranational government/national sovereignty									
European political union	0.331								0.411
European policy decision making									0.845
Further European integration									0.653
Support for the EU									
Country's membership is a good thing	0.272								0.399
Positive image of the EU	0.272								0.250
Would regret dissolution of the EU	0.330								0.359
Trust in EU institutions									
Trust in European Union					-0.472				
Trust in European Parliament					-0.899				
Trust in European Commission					-0.929				
Trust in European Council of Ministers					-0.879				
Utility									
Political stability	0.817								
Economic stability	0.752								
Personal Safety	0.756								

Efficacy					
Country's voice in the EU at present	0.675	-0.263			
Country's voice in the EU in the future	-0.817				
Personal voice in the EU	0.669				
Democracy					
Satisfaction with democracy in the EU		-0.696			
Satisfaction with democracy in own country		-0.949			
European identity					
European pride			0.837		
Attachment to Europe			0.902		
Cultural threats					
Our language being used less				0.922	
Loss of national identity and culture				0.778	
Transparency					
Information about EU Institutions					0.876
Understanding the EU				0.496	0.566

Note: [a] Based on the weighted aggregate of EU-25 (N = 9079); Principal component analysis, oblimin rotation, explained variance: 71.58 per cent.

Source: Eurobarometer 62.0 (2004).

The case is less clear for the two dependent variables. The indicators assigned to the constructs, namely, 'supranational government/national sovereignty' and 'trust in EU institutions',[6] each form a component. However, this is not the case for 'support for the EU'. All indicators related to this construct load on the component of 'supranational government/national sovereignty' as well as on the component of 'utility'. This indicates that attitudes towards the contemporary EU and towards further political integration reciprocally depend upon one another. This also hints at the fact that 'utility' is a significant predictor of the level of 'support for the EU' (see the following causal analysis).

In total, the factor analysis shows that the citizens of EU member states distinguish between the theoretically postulated constructs. Furthermore, the theoretical assignment of indicators to constructs was empirically tenable. On the basis of the measurement instruments for these constructs, a causal analysis can be conducted.

9.4 EXPLAINING SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE EU

The models to be tested refer to 'European integration' (supranational government/national sovereignty) on the one hand, and 'support for the EU' on the other. The two models differ only with regard to the aforementioned dependent variable. The independent variables for both are identical: utility, efficacy, democracy, European identity, cultural threats and transparency. The testing of the model will be done by a multiple regression analysis (OLS estimation) and will be conducted for both the weighted aggregate of EU-25 as well as for the individual member states. The results of the estimation can be found in Tables 9.3 and 9.4.

For the weighted aggregate of EU-25 the results of both estimations are very clear and similar. An explanatory power worth mentioning can be found for the constructs of effectiveness – utility and efficacy – and the constructs of identity – European identity and cultural threats. By way of contrast, the effects of democracy and transparency are rather weak, indeed practically non-existent. Utility has the relatively strongest effect out of the four relevant predictors and is followed by European identity, efficacy and cultural threats.

The explained variance of the predictors is extraordinarily high for the two dependent variables. For the weighted aggregate of EU-25 regarding

'European integration', 44 per cent is detected and for individual countries a variation between 21 per cent in Belgium and up to 75 per cent in Malta can be noted. In the case of 'support for the EU', the explained variance of the aggregate adds up to 49 per cent and between the countries it varies from 32 per cent in Luxembourg to 72 per cent in Malta. I shall reflect further upon this high explanatory power in the conclusion.

The results for the individual countries deviate partly from the results detected for the weighted aggregate of EU-25 and this deviation is rather striking at times. First of all we need to note that 'utility' shows a significant effect on dependent variables in all countries – except for Latvia – regarding support for European integration. The case is somewhat different concerning the predictors of efficacy, European identity and cultural threats. For a series of countries, the effects of these factors are not significant. The partly very different results concerning support for European integration for the countries are listed in Table 9.5 in a more condensed manner. Table 9.5 describes for each country a ranking of the significant predictors (ranked according to the strength of the beta-weights).

European identity is the strongest predictor in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Latvia and Portugal. In these countries, when it comes to European integration, the identification with the collective of Europeans plays a more important role than benefit considerations (utility and efficacy). Furthermore, in Belgium, the salience of perceptions of cultural threats ranks second and consequently identity is more dominant than effectiveness.

It is remarkable that for a number of countries negative aspects of collective identity, such as perceived threats to national identity and culture (cultural threats) have a stronger effect than the positive aspects of identification with the collective of Europeans (European identity). These countries are Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Slovenia and Sweden. With the exception of Germany and Poland, these are mostly smaller EU member states, hence the subjective sense that Europe represents a threat to national identity is quite plausible.

While normative reasons do not impact support for European integration regarding the weighted aggregate of EU-25, some countries differ from the aggregate. In Greece and Poland, for example, 'democracy' ranks first, and in Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania it comes in second.

For a deeper interpretation of country differences, condensed information about the individual countries would be essential, while for a systematic analysis of the differences between the countries, a multi-level analysis would have to be carried out. None of the two was objective of my analysis.

Table 9.3 Explaining support for European integration (multiple regression)

	Explanatory variables[a]						
Country	Effectiveness (Instrumental reasons)		Legitimacy (Normative reasons)	Identity (Expressive reasons)		Understanding (Cognitive reasons)	Adj. R²
	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	European Identity	Cultural threats	Transparency	
Austria	0.416 (1.215)	0.130 (0.384)[b]	0.169 (0.796)	0.084 (0.202)[b]	-0.112 (-0.480)	0.066 (0.356)[b]	0.581
Belgium	0.137 (0.327)	0.045 (0.124)[b]	0.039 (0.160)[b]	0.238 (0.527)	-0.184 (-0.627)	0.137 (0.494)	0.210
Cyprus (S)	0.254 (0.729)	0.123 (0.354)[b]	0.056 (0.229)[b]	0.388 (0.775)	-0.045 (-0.147)[b]	0.032 (0.143)[b]	0.513
Czech Republic	0.368 (0.993)	0.071 (0.210)[b]	0.185 (0.891)	0.167 (0.431)	-0.081 (-0.306)[b]	-0.019 (-0.077)[b]	0.404
Denmark	0.378 (1.238)	0.171 (0.621)	0.113 (0.568)	0.083 (0.260)[b]	-0.151 (-0.662)	0.002 (0.010)[b]	0.426
Estonia	0.352 (0.859)	0.231 (0.606)	0.055 (0.264)[b]	0.123 (0.256)[b]	-0.121 (-0.394)	0.007 (0.026)[b]	0.422
Finland	0.304 (0.802)	0.193 (0.592)	0.167 (0.786)	0.057 (0.144)[b]	-0.072 (-0.269)[b]	0.031 (0.140)[b]	0.314
France	0.229 (0.684)	0.109 (0.393)	0.033 (0.160)[b]	0.372 (0.821)	-0.092 (-0.361)[b]	0.097 (0.439)	0.412
Germany	0.298 (0.801)	0.196 (0.632)	0.164 (0.717)	0.128 (0.286)	-0.153 (-0.580)	0.052 (0.216)[b]	0.474
Greece	0.229 (0.652)	0.057 (0.150)[b]	0.252 (0.931)	0.252 (0.496)	-0.067 (-0.235)[b]	0.040 (0.175)[b]	0.456
Hungary	0.180 (0.433)	0.263 (0.681)	0.188 (0.796)	0.130 (0.328)	-0.137 (-0.499)	-0.030 (-0.113)[b]	0.381
Ireland	0.248 (0.707)	0.173 (0.425)	0.167 (0.646)	0.043 (0.093)[b]	-0.162 (-0.499)	-0.038 (-0.139)[b]	0.225
Italy	0.238 (0.559)	0.227 (0.594)	-0.170 (-0.616)	0.250 (0.543)	-0.126 (-0.423)	0.127 (0.458)	0.356
Latvia	0.136 (0.338)[b]	0.242 (0.673)	0.161 (0.681)	0.261 (0.528)	-0.153 (-0.538)	0.029 (0.119)[b]	0.407
Lithuania	0.480 (0.957)	0.083 (0.160)[b]	0.169 (0.510)	0.015 (0.021)[b]	-0.096 (-0.220)[b]	0.050 (0.125)[b]	0.441
Luxembourg	0.258 (0.723)	-0.057 (-0.172)[b]	0.100 (0.414)[b]	0.247 (0.512)	-0.193 (-0.677)	0.070 (0.369)[b]	0.273

Malta	0.371	(1.024)	0.171	(0.482)[b]	-0.011	(-0.038)[b]	0.259	(0.401)	-0.190	(-0.782)	0.018	(0.084)[b]	0.758
Netherlands	0.293	(0.818)	0.273	(0.892)	-0.023	(-0.110)[b]	0.152	(0.377)	-0.128	(-0.478)	0.089	(0.362)[b]	0.345
Poland	0.155	(0.337)	0.153	(0.415)	0.157	(0.680)	0.118	(0.270)[b]	-0.145	(-0.489)	0.043	(0.181)[b]	0.220
Portugal	0.324	(0.849)	0.087	(0.251)[b]	-0.067	(-0.284)[b]	0.355	(0.820)	-0.094	(-0.356)[b]	0.101	(0.520)[b]	0.467
Slovakia	0.264	(0.562)	0.124	(0.284)	0.121	(0.439)	0.163	(0.343)	-0.130	(-0.412)	0.039	(0.138)[b]	0.315
Slovenia	0.189	(0.361)	0.098	(0.191)[b]	0.134	(0.494)	0.130	(0.211)	-0.163	(-0.374)	0.062	(0.208)[b]	0.219
Spain	0.290	(0.723)	0.139	(0.363)	0.012	(0.045)[b]	0.246	(0.482)	-0.154	(-0.474)	0.036	(0.127)[b]	0.353
Sweden	0.380	(1.370)	0.221	(0.846)	0.171	(0.921)	0.072	(0.214)[b]	-0.113	(-0.558)	0.017	(0.092)[b]	0.494
United Kingdom	0.298	(0.951)	0.182	(0.628)	0.077	(0.413)[b]	0.264	(0.644)	-0.197	(-0.999)	-0.014	(-0.072)[b]	0.606
Weighted aggregate of EU-25	0.272	(0.760)	0.185	(0.591)	0.072	(0.332)	0.237	(0.552)	-0.128	(-0.520)	0.048	(0.215)	0.442

Notes:
[a] Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas), un-standardized coefficients are in brackets.
[b] Non-significant at the 0.01 level, all other coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: EB 62.0 (2004).

Table 9.4 Explaining support for the EU (multiple regression)

Country	Effectiveness (Instrumental reasons)		Legitimacy (Normative reasons)	Identity (Expressive reasons)		Understanding (Cognitive reasons)	Adj. R²
	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	European Identity	Cultural threats	Transparency	
Austria	0.542 (0.557)	0.164 (0.170)	0.024 (0.038)[b]	0.028 (0.023)[b]	-0.130 (-0.196)	0.135 (0.244)	0.634
Belgium	0.335 (0.328)	0.093 (0.106)	0.043 (0.070)[b]	0.189 (0.165)	-0.143 (-0.199)	0.157 (0.232)	0.348
Cyprus (S)	0.231 (0.266)	0.049 (0.054)[b]	0.062 (0.100)[b]	0.413 (0.330)	-0.235 (-0.314)	0.050 (0.091)[b]	0.622
Czech Republic	0.350 (0.370)	0.212 (0.251)	0.126 (0.230)	0.110 (0.111)	-0.062 (-0.093)[b]	0.105 (0.166)	0.497
Denmark	0.433 (0.466)	0.200 (0.248)	0.123 (0.215)	0.112 (0.119)	-0.150 (-0.218)	0.088 (0.153)	0.579
Estonia	0.355 (0.351)	0.122 (0.134)	0.167 (0.325)	0.161 (0.137)	-0.116 (-0.160)	0.175 (0.270)	0.542
Finland	0.339 (0.311)	0.142 (0.152)	0.174 (0.280)	0.103 (0.089)	-0.143 (-0.187)	0.106 (0.172)	0.419
France	0.252 (0.286)	0.064 (0.086)[b]	0.022 (0.039)[b]	0.373 (0.306)	-0.182 (-0.265)	0.120 (0.202)	0.460
Germany	0.410 (0.447)	0.125 (0.162)	0.062 (0.109)[b]	0.172 (0.156)	-0.183 (-0.282)	0.058 (0.097)[b]	0.517
Greece	0.317 (0.353)	0.138 (0.144)	0.091 (0.134)[b]	0.226 (0.179)	-0.110 (-0.153)	0.070 (0.118)[b]	0.485
Hungary	0.333 (0.351)	0.245 (0.271)	0.143 (0.261)	0.119 (0.132)	-0.063 (-0.101)[b]	0.111 (0.186)	0.538
Ireland	0.419 (0.363)	0.057 (0.047)[b]	0.158 (0.210)	0.165 (0.119)	-0.047 (-0.048)[b]	0.023 (0.027)[b]	0.381
Italy	0.258 (0.248)	0.225 (0.237)	0.012 (0.017)[b]	0.223 (0.189)	-0.180 (-0.250)	0.095 (0.141)[b]	0.472
Latvia	0.349 (0.331)	0.114 (0.123)[b]	0.065 (0.104)[b]	0.251 (0.191)	-0.064 (-0.088)[b]	0.049 (0.075)[b]	0.418
Lithuania	0.335 (0.360)	0.127 (0.135)[b]	0.188 (0.309)	0.081 (0.063)[b]	-0.126 (-0.170)	0.098 (0.143)[b]	0.416
Luxembourg	0.257 (0.248)	0.036 (0.036)[b]	0.072 (0.100)[b]	0.233 (0.165)	-0.138 (-0.163)	0.175 (0.285)	0.322

Explanatory variables[a]

Malta	0.400	(0.427)	0.059	(0.067)[b]	0.056	(0.076)[b]	0.261	(0.161)	-0.110	(-0.182)[b]	0.102	(0.173)[b]	0.725
Netherlands	0.336	(0.339)	0.260	(0.304)	0.059	(0.100)[b]	0.184	(0.161)	-0.134	(-0.179)	0.116	(0.170)	0.464
Poland	0.306	(0.308)	0.155	(0.190)	0.145	(0.272)	0.150	(0.155)	-0.186	(-0.287)	0.139	(0.247)	0.461
Portugal	0.501	(0.498)	0.070	(0.077)[b]	0.146	(0.242)	0.176	(0.157)	0.004	(0.005)[b]	0.088	(0.164)[b]	0.598
Slovakia	0.421	(0.429)	0.178	(0.195)	0.095	(0.165)	0.160	(0.158)	-0.100	(-0.150)	0.062	(0.105)[b]	0.522
Slovenia	0.353	(0.369)	0.127	(0.136)	0.089	(0.177)[b]	0.190	(0.166)	-0.108	(-0.141)	0.129	(0.232)	0.431
Spain	0.384	(0.365)	0.157	(0.161)	0.130	(0.183)	0.116	(0.084)	-0.098	(-0.120)	0.088	(0.123)[b]	0.470
Sweden	0.489	(0.567)	0.131	(0.161)	0.146	(0.253)	0.057	(0.053)[b]	-0.137	(-0.213)	0.127	(0.219)	0.558
United Kingdom	0.329	(0.324)	0.237	(0.255)	-0.024	(-0.040)[b]	0.204	(0.154)	-0.167	(-0.262)	0.126	(0.195)	0.576
Weighted aggregate of EU-25	0.350	(0.356)	0.169	(0.196)	0.057	(0.096)	0.190	(0.159)	-0.146	(-0.217)	0.092	(0.150)	0.490

Notes:
[a] Cell entries are standardized regression coefficients (betas), un-standardized coefficients are in brackets.
[b] Non-significant at the 0.01 level, all other coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level.

Source: EB 62.0 (2004).

Table 9.5   Ranking of the significant predictors of the support for European integration in the countries of EU-25[a]

Country	1.	2.	3.	4.
Austria	Utility	Democracy	Cultural threats	
Belgium	European identity	Cultural threats	Utility/ Transparency	
Cyprus (S)	European identity	Utility		
Czech Republic	Utility	Democracy	European identity	
Denmark	Utility	Efficacy	Cultural threats	Democracy
Estonia	Utility	Efficacy	Cultural threats	
Finland	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	
France	European identity	Utility	Efficacy	Transparency
Germany	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	Cultural threats
Greece	European identity /Democracy	Utility		
Hungary	Efficacy	Democracy	Utility	Cultural threats
Ireland	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	Cultural threats
Italy	European identity	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy
Latvia	European identity	Efficacy	Democracy	Cultural threats
Lithuania	Utility	Democracy		
Luxembourg	Utility	European identity	Cultural threats	
Malta	Utility	European identity	Cultural threats	
Netherlands	Utility	Efficacy	European identity	Cultural threats
Poland	Democracy	Utility	Efficacy	Cultural threats
Portugal	European identity	Utility		
Slovakia	Utility	European identity	Cultural threats	Efficacy
Slovenia	Utility	Cultural threats	Democracy	European identity
Spain	Utility	European identity	Cultural threats	Efficacy
Sweden	Utility	Efficacy	Democracy	Cultural threats
United Kingdom	Utility	European identity	Cultural threats	Efficacy

Note: [a] Listed according to the relative weight (beta-weights).

9.5 CONCLUSION

The estimated attitudinal models for European integration and support for the EU have significant explanatory power. It was already mentioned that for the weighted aggregate of EU-25 the explained variance of support for European integration is 44 per cent, while for support for the EU it is 49 per cent. This can be attributed to the fact that the independent variable measures attitudes and thus directly precedes predictors of the dependent attitudinal variables. The causal analysis provided evidence for the sources of support for European integration and the EU respectively – one of the explicit objectives of the study. Beyond the scope of this analysis is consideration of the degree to which explanatory variables at the macro level (for example, elite discourse, mass media coverage, difference between countries' institutional settings and historical factors), provide additional explanatory insight into the dependent variables and, indeed, for the independent variables (reasoned support).

With regard to the subjective determinants, namely, the various forms of reasoned support for both European integration and support for the EU, the most relevant empirical findings are that instrumental reasons (utility and efficacy) and expressive reasons (European identity and cultural threats) have the relatively strongest impact. By way of contrast, cognitive factors (transparency) and normative factors (democracy) have almost no explanatory power.

One can conclude that the basic goods which the EU delivers to its citizens such as economic and political stability play an important role in their evaluation of the EU. According to my analysis, this is still the case after the Treaty of Maastricht which launched the process of transforming the EU. The freedom to travel and work anywhere within the EU should also play an important role in citizens' positive evaluations of the EU. According to the report on Eurobarometer 69, positive attitudes along these lines were most salient in the years 2007 and 2008. Be that as it may, a variable which might have measured this could not be considered in the attitudinal model simply because a suitable variable was not available in the database employed in the analysis.

Over the last few years, one of the most frequently discussed issues concerning the EU has been its so-called democratic deficit (see, among others, Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002; Follesdal 2006; Follesdal and Hix 2006; de Vries and van Kersbergen 2007). One of the prevalent theses has been that the expansion of the competencies of the EU entails a transformation towards a supranational regime. This implies that the decisions made by the EU touch upon the daily lives of citizens more frequently and more strongly. Moreover, the EU regime is superimposed upon the regimes of the nation-states. Therefore, citizens are more and more inclined to evaluate and assess the EU through the standards that they apply to the regime of their own country, including democratic standards. The preceding analysis could not confirm this thesis. It thus remains

an open question whether further politicization of the EU and more intensive political integration would spur citizens to apply the same democratic standards to the supranational entity that they do to their national democracies.

In addition to considerations regarding benefits, the question of collective identity is also relevant for attitudes towards the EU. There are two aspects of collective identity which need to be considered. The first is the extent of identification with the collective of Europeans, while the second is the perceived threat to national identity and culture attributed to the EU. In some countries, these attitudes have a relatively stronger effect on the dependent variables than the benefit oriented predictors. Against the backdrop of this analysis, it can be assumed that a simultaneous increase and fortification of European identity as well as a reduction in the level of perceived cultural threats could play a major role in the future development of support for the EU and European political integration.

NOTES

1. The empirical evidence in favour of the thesis is less clear than commonly assumed (cf. the contribution by Fuchs and Schneider, 'Support for the EU and European Identity: Some descriptive results', Chapter 3 in this volume).
2. The dataset is the Eurobarometer 62.0 from 2004, since – in comparison to all Eurobarometers conducted after 2000 – it contains most of the relevant indicators for this analysis.
3. For the exact wording of the questions for all indicators and the construction of indices consult the Appendix.
4. The most relevant institutions considered in this analysis are provided in the Appendix of this analysis.
5. To ensure that the construct encompasses at least two indicators, 'satisfaction with democracy in one's own country' was incorporated into the factor analysis. This asserts that the democracy of one's own country is evaluated similarly to that of the EU.
6. 'Trust in EU institutions' was not included in the causal analysis since generalized support is already considered in 'support for the EU'.

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APPENDIX: CONSTRUCTS, INDICATORS AND MEASURES

Supranational Government/national Sovereignty

European political union
'Are you yourself, for or against the development towards a European political union?'

   Scale values are 1 'against' or 2 'for'.

European policy decision making
Index, counting the number of positive responses based on following questions:

1.   'For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the [nationality] government, or made jointly within the European Union?'
2.   'And, for each of the following?'

Scores of the two items are added to form the index 'European policy decision making'.

   Scale values run from 0 (no area) to 27 (27 areas).

Further European integration
Index, counting number of positive responses, based on the following questions:

   'What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.'

   - 'A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the Euro'
   - 'One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries'
   - 'A common defence and security policy among European Union member states'
   - 'A constitution for the European Union'

Scale values are 0 'against' or 1 'for'.

   Scores of the four items are added to form the index 'further European integration'.

   Scale values run from 0 'low' to 4 'high'.

   The index '*supranational government/national sovereignty*' encompasses these items:

- European political union
- European policy decision making
- Further European integration

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 12 'high'.

Support for the EU

Country's membership is a good thing
'Generally speaking, do you think that [our country]'s membership of the European Union is...?'
  Scale values are: 1 'a bad thing', 2 'neither good nor bad', 3 'a good thing'.

Positive image of the EU
'In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?'
  Scale values run from 0 'very negative' to 5 'very positive'.

Would regret dissolution of the EU
'If you were told tomorrow that the European Union had been scrapped, would you be very sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved?'
  Scale values are: 1 'very relieved', 2 'indifferent', 3 'very sorry'.
  The index '*support for the EU*' encompasses these items:

- Country's membership is a good thing
- Positive image of the EU
- Would regret dissolution of the EU

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 3 'high'.

Trust in EU Institutions

Trust in the European Union
'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?'

- 'The European Union'

Scale values are: 0 'tend not to trust', 1 'tend to trust'.

Trust in the European Parliament
'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?'

- 'The European Parliament'

Scale values are: 0 'tend not to trust', 1 'tend to trust'.

Trust in the European Commission
'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?'

- 'The European Commission'

Scale values are: 0 'tend not to trust', 1 'tend to trust'.

Trust in the Council of Ministers
'I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?'

- 'The Council of Ministers'

Scale values are: 0 'tend not to trust', 1 'tend to trust'.
 These four indicators were used to construct the index '*trust in EU institutions*'.
 Scale values run from 0 'low' to 4 'high'.

Utility

Political stability
'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'
 'I feel we are more stable politically because [our country] is a member of the European Union.'
 Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

Economic stability

'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

'I feel we are more stable economically because [our country] is a member of the European Union.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

Personal safety

'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

'I feel I am safer because [our country] is a member of the European Union.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

These three indicators were subsumed in the index '*utility*'.

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 3 'high'.

Efficacy

Country's voice in the EU at present

'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

'[Our country]'s voice counts in the European Union.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

Country's voice in the EU in the future

'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

'[Our country] will become more influential in the European Union in the future.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

Personal voice in the EU

'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

'My voice counts in the European Union.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to disagree', 1 'tend to agree'.

These three indicators were included in the index '*efficacy*'.

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 3 'high'.

Democracy

Satisfaction with democracy in the EU

'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [our country]?'

'And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?'
Scale values are: 1 'not at all satisfied', 2 'not very satisfied', 3 'fairly satisfied', 4 'very satisfied'.

European Identity

European pride
'And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?'
Scale values are: 1 'not at all proud', 2 'not very proud', 3 'fairly proud', 4 'very proud'.

Attachment to Europe
'People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to… Europe?'
Scale values are: 1 'not at all attached', 2 'not very attached', 3 'fairly attached', 4 'very attached'.
The two indicators were included in the index '*European identity*'.
Scale values run from 2 'low' to 8 'high'.

Cultural Threats

Our language being used less
'Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it, or not?'

- 'Our language being used less and less.'

Scale values are: 0 'not afraid of' 1 'afraid of'.

Loss of national identity and culture
'Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you – personally – are currently afraid of it, or not?'

- 'The loss of national identity and culture.'

Scale values are: 0 'not afraid of' 1 'afraid of'.
The index '*cultural threats*' covers the two indicators.
Scale values run from 0 'low' to 2 'high'.

Transparency

Information about EU institutions
"Have you heard of…?

- The European Parliament
- The European Commission
- The Council of Ministers of the European Union
- The Court of Justice of the European Union
- The European Ombudsman
- The European Central Bank

Scale values are: 0 'no', 1 'yes'.

All aforementioned indicators were subsumed in the index '*information about EU institutions*'.

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 6 'high'.

Understanding the EU
'Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree?'

- 'I understand how the European Union works.'

Scale values are: 0 'tend to agree', 1 'tend to disagree'.

The index '*transparency*' was constructed from 'information about EU institutions' and 'understanding the EU'.

Scale values run from 0 'low' to 2 'high'.

10. Cultural diversity, European identity and the legitimacy of the EU: Summary and discussion

Dieter Fuchs, Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Andrea Schlenker-Fischer

Contributions to this volume deal with three sets of themes: first, the legitimacy of the European Union; second, the identity of the European Union; and third, the relation between legitimacy and identity in the European Union (EU). We discuss these themes in the general context of cultural diversity among member states. While the degree of cultural diversity has increased as a consequence of various rounds of EU enlargement, this increase is perceived more and more as a problem by many EU citizens.

Part I of the book presents a review of the discussion of cultural diversity, European identity and legitimacy of the EU. Informed by this review of research findings a conceptual framework is proposed which is designed to guide empirical analysis and to identify research objectives. Part II focuses on the degree of European identity as well as the relation between national and European identity. It starts with an empirical survey of European identity and support for the EU. An analysis of the causes of support of the European Union and the emergence of a European identity is the main subject of Part III.

The permissive consensus supporting European integration seems to be withering away in a widening and culturally more diverse Union that has acquired more and more decision-making powers. European integration has become politicized to the extent that it can no longer be regarded as an elite project. Like any other democratic political system it depends on the support of its citizens. There is no agreement as to why citizens support or reject European integration. The question has been addressed by a large number of studies and 'yet there is no scholarly consensus on the answer' (Hooghe and Marks 2005, p. 420). This is true both for the normative and the empirical dimension of the problem. On the normative side, most arguments revolve around the problem that a European demos with at least some (political and/or social) identity is needed to legitimize political decisions at the level of the European Union. Only a collective identity could endow the European project with democratic legitimacy, solidarity and

persistence (Beetham and Lord 1998; Strath 2002; Habermas 2004; Herrmann and Brewer 2004; Cerutti 2008; Kaina 2009; Scharpf 2009; Fuchs 2010). These ideas tended to gain in importance when the cultural diversity of the EU has increased with the accession of new member states. Empirical research also generated contradictory results (Fligstein 2006).

The analyses assembled in this volume begin from two widely shared assumptions. The first is a functional assumption: a proposal that the legitimacy of political decision making in the European Union depends on a European demos with some kind of a European identity. The second is an empirical assumption: a proposal that the emergence of a European demos with some degree of European identity is unlikely because of the Union's cultural diversity. These two assumptions are evaluated conceptually and empirically throughout the book. Based on these theoretical and empirical analyses we present findings regarding both aspects. Theoretically, we provide an integrated framework for the emergence and construction of legitimacy of the EU and European identity as well as a precise definition of the two contested terms. All this is based on an encompassing review of the relevant literature. Our empirical analyses primarily concern attitudes of EU citizens; however, they also take into account political elites and collective actors such as civil society organizations and political parties.

In the following, a summary of the major findings resulting from the individual contributions will be provided and innovative ideas and counter-intuitive results will be highlighted in particular. This will be followed by a discussion of the results and some speculations concerning potential developments relating to legitimacy and identity in the EU.

SUMMARY

Our conceptual discussion in Part I is open to, and profits from, research and publications in the areas of interest. This is particularly true for major arguments about the development of a 'democratic deficit'. Over the years the complexity of assessing the legitimacy of the European Union has yielded a vast literature starting with a single touchstone: the 1975 Tindemans report. In Chapter 1, *Olivier Ruchet* presents a summary of the debate that ranges from portraying the European Union as a 'superstate' with huge democratic deficits, to revisionist accounts. The latter reduce the legitimacy question to the formal procedures available for political decision making at the Union level. A diachronic review of the debates, their main protagonists and the most contentious exchanges of arguments is presented. This chapter includes a review of the numerous attempts to model and characterize the European polity, from a federal or quasi-federal system to a regulatory polity.

Reflecting upon these various perspectives, Olivier Ruchet analyses theories of European integration and highlights the various criteria used to evaluate democratic processes and structures. Specifically, he emphasizes that cultural diversity among European citizens is often insufficiently considered in the models presented. Such models remain mostly at the level of normative, institutional theory, which is on the level of objective legitimacy. These models tend to overlook the social-psychological or subjective side of political legitimacy. As Ruchet rightly points out, the discussion of European identity and legitimacy has not systematically integrated the notion of popular support for the European Union and its institutions. For this reason, he calls for empirical research along these lines to open up new perspectives on European identity and legitimacy which acknowledge the rich context of cultural diversity.

Legitimacy of the European Union and European identity are the two concepts of fundamental importance for this volume. Both concepts are contested and they are often used in an imprecise manner. *Dieter Fuchs* systematically discusses and defines these two concepts in Chapter 2. In his specification of the concept of legitimacy of the EU, Fuchs emphasizes the difference between objective and subjective legitimacy. Objective legitimacy refers to evaluations based on normative standards of political elites, philosophers and other groups or individuals. Subjective legitimacy refers to evaluations based on the normative standards of citizens. From a functional perspective, subjective legitimacy provided by citizens is particularly relevant. A theoretical approach on subjective legitimacy has been developed by David Easton and it can be put to good use on our problem. On the basis of Easton's theory on the one hand and the scientific discussion about support of the EU on the other, Fuchs differentiates between five constructs: identity, generalized support, legitimacy, effectiveness and understanding. All these constructs are included in a causal analysis of support for European integration in Chapter 9.

In his effort to discuss European identity in a systematic way, Fuchs considers, above all, social psychological approaches. These approaches highlight the most relevant mechanisms for generating collective identities. By their very nature the social psychological approaches are based on the micro level of individuals. Therefore, the question of European identity as a macro-level phenomenon is left open. Fuchs suggests that the political culture paradigm may be helpful in this respect. Taking into account the existence and the intensity of collective identity, he presents an operational definition for European identity that is open for empirical testing.

A plethora of factors for the emergence of European identity are suggested in scientific and public debates. Fuchs attempts to integrate these in a model which rests upon the theory of opinion formation by Zaller. The basic assumption of the model is that attitudes of the citizens towards the EU are constructed by political elites and mass media. Nevertheless, the theory by Zaller is

supplemented by some major factors which impact the process of mass opinion formation for the EU. His general model is rooted in precisely defined concepts and a clear distinction between micro and macro level data that helps to generate empirical results that are comparable throughout the volume.

The point of departure for the empirical analyses in Part II is the commonly uttered perception that there exists a fundamental tension between national and European identity. National identities are, on the one hand, considered a major cause of a weak European identity and, on the other hand, they are also grasped as a key source of Euroscepticism. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty to gain majority support in France, as well as in the Netherlands, was interpreted as the culmination of Euroscepticism caused by these conflicting identities. Yet, results of empirical research have given us reason to be more cautious in our interpretation of such events.

In Chapter 3, *Dieter Fuchs* and *Christian Schneider* present survey data on legitimacy and support of the EU, and European identity. Trends for the period from 1992 to 2009 show the following major results:

1. Contrary to the general belief of many observers, there is no trend of declining support and legitimacy after Maastricht.
2. Currently, a narrow majority of EU citizens evaluate membership of their own country in the EU positively. This finding does not square well with the widespread contention of Euroscepticism.
3. About two thirds of EU citizens show a positive attachment to the political community of Europeans. Compared to the attachment to one's own nation, however, attachment to Europe is less expressed.
4. European identity and national identities are not mutually exclusive; rather they are complementary for the majority of citizens.

These empirical findings show that two assertions about the EU, which are often considered to be self-evident, cannot be sustained: first of all, the assertion that the citizens have developed an increasing Euroscepticism ever since the Treaty of Maastricht came into effect and, second, that there currently exists no such thing as a European identity. These counter-intuitive results are valid for the population of the EU as a whole. Thus, figures are weighted by population size of member states. Accordingly, larger countries weigh more and smaller countries weigh less. A more detailed analysis at the level of the individual member states shows a more differentiated picture. Country-specific factors still play a role in the explanation of European identity and legitimacy.

A possible explanation for between-country differences based on cultural diversity is suggested in Chapter 4. *Andrea Schlenker-Fischer* proposes that country-level differences in the relation of national and European identities are based on a country's understanding of national community. She hypothesizes

that the dominant national way of framing intrastate 'us-them' relations with respect to cultural minorities or immigrants potentially influences citizens' readiness to identify with the broader, culturally diverse European community. Based on findings of sociological and social-psychological research, she suggests that collective identities are constructed differently and, consequently, relate to each other in different ways. Schlenker-Fischer develops a conceptual framework that captures three main conceptions of national community: a (primordial) ethnic conception, a (traditional) republican conception, and a (universalistic) liberal conception. She proposes that these different concepts of national identity should translate into the following three corresponding concepts at the European level: a nationalist, a multi-nationalist, and a post-nationalist approach towards European identity.

These concepts are tested empirically using survey data for the 15 'old' EU member states from 2000 and 2003. These member states were classified by the dominant pattern of national identity construction based on a factor analysis of attitudes towards cultural diversity. She finds results in favour of the initial proposition: country differences in the approach towards European identity are indeed related to the perception of 'us-them' relationships in the national context. More liberal attitudes towards the national community, and greater openness to cultural diversity and immigrants, are linked to a stronger identification with Europe and a greater compatibility of European and national identity. As expected, the republican concept of national community triggers mixed results and a medium-level attachment to Europe. The group of countries favouring an ethnic concept of political community show inconsistent results. Unlike the initial expectation, this orientation does not necessarily go hand in hand with a nationalist attitude towards the European Union. Further research is needed to shed light on these inconsistent and contradictory findings.

Isabelle Guinaudeau offers a case study examining these problems in Chapter 5. Choosing France, she analyses the relationship between national and European identities in great detail. Like authors of earlier chapters, Guinaudeau begins with the widely believed assumption that there is a strong tension between national and European identity. Such a view links her approach to the cutting-edge debates in the camps of the social psychologists and political scientists. In line with Schlenker-Fischer's ideas, Guinaudeau differentiates the concept of national identity into a cultural and a political type. The cultural type of national identity is supposed to be less compatible with the formation of a supranational identity than the politically based type.[1] Guinaudeau shows the fluctuation of cultural and political types of identity over time as well as between individuals and sub-groups within France. Processes such as these are often hidden by a large-scale comparative research design and her analysis demonstrates the possibilities and the complementary power of a well-defined case study.

Guinaudeau's historical review of French conceptions of national identity reveals that the often cited concept of France as a politically defined nation (for example, Meinecke) is an oversimplification. The politically based concept was always contrasted with a culturally based concept of the nation proposed by groups of people trying to legitimize specific interests. The empirical evidence in this chapter (based on the 2003 ISSP national identity survey) indicates that the political definition of the nation can rely on much broader support than the cultural definition in the French public. However, the public is far from a consensus on this issue. This has implications for many assertions regarding Euroscepticism. Guinaudeau demonstrates that not all French citizens with high national identity rejected the European Constitutional Treaty. This proved to be true only for citizens who held a cultural concept of national identity. In general, results broadly confirm that French citizens display a high level of national identification as compared to other nations. More detailed probing, however, shows that it is only a culturally based national identity that tends to be incompatible with a European identity.

These findings imply that, in addition to national identity, other factors which influence support for the European Union and European identity have to be taken into account. Identities and support are politically mobilized by various actors. 'Political events and discourse may – or, in some countries, may not – construe for individuals that national identity is contradictory with support for European integration' (Marks and Hooghe 2005, p. 24). Thus, politicization by special events and by different actors should be analysed in order to better understand the context for individual orientations towards the European integration process and towards Europe as a political community.

Part III focuses on the question of attitude formation towards the EU. Civil society and political parties hold a relevant role in this context. The process of deciding a Constitution for the European Union has been a very special and important political event in European politics. The rejection of this Treaty in France and the Netherlands was a shock for pro-Europeans who wanted to further European integration. Inspired by theories of deliberative democracy, many hopes were centred on the process of Treaty formation itself and its impact on a further strengthening of European identity. Many of the participants involved in this discourse shared theoretical assumptions proposed by Jürgen Habermas who argues that civil society is crucial for the process of public deliberation which, in turn, impacts the formation of political identity. In a very original chapter, Chapter 6, *Julia De Clerck-Sachsse* analyses this process empirically using the Constitutional Treaty case as an example. Her focus is on the influence of civil society initiated deliberations on identity formation. This focus is important because organized civil society generates actors that legitimize democratic decision making in national and transnational institutions. The concept of the 'constitutional moment' implies – at least on a normative

level – that large parts of civil society are mobilized to debate a common political future. This, according to Habermas, is assumed to contribute to a feeling of common identity which, in turn, should contribute to the democratic legitimacy of the new constitution. In her analysis De Clerck-Sachsse explores the question of whether assumptions about the identity-building potential of civil society organizations are confirmed by the experiences gleaned from discussing the Constitutional Convention. Did the inclusion of civil society organizations in the process of EU constitution making contribute to the development of a European identity?

For many observers the process of constitution making in the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–2003) seemed to bear the promise of a 'constitutional moment' for the European Union. Indeed, the openness of the Convention and the explicit effort to secure participation of civil society organizations gave rise to the expectation of a wide public debate on EU politics. However, empirically, no such debate unfolded. De Clerck-Sachsse investigates why this was the case. Her analysis is based on interviews with 35 civil society organizations in Berlin, Brussels, London, Madrid and Paris, as well as interviews with members of the European Convention, public officials in the European Commission, journalists and academic observers. These interviews show that civil society organizations often struggle to fill the role they are so frequently assigned in both political discourse and democratic theory. Given the structural conditions of EU policy making, civil society organizations often work in ways that contribute little to public exchange and deliberation with a broader public. In order to be efficient and successful in Brussels, EU-oriented civil society organizations have to pay more attention to their addressees in Brussels than to their constituencies. Those civil society organizations that prefer the other alternative are usually less successful in EU politics. Therefore the general optimism of deliberation theories, and the resulting power of civil society organizations to contribute to legitimacy perceptions of the EU, needs to be reconsidered. Civil society organizations may have 'identity potential' in general, but there is no evidence that they have contributed to the deliberation process at large in the context of the European Constitutional Convention.

Thus, civil society organizations seem to be only weakly in a position to form or sustain European identity and to work against Euroscepticism. But what about political parties, the most important collective actors of the system of interest intermediation? Does opposition to European integration by political parties reflect national idiosyncrasies or can we observe coherent patterns in the party systems of the European Union's member states? *Simon Bornschier* argues in Chapter 7 that – despite a number of excellent case studies – we still lack a comprehensive comparative perspective. He claims that one of the major reasons for this deficit is because most prior research proceeds from the

assumption that political competition at the national level is structured by a single left-right dimension. His approach centres instead on a two-dimensional space of party competition that provides a better understanding of support and rejection of European integration.

The two-dimensional space of party competition that Bornschier proposes is structured by an economic and a cultural line of conflict. These dimensions help to classify arguments against European integration. The first dimension is labelled 'state versus market'. Regarding this dimension, Eurosceptics tend to prefer a strong state. The second dimension contrasts a traditionalist, communitarian outlook and a more libertarian one. Results show that opposition towards European integration organized by the populist right is mainly based on the cultural logic of traditionalist communitarianism. This logic implies that the traditionalist, communitarian concept of political community contradicts the logic of European integration. This position opposes the normative ideal of a liberal-universalistic understanding of political community, which would support the emergent European identity. In this respect, Bornschier's results are in line with those of Schlenker-Fischer and Guinaudeau.

Guinaudeau's case study has shown that national identity in France is structured by two logics that have different implications regarding European integration. In his analysis, Bornschier demonstrates in a first step that the cultural, traditionalist logic causing Euroscepticism finds some acceptance in the publics of all 15 old member states of the EU. In a second step, he investigates to which degree attitudes regarding the EU are structured by partisanship. Results show that parties relying on traditional communitarian arguments are particularly successful and often achieve political representation. Eurosceptic attitudes are also shared by supporters of the extreme left, however, following a different logic. Their rationale is that the EU is too market-oriented. Otherwise partisanship is only weakly related to attitudes towards the European Union. In countries where the populist right is successful, their voters are not so much concerned with economic threats posed by the European Union. Rather, they believe that the formation of a European polity endangers their traditional national political community and the primacy of national politics.

Thus, the extreme left and right, each in their own way, pose an ideological challenge to European integration and European identity. However, there are other problems when considering policy outputs and outcomes. Democratic theory proposes that political parties should be responsive to the interests of their voters. We should expect at least some congruence between the wants of the citizens and the behaviour of their representatives. Chapter 8 considers this normative proposition. *Catherine de Vries* and *Christine Arnold* discuss political representation in EU politics and focus on the degree of congruence between policy positions of political parties and voters on the one hand and policy output on the other hand. Specifically, they explore the triangular rela-

tion between EU public policy, citizen preferences and party policy making at the EU level. Two central questions are addressed: first, to what degree are positions of citizens and parties congruent? Second, does EU legislation reflect the policy preferences of citizens and parties?

In order to answer these questions, de Vries and Arnold use expert evaluations and survey data. They also include information about EU legislation derived from the *Official Journal* of the EU. Their results show a mixed picture of the degree of political representation in EU politics and of the responsiveness and accountability of EU institutions. On the one hand, citizens and parties appear to agree on the overall extent of EU policy making. Aggregate public opinion and party positions correspond strongly with aggregate level EU legislation. On average, political parties are slightly more supportive of EU policy making than their constituents. However, there is much less congruence when the focus is on the specific content of EU legislation. In terms of party-voter distances of EU legislation, mainstream government parties only partially represent their voters. Opposition or niche parties, on the other hand, are more closely in touch with their societal base. Analysing 12 different policy areas, de Vries and Arnold find that policy preferences of citizens and parties are not closely mirrored by EU legislation. Thus, while citizens' and parties' preferences appear to play a role as far as the overall volume of EU legislation is concerned, they do not have much weight regarding EU legislation in specific policy areas.

Results about EU politics can be summed up as follows. Populist parties are able to mobilize on Eurosceptic attitudes, thus reducing the potential of European identity. Civil society organizations are not in a position to positively influence the process of building European identity and support of the EU. In addition, decision making at the level of the EU is only partially able to cater to the interests of citizens. These results seem to indicate that the European Union is still an elite project with little regard for European citizens. Consequently, we should predict low support for European integration and EU. However, this prediction seems wrong as the analyses presented in this volume tend to show.

Chapter 3 demonstrates that there is no downward trend of support and legitimacy. On the contrary, a majority of EU citizens hold a positive evaluation of their country's EU membership. What are the causes of this positive evaluation? Is this pattern of support linked to the widespread affective identification with Europe? (see the respective results in Chapters 1 to 4). A comprehensive theoretical approach is needed to answer this question in an empirically informed analysis. In addition to expressive attitudes such as European identity, normative and instrumental reasons should be considered. The respective concepts have been discussed in Chapter 1, such as utility and efficacy, the evaluation of the democratic process, and transparency.

An integrated theoretical model based on these concepts is presented and tested empirically in Chapter 9 of this volume. *Dieter Fuchs* specifies an attitudinal model of support for European integration that includes all relevant predictors which have been suggested in the scientific discourse thus far. The model is tested empirically using survey data gathered in 2004. Results are reported for the individual 25 member states and for the European Union as a whole taking into consideration the population size of member countries. Most strikingly, the analysis shows that support of European integration, as well as support of the EU, depends on two determinants:

1. On instrumental reasoning, taking into account the evaluation of benefits of EU membership for the respondent's country, and for the individual citizen; and
2. On 'collective identity' measured as 'attachment to the EU' and 'perceived cultural threats'.

Contrary to the assumptions of many observers, Fuchs finds that the question of democratic legitimacy is more or less irrelevant on the attitudinal level. This finding may help to explain why the lack of responsiveness reported in Chapter 8 is not sanctioned by a withdrawal of support. These results apply to the European Union weighted by population size. However, at the level of the individual member countries, the same model produces results that deviate from this general pattern in some cases. In some countries, identity-related reasons outperform instrumental reasons in explaining support for Europe and European integration. While it would be interesting to know why this is the case, we leave this question to future research.

In *conclusion* we wish to confirm that European identity is one of the most important sources of support for European integration and for the EU.[2] Moreover, the process of European integration progresses in the context of a culturally diverse European Union. The empirical results are remarkable and they are based on a true sample of European citizens. A general identification with the European Union enables European citizens to be critical of specific European policies and institutional organization while, at the same time, supporting the goal of a unified European Union. Thus, while not questioning the political community of Europeans as such, these 'critical Europeans' are important actors to promote further democratization of the EU.[3]

DISCUSSION

The following concluding discussion elaborates on three issues. First of all, how can support for the EU and European identity develop in the future?

Second, which problems arise from the research approach which is applied in this volume? Finally, we discuss potential research that could be conducted for this thematic field in the future.

The empirical findings for support of the EU as well as European identity are surprisingly positive. Nevertheless, two questions remain open: How resilient are support for the EU and European identity development and how can such attitudes be widened and deepened? In the debate about European identity, consensus is predominant in the academic community with regard to two issues: first of all, the emergence of European identity is not a process which takes place parallel to the emergence of national identity (see, for example, Cerutti 2010; Lucarelli 2010). Therefore, European identity can only be a political identity. Values and principles of liberal democracy form the content of this political identity (Cerutti 2008). This conception differs extensively from national identities in two ways. On the one hand, European identity lacks a certain cultural element rendering demarcation from other identities on the basis of democratic values difficult or even impossible. Furthermore, national identities have grown over a lengthy historical process and, as such, are deeply rooted in the collective consciousness of a country's citizens. Therefore, if conflicts arise between national and European identity based on the afore-mentioned arguments, then national identity would most likely prevail while European identity would erode.

For support of the EU a similar pattern can be found. It has been empirically proven that support for the EU rests mainly upon generalized benefit calculations of citizens. This includes the guarantee of peace in Europe as well as the possibility to travel freely. Still, the belief that the EU provides economic advantages for all member states is clearly the most crucial aspect. This belief requires that citizens do not perceive distributional conflicts between the member states. In light of the recent financial crisis this has, presumably, changed. During this period of crisis, conflicting interests became more and more obvious, and these, in turn, have impacted the attitudes of citizens towards the EU. For instance, support for the EU has changed in Germany and Greece in the context of the debates about financial support of Greece on the part of the EU. Between autumn 2009 and spring 2010 the percentage of respondents believing that their country's membership was 'a good thing' declined in Greece by 16.8 percentage points and in Germany by 10 percentage points. Guaranteeing solidarity between the EU member states in times of such current and potentially interest-based conflicts necessitates a strong European identity. The question is, therefore, how it can be created.

This problem has been noted recently by the European Commission, which has initiated a number of projects and measures in order to strengthen European identity. Furio Cerutti (2010) has convincingly argued that the voluntaristic construction of European identity is nearly impossible. He argues that such

constructions can only be successful if they are deeply rooted in the everyday lives of citizens and if political predispositions are addressed (see, for instance, Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). According to Cerutti (2010), this can only be expected if the decisions of the EU are politicized. Vivien A. Schmidt (2010) argues similarly and postulates that the practice of 'policy without politics' which has been the common practice thus far, would have to be replaced by 'policy with politics'. However, such politicization is a double-edged sword. If politicization makes conflicting interests between the member states and citizens even more visible, then the politicization of the EU could have a converse effect. Cerutti (2010, p. 5) therefore emphasizes the necessity of 'shared decisions in matters of high politics'. Be this as it may, the question remains open as to whether these shared decisions can be achieved given that the interests of the individual member states are diverse and the decisions to be achieved are of such pivotal importance.

With regard to our research approach, most of the analyses in this volume are based on representative surveys. A commonly uttered point of criticism regarding this research approach is based on the argument that surveys lack depth and, as a result, are too superficial to grasp a complex phenomenon such as collective identity. This line of argumentation is taken in the recently published volume by Sonja Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti and Vivien A. Schmidt (2010) and is brought forward, above all, by Klaus Eder (2010) in that volume. This critique commonly ignores a decisive advantage of our research approach, namely that an external criterion exists in representative survey studies, that is, that the arguments derived by the researcher about the citizens' attitudes are intersubjectively verifiable and are not limited merely to the level of vague assumptions. This advantage is particularly meaningful if surveys are not restricted to a pure level of empiricism. If empirical analyses are theoretically guided, which is the case for the contributions of this volume, an added value can certainly be claimed. The analysis by Eder (2010), as elaborate as it may be, does not provide a reasonable response to the recurrent question: what are the grounds of validity of his assumptions? This question can be raised for a number of analyses which seek to answer questions about legitimacy and identity of the EU from a theoretical perspective and turn a blind eye on empirical findings.

Eder's (2010, p. 52) critique of the concept of collective identity by Dieter Fuchs (2010), which is also used in this volume, is noteworthy. It states that this concept 'is a mere postulate that is not controlled by an empirically falsifiable theory'. Despite the fact that this argument is not very plausible because of the strict empirical approach of the analysis one can raise the counter-question: how are Eder's (2010, pp. 39, 42) diverse definitions of collective identity, such as 'an emerging social world', 'a robust shared narrative' or 'a semantic property of the social relations among a defined set of people', empirically

measurable and verifiable? Given that these questions are neither clarified nor responded to, the analysis by Eder (2010) will remain merely a 'narrative' about collective identity among many other narratives.

Another point of criticism focuses on the measurement of legitimacy and identity by means of the simple questions posed in surveys such as the Eurobarometer (a summary of this critique can be found in Lucarelli [2010, pp. 198–99]). We begin by discussing the issue for legitimacy and then we address identity.

This volume takes a functional approach to the analysis of EU support and the creation of European identity that decisively depends on citizens' attitudes. In Chapter 2 of this volume a differentiated typology of support for the EU is developed and legitimacy is one of the differentiated types. In line with Easton, legitimacy is considered a type of support for a regime based on the subjective perceptions of citizens, who state the extent to which the considered regime corresponds to the values and principles the respondent considers relevant. This can be validly measured by means of a representative survey. The advantage of this typology lies in the fact that other forms of support for the EU, which are also relevant for their persistence and integration, can be identified.

The indicator for the measurement of European identity asks respondents about their attachment to the collective of Europeans. This is certainly a simple measurement which can only partially measure the complex phenomenon of European identity. In our opinion it is fully plausible that political identity is not 'purely emotional' (Cerutti 2010, p. 5). Yet, it is still to some extent emotional. The definition provided by Cerutti (2010, pp. 4–5) makes this clear: 'Political identity in the EU is the feeling of quasi-polity's members that they belong together … because they share with each other certain *values, principles and goals*'. The two dimensions which political identity has according to this definition, namely content and emotion, can be analytically separated and, as such, measured separately. From a functional perspective the result of shared content forms emotional attachment. This is the more relevant element since solidarity among citizens depends upon it.

Schmidt (2010) makes a conceptual proposition of a comprehensive understanding of European identity, which is concisely summarized by Lucarelli (2010, p. 195). According to Schmidt, identity includes substantive elements (*being*) but it is also shared by *doing* things together and developing a common narration (*saying*) of what we are/do. We agree with this conceptualization but claim an analytical differentiation. The political participation of citizens (doing) and the construction of frames about the collective of Europeans and the European Union by political elites (saying) are determinants of European identity. The question remains open as to whether these two determinants factually impact the emergence of a European identity, on the one hand, and whether they impact support for the EU, on the other hand.

According to Jeffrey Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (2009), the empirical research based on survey data has achieved relevant insights into various aspects of European identity but these types of data are not sufficient. According to these authors, an emergence of European identity can only be explained by a complex research design with various analytical levels and various methodological approaches. In our opinion, this approach would necessarily include a systematic multi-level analysis which detects the effect of macro variables on the individual attitudes of citizens. The focus should be on the framing of Europe through the discourse of political elites and mass media on the one hand, and the effect of these framings on the attitudes of the citizens on the other hand. Over the past few years, research projects have been conducted for the first of these two focuses (Pfetsch et al. 2008; Koopmans and Statham 2010). Systematic linkages of such framing processes to citizens' attitudes are still an open field of research.

Another broad, and thus far neglected, research field lies in country-specific and comparative analyses of the impact on European identity stemming from collective memories in the individual nation states. An effect of collective memories on the framing of Europe can be assumed to impact both the attitudes of political elites and the attitudes of citizens.

NOTES

1. The political type of national identity overlaps to a large extent with Schlenker-Fischer's (universalistic) liberal frame and the cultural type of national identity more or less with her (primordial) ethnic one; the (traditional) republican frame of national identity, however, includes political as well as cultural elements and cannot be included into Guinaudeau's dichotomous typology for this reason.
2. Relying on individual-level experiments, Bruter (2005, p. 174) comes to the same conclusion.
3. In analogy to the importance of 'critical democrats' (Klingemann 1999) for any democracy.

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