THE ASHGATE
RESEARCH COMPANION *to*
ANTHROPOLOGY

ASHGATE

Edited by
PAMELA J. STEWART
AND ANDREW J. STRATHERN

THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO ANTHROPOLOGY

This is a rich source of anthropological approaches to significant social and cultural issues across the globe. The subject matter is topical, the contributors are scholars of renown and the analyses are informed by detailed empirical inquiry. The collection is a valuable resource for scholars, teachers, students and general readers.

David Trigger, University of Queensland, Australia

The editors and authors are to be congratulated for this compelling companion to research in what it means to be human. Twenty anthropologists provide rich synopses of anthropology's intellectual heritage in their critical appraisals of key concepts long central to the discipline – belief systems, ritual, magic, sacrifice, myth, gender, war, violence, globalisation, language change and loss, indigenous knowledge and so on. More than the sum of its parts, this volume situates anthropological research as absolutely essential to understanding humanity's past, present and possible futures.

Naomi M. McPherson, University of British Columbia, Canada

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The Ashgate Research Companion to Anthropology

Edited by

PAMELA J. STEWART and ANDREW J. STRATHERN
both at the University of Pittsburgh, USA

ASHGATE

Contents

Lists of Figures and Tables

Cover image: Dolls on sale at city flea market, Osaka, Japan, June 2014, Stewart/Strathern Archive

Figures

Tables

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Notes on Contributors

Volume Editors

Pamela J. Stewart (Strathern) and **Andrew J. Strathern** are a wife-and-husband research team who are based in the Department of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh and direct the Cromie Burn Research Unit. They are frequently invited international lecturers and have worked with a number of museums to assist them with their collections. Stewart and Strathern have published over 46 books and over 200 articles, book chapters, and essays on their research in the Pacific (mainly Papua New Guinea and the South-West Pacific region, e.g. Samoa and Fiji), Asia (mainly Taiwan, and also including Mainland China and Japan), and Europe (primarily Scotland, Ireland and the European Union countries in general), as well as New Zealand and Australia. Their most recent co-authored books include *Witchcraft, Sorcery, Rumors, and Gossip* (2004), *Kinship in Action: Self and Group* (2011), *Peace-Making and the Imagination: Papua New Guinea Perspectives* (2011), *Ritual: Key Concepts in Religion* (2014), and *Working in the Field: Anthropological Experiences Across the World* (2014). Their recent co-edited books include *Exchange and Sacrifice* (2008) and *Religious and Ritual Change: Cosmologies and Histories* (2009 and the updated and revised Chinese version, 2010). Stewart and Strathern's current research includes the topics of cosmological landscapes; ritual studies; political peace-making; comparative anthropological studies of disasters and climatic change; language, culture and cognitive science; and Scottish and Irish studies. For many years they served as Associate Editor and General Editor (respectively) for the *Association for Social Anthropology in Oceania* book series and as co-series editors for the *Anthropology and Cultural History in Asia and the Indo-Pacific* book series. They currently co-edit three book series: *Ritual Studies*, *Medical Anthropology*, and *European Anthropology* and they are the long-standing co-editors of the *Journal of Ritual Studies*. Their webpages, listing publications and other scholarly activities, are: http://www.pitt.edu/~strather/ and http://www.StewartStrathern.pitt.edu/.

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Jonathan Hill is Professor and former Chair of the Department of Anthropology at Southern Illinois University and has done extensive fieldwork with the Wakuénai (also known as Curripaco) of Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s. He is the author of *Keepers of the Sacred Chants: The Poetics of Ritual Power in an Amazonian Society* (1993), *Made-from-Bone: Trickster Myths, Music, and History from the Amazon* (2009), and numerous articles and chapters on music, myth, and history in Lowland South America. In addition, he is editor of *Rethinking History and Myth: Indigenous South American Perspectives on the Past* (1988), *History, Power, and Identity: Ethnogenesis in the Americas, 1492–1992* (1996), and co-editor of *Comparative Arawakan Histories: Rethinking Language Family and Culture Area in Amazonia* (with Fernando Santos-Granero, 2002), *Burst of Breath: Indigenous Ritual Wind Instruments in Lowland South America* (with Jean-Pierre Chaumeil, 2011), and *Ethnicity in Ancient Amazonia: Reconstructing Past Identities Through Archaeology, Linguistics, and Ethnohistory* (with Alf Hornborg, 2011). He has served as a Contributing Editor for the Ethnology of Lowland South America in the *Handbook of Latin American Studies* (1986–1994), an Editorial Advisor for *American Anthropologist* (1989–1993), and Editor of *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* (2002–2009). He currently sits on editorial boards for several journals, including *Ethnohistory*, *Identities*, *Antropológica*, and *ABET (Journal of the Associação Brasileira de Etnomusicologia)*. He is a member of the Executive Board of the Society for the Anthropology of Religion and serves as 2014 and 2015 Chair of the Clifford Geertz Prize in the Anthropology of Religion. He is also President (2014–2017) of the Society for the Anthropology of Lowland South America (SALSA).

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Introduction

Andrew J. Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart

The idea for this volume came to us some years ago. Our aim was to produce a set of synoptic studies of topics in socio-cultural anthropology that would combine the expression of personal perspectives with some general coverage of significant themes. We approached scholars whose work was known to us and we broached a broad range of themes that could be handled. In practice, contributions on all of these could not be secured, but a substantial coverage has nevertheless been achieved. The intention is, then, to be informative, illustrative, and pertinent without a goal of encyclopedic scope. Our contributors have provided us with thoughtful and fruitful ways of thinking about numbers of contemporary and long-standing arenas of work where both established and more recent researchers are engaged.

Anthropology has expanded greatly over time in terms of the diversity of topics in which its practitioners engage. Nevertheless, many broad themes and topics remain at the heart of anthropological thought, and even with new topical arenas classic problems of analysis remain the same, for example, how to understand both order and change, diversity and continuity, and conflict and co-operation in the reproduction of social life. While the domain of the social, and sociality, also remains central to our discipline the intersection of the social with the psychological and individual aspects of life is an enduring underlying concern. As well, the adherence to ethnographic methods of exposition and enquiry provides a strong ongoing current or flow of thought that influences theorizing. (See our arguments regarding fieldwork and theory in Stewart and Strathern 2014b.)

In this Introduction we will make in turn a few comments on our contributors' topics, and then, as a supplement, discuss further some arenas that could not be covered in the essays themselves.

One set of chapters centers on issues to do with religion and ritual. There has been a rapid expansion of interest in ritual practices since these have been given a central place in discussions on religion. At the same time it is recognized that religion and ritual are not isomorphic terms, hence the category of secular rituals as discussed by Margit Warburg in this volume. "Ritual" has in some ways come to replace "belief" as a central focus of interest for theory, signaling a shift to embodied practice and away from mentalist explanations in anthropological thinking in general. Work by Roy Rappaport (1999) and Catherine Bell (1997) has influenced this transition, as also has the work of Thomas Csordas (e.g. 1994) and Manuel Vasquez (2011). Work in this vein of embodiment theory is well exemplified in the present volume in the chapters by Geoffrey Samuel and by Anne Sigfrid Grønseth. Samuel takes the approach a step further with a thoughtful consideration of how healing practices, including ones we are accustomed to think of as shamanic, actually do have effects on patients' bodies. Grønseth examines the bodily effects of migration and displacement on Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka working in a fish processing factory in the north of Norway. Safe from immediate danger, these refugees nevertheless found it hard to achieve "peace

at heart" and difficult to adjust to interactions with Norwegian biomedical physicians. Grønseth also interestingly describes how these Tamil migrants flourished better when they were able to move to a locality nearer to their co-ethnics in Oslo and were less enclaved as a minority, indicating the importance of emplacement. Studies of this kind bring up in critical ways the question of efficacy in medical treatment, involving levels of confidence in the medical practitioners and contrasts between curing and healing of the kind that are frequently broached and explored in medical anthropology studies. In general, within the sphere of studies of shamanistic practices and of cross-cultural healing practices, issues of efficacy have recently come to the fore (see, e.g., Stewart and Strathern 2014a and a series of studies in the *Journal of Ritual Studies* 24(1) 2010). Shamanic healing has been made a major focus in such studies because of its dramatic performance aspects implicating multi-sensorial experience and a heightened deployment of imaginative resources. As well, the complexities and ambivalences in the shaman's role in politics have provided a further point of attention (e.g. Riboli and Torri 2013). One thing is clear. Embodiment theory has contributed crucially to a trend to look at the actual physical effects of healing practices as distinct from their forms of "symbolic logic." Symbolism, performance, and performativity all run together in the synergistic consideration of efficacy, transcending the implicit mentalism of theories that placed all effects outside of biomedicine into the category of "the placebo" (see also Strathern and Stewart 2010a).

Creativity and change in ritual patterns are themes that are congruent with questions of efficacy. Studies of creativity emphasize fluidity, adaptation, imagination and re-creation of sources of power through ritual performance. Charismatic Christian practices provide an exemplary case in which leading performers develop and highlight ways of singing and praying that entail strong affect and move their congregations in highly ritualized ways. Contributors to a recent issue of the *Journal of Ritual Studies* have explored this type of theme (*Journal of Ritual Studies* 28(2) 2014). We ourselves have examined the importance of the concept of performance in ritual studies in our book *Ritual* (Stewart and Strathern 2014a).

In a less dramatic fashion, the study of change in ritual practices has provided insight into broader social changes. Satsuki Kawano's paper takes up this narrative in her chapter for this volume on changing mortuary practices around the world. She highlights a shift to choice in mortuary rites that is a part of the development of individuality. For Japan, she also identifies the importance of studying generational cohorts who experience differential forces of change in accordance with shifts in family patterns of residence and employment. Where there is no family member available to take on the role of keeping up a memorial shrine, people may choose to scatter the ashes of the deceased in a particular location as an alternative practice.

Elsewhere in the world we ourselves have noticed a shift toward cremation. In parts of Scotland, for example, cremation seems to have become the norm. Memorial sites can hold the ashes in the same way as is done for a body that is buried, but there is inevitably a sense of greater transformation concomitant with the death itself and abnegation of the traditional Christian notion of the resurrection of the flesh. Christian thinkers themselves have been at pains to struggle with the notion of resurrection and to metaphorize it so that it gains a broader spiritual meaning (see Williams 2000). At the level of individual choice, it is interesting that cremation gives flexibility to the distribution of bodily remains. We have observed a context in Scotland in which a daughter came to make a prayer and place flowers at an improvised site on her father's farm-land where his ashes had been spread. The remains had been reclaimed from a collective context and re-settled back in the individual land-holding of the deceased.

Perhaps the most striking example of ritual innovation that we have encountered has been afforded to us by our acquaintance with the activities of the large Tzu Chi Buddhist

NGO based in Hualien city in Taiwan. Tzu Chi maintains a number of well-run hospitals and they developed a way of dealing with a shortage of cadavers for medical students to use in their training. Instead of anonymizing the use of cadavers they re-personalized it in ritualized form. They offered hospice care for adherents who were prepared on their death to offer their bodies for students to use in anatomy courses, and they required the students to greet the patients and their relatives and pay ritualized respect to them. After the death and the use of the body the bodies were repaired and cremated, and the ashes were divided by agreement, one set going to a jar held with others in a Buddhist shrine within the hospital complex. The persons whose bodies were used in this way were described as the "silent mentors" of the students. The ideology behind the practice was that after death the person no longer needs the body to achieve their next form, so the body can be released for this new purpose. The ideology contradicts traditional Han notions regarding ancestors and the proper handling of burials, but the program has had considerable success and this not least because in another sense it adheres to the important value of respect towards persons, including the dead. Buddhist specialists are also recognized as having roles to do with the handling of death in general, so the silent mentor practices fit generally with this fact.

Creativity as a theme intersects with the topic of the chapter by Katie Glaskin. As with all of our authors, and in accordance with our overall idea for the volume, Glaskin takes as her inspiration her own fieldwork with Aboriginal people in the northwest of Australia, among whom classic ideas regarding spirit beings and emplacement of these in the environment are maintained. In addition, though, there is a special association between dreaming seen as a capacity, not just a phenomenon, and as facilitating discoveries of methods of healing or how to heal sick persons, as well as the recognition of types of sorcery actions. This kind of multiple enchaining of experience with knowledge is found widely in Pacific Island societies, and is attended to in the chapters for Roger Lohmann's edited volume *Dream Travelers* to which we contributed an essay on Papua New Guinea Highlands materials (Lohmann 2003). One of the things we found striking in one Highlands case, that of the Wiru of Pangia, was that the standard response for the origin of many innovative acts would be described as a result of seeing it in a dream (*pulere enanea*), whereas in the Mount Hagen area the standard phrase was *noman-nt wingnditim*, "the mind invented it." In all these Highlands cases the advent of Christianity brought on crises of imagination about the cosmos which resulted in an incorporation of dreams into new religious contexts. The most consistent overall feature here is that in all of these cultures dreams are regarded as significant occurrences requiring exegesis, discussion, and often action, especially where dead kinsfolk appear in dreams and pass on messages about hidden aspects of reality requiring sacrifices to avert misfortune.

Sacrifice itself is a major theme in the anthropological imagination. We asked Kathryn McClymond to provide for our readers her own perspective on this monumental topic. She points out, and argues vigorously, that there has been too much emphasis on sacrifice as involving the ritual killing of animals, and not enough on the fact that several items of a vegetable kind are employed in many systems. Her comments may lead us to consider further why such an emphasis on animal sacrifice may have arisen, and we may suggest that this could be because an iconic feature is the *exchange* aspect of sacrifice, in which one life is offered in substitution or compensation for another. We have explained this aspect in the edited volume on *Exchange and Sacrifice* (Stewart and Strathern 2008). McClymond's treatment, however, is a salutary reminder of the kinds of ethnographic bias that tend to grow up over time surrounding themes on which classic pronouncements have been made—such as on sacrifice, for example.

Another contributor whom we invited specifically because of the special perspective he could offer was Raphael Falco, because of his work on myth and charisma. As with sacrifice, many discussions on myth seem to turn awkwardly on issues of definition. A major

observation Falco makes is that myths may rely on charismatic force for their survival, and this force may need to be renewed over time. Myth is therefore not static, but dynamic (cf. Stewart and Strathern 2002a). He goes on, partly drawing on our own observations on the Duna people of the New Guinea Highlands to remark that the same holds for rituals. While people may need to claim that rituals are simply inherited from the past, actually innovations constantly occur. Certainly this is so. Moreover, people themselves are quite well aware of this process. The idea is not necessarily that a myth, or a ritual, should be exactly repeated over time, but that it should enable its narrators or practitioners to tie into powers of the cosmos.

The idea of the "cosmos" that we deploy here has the further potential to dissolve, at least in part, a distinction between secular and religious rituals. We asked Margit Warburg for a chapter on secular rituals, following the work of Moore and Myerhoff (1977). In part, this followed from a special issue of the *Journal of Ritual Studies* on civic rituals (*Journal of Ritual Studies* 23(2) 2009). Warburg skillfully covers a whole range of rituals that are significant and are outside of the domain of established or formal religion. This is quite in accordance with standard ritual theory, in which "ritual" is not isomorphic with "religion." The studies she cites creatively extend the category of ritual to phenomena such as tourism or dieting, often seen as kinds of rituals of passage. Warburg rightly points out that the "ritual" aspect may be greater or lesser in these activities. In theoretical terms the way this can be further clarified is by use of Catherine Bell's term "ritualization" (Bell 1997: 81–2). Activities become ritualized as they articulate certain values and become more fixed as expressions of those values.

There is a further overlap here with John Traphagan's study of the anthropology of sport. Games in general, as rule-bound universes of action, and spectator-sports in particular, are subject to processes of ritualization. Recognition of the force of this point has been brought greatly to our own consciousness as we have watched, first, a series of sumo-wrestling championships in Japan and, second, television coverage in Japan of the FIFA football championship context in Brazil, during April–June 2014. With sumo, the ritual aspect is perfectly obvious and consciously expressed, since the referee behaves rather like a priest. With football, the spontaneous ritualization of fan behavior makes the ritualized aspects of the game quite evident in terms of the identification of supporters with their national team and the embodied reification of the nation that follows from this identification. (The emotional charge of this identification was well exemplified by Germany's win over Argentina in the final, and the subsequent declaration that this was the first win recorded by a reunified Germany.) Traphagan makes a quieter set of points about Little League baseball in Japan and the inculcation of father-son values through sport, thus bringing to the fore the gendered aspects of sports traditions.

Victoria Goddard and Susan Rasmussen have supplied firm descriptions and analysis of gendered relations in different social contexts. Here again, we invited the authors to follow their own inclinations and expertise. Goddard provides an expert review centered on economic anthropology and work relations, in an approach that fits well with the study of contemporary industrialized contexts. Rasmussen takes us to her field area among the Tuareg of Northern Mali, discussing gendered spaces and changes in gendered roles in artistic theatrical performances. Gender and space are classic themes, stemming in part from work by Pierre Bourdieu (1977) and Henrietta Moore (1996). Rasmussen shows us that the gendering of space changes with overall changes in power relations in the society and how this is exemplified in theatrical productions. This theme has also been very prominent in the literature on the New Guinea Highlands. Early treatment tended to see the gendering of space in ritual and everyday contexts as diagnostic of gendered hierarchy or antagonism. We ourselves (e.g. Stewart and Strathern 1999) argued instead for seeing much of the

division as actually collaborative rather than conflictual. This point has some resonance with Goddard's discussions on the gendered meanings of labor, and on the mistake of supposing that affective labor can be distinguished clearly from industrial labor (a re-read of the older contrast between pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production). In the New Guinea Highlands *all* types of labor were seen as affective as well as instrumental, and the products of labor such as pigs as wealth items were seen as embodying both aspects of values. Labor itself thus becomes a kind of performance.

Two chapters deal with major world religions, Christianity (Simon Coleman) and Islam (David Montgomery), or rather with anthropological approaches to their contemporary cross-cultural and ethnographic study. Coleman highlights the gradually growing interest in the study of Christianity, recognizing that such study now uncovers much variation as well as similarities between cases. Coleman reflects on the ways that forms of Christianity have changed notions of personhood, and also how the dramatic phenomena of charismatic worship have tended to overshadow studies of mainstream Christian denominations. He engages also with the question of rupture and change, on which we have ourselves argued for a complex view that continuity and change are always intermingled even though the Christian rhetoric of conversion often stresses rupture (e.g. Strathern and Stewart 2009). In his thoughtful chapter on Islam, David Montgomery argues that the focus should be ethnographic and local, looking at the lives of Muslim people in different places without assigning them all to a monolithic category of Islam. Many works support his point, including monographs we have published in our Ritual Studies and Medical Anthropology series (e.g. Stewart and Strathern 2005a, Cochrane 2013, MacPhee 2012).

The separate question of how Islamic doctrines and ideas have been co-opted into cultures of revolutionary violence would require a different survey of materials and would inevitably take us beyond religion into politics and economics.

Sami Hermez's chapter on armed conflict in Lebanon takes us into the general field of the study of violence which overlaps with our remark above. (We have published a set of views about religion and violence earlier, Stewart and Strathern 2013, Strathern and Stewart 2013, and see also Stewart and Strathern 2002b.)

Hermez's work emerges out of his intense involvement with the phenomenon of violence in his own experience in Lebanon. He questions what meaning we should give to the term violence and what meanings do people themselves give to actions that are labeled as violent. He discusses the existential phenomenon of living with violence and the senses of risk and precarity that go with this. We have ourselves recently worked to go beyond the ethnography of violence by focusing on processes of peace-making and on concepts of peace that go with these processes, and the question of risk and the wish to obviate risk are important in this context (see Strathern and Stewart 2011a).

Violence, or the possibility of it as a persistent factor in human social relations, is a topic that can intersect with many other domains of life, particularly when violent actions coalesce into armed conflicts between groups. Bryan Hanks, in an examination of archaeological data from Iron Age sites in Eurasia, notes the recognition by scholars of the evidence for warfare and the importance of warrior-hood. This phenomenon was probably connected with developments in metal technology, competition for resources, and the possible emergence of leading lineages exercising power and hierarchy as well as control over the labor of captives held as slaves and used in the construction of burial monuments. The significance of sacrifices of animals, of grave goods reflecting wealth and representations of the natural world is a crucial issue in this context, allied to the explanation of sacrifice as a general topic in Kathryn McClymond's chapter in the present volume. Human and animal sacrifices may themselves be seen, from an observer's perspective, as violent acts, but their purpose must be understood as belonging to an overall cosmology. In this scheme of things, such sacrifices

may be seen as ritual investments designed to help the reproduction of both power and fertility in the land tied, as Hanks observes, to the symbolic construction of the special *places* where elaborate burials were impressive markers in the landscape.

In general such markers probably fixed, at least for periods of time, a certain state of local political power, geared to cyclicities of war and peace and perhaps tied in with ideas of fertility and renewal as well as with, concomitantly, conspicuous expenditure, destructions of wealth comparable to the Kwakiutl potlatches through which rank was achieved among North West Coast Native Americans. Looked at this way, warfare becomes a part of a wider cosmology linked to the intensification of power in particular places and subject also to historical fluctuations and vicissitudes. Funerary sacrifices would thus be attempts to place a stamp of fixity and legitimization on a state of play in regional dynamics.

Hanks seeks to address topics that link archaeological findings, and interpretations with insights from cultural anthropology. Analyses that cross boundaries in this way can prove to be creative ways of pushing theory forward. When we planned this volume we had expected to receive another contribution to theories of the relationship between culture and violence by Christian Kordt Højbjerg, then of Copenhagen University. Højbjerg had carried out detailed research among the Loma of Guinea in West Africa on ritual traditions characterized by secret practices and on how the upholders of these traditions had resisted persecution by national authorities. Taking an innovative line in his analysis, Højbjerg sought to take into account not only historical factors but also "determinants associated with the cognitive-psychological and relational aspects of an existing cultural practice" (Højbjerg 2007: 5), centered on the indigenous concept of *sale*, ritual power. After political independence from the colonial power, France, was gained in 1958 the new state government in Guinea embarked on a violent purge of indigenous religion as a part of a supposed attempt to create a kind of modern national integration in a "demystification campaign" (Højbjerg 2007: 46) against ritual secrecy. In the event secrecy and the *sale* ideas that went with it prevailed in spite of state practices of violence and desecration—or possibly in part because of them. The cognitive means of this persistence provides novel dimensions of the analysis.

We had invited Højbjerg to provide us with a contribution spanning resistance, ritual continuity, and state violence in postcolonial situations. Sadly, as time went on, we learned that he was ill and his contribution would be delayed, then in April 2014 that he had succumbed to his illness without being able to address his topic. At the time of his death he held the position of Associate Professor in the Department of Anthropology, Archaeology and Linguistics, Aarhus University, in Denmark, having been Associate Professor in Copenhagen from 2004 to 2009. He had done fieldwork in Guinea, Liberia, and Senegal, and was affiliated with the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology in Halle, Germany. We honor his memory here.

Another context into which studies of violence need to be set is that of conflict studies generally, since not all conflicts lead to overt physical violence, hence the current dual focus on peace and conflict studies (see Strathern and Stewart 2011a). A major context in which issues of conflict emerge is that of globalization. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, whose work is well known in many spheres of anthropology, has provided us with an integrative chapter in which he uses a new field study of his to delineate conflicts over globalization processes in Gladstone, a town of some 30,000 people in Queensland, Australia, long used as a port for the transport of coal. Intensifying industrialization has led over time to protests, in particular about a plan to dredge the harbor that was executed in 2011–2013, causing protests about noise and environmental changes among the population. Eriksen's study is surely mirrored in so many other places where concerns for sustainability and heritage conflict with industrial priorities or government plans. Wind farms in Scotland are a case in point, although, unlike coal mines, such farms are promoted as producing "clean energy."

Who benefits? Or who benefits most and who suffers most? These are relevant questions to pose. (See, e.g., Strathern and Stewart 2010b: 28.)

The important general topic that is involved here is social justice, which also implicates issues of discrimination. While pointing out this topic it is important to remember the question of reflexivity in academic work, that is, the contexts of experience in which one's own daily work is carried out. Many arenas can be included here but one in which we as editors of this volume are currently writing on and encourage others to write on is ageism. Senior persons may be treated wrongly in the workplace, and this is also true in academia when the practitioners of ageism denigrate the scholarly work of seniors, denying them resources or removing resources such as space, and excluding them from decision-making arenas such as committees or searches for new appointees. One rhetorical trope that is often deployed here is the labelling of work as "old-fashioned" as opposed to "progressive." Those who employ this method of attack do so as a means of concealing their own personal and political agendas in pursuit of power and patronage.

A further set of papers are the result of our editorial pinpointing of major themes of interest both to ourselves and the discipline at large. One of these chapters, by Jonathan Hill, and Juan Luis Rodriguez, looks at the problem of social change from the viewpoint of language studies in Lowlands South America. Language is obviously a huge arena of importance in socio-cultural study, as the relatively recent emergence of linguistic anthropology testifies (see, e.g., Duranti 1997). Language intersects with ritual (Stewart and Strathern 2014a), with politics (Duranti 1994), with cognition (Bloch 1998, 2012), indeed with every feature of social life. Hill and Rodriguez provide their readers with an innovative dimension of study, on how languages change but also on how people maintain or create identities through language usages. Study of the Watunna people reveals how they used a small specialist genre of ritual discourse to remember lessons of conflict learned from their colonial history. Language being a flexible "cultural tool" (cf. Dan Everett's book title, Everett 2012), local political leaders in South America developed practices that combined their cosmological knowledge with Western-style political discourse. Hill and Rodriguez's chapter is rich with possible parallels between South America and Pacific Islanders' discursive strategies. (See, e.g., the studies in Stewart and Strathern 2005b, and our contribution in Rumsey and Niles 2011, also Duranti 1994, 1997, and Brenneis and Myers 1984.)

There is a further overlap here with Paul Sillitoe's chapter on indigenous knowledge (IK). Sillitoe is a major expert on this arena of study and his very detailed work on the Wola people of the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea gives him authority to speak on the topic. Interestingly, however, he has used the topic as a platform for critical reflections. He rightly points out that "IK is the stuff of anthropology." So why, he asks, has interest in it declined? One answer he gives is that much important "knowledge" that people have is not held consciously and is hard to establish, so the question of what is IK arises. (Surely, the same point must arise in relation to Pierre Bourdieu's famous concept of the habitus, Bourdieu 1977.) A proportion of IK, however, is certainly held at the conscious level and is highly pertinent to development issues. Sillitoe rightly insists that we should work with indigenous collaborators—and in practice this is what anthropologists have almost always done, as for example we ourselves have done with persons of knowledge among the Duna people. Moreover, the "knowledge" of the environment that people convey to us, deeply imbued with ideas of the cosmos and spirit entities, is precisely the kind that indicates a potential attitude of resistance against destructive acts by developers and therefore shows that IK is a politically active category. Sillitoe himself offers a thoughtful set of reflections on "development" and concludes wryly that IK studies can be both supportive of development and subversive of it, which can help to explain why it has come to occupy an ambiguous niche. As anthropologists ourselves who have spent much time trying to understand

what people's own knowledge constitutes, we remain supportive of the IK view of what ethnography should encompass without suggesting that it is everything, since to do so would be to privilege knowledge in the way that the ethno-scientists did when they defined cultural knowledge as what is needed to know in order to behave appropriately in any given context.

Sillitoe's chapter captures many intriguing dilemmas of anthropological work today, such as how do we view the question of development (see also Stewart and Strathern 2005c) and how do we rate the cultural knowledge of the people we study in relation to our own (if we are not studying our own group—and however that may be defined). Such broad issues, ultimately philosophical or general in their import, tend to lie just below the surface of much anthropological writing, if not on the surface itself. One such general issue is the question of the category of the "individual" which turns up endlessly in debates about the universality of the terms we employ in our analyses. Other terms are "person," "kinship," and "marriage," "group," "descent," "religion," and many others. Nigel Rapport has supplied us in this volume with a boldly stated position on the individual, arguing that the capacity to interpret events and make sense in life is (in his words) an "individually embodied facility." This potentiality, however, he at once notes, is played out in very different ways in different cultural contexts and in different regimes of power. Rapport goes on to argue that his starting point also implies that as anthropologists we should have a liberal or cosmopolitan mission, and should investigate how universal capacities are related to individual realizations. In accordance with this vision and in line with the established interest in life-histories as a part of the ethnographic endeavor, Rapport proceeds with an account of a particular life history narrative from a Jewish Romanian born in Bucharest who made his way to Canada via Israel through a number of sufferings. His story, then, is one of survival from hardship and a final arrival at a more congenial social context of friendship. Rapport implies in his narrative the worth of human personhood as a universal value. Herein lies, then, the locus of a humanistic vision of life. This is a bold way to cut through both cultural relativism and sociological determinism.

The vision of humanism, or a human-centered view of life, which is a long-standing part of anthropological discourse, can in some ways be traced back to the legacy of ancient Greece and Rome. Even as the place of the linguistic study of Greek and Latin has declined as a part of school curricula, the academic interest in the analysis of these ancient cultures has in some ways resurged. All manner of anthropological topics have been brought to bear—kinship, adoption, succession, gender relations, religion and ritual, theater and its origins, the emotions and ideas of the body, sacred sites such as Delphi—all these and many more have been made the subjects of vigorous studies based equally on scholarship and anthropological comparisons (see, e.g., Stewart and Strathern 2014a: 25). These developments deserve to be given more recognition in anthropology as a whole. After all, we owe our discipline's name to the Greek language, so the "study of human beings" has a venerable basis. In the present volume this stream of scholarship is represented by the notable work of Margo Kitts, whose writings have expanded beyond their original context in the study of Homer's *Iliad* to a general investigation of violence, ritual, and religion. In the present volume she returns to her work on Homer's *Iliad*, and presents us with a rich analysis that brings together analytically the topic of oral traditions, approaches from archaeology, social dynamics, ritual, and scenes of oath-taking and sacrifice. Kitts's chapter illustrates both the richness of materials in ancient texts and the fruitfulness of applying anthropological concepts to their interpretations. Her exposition stands as an excellent example of how we can learn much by applying anthropological ideas to the analysis of past societies. Her study both finds its place in a long lineage of work stemming from the Classics and entering into anthropology from its beginnings in the nineteenth century, and also stands as an example of how each generation of scholarship can bring new insights to the study of well-established topics.

Many significant arenas of work in anthropology could not be accommodated within the present volume. Originally we identified a very large number of themes. Those we have presented here are wide-ranging enough and many of them overlap and interpenetrate, giving an inter-textual aspect to the text. We mention here a few that were a part of our original conspectus but for various reasons could not be realized. Medical anthropology comes first to mind, in part because we have ourselves contributed an ethnographically oriented text book to it (Strathern and Stewart 2010a). Medical anthropology has become a tremendous growth area of the discipline, offering theoretical and comparative considerations and a host of practical applications in cross-cultural medicine. It is notably informed also by broad philosophical concerns as in the work of Margaret Lock and collaborators (Lock and Gordon 1988, Lock and Nguyen 2010). Body/mind categorizations are at its heart also. The contributions to this volume of Samuel and of Grønseth cover some of these themes. Critical medical anthropology is another important branch (e.g. Singer 2009; Strathern and Stewart 2010a: 213–18). Interfaces between anthropology, cognitive science, and neuroscience are further opening up on the issue of healing.

Visual anthropology is another major arena, encompassing ethnographic film, media studies, the use of the Internet in general, and in particular its appropriation by indigenous people in pursuing their aims of self-determination. Kyra Landzelius's edited volume *Native on the Net* (Landzelius 2006) provides a broad array of materials on this theme. We have ourselves observed in Taiwan the enthusiastic embrace of the Internet for political activism and the popularity of a TV channel for the indigenous, non-Han, minority groups. In New Zealand, TV is also an important outlet for the Maori people.

Another major arena which is a part of anthropology's central history is the topic of kinship. Kinship studies suffered a certain set-back for a while owing to their great concentration on the technicalities of kin terminologies. This concentration, of course, derived from the early days of the discipline with the work of Lewis Henry Morgan, J.F. McLennan, and many others who sought in the evidence of kin terms to find the evolution of human kinship systems. Another controversy arose over the questions of whether kin terms refer primarily to nuclear kin based on the immediate family or reflect broad social classifications. This controversy was never fully put to rest. Kin term specialists in American cultural anthropology promoted the idea of primary term types and rules of extension. However, from the 1970s onward, practice theory has tended to take over as a focus rather than the quasi-textual study of lexemic terms. Our own recent textbook *Kinship in Action* (Strathern and Stewart 2011b) seeks to integrate the study of many classical themes in kinship analysis around the concept of action. This approach does not depend on taking a particular stand on the question of kinship as classification. Rather, we suggest that whatever the basic classifications are, how they operate in practice reveals what the social roles of kinship are. Classification and practice interact in these spheres. At the same time, there is ample cross-cultural evidence for the significance of primary kin terms derived from ties of procreation.

A major arena in theorizing which has also made a comeback in transformed ways is material culture. Museums are primary places of deposit of material culture as "artifacts," and critical and innovatory studies of the roles of museums form one stream of renewed interest (e.g. Kidd 2014). We would emphasize from our own experiences around the world with examining museum holdings on the Pacific region that traditional collections may still provide stimulating bases for analyses and interpretations. (An excellent example is the George Brown collection at the National Museum of Ethnology in Osaka, Japan.) In addition, however, interest in materiality as an analytical construct and in questions of the consumption of material goods have been integrated with the original study of material culture (see, e.g., Miller 2012).

Another major arena is the study of migration and displacement. Migration studies became popular in the anthropology of mobility from at least the 1970s onward. The focus of migration studies was on labor migration, and for Pacific Island places the transportation of workers from their homes to other or distant locations was an early colonial phenomenon with many consequences, including the development of vernacular forms of lingua franca based or English, French, and indigenous languages.

Such an emergence of new language forms goes with change and transformation in existing languages. Language death and revitalization are significant topics linked to change throughout the world (see, e.g., Crystal 2000, Kulick 1992, Grenoble and Whaley 2006, Meek 2010). Our work on vernacular Scots and Ulster Scots in Scotland and Ireland over many years has pointed to the vibrancy and connectivity with history and politics of such issues, as well as making us aware of the deep wells of creativity that survive in vernacular forms (see, e.g., Begg 2012).

Migration studies fed naturally into studies that later were subsumed under the category of globalization, and the inequities of the capitalist "world system." Since populations often remained in places to which they migrated but retained ties with their home arenas, diaspora studies flowed from this fact, applying equally to Third World and metropolitan societies. Colonization and diaspora studies also interpenetrate. Forced relocations and displacements resulting from wars or natural disasters, together with questions of refugees, refugee camps, famine, and asylum engulf major sections of populations around the world. South Sudan provides an example from 2014 onward.

Another sphere of human experience which has gained international attention and concern is the sphere of environmental disasters. Following our fieldwork over several years in Taiwan among indigenous Austronesian speakers who have been affected by typhoons we have been working to develop the new and important field of "Disaster Anthropology" and are discovering colleagues around the world with parallel interests. The final chapter in this volume deals with this topic in further detail.

We end this Introduction with reference to one of the guiding principles that has underlain our work together in Anthropology: a concern for the continuing productive relationship between fieldwork and theory. Fieldwork and theory are historically and personally intertwined and give life to each other. If this thought were expressed in the Melpa language of the Mount Hagen people of Papua New Guinea, fieldwork and theory would be said to be paired as a *rakl*, bound together in alliance. Within the alliance we see long-term, detailed fieldwork as providing the dynamism within this overall dialectic. Fieldwork challenges, and initiates new conversation with current theory. That is why for us, it remains the essential touchstone and inspiration for our ongoing work in anthropology. The contributions we have been fortunate to garner from colleagues in this volume subscribe, as we see it, to this same philosophy, which we have expressed in our book *Working in the Field* (Stewart and Strathern 2014b).

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PART I
Religion, Experience and Change

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Healing

Geoffrey Samuel

Introduction

Healing, which I use in this chapter as a generic term for practices intended to relieve pain, restore damage or deterioration, or assist in the attainment of the best possible functioning of the human organism (Alter 1999), has been a major preoccupation within virtually all societies studied by anthropologists. Yet while practices and ideas concerning healing have been noted from the early days of anthropology, their study took place for many years in a curiously oblique manner. Anthropologists looked at systems of thought relating to healing, and at magical, ritual or shamanic practices intended to bring about healing. Healing itself, however, as a practice that might bring about genuine results in the real world, remained largely out of focus until the development of medical anthropology in the 1980s. This was because the organic effects of healing were seen as the concern of medicine, not of anthropology, and the medical science of the times did not take these healing practices seriously. This was particularly so in relation to those modes of healing which were not based on pharmacological substances or other material procedures: shamanic healing, spirit healing and the like. Such practices, generally classed as magic, religion or ritual, are the primary focus in this chapter, since it is here that anthropological analysis has had the most to contribute. As we will see, these modes of healing point to aspects of the healing process that are (or at any rate should be) also significant for biomedical practice.

Today, biomedicine has come to dominate state and public medical provision throughout the world, and the development of 'evidence-based medicine' has reinforced its claims to a privileged status as the sole source of valid knowledge about healing. Anthropologists are however now far more willing to challenge that privileged status. This change is the result of a shift in popular consciousness in regard to healing practices, a shift to which the discipline of anthropology itself has contributed to a significant degree. Most Western societies today live in a situation of *de facto* medical pluralism. Large parts of the general population today accept without much demur the idea that biomedicine has no monopoly on healing. While the degree to which non-Western and other 'alternative' medical systems have received official recognition and legitimation varies from country to country, the idea that Ayurveda, Tibetan or Chinese traditional medicine, herbalism, homeopathy, yoga, various forms of visualisation, spirit healing, *reiki* and even more exotic practices may play a useful part in the healing process has been widely accepted among all sectors of the population. This has created a climate to which anthropology, among other disciplines, has responded.

At the time when the basic approaches of contemporary social and cultural anthropology were being developed, however, the period from the 1920s to the 1950s, such tolerance of alternative healing was much less prevalent among educated society. The anthropologists of that time lived in a world where non-Western modes of healing, especially those of

small-scale, technologically simple societies, were routinely disparaged as primitive and meaningless. Biomedical science, the academic discipline that derived from and supported the growth of modern medicine, had little interest in these healing practices, regarding them as useless at best, if not actually damaging to patients. Shamans were regarded as examples of psychopathology, and if indigenous populations were willing to employ their services, this only demonstrated their ignorance and naivety. At most, pre-modern medicine might have discovered a few herbal remedies with some genuine pharmacological effects, and in this sense might be regarded as a crude precursor to the achievements of biomedical science. Even the complex and sophisticated medical practices of the Islamic world, India, Tibet and China were routinely regarded as of little or no practical value.

Before being too dismissive of such attitudes, we should appreciate that in the mid-twentieth century the overall picture of illness had been recently and dramatically transformed for much of the Western world. This had come about through the provision of safe water supply, proper sanitary arrangements, hygiene both in medical and hospital practice and in daily life, the growth of vaccination and inoculation against common infectious diseases, and the development of the first generations of antibiotic drugs, such as the sulfonamides, introduced in the mid-1930s, and penicillin, in the early 1940s. The germ theory of disease provided a convincing theoretical basis for the spectacular success of these new procedures. The introduction of effective anaesthesia and antiseptic procedures had transformed surgery, and the relief of pain had become part of everyday life. If the populations of advanced Western societies today take much of this for granted, at the time it was a huge achievement in terms of human wellbeing. This transformation in people's experience of illness and pain also facilitated and was encouraged by the progressive secularisation of Western society over the same period, which itself involved a massive loss of faith in the reality of the spirit world. Initial approaches within anthropology to healing need to be seen against this background. Scholars such as Edward Evans-Pritchard, Bronislaw Malinowski and Sergei Shirokogoroff were both products of their own time, and struggling themselves to make sense of practices which they had been taught to regard as being of very little value, and as based on modes of thinking that were intrinsically non-rational.

By the early twenty-first century, the secularisation of society has come to seem much less total and irreversible than it did, and the achievements of biomedicine have also become more open to question. Today we are as likely to see the large pharmaceutical companies, with their questionable trade practices and their deliberate manipulation of biomedical research to support their sales strategies, pushing dubious products that may often do more harm than good onto those who do not need them, as an expression of the malign dominance of large corporations over contemporary society (Healy 2012; Goldacre 2012). Biomedicine itself, especially in the highly commercialised and privatised forms prevalent in countries without effective state health systems, can seem an increasingly suspect enterprise, at best distributing its benefits selectively to those who are most able to afford them, at worst encouraging excessive and harmful levels of medical intervention. The overuse and inappropriate use of pharmaceuticals, and the consequent growth of drug-resistant strains of bacteria, is reversing many of the positive achievements of the past in the area of public health. Nevertheless, however justified the criticisms of biomedicine and the pharmaceutical industry today, the structures of evidence-based medicine, now routinely subverted by Big Pharma to promote problematic products, or employed by national medical associations as a protectionist strategy against competing forms of healing, were undoubtedly intended by their originators as positive interventions aimed at the public benefit. The new approaches to the anthropology of healing that developed from the 1980s onwards are situated within this academic and social context; the work of scholars such as Arthur Kleinman, Margaret Lock or Emily Martin are interventions within this much more complex and contested field.

The general perspective from which this chapter is written may be summarised as follows: biomedical science, with its focus on the material and physiological levels, provides a productive and valid explanation of part of the healing process, but that explanation is not complete or exhaustive. As research on the so-called placebo effect and related phenomena demonstrates, much of the healing process is independent of therapeutic interventions at the physical level, relating more to the ability of the organism to mobilise its own healing resources (e.g. Moerman 2002; Moerman and Jonas 2002; Wilce 2003; Samuel 2006a, 2006b). This process, which in many cases is as or more significant than any therapeutic intervention, appears to involve both body and mind, both conscious and unconscious factors, and is critically associated with issues of subjective meaning. This is where anthropology and related disciplines of social and cultural analysis have a vital role to play in the understanding of healing. These disciplines are able to critique and deconstruct biomedical assertions regarding the centrality of therapeutic interventions on the physical level and the insignificance of other ('subjective', social, cultural) aspects of the healing process, and to work towards an understanding of how these other aspects may be more effectively mobilised to facilitate healing.

The significance of medical anthropology is certainly not limited to this area. One might point in particular to the critical and very important work done by medical anthropologists on the political economy of medicine and healing, and so on the actual ability of populations around the world to access healing resources. However, I would suggest that the area of culture and meaning, and its linkage to the healing process, is where medical anthropology has a unique role to play in the understanding of healing.

Precursors and Foundations

As the historical contextualisation with which I began might suggest, initial approaches to healing practices within the small-scale, non-Western societies where most early anthropology was located took the form of rationalist deconstructions of those practices, of explanations of why native populations undertook practices that almost by definition did not or could not work. In those days, anthropologists had, in effect, to choose between seeing the world in the terms of the native populations they were studying, or in those of the modern industrial societies of the West. In practice, 'going native' was not a serious career option. Even if anthropologists might have a genuine sympathy for the worlds they studied, they knew better than to admit it in their publications. Here the *locus classicus* is doubtless Edward Evans-Pritchard's *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (Evans-Pritchard 1937), but one can also see a similar strategy of explaining away in Bronislaw Malinowski's *Magic, Science and Religion* (Malinowski 1954). The foundations of this mode of argument can be found in the work on magic of Sir James Fraser, with its analysis of the logic of similarity and contagion, and his predecessors.

Evans-Pritchard's approach in *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* focused on the logic of explanation in African responses to misfortune. It was premised on the assumption that while Zande ideas about witchcraft, the oracles, the 'witch-doctors' and magic formed a coherent system, the underlying concepts were not and could not be true. Thus when the Zande fed a (presumably poisonous) substance to a chicken, waited to see if it would die, and interpreted the chicken's living or dying as an answer to a specific question, such as whether witchcraft was present, Evans-Pritchard took it for granted that whether the chicken lived or died could not have any actual relationship with the question asked. The system of ideas was self-evidently false, and Evans-Pritchard's analysis concerned how

it was that the Zande continued to accept a system of ideas based upon false premises. Since the responses of the oracle could have no relationship to the question, and could only be explained by factors such as the strength with which the poison was prepared or the health of the chicken, the results of the oracle would necessarily be inconsistent: how was it that the Zande did not realise this?

Evans-Pritchard's answer, as is well known, was to point to processes of 'secondary elaboration' that explained away apparent inconsistencies. If the same question were asked on more than one occasion, for example, and different answers were obtained, this was the result of witchcraft interfering with the oracle, of taboos being broken, errors in the management of the oracle and so on (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 330). Evans-Pritchard's analysis is one of the classic texts of British social anthropology, and was influential in the subsequent development of the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science, since it became evident that similar processes could be observed in many systems of knowledge, including Western science itself. Thus Evans-Pritchard's work became significant in the context of the so-called rationality debate within British philosophy (Winch 1964; Wilson 1970; Horton and Finnegan 1973; Hollis and Lukes 1982). From the point of view of understanding healing, however, it provided effective support for the rationalist deconstruction of non-Western systems of thought. Evans-Pritchard certainly helped to explain why non-Western healing practices might continue in use despite their not being efficacious, but he was fundamentally uninterested in considering whether and how they might actually have some real effects.

Malinowski's analysis in *Magic, Science and Religion* (Malinowski 1954), while more psychological in its orientation, was equally unconcerned with the effectiveness of magical healing practices. Malinowski was quite interested in the effects of magical ritual in promoting confidence in situations of uncertainty, and also (particularly in his later study of agricultural magic, *Coral Gardens*, Malinowski 1935), in magical ritual's logical and linguistic form, but he was not interested in magic's possible efficacy. As Siegfried Nadel put it in an essay on Malinowski:

> *Withal, naturally, the powers 'beyond the normal' promised by magic are only an illusion, if one reinforced by spurious successes and by the general human reluctance to abandon cherished and comforting beliefs. But though magic is akin to 'wish-fulfilment' and 'day-dreaming' it is not of the stuff that dreams are made of. It shows in activity; it encourages and permits action where a dispassionate assessment of conditions might leave no scope for rational effort. (Nadel 1957: 195)*

However an alternative and more sociological approach to magical healing had already been prefigured in the work of Émile Durkheim, since the concept of 'collective effervescence' in Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* clearly implies that ritual (and so magic, as a form of ritual) can have a positive effect on the social group (Durkheim 1965; Buehler 2012). 'Collective effervescence' had a mixed reception, but the idea was picked up by other authors, most notably perhaps by the Russian anthropologist Sergei Mikhailovitch Shirokogoroff, who spelled out the possible sociological implications with remarkable prescience in the 1920s. In a short paper from 1923 Shirokogoroff presented the elements of his 'general theory of shamanism', in other words of shamanic practice among the Tungus people of Siberia (the people among whom the term 'shaman' itself originated). There are a number of fascinating things about Shirokogoroff's treatment, but I begin with his concluding comment:

> *The theory of ghosts or spirits, their relations to men are only the forms that in the mind of the shamanist generalize all the phenomena of normal and pathological psychic life. The shaman and shamanism are the organs and system regulating these*

> *phenomena and have for their principal concern the hygienic and preventive quality,*
> *par excellence. (Shirokogoroff 1923: 249)*

Shirokogoroff's vocabulary of 'psychic hygiene' reads oddly today, but in fact his argument was posed at both the psychological and the sociological level, and it focused primarily on what the shaman is doing in relation to the community (or what the community is doing to and for itself through recourse to the shaman) rather than on the shaman's personal mental or psychological state. Earlier in the same article he noted that:

> *The nervous and psychical maladies which are commonly found among the Tungus*
> *Tribes wax and wane. The normal life of the clan becomes interrupted and, during*
> *periods of increase, nutrition and natality are reduced, mortality increased, and the*
> *very existence of the clan threatened … Within the clan maladies of this kind are*
> *stopped just in the nick of time, when all harmful ghosts, being possessed by some*
> *person of the clan, are submitted to the 'master'. Such a 'master' is the shaman who*
> *becomes, if the analogy be allowed, the 'safety valve' of the clan. … Shamanism as*
> *a preventative is a kind of clan self-defence and an apparent aspect of its biological*
> *functions. (Shirokogoroff 1923: 247 and 248)*

Thus Shirokogoroff suggested that the shaman acted as a kind of emergency mechanism, which came into action primarily in times of crisis. The specific technique that the shaman used was a secondary question, although it was certainly one in which Shirokogoroff was interested. The key issue was that the shaman was able to deal with crises in the community, crises that manifested in psychological forms but which clearly also, for Shirokogoroff, had sociological and biological implications. The shaman was not the dominant figure of the clan's religious life, but he came into play in specific situations where his particular skills were needed. Put in other words, Shirokogoroff saw the shaman as a community therapist – or, more accurately perhaps, as part of the way in which the community healed itself. The approach was in fact very similar to that which Victor Turner was to take some 40 years later to the analysis of Ndembu divination in Southern Africa, in *Revelation and Divination* and *Drums of Affliction* (Turner 1968, 1975).

Shirokogoroff's approach was very much the exception in anthropological writing of its time. The vast majority of anthropologists shared the conviction that the spirit-healing practices they observed could not work in their own terms (they presumably regarded herbal healing as potentially valid, if theoretically uninteresting). This is not to say that other currents of thought were not present within Europe, as with the work of Henri Bergson,[1] or, most conspicuously as far as anthropology was concerned, that of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Evans-Pritchard, in his later years at least, took Lévy-Bruhl's work seriously, and indeed suggested that the participatory mode of thought that Lévy-Bruhl describes was frequently present in the modern European society of his time as well. However he was no more receptive than in the 1930s to seeing 'participatory' and 'mystical' modes of thought as having useful intellectual content (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 78–99; see also Greenwood 2009: 29–43).

By the time I began studying anthropology at Cambridge in the late 1960s, Lévy-Bruhl was no longer read, and Shirokogoroff was nearly forgotten. However, when Victor Turner developed a similar approach to Shirokogoroff's, he was taken much more seriously, in part because he came from the most sociological end of the discipline, the famed Manchester School

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1   Bergson's work had as far as I know little effect on British anthropology in the 1920s and 1930s, but the neo-Bergsonian approaches of the 1970s and 1980s constitute an important resource for the rethinking of anthropological theory today (cf. Watson 1998; Samuel 2009).

directed by Max Gluckman. In the 1960s Max Gluckman and Edmund Leach represented opposite poles in British anthropology (cf. Kuper 1973; Tambiah 2002). But while Leach intellectualised magic away, in this respect following on Evans-Pritchard's Azande work, the Manchester School approach allowed Turner in effect to see 'effervescence' as being canalised and directed to serve a social purpose, in much the same way as Shirokogoroff had proposed.

Turner argued that the diviner, who is consulted as the result of an individual illness or misfortune, uses his or her visionary techniques to arrive at a ritual prescription that heals the psychic and social conflicts within the community – in the Ndembu case, typically a small village. More specifically, the Ndembu diviner can diagnose that the illness is the result of a particular ancestral spirit, acting in a particular mode, and this leads to the performance of a specific ritual, in which a specific group of people will take part (Turner 1968: 25–51). Turner assumed, and tried to demonstrate through symbolic analysis, that the ritual facilitated group healing both at the sociological and at the psychological level (Turner 1968, 1970).[2] In some cases, the diviner may diagnose the presence of sorcery, a result which in Turner's analysis is a way of legitimising a *de facto* break up of the village into opposed factions, one of which will then go off and set up a separate village elsewhere.

What Turner added to Shirokogoroff's work was a brilliant analysis of how the ritual brought the job about, focused on the operation of 'symbols' which brought together moral and physical aspects of human experience and made them seem natural (see especially Turner 1968, 1970). His successors, scholars such as Bruce Kapferer (1979, 1997) and Suzette Heald (1999), developed this mode of analysis further, and gave it more psychological depth and political edge.

The key point in Turner's analysis was the role of symbolic objects and their imagery to manipulate both individual and collective emotion for socially positive ends. Here it is best to avoid getting too caught up in Turner's somewhat idiosyncratic use of the term 'symbol', later deconstructed by Dan Sperber and others (e.g. Sperber 1975). It is more useful to focus on the process Turner was describing, in which objects such as the *mudyi* tree, with its white sap connecting to milk, motherhood, the matrilineage and the social order, or the *mukula* tree with its red sap, connecting to death, circumcision and masculinity, formed building blocks of the ritual, conveying messages to the ritual participants. Sperber had a point when he criticised Turner on the grounds that the various indigenous interpretations of the symbols were part of what had to be explained, rather than constituting an explanation in their own right. However, by rejecting the whole idea of symbolic meaning and moving to a frame of analysis in which the most significant thing about 'symbolism' was to be precisely its meaninglessness, Sperber lost the vital link between ritual, individual emotion and social morality to which Turner's work pointed. Sperber and his followers, such as Pascal Boyer and Harvey Whitehouse, started a school of so-called cognitive anthropology which, like structuralism at its worst,[3] seemed to lose any interest in what the 'symbols' being analysed were actually doing in the social world, regarding them instead as indications of abstract and pan-human intellectual processes. The project of uncovering such processes is not necessarily invalid in its own terms, but it easily leads to a renunciation of cultural and social anthropology as a discipline that has anything real to say about how society operates.

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2   In this respect Turner's analyses of ritual build on and take for granted the sociological argument presented in his first major work on the Ndembu, *Schism and Continuity in an African Society* (Turner 1957), a point often missed when they have been taken up outside anthropology.

3   It should be noted that Lévi-Strauss himself, as Bateson pointed out, saw the logic of myth precisely as a window to the 'reasons of the heart' (Bateson 1973: 112).

Evans-Pritchard's deconstructions of Zande thought took place in a wider intellectual context in which the breakdown of Newtonian physics heralded by the theories of special and general relativity and the development of quantum theory were beginning to penetrate to the general educated public. Evans-Pritchard, as far as I know, never referred explicitly to this collapse of classical physics in his work. *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic* (Evans-Pritchard 1937) was, however, as noted above, to become a significant contributor to what was later known as the 'rationality debate' within philosophy, which was in many ways a response to the new physics. The effects of the breakdown of Newtonian science and the new approaches to the philosophy of science are evident in the work of Robin Horton (Horton 1967a, 1967b, 1993; Horton and Finnegan 1973). Horton was aware of and influenced by Turner's early analyses. Horton's own work was notable in that it both took African traditional thought seriously in its own terms and argued for its validity as a mode of thinking. An important element here was Horton's stress on the personalistic nature of African thought.[4] Horton was not directly interested in healing, but his argument that spirits could be theoretical entities on the same basis as the theoretical entities of Western science, along with Turner's more social and psychological analysis of ritual healing, opened the way for a serious consideration of the role of spirits in the healing process:

> *To say of the traditional African thinking that he is interested in supernatural rather than natural causes makes little more sense … than to say of the physicist that he is interested in nuclear rather than natural causes. In fact, both are making use of theory to transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by common sense. (Horton 1967a: 54)*

Here Horton in effect turned Evans-Pritchard's arguments, and their appropriation in the rationality debate as the basis of a critique of Western science, on their head. He was aware that background assumptions both structure intellectual thought and limit what can be thought within any given system, African or Western. However, rather than using this as an argument to deconstruct African thought and Western science, Horton argued that *both* systems of thought were valid approaches to the world. This position allowed for the acceptance of parallel but different sciences, each with its own partial efficacy and validity, a position that was also very compatible with parallel developments in the philosophy of science (e.g. Kuhn 1970; Munevar 1981, 1984; Samuel 1990).

Horton did not claim a total parity between African traditional thought and Western science here. In fact he accepted, in general terms, Karl Popper's distinction between 'closed' and 'open' systems of thought, and explored the reasons why 'open' systems developed in the West (natural science being of course Popper's primary example) (Horton 1967b). However, his work marked an important step towards taking traditional modes of healing seriously.

If the structural functionalism of the Gluckman school was to develop one of the major contributions to the understanding of healing in anthropology, another was to come from Claude Lévi-Strauss, the central figure of the structuralist school in anthropology. Lévi-Straussian structuralism within British anthropology tended to become a set of formal procedures for the analysis of fieldwork data, but Lévi-Strauss himself was less limited in his interests, and was particularly interested in how the healing process worked. He explored this theme in two remarkable papers, both originally published in 1949, 'The Sorcerer and His Magic' and 'The Effectiveness of Symbols' (Lévi-Strauss 1963a, 1963b). The second of

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4   On the contrast between 'personalistic' and 'naturalistic' idioms in medical anthropology, cf. Foster 1976; Teerink 1995; Samuel 2010.

these papers led to another important thread in the later analysis of healing practices, which had important parallels to Turner's work. Here the image of the body, the patient's internal sense of her or his physiological identity, was understood as part of the healing process, taking us considerably further into the physical meaning of symbols than did Turner. Lévi-Strauss treated the imagery of the shaman's chants as operating directly on the mind and body of the patient, here a woman undergoing a difficult childbirth, assisting her to relax her body and allow the child to be born.

Lévi-Strauss's analysis was schematic and in some respects problematic, as Joel Sherzer (1989) and Michael Taussig (1992) among others pointed out. However, as Carol Laderman noted (1987), the problematic aspects of Lévi-Strauss's analysis can be reformulated, and they do not detract from the highly productive insight of his work. As I have argued elsewhere, such a reformulation would provide for a more active and creative role for the person being healed, in which the imagery is less a series of directives to be followed in a mechanical manner than an opportunity to mobilise the mind-body's own ability to respond positively to the situation of crisis (Samuel 2005: 232–3; 2010).

Lévi-Strauss's work had the potential to break down the *cordon sanitaire* that had developed between anthropology and biology, but it took many years before that potential began to become reality. The alliance between evolutionary biology and the New Right in the 1970s and early 1980s, which led to a polarisation in the USA and elsewhere between a minority of anthropologists who adopted the new evolutionary approaches and a majority who rejected them outright, did not help the situation. Many of the more creative minds in anthropology rejected the whole attempt to build connections with biology, retreating into literary and humanistic approaches to the discipline. The introduction of the body into the anthropological study of healing was thus a slow process. However the development of the new sub-discipline of medical anthropology in the 1980s, to a significant degree through the work of biomedical practitioners such as Arthur Kleinman who had turned to anthropology in order to develop a critical perspective on biomedical practice, began to change the situation. The relatively easy access to funding for medical anthropology also helped this to become a growth area within anthropology as a whole.

Medical Anthropology

The new approach was exemplified in works such as Kleinman's *Patients and Healers in the Context of Culture* and *The Illness Narratives* (Kleinman 1980, 1988). These works, and other writings of the first generation of medical anthropologists, stressed the difference between the biomedically-defined entity ('disease') and the patient's experience of 'illness', often grounded in 'folk models' which, unlike the biomedical disease entity, often include strong elements of moral and personal meaning. Consequently, effective healing needed to respond to the patient's illness as well as to the biomedical disease. Thus eliciting and making sense of the narrative the patient constructs around the illness, and of the explanatory models implicit in that narrative, became a key process for medical anthropologists. However, as is clear from the final chapter of *Patients and Healers* (Kleinman 1980: 311–74, earlier published separately as Kleinman and Sung 1979), Kleinman's work continued to assume that, in effect, the biomedical analysis was correct. In this chapter Kleinman asked why it was that the indigenous practitioners he studied in his Taiwanese research project were able to heal successfully. The answer, essentially, was because most of the patients were not seriously ill, in biomedical terms, in the first place. Of the 100 cases he followed 90 per cent were suffering from:

(1) non-life-threatening, chronic diseases in which management of psychological and social problems relating to the illness were the chief concerns of clinical management; (2) minimal, self-limiting diseases; and (3) somatization [i.e. physical symptoms which Kleinman regarded as expressions of an underlying psychological disorder]. The last group accounted for almost 50 per cent of cases. The overwhelming majority of these cases were satisfied with the indigenous care they received and believed it to be at least partially effective. However, most cases with severe acute diseases in this sample were not satisfied with indigenous care and did not believe it to be effective. (Kleinman 1980: 330–31)

'Therapeutic efficacy' for the minor disorders which indigenous practitioners could heal was 'principally a function of the treatment of the psychosocial and cultural aspects of the disease' (1980: 361).

Kleinman's main, and very significant, practical concern was to emphasise the need, both in Taiwan and in other medical contexts, for the practitioner to respond to and treat the illness as well as the disease. Good doctors, he argued, had always done this, but the professional training of modern Western practitioners was making it increasingly difficult for them to do so (1980: 363). This concern with what has been lost in modern Western medicine continues to be a major theme within medical anthropology, for example in Adams, Schrempf and Craig's call to recognise how the sensibility of traditional Tibetan medicine (*sowa rigpa*) goes beyond that of Western biomedicine to recognise the need for healing to operate at all levels, not just the organic (Adams, Schrempf and Craig 2011). Analytically, though, Kleinman's model was not much different from Evans-Pritchard's. The Taiwanese *tang-ki* (spirit-mediums or shamans) might help the patient, but they did not really deal with the underlying organic problem.

Subsequent scholars in this tradition, such as Thomas Csordas, equally tended to assume that the 'healing' brought about by indigenous healers was limited if not illusory. Csordas explained the success of a charismatic healer in terms of a 'margin of disability'. The sick person unable to move a limb, or claiming to be blind, actually had some ability to move or to see, but was not sufficiently motivated to do so until the ritual procedures of the healer created a situation in which it became appropriate and worthwhile (Csordas 1997: 71–2).

Csordas emphasised the importance of what he refers to as the 'somatic mode of attention', a mode of bodily self-awareness which he argued was largely unrecognised in North American culture, where the body was experienced as sensations and the constructive role of body imagery in shaping those 'sensations' was neglected (Csordas 1997: 67–70; 2002: 241–59). It was the healer's ability to manipulate and bring about changes in this mode of attention that was at the basis of successful charismatic healing. As I have noted elsewhere, Csordas's model was essentially that of an equilibrium (constituted by the established way in which the body is perceived, the *habitus* in Bourdieu's vocabulary) punctuated by episodes of change brought about by the healer (Samuel 2010: 13). In this respect his approach was close to that of Turner, who also saw the ritual process as providing an opportunity for the ill person to undergo change and transformation. Csordas's work brings us closer to a sense of the body as experienced, but for him, as for Kleinman, the biomedical diagnosis remains primary, and symbolic healing can bring about change in the physical body to a very limited degree.

An important step onwards was being taken at around the same time in the writings of a group of medical anthropologists influenced by a different series of influences, the growing body of work in science and technology studies stimulated by the approaches of Bruno Latour and others, and related work in the feminist critique of science by Donna Haraway. Important examples here are Emily Martin, Margaret Lock and Annemarie Mol, all of whom

turned to examine the practices through which biomedicine itself produced its authoritative understandings of human pathology (e.g. Martin 2001, 2007; Lock 1993, 2013; Mol 2002; Mol and Berg 1994). In their analyses, and in parallel work in the sociology of medical knowledge (e.g. Featherstone and Atkinson 2012), the biomedical categories themselves began to become less solid, and the ways by which a biomedical diagnosis is constituted were themselves brought under the analytic gaze. Martin in particular had a strong focus on the specific ways in which the distinction between mind and body, and the primacy of the material level, was constructed and rigidified in biomedical thought and in science more generally (Martin 1998, 2000). This move to examine the creation of biomedical knowledge was important, because in undermining the epistemological authority of the scientific framework, it became possible to see the relationship between biomedicine and non-biomedical healing in a very different light.

What this work made increasingly clear was that biomedical knowledge was not simply a product of objective scientific processes. The processes by which it came into being constituted specific bodies of biomedical knowledge, whereas other, equally scientific and objective processes, had they received similar levels of support from state and industry, might have yielded quite other forms of knowledge. This can be seen clearly in the elaborate randomised double-blind protocols currently used for testing pharmaceuticals and other medical treatments. These procedures were introduced for sound biomedical reasons, in order to generate criteria for the choice and use of pharmaceuticals and the best distribution of limited resources. The protocols, and the meta-analyses created by combining results from numerous randomised controlled trials (RCTs) conducted according to them, were long regarded as the gold standard of reliable and objective biomedical knowledge. The extent to which the results of these protocols have been biased and distorted by the commercial interests of pharmaceutical companies is gradually becoming clear (Healy 2012; Goldacre 2012). Results showing problematic side effects are routinely suppressed, full records of trials not made available, and so on. However, leaving all this aside, what is less recognised is the extent to which, even if the protocols were applied properly, they would shape the knowledge they produce (Moerman 2002).

Thus, the whole concept of a randomised trial is dependent on a pre-existing biomedical definition of the condition, since it requires that one can define a large sample of patients each of whom can be regarded as having the *same* disease or medical condition. Even leaving aside the unavoidable degree of subjectivity in defining many conditions, the patients are of course not the same in other respects, however carefully samples are matched. The procedure also requires that the same treatment be given consistently, which makes it impossible to apply the RCT procedure properly to therapeutical traditions such as Tibetan medicine, where the drugs used may be changed every few days in response to changes in the patient's condition (Adams 2002; see also Craig 2012). In any case, since Tibetan remedies (like many other traditional pharmacological remedies) consist of compounds of different herbs or mineral products, none of them entirely consistent in their composition, and RCTs are typically carried out on single chemical constituents in isolation, the application of Tibetan remedies under RCT conditions generally bears little resemblance to their use in Tibetan clinical practice. Traditional Chinese medicine faces analogous problems, since a prescription is typically a mixture of ingredients designed for the individual patient, contradicting the whole idea of a sample of patients with the 'same' condition to whom the RCT protocol could be applied.

Similar difficulties occur with many non-biomedical systems of healing, especially those that differ far more than Chinese or Tibetan medicine from the general framework of biomedical practice. The traditional Chinese or Tibetan doctor is, after all, still engaged in providing a pharmacologically active remedy to an illness seen in organic or quasi-organic

terms. Many modes of healing do not have this form. Consider acupuncture, for example. Since the double blind procedure requires that the physicians administering the remedies are themselves not aware of whether a particular pill is genuine or placebo, RCTs cannot be applied properly to a procedure such as acupuncture, where the therapist has to be aware of whether the procedure is being applied properly or not.[5]

In these and other ways, even under ideal conditions, the RCT does not select the best therapy out of the range of all possible therapies. It selects the best therapy out of a set of procedures that has been artificially narrowed and distorted by the demands of the RCT, demands that exclude all kinds of therapies not because they are not efficacious but because they cannot be fitted into the Procrustean bed of the RCT.

Meaning in Healing: The Role of the Bodymind

The RCT process, however, has had the virtue of highlighting how much of the healing process cannot in fact be attributed to pharmaceutical remedies and other physical interventions. In the RCT framework, this issue takes the form of the so-called 'placebo effect'. Daniel Moerman has pointed out that the whole concept of a placebo is incoherent and inconsistent (Moerman 2002; Moerman and Jonas 2002) but what is evident is that medical interventions in very many cases affect only a part, often a relatively small part, of the process of healing, and that what Moerman refers to as the 'meaning response' ('the physiological or psychological effects of meaning in the origins or treatment of illness'; Moerman and Jonas 2002: 472) often accounts for as much, or substantially more.

This brings us back to the analyses of Lévi-Strauss, Turner and their anthropological successors, which focus precisely on questions of meaning. A useful bridge here is the role of the immune system, as discussed in James Wilce's edited collection *The Social and Cultural Lives of Immune Systems* (Wilce 2003), particularly the contribution Wilce wrote with Laurie Price, 'Metaphors Our Bodyminds Live By' (Wilce and Price 2003). If one can accept that the metaphorical structure of the narratives, rituals and practices surrounding medical treatment and healing can have a real effect on the immune system, and so on the success of the treatment, physiologically as well as psychologically, then the complex and elaborate healing ritual performances found in many cultures, often incorporating elaborate theatrical sequences, music and dance, begin to look, at least potentially, like sophisticated ways of operating with the meaning response (cf. Samuel 2005: 229–55; 2010; Kapferer 1979, 1983; Laderman 1987, 1991; and many other ethnographic studies). Of course, this does not guarantee that any particular ritual will be effective in any particular situation. In fact, the hallmark of many of these practices tends to be high levels of redundancy, with positive messages being repeated over and over again in many different forms and sensory modalities, presumably so as to maximise the possibilities that they can be used effectively by the patient's body and mind – or perhaps one should say, as do Wilce and Price, 'bodymind'.

The use of 'bodymind' (or 'mindbody') here has the virtue of reminding us that the distinction between body and mind (or body and spirit, soul etc.) has a paradigmatic force for most Western scientists that is certainly not shared by non-Western cultures, or even by

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5   There have of course been attempts made to apply RCTs, or something as close as possible to them, to Tibetan medicine and similar traditions, and to acupuncture, in a more realistic manner, but these generally lead to other problems. In any case, once the RCT protocols are not strictly followed, the likelihood of the results being taken seriously by the biomedical establishment becomes very much lower.

many lay people within Western societies. Here again biomedicine tends to take for granted what remains to be proven; the biomedical tendency to treat mental or psychological factors as minor or peripheral in the process of healing reflects a generally unexamined ontology in which mental and psychological factors are regarded as secondary and derivative. This is not the case in many other cultures, where 'subtle body' concepts such as *qi* and *prāṇa* refer explicitly to processes that are intermediate in level between 'mind' and 'body' as conceived of in biomedicine and mainstream Western thought. Such concepts frequently have an important role in relation to healing practices (Samuel and Johnson 2013; Mayor and Micozzi 2011). The current dominance of cognitive neuroscience on the intellectual scene tends to marginalise such ideas and practices, but they arguably deserve to be taken much more seriously as alternative scientific accounts that allow the analyst to grasp, and the therapist to work with, connections and relationships obscured by contemporary biomedicine. In a couple of recent essays, I have argued for the illegitimacy of excluding such concepts on scientific grounds (Samuel 2013a) and I have also described in some detail how they form the basis of a specific Tibetan healing practice, *tsedrup* or 'accomplishment of [control over] life-span' (Samuel 2013b).

If anthropological theory needs to work across the body-mind distinction to make sense of indigenous healing theories and practices, it also needs to transcend the individual-group distinction. Victor Turner saw the significance of this issue, and his own ritual analyses made important steps to integrate the two levels of analysis. It is here that we can begin to understand the significance of the spirits that are so common as explanatory agents in non-Western understandings of illness. The specific heritage of Christianity leads Westerners to see spirits as imagined, and implausible, external entities, but a closer look at the way in which spirit-vocabularies are employed might suggest that they often refer to processes that are internal *and* external, and entrain both body *and* mind, or more accurately the bodymind as a whole (cf. Samuel 1990). The equivalence between spirits, winds, breath and internal currents that can be found in, for example, several East and Southeast Asian understandings of healing also point in this direction (cf. Laderman 1991; Lo and Schroer 2005; Low and Hsu 2007). If we can see the spirits and forces in these various vocabularies as ways of grasping and working with processes of imbalance and breakdown within both the human bodymind and its social and ecological context, then the practices that employ them begin to make as much sense as those of biomedicine, if in a different register and vocabulary. To return to Horton's observation regarding traditional African thought and physics that I cited earlier, both biomedicine and spirit-healing 'are making use of theory to transcend the limited vision of natural causes provided by common sense' (Horton 1967a: 54).

Practices such as the Tibetan *tsedrup* rituals work explicitly across both body-mind and self-other boundaries (cf. Samuel 2012, 2013b). *Tsedrup* is a Buddhist tantric practice and so assumes, at some level, the relativity of our ordinary conceptions of self and other, consciousness and material reality. Ultimately, for Buddhists, reality is unknowable except through the direct insight of a Buddha, but *tsedrup*, like much Tantric ritual, has its own model of reality. This involves the possibility of moving back and forth (Samuel 2012, 2013b) between the everyday reality of the ordinary world and the transformed reality represented by the Tantric mandala. The ordinary world is inhabited by human and non-human entities who can drain or damage the various life-energies within the bodymind, according to idioms of soul-loss and sorcery similar to those found in many societies. The Tantric mandala, however, represents the universe as a pure realm inhabited by Tantric gods and goddesses, who are themselves fractal expressions of the Buddha-nature innate within all phenomena, and whose intrinsic motivation is that of compassion and healing (Samuel 2013b). It thus provides a source from which these drained and damaged energies can be replenished.

Yogic practitioners learn to transform themselves through creative imagination into the central deities of the mandala, and to transform their material and social environment into the pure realm of the deities. The pure essence of the universe (*rāsa* or *amṛta* in Sanskrit, *chüd* or *düdtsi* in Tibetan) can then be drawn in to restore and supplement the depleted energies of the ordinary body, and also accumulated and transferred to strengthen the health of lay people, for whom large-scale 'life empowerment' (*tsedrup*) rituals are regularly performed. Other, similar rituals (*mendrup*) are used to empower the herbal and mineral medicines used in traditional Tibetan medicine, and this ritual empowerment of medicine is regarded as an important part of the action of the medicines (Craig 2011: 218–28; Blaikie 2013: 7–9). Doctors too may undertake rituals such as the Yuthok Nyingthik empowerments, which are understood as both strengthening their motivation and improving their ability as a doctor.[6] In the contemporary context, *tsedrup* may also be performed for patients in hospital, as a way of strengthening their life-forces in parallel with biomedical treatment.

The point here is not so much whether *tsedrup*, *tsewang*, *mendrup* and the like are efficacious in biomedical terms. This is a question that it is in any case virtually impossible to test via RCT methodology, for the reasons sketched above among others (Craig 2011). The point is more that unless we are prepared to consider such fluid transactions between patient, doctor, medicine and environment as possible, the question of their efficacy cannot even be meaningfully asked. Yet if the meaning response discussed by Moerman is taken seriously, it indicates the importance of transactions of this kind (Moerman and Jonas 2002; Moerman 2002). There is no good reason why they should be ruled out of court within medicine, especially given that, as the so-called placebo effect indicates, much of the process of healing is not adequately explained by biomedical science.

The transactions and effects postulated by Tantric theory, such as the effect of a Tantric empowerment on the efficacy of a medicine or the diagnostic skill of a doctor, go some way beyond the meaning response as discussed by Moerman. However, from the perspective of post-Newtonian physics, interactions of this kind are hardly inconceivable, even if we are some way at this stage from being able to construct a detailed model of their mechanism (cf. Schwartz, Stapp and Beauregard 2005), and again it seems premature to conclude that they do not and cannot take place.

Cultures such as Tibet, China and India have developed sophisticated bodies of scholarly knowledge that attempt to grasp and to make intellectual sense of the kinds of healing process involved in *tsedrup*. The basic transactions involved have, however, many similarities to healing processes in many cultures, including those of small-scale preliterate societies, that understand illness and healing to be related to spirit-entities, lost soul-substances and similar concepts. Indigenous understandings of such healing techniques are generally more concerned with assisting practitioners to handle the processes involved than in providing a sophisticated intellectual model, but the general point remains, that we are unlikely to get very far in understanding practices such as spirit-healing unless we begin by enlarging our model of the universe to include the possibility of the basic premises according to which they operate.

It seems to me that, if anthropology is to develop a genuinely adequate account of the healing processes that it studies, it is important to start by recognising the complexity of the self, of consciousness and the mind-body process, including their social and biological situatedness. That process will involve moving beyond the comfort zone of much current anthropological thinking, and entering into a substantial dialogue with relevant areas of

6   A number of papers focused on these rituals at a recent Wellcome Trust-supported conference on 'Sacred Transmission in Tibetan Medicine' organised by Mingji Cuomu and Elisabeth Hsu at the University of Oxford, 24–25 May 2014, including presentations by Mingji Cuomu, Lujam Gyal and Sienna Craig.

biomedical science and biology more generally. I am particularly thinking here of areas such as neuroimmunology, neuroendocrinology, and neuroscience more generally, which might give us some real grasp on how Moerman's 'meaning response' is translated into healing. It is, I think, not coincidental that a recurrent and valid concern of the various critiques of neuroscience that have emerged in recent years has been the lack of attention to the social and cultural aspects of the neuroscientific account of consciousness (see e.g. Martin 2000; Choudhury and Slaby 2011). This is precisely the area where anthropology has a great deal to offer. There is room here for a productive encounter.

So far, though, there has been little sign of constructive engagement between anthropology and neuroscience. This is unfortunate, since a dialogue with neuroscience, for all the theoretical naivety and crudity, and the problematic underlying assumptions, of its dominant contemporary versions, offers an opening towards a wider and more inclusive perspective on the whole area of healing. Present day neuroscience is as much the impoverished product of an arbitrary and limiting set of procedures as is the evidence-based medicine resulting from the RCT protocols, but this does not exclude the possibility of a neuroscience that could genuinely incorporate mental and psychic factors, and social and cultural contexts. Such a more complex conceptual structure, which includes emotional, cognitive and physiological components of the mindbody on an equal basis, could provide the basis for a more effective and more adequate model of healing, within which the spirit-vocabularies and other apparently exotic concepts of non-Western thought could be seen as valid and appropriate ways of describing real processes. In such a development, the anthropology of healing would have a central and essential role to play.

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Embodiment, Performance and Healing

Anne Sigfrid Grønseth

Introduction

Embodiment, performance and healing are concepts that cover vast and plural fields for research, and they can by no means be fully discussed in this one chapter. I will narrow down the discussion by focusing on certain intersections between these concepts with the aim to illuminate our understanding of the human self as it is related to experiences of illness and well-being. Taking this approach, the chapter argues self to be embodied and constituted within, across and between diverse cultural and social life-worlds that structure and direct individuals' everyday life experiences (see Grønseth 2013). This position reflects how I explore senses of self and personhood less as culturally established concepts and more as experiences of actual behaviour and negotiations of interactions in peoples' everyday lives, thus linking the building of personhood and the sense of self to the realm of embodiment and sensorial experiences (see also Strathern and Stewart 2011:393). Furthermore, this approach arises out of my study on Tamil refugees as they visit Norwegian health-care centres with various illnesses and diffuse bodily pains such as headaches, stomach pain, dizziness, fevers, fatigue and sleeplessness (Grønseth 2010a). While the study starts out from a medical model focusing on illnesses within the context of doctor–patient relations, it has turned to a client-centred model including the wider context of Tamil social relations and experiences of not only pain, but also pleasure and well-being. Through this move I have become attuned to embodied tensions in everyday life, including performance and ritual practices within a quest for health and well-being. When paying attention to performative practices, I further came to recognize the impact of relations between humans and non-humans, as the latter includes gods, material objects and visual images that are seen to interact in the human experiences of self, illness and well-being (Grønseth 2012).

As will appear, my approach to illness and well-being as embodied experiences of social life includes a concern for the human creation of meaning and knowledge. The link to the creation of meaning and knowledge comes from recognizing how suffering and pain can open up a complex agency that emerges in intersubjective spaces between self and other(s), humans or non-humans. In such agentive and intersubjective moments, the sense of self can be re-formed and find new meanings and knowledge about everyday social life. Sometimes the new sense of self and its being in the world can heal moral and social ruptures and tie together fractures into a new meaningful wholeness that supplies well-being and pleasure. Of course, the opposite may also occur, as the new or diminished sense of self can struggle with ruptures and conflicts that may lead to pain, illness and destruction.

In this view, I see the process of healing to include the whole person – body and mind – with physical, social, spiritual and moral components (see also Strathern and Stewart

1999:7). Thus, healing is understood to differ from curing, which is seen as successfully treating a specific condition (Strathern and Stewart 1999:7), or other diseases understood as biological or biochemical malfunctions (Finkler 1994:5). In this view disease differs from illness, as the latter refers to the patient's own perception of an impaired function (for more on the distinction between disease and illness, see Fabrega 1974; Kleinman 1980; Finkler 1994 and others). As Strathern and Stewart (1999:7) point out, we can see how healing and curing to some extent matches the distinction between disease and illness. However, there are overlaps that are in a more or less well-balanced relationship depending on the specific context. In various contexts both approaches can be included, while often one of them will have the stronger emphasis. Generally, there is a tendency for the non-biomedical or 'non-Western' systems to be stronger on healing than curing (Foster and Anderson 1978). Moreover, the difference refers to how curing and healing resonates with the underlying distinction between body and mind. Just as my study of Tamil illness argues for a need to reach beyond the distinction between body and mind by employing the holistic term 'embodiment', so it is also necessary to breach the differences between healing and curing, as they sometimes depend on each other. As Strathern and Stewart observe, curing may depend on emotional states, healing on physical states (1999:8).

While recognizing the need for multiple approaches in dealing with human suffering and pain, disease and illness, this chapter further sees healing as linked to Tamils' illnesses which are often expressed in bodily pains (mentioned above) and also feelings like 'lost and alone', 'no peace at heart', 'loss of self' and 'not worthy' as fully social persons. The Tamils dealt with such experiences through everyday ritual performances in which relations to Hindu gods, images and other objects interact in significant ways. In this context, I propose the perspective of ritualization (Bell 1992, 1997) and performance to be fruitful, as they sometimes highlight the sensory aspects of experience and are understood to occur on many different occasions and in many different kinds.

Performance can be seen to cover a continuum of human actions like rituals, play, sports, theatre, dance, music, the everyday enacting of social, professional, gender, race and class roles, and engagement in media and the Internet (Schechner and Brady 2013), as well as different actions of healing or curing. Many performances can belong to more than one category along such a continuum. As Schechner and Brady point out: 'The underlying notion is that any action that is framed, enacted, presented, highlighted, or displayed is a performance' (2013:2). The concept of performance opens up the study of text, architecture, visual arts or other objects, not as what they are in themselves, but as interactors in ongoing relationships. This is an approach in which one does not 'read' the ritual, act, event, picture or object as a text (see Geertz 1973). Rather, one examines how the 'thing', the object of inquiry, interacts with those present and how 'it' changes over time. In this way, even though the thing in itself is relative stable, it is the thing's 'liveliness' which is at issue (Schechner and Brady 2013:2), how it is part of, enacts in and creates behaviours, practices, feelings and sensations.

This approach encourages how I suggest that objects and images are interactors in everyday Tamil practices, senses of self and quests for well-being (Grønseth 2012). Experiences of personhood and self are constantly reconstituted by bodily sensory perceptions of social relations and the environment. Here, I draw inspiration from theories of 'embodiment' (Csordas 1994, 2002) and 'being-in-the-world' (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [1945]) emphasizing that emotions and feelings do not originate in a biological and pre-cultural domain, but arise in an existential experience that transcends the dichotomies of mind/body and culture/nature. Thus feelings and emotions are seen to originate from the interplay between bodily perceptions and sensations, as well as cognitive processes of language and discourses. In this view embodiment is understood as patterns of behaviour inscribed in or enacted in

the body, thus linking the body as a source of perception to the realms of agency, practices, emotions and meanings.

Underscoring how embodiment and sensory experiences of one's surroundings support memory and can transform a person over time, embodiment is seen as highly related to our senses of self, and thus they affect an individual's understanding and experience of their personhood (see Strathern and Stewart 2011). As Strathern and Stewart observe, this implies that '… embodiment does not simply refer to the body as a bounded entity but rather to the body, and the person, in their surrounding environment' (2011:393). Moreover, this view highlights how individual senses of self can vary and change in relation to which sensory experiences are being felt, understood or chosen as important in a particular context. In this perspective it becomes pivotal to recognize emotions as being formed by and contributing to the formation of local, national and international politics and structures. Exploring the embodied and tacit, I propose, allows me to examine how objects and items interplay with Tamil senses of illness, well-being and identity. Furthermore, this approach permits me to access domains of experience and intersubjectivity which facilitate an exploration of illness and well-being as this can be seen as results of an interactive process between the human body and its social, cultural and material environments.

This view links to the idea that the experience of 'things' is in itself a meaningful encounter (Henare et al. 2007:4). 'Things' are not defined or categorized beforehand by the researcher, but present themselves heuristically within a particular field of identified phenomena. Thus, things can be seen not only as 'matters of fact' but as 'matters of concern' (Latour 2004; see also Grønseth 2012). Looking at things as a 'matter of concern' aims to transcend the dualism of objects and subjects. What matters is not human bodies or material forms, but rather the relations between them (Miller 2005). Moreover, attention is drawn not to the dialectics between subject and object, but to the nature of agency (Latour 1999; Gell 1998; Strathern 1988; see also Miller 2005). This view fits with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological understanding of the human body as not only perceptive, but also as active and as intentionally creating meaning, a view that contributes to an understanding of many Tamil refugees' experiences of illness and stigma, as well as well-being and comfort (Grønseth 2010a).

A perspective based on performance and materiality deals with embodiment and agency interculturally, as it recognizes that cultures are always interacting while also profoundly different and often at play in asymmetrical and hegemonic relations of power. When examining Tamils' illness and well-being in Norway, these overarching perspectives come into play in the contexts of othering, stigmatization and producing second-class citizens, which have profound implications for experiences of self and well-being (see Grønseth 2010a, 2010c). Thus, the chapter suggests embodiment, performance and healing to be a fruitful approach for investigations of experiences of personhood and senses of self.

In the following I will first briefly depict the background to the Sri Lanka civil war, describe how Tamil refugees re-settled along the Arctic coast of Norway, where they found well-paid jobs in the fishing industry and a safe place to live, and show why they then moved on to Silver Forest outside the capital city of Oslo. Secondly, I present the story of Amara and Murukan, which illustrates how many Tamils experienced feelings of 'aloneness' and of having 'no peace at heart' together with fatigue, dizziness and bodily pains which brought them to the local health-care centre to consult a doctor and intensify ritual performances. Thirdly, the chapter discusses embodiment and intentionality as Tamils' pain and suffering are understood as a response to tensions in ongoing social relations. Fourthly, the discussion includes a perspective on performance and artefacts, as these highlight a crucial dimension in Tamils' negotiations of self and identity. The fifth section looks at how processes of healing and belonging are interrelated and give direction to creating new imageries of social life. Lastly, and by way of concluding, I highlight how the employed perspectives

of embodiment, performance and healing call for an understanding of the creation of knowledge as fundamentally partial and as related to how we deal with each other and comprehend the complexity in relations that characterize it.

Tamil Refugees Negotiating Place and Identity: From Arctic Harbour to Silver Forest

Though to describe the Sri Lankan conflict itself is beyond the scope of this chapter, I will briefly mention the context of the civil war for Tamil refugees in Norway (for a more thorough background, see Tambiah 1991; Hoole et al. 1992; Fuglerud 1999; Grønseth 2010a and others). The convolutions of inter-ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri Lanka are as vast as they are heart-breaking and horrendous for those who have experienced it as part of their daily lives. The Tamil minority situation has been a political issue since Sri Lanka's independence in 1948. Political tensions and discrimination increased when, in 1956, Sinhalese was declared to be the official language of the island. In June 1983 there were upheavals in which many were killed and others had to flee their homes. Among different political and guerrilla movements, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) were the most aggressive and led the opposition fighting for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The traditional Tamil majority areas of Jaffna in the north and eastern Sri Lanka were declared war zones, and most Tamil people now live in exile or as refugees in their own country. Following the end of the war in May 2009, the LTTE dropped its demands for a separate state in favour of a federal solution. Since the civil war ended the Tamil diaspora has continued to protest against the war by urging governments to undertake investigations of war crimes in Sri Lanka.

While acknowledging the tensions and complexities of the civil war and ultimate declaration of peace, the focus of the present chapter is on Tamils from Sri Lanka who are living in Norway as refugees in the diaspora. According to Statistics Norway, on 1 January 2011, 13.1 per cent of Norway's total population consisted of around 460,000 immigrants and their descendants from 219 different countries and self-governed regions (for more on Norway's immigrant populations, see Henriksen et al. 2010). At that time, 157,692 immigrants had refugee backgrounds, of whom 114,760 were refugees themselves and a further 42,932 had arrived as family members to be reunited with them. This total represents about 3.2 per cent of Norway's total population. Of this population, 14,293 have a Sri Lankan background. According to figures from 1 January 2012, a year later, 8,816 individuals were first-generation immigrants and 5,477 had been born in Norway of parents both of whom came from Sri Lanka. Virtually all the Sri Lankans are Tamils.

Being a refugee implies a sense of being forced to escape from life-threatening circumstances, such as political persecution and war; it often implies sudden departures and a need to travel at great risk, together with great uncertainty about one's destination and future prospects (Malkki 1995; Daniel and Knudsen 1995; Jenkins 1996; Sideris 2003; Hammond 2004; Zmegac 2007; Migliorino 2008). The refugee experience can generally be divided into four phases (Desjarlais et al. 1995:140): the pre-flight period, in which the pressure of the situation increases and a decision to leave is reached, the escape of migrating from one place to another, and the reception period that passes before the person returns to his or her home region, or settles in the asylum country or in some third location in the fourth phase.

This investigation looks into the fourth period of resettlement and long-term residence, with a focus on the daily efforts to adapt and the quest for well-being on the part of Tamil refugees in their new environment (see also Grønseth 2010a). The present study confirms how research on refugees generally discusses problems related to cultural differences,

acculturation and social ties, and suggests that refugees have a better chance of retaining their psychosocial health if they maintain strong social and community ties and a sense of cultural identity (Desjarlais et al. 1995:143). Difficulties in obtaining appropriate employment can provide an additional long-term stress factor and may threaten one's sense of self-esteem, as well as one's standard of living. However, while not disputing such general features, this chapter explores how embodied social suffering (Kleinman et al. 1997) can also be seen as granting access to an existential agency in forming new senses of identity, self and well-being.

In 1975, Norway closed its borders to immigration. Since then, not only immigration laws but also refugee policies have become ever more restrictive. In addition to the annual UN quota of refugees of about 700–1,000, individual asylum-seekers also arrive. In Norway, asylum-seekers are the responsibility of the government. While waiting for their cases to be concluded, they live in special refugee reception centres (*asylmottak*), spread throughout the country. The few asylum-seekers that are either granted refugee status or residence on humanitarian grounds are relocated to municipal settlements (*kommunal bosetting*). The time spent in reception centres may vary from a few months to more than a year (see Lauritzen and Berg 1999). Norwegian refugee policy shows little sensitivity to the difficult and often urgent situation for many asylum-seekers. As a consequence, there is a steady increase of people who avoid applying for asylum, or disappear from the refugee centres and become illegal or non-existent residents.

As one can see, the process of applying for asylum or residence is time-consuming and strenuous, as the Norwegian authorities are steadily becoming sterner in their acceptance of refugees. Upon arrival in Norway, Tamil refugees felt they were being treated with suspicion and mistrust and find that they occupy the lower end of the Norwegian social hierarchy. These experiences influence how many refugees and Tamils perceive their being part of Norway as being marginalized as an evolving 'underclass' (Myrdal 1963; Wikan 1995; Grønseth 2010c), and as being excluded from Norwegian social life (Grønseth 2010a, 2011).

Arctic Harbour

Arctic Harbour was one of several fishing communities along the northern coast of Norway where there was a substantial settlement of Tamils – about 200 out of a total of approximately 2,500 inhabitants in the period 1999–2000. The numbers vary as the population as a whole is shifting, mostly according to fluctuations in the need for labour in the fishing industry. From national and political perspectives, the fishing communities in Finnmark are regarded as isolated, marginal and dependent on the whims of nature and the fishing industry. Nevertheless, the settlements are considered to be of great importance to the national economy and social structure (Brox 1987), a fact that provides arguments for national subsidies to the fishing industry, the establishment of a modern infrastructure and a minimum of social welfare.

Arctic Harbour lies inland in a small fjord near the Barents Sea and the open ocean stretching to the North Pole. The buildings and houses of Arctic Harbour surround the interior of the fjord and mainly stretch along one main road and down several side streets. The village extends for approximately three kilometres. The great flat, windswept mountains rise along the shore behind the settlements leading to the Finnmarksvidda plateau.[1] There is

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1   The inhabitants of Finnmarksvidda are mostly the indigenous Sami populations that traditionally make a living as reindeer (caribou) herdsmen. Along the coast there is a more mixed population consisting of Sami peoples combining fishing and reindeer-keeping and non-Sami Norwegian inhabitants.

not a tree in sight, only a few bushes firmly secured between cracks providing shelter from the storms, which sweep the area. On a lovely summer's day the temperature is still below 20°C, and the air may be thick with swarms of mosquitoes. The sun shines both day and night, never dipping below the horizon from May until July. Then, between November and February, the sun gradually descends and disappears altogether. During the winter blizzards, the roads are closed and covered by snow and ice. There are also times when even the small aircraft, especially built for the tough climate and short airstrips, are grounded. In such periods, people in Arctic Harbour are rather isolated; in emergency situations, there is no transportation to hospital services.

In Arctic Harbour four fishing plants provide the community with work and a good economy. In the mid-1980s Arctic Harbour experienced a dramatic shortage of labour. Knowing that Tamil refugees needed a community to settle in, the municipality made a request to the Governmental Refugee Secretary (GRS) to use refugee labour in the fishing industry. In 1987, after some negotiations, an agreement was reached, and five married couples and a single young man were sent to Arctic Harbour. Each Tamil family and the young single man were designated a host-family who introduced them to Norwegian local ways of life which included hiking, fishing and local foods and dishes. Since then,[2] Tamils have been invited to Arctic Harbour as wage workers in the fishing industry and have proved to be necessary resources for the local economy. Not only in Arctic Harbour but also in most of Finnmark's fishing villages, Tamils have settled and found work in fish plants. The mayor of one community emphasized their dependence on Tamil labour, stating in a national newspaper: 'Without the Tamils, our community would cease to exist'. The Tamil labour force in the community is highly valued, but the work itself is not. The local population traditionally regards 'cutting' as low-status women's work. Even though the Tamil population is well integrated into the local (and national) economy, they are socially and culturally segregated. They rarely mix with the locals. Nevertheless, some Tamils express a wish to live in small places such as Arctic Harbour because these places offer well-paid jobs, a close network of Tamils and a local Tamil association providing the experience of social security and cultural continuity.

When living in exile without the traditional social organization regulated by kin, caste, temple and neighbourhood, the Tamils experienced living outside order and struggled to find trust and confidence in each other. Having been torn apart from village and kin (*akam*), being thrown together with others in a radically different place produced a strong sense of chaos (*puram*), insecurity and loneliness (*tanimai tosam*). In particular, issues of illness (particularly mental illness), politics and caste were carefully avoided so as not to expose themselves to additional social and emotional tensions arising from gossip, shame and stigmatization. For many, the close but still incomplete local Tamil community combined with the monotonous work at the fish plant constitutes a difficult life. They find little (or no) opportunity for other kinds of work, which leaves them with scarce hopes of social mobility within the local community. Furthermore, Tamils experience being forced to be with other Tamils whom they do not consider 'proper to be with'. Lacking a more coherent community, the Tamils are forced to relate to unknown and sometimes inappropriate Tamils. This causes uncertainty, mistrust and discomfort about Tamil social relations. Another source of discomfort for many Tamils is a lack of opportunities to practice Hindu rituals

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2   To my knowledge, there exist two different accounts of how the first Tamils actually settled in Arctic Harbour. The one presented here bears an official status as it refers to a verbal account by the local refugee consultant employed at the time. An owner of one of the fish plants told me a slightly different story. He stated that he himself contacted GRS, which resulted in some Tamils arriving before the municipality organized a settlement schedule. Both accounts nevertheless mention GRS's initial refusal to send refugees to the cold outskirts and the ensuing dispute.

and participate in religious life. There is no Hindu temple, Hindu priest or any other crucial religious component in the local community.

Tamils look to Oslo to ensure higher education opportunities for their children, which are lacking altogether in Arctic Harbour and are severely limited within Finnmark County. Since many Tamils succeed in financial matters, they make plans to move farther south in Norway, mostly to the capital, Oslo. In Oslo there is a Tamil Hindu temple, Tamil Hindu priest and larger and more complete Tamil community (though not without factions and tensions). Furthermore, Oslo offers a broad range of schools, colleges and a university, as well as more varied job options (although they are still low-status jobs).

During my one year of fieldwork, most of the roughly 65 families residing in Arctic Harbour told me of their plans to move to Oslo sometime in the near future. A few families moved during my fieldwork, more followed in the summer of 2000, and since then there has been a continuous stream of people to the southern parts of Norway and Oslo. This picture pertains not only to Arctic Harbour but by and large to all Tamil settlements in the fishing villages of Finnmark. While the Tamils gradually moved from Finnmark, they were largely replaced above all with Russians (as a response to a Russian-Norwegian agreement in fisheries development and for wider cooperation in the Barent Region), and to some extent a Finnish labour force (see Grønseth 2011). However, today (2014) unfortunately many of the fish plants along the northernmost coast of Finnmark have been closed down (and more are under the threat of closure) due to global, national and local structural changes that together have adversely affected the fisheries market and policy. This has reduced the need for a labour force, which leaves many of the fishing villages with a threat to their existence. When I in 2007, contacted some of the families who had moved from Arctic Harbour to Oslo, it appeared that many of them had settled in the same area, in Silver Forest.

Silver Forest

Silver Forest is situated in a rather flat landscape previously used for agriculture. It is located about 40 kilometres north of Oslo, and among Norwegians is not considered an attractive place to live, thus offering comparatively low housing costs. Most Norwegians see Silver Forest as being on the 'wrong side of Oslo' and being a 'nowhere place'. The more attractive and high-cost suburbs are traditionally and currently located south and west of Oslo, offering a more varied and hilly landscape, access to the Oslo fjord and an old and stable infrastructure of work, education, health care, cultural entertainment and activities, as well as other much appreciated public and private services, organizations and institutions. However, the Tamils sensed a potential future for themselves in Silver Forest, as it promised opportunities they appreciated in terms of both current and planned new investments in the area.

Living in Silver Forest, the Tamils felt less prone to stigma from Norwegians and felt a greater sense of belonging to the Tamil community, as well as to the larger community of immigrants. This was explained with reference to the many other immigrant groups of colour living in areas in Oslo, who made the Tamils a less visible and identifiable group. The Tamils said they felt 'mixed into a multicultural population', which gave them a sense of 'freedom and opportunity' (see also Grønseth 2013). Many Tamil adolescents stated that they preferred the larger Tamil community, as it gave them a sizeable social milieu in which to make friends and acquaintances. They also felt they had 'come closer to Norwegian ways', since there was a greater degree of interaction, as well as exchanges and flows of knowledge, between distinct groups of youths. However, none of the Tamil youth I spoke to engaged in any close friendships with Norwegians. Both boys and girls stressed that

they lacked the time for friendship with either Tamils or Norwegians, as they felt the heavy demands on them to fulfil their parents' expectations to maintain the Tamil language and cultural identity. Some felt 'overloaded', as they needed to learn both Norwegian and Tamil language and culture, and they had little free time at their disposal after doing Norwegian schoolwork and taking part in Tamil activities.

Looking to the future, the Tamils thought of Silver Forest as offering a place where their children could complete senior high school within the municipality and eventually go on to higher education at college or university in Oslo, still within a relatively short distance. The Tamils pointed out that the municipality was enjoying a period of economic growth, expanding its welfare services, and they referred to on-going constructions of roads, terminal buildings, an already established large hospital and homes for the elderly, which together offered many varied and new jobs and prospects. And importantly, the Tamils perceived Silver Forest as being placed on the 'right side' of Oslo, as it is only about 20 kilometres from the international airport, which makes international flights easily available. This facilitates significant visits to kin and 'good Tamil Hindu temples' (mostly in Tamil Nadu, India), as well as Ayurvedic and other healing experts for various illnesses and misfortunes.

In both periods of fieldwork (1997–2000 in Arctic Harbour, and 2007 in Silver Forest) the Tamils demonstrated a profound concern with maintaining Tamil relations locally and in a worldwide diaspora. As was repeated in different settings, they felt 'not having anyone to confide in', being 'all alone', 'insecure', having 'deep worries', and a sense of 'losing oneself'. In their quest for 'peace at heart' and well-being, Tamils sought to maintain crucial religious and social relations through daily worship of Hindu gods, use of the Tamil language, food and culture, and networking with diasporic kinship relations. Such commitment included expensive and time-consuming visits to kin and vital Tamil Hindu temples in other parts of the world. Furthermore, Tamils engaged in the worldwide circulation of home-made videos and CD productions depicting family events and ritual congregations.

Being with the Tamils and sharing experiences in everyday life, I strongly sensed, and was told by Tamils, that they did not feel confidence and trust in relations with Norwegians and other Tamil refugees in the local community. Rather, it appeared that certain practices, rituals and objects became significant in supplying them with a minimum of comfort in the present and hope for the future. Such practices and items were commonly related to religion, but also to kin ties, family members and specific places. Exploring such links, embodiment, performance, rituals and objects can be understood as having the power to connect Tamils to significant relations and places from the familiar past, to provide precarious feelings of protection, well-being, and 'peace at heart' in the present and new place of re-settlement, and to offer hope for a prosperous future. As stressed earlier, embodiment, performance and objects may also lead to the opposite: rupture in relations and places of the past, insecurity, illness and no peace at heart in the here and now, and a sense of despair for the future. However, by engaging and embodying practices of aesthetics, and by repeating and appropriating the familiar in new and improvised ways, I suggest that Tamils overall succeeded in creating continuity, but also new senses of identity and well-being, within the new social and cultural context of Norway.

In the following, I introduce the case of Amara, a Tamil woman in her early thirties, and her husband Murukan, together with their two children. The case study is based on one specific woman and her family, though it is here presented with some central changes to ensure anonymity and confidentiality. Thus, any resemblance to any particular person or family is only coincidental. By changing some easily identifiable information, the story is not only Amara's and her family's, but also carries what many Tamils expressed.

Case Study of Amara: 'I feel proud to be Tamil; Tamil in Norway'

Amara married her husband Murukan in Colombo about a year before she moved to Arctic Harbour through a grant of family re-unification, with prospects of establishing a family and bettering her life. Shortly after her arrival in 1991 she took work as a cutter in the fishing industry. When I met the family in 1999, Amara and Murukan were doing fairly well. They had a daughter, Thillay, about six years old, and a son, Navilan, about four years old. They were renting a reasonably good house and had their own car. However, Amara was concerned about Murukan, who was suffering from bodily pain, fatigue and withdrawal. Murukan had visited the local medical doctor, who carried out examinations and blood tests, though these did not enable any diagnosis to be made or explain Murukan's condition. When speaking with Murukan about his consultations with the doctor, he said he felt that the doctor did not understand his pain. He said 'The doctors do not listen. They care only about my body, not about me. There is no help to get from the doctors.' This broadly expresses what many other Tamil men and women felt, as strikingly captured by another Tamil man's phrase: 'the doctors treat me as an organ, not as a person' (see Grønseth 2010a).

Amara explained how Murukan used to be helpful in household chores and would play with the children. Early in their time together he had laughed and engaged with the other Tamils, as well as some Norwegians at work. Murukan spoke more Norwegian than most other Tamils.[3] Now, about nine years later, he avoided Norwegians and had forgotten most of the language.[4] Murukan said he felt degraded by the Norwegians: 'I have been with Norwegians. They only see my dark face and treat me like shit.' These days he tended to grumble about his pain and watch TV, while demanding that Amara cook time-consuming Tamil dishes, keep the house, and care for the children. In the late evening Amara often gave Murukan massages, as she tried to ease his pain and offer some comfort. Amara felt quite exhausted and suffered from headaches, dizziness and fevers at night.

Late one evening after supper, Amara and I were in the small kitchen preparing tomorrow's supper. She talked about her daughter Thillay. Amara said she was worried. She had received a letter from the municipal pedagogic services with an appointment to do tests related to Thillay's memory functions. Amara said that the kindergarten staff had already suggested that Thillay might have some difficulties, as she did not seem to pick up on messages issued and some of the social interactions among the children. Amara had been to several meetings with various municipal health-care workers and felt very uncertain about what was going on. She showed me the latest letter she had received, and said she did not know why they wanted to examine Thillay's memory: 'I am very uncertain. What do they mean?' Amara said she had no one to discuss the issue with. She did not want the

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3   During the 1980s and 1990s the municipality of Arctic Harbour offered Tamils courses in Norwegian. However, the Tamils generally tended to put a priority on wage work at the fish plant and attended the courses only occasionally. The Tamils saw a greater need to earn money so as to repay debts, support kin in Sri Lanka or elsewhere, and establish home and family, while acknowledging the difficulties they encountered from not achieving fluency in Norwegian. At the courses they were taught the standardized written Norwegian language, *Bokmål* (book-language), while during classes and in ordinary everyday life the Tamils heard and spoke the local North Norwegian dialect. The differences between the written language and the local dialect were not brought up as a difficult issue. The Tamils in Finnmark and Arctic Harbour all spoke, although most not very fluently, the same local dialect as the local Norwegians. Generally, those who speak different Norwegian dialects have no difficulties in communication or only minor ones.

4   While generally avoiding Norwegians, he had given his approval to my visits to his home and to my being with his wife and family. He was friendly to me and spoke to me with the help of Amara, who interpreted between us when needed. At an early stage of my fieldwork I also conducted an interview with him using the local Tamil interpreter.

other Tamils to be aware of the issue, as she was concerned about protecting her family from the possible stigma of 'something being wrong' with her daughter. Amara described Thillay as a good child; she sang and played with her toys, liked to draw, watch Norwegian television and loved to look at the albums with photographs of kin and family. However, once in a while, Amara said, Thillay had angry fits. She would get angry over small matters and simply stamp her feet and scream. Usually Amara let her scream herself out, and then it was over. Murukan, Amara said, found it more disturbing and tended to scold Amara for not dealing with Thillay. Amara said:

> *Murukan worries too much. It will help when we move to Oslo. Murukan has plans for us to move. It will give us more opportunities. He will find some other work. We won't be so different. There will be other Tamils and other people with dark faces around us. Our children will have good prospects for education. We can go to the Tamil Temple in Oslo and seek help and support from the gods. We can visit family in Paris and London. We will have a better life. I am sure. I do puja and pray to the gods. But, my home altar is not enough. I find no peace at heart. I need to visit the temple, it has more force.*

Amara, like other Tamil women, felt responsible for the family's health, safety and well-being in terms of offering prayers and interacting with the gods. Living in northern Norway, they were cut off from habituated Tamil tradition and practices, of which temple visits were of particular importance when dealing with issues of illness and well-being. There were no Hindu temples in the north of Norway. Not being able to visit a temple, the Tamils, especially the women, could only perform daily worship and *puja* in their homes. Most Tamil homes had an altar, typically situated in a bedroom or small spare room on a shelf (often behind a curtain) designated for the Hindu gods and offerings. Colourful images of different gods were displayed, together with incense, powders, oil lamps, blessed strings and other significant items, such as small figures and images of holy men or women, different saints such as the Virgin Mary, and bottles of holy water and amulets. The items required for the altar were obtained in different ways. Many, especially women, brought with them an oil lamp (or two), small bowls for ritual food, a picture of their favourite deity, and amulets given to them on different ritual occasions before they left Sri Lanka. Further artefacts were constantly purchased, as some of their fellow Tamils were in Oslo or other places where they could buy deity images, frames, powders, incense and suchlike. Maybe most important of all, kin and family sent items which were acquired in relation to particular issues of concern, which in a sense held the power and blessings with which the items were endowed by temple priests or other holy healers. Such items were commonly various amulets and blessed strings for protection against evil forces, and simultaneously vital for enhancing prosperity and good health.

Amara, like other Tamil women, did *puja* and prayed to the gods. However, as Amara said, the private *puja*, offerings and home altar with the images on the shelf were not felt to be sufficient to ensure the well-being of their families or give them peace at heart. Amara said:

> *My heart cries, I find no peace. I pray to the gods. They must protect my children and help me to keep my family together. We are so alone.*

Amara, like many other Tamil women, committed herself and intensified her relationship with the deities. She made vows to the gods and went on a restrictive diet, with extensive purification and daily worship. However, in dealing with everyday life experiences and issues concerning the family's well-being, Amara expressed a sincere longing for kin and Tamil Hindu temples.

After close to 10 years living in Arctic Harbour, Amara and Murukan succeeded in moving to Oslo. When, during the autumn of 2007, I visited Amara and her family and other Tamils who had moved, I was curious to know how they were doing, and if the move had proved fruitful.

Like many other Tamils who had moved from Finnmark, Amara and her family experienced a greater variety of opportunities for making a life of their own. Murukan had found two cleaning jobs that paid well and did not feel the constant discomforting gaze of other Norwegian colleagues as he had done at the fish plant in Arctic Harbour. He had early morning working hours, which gave him an opportunity to take part more in household chores throughout the day. Amara said he was less grumpy and bad-tempered, though he still felt bodily pains, which she tried to comfort with, for instance, massages. Amara said that there had been no further examinations of Thillay after they moved to Oslo. Amara was very relieved that while Thillay, now about 13 years old, was a bit shy at school and had had some problems in learning proper Norwegian and other subjects, she was otherwise a girl with much song and laughter. Thillay told me she was doing courses in Tamil dancing, and she liked to draw and watch Tamil movies. Thillay was proud to tell me that before the summer they had celebrated her puberty. Many relatives had come from Europe for the ceremony together with friends from the time in Arctic Harbour and some new Tamil neighbours in Oslo. She said that her family was discussing the prospects of finding her a suitable husband, although she was not going to marry for many years yet. She first had to finish her education and find a job.

After moving to Oslo, Amara had engaged more in Norwegian social life. She had succeeded in getting a job at one of the local kiosks. Thus, she was engaging more with other Norwegians, though only sporadically and as part of her job. She engaged in conversation with some of the regular customers. Amara explained that she tried to talk with the customers so as to improve her Norwegian, and she felt that she was learning more about Norwegian people. Working in the kiosk, she also met the parents of her children's schoolmates, which made her feel more attuned to her children. Amara and Murukan had discussed how to deal with their children's desires to be out with their schoolmates. While being in agreement with the Tamil practice of laying down strict limits (especially for the girls) for social interaction outside the home, they had nevertheless agreed to challenge their own customs and let Thillay and Navilan engage more freely. They felt it important to let their children do some of the things their classmates did, though still within limits. Amara said she had noticed how some Tamils disapproved of their more liberal line by not greeting and turning their back on her when she accompanied Thillay to Tamil dancing classes or Navilan to English football training. She felt that her identity as a 'proper Tamil' was at stake among some of the Tamils. Amara sighed and confessed that, even though things were generally better, she still felt deeply insecure and suffered from headaches and a sense of dizziness, and went to bed at night with slight fevers.

In dealing with the illnesses, pains, troubles and identity issues in the family's everyday lives, Amara turned to the Tamil temple. She prayed for her family's well-being, for the relief of Murukan's bodily pains and fatigue, for Thillay's struggles at school, and for her own strength and endurance. However, Amara was disappointed. She found that the temple and its sculptures of the deities did not have sufficient power and force to take on their prayers and provide peace to her heart. As Amara said:

> *The temple in Oslo does not carry the spiritual force. The sculptures have not gained strength. I feel it when I stand in front of them. I look and search for community with god, but it remains a statue. I do not trust the power of the temple rituals or the statues to help me. Actually, my home altar serves equally well, or better.*

While it may seem that the home altar and the icons offered Amara a closer connection and relation of intimacy, she continued to visit the Tamil temple in Oslo. As a response to the delicate situation of negotiating her family's reputation and Tamil identity, Amara saw the visits to the temple in a slightly new light. Visiting the temple became a strategy for upholding Tamil identity and the sense of self and well-being. She enjoyed putting on her sari, the jewellery and *pottu*, and to engage in the songs and rituals. As she said:

> *Going to the temple makes me feel close to kin. And, you know, I feel closer to my mother. She used to dress me and bring me to the temple back home. So, I somehow feel a connection to the past and a deeper sense of myself. Also, it is as a way of telling the other Tamils that we [her family] are good Tamils. They cannot question us. However, we cannot live in a Tamil cocoon – we need to expand our views and be Tamils in Norway. I know many feel the same way, but it is difficult. Also, when I go to the temple, dress up and walk the streets, I feel proud to be Tamil, a Tamil in Norway. I hope one day Tamil ways will be accepted as part of Norway, as Norway must become part of us.*

Embodiment and Intentionality: Experiencing Social Relations

In the case described above, it appears that interactions and consultations with various health workers leave Amara and Murukan, like many other Tamils, with feelings of 'uncertainty' and 'not being understood'. After consulting the medical doctor about his pains and fatigue, Murukan stated that 'The doctors do not listen. They care only about my body, not about me. There is no help to get from the doctors.' Amara said 'I am very uncertain. What do they mean?' after meetings with municipal health-care workers and receiving a letter concerning Thillay. I suggest that this sense of 'uncertainty' and 'not being understood' is related to social and cultural differences in approaches to health and illness, as well as in senses of self and well-being.

The Norwegian doctors generally gave their Tamil patients a biomedical understanding of their suffering which separates body from soul and the individual from its social context. Among Tamils, such distinctions are uncommon and seem to produce uncertainty and confusion about Norwegian health treatment. The confusion is related to Tamils' familiarity with Ayurvedic medicine and other ways of understanding well-being and sickness, but most Tamils are also accustomed to aspects of biomedicine such as medical prescriptions and treatment. Based on the descriptions of Tamils in Arctic Harbour, many Tamil physicians and healers tend to practice an eclectic approach, which stresses the holism of Ayurveda and includes elements of biomedicine (see also Waxler 1984). Thus, Tamils are familiar with certain biomedical remedies, as they are interwoven and understood within the framework of an Ayurvedic approach.[5] While Tamils are familiar with some of the medicines of biomedicine, they are not familiar with the biomedical line of thought and understanding

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5   Ayurvedic theory understands the body as composed of particular channels through which distinct forces, senses, constructive substances and waste products flow. Disease is understood to arise when, for whatever reason, these channels become blocked and thus produce an imbalance in the body as a whole (Trawick 1995:286). Thus, a combination of the notions of humours and their balance provides the basis for a theory of sickness and health, as well as a theory of what comprises the human person (Strathern and Stewart 1999:34). In diagnosing, the patient's signs and description of symptoms are considered of great importance in addition to physical examinations of temperature, breath, urine and pulse, which together construes the patient's caste. Treatment

based on strict empirical and direct observations of the individual body. When they are offered biomedical medication accompanied by biomedical examinations and diagnosis and not Ayurvedic medicine, Tamils feel confused and uncertain about the treatment. This is related to how I see Tamils' frequent visits to the health centre, and not only as a consultant for the cure or improvement of bodily conditions. Rather, I suggest that Tamils also seek a kind of holistic healing that responds to bodily experiences of abrupt crisis in senses of personhood, identity, spirituality and cosmology.

Tamils in Arctic Harbour lived in a situation where they were offered brotherhood and assimilation, as when they were introduced to local Norwegian ways and traditions by the early host families. Simultaneously, they were struck down by a sense of stigma, as when doctors were not able to diagnose their pain the Tamils were seen as having 'a low pain threshold', when they received an extra bonus for efficient cutting of the fish they were seen to 'cheat on the fish line', and when they carried out lower status work in the fishing industry they were seen as 'dirty workers' (for further details see Grønseth 2010a). Being associated with such collective moral stereotypes, the Tamils were not able to emerge from their group stigma as individuals (Bauman 1995). In this situation the Tamils were in an ambivalent position that had not been chosen and over which there was no control.[6]

Living in such confusion, it is plausible that many Tamils developed severe distress, bodily pain and insecurity over their identity. To grasp Tamils' wider experiences of worry and uncertainty, as well as their creative solutions and inventions, I suggest it would be fruitful to explore the existential dimensions of embodiment and questions of agency and meaning. In this venture, I turn to a psychological and phenomenological approach that understands the person and the self as active self-systems that position and figure themselves in a social and cultural world. Here, it is by the individual's position and relation to the world and 'the other' that the self becomes aware of itself, and thus produces meaning and intentional actions.[7] To grasp further Tamils' pains as part of social life, I seek an approach that provides a deeper insight into the perceptive and creative body, which in turn also allows for an emphasis on the production of meaning, in addition to practice. This perspective is inspired by Merleau-Ponty (1962 [1945]) and explores the bodily experiences and domains of meaning and perception by collapsing the dichotomy of subject and object.

Following Merleau-Ponty, the body image is not only a set of impressions, it incorporates the 'project' or intentions of the subject. As such, the body emerges as an image of 'incarnate intentionality' which operates with 'the world' as its horizon (Strathern 1999). Merleau-Ponty argues against an understanding of the body as an object and the mechanistic physiology that goes with such a concept, and seeks to go beyond a psychophysical understanding in which we make psychic representations about objective events that occur in our 'real bodies'. As an example he points to the phenomenon that medical patients who have lost a limb can

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includes prescriptions for diet, exercise (such as yoga), hygiene and sleep, along with a natural medical mixture to rebalance the humours and heat treatment involving hot water or smoke.

6　In some cases such experiences may develop a kind of self-hatred that might be captured in Norman's concept of embodied or 'inner demons' (referred to in Bauman 1995:73).

7　This approach was introduced earlier by Hallowell (1955) and marked at that time a turn away from a concern with personality structure. Although Hallowell acknowledged the self as a product of self-reflection and as a self-objectification, his analysis kept to the conventional anthropological concept of the self as constituted in the process of socialization. He did not take a fully phenomenological step in recognizing the pre-objective and pre-reflective experience of the body. Before Hallowell, Mauss (1996 [1938]) explored the concepts of person and self, suggested a universal human sense of spiritual and corporal individuality and stated that the particular social context was associated with qualitative differences in cultural constructions of person. He saw the person as associated with the distinction between the cognitive and material worlds and thus replicated the duality of mind/body and subject/object.

still often feel it. This must imply that their perceptions are conditioned by their personal, bodily memories.[8] This is meant to illustrate how the body 'is essentially an expressive space' (Langer 1989:47). Thus, it is through the body that other objects, or expressive spaces, come into existence. In this view, it is possible to see how social and cultural challenges, as well as stigmatization, are inscribed and expressed by individual bodies. Recognizing the body as a perceptive and intentional subject, it appears that Amara and Murukan's undiagnosed pains and illnesses express, as many other Tamils experience, insecurity and degradation in social relations in everyday life that together challenge their senses of self and well-being. Not finding sufficient support in fellow Tamils or help when consulting the local health-care workers, many Tamils, especially women, turn to performance and ritual interactions with their deities.

Performance and Artefacts: Negotiating Identity

As is illustrated in the case study, Amara, like many Tamil women (and also some men), tended to turn to their deities to seek relief and healing of illnesses and pains in their everyday lives. Considering how illnesses are seen to be related to senses of self and identity, I suggest that performing such rituals can furthermore be understood as a way to negotiate identity and belonging. The case above demonstrates how Amara, like other Tamils, does not simply reproduce a Tamil home world outside their home country, but uses traditional rituals and items to create a sense of identity and belonging. In doing *puja* and interacting with ritual artefacts, Amara can be seen as repeating the known and familiar, as well as engaging in creative processes of appropriation (Schneider 2006) which include improvisation, negotiations and transformations of values and meanings that inform new identities and senses of well-being. When Tamils move and migrate, traditional rituals and objects are involved in processes of transformation (Svašek and Skrbiš 2004) as they travel and mediate between places and times. Such transformations imply that the rituals and objects included both lose some familiar values and meanings and gain some new ones.

　　This is illustrated in how Amara experienced her visits to the Oslo Tamil Hindu temple. Re-constructing crucial features of Tamil Hindu temples as they are constructed in their homeland, Amara experienced the temple, its statues of the gods and rituals as not fully supplying the healing, comfort and well-being she had expected and hoped for. In the new context of Oslo, she did not perceive them as offering sufficient strength to provide her with protection and 'peace at heart'. However, Amara said the temple visits made her experience a deeper sense of herself. When visiting the temple she dressed in her sari and engaged in temple songs and services. Although not experiencing closeness and unity with the gods, it appears that in the context of Oslo the temple offered her a sense of connecting to herself as an individual and to significant relations such as her mother, kin and homeland, to the diaspora, to the local Tamil community and to the wider Norwegian society.

　　I further suggest that Amara's connecting illustrates how performance, ritual practices and objects do not carry an essential and static meaning that can be disclosed. Rather, when rituals and objects travel and come into interplay with humans in new contexts,

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8　　Acknowledging this point, Merleau-Ponty's concepts of the 'habitual body' and the 'present body' emphasize the historically layered character of the body and also of perception itself. As Strathern (1999) notes, this insight fits and maybe foreshadows the ideas of Bourdieu by 'recognizing the dialectical movement of our existence … that allows the personal and the cultural to become sedimented in a general anonymous structure' (Langer 1989:34).

they demonstrate themselves to be living phenomena. They appear as flexible entities and practices that supply motivation and direction for Amara's and other individuals' life-projects, senses of self and well-being, as well as shaping new images of community and belonging. In this sense, I suggest that things can be seen to hold a kind of subjectivity (see also Grønseth 2012). When seeing forms and things as taking part in interactive relations, the shapes and objects themselves turn into subjective entities, as they supply content and direction that produce feelings and meanings, and together frame action. Social and religious life, in other words, cannot be distinguished from the material world. Things, like Amara's sari, the *putto* on her forehead and ritual performance within the religious context – such as being immersed in smoke from the camphor flame and singing Sanskrit temple songs – connects Amara and other Tamils to significant social and religious diasporic and local relations and supplies crucial images of the past, in the here and now, as well as hopes for future prosperity and well-being.

Recognizing ritual performance and objects as flexible and open to shifting meanings as social contexts vary and change, we realize how they interplay in an intersubjective space (Jackson 1989; Grønseth and Davis 2010). In previous writings, I have addressed intersubjectivity understood as shared experiences between self and other of which both parts are human beings (Jackson 1998; Grønseth and Davis 2010; Grønseth 2012). Turning my concern to the interaction between humans, performances and the material world, such as Amara's ritual performance and interaction with objects, I expand on this view to include subjects and objects (Grønseth 2012). Through this expansion, I suggest that it is possible to capture how agentive processes and moments take place in spaces, rather than in dialectics between subjects and objects (see Strathern 1988; Gell 1998; Latour 1999; see also Miller 2005).

This approach, I suggest, addresses the issue of how we can create knowledge from the subjective, relational and intersubjective, thus transcending the objective and essentialist stable reality such as the old philosophy of Plato's ideal world or more recent structuralist approaches such as those of Saussure (1955 [1915]), Radcliffe-Brown (1953) and Lévi-Strauss (1968). As I have argued earlier, the crux of subjectivity is to be relating with others, as it implies a reaching beyond and stretching of the self (Grønseth 2010b). Addressing ritual performance and objects, I highlight how the other refers not only to human beings, but also to the material world of things, shapes, items and artefacts. Further, when rituals and objects travel and take on distinct and shifting values and meanings, it is shown how the other, as also the self, are relational and processual units (Grønseth 2010b, 2013). With this recognition, we can capture how Tamils, like many other diasporic groups, experience the interaction with performance and objects as crucial for identity, comfort, health and well-being.

Seeing the relation human–object to be a 'matter of concern' (Latour 2004) makes it possible to acknowledge how not only the human self, but also the material world has the capacity to hold specific values and meanings, while simultaneously varying from context to context. In recognizing forms and objects as participants in intersubjective and agentive processes, we gain insight into how the rituals and objects are flexible and changeable living phenomena that interplay with and direct individual persons' healing, affections, feelings and emotions. This is a view that underlines and expands Abu-Lughod and Lutz's (1990) demonstration of how affect is not an essential aspect of human nature or the individual subject, but culturally embedded in intersubjective relationships. This view fits with my suggestion that it is in the intersubjective space between self and other – being other persons, gods, objects, institutions, ideologies, cosmologies, ideas or imagery – that the experience and senses of self, pain, healing and well-being emerge.

Healing and Belonging: Creating Imageries of Social Life

For Tamil refugees, as for refugees and migrants in general, this open-ended and flexible feature of material culture makes it a precarious but vital instrument in an existential struggle for meaningful relations and practices in new and unfamiliar environments. Rituals and artefacts can confirm old meanings, attachments, relations and practices, while simultaneously being ready to create new ones. In this perspective, it is the interaction, or rather the process taking place between subjects and objects, that generates healing, emotions, sensations and agency. Thus, when Amara and other Tamils interact and engage with significant entities, they can experience a relation that provides agency and the creation of new identities, meanings and healing practices.

Not only do diasporic ritual performances and objects interplay in an intersubjective space for the appropriation, negotiation and creation of meaning, identity, healing and well-being for many Tamils. As appears in the case of Amara and Murukan, Tamils' engagement with ritual performances and artefacts merge into a larger social and political context as they take place in the course of mundane day-to-day living in Norway. This appears in how Amara took pride in demonstrating her Tamilness when dressing in a sari and walking the streets of Oslo to do *puja* and temple services in the Tamil Hindu temple, or at home in worship at her altar. Such experiences are understood as an embodied perception, negotiation and expression of values, meaning and feelings which address a kind of aesthetics understood, in agreement with Jacques Rancière, as 'the forms that life uses to shape itself' (Rancière 2004:23). It is an aesthetic in which perception and experience of form in themselves are more a mode of being than a way of doing and making.

Thus, by performing and embodying the aesthetics of Tamil Hindu traditional rituals and objects, Amara and the other Tamils are seen to demonstrate a singularity and uniqueness within Norwegian society. Simultaneously, the Tamils' re-construction and appropriation of Tamil traditional culture can also be seen as challenging the established Norwegian regime of meaning, order and categorization. While embodying, or 'being' Tamil aesthetics, Tamils form a distinction that also breaks down the criteria for isolating singularity and uniqueness (Rancière 2004:23). In this view of aesthetics and performance, the Tamil Hindu temple and practices at the home altar are seen as part of a social and political process that distinguishes the distinctiveness but also links it to a global, national and local community with an overall hierarchy of political and social positions. As such, I suggest that the study of illness and well-being, as they express intersubjective and agentive moments taking place between migrating subjects and moving objects, can highlight how performance, rituals and objects are alive and fuel the human imagination of healing and belonging within the power of aesthetics, as well as past, present and future imageries of social life.

This understanding of illness and well-being rests on a view in which identity and belonging are created in the course of social life, rather than being an 'ethnos' that is often designated as an indisputable 'biological fact' (see Baumann 1997:213). Furthermore, it appreciates how identity is individually and socially created and defined in interaction and performance, rather than being pre-ascribed (see also Amit-Talai 1995:131). However, my focus on the bodily, cognitive and emotional experiences of Tamil refugees further stresses how assertions of fixed and closed identities, communities and categories are, as Rapport argues, ontologically and morally illicit (2013:156). As such, I stress that migration and refuge is often occasioned by the lack of a full human recognition in a 'home' milieu and a political desire to achieve recognition and expression elsewhere. However, the focus here is on the more mundane experiences that Amara, Murukan and their fellow Tamils, like other migrants and refugees, face in a variety of contexts, such as when negotiating curing and

healing in medical consultations, work and education opportunities, and senses of well-being and belonging within family and kin relations, as well as larger social networks.

The case study of Amara and Murukan illuminates how consciousness expresses interrelationships between self and other, subject and object, which are pre-conditioned through the intermediary of the body (Jackson 1995:169). As such, a phenomenology of 'being-in-the-world' and embodiment stresses social and cultural processes like migration and re-settlement as part of perception, existential experiences and human capacities (see also Grønseth 2010a). The perceptive experience implies a sense of home, of being in the world, as a mobile habitat (Chambers 1994:4). Thus, living and dwelling are conceived as a mobile habitation of time and space, not as fixed and closed structures, but as supplying an opening and movement in what constitutes our sense of identity, place, belonging and well-being.

Striving towards healing and well-being for her family and herself, Amara involved herself in ritual performance and artefacts and connected with others. Through daily improvisation and creativity, she transformed her sense of being 'so alone' to include an experience of belonging with the Other as fellow human beings. As such, the case of Amara and Murukan highlights Tamils' everyday experiences of a ruptured and fragmented social, cultural and material life as it activates a human disposition to connect in everyday life, and to create new senses of identity and belonging, as well as healing and well-being.

Concluding Remarks: Embodying Partial Knowledge

In exploring Tamils' senses of illness and well-being through perspectives of embodiment, performance and healing, this chapter offers knowledge about refugee and migrant tensions and challenges in the everyday life of re-settlement in radical new social, cultural and material surroundings. Moreover, the chapter also offers insight into the human self by demonstrating the self's orienting and flexible capacity in creating new meanings, identities and senses of well-being by ways of ritual performance and engagement with the other, both humans as well as non-humans. As such it shows how self is embodied and constituted in intersubjective encounters within, across and between various individual, cultural, material and social life-worlds.

As the study of Tamil illness and well-being moved from a medical model of explanation that looked at the patient–doctor encounter toward a client-centred model that emphasized the significance of sharing experiences and embodying the other, the chapter calls for a mode of knowledge based on contextualized and heartfelt recognition of the Other as equal and mutual human beings. From such a perspective, the creation of knowledge appears as fundamentally related to how we deal with each other and comprehend the complexity in the relations that characterize it. The focus here is turned towards the human experience and the intersections between the subjective and the intersubjective. Appreciating that the subject always has both a personal and a social history and that the intersubjective relations are formative, though not always explicit, I stress that our analysis cannot solely focus on conscious meanings and intentions. When further recognizing the subject as always embodied, it appears that the individuals such as Amara and Murukan have experiences and stories which cannot be fully grasped by language and symbols. Thus, I suggest an approach that recognizes a dynamic space for the embodied, performed, empathic and imaginative creation of knowledge and which can capture senses of self, healing and well-being as they are partially experienced in everyday social life.

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Mortuary Rituals

Satsuki Kawano

Introduction

There has been renewed interest in mortuary rituals, which constitute one of the classic research topics for anthropological investigation. Mortuary rites had long been quintessentially understood for their integrative functions that serve to maintain a harmonious whole. However, recent approaches to mortuary rituals reveal the ways in which social actors strategically mobilize them in a rapidly changing society (De Boeck 2009; De Witte 2001, 2003; Gable 2006). Mortuary rites are occasions for various groups of people to negotiate or shape social relationships in a society characterized by diversity and stratification (Kawano 2010; Jindra and Noret 2011; Smith 2004). This shift partly reflects the revised view of what constitutes a field site in the larger discipline of anthropology. The locality where an anthropologist conducts fieldwork is no longer regarded as an isolated, more-or-less internally coherent unit set apart from global economic and political relations. A growing body of literature on mortuary rites incorporates such a view and examines mortuary rites as opportunities for strategic engagement shaped by the larger politico-economic forces, even though, to an outsider, the ritual may appear to be an unchanging, ahistorical practice of "tradition."

This chapter will explore mortuary rituals as forms of calculated engagement in the context of social change by examining the rise of an alternative mortuary rite in contemporary Japan. By analyzing the ways in which social actors have created and adopted ash scattering ceremonies in Japan, where the interment of cremated remains in a family grave remains the norm, I will scrutinize the crafting of a new mortuary rite in a particular cultural environment. In my analysis, I will highlight the role that demographic transitions have played in structuring the mortuary choices among a specific cohort group and that have thus facilitated the adoption of this new ritual among certain individuals. Based on my study, I propose an analysis of cohort-specific availability of what I call "ritual-care resources"— both material and non-material—to ensure the performance of a conventional mortuary rite. I argue that, in a society where conventional and alternative mortuary rituals coexist, it is necessary to examine cohort groups' (potentially) uneven access to diverse mortuary options. I recommend the use of the concept of ritual-care resources for further research from a cross-cultural perspective to deepen our understanding of the processes by which mortuary rites are adopted and changed.

Anthropological Studies of Mortuary Rites: From Fixity to Fluidity

When structural-functionalist perspectives dominated the field, mortuary rituals were a very common subject of scholarly work in sociocultural anthropology, and were frequently analyzed in tightly knit community settings. Thus, many studies focused on the internal workings of mortuary rituals in an enclosed social system, and one major function of these rites was social reproduction. Robert Hertz's classic study of mortuary rites (1960 [1907]), for example, illustrates the functions of these rites that transform the deceased's remains and identity in order to reincorporate the dead into the community. The material remains of the dead are handled ritually—through cremation or (re)burial—to allow the shift of his or her identity, for example, to achieve ancestorhood (48, 61). Socially, the deceased person's social role and rights are reallocated in the existing community, thereby reproducing the society (48, 61).

Beyond the functions of death rites in maintaining a society, the processual structure of mortuary rites in non-Western cultural settings has also attracted anthropological attention. Similar to other rites of passage in a person's life course, death rites in a number of societies mark a deceased individual's shift in status through the three stages of separation, transition, and reincorporation (Turner 1966; Van Gennep (1960 [1909]). Victor Turner (1966) has made contributions to the study of ritual process by expanding and deepening our understanding of the transitional period when ritual participants leave their social statuses behind but have yet to acquire new ones. This period of transition is known to involve symbolic practices that challenge the existing norms and social hierarchies that are upheld in everyday, non-ritual settings. Some of these practices include the lowering or the elevation of the status of a ritual participant (1966: 201), which ultimately strengthens societal structure by ritually creating gaps between the existing status of a ritual participant and his or her temporary status during the liminal period. Hertz's essay noted above also involves a similar discussion of the transitional state and the eventual allocation of a new status to the deceased (e.g., ancestor), although his main focus is the secondary mortuary rite rather than rites of passage in general.

Beyond the processual structure of mortuary rites, funeral symbolism and collective representations of death have been explored in a range of cultural settings (Hertz 1960 [1907]; Metcalf and Huntington 1991 [1979]). Even in an ethnically diverse society such as America, Metcalf and Huntington illustrated that there is a set of shared collective representations prevalent in mortuary rites. In their study of American deathways, the authors maintain that "(i)n a funeral parlor, basic values of life are condensed into the peaceful image of the embalmed body" (1991 [1979]: 214). In other words, funerals reveal the operation of domestic civil religion in America. Death rites have also been reported to commonly involve metaphors of death and rebirth, and the regeneration of life is a theme frequently found in mortuary practices in various societies (Bloch and Parry 1982).

These previous studies collectively reveal the structural, functional, and symbolic similarities found in mortuary rites in diverse cultures, despite the fact that actual procedures or native symbolic representations vary. Death rites transform the status of the deceased person—he or she leaves the rank of the living and achieves the position of a full-fledged ancestor. Mortuary rituals provide a way to handle the loss of a community member by allocating his or her assets, role, and status among the living. Individual members come and go, but the society continues to exist by regenerating itself, and death rites contribute to societal stability in a significant way (e.g., Bloch 1971; Goody 1962; Miles 1965). In such a scheme, death rites are seen as "given." In recent works, as we will discuss below, scholars have shifted away from the fixity of mortuary rites to consider their changeability. Of course, individuals do not make mortuary rites anew every time a death occurs. Nonetheless,

historical analyses show that death practices do change over time (e.g., Ariès 1974; Elias 1985; Gorer 1955; Hockey 1990; Howarth 1996; Kellehear 2007; Walter 1994). Therefore, it is sensible to consider the extent to which mortuary rites are a product of human creativity and strategic engagement.

Shifts in Mortuary Rituals

Mortuary rituals are crafted in power relations, which affects the content of rituals over time. A seemingly "traditional" funeral, therefore, may be a modern development (Jindra and Noret 2011). Among the Kikuyu of Kenya (Droz 2011), for example, colonial and Christian influences have redefined what constitutes a "proper" burial. Formerly, a corpse was left in the bush without burial, and wild animals, such as hyenas, came to consume the exposed body. Only a special class of persons received burial in pre-colonial times. Droz (2011: 70) reports that older men and their spouses who had sons old enough to carry their bodies and who died "after a long life … received the status called *ahomori*, conferring the honor of burial." However, modern concerns of hygiene and Christian ideals brought change to the Kikuyu practices. British colonizers encouraged the Kikuyu to bury the dead, at first with only limited success, but burial came to be adopted by the Kikuyu more widely and rapidly after a specific event. In 1933, a chief proved that the land where an English settler lived had belonged to his family by disinterring his grandfather's remains (73). Kikuyu landowners came to use burial as a way of legitimizing their property rights (Lonsdale 1992: 377–8). Consequently, land ownership and the fate of the body came to be firmly intertwined, and burial is now intended for a wider range of people.

For a Kikuyu whose family has land for burial, being buried at a municipal cemetery came to signal isolation or abandonment. Burial at a municipal cemetery "means that you have been thrown away by your family," in one informant's words (Droz 2011: 74). By the end of the twentieth century, among the Kikuyu, burial in a cemetery in urban areas became an exception, and it required an explanation—for example, this type of burial is acceptable when bringing a body back to the family land is difficult (Droz 2011: 81). Those who migrated to urban areas still desire burial on their family land in rural areas, and a large sum of money is often collected to transport the body from a city to a rural hometown in order to have a proper burial. Droz notes that, in this context, Islam provides funerals for those in Nairobi who were no longer maintaining ties with their families—such as prostitutes. Thus, urban residents who have no family to arrange a funeral can turn to Islam to have an alternative mortuary ceremony conducted for them. The Kikuyu case discussed above illustrates that Christian missions and the British colonial administration played a major role in transforming their mortuary practices, while the Kikuyu also strategically employed burial to legitimize their land ownership. Furthermore, Islam has been adopted in urban areas by those who cannot ensure their peaceful rest on family land but do not wish to be "abandoned" by their families in the posthumous world.

In the late nineteenth century, people in Japan faced similar control by those in power over the disposal of the deceased's remains, though the details differ. During the process of Japan's modern state building (1868–1912), control by the central government over the treatment of the deceased strengthened. In 1884, national mortuary laws were established to define what constitutes a grave and a proper disposal of a corpse. The government became the authority that could give permission to people who wanted to build a cemetery or expand an existing one (Mori 1993a: 213). Legally, the cemetery became the only space for burial or interment (1993b: 171). The state also stipulated that a grave was a place for veneration to be

treated with respect (1993b: 158–60), and the ideal of filial piety was the reason behind such treatment of a grave. The reverent preservation of deceased persons' remains was to some extent intended to be a critique of Buddhist cremation, as well (Bernstein 2006: 71). Although there were initially some disagreements among power holders, the state eventually came to promote cremation as a hygienic, modern practice (see Bernstein 2006 for details).

Meiji state policies undermined diverse burial customs practiced across the nation and contributed greatly to their standardization. The importance of reverently preserving the grave challenged the practice of temporary veneration at a grave and the recycling of a burial or interment space and monuments to make space available for new arrivals. Due to public health and taxation concerns, burial on family land (such as fields and hills) became illegal, though it was common during the early Meiji period (Mori 1993a: 205; 1993b: 79–84). In some areas where the Ōtani school of Shin Buddhism was influential, no graves or cemeteries existed. Instead of burial, people in these areas were expected to bring the remains of the dead to their family temple or the head temple (Higashi Honganji Temple) (1993b: 125–8). People in these areas came to adopt interment in cemeteries as the Meiji policies penetrated their regions. The state's policies also undermined the double-grave system (e.g., see Mogami 1963). In this system, people customarily maintained two "graves," a burial grave and a ceremonial grave. The burial grave was where the deceased person's body was deposited. Survivors did not make visits to conduct veneration rites at the burial grave. They built a separate ceremonial grave in a different location, and performed rituals to venerate the deceased there, although this structure did not house the body of the deceased. The state did not regard the ceremonial grave as a "grave" and urged people to use burial sites for ceremonial visits (Mori 1993a: 208).

While the Meiji policies paved the way for standardizing disposal, it was further homogenized between the end of World War II and the 1990s. By the 1990s, cremation became nearly the only choice in most regions of Japan, and the interment of cremated remains of multiple family members in a family grave structure came to be the norm. Though at first glance interring family members' remains in a single grave appears to be a "traditional" practice—even in the minds of contemporary Japanese—this is in fact a product of relatively recent history (Makimura 1996: 111). Japanese scholars noted that the family grave gradually gained popularity in Japan after the middle of the Taishō period (1912–1926) and became common during the Shōwa period (1926–1989) (Fujii 1993: 17–18; Iwata 2006: 70, 81–2; Makimura 1996: 112). Family graves became a normative destination for the dead in postwar Japan, and they remain so in many people's minds, even to this day. In this climate, ash scattering has emerged as an alternative for aging urbanites who cannot easily depend on their descendants to maintain a family grave. I will return to the rise of this new practice shortly.

While the above brief comparative discussion illuminates the fluidity of mortuary rites and their potential for strategic engagement, unlike in the Japanese case, modernity and conversions to Christianity or Islam are intimately intertwined in the production of a new mortuary rite among the Kikuyu, as discussed above. There are other examples from Africa that illustrate an intimate link between Christian and colonial influences and the adoption of new mortuary practices (e.g., Lamont 2011; Jindra and Noret 2011). Furthermore, scholars have noted the impact of Christianity on shifting mortuary practices and ancestor rites in other parts of the world, such as Indonesia, Solomon Islands, and Papua New Guinea (Coville 2002; Guo 2009; Olupona 2001; Reid 2002; Stewart and Strathern 2009). For example, among the Duna people of Papua New Guinea, missionaries encouraged them to place the dead in coffins under the ground rather than placing them on above-ground platforms, which allowed "the flesh to drop down into the earth while the *tini* or spirit was told in songs to fly up to rock faces in the forest" (Stewart and Strathern 2009: 10; also see Strathern

and Stewart 2004: 58–9). The Duna have created a new type of platform under the ground to comply with the missionaries' demands but they still maintained their indigenous process of letting the flesh seep into the ground. They have not abandoned the practice of collecting the bones later and taking them to the forest caves, although the uniting of the spirits and the remains of the dead is no longer marked as an important religious ritual but is referred to as a "little party" (2004: 58). Similarly, Christian influences as well as the effects of formal schooling, cash economy, tourism, and migration have led to "a change in the illocutionary or performative force of ritual acts" among the Tana Toraja of Indonesia (Coville 2002: 73). The Tana Toraja were encouraged to cease the practice of animal sacrifice to "feed" ancestors, although they were allowed to "honor the memory of the dead" by having a communal meal involving buffalo meat (Coville 2002: 73). It is thus important to note that the African case discussed in this section constitutes the larger trend of reformulating mortuary rites due to Christianization. (For further discussions on this issue, see Stewart and Strathern's 2009 volume, *Religious and Ritual Change*.)

One finds a somewhat different modern production of mortuary forms authorized by the state in nineteenth-century Japan, as the country was neither colonized nor Christianized. Nevertheless, what constitutes a "proper" burial in postwar Japan, which seems "natural" and "traditional," owes much to state policies and regulations that were promoted during the building of Japan's nation-state. Ritual actors do not blindly perform prescribed rites and enact their predetermined functions to reproduce their society, regardless of their interests. The bodies and remains of deceased persons, over which individuals and groups may make competing claims in diverse sociopolitical settings, play significant roles in the establishment and re-establishment of order (Strathern and Stewart 2004: 71–2). Mortuary rites, therefore, are a moving target (Smith 1999) that mirror ongoing social struggles and allow social actors to construct a particular view of their world.

The Adoption of an Alternative Ritual

A number of previous studies have examined the patterns of shifts in mortuary practices and their relations to social change. For example, previous studies of mortuary rites in Western societies have examined the replacement of community networks with funeral services, the waning public significance of death rites, the social isolation of the bereaved, the state's and medical control over death-related practices, and secularization (e.g., Ariès 1974; Elias 1985; Gorer 1955, 1965; Hockey 1990; Howarth 1996; Kellehear 2007; Walter 1994). In the modern West, death became taboo, and those left behind became socially isolated. In responding to this modern condition of death and dying, a new mortuary ideal of "revivalism"—which prompts an individual social actor to die in his or her own way— has emerged (see Walter 1994). In this view, mortuary rites are conducted to celebrate the deceased's individuality, and the style of the rites reflects the personal preferences and choices of the deceased.

A number of previous studies on mortuary rites in contemporary and postwar Japan have also usefully linked the changes in mortuary practices with those in socioeconomic realms (Ambros 2012; Boret 2011; Fujii 1993; Inoue 2003; Iwata 2006; Kawano 2003; Kōmoto 2001; Makimura 1996; Mori 1993b, 2000; Morioka 1984; Nakamaki 1995, 1999; Rowe 2003, 2006, 2011; Smith 1974, 1999; Suzuki 1998, 2000; Tsuji 2006). However, what still remains unclear is the perspective of the individual. If multiple mortuary options are available in a given society, what prompts an individual to seek an alternative funeral or even create a new mortuary rite? This question is all the more important, as previous studies have

usefully acknowledged that revivalist scripts have spread unevenly (Seale 1998; Walter 1994). Why, then, do some individuals turn to revivalism, while others do not? How do various factors and ideals shape an individual's mortuary choice? Furthermore, above all, what is the relationship between an alternative rite and a "conventional" one?

To refine our understanding of the process by which alternative rites spread, it is important to explore "individual choice" as a culturally constructed one made in a specific social environment where various mortuary options are distributed unevenly. Culture structures people's options and provides a dominant way of prioritizing individual choices (see Long 2005 for an in-depth analysis of choice). Some options that are available in one culture, therefore, are not recognized as "choices" in another. In a complex society, of course, some people have the means to make an "ideal" choice, whereas others lack such means, whether material or non-material. Not only a person's social class, but also gender and age possibly shape his or her access to various mortuary options. Moreover, individual social actors who can afford a socially ideal mortuary rite might still forgo such a ritual for various reasons, and a need exists to examine the contexts in which an "ideal" ritual is replaced with an alternative one.

It is insufficient to examine individual orientations alone—for example, if a person is religious or progressive—when considering a mortuary choice, as the distribution of choices changes over time and thus different cohort units maintain differential access to such options. Therefore, in my study of ash scattering ceremonies, I have developed a cohort-specific analysis of "ritual-care resources" and the availability of mortuary options by considering an individual's access to them according to his or her age status (cf. Ahern 1973; Fortes 1961; Freedman 1979; Goody 1962; Metcalf and Huntington 1991; J. Watson 1988; R. Watson 1988). Rituals require space, objects, and people to perform them; thus, ritual-care resources involved in mortuary practices may include, but are not limited to, funds, built structures, time, ritual objects, certain property and assets, religious specialists, and ritual performers at present and in the future. It is critical to examine mortuary expectations and required ritual-care resources in a given cultural and historical context, as what constitutes proper ritual care for the deceased depends upon culture and shifts over time. Furthermore, it is important to examine individuals as members of a cohort group characterized by a certain distributive pattern of mortuary options, as members of several cohort units, who all exist in the same society and share the same culture, are nonetheless subject to certain structural forces that may give rise to cohort-specific sets of mortuary options. For example, the choice to have one's remains interred in a family grave is easier to follow among people who are over 90 years old in today's Japan, as these individuals are more likely to have a dependable caretaker of their grave, while many people in their forties lack such a future caregiver, as we shall see below. By analyzing cohort groups' access to ritual resources and the availability of mortuary options, rather than examining the society as a unit of analysis to capture the trends of change in mortuary rites, we are able to refine our analysis of the transformation of mortuary practices. Individual choices accumulate over time and eventually shape the larger trends of societal change.

Tending the Dead in Postwar Japan

A family grave in postwar Japan is often regarded as the "house" after death (Kawano 2010), as well as a place of moral significance where ties between ancestors and their descendants are maintained. Only with the ritual efforts of the living are the family dead considered to achieve the full-fledged status of ancestors, typically within 33 or 50 years.

Although there are variations, the mortuary ritual cycle for the dead begins with the initial funeral and is followed by the periodic Buddhist memorial rites that mark the first, third, seventh, thirteenth, seventeenth, twenty-third, twenty-seventh, and thirty-third memorial anniversaries (see Smith 1974: 95). While not all Japanese today maintain personal faith in the efficacy of these rites to ritually transform the dead into benevolent ancestors, many people still consider the rites to be culturally and socially important expressions of respect and affection toward the departed.

Those who do not receive ritual care from their family are considered to become pitiable homeless spirits (*muenbotoke*), and the remains interred at a deserted grave are dug up and placed in a collective grave for nameless spirits. In this study, they are examined as a culturally specific category of the dead. Homeless spirits—those without kin to ritually care for them—are analytically separated from hungry ghosts (*gaki*)—the dead who are suffering in the Buddhist Realm of Hungry Ghosts. Homeless spirits in Japan typically include unidentified persons who died away from home as well as those who died in a disaster. The latter group of the deceased usually becomes the target of community-level veneration rites. Dying in a disaster is far from an ideal way of dying, which is thought to threaten the deceased's peaceful rest in the posthumous realm. Again, people today do not always believe in the existence of such homeless spirits, yet the condition of homelessness (*muen*) is still considered to be miserable as these spirits fail to achieve the valued condition of interdependence—the primary characteristic of personhood in postwar Japan. Thus, the family grave system in Japan produces the stratification of the dead in the posthumous world: those who are cared for (ancestors) and those who are abandoned (homeless spirits).

In postwar Japan (after World War II to 1989), ritual-care resources that an individual needs to continue the veneration of ancestors in a normative manner consisted of a memorial asset (family grave) and a ritual caretaker of the grave (Kawano 2010). The following three characteristics of this family system structure the availability of mortuary options and an individual's access to the cultural ideal of interment in a family grave. First, a family grave belongs to a kinship unit, or the stem family, which ideally extends into the future. Unlike a nuclear family, it does not dissolve when children marry and the original married couple passes away. That the memorial asset requires succession within a stem family framework creates a situation in which some individuals lack appropriate descendants to inherit the assets in the future. The second characteristic of the family grave is that it will be abolished if not inherited, which is considered an unfortunate situation. Third, once acquired, the grave cannot be resold to another buyer, but only "returned" to the provider without any refund, which affects the choice of having a new family grave established. In Japan, graves bind the living to the dead, both materially and socially, as they demand people's ongoing material and social investment. In other societies, however, graves do not presuppose long-term maintenance and ceremonial care by generations of kin, which presumably produces a different type of mortuary choice and associated relations between the living and the dead. These differences are likely to affect the continuity of the existing mortuary practice or the development of an alternative.

Before considering the impact of demographic change in postwar Japan on the availability of memorial-care resources, it is important to outline the rules of acquiring and inheriting a family grave in Japan. Before World War II, only one child (successor) inherited the ceremonial and non-ceremonial assets of the stem family. After the war, an equal inheritance law replaced the one-child inheritance law of pre-war Japan, but the new law was not extended to the inheritance of ceremonial assets. The postwar Civil Code continues to regard ceremonial assets as indivisible—therefore, only one child is allowed to inherit the family's ceremonial assets (although there are differences between pre-war and postwar succession of ceremonial assets; see Mori 1993b: 214–16). In pre-war Japan, the eldest son was typically

the successor of the family's assets, both ceremonial and non-ceremonial. Today, the law does not state a preference for the eldest son, although the culturally preferred successor remains a married son who has his own child(ren). Because the family grave presupposes the existence of descendants and obliges them to care for it in the future, in many cemeteries a person cannot acquire a grave plot (technically, the right to use the plot) unless he or she has a successor. Because only one child inherits the existing family grave, his (or her) sibling is expected to establish a new grave or to use the grave of the marital partner's family, if any. If neither a husband nor a wife is in the position to inherit a grave, the couple is expected to establish a new one. A grave is often established in a Buddhist temple compound, a public cemetery, or a private cemetery. The location of the new grave, in relation to its cost, matters greatly as survivors are obliged to visit and maintain it.

It is worth noting that the ritual-care resources discussed here are culturally defined. One may wonder if cash constitutes ritual-care resources. From an emic perspective, however, whether an individual can afford a new grave does not necessarily determine his or her access to peaceful rest in a family grave. In many cases, a wealthy person without a future successor is not "qualified" to acquire a new grave, given the above acquisition and inheritance rules. Meanwhile, the limited availability of financial resources may not prevent a person from having his or her ashes interred in a family grave, if the person inherits a grave, or the person's adult children co-establish a new grave for their parent by pulling resources together.

Demographic Change and Strains on Ritual-Care Resources

In the process of demographic transitions in modernizing societies, birth rates and mortality rates decrease over time (Johnson-Hanks 2008: 303). In many cases, the decline of mortality rates occurs before that of fertility rates, although scholars have noted some variations (see Johnson-Hanks 2008: 304–5 for European examples). Consequently, there is a period in which the society's population increases rapidly, wherein birth rates remain high but mortality rates begin to decline. This period is known as the "transitional" period. Therefore, the demographic change consists of three phases: the pre-transitional, the transitional, and the post-transitional (Itō 1994; Ochiai 2000). According to Japanese sociologist Ochiai Emiko (2000), the period between 1925 and 1950 constitutes the transitional period in Japan. This rough division of people into three cohort groups—pre-transitional, transitional, and post-transitional—does not do justice to the culturally meaningful cohort units, such as the Shōwa *hitoketa*, who were born between 1926 and 1934 during the first nine years of the Shōwa period, or the baby boomers, born between 1947 and 1949 (Kawano 2010). The Shōwa *hitoketa* are known for their frugality, work ethic, and having endured extreme suffering during World War II in their youth (Lock 1993: 81–2; Plath 1975: 57–8), while the boomers are the beneficiaries of Japan's postwar economic boom, the mass education system, and the rapid growth of consumerism and urban middle-class lifestyles. Nevertheless, this division of people into these age groups is still useful as it markedly reveals the structuring of care-related choices in Japan, including those related to the care of the deceased. In fact, a cohort analysis reveals the increasing strain on memorial-care resources to continue the conventional memorial practice among Japanese people born between 1925 and 1950. The limited availability of ritual-care resources is intimately tied to the development of an alternative mortuary practice.

Members of the pre-transitional group did not necessarily face a major shortage of ritual-care resources. As a group, those born before 1925 are associated with high birth rates.

Although mortality rates were also high, people's mobility was relatively limited and the practice of adoption was common. Children and even adults were adopted into a family without an appropriate successor, and families with a daughter but no son also commonly adopted the daughter's husband. Therefore, families used these strategies to secure a successor to serve as the future household head and caretaker of the family grave.

In contrast, members of the transitional cohort, as a group, face a shortage of human resources to care for their family graves. Born between 1925 and 1950, the transitional cohort members are known to have many adult siblings. Therefore, members of this group were able to provide a successor to their parents' family grave without difficulties. However, this group is also known for their limited opportunities to inherit their parents' grave, as a family grave cannot be co-inherited among siblings. If there were three sons in the family, for example, only one son would be allowed to use it in that generation, while the other two sons would need to establish new graves.

Many members of the transitional cohort moved to urban areas when they were young to obtain an education or to seek employment during the 1950s and 1960s, when cities were expanding rapidly and many new jobs were created. These migrants were licensed to leave their hometowns, provided that one of their siblings stayed with their aging parents in the countryside. The family grave, therefore, was left in the hands of a married sibling who stayed with his parents in their hometown. As new urban migrants, those who moved to the Tokyo area during the 1950s and 1960s were typically positioned to establish their own family grave when they aged. Cities, therefore, have been full of people who are in need of a grave plot, and it makes sense that a shortage of graves became a major issue in urban areas. Many large-scale municipal and private cemeteries were established in the postwar period to meet the mortuary needs of new arrivals (see Fujii 1993; Makimura 1996).

By the 1990s, members of the transitional cohort began to reach retirement age and found that they had limited memorial-care resources. They were not childless—typically they had two children—but they did not always have a preferred caretaker for the family grave in the future: a married son with children. Members of the post-transitional cohort are associated with low marriage and birth rates. It is not unusual for members of this group to remain unmarried into their forties or to be married long-term without children. Therefore, some transitional cohort members find it unattractive to invest in a costly family grave for them to use in the future, as their investment would not be kept within the family for generations. In this context, the scattering of ashes, which requires no inheritance or caretaking, may be adopted as an alternative that solves the memorial problem of limited ritual-care resources.

The Rise of Ash Scattering

A citizen-based group called the Grave-Free Promotion Society of Japan (*Sōsō no jiyū o susumeru kai*, henceforth GFPS; recently the group's English name has been changed to Japan Sōsō Society) was established in 1991 to promote "freedom from a grave." A former *Asahi Shinbun* Newspaper journalist, Yasuda Mutsuhiko, started this civic movement, as he was unsatisfied with a contemporary Japan that allowed no freedom in choosing a burial practice and that obligated people to inter the remains of the dead in a grave. He founded the society to offer a "natural" mortuary practice that allows the remains to "return to nature," in contrast to the practice of storing the remains in a ceramic pot in a stone structure. Specifically, the scattering of ashes on land or at sea, the founder maintained, does not damage the environment, unlike large-scale cemeteries that are typically developed on hillsides. In his late adulthood, Mr. Yasuda became a freelance

journalist and worked on water conservation issues, which brought him to a mountainous area of central Japan where burial was still permitted by municipal law. He realized that the deceased's body gradually decomposed and returned to nature in the area that provided drinking water to Tokyoites. Thinking about ash scattering from a public heath perspective, he thought that the scattering of cremated remains would not contaminate the water source, as burial is allowed in an area that provided drinking water to many. When he visited the forested area of central Japan, he was coincidentally thinking about his close friend who had passed away and had wanted to have his ashes scattered. This friend's wishes did not come to fruition, as ash scattering was widely believed to be illegal in Japan at the time (technically, there were no prohibitions against ash scattering as a mortuary ceremony, though discarding the remains of the deceased was illegal). The seed of the GFPS movement thus came from the intersection of Mr. Yasuda's personal loss of his friend and his professional interest in water and environmental conservation. The original focus of ash scattering was to solve the shortages of drinking water and grave lots in the Tokyo area at the same time by having the ashes of its residents scattered in the forests that provide them with water.

Mr. Yasuda was also critical of the commercialization of death—namely, the for-profit death industry, Buddhist institutions, and cemetery developers. He maintained that by conducting an ash-scattering ceremony, the bereaved could regain control over a mortuary practice. In addition, ash scattering was presented as an aesthetic practice. Rather than going into a "dark, small" grave, the deceased "return" to nature—on a mountain or at sea—listening to song birds or rolling waves. Mr. Yasuda clearly avoided religious—often Buddhist—images of the dead when describing ash scattering. He refused to discuss issues regarding the deceased's soul. In his view, the deceased are "reminisced and memorialized." The pacification of spirits or the veneration of the dead belonged to the realm of religion, rather than to a civic movement such as the GFPS.

How do the views of ordinary GFPS members differ from those of the founder? It is important to make a distinction between Mr. Yasuda's perspective as the founder of the GFPS and ordinary members' ideas. My study indicates that the conservation of the environment is not necessarily the primary reason why ordinary members have sought out this practice. Moreover, ordinary members maintained diverse religious orientations and developed their own interpretations of ash scattering's effects on the deceased's soul, though the founder avoided the discussion of its destiny. Some members are indifferent to religion, although they still participated in a range of domestic and institutional activities to venerate the family dead, for example, at a Buddhist altar at home, a kin's grave, or a Buddhist temple with which they are affiliated. Other members stayed away from religious activities but memorialized the deceased by holding a secular gathering with kin at a hotel or a restaurant, and maintaining a domestic shelf where flowers were offered. Some people thought that the dead do not have souls, while others felt that the dead "watch over" the living and stay close to their descendants. One older woman told me that her deceased husband "would come over to the domestic altar when called upon" during the festival of the dead. Despite such variations regarding their religious orientations and beliefs about the destiny of the deceased's soul, as a group, the majority of the GFPS members shared one trait: they belonged to the transitional cohort group and maintained limited ritual-care resources to participate in the family grave system.

The 1990s saw the development of multiple alternative burial systems, including ash scattering, which corresponds to the time period when members of the transitional cohort began to retire (Kawano 2010). Although ash scattering through the GFPS was not publicly declared as a solution to the problem of people who have limited ritual-care resources to continue venerating the dead at a family grave, the group certainly attracted such individuals.

This phenomenon becomes clear as we review the initial responses GFPS members had when they were asked why they had joined the society. First, a number of informants stated that they were the second or the third sons (or their spouse). In other words, they were not in the position to acquire their family grave, and the family's grave, if any, would be given to their sibling in their rural hometown. Second, many informants noted that they had only married-out daughters but no sons, meaning that they did not have a culturally preferred caretaker for a family grave. Married-out daughters are expected to care for their marital family grave, where they are expected to rest with their husband and potentially with their in-laws after death. Asking a married-out daughter to care for a natal family grave would imply doubling her ritual burden. Third, some informants had sons, but they were not ideal caretakers, though the informants did not explicitly use such a phrase. Frequently, people gave reasons that indicated it was difficult for a son to be an ideal caregiver. Some sons were unmarried or were married but had no children, while others lived far away from their parents. According to my survey concerning 76 deceased persons whose ashes had been scattered by the GFPS (Kawano 2004: 239), 73 people had been married and had an average of 1.84 children (0.77 sons and 1.06 daughters). Thirty-seven deceased persons (out of 76) had a family grave that they could have used for interment. Thus, the GFPS attracts many people who are expected to acquire a new grave for themselves (and their descendants) and/or lack a future caretaker in the family grave system.

Mr. Nogawa's case further illustrates the relationship between ritual-care resources and the adoption of ash scattering. When I asked Mr. Nogawa, who is in his mid-seventies, why he had joined the society, he initially told me that it was because he was the second son. He noted that he could have afforded a grave, indicating that he was not financially disadvantaged. However, his son was unmarried and in his forties. Therefore, he had the memorial problem of not having a future caretaker for a grave. Mr. Nogawa also noted that he read about the GFPS in a national newspaper and went to listen to the founder's seminar: "I liked his talk, and joined the organization." Although he was not an enthusiastic environmentalist, he valued the conservationist focus of the society and found its activities socially meaningful. Later, he added that he "did not want to make a Buddhist priest richer" by obtaining a grave, as it would only be held by the family for two generations and it would likely be abolished once his son passed away without providing a successor. A grave was expensive for a former professional such as Mr. Nogawa, but he could have managed the cost if he had the prospect of keeping the newly acquired asset in his family for generations. Yet, without that prospect, the investment of 20,000 dollars for a new grave would be far too expensive.

Nevertheless, not all of those who lack a memorial site or a future caretaker turn to ash scattering. A key informant from my previous field site, a mid-sized city near Tokyo, told me: "If people have no ritual caretakers, they can ask a Buddhist temple to care for the grave." In fact, if a person has a family grave but no ritual caretaker, one possible option is to make a sizable donation to have the grave cared for by the temple. In a tightly knit community where residents are aware of their neighbors' family ranks and the locations of their family graves, this option may be chosen to keep the deceased's family standing in a public community context. In such a community, there is a stronger reciprocal tie between the family and its Buddhist temple that provides mortuary rites, and deviations from Buddhist mortuary ideals would carry a social cost. Mr. Nogawa's situation examined above, however, involved neither a memorial site nor a future caretaker, which thus presents a different case. Furthermore, he had moved from his rural hometown to Tokyo when he was young and had established his nuclear family household, which he has known for most of his adult life. He has not maintained close ties to Buddhist temples, nor has he built a strong community network in his place of residence. For a person such as Mr. Nogawa, acquiring

a new grave and donating a premium in addition to having it cared for by the temple is not as attractive as a new burial system such as ash scattering. Rather than depending on Buddhist institutions and investing more in a family grave system to deal with their limited mortuary-care resources, GFPS members turn to ash scattering, which does not necessitate the inheritance of a memorial site. Members choose to forgo a grave and manage memorial care with the help of nature and their small family, which does not necessarily provide a culturally preferred ritual caretaker in the family grave system.

GFPS members have created a new mortuary destination and expect to "rest peacefully" embraced by nature, rather than being venerated in a family grave and achieving ancestorhood. My informants did not describe their future posthumous status as "homeless"—the condition referring to the souls of the dead in an abandoned grave. Ash scattering thus can be seen as a shift away from the bifurcation of the dead into ancestors and homeless souls in the family grave system. Rather than investing in a system that is likely to confer on them the status of "homeless" in a foreseeable future, GFPS members "return to nature," perhaps as a new class of dead. Nevertheless, the creation of this image of the deceased should not be considered as the initial driving force for their joining the society. The family grave ties the living to the long-term care system for the deceased, and given this social reality, ash scattering was adopted by aging urbanites to address the deceased's overdependence on the living (Kawano 2010). Ash scattering is thought to allow the deceased to become more self-sufficient in the posthumous world, rather than overburdening the living with mortuary care. Thus, the adoption of ash scattering aims to create a new pattern of relations between the deceased-to-be and their survivors in Japan's changing society. The new mortuary rite may be condemned as "anti-traditional" in local representations, in particular, as signs of "selfishness" and "moral decline" due to modernization or Westernization. Ash scattering in Japan is a case in point. While these native representations of a new mortuary rite are important for anthropological investigation, an analysis of these images alone is insufficient for understanding the ongoing process of change in mortuary rites.

Conclusion

Historically mortuary rites used to be regarded as a "given" mechanism that a society imposes upon individual social actors, regardless of their interest or positions. In this view, people were obliged to perform the "traditional" rites to reproduce the existing social norms and relations. However, as we have discussed, there has been a questioning of the fixity of mortuary rites as well as the norms and relations to be enacted by these rites. The content of the rites is fluid, and a group of people may create a radically different mortuary rite. Nevertheless, the creation of new mortuary rites does not simply occur because people have gained individual freedom of choice to depart from the performance of "traditional" rites. As noted in this chapter, the "traditional" allocation of ritual labor and assets in mainstream society produced a large number of urbanites who could not easily follow the conventional path. Therefore, a study of a new mortuary rite must investigate and analyze the relationship between the old and the new rites. I contend that the analysis of "ritual resources" discussed in this study is useful for further cross-cultural exploration, as it allows us to compare the existing distributions of mortuary choices in diverse societies in the evolving field of mortuary rites in sociocultural anthropology.

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PART II
Ritual, Myth and Creativity

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Anthropology, Dreams and Creativity

Katie Glaskin

Although drawing on aspects of our experience, dreams often produce scenarios and ideas that seem fantastic and improbable, and hence they have frequently been associated with kinds of creativity, since they link elements that in waking life we might not consciously connect. Definitions of dreams vary from a narrow understanding of dreams as imagistic narratives having plotlines and characters, to a broader definition of dreams as being any mental activity occurring during sleep (Rock 2004:viii). In both definitions, dreaming appears as a kind of thinking. Barrett and McNamara (2007:ix) describe dreams as 'predominantly visual, metaphoric thought often linked to mental processes outside conscious awareness', and it is the seeming independence of dreams from conscious aspects of self that Stephen's (1989:54, 62) description of dreams as products of the 'autonomous imagination' seeks to capture. It is this apparent autonomy that has contributed to the many folk theories about what is going on when we dream (see Lohmann 2007). Tylor (1871) famously postulated that the commonality of the dream experience provided the catalyst for the development of religion throughout the world (Basso 1992:102).

For many people around the world, dreams have as much perceptual value as waking experience. Indeed, for many, dreams and waking are part of a continuum of experience that form the reality in which they live, and events experienced in dreams may be charged with as much emotional salience and epistemological significance as events experienced while awake. This is not to suggest that people do not distinguish between dreams and waking experience; it is to suggest that, in some societies and cultures, both are vested with meaning and importance. This is clearly not the case in all social and cultural contexts. Tedlock (1992a:2), for example, notes that Western thought has tended to devalue dream experience, and she traces this propensity back to the ancient Greeks, and particularly to Aristotle, who 'dismissed dreams as nothing but mental pictures'. With the advent of Cartesian dualism in the seventeenth century, dreams, which were already undervalued within the West, were placed 'within the realm of fantasy or irrational experience' (Tedlock 1992a:2). Exceptions to this have included movements from the Renaissance focus on the imagination through to the Dadaists and Surrealists (Tedlock 1992a:4), and following on from Freud's (1900) pioneering work, the place dreams have acquired, for some, as an insight into the subconscious through the development of various streams of psychoanalysis.

People from around the world have a range of folk theories about dreams, which include theories that the soul or some other aspect of self travels in dreams; that encounters with people and spirit beings in dreams are visitations; that dreams convey messages; that dreams foresee and shape future events; that ascribe greater power to dreams than to waking thought, and, at the other end of the spectrum, to perspectives that dreams are meaningless or 'nonsense' (Lohmann 2007:41–3). Barrett (2007:135, 146), for example, notes that some scientists view dreams as 'evolutionary byproducts of sleep, or epiphenomena',

in which dreams are thought about as a kind of 'screen saver'; what matters is not the dream, but that the dream indicates that parts of the brain remain active. Other scientists take a different view: if we dream, there must be a good evolutionary reason why (e.g. Revensuo 2003; Stickgold 2003).

Lohmann (2010a:230) notes that within a particular cultural context, people may employ a number of these dream theories simultaneously. For example, Tedlock (1992b:113) says that Zuni from New Mexico view dreaming as involving part of a person's self travelling beyond the body, as do Quiché Maya, but the latter also regard dreams as occurring when 'gods or ancestors' approach the sleeping person (1992b:115). The interpretation of dreams, too, may vary both between individuals and in relation to particular dreams, and they may transform over time. Writing about Hopi many years ago, Eggan (1949:178) observed that while specific dream referents might have had 'almost' universal interpretations, a person would still explain that referent in their dreams according to how they felt upon waking. Tedlock's (1992b:113) account of Zuni dreaming indicates that within cultures, people do not necessarily hold a uniform view about aspects of dreams; in that case, Zuni held different notions about what part of the person travels in dreams. Lohmann (2010a:227) also describes how, when assessing whether a particular dream is an accurate representation of reality, the Asabano of Papua New Guinea 'draw on multiple and changing opinions and theories of dreams and dreaming'. Notwithstanding these kinds of variations, because attitudes towards dreams are shaped within specific cultural contexts, how a person understands dreams is likely to reflect aspects of that context (e.g. see Tedlock 1992a; Graham 2003; Lohmann 2003; Edgar 2011; Mittermaier 2011).

In her edited volume on dreaming, Tedlock (1992a[1987]:ix) described the marginalization of dreaming in anthropology as leading to a paucity of possible contributors for a book that focused on the topic. But she suggests that the lack of interest in dreams began to change from the mid-1970s onwards as anthropological approaches themselves began to change, as anthropologists became more interested in understanding how various cultures attribute meaning and create knowledge 'in their own terms' (Tedlock 1992a[1987]:x). One of the challenges that anthropological research into dreaming confronts is that it is not possible to participate directly in another person's dreams, although in some cultural contexts participation in other's dreams may be regarded as possible (Lohmann 2003:6). As Kracke points out, though, the limitation about participating in another's dream experience needs to be put into perspective. He argues that this is in fact the case with all our experience, most obviously with our 'inner' experience, not simply with our dream experience (Kracke 2003:211). While we may not be able to participate actively in people's dreams, as Stewart and Strathern (2003:43) say, dream narratives provide 'a window through which to view the social life-worlds of people, perceptions of self and personhood … and patterns of thinking'. Nevertheless, the perception that dreams are inaccessible to others, or indeed that they do not have value, may go some way towards explaining why research into dreams remains a small part of anthropology overall.

Research on dreams within anthropology has reflected various orientations of anthropology, and particularly of psychological anthropology, over time. Such research has, for example, sought to test Freudian hypotheses (e.g. Seligman 1921; Lincoln 1935); considered dreams through their manifest content (e.g. Eggan 1949); used psychoanalytic or symbolic interpretations (Freudian, Jungian, phenomenological or other) (e.g. D'Andrade 1961; Kracke 1992; Mimica 2006) and combinations of psychoanalytic and schema theory (e.g. Hollan 2003). But dreams have also been approached without specifically psychological orientations, as a focal element of wider social processes, such as the political use of dreams (e.g. Robbins 2003; Dussart 2000; Keen 2003), or dreams and the constitution of intellectual property (e.g. Glaskin 2011a).

My focus in this chapter is on the relationship between dreams and the creativity that has been reported in many different cultural contexts around the world as emerging through them. The approach that I take here is one that relies on anthropology and its methods to understand the cultural bases, elaborations and interpretations accorded to dreams, and on cognitive neuroscience to understand the biological basis of these experiences. Such an approach has been described as neuroanthropology (e.g. Lende and Downey 2012a, 2012b; for examples of such work in relation to dreams, see Glaskin 2011b; Dahl 2013). Lende and Downey (2012a:2) describe the 'new biology' of brain sciences today as emphasizing 'variation, plasticity, processes, and emerging systems', and they argue that a neuroanthropological approach can bring biology and culture together through 'an insistence that brain function is always embedded in larger, living systems, including the human body, the social field, and the longer-term, larger-scale structures that are the products of … cooperative, cumulative systems'. As humans we have a 'developmental dependency'; during infancy and childhood, we learn skills, such as language, that allow us to operate in the world, and these 'do not appear without immersion in culture' (Lende and Downey 2012b:27, 29). So while our experience in the world is fundamentally embodied, having a biological basis, it is also encultured through the protracted dependency that the human infant has on its parents. This means that our experience – even our inner, subjective experience that others cannot directly participate in – is already socially mediated. Whether we recognize it or not, culture shapes much of our experience. How we think about, experience, and apprehend dreams and sleep is one example of this (Glaskin and Chenhall 2013). This means that what we understand as dreams in Western culture may be understood quite differently in other cultural contexts (Glaskin 2005). This is likely to have implications for how people in different cultural contexts apprehend and draw upon dream experiences.

Dreams, Creativity, Innovation

Anthropologists have long been interested in cultural innovation (e.g. Barnett 1953; Wagner 1981[1975]), although research specifically into creativity appears more recent (e.g. Lavie, Narayan and Rosaldo 1993; Liep 2001; Leach 2005; Hallam and Ingold 2007; McLean and Coleman 2007; McLean 2009; Lohmann 2010b). There is evidence to suggest that research into creativity in general is becoming increasingly cross-disciplinary (e.g. Hargreaves, Miell and Macdonald 2012). Anthropological research that has specifically sought to investigate how dreams contribute to creativity and innovation, though, is uncommon (exceptions include Gaines and Price-Williams 1990a, 1990b; Price-Williams and Gaines 1994), although ethnographic accounts have come to address these issues as they have emerged through fieldwork (e.g. Dussart 2000; Graham 2003).

Dreams have been described as 'the earliest form of human creativity, even of human cognition', with some claiming that '"literature" made its first appearance when dreams went from being narrated orally to being written down' (Rupprecht 2007:1). Neuroscientific studies of dreaming suggest that a number of features of dreams experienced in REM (rapid eye movement) sleep, related to the physiology of this sleep stage, may be particularly productive of what we call 'creativity'. Dreams are hyperassociative, and in this sense are analogous to the kind of free association that is often understood as essential to the creative process, allowing the dreamer to make connections between things (images, thoughts, experiences and so on) that they may not (otherwise) consciously connect.

While understandings of dreams vary cross-culturally, the occurrence of dream-derived creativity and innovation accords with anecdotal accounts from many societies

and cultures around the world about dreams as sources of creativity and inspiration (e.g. see Barrett 2001; Van de Castle 1994:33–9). Significant too is that many innovative, creative moments in waking life appear to have similarities to the creative and innovative stimulus that many humans also report as being gained through dreams, sleep (or various sleep states; from sleep-onset, to being 'half-asleep', to being sleepless in the night). For example, the modes of thought that those engaged in creative activity report often bear a resemblance to a kind of day-dreaming. In day-dreaming, we can readily recollect the thoughts we were having upon return to conscious thinking; it is an 'in-between state' which 'is variously called the preconscious or subconscious', and has been associated with the 'transition before sleep onset' (Cartwright 2010:155). Psychologist Csikszentmihalyi (1996) has described how artists and performers enter what he calls a 'flow' state, a term that describes 'an optimal experience when the performer is totally absorbed in performing and everything comes together, often associated with a "high"' (Gruzelier 2012:332). Of particular note here is the suggestion that this state is equivalent to a kind of temporary sleep mode. In common with waking creativity, the dreaming state is an immersion 'in another world' that manifests a conversion of 'experience into some form of structure' (Rock 2004:145). The manner in which this is 'converted' into some form of structure will depend on a person's experience, which in turn is mediated through their social and cultural context. This is where anthropology can make an important contribution to these questions.

Ethnographic Examples

My first example of dream-inspired creativity comes from an Indigenous Australian context. Indigenous Australian cosmologies share the concept of a creative period in which ancestral beings performed various deeds that shaped the country, imbuing the landscape with their presence, inscribing it with narratives of their activities, and giving humans laws to follow. This creative epoch is now widely known to English speakers in and beyond Australia as 'the Dreaming' or 'Dreamtime', the latter a term first coined by Gillen as a translation of the Aranda term *alcheringa* (Spencer 1896:111). Ethnographic accounts from around Australia have shown that for many different Aboriginal groups, in nocturnal dreams, 'new' songs, ceremonies and designs may be revealed through ancestors, and subsequently become assimilated into this creative period, which is nevertheless understood as unchanging (e.g. Dussart 2000:139–76; Keen 2003; Myers 1986; Poirier 2005; Tonkinson 1970, 2003). As we shall see, the ethnography itself reveals that although we might regard the emergent songs, dances and designs as 'created', those responsible for dreaming them, working on them and performing them do not tend to think of them in this way, and this is where cross-cultural investigations can challenge how we think about such things as creativity and imagination.

My interest in the relationship between dreams, creativity and innovation is one that grew organically from my field research with Bardi and Jawi Aboriginal people of northwest Australia, stimulated by what I have learnt about how they understand the songs, ceremonies and designs to emerge through dreams, and how aspects of personhood are implicated in these processes. While fuller accounts of this are available elsewhere (e.g. Glaskin 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013), some details of this are provided for the purposes of illustration here.

Before being instantiated in human form, the middle-aged and elderly Bardi and Jawi people with whom I mainly worked during the 1990s held the view that they already existed

as spirit-beings called *raya* that were emplaced in country during ancestral times.[1] Other spirit beings inhabit country too. They include important creator beings, who made the country, including the *raya*, and gave humans laws to follow; dangerous spirit beings of various kinds; and the spirits of the old people who have passed away and returned to their country. In this cosmology, Bardi and Jawi persons exist as spirits before birth and continue to exist as spirits after death. One of the important ways through which these various spirits are understood to communicate with people is in dreams; hence, the appearance of a deceased person or other being in a dream is understood as an actual visitation by that spirit being. In general terms – there are some exceptions – it is mainly *jarlngunggurr*, persons who are considered to have extraordinary powers, who have metaphysical knowledge (including the revelation of ritual or ritual elements) revealed to them in dreams. While in the Australian context the word 'shaman' is rarely used to describe such persons, who tend rather to be described as 'magic' or 'clever men', 'native doctors', 'sorcerers' and 'men of high degree' (e.g. see Berndt and Berndt 1970, 146; Elkin 1984:283), they do share characteristics with those described as shamans in other contexts (e.g. see Ohnuki-Tierney 1981; Eliade 2004[1964]; Atkinson 1992). This includes their use of dreams to access metaphysical realms in order to heal, perform sorcery and gain knowledge that may not be considered accessible to others (see Glaskin 2013). This may involve them travelling in dreams and encountering deceased persons or other spirit beings in dreams, or through these beings 'visiting' them in dreams. Sometimes, these beings reveal ritual components, such as song, dance or design, to a person in dreams.

Ilma, a term used to refer to a particular genre of song, dance and associated emblem, as well as the performance constituted by all three elements, is a public (that is, non-restricted) example of this.[2] Because of their ancestral origins, *ilma* are not thought of as having been individually 'created'. This contrasts with some other Bardi song genres (such as *ludiny*), in which individual creativity and authorship is recognized. The explanation that one Bardi man gave to me of the relationship between the dreamt material and the dream experience was that a dreamer could visit a certain place in dreams, and there would 'photocopy', 'recollect' and 'memorize' the song that was revealed in that location (Glaskin 2005:305). Another man told me that 'you dream about *ingarda* [a spirit being] or ancestor that had passed away that comes to you and brings you this *ilma* and show(s) you the song and dances, how to dance and sing'. In relation to the *ilma* designs themselves, another man told me that what is seen in a dream is 'copied'. All of these descriptions, then, involve seeing and remembering, albeit seeing and remembering something that has occurred in the dream. The origins of that which they see, which they 'copy', 'photocopy', 'recollect' and 'memorize' are not understood as a product of the dreamer's mind or their imagination, but as something shown or revealed to the dreamer through the agency of various spirit beings. The comparative accounts from different regions of Australia about this kind of dream-inspired creativity referred to above exhibit numerous similarities, with an interaction occurring between the dreamer and some kind of spirit being in the dream, who 'shows' the 'new' song or ceremony to the dreamer in that dream (e.g. Marett 2005:45). These dreams are not automatically accepted as ancestral revelations; the social processes through which they are validated as such means that they are intersubjectively constituted (e.g. see Glaskin 2011a; Myers 1986:52). The meaning and the significance of such dreams occurs within a particular social and cosmological framework that informs both how these dreams

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1   Some of the younger generations may now not uniformly hold this view.
2   In Australian Aboriginal societies it is common for there to be restrictions (according to gender and stage of initiation) on certain kinds of knowledge often related to the ritual context. By saying it is 'public', I am indicating that there are no such restrictions involved: men, women and children can watch and participate in *ilma* performances, although certain people have particular responsibilities in relation to particular *ilma*.

are interpreted and understood, and, as I have argued elsewhere, how they are perceived and remembered prior to this (Glaskin 2011b). Like other aspects of consciousness, dream experiences are shaped by cultural ontologies and expectations. In contexts where Christian motifs have been incorporated into Aboriginal cosmologies, such as among Anangu people at Ernabella that Eickelkamp (2011:115) describes, distinctions are still drawn between what originates from within one's mind, that is considered 'made up', in comparison to dreams, which 'are often felt to have come by force of volition of another subject', and hence are considered 'true'.

In comparative terms, the example of how such dreamt material is connected with the ancestral creative period to create and innovate reveals that creativity in this context emerges as a relational process operating between humans and deceased persons or between humans and powerful ancestral beings. The agency associated with the dreamt material is not understood as something that emerges from within the mind of the individual, even though there is explicit acknowledgement of engagement in the process, since the individual has to remember what they have seen or heard. While a person, then, may have been the one who dreamt a new song, ceremony or design, they are not considered to be the creator of it, even when they have worked on the dreamt material subsequently. As Keen (2003:133, 138) has said in relation to dreamt material that is similarly integrated into ritual in north-east Arnhem Land, this is a context in which the agency of the individual is downplayed, and he attributes this to the collective ownership of the ideas and objects concerned. For this reason, the term creativity itself is largely inappropriate (in emic terms) to describe the products of encounters between human beings and their nocturnal interlocutors, although it remains useful here as a heuristic device for the purpose of cross-cultural comparison.

Another example comes from Brazil, from the work of anthropologist Laura Graham (2003) concerning the Xavante people. Her description of how the Xavante 'receive' songs in dreams is not unlike the description of how many indigenous Australian cultures understand dreams and dreaming. She refers to a songs of a genre called *da-ñoʒre* which 'originate with the immortals and … creators whom people see and hear in their dreams' (2003:114). This is a song genre that, she says, is 'performed primarily by men, particularly during those phases of the male life cycle in which solidarity is at a peak' (2003:118) (such as initiation). And while Xavante told Graham that 'everyone experiences dreams', she notes that how these dream experiences are represented vary according to a range of criteria, including gender and age (2003:114). Thus, she says, while some young children, especially boys, will often report that they have heard songs in their dreams, because the boys are considered too young to be dreaming these songs, the parents are quick to note that the children's young age has prevented them from being able to remember the dreamt songs (2003:115). She describes how young men wake and sing 'the song through softly one time', as a strategy for remembering the dreamt song: 'they say a man "sings quietly so as not to forget" … He then repeats the song loudly to etch it indelibly into his memory' (2003:126). While the origin of the dream is with 'immortals' and 'creators' who are encountered in dreams, there are deliberate strategies for remembering the dream experiences that involve the active participation of the dreamer in bringing these dream experiences into public view, and this is not dissimilar to the accounts that Bardi gave me of how dreams had to be actively remembered.

Many composers around the world draw upon sound in their creative works (e.g. Barrett 2001). Musicians such as Sting, Billy Joel and Paul McCartney have all attributed creative facets of their song writing to dreams (Grace 2001:167). In the notes to his (1987) song 'Lazarus Heart', for example, Sting writes that 'Lazarus Heart was a vivid nightmare that I wrote down and then fashioned into a song' (in Grace 2001:168). Paul McCartney said of the song 'Yesterday' that he woke with the melody of the song, but 'because I'd

dreamed it I couldn't believe I'd written it … but I had the tune, which was the most magic thing' (cited in Grace 2001:167). These descriptions are not intrinsically dissimilar to those descriptions of the revelation of new songs that Aboriginal Australians, or Xavante, for that matter, experience in dreams. An evident difference is how people conceptualize the origins of the music or images that they experience in dreams; and, of course, how the 'product' of the dream is elaborated and how authorship or ownership is subsequently understood. As Lohmann (2007:50) says, while '[C]reativity in arts, crafts, and other imaginative realms is attributed to dreaming in a variety of social cultures', how dream agency is understood varies. This question of agency, in turn, is fundamentally linked to how we might think about what constitutes 'creativity'.

While 'the polarity between novelty and convention' (Ingold and Hallam 2007:2) tends to inform ideas about creativity in Western societies, Rosaldo, Lavie and Narayan (1993:5) note that 'invention takes place within a field of culturally available possibilities, rather than being without precedent. It is as much a process of selection and recombination as one of thinking anew.' As they say, 'mundane everyday activities' are as much 'the locus of cultural creativity as the arduous ruminations of the lone artist or scientist', because invention is necessary even in the perpetuation of cultural traditions. Ingold and Hallam (2007:10) identify the tendency, in Western society, to judge 'creativity by the innovativeness of its results rather than by the improvisations that went into the process of producing them'. The characterization of creativity by way of its products tends to obscure the generative aspects of creativity that occur through its processes. This tendency to 'read back' from a product in terms of ascribing creativity is very much linked with the idea of the individual and their agency, and is one that tends to sublimate the social aspects of the generative process (2007:10).

One's experiences, influences, deliberations and so on are an integral part of the creative process (Tan n.d.). Because humans apprehend the world through cognitive schema that may be modified in relation to new experiences (e.g. Strauss and Quinn 1997), our connection with 'new' things – whether experiences, or objects, or 'created' things – means that there is always an element of recognition in the encounter. Acclaimed artist Shaun Tan's (n.d) view is that 'what is original is not the ideas themselves, but the way they are put together'. His description of recombining and reconstructing is not that dissimilar to what scientists have argued is happening to our memories and our experiences when we dream. In 2004, a group of scientists wrote a letter to the journal *Nature*, outlining an experiment that they had performed to test the role of sleep in what they called 'the process of insight'. They suggested that, along with sleep consolidating recent memories, it 'could allow insight by changing their representational structure' (Wagner et al. 2004:352). What they are describing as insight here does, I think, have something in common with what I am describing as 'creativity'. They cite Loewie, a Nobel Prize winner who 'reported that he woke up with the essential idea for an experimental confirmation of his theory of chemical neurotransmission', and Mendeleyev, who derived 'his understanding of the critical rule' underlying the periodic table of chemical elements from a dream, as examples of sleep-inspired 'insight' (2004:352). They describe how, in sleep, 'recently encoded' experiences and memories undergo a process of integration in which they are temporarily stored in hippocampal networks and then 'played back to the neocortex where they are gradually incorporated into preexisting knowledge representations … [this] then forms the basis for a remodeling and qualitative restructuring of memory representations' (2004:354). In other words, the hyperassociativity associated with dreams reflects the integration of new and existing experience.

This account of how memory representations are being remodelled and qualitatively restructured during sleep may explain why dreams are hyperassociative; but beyond that, it may also explain how sleep itself, not simply dreams, can, as they say, '"catalyse" mental

restructuring, thereby setting the stage for the emergence of insight' (Wagner et al. 2004:354). Research now shows that not only do we dream in REM sleep, we also dream in non-REM sleep, and at sleep onset. Research has found that subjects woken during non-REM sleep often reported that they had been 'thinking' (Van de Castle 1994:265). As psychologist Robert Van der Castle says, 'the list of products produced by our sleeping mind', then, includes dreams, dreams at sleep onset, which may be 'more like a succession of snapshots than a movie', 'extensive thought patterns, and many hybrid combinations of these mental experiences' (Van der Castle 1994:267).

In the accounts that I have provided about dream-inspired creativity, to begin to realize that which has been 'received' in a dream, the dreamer must first remember the dream in a way that makes it amenable to being recalled. Hence we have accounts of Bardi telling me that what they see in a dream they must 'photocopy', recollect, and memorize, and of Xavante telling Graham that you must 'sing quietly so as not to forget' (2003: 126). Scientifically speaking, the fragility in dream recall is due to the 'shut down' of chemical systems associated with recent memory during sleep, meaning that we are most likely to remember our dreams at sleep onset or upon waking (Hobson 2002).

Inasmuch as dreams themselves may be hyperassociative, as soon as we begin to recall a dream, whether consciously or not, we are additionally already making connections between that dream and other aspects of our experience, and these will shape the way that we remember the dream, who we tell the dream to, how we tell the dream, and indeed, what we do with the dream experience. This is evident in Graham's (2003) account of how, amongst Xavante, young boys who dreamt songs but were considered too young to do so were said not to have remembered them. While the relationship between dreams and memory has been subject to ongoing debate (Revonsuo 2003), memory is clearly implicated in dreaming: we activate old memories in our dreams in new configurations; if we remember our dreams, then, as Stickgold (2003:224) says, we have additionally 'laid down' new memories. These memories are primarily (although not exclusively) imagistic, with the dreams that we are most likely to remember being those that have a strong emotional association (Hobson 2002).

Regardless of context, dreams (like 'the mind') have an inherently relational dimension; we experience the world intersubjectively. The process of translating mental images, ideas and memory fragments into something beyond oneself is a social process, one that invariably involves relations, if not collaborations, with others. Indeed, the act of transforming a subjective 'inner' experience into an outward expression of that experience necessarily involves social interaction. Vološinov's theory of expression assumes that 'consciousness exists through its dialogue with exterior, social expressions; it conveys the material of its inner processes through acts of objectification' (Graham 2003:115). Speaking of creativity more generally, Ingold and Hallam (2007:9) offer a similar perspective, saying 'the mind's creativity is inseparable from that of the total matrix of relations in which it is embedded and into which it extends'. Whether we understand dreams to be 'in the mind' or whether we have other cultural explanations for dream experiences, it is clear that dreams have social dimensions. As Graham (2003:115) says, while dreams may be 'culturally positioned along a continuum between sleeping and waking realities', the fact remains that these experiences are 'publicly expressed in socially interpretable forms', and these forms may 'even influence the way in which dream experience is brought forth to consciousness' (and see Glaskin 2011b). Both our culture and our experiences then are likely to shape the ways in which we experience dreams, the attention that we give to them, and the extent to which we remember them, as well as influencing the elements of the dream we recall and the forms in which we recall them. Writing about the Hopi, Eggan (1949:179), for example, writes that because dreams are regarded as significant, 'the Hopi tend to dream much and to remember their dreams. In this they depend on prodigious memories trained by necessity of memorizing the intricate details of their social heritage.'

The apparent similarities across cultures concerning the relationship between dreams and creativity raises interesting questions about how our sleep experience is integrated into our conscious, awake experience, and vice versa. What is evident is that there is an integration occurring, whether we are consciously aware of it or not. Clearly memory, perception and experience inform and shape one another across this continuum. Our experiences, our perceptions of these experiences, our memory of these experiences and the learning that occurs through them rely on the fact of our embodiment, which include our sensory perceptions, neural processing and so on. These allow us to experience the world and indeed our 'selves'. But we also grow up in a social milieu, in which we learn, as Hallowell put it some time ago, the 'basic orientations provided by culture', including 'self-orientation'; 'object orientation' (cosmological or metaphysical understandings, such as those concerning how we think about dreams, would fall into this category); 'spatiotemporal orientation', motivational orientation, and a normative orientation: 'values, ideals, [and] standards' (1967[1955]:89, 91, 93, 100, 105). Thus, whether we understand dreams to be 'in the mind' or whether we have other cultural explanations for dream experiences, their social, relational quality is apparent; we have learned how to think about them within a particular social environment. The implications of this for an anthropological approach to dreaming include the importance of differentiating between the experience of the dream, the memory of the dream and its subsequent narration, and the interpretation of the dream. But it is also to highlight that each of these aspects of the dream are encultured, including our experience of the dream. This is not only because of specific cultural dream theories that mean that the experience of the dream is understood differently in various cultural contexts, it is also because much of the taken for granted aspects of the world – how we *perceive* it – 'is in fact what we have learned about the world – as we remember it' (Solms and Turnbull 2002:154). Experiences of dreams are already mediated by cultural understandings learnt through socialization, and this in turn affects our perception of the dream, its subsequent recall and its interpretation. A contribution that anthropology can make to this research then is to highlight the dialectic interplay between culture and experience, to illuminate how perception, memory and cognition, all of which have an embodied, biological basis (Damasio 1999), are encultured through our interaction with our social environment.

Not everyone remembers their dreams, nor pays attention to them when they do, and comparatively speaking, few anthropologists focus their attention on dreams. As Kroker (2007:431) says though, dreaming and sleeping are central to our physical and mental lives; it is surprising, given this, that they have not been ascribed with greater value as objects of knowledge. Although there are indications that sleep and dreams are becoming increasingly important research topics, research that, by design, looks at the relationship between creativity, sleep and dreams is rare. And while research from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including anthropology, has focused on creativity, innovation, imagination and improvisation, very little anthropological research has specifically looked at sleep and dreams in this regard. A focus on creativity, sleep and dreams holds enormous potential to illuminate our understandings of creative thought processes more generally, as well as sleep and dreams – about which, relatively speaking, we know comparatively little. As Gruzelier (2012:333, my emphases) states, 'there have been *extensive* historical *anecdotes* that hypnogogia [transitional phases in and out of sleep] has facilitated creative associations in various cultural spheres', and these, he says, are related to the 'spontaneous visual, auditory, and kinaesthetic images' that are produced in these states. But much of this information remains anecdotal. Even as technological and scientific innovation continues at a pace that is quite extraordinary, questions remain about one of the most basic of human experiences, the barely-charted third of human experience that we spend asleep. While neuroscience explores *how* we dream, and psychology *why* we dream, anthropology's contribution is to

explore the effect of social and cultural context on how dreams are understood, shaped, remembered and recalled and the social processes through which these experiences are integrated into daily life.

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Sacrifice

Kathryn McClymond

Sacrifice has long been a topic of interest to scholars in the humanities and social sciences, including anthropologists, and it continues to be an authoritative category in contemporary individual and communal experience. As such, it is a useful analytic category for students of human culture. Sacrifice appears as cultural phenomena in various forms: material sacrifice, internalized sacrifice (via bodily and mental disciplines), and symbolic sacrifice, to name a few. Because of its multiple dimensions and forms, and because sacrifice is often linked intimately with authoritative figures, textual traditions, ritual practices, theological or philosophical systems, and socio-economic structures, sacrifice has also been the focus of extensive theorizing. Certain themes and approaches have dominated this theorizing and shaped the body of scholarship frequently referenced today. First, scholarship on material sacrifice has tended to focus on animal (including human) offerings, paying relatively little attention to other sacrificial substances (grain, fruit, and vegetable offerings; liquid offerings such as wine, milk, and ghee; and manufactured offerings such as scarves). Second, as a result of this focus on animal offering substances, interpreters have tended to highlight certain sacrificial procedures above others. Specifically, they have emphasized the death of animal victims, with particular attention to bloody, violent deaths. Finally, sacrificial theorizing has been viewed largely through a Western European Protestant Christian lens, which forefronts concerns about atonement and substitutionary death. This perspective has led to an emphasis on death and killing as the key functions and goals of sacrifice, and an inordinate emphasis on violence.

This chapter seeks to correct the skewed characterization of sacrifice generated by past emphases on these themes and approaches. As I have argued elsewhere, sacrificial studies that focus on the violent death of animals perpetuate a specific understanding of sacrifice, and they impose that understanding on other communities. This is problematic because it puts the cart before the horse, excluding a wide range of rituals simply because they do not fit a popular theory. In thoughtful scholarship, the data ought to drive the theory, and the data supports an expansive view of sacrifice that challenges widespread academic and popular assumptions about the nature and significance of sacrifice in various cultures around the globe. A theoretical approach that recognizes a variety of styles, materials, and purposes attached to sacrifice reflects the textual and ethnographic data more accurately. Such an approach also helps us appreciate the complexity, subtlety, and nuance of sacrifice in different cultural contexts, as well as its dynamic nature. Sacrifice is an organic phenomenon—it changes over time, in response to and as an element of cultural shifts and historical forces.

In the following pages I will outline an alternative understanding of sacrifice based on a "polythetic" approach. That is, I will argue that sacrifice is best understood not as a monolithic phenomenon defined by a single essential characteristic (e.g., killing,

consumption, etc.). Instead, sacrifice is best understood as varying clusters of events that share a "family resemblance." Here I draw on the work of Jonathan Z. Smith, famous for arguing that religion itself is best approached from a polythetic perspective. Smith (drawing himself on Wittgenstein) argues that no single, essential element marks every religion. Referencing Judaism as an example, Smith notes, "students of religion need to abandon the notion of 'essence,' of a unique differentium for early Judaism. … We need to map the variety of Judaisms, each of which appears as a shifting cluster of characteristics which vary over time."[1] I take a similar approach to sacrifice, arguing that sacrificial events are best understood as dynamic clusters of activities. No single activity—including killing—defines sacrifice. Rather, each sacrifice is comprised of differing combinations of multiple activities.

Once we open ourselves up to a broader understanding of sacrifice, we can see more easily how rituals from different times and traditions constitute sacrifices within distinct communities. For example, at first glance, the *agnihotra* of ancient India differs markedly from the Mass celebrated in twenty-first-century Los Angeles. However, when we take a polythetic approach and examine these two rituals more closely, it becomes clear that these two sacrifices share certain commonalities—they resonate with each other. These resonances arise because the two rituals resemble without replicating one another. Specifically, they resemble one another by drawing from a common array of activities. Various combinations and permutations of these activities occur in sacrifices around the globe and throughout time, in physical, internalized, and metaphoric forms.

What are the building blocks of sacrifice, the "common array of activities" that combine in various ways to comprise individual sacrificial events? As I have written elsewhere, individual cases of sacrifice include some, but not necessarily all, of several procedures: selection, association, identification, killing, heating, apportionment, and consumption.[2] These individual activities constitute the fundamental elements of sacrifice. Individual elements exhibit distinct personalities in different cultural communities, and they combine with one another in distinct ways, making each sacrificial tradition unique. However, we can identify some combination of these fundamental elements in virtually every sacrificial tradition.

Let's take a moment to examine these elements in detail. First, sacrifice frequently requires *selection* of an appropriate sacrificial substance. Sacrificial traditions identify one or more substances that must be manipulated in sacrifice, and these substances must be obtained and subjected to ritual manipulation for a sacrifice to be recognized or acceptable. Priestly texts or cultural tradition establish which offering substances are appropriate and may be selected for use in a sacrifice. The key is that certain substances are designated while others are not. Note that the selection of a substance is "sacrifice-specific"—that is, individual rites often require specific sacrificial substances. For example, within the biblical sacrificial system, a bull is necessary for the *ʿōlâ* or a *ḥaṭṭ'āt* rites, but a grain offering is needed for the *minḥâ*. These rituals serve distinct purposes and accomplish distinct goals, and these differences are reflected, in part, in the selection of the appropriate offering substance for the sacrifices.

In the past, it has been common not to consider the selection and procurement of an offering substance as part of the sacrificial ritual. Instead, this process is often understood as a necessary but secondary prelude to the actual sacrifice, much like shopping for groceries

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1 Jonathan Z. Smith, *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 18.

2 Kathryn McClymond, *Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study of Sacrifice* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

before you get down to cooking the holiday meal. However, the selection of a sacrificial substance is, in fact, integral to the sacrificial process. It often signals both the identity and the purpose of the sacrifice, and it is often tied to sacrificial timing, location, materials, and staffing. In some cases, the presentation of the required offering substance explicitly inaugurates the sacrificial "clock." Consequently, it is appropriate to include the selection of an appropriate sacrificial offering as part of a sacrificial rite.

Second, sacrifice may involve *association*. Association is the process by which a specific substance is associated with specific gods, deities to whom the sacrifice will be directed or who will be integrally involved in the sacrificial process. The act of association is usually performed publicly. The process effectively invites a god or gods to become involved in the sacrifice, or announces the deity to whom the sacrifice is being presented. Thus the act of association effectively proclaims an allegiance to a certain god or gods, effectively rejecting others. For example, in the biblical tradition, the Israelites were directed to slaughter a bull intended for their god, YHWH, with its head directed to the south and its face turned toward the west.[3] In doing this, the Israelites distinguished themselves from the surrounding communities, who slaughtered their animal offerings with the animals' faces directed downward (toward chthonic deities) or upward. Association, therefore, forged or identified a link with a specific god or gods, and it simultaneously publicly announced that bond. The act of association publicly established internal allegiances to specific gods and distinguished certain communities from others based on these allegiances. For scholars, association procedures can be helpful reminders that distinct religious and cultural communities often live in relationship with other communities (rather than in isolation). Sacrifice underscores distinct community identity. The act of associating a sacrificial offering with one god automatically involves the rejection of other gods or, more broadly, of other sacrificial systems. To say yes to one is to say no to another, and the "no" is just as important as the "yes."

Third, sacrifice may include *identification*. Identification is the process whereby an offering substance is linked with an individual or community who will benefit directly from the sacrifice. Sometimes this is accomplished by physical contact (laying on of hands, for example); at other times, this is done verbally (via an initial vow or oath). The identification process establishes the person or community who will benefit from sacrifice. For example, the biblical tradition requires that an individual lay his hands on the sacrificial animal victim's head publicly just before it is slaughtered (Lev. 1:4, 3:2, 3:8, 3:18). This act indicates that the individual (or the community whom the individual represents) will benefit from the sacrificial offering. This procedure is important because often, especially in elaborate sacrifices, the individual performing the sacrificial activities is *not* the individual intended to benefit from the sacrifice. In the elaborate Vedic *agnicayana*, for example, a team of 16 or more priests performs most of the sacrificial work; the *yajamāna* (ritual patron) is relatively passive. The priests have the ritual expertise to perform the sacrifice, but they are not the primary beneficiaries of their ritual work. The act of identification signals to the appropriate deities, as well as to ritual participants and observers, the intended beneficiary.

At the same time, the public act of identifying with the sacrificial substance also signals that the ritual patron is willingly entering the sacrificial arena and, by extension, subjecting himself to its rules. In performing the act of identification, an individual becomes a ritual "player," entering into ritual time, space, and roles. The act of identification suggests that the individual (and any community he represents) agrees to occupy, within the designated ritual time and space, a distinct ritual office that, at least for periods of time, may trump his normal social role. The act of identification suggests that he agrees to occupy this sacrificial

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3   Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16*, Anchor Bible Series (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 155.

office for the duration of the ritual. This may mean subjecting himself to guidance from ritual experts, even when he holds a dominant role in other social and political spheres.

Fourth, sacrifice may involve *killing*. Given how frequently scholars link killing with sacrifice, this procedure warrants some discussion. First, killing—like the other activities described in these pages—is not essential to sacrifice. It may or may not occur. I've explained elsewhere that modern Westerners tend to over-emphasize the role of killing in sacrifice.[4] For example, scholar Walter Burkert declares unequivocally, "Sacrifice is ritual slaughter."[5] However, a widespread study of sacrifice, ranging over multiple locations, time periods, and cultural communities, demonstrates that killing is far less prevalent in sacrificial traditions than recent scholarship has frequently assumed. Modern Western theorizing about sacrifice has been inordinately informed by Christianity, which focuses on the expiatory crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth. However, many sacrificial traditions do not include killing at all. In addition, traditions that do include killing vary widely from one another in terms of the object, the process, and the purpose of the killing. A careful study of the nature of sacrificial killing across multiple traditions leads to several striking conclusions.

First, many sacrificial traditions do not involve large animal or human victims. While animal slaughter and human execution makes for sensationalist reading, large animal (horses, bulls, cows) and human offerings are relatively rare. Practically speaking, they are expensive ways to perform sacrifice. Instead, traditions commonly avoid killing large animals and humans. In practice, it seems that when sacrificial traditions do require animal offerings, they frequently designate small animals or birds. More commonly, sacrificial traditions tend to prefer vegetal substances. (As an aside, some scholarship suggests that not all animal sacrifices described in ritual texts were actually performed. For example, the Vedic tradition refers to a great horse sacrifice, the *aśvamedha*. Several scholars have suggested that the ritual may never have been performed. This is a good reminder that discussions of sacrifice are not the same things as sacrificial performances themselves. It also raises an interesting issue for scholars of sacrifice: what role does the *rhetoric* of sacrificial activity play in cultural traditions?)

Scholarship that acknowledges the important role of non-animal offerings tends to reduce (appropriately) the importance of killing in interpreting sacrifice. For example, Pamela J. Stewart Strathern and Andrew Strathern argue that sacrifice can be understood in terms of gift exchange.[6] They examine the manipulation of fruit and vegetable offerings and demonstrate that sacrifice can be interpreted cogently without focusing on violence or killing.

On the other hand, the act of killing is not limited to animal or human victims; some traditions refer explicitly to "killing" vegetal substances. The Vedic tradition, for example, refers repeatedly to the "killing" (root *han*) of the soma plant, the focal offering in the Vedic tradition's most valued sacrifice, the soma sacrifice. The priests pound the stalks of the soma plant on the final day of the sacrifice, in an effort to release the plant's juices. The Vedic texts refer to the pounding of the soma stalks as "killing." Taittirīya Saṃhitā (TS) 6.4.8.1–3 characterizes it as the slaying of the soma king. TS 6.6.9.2 states, "they kill the soma when they press it. In the slaying of the soma, the sacrifice is slain." Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (ŚB) 2.2.2.1 declares, "in pressing out the king [*soma*], they slay it." There's no getting around it—the plant is killed.

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4   Kathryn McClymond, "Death Be Not Proud: Reevaluating the Role of Killing in Sacrifice," *The International Journal of Hindu Studies* vol. 6 no. 3 (December 2002), 221–42.

5   Walter Burkert, "The Problem of Ritual Killing" in *Violent Origins: Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation* ed. Robert G. Hamerton-Kelly (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 164.

6   Pamela J. Stewart Strathern and Andrew Strathern, eds, *Exchange and Sacrifice* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2008), xiii.

We should note that the Vedic tradition also includes animal offerings. However, the verb used to describe what happens to them is śam, which is best translated "to quiet," not "to kill." Given that the animal is strangled, this term probably refers to the stopping of the animal's breath. The ritual personnel who strangle the animal victims are referred to literally as "quieters" (śamitra), not slaughterers. The Śānkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra (ŚŚS) 5.17.1 commands them, "You divine *quieters* as well as you who are human, begin!"[7] Scholars of Vedic literature have noted that this kind of death is distinct from common, everyday animal slaughter: "cutting the victim's head is well known outside the śrauta system of ritual as the normal method of immolation."[8] The sacrificial death of an animal victim differs intentionally from mundane slaughter.

In addition, it's clear that the killing of a sacrificial offering is not always characterized as violent. Stated more emphatically, killing is *not* violence. Violence can occur without death, and death can occur without violence. For example, the killing of the soma plant is never characterized as violent. In addition, later Vedic sacrificial animal slaughter is explicitly *not* supposed to be violent. Scholar J.E.M. Houben argues that the Vedic sources never characterize sacrificial killing as violent.[9] The later Indian concept of *ahiṃsā*, usually translated as "non-violence," can be traced back to the Vedic arena, in which violence was explicitly forbidden in sacrificial slaughter.[10] Similarly, the biblical tradition prescribes a form of animal slaughter that is designed to inflict minimal pain on the animal victim, a tradition that continues today in the laws of *kashrut*. One could, in fact, make the case that in certain traditions sacrificial killing was carefully distinguished from mundane killing by the fact that it did *not* include violence. Thus killing must be distinguished from violence in thoughtful scholarly research. I emphasize this distinction because killing and violence are frequently—and inappropriately—conflated with one another in sacrificial theorizing. Specifically, the work of René Girard depends, in my view, on conflating violence and killing inappropriately.[11] Girard has written extensively on the topic of sacrifice, and his argument, while it has evolved over the years, still consistently links violence and killing. It is not at all clear that the examples of killing he references (drawn largely from ancient Greek artifacts and drama) actually include violence. Conversely, he does not address examples of violence in Greek sacrifice that are distinct from violence. Thoughtful scholarship on sacrifice needs to avoid assuming that killing and violence are synonymous.

Furthermore, killing, when it occurs in sacrifice, is not always the goal or "climax" of the ritual. In the biblical tradition, for example, the killing of the animal is not the culminating moment in animal sacrifice. Rather, other elements of the ritual are, particularly the manipulation of the blood. In the biblical tradition, blood contains the "life force" of an

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7   My emphasis. As a side note, one should note the work of Temple Grandin, who has developed relatively painless slaughtering methods for the beef industry. Grandin notes that the absence of "vocalization" is a reliable indicator that the animal is not in pain or experiencing trauma. See Daniel Zwerdling, "Kill Them with Kindness" americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/mcdonalds/grandin1.html, accessed January 3, 2014. Perhaps the "quiet" required at the Vedic sacrifice of a goat is intended as an indicator that the animal died a non-painful death. In other words, rather than seeing the texts as denying reality by describing a quiet death, perhaps the texts are attempting to set a standard for real activity.

8   Jan C. Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice: An Essay in Ancient Indian Ritual* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 72.

9   J.E.M. Houben, "To Kill or Not to Kill the Sacrificial Animal (*Yajña-Paśu*)?" in *Violence Denied: Violence, Nonviolence, and the Nature of Violence: South Asian Cultural History*, ed. J.E.M. Houben and K.R. van Kooij (Boston, MA: Brill, 1999), esp. 146.

10   See, for example, the phrase found in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.15: *ahiṃsan sarvabhūtāni*. Houben, "To Kill or Not to Kill," 146.

11   René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972).

animal: "the life of the flesh is in the blood" (Lev. 17:11). Consequently, humans are not permitted to consume blood; rather, blood is returned to YHWH in the context of sacrifice. I have argued elsewhere that the biblical texts indicate that sacrificial blood manipulation—and not the death of an animal victim—was the culmination of biblical animal sacrifice.[12]

I underscore this point because the death of an animal victim has often been presented as the driving purpose behind sacrifice. In their classic work, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions*, Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss described the death of the sacrificial offering as "the culminating point of the ceremony."[13] They continue, "we must designate as sacrifice any oblation, even of vegetable matter, whenever the offering or part of it is destroyed, although usage seems to limit the word sacrifice to designate only sacrifices where blood is shed."[14] This definition is crucial to them, because the purpose of sacrifice is tied inextricably to the destruction of the offering. Ever since Hubert and Mauss, modern Western theorizing has focused inordinately—and almost myopically—on the death of animal sacrificial victims, while virtually ignoring other offerings and other sacrificial activities.

Perhaps most importantly, a careful study of sacrificial "killing" reveals that it almost never occurs independently of other procedures (such as selection, association, identification, etc.). Killing alone isn't sacrifice—sacrificial killing requires that other procedural and material elements be present. In addition, sacrificial killing can never be meaningful on its own; its significance derives from its relationship with other sacrificial procedures. And frequently, no killing occurs. Thus it is inappropriate to equate killing with sacrifice, and it is inappropriate to make killing (or violence) the centerpiece of any general theory of sacrifice.

Shifting back to our review of the various elements of sacrifice, we turn now to *apportionment*. Sacrifice often involves the division of the sacrificial offering into multiple portions, and the subsequent distribution of these portions to distinct ritual recipients, as designated in ritual texts or traditions. These parties may include the priest(s), god(s), ritual participant(s), sacrificial benefactor(s), or a broader community. This process I call "apportionment." What makes this process distinctive is that when the original offering is divided, each portion takes on a distinctive identity as a new "whole" portion of its own, often with its own distinctive name. The sacrificial process, in effect, takes an undifferentiated offering substance and then divides this substance, generating into several new, distinct entities, each with a distinct name and purpose. For example, in the *paśubandha* (the Vedic animal sacrifice), an animal victim (typically a male goat) is strangled and then cut up in an elaborate predetermined sequence in which six priests participate, along with the ritual patron and his wife. An incision is made in the goat's stomach. The omentum is removed, roasted on one of three sacrificial fires, and ultimately cast into the fire as an offering for the god Indrāgnī (Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra [KŚS] 6.6.15).[15]

At this point, the priests turn their attention to the goat's *aṅgas* ("limbs" or animal parts). One of the priests removes various portions of the animal, and another priest cooks them. A third priest directs the cooking activity, commanding,

> *O śāmitṛ, do you (extract from the animal's body and) put together the heart, the*
> *tongue, and the sternum; put together the liver and the two kidneys; keep aside the*

12   Kathryn McClymond, "Don't Cry Over Spilled Blood: Ritual Correction in the Mishnah" in *Ancient Mediterranean Sacrifice*, ed. Jennifer Wright Knust and Zsuzsanna Varhelyi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 235–50.

13   Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, *Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions*, trans. W.D. Halls (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964 [1898]), 32.

14   Hubert and Mauss, *Sacrifice*, 12.

15   Some traditions indicate that the omentum should be offered with gold pieces.

left forefoot; place the two thoracic walls separately; keep aside the right buttock and the testis with penis; put together the three organs, namely, the right forefoot, the left buttock, and the thin part of the rectum with anus; put down separately the large intestine and the tail; provide ample broth, shuffle (the various organs of) the animal three times; place the heart uppermost (among the organs of) the animal which have been shuffled.[16]

The heart may be cooked in a pot with the other organs or roasted separately on a spit on a second sacrificial fire (KŚS 6.7.14). If it is cooked separately, then the cooked heart is added to the boiled parts in the pot later (KŚS 6.8.2).

When the organs are cooked, curds and clarified butter are poured over them (and over the heart) (KŚS 6.8.6; see also Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā [VS] 6.18, ŚB 3.8.3.8–9). Then the organs are taken to the altar and distributed between several ritual vessels. The largest part of the entrails (which includes the apportionment of the rectum) is designated as the *upayaj* offering (KŚS 6.7.8). The *upayaj* accompanies another distinct collection of offerings known as the 11 *anuyagas* or "after-offerings."[17]

Following this, the heart and the other organs are distributed to various ritual actors, including the priests: "the Adhvaryu gives the part of the entrails to the Āgnīdhra. The part above the udder of the animal he gives to the Hotṛ" (KŚS 6.9.4–5).[18] Finally, an offering is prepared for the "wives of the gods" (*patnīsaṃyāja*), taken from the lower part of the tail. The sacrificer's wife is then directed to give certain portions to the *adhvaryu* and *śāmitra* priests.[19]

To summarize, then, a single animal victim generates multiple distinct sacrificial offerings, which are distributed to various ritual participants as directed by established priestly traditions. Each piece must be manipulated a specific way, in a specific sequence, at specific times and locations, and then offered to specific recipients. Apportionment is a highly constructive dimension of sacrifice, creating multiple new substances out of one original substance. Each of these new substances takes on a distinctive role in the sacrifice as it moves forward, often leading to more complex manipulation, as well as signaling distinct ritual and social roles between recipients. Theories that view sacrifice as largely destructive tend to miss this generative dimension of sacrifice. Yet, this activity is the most elaborate activity in the *paśubandha* sacrifice, requiring far more time, ritual expertise, and manpower than the animal's slaughter; as a result it deserves sustained scholarly attention.

Sixth, sacrifice may involve *heating*. Traditionally, sacrificial offerings are heated by fire, either directly (e.g., roasting on a spit) or indirectly, in a pan or some other vessel. In some cases, the heating process functions as cooking, making the sacrificial substance fit for eating. Note, however, that heating should be understood more broadly than "cooking"; heating also serves other purposes. For example, some offerings are heated as part of a purification process. For example, Walter Kaelber notes that fire is generally viewed as purificatory in the Hindu ritual tradition.[20] In other contexts, substances are heated in order to transform them. For example, heating often transforms an offering from a solid substance into a smoky offering. The Bible provides the classic example of this. Often, the sacrificial offering

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16   R.N. Dandekar, editor, Śrautakośa Encyclopedia of Vedic Sacrificial Ritual. 2 vols (Poona: Vaidika Saṃśodhana Maṇḍala, 1958–82), 831–2.
17   By contrast, the mid-section of the entrails is associated with the *juhū* (KŚS 6.7.9).
18   "There is an optional enjoining of the avāntara iḍā (portion of clarified butter from the Iḍā-vessel to be applied to the forefinger to be licked by the Hotṛ) for the part above the udder (to be given to be [sic] Hotṛ as the Hotṛ-portion of the Iḍā)" KŚS 6.9.6. Trans. H.G. Ranade, *Illustrated Dictionary of Vedic Rituals* (New Delhi: Aryan Books International, 2006).
19   Dandekar, Śrautakośa Encyclopedia of Vedic Sacrificial Ritual, 772.
20   Walter Kaelber, "*Tapas* and Purification in Early Hinduism," *Numen* vol. 26, no. 2 (1979), 192–214.

burned on the tabernacle altar generates a "pleasing aroma," which is presented to YHWH as part of the sacrifice. Finally, heat can convey a substance rom one realm to another. Most frequently, heat transforms and conveys a substance from the natural realm to a divine or transcendent realm.

As an aside, it is important to note that just as offerings can be heated without being cooked, they can be cooked without being heated. Scholar Charles Malamoud has argued persuasively that within the Vedic system, soma juice is "cooked" by being mixed with cow's milk: "Mixed together with a cooked substance—including milk—*soma* is thus considered to be cooked."[21] Thus, just as killing should be viewed separately from violence, heating should be viewed separately from cooking. This distinction underscores the fact that heating can serve various purposes in a sacrificial event.

Finally, sacrifice may include *consumption* as an activity. I understand this to refer to the ingestion of an offering by any ritual participant, including any relevant god(s). For example, in the *šĕlāmîm* (the biblical "well-being" offering), the "breast meat shall belong to Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 7:31). However, the choicest portion of the offering, the animal fat, is designated as YHWH's portion. Consumption is a useful procedure to study closely, because it often reveals social and ritual hierarchies as well as practical means for distributing food. For example, in the biblical tradition, certain animal parts are designated for priests while other portions may be distributed to lay people. Other portions are prohibited from consumption altogether. Specifically, no human being may consume sacrificial animal fat or blood; these elements are reserved for YHWH, the supreme ritual participant. (YHWH consumes the fat once it has been transformed by the fire into a "pleasing" or "fragrant" smoke.) Setting these animal parts aside for YHWH distinguishes Israelite practice from other Ancient Near Eastern sacrificial systems.

Sacrifice, therefore, involves varying combinations of the seven activities described above—selection, association, identification, killing, apportionment, heating, and consumption. Some sacrificial activities will include only two or three of these activities. For example, the *agnihotra* involves the selection of an appropriate substance (cow's milk whose flow was inaugurated by calf suckling, not by human manipulation), its apportionment ("the fullest ladle for the most favorite son of the sacrificer … and the later ones less and less"), and its partial consumption by fire.[22] At the other end of the spectrum, complex sacrifices will incorporate all seven activities, with some procedures occurring multiple times (such as in the Vedic *agnicayana*). In addition, in different sacrifices various activities will combine in different sequences. For example, in some cases, an offering substance will be heated before it is apportioned; at other times the offering will be apportioned first, and then one or more of the portions will be heated. Individual examples of sacrifice range from the simple to the complex, but they all include at least some of the preceding practices.

It is important to emphasize that no single activity is, in and of itself, "sacrificial." For example, killing alone is not sacrifice. But the slaughter of a selected offering, which has been apportioned to ritual participants, then heated and, at least in part, consumed, will understandably be understood as a sacrificial act. An activity becomes more sacrificial in nature as it is more intimately entwined with and dependent on other elements. Individual procedures and the ritual as a whole take on a sacrificial dimension or "feel" as they are performed in relationship with other activities. Once we understand sacrifice from this perspective, we recognize that sacrificial events are sophisticated and complex cultural

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21   Charles Malamoud, *Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India*, trans. David Gordon White (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 40.
22   P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1990), 1003.

phenomenon, even in seemingly simple forms. This complexity helps to explain how sacrificial events can carry the religious, political, social, and cultural authority that they often do.

One other note: the careful reader will recognize that I have used male pronouns almost exclusively when referring to sacrificial beneficiaries and experts. This is no accident. In most religious and cultural traditions, men have created sacrificial systems, dominated sacrificial activity, and controlled the oral and written transmission of sacrificial traditions. Not surprisingly, men have also generally benefitted far more from sacrificial activity than women have. There are exceptions to this. Stewart Strathern notes, "in the Papua New Guinea Highlands women are recognized as important in the rearing of pigs, and when pigs are sacrificed they gain a considerable portion of the meat for consumption."[23] This example is helpful not only because it indicates that women *do* play important roles in some sacrificial traditions, but also because it points to a social indicator that marks an actor's ritual significance: receiving a portion of the primary sacrificial offering. The Papua New Guinea Highlands example, however, is the exception that proves the rule; for the most part, men are ritual patrons, beneficiaries, and priests. Women have largely played secondary roles, and as a result women have received comparatively little attention as ritual participants or stakeholders. Despite this, some recent scholarship has begun to note how traditional gender roles are formed, reinforced, and reflected in certain sacrificial arenas, while other sacrificial moments offer opportunities for re-imagining roles for men and women. However, for the most part sacrifice is a man's world.[24]

Substitution

We need to comment on one other element of sacrifice for our discussion of sacrificial procedure to be complete: the process of substitution. One of the most powerful aspects of sacrifice is that, despite its seemingly rule-bound nature, sacrifice is able to accommodate substitution of one element for another surprisingly easily. Substitution can—and often does—occur on multiple levels. First, one offering substance may easily be substituted for another. While sacrificial texts and oral traditions designate specific offering substances, they often also designate appropriate substitutes. For example, the biblical tradition provides for a substitute when a poor man cannot afford the birds required for a sin offering: "But if you cannot afford two turtledoves or two pigeons, you shall bring one-tenth of an `ēpâ of choice flour as a sin-offering, as your offering for the sin that you committed" (Lev. 5:11). In addition, substitutions can be made when a preferred substance is not available. For example, the Vedic tradition allows participants to replace animal offerings with grain cakes: "the animals would be represented by cakes made of a paste of rice flour (*aṭa*)" folded into a banana leaf.[25] In modern times, vegetal substitutes were used when animal rights groups opposed animal offerings in the 1975 performance of an *agnicayana* in Kerala, India.

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23   Pamela J. Stewart Strathern, personal correspondence, January 29, 2014.
24   The scholarship on sacrifice has fared only slightly better—the study of sacrifice has also been dominated by men. Recent exceptions include Nancy Jay and Stephanie Jamison. Their work has drawn attention not only to how sacrifice constructs gendered identities, but to how it may reflect tensions and vulnerabilities associated with those identities. See Nancy Jay, *Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and Paternity* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Stephanie Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife/ Sacrificer's Wife: Women, Ritual and Hospitality in Ancient India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
25   Frits Staal, *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*. 2 vols (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1983), vol. 1, 303, and vol. 2, 464–5. Staal describes this substitution as an unprecedented aberration,

In addition, certain ritual participants can substitute for one another. The Vedic tradition includes mechanisms for replacing the *yajamāna* (ritual patron) if he dies while a sacrifice is being performed on his behalf. More commonly, various traditions provide ways for substitutes to fulfill specific ritual roles if a designated priest cannot be found. Perhaps most fundamentally of all, certain sacrificial acts seem to assume that an offering substance stands in for the ritual patron, whether that is an individual or a community. The act of identification sometimes (but not always) involves substitution. For example, Leviticus directs an individual to lay his hands on an animal offering's head just before it is slaughtered (Lev. 1:4, 3:2, 3:8, 3:18). This action, in combination with other activities, suggests that the animal stands in for a specific individual or for the Israelite community as a whole, expiating individual or communal sin. While I reject expiation as a universal, blanket explanation of sacrifice, it is clear that certain sacrificial activities involve substitution of an offering for a ritual participant.

Finally, certain procedures and activities can occasionally substitute for one another. Sometimes this is prompted by a change in the offering substance. For example, Lev. 1 allows for a domesticated bird to replace a domesticated animal offering in the *'āšām* offering. In cases of extreme poverty, grain-cakes may be substituted (Lev. 5). When these substitutions occur, procedural changes also occur for logistical reasons. At other times, however, specific procedures replace other procedures for other reasons.

The ability to substitute one offering substance for another, one ritual participant for another, even one ritual procedure for another, means that sacrifice is remarkably elastic and adaptable. Flexibility is a powerful component of sacrifice. I cannot emphasize the importance of this too strongly. We have done a great disservice to our understandings of sacrifice (and other rituals) by emphasizing their rule-bound nature without simultaneously recognizing the myriad ways in which ritual traditions allow for rules to be bent, broken, ignored, and changed along the way. Substitution makes sacrificial survival possible, by allowing existing ritual traditions to "flex" with changing customs, resources, situational priorities, and historical conditions. As I have argued elsewhere, ritual traditions that are rigid in their adherence to rules die away. By contrast, healthy ritual traditions provide for systematic substitutions, making them flexible, vibrant, and able to survive tectonic shifts in cultural, geographic, political, and economic conditions far more easily than rigid ritual systems. Substitution thus provides an important survival mechanism for sacrificial traditions.[26]

Conclusion

What is the payoff for approaching sacrifice from a polythetic perspective? First, and most importantly, a polythetic approach is consistent with the data on sacrifice available in ritual texts, anthropological studies, and historical records—it rings true. Research on multiple sacrificial traditions indicates that no single element or procedure appears in all sacrifices, and no single purpose drives all sacrifices. In fact, any approach that seeks to identify a single defining characteristic of sacrifice will naturally skew the data to forefront that

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brought on by "a great deal of publicity, popular sentiment, and official pressure," but he also notes that the rice flour was "folded in banana leaf in the same manner in which this is done at the śrāddha or funeral ceremonies, when the same substance also stands for an animal offering." Thus the priestly tradition provides for the substitution of a grain-based product for an animal offering.

26   Kathryn McClymond, *Ritual Gone Wrong: What We Learn from Ritual Disruption* (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

characteristic, much like a funhouse mirror skews the images it reflects. Approaches that focus on the death of an animal victim, for example, tend to ignore or marginalize other activities performed during the course of a sacrifice while simultaneously weighting the significance of animal slaughter too heavily. A polythetic approach, which recognizes that multiple elements and procedures contribute to the significance of a sacrifice is less likely to privilege one element or procedure inappropriately. For example, such an approach draws attention to ritual sacrificial offerings that are frequently overlooked, such as vegetal (grain cakes, soma plants) and liquid (blood, milk) offerings.

Second, a polythetic approach highlights the complexity and nuance of sacrificial activity. Approaches that focus on one aspect of sacrifice tend to ignore or marginalize other activities, considering them only insofar as they contribute to that privileged aspect. As a result, both the descriptions and analyses of sacrifices they generate appear rather flat and one-dimensional. By contrast, a polythetic approach emphasizes the multi-dimensional quality of sacrifice. It explores the nature and significance of multiple aspects of sacrifice, and it explores the often complex relationships different elements of sacrifice generate with one another. As a result, a polythetic approach avoids a shallow, one-note depiction of specific sacrificial practices and of sacrifice overall.

Third, the polythetic approach, while remaining true to the research data available, is not beholden to indigenous representations of sacrifice. As all scholars know, the study of cultural phenomena involves walking a fine line between presenting data accurately and retaining a critical, analytical perspective on this data. Indigenous communities may not control the scholar's analysis of data from their communities. The polythetic approach facilitates comparative work and theoretical analysis by not allowing any individual cultural tradition to control the analytic conversation.

Fourth, anthropological studies have tended to focus on concrete, material offerings, sacrifice in which the offering substance is physical. However, it is clear that streams of metaphoric or internalized sacrifice have developed within cultural communities as well. Some streams of symbolic or metaphoric sacrifice are presented as continuous with material sacrifice. For example, rabbinic Judaism traditionally characterizes prayer and Torah study as sacrificial activity in the post-Temple (post-70 CE) Jewish world. A polythetic approach helps us to see that the Israelite material sacrificial system involves not simply animal slaughter, but the selection of appropriate substances, the association of those substances with YHWH, the identification of the offering with a ritual beneficiary, the apportionment of the offering to designated ritual participants, the transformation of that substance via heating on the altar, and the consumption of the offering by various ritual participants. Close study reveals that prayer also involves specific "substances," the words of prayer, the association of those words with YHWH, the identification of those words with ritual beneficiaries, the "heating" of those words via disciplinary austerities, and the consumption of those prayers by YHWH as if they were a fragrant aroma. Obviously, the successful transition from a sacrifice-based religious system to a system focused on prayer and Torah study involves multiple factors. But I will argue that this transition was facilitated by the fact that prayer and Torah study were able to be characterized as forms of sacrifice, and this characterization was possible precisely because Temple-based sacrifice was much more complex and sophisticated than mere animal slaughter.

At other times, symbolic or internalized sacrificial practices are often presented vehemently as distinct alternatives to material sacrifice. For example, yogic streams of Hinduism positioned themselves as alternatives to Vedic sacrifice, emphasizing the interiorization of practices that Vedic streams executed with material substances. The practice of *tapas* (a kind of spiritual internal "heating" fueled by austerities such as fasting and meditation) was presented as an internalized form of the Vedic altar fire. Yogic practices

were explicitly presented as in line with—yet superior to—Vedic sacrifice, precisely because certain yogic activities could be reasonably characterized as resembling activities performed in traditional Vedic sacrifice.

Thus, a polythetic approach to sacrifice helps scholars identify elements that material and symbolic forms of sacrifice share with one another, ultimately helping scholars identify practices developed as successors or alternatives to traditional material. By identifying these shared elements, we can see how religious and cultural communities transition from one form of sacrifice to another form without experiencing sacrificial "culture shock."

Internalized or metaphoric sacrifice usually lives in one of two relationships with material sacrifice. First, internalized sacrifice may be embedded within an esoteric or elite stream within a cultural tradition. The early yogic traditions, for example, while claiming to offer an alternative to priestly-dependent sacrificial practice, offered an equally elitist ritual tradition. Yogic practices required studying under a teacher, often learning secret and intellectually complex epistemological systems, and dedicating extensive time to meditative practice. This can be just as exclusive as traditional Vedic altar-based sacrifice.

Alternatively, internalized or metaphoric sacrifice may reflect a broadening out of a tradition so that the benefits of sacrificial practice are made available to a wider audience. An internalized sacrificial tradition does not require specific materials, travel to a specific location, the services of trained priests, or anything else that requires cost, time, or travel. As a result, interior or metaphoric sacrifice can be portable and relatively easy to take up. As mentioned earlier, the Jewish tradition successfully replaced Temple-based sacrifice with prayer, Torah study, and the performance of *mitzvot*. This transformation of sacrifice proved particularly helpful after the destruction of Jerusalem and the forced exile of most Jews into a diaspora community.

Material sacrifice has also successfully been translated into symbolic forms. For example, notions of civil sacrifice that underlie individual actions in the twenty-first century have roots in traditional sacrifice. Individual acts of "self-sacrifice" have, at times, been material (e.g., lives, resources), but it has also been common to use "sacrifice" to describe actions that do not involve material offerings (e.g., time, family ties). In this way, actions taken on behalf of the nation have been invested with some of the authority of traditional sacrifice. A polythetic approach to sacrifice highlights the sacrificial dimensions of symbolic activities. Certain symbolic procedures become recognizable as selection, identification, association, and apportionment. Identifying them as such helps us to understand how they can be accepted readily as "sacrificial" by a wide audience. Thus, a polythetic approach to sacrifice informs research on symbolic practices that tap into the authoritative category of sacrifice.

In addition to actual sacrificial activity—material or metaphorical—the *language* surrounding sacrifice is also significant for cultural studies. First, we have noted that references to certain forms of sacrifice are often used to divide cultural communities from one another. Historically, material sacrifice is what "they" do, and "they" are primitive people. By contrast, "we," those doing the observing, the work of anthropology, have evolved past material sacrifice toward metaphoric or symbolic sacrifice. Material sacrifice is conflated with the "other," and positions that "other" as inferior to those engaged in academic study. Second, within a community, sacrificial rhetoric is used to authorize activities that might otherwise be problematic. Most obviously, modern Western governments have often characterized soldiers' deaths as "sacrificial," thereby investing those deaths with transcendent or cosmic authority. The sacrifice that soldiers make is compounded by the sacrifices their families make. Once the majority of a community accepts a characterization of their efforts as sacrificial, it becomes virtually impossible to challenge that activity without experiencing some kind of backlash. Sacrifice carries moral authority with it, so to challenge a sacrifice can be risky.

Once we realize the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of sacrifice, we recognize what a full-bodied cultural phenomenon sacrifice is. After all, once we acknowledge that sacrifice can involve multiple elements, appearing in different combinations, distinct from one another, we have to acknowledge that the study of sacrifice will be complicated. In addition, the possibilities for substitution on multiple levels make sacrifice a flexible cultural phenomenon that can be responsive to change at the individual and community level. Finally, when we recognize the number of forms in which sacrifice can manifest—material, internal, and symbolic—we recognize the many ways sacrifice can play a role in culture. The weight that sacrifice carries makes it an influential activity and a powerful rhetorical reference. For all these reasons, scholars dismiss sacrifice at their peril. By contrast, a robust and dynamic understanding of sacrifice as a cultural phenomenon offers countless opportunities for unfolding multiple aspects of dimensions of cultural life.

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Charisma and Myth

Raphael Falco

Living Myth

Bronislaw Malinowski, living at the dawn of anthropological field work, argued vehemently in 1926 that

> *The forms of myth that come down to us from classical antiquity and from the ancient sacred books of the East and other similar sources have come down to us without the context of living faith, without the possibility of obtaining comments from true believers, without the concomitant knowledge of the social organization, their practised morals, and their popular customs. (1926: 18)*

Yet, despite the enormous strides made in field work around the globe, the study of myth has retained a hothouse quality. When, many years after Malinowski, Clifford Geertz observed in *The Interpretation of Cultures* that "although culture exists in the trading post, the hill fort, or the sheep run, anthropology exists in the book, the article, the lecture, the museum display, or, sometimes nowadays, the film" (1973: 16), he might just as well have been referring to the study of myth. Anthropologists, scholars of religion, sociologists, even literary critics all acknowledge that myths have a living quality, but few have attempted to define how this living quality functions in social life.

I believe that this living quality of myth can be defined in terms of charismatic authority. Even though the concept of myth as a charismatic group experience has received virtually no attention either in scholarly literature, or, for that matter, in the public imagination, it's only through an understanding of the transformations of charismatic groups that we can satisfactorily account for what Malinowski called "living faith" in our own myths. Only the shared experience of a myth system gives it the kind of meaning Malinowski observed in his field work.

Regardless of appearances to the contrary, myths are functions of group interaction. They may appear to have an isotropic existence as fables, prayers, hymns, fairy tales, folk ballads, holy writ, or catechism. They may appear too far-fetched to believe, and the protagonists of the mythopoetic imagination may seem too artificial to worship. But the quality that gives them life and wrests them from the kind of clinical isolation of the lecture hall or anthropological study is best identified in the unique circumstances of charismatic group dynamic. Every example of a successful myth system contains a crucial bond between charisma and myth. Most myth systems will not function as successful and long-lasting social vehicles without an active charismatic element. A remarkable example of this kind of active element can be found in the Duna of Papua New Guinea, who, despite the plundering and exploitation of their land by mining companies, are able to make protean adjustments

to their sense of the ground's numinous power. Andrew Strathern and Pamela J. Stewart note that, even after conversion to Christianity, "the indigenous spirits were and are seen as inextricably bound up with the landscape itself. The landscape at large is imbued with innumerable cultural associations, communicated and reinforced in courting songs, mourning songs, stories of origins, and the *pikono* ballads" (Strathern and Stewart 2004: 96). The aestheticization of loss and change is common in most cultures, and, as in these Duna songs and ballads, helps to memorialize eviscerated myth. The Duna, however, manage to keep their myth active, even as the landscape is transformed. According to Strathern and Stewart, they "tend to associate places where the mining companies have made surveys, or actually taken up operations, with their own notions of the sacred. Resources such as oil, gold, and copper, which these companies look for and seek to exploit, are themselves seen as substances of sacred power" (2004: 96). The Duna might be said to manage and preserve the aura of the indigenous spirits by re-fashioning the destruction of their sacred sites to fit their myth of charisma.[1]

It is easy to see how charisma and myth are linked among the Duna, at least in this story of the mining operations and their Tindi Auwene and Pauame Ime (indigenous spirits). And, it seems to me, this example demonstrates how valuable it can be to establish a connection between charisma and myth. Understanding how myths flourish and survive touches every aspect of intellectual endeavor: sociology, religious studies, theology, history, and literary theory. Further, I would argue, many myth systems survive in the same way that charismatic groups survive—through constant alteration and ineluctable compromise with economic interests and stable forms of authority. Surprisingly, although anthropology is concerned with religious ecstasies, magic, ritual, priesthoods, social elites, definitions of the supernatural, and kinship relations, charisma studies have gained interest only slowly in the field since Clifford Geertz published an article titled, "Centers, Kings, and Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power," in which he applies notions of charismatic leadership first to Elizabethan England and then to Javan and Moroccan government (1977: 150–71). Though slow to start, however, in recent decades there has been an explosion of interest in charisma among anthropological theorists and fieldworkers, both in the West, and, significantly, in studies of Chinese politics and religion. In 2001, Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming, in their *Grassroots Charisma*, surveyed the anthropological literature on Western charisma before examining the effect of this consummately European concept on the analysis of Chinese political figures (2001: 10–21). More recently still, the journal *Nova Religio* (vol. 12.2, 2008) devoted an entire issue to charisma in Chinese religious movements (2008). Feuchtwang, in 2010, published *The Anthropology of Religion, Charisma, and Ghosts*, a rigorous exploration based on Shmuel Eisenstadt's study of charisma, "not focused on a leader," but as "a generalized propensity, out of which charismatic movements and groups emerge." He adds, still paraphrasing Eisenstadt, that the "universal concept of charisma … names a sociological dynamic of embodiment," which is "the liminal sense of community among charismatic followers … established by companionship and joint dependence on a vision and a visionary leader" (2010: 108). The notion of charisma as a form of group

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1   Another excellent example from Duna culture is their "relabeling" of burial rites. Forbidden to use above-ground platforms, they make a platform underground, from which, at a certain point, they remove the slats and take the bones to one of their traditional ossuaries. Then: "People contribute money and pigs for a cooking of food (i.e., a sacrifice) to go along with this occasion. They do so on a low-key basis and refer to such events as a 'little party.' An important ritual in the cycle of life and death is thus camouflaged by verbal relabeling, making it seem modern and innocuous. Such usages were probably developed as a means of evading and quietly subverting outsider diatribes against traditional burial practices" (Strathern and Stewart 2004: 58–9). The Duna keep their myth alive by adapting it, and, in fact, literally relabeling the ritual practice.

interdependence is critical, but even more important to this chapter is something not touched on by Feuchtwang (or by Eisenstadt, for that matter): the bond of interdependence in relation to the visionary fabric of the communal experience exists only because of its mythicization, its shared narrative reality.

This is not to say that charisma functions only in the presence of an architecture of myth. It is impossible to take such a one-sided approach to the relationship of charisma to myth. That is, it would be impossible to speak only of charisma as a transformative agent in the development of myth, or vice versa. In reality, charisma does not affect myth without itself being affected. Changes in charismatic status are mirrored in the development of the myths that symbolize, bring about, or otherwise contribute to those changes.

Despite the reasonable link between charisma and myth, and despite studies ranging from Eisenstadt's transcendent community to the leaderless Falun Gong movement as group charisma, for the most part, in the vast critical literature on the topic, myth has rarely been explored as a specifically group phenomenon. Social theorists of the nineteenth century regarded myth in terms of a dichotomy between the primitive and the present day. This absolute distinction didn't start to break down until the early twentieth century when anthropologists such as Malinowski wrote about myth and culture in existing societies, and introduced the role of the anthropologist as the only viable source for the accurate discernment of functioning myths. A "fieldwork revolution" occurred, superseding the historical (and armchair) anthropology of such influential authors as Sir James Frazer, Robertson Smith, and Edward Tylor (whose views on animism might have been rich ground for charisma studies). Malinowski and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, for example,

> took their orientation initially from periods of close immediate observation of single societal complexes: in Malinowski's case, the Trobriand Islanders of Papua New Guinea, and in Radcliffe-Brown's the Andaman Islanders of the Indian Ocean. The concentration on the ethnography of a particular people as the stimulus and foundation for theorizing and generalization set the tone for what became the predominant pattern in ethnographic writing throughout much of the twentieth century. (Stewart and Strathern 2014: 36)

Malinowski's functionalism, as his method was called, was influenced by Émile Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (1912), which "effectively established religion as a social phenomenon, what in other writings he called a 'social fact'" (Bell 1997: 24). Durkheim's "monolithic" definition of "society in terms of religion and religion in terms of society" led to objections—objections which, significantly for a study of charismatic authority and myth, focused on Durkheim's misleading claims about group cohesion.

This is not the place, nor am I the right scholar, to trace the history of ethnographic research from Durkheim to the present day. On the contrary, I would only hope to point out that the earliest field studies of ritual eventually developed into broader theories of myth, most notably those of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Mary Douglas, and Ruth Benedict, the last two of whom were influenced by Lévi-Strauss's structuralism. In a similar vein, scholars of comparative religion such as Mircea Eliade, Georges Dumézil, and Bruce Lincoln built theoretical matrices of myths and myth production. Yet, despite widespread agreement regarding myth as a shared component of tribes or cultures, scholars continued to ignore the principles of social organization associated with the functioning of groups per se in favor of discussions of individual psychology, symbolic forms, aesthetics, and mythopoetic production.

This chapter, then, will be concerned chiefly with interrogating the group element of myths, especially those myths that best reflect a shared experience of charismatically

sustained discourse. The concept of "discourse" encompasses both conventional verbal narrative and also other forms of *fictio* (making, or manufacture) from the linguistic to the visual. This is not to suggest that myths that are not charismatically sustained do not exist— they do—but recognizing a distinction between those that clearly depend on charismatic authority and those that don't might help to clarify the relationship of charisma to myth. For example, while Marxism-Leninism in certain hands functions as a myth, positivism does not, nor does Jacques Derrida's deconstruction or a concept like "the myth of modern science." These latter terms diffuse rather than help to focus the meaning of the myth and make it all the more difficult to identify the link with charisma. Italian Futurism, on the other hand, is a likely candidate for a modernist myth: F.T. Marinetti was a consummately charismatic leader, replete with bravura rhetorical skills and a gift for improvisation (as well as a martial enthusiasm), and his Futurists issued notoriously revolutionary manifestos proclaiming their independence from traditional modes of thinking, aesthetic production, and social organization. A similar claim might be made for Tristan Tzara's Dada movement and the subsequent Surrealist movement which included André Breton and Salvador Dalí. But we should proceed with care in reconstructing the relationship of erstwhile charismatic groups to myth, especially when dealing with as deliberately ephemeral a group as Marinetti's. In order to pronounce these cultural phenomena myths intertwined with charisma it is necessary to measure the extent to which their tenets or ideals are genuinely shared in an interdependent group structure, and, concomitantly, the extent to which that group structure is subject to the manipulations of entropy and order endemic to any functioning charismatic system.

Modern Charisma

Modern charisma can be said to begin when Max Weber deliberately secularized the word. He was revising Rudolf Sohm's use of the term "charisma" in his *Kirchenrecht*,[2] which was a history of the charismatic Christian myth as it became systematized into a tradition. Weber's theory of charisma became the foundation of all studies of the subject. In his *Economy and Society*, he divides forms of authority into three categories: charismatic, traditional, and legal-bureaucratic, a set of "ideal types" that have long been debated, revised, rejected, and even reviled. Nevertheless, Weber's basic principles regarding charisma have remained in place: "All *extra*ordinary needs, i.e., those which *transcend* the sphere of economic routines, have always been satisfied in an entirely heterogeneous manner: on a *charismatic* basis" (Weber 1978: 2.1111, emphasis in original). He goes on to point out that, throughout history, charismatic figures have been "the bearers of specific gifts of body and mind that were considered 'supernatural' (in the sense that not everybody could have access to them)" (Weber 1978: 1112). But charisma—the word means "gift of grace"—has more to it than an original flush of excitement. As Weber and his many revisionists explain, charismatic authority usually begins as a revolutionary force, at first overturning the norms of everyday routine, but, eventually, it must compromise with traditional and bureaucratic forms of authority in order to survive. This compromise is called "routinization." All successful charismatic systems, those that hope to endure beyond the death of the original charismatic figure, are the products of routinization. The Christian Church and the various Muslim theocracies are good examples of this kind of

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2   Some of the background material in the rest of this section is drawn from my *Charismatic Authority in Early Modern English Tragedy* (2000), esp. 1–20.

compromise. Weber did not, however, explore the place of myth in the transformation of charismatic authority from its chaotic revolutionary beginnings to its routinized (though never static) later stages.

Sohm attached the notion of charisma to the *didaskaloi*, the traveling preachers of the gospel in the early centuries of Christianity. Charisma retained the meaning assigned to it by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 12, where he coined the word "charism" to mean "a gift of grace."[3] Paul introduced the notion of the charisms for what might be called ecclesiological reasons because he was determined to establish the limits of congregational authority. He wrote his letter to the Corinthians in response to a challenge to his authority as leader of the burgeoning Christian movement and to chastise them for what he deemed pagan worship. His polemical purpose should be borne in mind, as should the exclusionary element of his mythicization. Meant to curtail the rebellious voices at Corinth, his taxonomy of the charisms, broken down into functional properties of the Body of Christ, acted as a rebuke aimed at the dissidents.

Astonishingly, Paul created the myth of charismatic authority in a few sentences. He silenced his opposition by describing a shared group experience:

> *Now there are diversities of gifts (diaireseis … charismaton), but the same Spirit (pneuma).*
> *And there are diversities of administrations (diaireseis diakonion), but the same Lord.*
> *And there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all.*
> *But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal.*
> *For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit;*
> *To another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit.*
> *To another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues:*
> *But all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will. (1 Cor. 12:4–11)*

Emphasizing a monotheistic message in the face of pagan rebelliousness, Paul divides the gifts of grace among the congregation. Hierarchy masks as egalitarianism in his list, and individuality emerges only in group participation. The passage maps out the foundational myth of the Pauline church. What is ironic, however, is that the gospel myth, which enfables the life of a single charismatic figure, is effectively revised by Paul's empowerment of *every participating member* as a charismatic. He explains it this way: "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that body, being many, are one body, so also *is* Christ" (1 Cor. 12:12); and then, after giving a brief anatomy lesson, he sums up, "Now ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular" (1 Cor. 12:27).

Regardless of Weber's secular categories, from pure to office charisma, a palimpsest of religious myth remains visible at every juncture. Weber was demonstrably aware of this underlying current of Pauline mythology in all forms of charismatic authority, and he often highlights the divine myth lurking behind such secular manifestations of charisma as political leadership or royal genealogy. But one of the most important implications of Weber's theory is that charismatic authority is a consummately group experience. As Donald McIntosh observed, "charisma is not so much a quality as an experience. The charismatic

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3   It seems likely, if not proven, that Paul's word "charism" is etymologically related to the Hebrew word "chrism," meaning "an anointing," which occurs several times in the Hebrew Bible (as in the anointing of Saul, 1 Samuel 9:16 and 10:1).

object or person is *experienced* as possessed by and transmitting an uncanny and compelling force" (McIntosh 1970: 902). This sense of a shared experience of charisma was implicit in Paul's message. He rejected charismatic individuality in pursuit of an effective group dynamic. Moreover, as 1 Corinthians shows, the concept of charismatic authority began as a cog in a mythmaking process.

Critics have objected to Weber's secularization of the term "charisma" for different reasons, and have been particularly uneasy with his notion of the "value-free" categories of authority. But even if Weber's categories are porous, by "value-free" he clearly means without prejudicial application to one myth system or moral scheme over another. Philip Rieff and others, however, such as Carl Friedrich, object that Weber's sense of objectivity is basically flawed. For Rieff, Weber's ethical neutrality and objectivity mask "his one and only inner law … against faith" (Rieff 2007: 115). Rieff continues, adding that

> the Weberian theory of charisma constitutes a brilliant ambivalence toward the very possibility of the charismatic experience. Weber's "recognition" theory emerges as a negation, a tremendous denial of charisma and a shadowing forth of the therapeutic—at worst, in our rationalizing social order, of "charisma" squirted out of a canful of recognition-inducing techniques. (2007: 117)

The phrase "brilliant ambivalence" strikes me as tendentious. Another way to put the idea is to say that Weber's theory of followers' recognition of a leader doesn't necessarily require a spiritual element. Rieff seems to be lamenting the loss of charismatic authority as a spiritual guide in present-day life, but Weber never promises any such thing, and, in any case, recent scholars of charisma tend to think the reverse. As Stephan Feuchtwang and Wang Mingming emphasize in their fascinating study of charismatic authority in China, Weber "turned the Christian idea of charisma into something which could be subjected to empirical analysis, but it was still as a Christian and only afterwards as an agnostic Western word that 'charisma' entered the Chinese language" (Feuchtwang and Mingming 2001: 10). The translation of the word into Chinese and back into English proves the ineradicable nature of the Christian palimpsest. As the authors note:

> A recent English-Chinese dictionary entry presents the orthodox view of the central government: the Chinese description of the english word translates back as "extraordinary enchantment or glamour" (chaofan meili), "capability or power received from a god" (shenshou negli) … A second translation in the same dictionary is "especially able leadership enjoying popular confidence" (zhongwang suoguide zuilingdaode texhu benling). (Feuchtwang and Mingming 2001: 10)

None of these terms, however, according to Feuchtwang and Mingming, are in general usage:

> the religious aspect of being able to get things done would not be shenshou nengli. It would be lingyan—said of the efficacy and responsiveness of gods who have been human, and also of the images in whom that efficacy and responsiveness has been injected by means of a ritual of invitation and insertion. If lingyan were translated back into secular English, it would be "proven efficacy of an uncanny intelligence." The most important difference is that lingyan is firmly located in a subject, whereas the English word "charisma" is as much located in the divine origin of the gift as in the recipient. (Feuchtwang and Mingming 2001: 10–11)

So, Rieff's complaint notwithstanding, the missing aspect of "charisma" after its cultural transformation in China is the religious element supposedly expunged by Weber's secularization. The need for this otherworldly authority resonates throughout charismatic movements, and it would be mistaken to assume that religious conduits for charisma have less appeal today than at earlier periods in history. Harvey Whitehouse has detailed what he terms the codification and dissemination of missionary Christianity in Melanesia, noting in particular the clash between Christianity's instantiation and transmission through "continual sermonizing and liturgical ritual" and the imagistic practices of Melanesian religion: "whereas Christian rituals possess meaning only in the light of doctrines, stories, and other verbal and textual material, the iconic imagery evoked by many traditional Melanesian rituals is a source of meaning in its own right, which may or may not be embellished through oral transmission" (Whitehouse 2000: 34, 37). Although Whitehouse doesn't allude to charisma, we can nevertheless conclude that the proselytizers carrying the Christian doctrine across Melanesia resemble—in fact, *deliberately* resemble—the *didaskaloi* of Sohm's early church. Their charismatic bond to the original divine source compels their mission. Of importance in regard to charisma and myth, however, is how and to what extent the missionaries adapted their narratives to accommodate Melanesian myth—and vice versa.[4]

Other conduits of charismatic authority, such as revolutionary politics, invest myth systems unconnected to conventional religious practice. These conduits remain exceedingly strong and have little to do with Rieff's notion of "spray-on charisma," for which he has so much scorn. As Feuchtwang puts it, still referring to China, "Although the sociology of modernity now includes new religions and revivals of religious traditions, severely modifying Weber's propositions on secularization and disenchantment, it is still possible … to use notions of secularity and disenchantment without concluding that they entail the disappearance of religion and magic" (Feuchtwang 2010: 106). The pre-Socratic philosopher Thales is supposed to have said, in despair, "There are myths everywhere." We can borrow his phrase and say, "There are charismas everywhere." And they remain as vibrant and replete as any in the past. In seeking a satisfying definition of charismatic function, 1 Corinthians should never be forgotten. Putting too much emphasis on charisma as an individual gift causes a skewed impression of the interactions of charismatic authority in daily life. Such authority simply does not exist outside group experiences.

Myth and Authority

Like charisma, myth cannot be experienced on an individual basis. It demands the shared values and interdependent power structure of a participating group. Weber said that the legitimacy of charismatic norms lies outside the norms of existing society because:

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4   For example, as Whitehouse quotes T. Schwartz: "'the word "*guria*" was used in the Neo-Melanesian versions of the Bible of all mission sects, referring to the *guria* that occurred at the death of Christ, the Noise, the *guria*, and the speaking in tongues that came to the followers of Jesus in Jerusalem at the first Pentecost which impressed and converted many Jews'" (Whitehouse 2000: 132; cf. Schwartz 1962: 390). In point of fact, Paul was concerned that his status might be threatened by the Corinthians speaking in tongues and in his sermon on the charisms he deftly relegates that particular gift of grace to almost last in the list. Nevertheless, the example of *guria* as a cross-cultural phenomenon calls attention to the ongoing importance of charisma's supposedly divine origins in the remythicization of religious doctrines.

> *Charisma is self-determined and sets its own limits. Its bearer seizes the task for which he is destined and demands that others obey and follow him by virtue of his mission. If those to whom he feels sent do not recognize him, his claim collapses; if they recognize it, he is their master as long as he "proves" himself. (Weber 1978: 1112–13)*

Myth, too, is self-determining. It sets its own limits in confrontation with everyday routines, and survives as a group experience only through challenging those routines and expanding beyond them. Powerful, successful myth systems continue to thrive and to be widely shared by remaining at all times, like charismatic movements, *in statu nascendi*, thereby superseding the confines of economic, political, and aesthetic structures. In this sense, all successful myths function charismatically, both as group experiences and in their development from the initial or revolutionary-transitional stages of magic, divinity, exceptional heroism, and vatic genius (to give only a few possibilities) through the compromises with other, more restraining forms of authority in the course of routinization.

Myth is not, however, in and of itself a form of authority. Rather, myth has both a contiguous and a legitimizing relationship to certain types of authority, in particular those stemming from tradition and charisma. (Legal authority, apart from canon law and similar dogmatic codes, tends to marginalize the validation of myth systems through legislative practices and bureaucratization.)[5] Neither traditional nor charismatic authority could survive without the support of myths. Yet "mythical authority," like poetic authority and erotic authority, functions primarily in the sphere of the symbolic imagination. The distinction is between *effective authority*, such as charisma and tradition, and *affective authority*, such as myth, the poetic, and the erotic. These are not absolute distinctions, and they should not be mistaken for simple binaries. But they are valuable as indexes of different realms of operation. Therefore, we might say that myths have authority over other myths and other kinds of narratives, but that their chief function in social life is to serve in support of manifest power.

In his *Work on Myth* (*Arbeit am Mythos*), Hans Blumenberg says that myth, despite appearances to the contrary, is itself a form of rationality, "one of the modes of accomplishment of logos" (Blumenberg 1990: 27; cf. 12, 31). He calls myth "a high-carat piece of logos." This phrase has a striking resonance with the notion of synergy in charismatic systems and the necessity for a rational administration of dissipative structures in a charismatic group.[6] Every charismatic myth system requires a wide array of "high-carat piece[s] of logos" to accomplish its ends.[7] The incest taboos of the Trobriand Islanders, the laws of *kashruth*, Muslim *purdah*, Christian Lenten restrictions, and even something as apparently secular as the Marine Corps motto ("Semper Fidelis") all conflate the numinous power of shared charismatic endowment with highly rationalized fabling. Adherents of different charismatic belief systems continue to participate in those systems precisely because the rational element provides a structure within which they can trust that their conduct gives them the manifest power to transcend everyday routine and maintain select status in society.

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5   In his *Canon Law*, esp. 37–41, Libero Gerosa (2002) includes a section titled "The Ecclesiogical-Constitutional Role of *Charisma*." His discussion both validates the myth of the charisms and, by implication, denies its status as what I earlier termed *fictio*.

6   See Schweitzer (1984: 28): "We shall speak of synergistic charisma when the charismatic and noncharismatic features interact in such a way as to either maintain or strengthen the charismatic component of the interaction." Schweitzer goes on to enumerate instances when synergistic charisma prevails, such as in politics, in the use of mass media, and when charismatic and legitimate authority are linked.

7   The opposition of *mythos* to *logos*, or the supposed progression from one to the other, has tended to pit the development of the individual (or the self) against the power of myth to hypnotize the collective. As early as Plato the relation of the self to myth came under scrutiny, and, in different form, the same scrutiny continues in contemporary myth.

This sense of select status is, however, double-edged. While it provides a structure of belonging, it also requires, as Pierre Bourdieu noted, complicity with the exercise of symbolic power—a power usually, and predictably, deployed to exclude and dominate outsiders.[8] Moreover, charismatic belief systems, like all charismatic groups, institutionalize an antipathy to the individual. Paul enfables this antipathy with his metaphor of the body parts: Pauline group membership requires submerging individual attributes in the programmatic, albeit divine, mission of the "one body."[9] Inclusion in the group consists of *both* the submersion of unique attributes into the mission *and* the belief that that submersion confers select status in society. The irony is almost palpable: the more profound the submergence into the one body, the more select, and unique, a person feels himself or herself to be in the wider social sphere. The survival of the group depends on trust in this charismatically maintained mission, which in turn serves to enforce and eventually institutionalize the stipulated antipathy to individualized traits. Consequently, we can conclude that belief and the myths that propagate a feeling of select status are coterminous in groups similar to Paul's charismatic church.

There are many such groups. They are not, however, necessarily religious, nor, as we have come to expect from news reports, are these groups necessarily ideological extremists. Weber was substantially right to secularize the notion of charismatic authority.

The Exclusionary Process

Mircea Eliade once said that all myths are fundamentally origin myths. One might counter that most myths are transformation myths, obsessed with the emergence of new forms from older ones, and in the process destabilizing whatever the current myth structure might be. Again, the three chief world religions come to mind: Christ, Mohammed, and the Buddha (especially the last two) are deified because of what they become in the corresponding myths, how they are transformed from a human state to a divine state. Of course, every transformation is itself a new origin, which may be Eliade's point. But I would emphasize that it is not so much an etiological as a revisionary impulse that drives the mythical imagination. This difference should be a reminder that most cultural self-definition is more concerned with connecting beginnings to endings than with isolating beginnings in a metaphysical, an ontological, or a historical sense. Moreover, the etiological connections often depend on a form of genealogy, which is a consummately charismatic form of myth.

Ernst Cassirer calls myth a "conceptual language" (*Begriffssprache*), the only one in which the world of becoming can be expressed (1955b: 2: 2–3; 1923: 2: 4) Blumenberg hones this definition when he notes that "one of the functions of myth is to convert numinous indefiniteness into nominal definiteness and to make what is uncanny familiar and addressable" (Blumenberg 1990: 25). Charismatic authority, as we have seen, has both a "numinous indefiniteness" and a "nominal definiteness," and it is the responsibility of charismatic leaders to make their uncanniness, or the uncanny element of their mission,

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8   Cf. Pierre Bourdieu (1991: 164): "that invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it."

9   1 Cor. 12: 14–15, 17, 19–20): "For the body is not one member, but many. If the foot shall say, Because I am not the hand, I am not of the body; is it not therefore of the body? … If the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? If the whole were hearing, where the smelling? … And if they were all one member, where were the body? But now are they many members, yet but one body."

familiar and addressable to group members. This is more than merely an accidental parallel: myth and charisma function in a demonstrably similar manner. The experience of myth, particularly in terms of group responses, intersects and often mirrors the experience of charismatic authority.

Thus we can say that a group of believers in a particular set of myths is subject to the same freedoms and constraints as members of any charismatically constituted group. The significance of this analogy should not be underestimated because, if we acknowledge the analogy, then we can begin to see how myths develop their exclusionary character and also how they interact symbiotically and dialectically with charismatic authority. Charismatic groups are, per force, exclusionary: individual empowerment depends on submergence in the group culture. The sense of privilege and even prestige comes only with membership, and indeed both privilege and prestige rely on a consciousness of unique, insider status which most often defines itself against prevailing norms of society. Even when active revolution does not furnish a charismatic group with its mission, a shared sense of exceptional status inheres in, and guarantees, membership privilege. In virtually all social circumstances and cultural encounters, such privilege must protect its uniqueness by establishing (and eventually institutionalizing) provisions for excluding non-members.

Myth systems mimic this exclusionary process, in part because of the overlap between charismatic groups and mythmaking—the establishment of insider, privilege-protecting provisions is accomplished by the propagation of myths idealizing particular charismatic missions (such as covenants or the master-race)—and in part because myth systems depend on charismatic origins and could not operate *systematically* if they didn't have a significant group component. The charismatic elements of a myth system's group component are easy to identify. They can be militant, devotional, erotic, or prophetic, but they are inflexibly exclusionary, restricted only to believers. An infidel is so named not simply because she is untrue or faithless, and maybe not even primarily for that reason. She is an infidel because she is not a group member. There is no test of belief prior to group membership. There cannot be, because one cannot believe—that is, participate in the myth of charismatic endowment, whether from Allah or Mao—until one is already a member of the group. It is literally preposterous (back-to-front) to label a group of unbelievers "infidels"—without faith—unless the members of the faithless group first pledged their faith and then lapsed. Otherwise such a label is a meaningless smear, serving only the ulterior purpose of confirming the exclusionary character of the "faithful" (probably charismatic) group.

This pattern, in which charismatic authority binds groups against outsiders prior to the advent of belief, helps explain the exclusionary nature of myth. We tend, mistakenly, to see belief as the producer of myth and group construction. We infer a causal continuum leading from belief to the infrastructures supporting it—sacred texts, icons, taboos, offerings, marriage laws, and so forth. This continuum mirrors the false progression from *mythos* to *logos*, with a notion of causality added. But a different causal relationship is more likely. In most cases, belief is the product of group construction, not the initiator, and its bolstering myths and rituals emerge (and change) as a function of sustaining the longevity of the original charismatic endowment.

The progression to belief cements the exclusionary character of myths, which emerges as a consequence of followers' recognition of their duty to their leader and their group. When leaders mythicize their mission—as they must to keep the mission alive past its initial revolutionary moments—the myths they create about their own exceptional powers serve as prototypes for the myths that are required to sustain group cohesion. Narratives link the founding myth to its various ramifications. Take, for example, the legend of St. Francis, a charismatically sustained discourse that continues to influence behavior in the present day. Franciscan friars wear a thick white rope belt because, coexisting with the unrationalized

founding *mythos* of St. Francis's charisma is the highly rationalized set of criteria necessary to sustain imitation of Francis in the everyday world. These criteria appear as written dogma and also as a continuing narrative of the select status of belonging within a *mythos*. Both dogma and narrative serve to institutionalize Franciscan charisma and to build a priestly order. The criteria of inclusion cover rules for devotion, deportment, diet, work, and costume, all of which testify to the cooperation of *mythos* and *logos* in the propagation of the original myth. The white rope belt worn by the friars should therefore be seen as, simultaneously, a petrified symbol of a defunct charismatic movement (based on the assumed poverty and personal charisma of Francis of Assisi) and living symbolic proof of the continuity (and routinization) of charismatic power. No one believes in the rope belt per se, except as a symbol of the movement.

Entropy

It is a common misconception that stability assures belief in a myth system. But evidence reveals the opposite tendency. Ironically, it is not stability, but instability of a mild sort that is the hallmark of ongoing charismatic myths. The assumption that charismatic myths are stable entities, which is true only for the unbelieving, derives from the invidious concept of "primitive" religion or "primitive" myth. This concept implies a contrast with some more progressive form of religion or myth—in Weber the distinction is between traditional and rational—and inevitably leads to the mistaken conclusion that so-called primitive myth had a stability unfamiliar to the more abstract religious concepts of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. But, as Clifford Geertz has emphatically maintained, these assumptions deny the active, self-conscious component of religious practice:

> it must not be assumed that the religions of nonliterate peoples are wholly lacking in rationalized elements and those of literate ones rationalized through and through. Not only do many so-called primitive religions show the results of significant amounts of self-conscious criticism, but a popular religiosity of a traditional sort persists with great strength where religious thought has attained the highest reaches of philosophical sophistication. (Geertz 1973: 174–5)

Geertz calls attention correctly to the presence of self-conscious criticism in so-called primitive religions, as well as a kind of stable traditionalism in more philosophically sophisticated religions. Both of these observations demonstrate the necessity for *instability* in maintaining a myth system. Believers who participate in rigidly traditional religions disturb the status quo with self-criticism (to use Geertz's term), while, concomitantly, believers participating in sophisticated and abstract religions like Protestantism or Judaism revert to a "popular religiosity" to keep their myth in a state of mild chaos. This latter phenomenon is visible across the globe in the flourishing fundamentalist movements, both Islamic and Christian Evangelical.

The management of entropy, indeed the deliberate fostering of what Thomas Spence Smith calls dissipative structures, ensures the promulgation of religious institutions, patriotic movements, and revolutionary cults—all of which depend to a significant extent on myth for success and permanence. Smith takes the concept of dissipative structures from the physicist Ilya Prigogine, who uses it to describe unstable conditions in the thermodynamics of nonequilibrium systems. Applying the concept of dissipative structures to the formation of charismatic groups can be extremely productive. Smith argues for what

he terms nonequilibrium functionalism, a form of systematic destabilization in which social organization depends on the generation of entropy and disorder, rather than order, to be successful. In this model, charismatic group cohesion stems from the manipulation of destabilizing conditions. Leaders who introduce and manage these destabilizing conditions ensure both the survival of the group and, concomitantly, their own continued domination (see Smith 1992: 110–15, 192–7). Feuchtwang, citing Lorne Dawson, refers to such a leader as a "*bricoleur* of heroic roles, religious symbols and stories" (Feuchtwang 2010: 110; Dawson 2006: 17–19). Feuchtwang goes on:

> I would add that the repertoire has been increased enormously in modern times with the proliferation of religions and the tremendous visibility of images and claims of different religious practices due to the increase in communication through print and other media. It now includes the results of social movements and heroes in the politics of progress, development, democratization or revolution, becoming either positive or negative models. This proliferation increases the rivalry of different claims to bring about renewal and at the same time increases resources for further bricolage. Since charisma is innovation with authority, bricolage in these times is always likely to include the local with the exotic, the ritual with the scientific and secular. (Feuchtwang 2010: 110–11; see also Feuchtwang 2008: 94)

This last sentence happily describes the management of dissipative structures, while the notion of charisma as "innovation with authority" should be understood to include the introduction of entropy to a group. A famous example of this kind of destabilizing manipulation—or innovation with authority—might be that great *bricoleur* Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956 in which he repudiated Stalin's cult of personality (which he also did in public at the XXII Communist Party Congress in 1961). His repudiation, less a revelation than an open expression of what others had thought for decades, threw the Party into turmoil regarding the myth of Communist superiority versus Western decadence. By simultaneously introducing and managing the turmoil, Khrushchev offered the tools to rescue the original, "pure" Marxist-Leninist myth and fostered his own ascendance as a charismatic leader.[10]

The interfacing (symbiotic/dialectical) relationship of charisma and myth produces a field of mirroring responses on both sides of the affective-effective divide. If, for instance, the charismatic symbols of a particular movement become static or ossified, it becomes necessary to dismantle the symbols to preserve the original charisma. This process is fraught with deceptions, but serves to propagate power as a product of a new set of charismatically managed symbols.[11] Power, in this model, mirrors the transformation of charismatic myth.

Whitehouse speaks of the shift and imbalance between a doctrinal mode of religiosity, whose characteristics are "the frequent repetition of both ritual and dogma" and the "rituals and images of the imagistic mode … encoded in episodic memory" (Whitehouse 2000: 9–10).

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10 The secret speech caused considerable trouble in Chinese-Russian relations. To begin, the Chinese Communist Party Delegation "was neither given advance warning nor allowed to attend the session" (MacFarquhar and Schoenhals 2006: 4, 483fn5). But Khrushchev's aim in suddenly destabilizing the Communist world, and realigning group response in areas he was able to manage, seems to have had less to do with Chinese-Russian relations than with Kremlin politics. Nevertheless, by excluding the Chinese, Khrushchev transformed the Russians who were privy to his speech into an even closer-knit, embattled group.

11 Contemporary business theorists have begun to notice the importance of being what Jay Conger calls "skillful craftsmen of their organization's mission," and weaving a narrative: "Stories or metaphors are most potent when they invoke meanings or symbols that have deep cultural roots, and as a result, elicit stronger emotions" (Conger 1991: 41).

His implication is that the former, doctrinal mode is more stable than the latter because, "in many societies, religious life is focused around very infrequent, traumatic ritual episodes [e.g., rites of initiation]" (2000: 10). While Whitehouse's distinction between cognitive reaction and imagistic or episodic memory brilliantly adds a dimension to the appreciation of focused instability in a religious tradition, it should not be ignored that even in doctrinal modes of religion entropy-introduction is vital to the survival of the universalist religious claim. Episodic memory, in a sense, represents a mild form of unpredictability in contrast to the relative semantic constancy of, for example, missionary Christianity (Whitehouse's chief topic). Both modes of religious expression, however, would require, *mutatis mutandis*, a managed dissipative structure to remain in place as a set of accepted religious practices.[12] And both, though Whitehouse never mentions the fact, would be supported by myth systems, like shadows imbued with charismatic power.

In order for myth systems to remain alive they must keep changing and adopting new forms to keep the group experiencing them slightly off balance. Myths that stop changing become meaningless. Smith contends that the survival of "charismatic circles" depends on "entropy production and on the scavenging of entropy" (1992: 189). This notion can be applied as well to the circle of myths, which continue to thrive only as a result of entropy production (or the scavenging of entropy by the managers of particular myths or myth systems). If it is the case that changes in myths mirror, and sometimes bring about, sociocultural change, then there is much to support Smith's argument that "sociocultural change ultimately depends on embedded processes that produce, amplify, and spread destabilizing positive feedback" (1992: 188). Myths that fail to produce destabilizing feedback expire. In effect, they are de-mythologized, like the Greek myths to Judeo-Christian or Muslim society, or the Chinese myths to Western culture.

The conviction that a myth belongs to a particular culture—the conviction, in other words, that produces belief and refuses to accept myths as false—only survives if the value and promise of the myth continue to function charismatically. The only way that this can happen is if the myths are able, continually and through entropy production, to adopt new formulations, to shift emphases, and to keep believers in a state of mild chaos in relation to variations of a perceived original core. Although myths never exist in a "pure" state, the perception of an original charismatic truth on the part of believers provides the standard on which later improvisations are based. All Christian evangelical movements, for example, from the seventeenth-century Quakers and Diggers to twentieth-century television preachers, rely on a fundamental myth of biblical truth onto which they graft topical interpretations. These improvisatory changes made to the supposedly pure version of the myth keep members of particular sects in a state of constant expectation, shifting the authority of the original charisma to a present-day charismatic authority. Depending on the circumstance, the original myth can be improvised to justify war, regicide, racial segregation, polygamy, polygenesis, or an anti-birth-control policy. The multiplicity of Christian sects is well known, as is their extraordinary diversity. Yet all depend on a single myth, which, in principle, has only one central charismatic figure—Jesus Christ—whose authority is *lent* to local figures. Every sect and denomination, therefore, borrows from that original charismatic source, producing its own proof of charismatic endowment, from papal infallibility to snake handling demonstrations. Moreover, every sect and denomination exists

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12   The separation between these two modes is not absolute, as Whitehouse explains: "Before proceeding any further … an area of potential misunderstanding must be anticipated and dealt with. Semantic and episodic memory are universal features of human cognition and, indeed, are common to the cognitive systems of many other species. In consequence, there is no such thing as a religious tradition that does not depend for its transmission on both semantic and episodic memory" (2000: 11).

as a separate charismatic group, and each continues to thrive only because it regularly alters the contours of the original Christian myth. The alterations may be large or minute, tailored to socio-political or economic shifts, or intramural theological revisions, but in all cases the aim is to carve out a separate group and preserve its cohesion for as long as possible.

Routinization and Myth

As time passes, charismatic movements must develop symbols to mythicize themselves. Those symbols, per force, must become petrified in order to insure the permanence and unity of the movement (e.g., "the thousand-year-Reich" or "one nation under God"). Leaders deploy the symbols to legitimate themselves and to raise among followers a sense of stability and continuity. This symbolic legitimation is particularly important in charismatic myth systems because the leaders must sustain the vitality of the myth by introducing and managing dissipative elements—disruptions, cultic breaks, discrepancies—creating a tension between the everyday function of the myth system and the static symbolic representation of its own (often revolutionary) origins.

The more stable the symbols of the charismatic myth the greater the tension, or contradiction, between the symbols and the original character of the movement. Dissipative structures are odd bedfellows for permanent symbolic representations. Yet permanence is the watchword of charismatic myth systems once they make the transition from revolutionary origins to institutional status. Thus, for example, the Russian October Revolution of 1917 was transformed into a permanent rallying point for the revolutionary myth, a stable symbol of an original (and supposedly ongoing) victory. Inevitably, as the movement gained legitimate authority, the hammer and sickle and the sheaves of workers' wheat, once icons of resistance and violent class upheaval, devolved into petrified symbols of the status quo. Nevertheless, in theory at least, those who accepted the myth of "continuing revolution" automatically (and retroactively) belonged to a revolutionary vanguard for as long as the myth continued to reflect what Malinowski called "the context of living faith," even if there no longer was an active vanguard of resistance associated with the symbols of the revolution which were displayed on every flag, medal, and youth poster. Indeed, the symbols promised entry to a closed circle of progressivism even when they were regularly wielded by a repressive authoritarian government. This irony was well-known in state communist regimes.

The relationship of charismatic authority to myth comes into relief in this obvious interdependence of the petrified symbol and the continually evolving, dissipative structure of a group of believers. Recognizing the apparent conflict between the stability of a symbol and the unstable nature of its cause is crucial to understanding how charismatic myth systems preserve themselves and continue to enthrall followers—often in concert with such deadening forces as bureaucracy and self-imposed legal restrictions. As charismatic movements age, the symbols of their revolutionary origins become more and more important, in large measure because memories of idealized moments must be more firmly fixed as rallying points if the movement is to survive under the auspices of its original charismatic authority.

Charisma and myth meet at this juncture. Charismatic movements embrace the language and symbolization of myth to establish themselves as permanent forces in society. They mythicize their beginnings, their leaders, their signal achievements, and their goals, and they weave a careful narrative to support the newly established symbols of their permanence. Followers—whether religious believers or gang members—rally to the symbols and repeat a ritualized form of the narrative myth as inspiration. They do this willingly, because, as

Weber points out, "the desire to transform charisma and charismatic blessing from a unique, transitory gift of grace of extraordinary times and persons into a permanent possession of everyday life … is desired usually by the master, always by his disciples, and most of all by his charismatic subjects" (1978: 2.1121). The importance of myth at this juncture of transformation grows in direct proportion to the urgency attached to fixing a transitory charismatic blessing into a permanent possession, such as a church, a regime, a genealogical line, or even a school of influence like Dada.

Charismatic movements mythicize their own symbols of charisma, upheaval, and revolt in the necessary establishment of civic authority and economic stability. These symbols become emblematic of stasis, the very condition they were invented to confront. This paradox of establishing stable symbols that allude to a form of upheaval, such as a revolutionary movement or an overturned pantheon, occurs when charismatic authority begins to become diluted and, as Weber explains:

> When the tide that lifted a charismatically led group out of everyday life flows back into the channels of workaday routines, at least the "pure" form of charismatic domination will wane and turn into an "institution"; it is either mechanized, as it were, or imperceptibly displaced by other structures, or fused with them in the most diverse forms, so that it becomes a mere component of a concrete historical structure. (1978: 2.1121)

A similar process of institutionalization must unfold as a myth system matures. Weber's view is somewhat demoralizing that charisma, once it is "mechanized" or "displaced by other structures" becomes a "mere component" of concrete historical structures already in place. Actually, there's nothing "mere" about this process—a process described by one theorist as "continuity formation" (Schluchter 1989: 232)—and charisma can manifest itself in extremely effective ways after it has begun to restructure its mission and remythicize itself following the initial burst of pure revelatory or revolutionary action.

Weber of course recognized the importance of restructuring, as is evident from his introduction of such categories as office charisma and hereditary domination. But for the most part he framed routinization in utterly deflating terms:

> In every case charisma is … exposed to the conditions of everyday life and to the powers dominating it, especially to the economic interests. The turning point is always reached when charismatic followers and disciples become privileged table companions … and subsequently fief-holders, priests, state officials, party officials, officers, secretaries, editors and publishers, all of whom want to live off the charismatic movement, or when they become employees, teachers and others with a vested occupational interest, or holders of benefices and of patrimonial offices. The charismatically dominated masses, in turn, become tax-paying subjects, dues-paying members of a church, sect, party, or club (Verein), soldiers who are systematically impressed, drilled and disciplined, or law-abiding "citizens." Even though the apostle admonishes the followers to maintain the purity of the spirit, the charismatic message inevitably becomes dogma, doctrine, theory, reglement, law or petrified tradition. (1978: 2.1121–2)

In this description it would seem that all charismatic life is snuffed out as the disciples become "table companions." But, as has often been argued since Weber wrote, charisma can indeed survive, if not exactly intact, then in still magnetic forms, in the transformed states it achieves as routinization occurs. It isn't all as dark as Weber indicates when he describes the decline of charismatically dominated masses or the deterioration of religious

prophecy into "dogma, doctrine, theory, reglement, law or petrified tradition." In fact, paradoxically, Weber acknowledged that under the pressure of necessity charisma would have to merge with tradition, despite their basic antagonism as two of his three ideal types of legitimate domination (*Herrschaft*). And this acknowledgement on his part might be seen as a shibboleth, opening the way for the wide speculation regarding what Edward Shils called "dispersed" or "attenuated" charisma in routinized institutional structures (see Shils 1982: 117–18).

Routinization probably remains the most vexed concept in Weber's description of charismatic transformation. Arthur Schweitzer, for example, resists seeing the term as an umbrella expression under which to gather all versions of charismatic organization. While he doesn't deny the threat to leadership of diluted charismatic share, he makes an important distinction between the forms of organization often categorized as routinization. "Instead of a uniformly alien relationship between charisma and organization *per se*," he remarks, speaking about what he terms "charismatic giants" of the twentieth century, "there developed one conflict between organizational and charismatic leaders, and another between bureaucracy and charismatic apparatus. But there was also a supportive relationship between a leader and his apparatus" (Schweitzer 1984: 130). Schweitzer's distinction between the different kinds of conflict is valuable, particularly in recognizing the crucial element of human agency necessary for that "supportive relationship" in the management of a charismatic system as it is transformed, through different forms of mythicization, into an organizational apparatus.

I have already noted the absence of literature on charisma and myth and I think that it is in analyzing routinization that that absence is felt most sharply. If charisma functions within the institutions of society, as part and parcel of apparently rationalized structures, then it would have to be naturalized or made consistent with all that is anti-upheaval, anti-revolutionary, and anti-disruption. Roland Barthes has suggested that myth serves just such a function in regard to history: "What the world supplies to myth is an historical reality, defined, even if this goes back quite a while, by the way in which men have produced or used it; and what myth gives in return is a *natural* image of this reality" (Barthes 1972: 142; emphasis in original). Barthes, writing in an overt neo-Marxist mode, sees myth as a "conjuring trick" of bourgeois ideology: "the world enters language as a dialectical relation between activities, between human actions; it comes out of myth as a harmonious display of essences" (1972: 142). And again, more specifically: "Myth does not deny things, it purifies them, it makes them innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact" (1972: 143). Insisting that the "conjuring trick" proves that myth is what he terms "depoliticized speech," Barthes seems to mean that, even when we are speaking of political myths, myth de-sensitizes us to the reality of the political, where the political describes "the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world" (1972: 143).[13]

There are many weaknesses in Barthes's definition of myth, not least of which is the absence of human agency in the so-called purification of history. The idea that "the world" gives something to myth and that, in turn, "myth" gives something back to the world is simply too vague and too impersonal. It reflects a not uncommon sort of Marxist animism of abstract concepts—a mythicizing practice in its own right. Myth for Barthes, like ideology for Marx, has a life of its own apart from the ability of what Weber terms "cultural beings" to make deliberate choices and change their environment. This is a significant weakness as

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13   As Michael Tager explains, Barthes believed that "through myth the subordination of colonials, women, and workers appeared eternally sanctioned—one could not argue with nature. Myth obliterated the memory that peoples were once conquered, hierarchies once imposed, and objects once made. With its anonymous universal representations, myths helped shape the forms and norms that sustained everyday life" (Tager 1986: 632).

far as I'm concerned, as my discussion of the management of charismatic myth by priests, gang leaders, and others has demonstrated. But it might nonetheless be useful to apply aspects of Barthes's critique to the relationship of charisma and myth as it develops in the course of routinization. Indeed, we might well say that it is through a kind of "conjuring trick" that charismatic properties are distributed. This conjuring trick is the transformation of revolutionary, personal charisma into stable charismatic myths. Barthes claims that myth, in its whitewashing of history, creates an image of purity and innocence, a naturalized image of the past and a "harmonious display of essences." In the course of routinization charismatic myths aspire to similar ends. They require a kind of purification and innocence to retain (or retrieve) an image of the original revolutionary movement in the face of structural rationalization. Barthes's conjuring trick is as necessary as routinization itself, both to preserving the charismatic force of the myth and to conserving the social order *charismatically*.

But we need to ask: Is it important to link the negative connotation of the term "conjuring trick" to the establishment of charismatic myths? Alas, the answer to this question is undoubtedly "yes." Yes, the transformation of an original, personal charismatic blessing into a myth system that includes such apparently stable elements as symbols and sacred texts qualifies as a conjuring trick. And yes—more importantly—behind every conjuring trick is a conjurer. Globules of charisma don't float from place to place, settling like manna in the icons, symbols, or slogans of certain "blessed" institutions. Charismatic authority, like charismatic qualities themselves, must be managed, controlled, and, as it gradually becomes routinized and perilously diluted, transformed into a mythical-symbolic structure that can preserve the original charisma while maintaining the existing power structure of the charismatic group. Charisma remains, even in the throes of routinization, a consummately shared experience. The authority of charismatically imbued symbols, therefore, only exists insofar as those symbols represent an *interdependent relationship* with a group. The management of the group might well depend on keeping its relationship to the symbols in a state of disequilibrium, a state usually achieved by small transmutations of the charismatic myth both to fit current needs and to keep the group slightly off balance. This is the conjurer's art, the sleight-of-hand that masks the shifts and redistribution of power while instituting a mythical structure in which group members have a share.

Both synergistic charisma (Schweitzer's term) and attenuated, "mediated" institutional charisma must partake of the conjurer's art—indeed, the mediation is the art. Both variations of charisma re-taxonomize the Weberian category of routinization, adding nuance to such forms as office charisma and hereditary charisma, while at the same time exposing the need for an administrative element in charismatic development. Moreover, notions, on the one hand, of "interlinkage" among charisma, ideology, and organization, and, on the other hand, of what Shils calls the "dispersed focus" of charisma in an institutional setting, lead ineluctably to a discussion of the mythicization of charismatic authority. Schweitzer claims that a leader's second task (after establishing a political party) is "to superimpose [an effective charismatic apparatus] upon the regular bureaucracy" (1984: 130).[14] This is a provocative statement in terms of charisma and myth, raising two immediate questions: *How* does one "superimpose" a charismatic apparatus?; and, What exactly *is* a charismatic apparatus?

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14   Schweitzer's full schema delineating synergistic charisma is worth noting: "Synergistic charisma prevails when (1) the charismatic quality is combined with political talents; (2) scope and strength of the charismatic appeal is multiplied by the use of mass media; (3) the charismatic group transforms itself into a mass following; and (4) charismatic authority and legitimacy are linked with non-charismatic authority" (1984: 28). With the exception of number 2, all of Schweitzer's categories of transformation come into play in the generation of charismatic myth systems, though not necessarily under the heading of synergistic charisma.

My response to the first question would be that one can only superimpose a charismatic apparatus through the deployment of myth, precisely the remythicization of the charismatic movement's origins. My response to the second would be more complicated, and probably more tentative since the term isn't mine to begin with. But, for the sake of argument, I'd say that a charismatic apparatus would have to come into being as a result or condition of routinization, and that, in most cases, it would consist of a mixture of symbols, narrative, and administration, all directed toward the identical end of fashioning an enduring charismatic authority from a relatively ephemeral movement. Even tradition, the supposed arch-enemy of charisma, would become part of the narrative structure and symbolic architecture. The capacity for disruption would at once be instilled and controlled. Moreover, ritual practices, regularly made and remade at different levels of formality, would accumulate as proof of stability and historical continuity. By this process a living charismatic myth might emerge.

Ritual

E.R. Dodds once said, "History no doubt repeats itself: but it is only ritual that repeats itself *exactly*" (Dodds 1963: xxvii). In a similar vein, but with more at stake, Mircea Eliade, according to Catherine Bell, "drew attention to how the ritual reenactment of founding events is able to generate a meaningful, mythic, and cyclical sense of time, a temporal sense in which it is as if the original events are happening all over again" (Bell 1997: 108) The universal assumption of those studying ritual is that its basis is repetition. Yet at the risk of contradicting voices as venerable as Dodds's and Eliade's—to mention only two—I would argue for a much different approach to ritual practice, and even what Victor Turner long ago called the "ritual process." Although ritual might seem to repeat itself exactly, must indeed *claim* to repeat itself exactly, in order to survive and to continue to represent a particular tradition, ritual embraces change and disequilibrium in the same way that Ernst Cassirer described when talking about myth. Stewart and Strathern give an extraordinary example of this in explaining how the Duna people of Papua New Guinea developed their rituals "largely … to cope with the perturbations in social and environmental conditions":

> *In order to maintain the achievement of continuity in the face of such perturbations, the Duna were prepared to import rituals from neighboring peoples or to invent forms of ritual that could suit their needs ….The important thing was to achieve the aim of social reproduction and a form of accommodation with the environment, seen as an extension of the groups themselves. (Stewart and Strathern 2002: 17)*

Dodds is clearly proved wrong in this case. The ritual itself doesn't repeat itself exactly. On the contrary, the ritual is adopted new in order to *remythicize* the exact repetition, or continuity, of Duna society. "History, myth, and ritual," according to Stewart and Strathern, "were therefore seen in a dynamic state of interplay and movement" (2002: 17). The dynamism of this "interplay and movement" adumbrates the change and social disequilibrium that allow leaders to manage dissipative structures in charismatic myth. The process by which ritual affixes believers and practitioners into exclusive groups depends for its protean energy—not to mention its frequent link to divine sources—on the same deployment and management of dissipative structures as charismatic myth systems. This dynamic state helps to prove that the inflexible criterion of ritual is that participants in ritual practices be assured they belong to an exclusive group, and not, as commonly believed, that rituals are only rituals if they themselves remain the same over time.

As seen in Duna practice, ritual punctuates, reflects, and simultaneously generates the mythic narrative that tells the story of a group's connection to other-worldly authority, while at the same time confirming its members' this-worldly bond to each other. These members are tied, through shared repetitive practices (even imported ones), to some form of supernatural force or unique secular mission. Bell suggests that Eliade thought the "reenactment of sacred events released something of their original transformative power" (Bell 1997: 108). This transformative power has the earmarks of an inherited charismatic authority. Arguably, therefore, at the heart of ritual practice we find charisma, both as a form of divine or extraordinary *auctoritas* and also as a methodology. Charismatic organization structures the ritual process.

To some extent, Roy Rappaport's forceful division of ritual from myth supports the notion that charisma, rather than narrative alone, governs ritual practice. In an attempt "to take issue with a loose anthropological truism," Rappaport insists that "while it may be, as in [Edmund] Leach's phrase of four decades ago (1954: 12), that 'myth is the counterpart of ritual, myth implies ritual, ritual implies myth,' they are not, to complete the famous dictum, 'one and the same'" (Rappaport 1999: 134). He is concerned to show that ritual carries "self-referential information" while myth need not carry such information. But Rappaport's definition of myth seems to suggest a beaker-to-vessel version of narrative experience, rather than the group experience that distinguishes myth—especially charismatically driven myths—from other kinds of social narratives. He concludes that "in enunciating, accepting and making conventions moral, ritual contains within itself not simply a symbolic representation of social contract, but social contract itself. As such, ritual, which establishes, guards, and bridges boundaries between public systems and private processes, is *the* basic social act" (1999: 138).

It may be that ritual, because of its power to make conventions seem moral, is "*the* basic social act," but Rappaport inadvisedly subordinates what he calls "simply a symbolic representation of social contract." This symbolic representation, coupled with the dissipative charismatic structure needed to sustain it, also deserves to be recognized as *the* social act. Charisma imbues ritual with numinousness and the glue of bonding, but, ironically, is also antagonistic to it. What Weber calls the "specifically creative force" of charisma will always keep ritual practices in a labile state, and, *ipso facto*, will seem to be counteracting the purpose of repeating an act "exactly." But ritual, like myth systems themselves, would degenerate into mere cultural compulsions if not for the creative disequilibrium injected into them by the charismatic process.[15] I use this term "charismatic process" advisedly in this context, bearing in mind Victor Turner's influential work on the ritual process in Ndembu society. Just as Turner speaks of the processural element in ritual, so we will have to acknowledge a processural charismatic force as a contributing element to ritual. As Bell explains,

> *Turner found symbols to be structurally bipolar, referring to sensory experiences on the one hand and ideological or normative values on the other … The mobilization of such symbols in ritual involves a dynamic exchange between their two poles: the orchestration of the sensory experiences associated with such symbols can effectively embed their allied ideological values into people's consciousness, endowing the ideological with sensory power and the sensory with moral power. (Bell 1997: 41)*

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15   See Bell (1992: 71): "the distinction between ritual and instrumental activity can easily collapse into a distinction between the rational and the irrational or the logical and the emotional. Hence, the identification of ritual with symbolic as opposed to instrumental action has also led to descriptions of ritual as cathartic performances that are responses to situations of anxiety or fear. The great debate between Bronislav Malinowski and Raymond Firth on the relationship of ritual and anxiety essentially reflected the need to account for the existence of nonutilitarian practices among people who were incredibly practical in most things."

As much as this interchange, or mirrored endowment, helps to explain the symbolic architecture of ritual, of significant interest to a study of charisma and myth is determining who or what force manages the "orchestration" of symbols. The bipolarity of Turner's symbolic structure, because of its physiological-ideological comprehensiveness, highlights the parity of representation with "*the* social fact"—or function—of the ritual dynamic. But the charismatic process does not copy the ritual process in all its aspects. On the contrary, charisma contests, contradicts, and revises ritual because its authority garners its power from change and transformation. And, perhaps, charismatic remythicization is tantamount to the "orchestrating" force that produces Turner's ritual process.

Not unlike in the routinization process, this power grows from a radical attempt to remythicize the authority of ritual or to re-invest ritualized symbols with an original charismatic numinousness. The reason for this similarity is that ritual is itself a highly routinized set of charismatically imbued practices. The difference between routinization and ritual is more one of degree than of kind. The charismatic element of ritual not only keeps the rituals themselves alive, but also makes the ritual process a slave to the changing heterogeneous needs of participating groups. *Pace* Leach et al., ritual is the counterpart, not of myth, but of the routinization of charisma.

Weber uses the term "relatively rational behavior" (*relativ rationales Handeln*) to explain how apparently irrational belief in otherworldly intervention is tempered by the relative rationality of repetitive practices. The concept of relatively rational behavior supplies a valuable foundation for the analysis of ritual. While ritualistic practices appear to be totally irrational, their value as components of charismatically organized institutions contains a powerful rationale: those who experience group membership believe that practicing the ritual will provide them with a share in the charismatic endowment. Each individual ritual, with its accompanying rationale—from rosary beads to the chicken-slaughtering of the *Santeria* religion to May Day parades—only makes sense to members of the particular charismatic group or charismatically organized institution in question. To anyone outside the group such ritual practices are irrational, sometimes sacrilegious, and often offensive. Those on the inside adhere to norms of conduct guided and delimited by group membership. Those on the outside—even within the same culture—seek to demythologize the ideals of their adversaries and thereby to demonize alien groups and their myths.

Feuchtwang and Mingming cite Thomas Csordas as one of several anthropologists who have applied the paradigms of charismatic development to ritual. Csordas has charted the interplay of charisma and ritual among a rare group of evangelicals in what is known as the Catholic Charismatic Renewal. In a Benedictine abbey in Pecos, New Mexico, he discovered that "Community life and ritual healing are self-characterized as a 'holistic' synthesis of Benedictine rule, Charismatic spiritual gifts, and depth psychology," the latter derived, perhaps not unexpectedly, from Jung (Csordas 1997: 9; author's capitalization). Offering scores of examples of how "Charismatic parishes" formed and sustained themselves across the United States and in other parts of North America, Csordas establishes the vitality of the movement (which he notes is not any longer driven by youth and therefore must adjust to old congregants), while at the same time denying that the Charismatic Renewal is exclusively a crisis cult: "While some American participants acknowledge joining in the wake of an intense personal crisis or conversion experience, others regard it as a perfectly natural step to have taken at a particular moment in their lives" (Csordas 1997: 44–5). This difference in motivations testifies to the power of the Renewal movement to satisfy heterogeneous needs on a charismatic basis. It also indicates the value of charisma in creating something that re-creates a pure and individuated link to the deity. "With the synthesis of Catholicism and Pentecostalism," Csordas explains, "the developmental need for the 'solidarity of close affiliations' became realized in the Charismatic ritual forms of personal relationship with

the deity, collective prayer, and communal life" (1997: 45). But ritual form doesn't merely fulfill internal needs. Charisma, to *be* charisma as a group experience, must have the ability to create a bond among believers, congregants, parishes, and so forth. Csordas asks the question: "Could it not be the … locus of charisma is *among* participants in a religious movement? Could not charisma be a product of the rhetorical apparatus in use of which leader and follower alike convince themselves that the world is constituted in a certain way?" (Csordas 1997: 45; cited in Feuchtwang and Mingming 2001: 14) Weber anticipated this concept of charisma "among participants" with his term *metanoia*, the transformation of followers and their embracing of the leader's charisma. Csordas concludes, in regard to the Catholic Evangelicals: "Coming to grips with 'intuitions from the recesses of the self' took the public form of divinely inspired prophetic utterance and the private forms of 'inner healing' from emotional disability and 'leadings from the Lord' through prayer and inspiration" (1997: 45).

One could hardly ask for a more explicit example of syncretic charisma, a term I have not used until now, but one which seems unavoidable in discussing the infusion of charismatic elements into ritual forms. In the case of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, the syncretism combines Catholic anonymity before the deity with the Protestant individualism of god and human, sharing out the charisms, which for Catholics are historical, preserved in the petrified letters of Paul and the dogma of Canon Law. For the participants in the Renewal, the charisms once again become living things, ritualized by the different parishes in different ways.

Bourdieu's *habitus* is relevant to the ritualizing of the charisms. Tony Bennet points out that

> *in Bourdieu's assessment, the virtue of his concept of habitus is that, by accounting for how the agent (individual or class) acts on the determinations that structure it so as to make the habitus a mobile, structured-yet-structuring structure, it overcomes a series of dualities—between inside and outside, structure and agency, body and mind—while simultaneously offering an account of how past moments of the shaping of the habitus are retained in the present. (Bennet 2007: 205)*

In Bourdieu's own language, "The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment … produce *habitus*, systems of durable, transposable *dispositions*, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures" (Bourdieu 1977: 72).[16] This description might be compared to the concept of a charismatic authority that functions through dissipative structures, so that we might link Thomas Spence Smith's disequilibrium functionalism and Bourdieu's "structures predisposed to function as structuring structures."

Systems that are at once durable and have transposable dispositions might well be compared to myth systems whose durable symbols and traditions continually *re*-structure themselves in order to keep belief alive and to legitimate new leaders. This is not to say that *habitus* and myth systems are the same. Yet, as collective enterprises, they clearly share a form of functionality. Their structures are managed in similar ways by political leaders or priests, among others, with the dual end of fostering mild chaos and maintaining stable, ongoing authority. Ritual practices contribute to this living structural paradigm because

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16   Cf. Bourdieu 1972: 175: "les structures qui sont constitutives d'une type particulier d'environnement … et qui peuvent être saises empiriquement sous la forme des régularités associés à un environnement socialement structuré, produisent des <u>habitus</u>, systèmes des <u>dispositions</u> durables, structures structurées prédisposées à fonctionner comme structures structurantes" (emphasis in original).

they are processual, and the process must be managed. Frances Gray has suggested that "collective members develop the illusion that they are authors of their own being, that they can anticipate the outcomes of their actions and will see themselves as agents. What agents are actually doing exceeds their conscious intentions because they are engaged in reproducing the objective ends of the *habitus*" (Gray 2008: 70). Bourdieu himself observes a similar phenomenon:

> *One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) or practices in the world, in other words the harmonization of agents' experiences and the continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences. (Bourdieu 1977: 80)*

Paradoxically, a "commonsense world" is precisely the world of ritual. The practice of relatively rational behavior transforms the arbitrariness of rituals into a "natural," commonsense phenomenon—but only among believers already experiencing a charismatic bond. Clifford Geertz once pointed out that

> *In religious belief and practice a group's ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life. (Geertz 1973: 89–90)*

Geertz is right, and the notion of a state of affairs "peculiarly well-arranged" more than adequately describes the administration of mild entropy which serves to sustain a group "ethos." Myth systems depend on such peculiar arrangements. And the rituals attached to those myth systems, rituals which are continually improvised and revised by local leaders to keep them "emotionally convincing," at once bind followers in an exclusionary group and, because of their relatively rational status, naturalize highly normative practices.

Conclusion

Possibly I have raised more questions than I have answered. But all my questions in this chapter come down to determining precisely by what means unrationalized charismatic values are made to fit in and indeed sustain a traditional structure in social life. This is not only a matter of how charisma becomes "crystallized" in routines and rituals, but also of how it *remains* crystallized without being utterly absorbed into the everyday, the bureaucratic, the anti-heroic. And it is here, I believe, that we must consider the function of myth. The enduring propagation of crystallized charisma requires the accompaniment of a myth fluid and powerful enough to adapt to everything from changing regimes to crushing repetitive practice. Only a myth, administered with the same eye for disequilibrium functionalism as that displayed by a charismatic figure, can sustain charismatic values in later, systematized stages. There is a temptation to regard the gradual development of myth systems as somehow evolutionary, or even natural, especially in the face of such established structures as a centuries-old university

system or a hereditary throne. But we should never completely lose sight of leadership roles in any kind of charismatic management situation. Even when the leadership is traditional, regimented, and immensely powerful, there must be a leader or series of leaders who break through the routine if only to keep the myth alive. Systems cannot survive without agents and myth systems fail without remythicization. For this process of remythicization to succeed in the long term some form of charismatic leadership is required. It can be formalized in priesthoods or kingships, and perhaps as a "crystallization" shared among a plurality. Despite appearances to the contrary, however, such as the deceptive appearance of an evolutionary development from pure charisma to institutional charisma, a creatively managed myth system must be in place for any form of charisma to flourish in a routinized condition.

Unfortunately, most theorists of charisma neglect to acknowledge the vital importance of mythicizing the leader's mission. In particular, it would be important to delineate the specific characteristics of charismatic management deployed as a means of fulfilling the needs of followers when the movement transforms itself. Yet it hardly needs proof that myths of personal charisma, of revolution, of upheaval become the very fabric of routinized movements. Indeed, routinized movements can only survive as collectives through a process of charismatic mythopoesis. The myths they produce invariably reflect the leader's personal power and the origins of the mission. Such myths are transformed into, *inter alia*, ritualized objects of worship, the *homoousia* of the Christian father and son, the uniqueness of the Dalai Lama, ecclesiastical offices, political movements (such as Martin Luther King's), even Latin tags and sacred songs. Supported or not by divinely sanctioned texts, the charismatic-mythopoetic imagination drives and fashions the *re*-development of leadership as personal charisma wanes, and in consequence re-affirms the interdependence of leaders and followers.

But with mythopoesis comes agency. There is no such thing as the automatic or evolutionary development of a charismatic movement. Mythmaking requires a human imagination both to fashion and refashion the narrative, as well as to insure that the narrative (even when it is merely a re-enforcement of ritual or object worship) creates an interdependent relationship with followers. As I've tried to emphasize, the management of charismatic myths, like the management of charismatic movements themselves, requires the mild chaos or control of dissipative structures, introduced and subsequently manipulated by charismatic leaders. Only the creation and manipulation of myths can assure the continuation of a movement. As the charismatic group collectively transforms the transitory gift into a permanent possession, both leaders and members must first establish and then embrace the group's myths. This is a crucial step in the process of routinization. Yet it is an inescapable fact that there cannot be routinized charismatic groups without self-sustaining myths. Indeed, the mythicization of charisma and its re-direction as a permanent fixture in society are the basis of all tradition and ritual, whether religious, political, or otherwise socio-cultural (such as literature and the arts). The process can take various forms, but common elements insure that charismatic content is remembered: symbols of the original, "pure," revolutionary charisma take root; certain texts or objects are deemed sacred; hierarchical blood lines (and the power accruing to them) are established; the apotheosis or canonization of founders and honored figures occurs, petrifying a charismatic blessing; rites are inculcated as proof of an ongoing link to grace; and special conduct, such as asceticism or virtuosity, attains an ethical value that can qualify a person for higher office or institutionalized prestige. Each of these steps requires the articulation of a mythical narrative, an articulation which underlies and determines the conduct of the institutionalized charismatic authority. The forms of articulation vary widely and might not even be recognized as contiguous with myth, especially as the myth system becomes increasingly depersonalized.

I began by noting that, when people speak of charisma, they almost always refer to unique individuals. Yet charisma would die if it were confined to those individuals alone, or to the span of their lifetimes. All charismas, when seeking to distribute personal authority with a minimum of dilution, must routinize their own movement. And all versions of routinization are "depersonalized," even when no actual person is involved. Critical to depersonalization, however, is the method by which the personal charismatic claim is transformed into a myth. Depersonalization is vital to myth systems because only through its advent do the stable structure of symbols and the dissipative structure of narrative meet with enough force to inspire and sustain conviction, while expanding the reach of the local charismatic figure. The result is a systematic myth which is not quite stable, so that priests or priestesses, political leaders, and other office holders can foster the mild chaos that allows them to manipulate their following and keep the myth alive.

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PART III
Work, Play and Gender

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Secular Rituals

Margit Warburg

Religious or Secular Rituals?

It is a sunny afternoon, the newly married couple is standing outside the city hall and is greeted by the guests. At the sidewalk a car is waiting, for this occasion it may often be a rented limousine or an open sports car decorated with pieces of white tissue symbolizing the bridal veil. It is not any car, it is a ritual carriage. After the greetings, the bride and groom walk towards the car in a shower of rice thrown by the guests.

The ritual of throwing rice at weddings is a widespread custom over most of the world (Kalmijn 2004). Many of the participants know that the throwing of rice symbolizes a wish of fertility and good fortune for the couple. The ritual is not part of the authorized wedding ritual itself; it clearly has its origin in folk belief and may be traced back to Ancient Rome where nuts were thrown instead of rice (Hersch 2010: 141, 156–8). Today, the ritual of throwing rice is part of secular popular culture in which a wedding is one of the central ritually laden events (Woodruff 1980).

On the one hand, there are arguments for calling the throwing of rice a religious ritual because of its historical roots in pre-Christian fertility rites. On the other hand, in today's Western society it seems questionable to call it a religious ritual on a par with the Christian communion or the Muslim daily prayers. But does that make this ritual of throwing rice a secular ritual? This is not easily answered considering that the same ritual is performed after the official marriage ritual, regardless of whether the marriage takes place in a church or before a registrar.

A newly built ship is given a name by ritually breaking a bottle of champagne against the stern of the ship. Few would accept calling this a religious ritual, but is it then a secular ritual? The answer is complicated by the fact that "baptism" of a ship was a religious act in medieval times in several European countries, and the many customs and beliefs connected with the launching of a ship have roots in both Christian and pre-Christian religion (Henningsen 1983).

These two examples of well-known contemporary rituals show that a classification of rituals as being either religious or secular would probably leave us with a considerable number of borderline cases. Cultural classifications are, however, often ambiguous anyway. Studies of borderline cases are analytically rewarding when they lead to a conceptual clarification of the topic. However, in my view, the way in which secular rituals has been dealt with in previous research has not yet led to a coherent clarification regarding the definition and delimitation of secular rituals as opposed to religious rituals. This chapter therefore aims at a conceptual clarification of secular rituals based on a critical review of current discussions of rituals, both religious and secular.

It may appear to be a self-evident statement, but the concept of secular rituals is only meaningful in a differentiated society where the aim is to distinguish between a religious sphere and a non-religious or secular sphere. This distinction is, however, rarely an ideal, unambiguous divide.

From its beginning in the late nineteenth century the study of rituals was intertwined with the study of religion and its role in society, and the chapter therefore introduces a brief overview of the study of ritual theories. The inclusion of both religious and non-religious rituals in a generalization of ritual theories is a rather recent development from the 1970s; this development is reviewed with particular emphasis on discussing secular rituals and their characteristics as a special category of rituals. A seminal contribution in this context is the edited book *Secular Rituals* by social anthropologists Sally Moore and Barbara Myerhoff (1977). Because of its significance a considerable part of the present chapter is devoted to a critical evaluation of the theoretical implications of the concept of secular rituals as proposed by these authors (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 3–24). Then follows a treatment of the position of secular rituals in relation to civil religion because civil religion harbors rituals which usually have a secular objective but which also legitimize this purpose by referring to a transcendental power. Further examples of secular rituals are then discussed. This apparent ambiguity arises because classifying certain rituals as secular rituals hinges on which definition of religion is applied, which is a recurrent issue discussed in this chapter. The conclusion of this is that secular rituals are a meaningful and useful empirical category of rituals within a substantive definition of religion.

Ritual Theories

Rituals designate certain forms of stereotypes i.e. symbolic acts allowing a certain and sometimes irreversible symbolic change in the world to take place. The Christian baptism, for example, is not only an act of giving a child a name—from now on, the child counts as a full-fledged member of the Christian community. The child may later change his or her first name according to law, but within a Christian understanding there is no way of reversing the christening.

The discussion of rituals, their meaning and characteristics emerged with the historical, sociological, and anthropological studies of religion in the late nineteenth century (Bell 1997: 3–16). In brief, the initial issue was whether, in the course of the development of human cultures, religion was rooted in myths or in rituals. Myths represented the theory and belief aspect of religion while rituals summarized the behavioral side of religion. Edward B. Tylor (1832–1917) saw myths as a result of the first humans' intellectual speculations on the possible existence of a life after death, and on the possibility that spiritual forces inhabited nature and made it work. Tylor regarded rituals such as sacrifices as deliberate communicative acts directed towards the spirits in order to influence them.

A contrasting and for its time radical view on the role of ritual was forwarded by the theologian and Old Testament scholar William Robertson Smith (1846–1894) in his most famous work, *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites* (1889). To Robertson Smith rituals were fundamental and primary in religion, and he argued that myths had evolved later to explain the meaning of the rituals. He interpreted the sacrificial meals described in the Old Testament and in parallel Greek and Arabian sources not as a sacrifice to the gods but as worship of the social order of the group (Smith 1969: 338–45). Participation in the common rituals was therefore obligatory while belief in the myths was secondary to the social cohesion of the group (Smith 1969: 18).

Following Smith, the primary role of ritual in the evolvement of religion was emphasized also by Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) who maintained that rituals were first and foremost an expression of group coherence and solidarity. Durkheim's focus on the societal role of religion was further developed but also modified by the functionalist school of anthropology, where in particular Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) was a proponent of viewing rituals as playing a key role in the upholding of a particular culture as a whole besides covering individual needs for transcendental assistance in life.

From Durkheim onwards the view of religion as an integral part of social life has been upheld, and in this view rituals are core elements. With Edward Evans-Pritchard's (1902–1973) study of Nuer religion the focus on the interpretation of rituals shifted from largely an outsider's view to a position drawing upon the particular cognitive system of the culture being studied. Bearing different names this approach is common to the symbolic system and culturalist currents in anthropology, where the primary and classic figures in anthropology are Victor Turner (1920–1983), Mary Douglas (1921–2007), and Clifford Geertz (1926–2006).

Clifford Geertz's article "Religion as a Cultural System" from 1966 has had a profound influence on the study of rituals, inside and outside anthropology (Bell 1992: 25–8; Bell 1997: 66–7; Kreinath 2005). The article is, in fact, a bold attempt at defining religion (Geertz 1993: 90):

> *(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. (Geertz 1993: 90)*

The definition has no direct reference to transcendental powers and must be characterized as a *functional* definition of religion, which is a definition focusing on what religion *does* (McGuire 1997: 12). Unfortunately, Geertz did not engage much in the discussion of alternative definitions. In the study of religion, functional definitions are one class of definitions; the other class represents the substantive definitions which focus on what religion *is*.

It is not the place here to engage in the many different substantive definitions of religion and of the religious. However, as a minimum, a substantive definition demands that religion somehow involves a realm of transcendence of ultimate significance (McGuire 1997: 9–14; Beckford 2001: 240). Both the functional and the substantive definitions have their advantages and disadvantages, and no universal agreement on a definition of religion exists. In general, functional definitions tend to be more inclusive than substantive definitions (McGuire 1997: 9–14). Whether a definition is functional or substantive plays a key role in the discussion of secular rituals.

Geertz's definition of religion is echoed in later definitions of rituals, both religious and secular, for example one by Frederick Bird:

> *Phenomenologically considered rituals may be defined as culturally transmitted symbolic codes which are stylized, regularly repeated, dramatically structured, authoritatively designated and intrinsically valued. (Bird 1980: 19)*

In this definition we can clearly recognize the structure and the five elements of Geertz's definition of religion. Bird's definition of rituals does not mention any involvement of transcendental forces.

The most radical thought in Geertz's article is probably that he moved beyond Durkheim's position and saw religion as more than just a reflection of the social order. Based on his fieldwork in Bali Geertz argued that the rituals in religion were instruments in *shaping* social order (Geertz 1993: 119; Bell 1997: 67):

> *Religion is sociologically interesting not because, as vulgar positivism would have it, it describes the social order (which, in so far as it does, it does not only very obliquely but very incompletely), but because, like environment, political power, wealth, jural obligation, personal affection, and a sense of beauty, it shapes it. (Geertz 1993: 119)*

Geertz's interpretation allows for the fact that agents can change the rituals and thereby change the social order. Geertz's interpretation solved a main problem with classical functionalism, and that is that it had difficulties accounting for social change (Bell 1997: 66–7).

The example Geertz used in "Religion as a Cultural System" is a ritual performance of a combat between a frightening witch, Rangda, and a clumsy, comic monster, Barong (Geertz 1993: 114–15). Interestingly, Geertz stressed that for the Balinese the myths relating to the Rangda-Barong ritual varied considerably and were not considered particularly important—it was the ritual that counted (Geertz 1993: 114–15). Here, Geertz could have referred to Robertson Smith's famous statement:

> *… it may be affirmed with confidence that the myth was derived from the ritual, and not the ritual from the myth; for the ritual was fixed and the myth was variable, the ritual was obligatory and faith in the myth was at the discretion of the worshipper. (Smith 1969: 18)*

Geertz did not refer to Robertson Smith, though; this may be understandable within an anthropological tradition where Robertson Smith has not been a central figure, but it stresses the potential advantage for anthropology of drawing more widely upon theories of religion and rituals from history of religions and theology.

Geertz's main conclusion that rituals may incite changes in the social order has inspired subsequent studies of rituals towards an orientation of practice theory. Continuing Geertz's thinking, practice theorists, such as historian of religions Catherine Bell, emphasize and explore how rituals are vehicles for the *construction* of authority as well as expressions of authority (Bell 1992: 81–8; Bell 1997: 82). Bell argues that by putting emphasis on action, the complications of a universal phenomenological definition of ritual are circumvented (Bell 1997: 80–81; cf. also Bell 1992: 74). In a practice approach the ritual should be analyzed in its full context, and focus should be on the actions that make a participant a "ritualized agent" (Bell 1992: 88–93; Bell 1997: 81–2).

Analyzing a ritual often calls on Arnold van Gennep's famous three-stage model of rites of passage: a separation phase, a liminal phase where the ritual transformation takes place, and the reincorporation phase (van Gennep 1965: 10–13). This approach is still fruitful although not all documented rites of passage seem to comply strictly with van Gennep's scheme (Bell 1997: 56–9).

My conclusion from this very condensed survey of ritual theories is that I agree with Catherine Bell and Jan Platvoet (2006) in the futility of seeking a universal operational definition of ritual as an autonomous phenomenon. Attempts at making a rigid definition rather show that the concept of ritual is fuzzy and pragmatic (Snoek 2006). We can usually recognize a ritual when we see it, although as an outsider it may sometimes be deceptive. Horace Miner's famous satirical study of the morning mouth ritual and other body rituals among the Nacirema is a case in point (Miner 1956). It requires a little thinking-out-of-the-box to recognize the average American (Nacirema spelled backwards) in his or her mundane act of brushing teeth in the morning.

Religious and Non-religious Rituals

The academic tradition of tying rituals to religion spurred scholars to use ritual theories from studies of religion and culture in their analyses of ceremonies and other forms of formal behavior having the characteristics of religious rituals but seemingly without a transcendental reference (Browne 1980; Gusfield and Michalowicz 1984; Handelman 1998; Harth 2006). Observing this trend, Jan Platvoet has discussed whether the term ritual should be restricted to religious behavior (Platvoet 2006). He concluded, however, that since rituals basically are symbolic actions, an inclusive definition of rituals allows for much wider comparative studies of various types of formal or repetitive practices in society, both religious and non-religious. This is not possible if rituals are only accepted as rituals if they are religious.

This is in line with Clifford Geertz's functional definition of religion and Frederic Bird's definition of rituals discussed above. It also complies with the conclusion drawn by Catherine Bell:

> … high mass in a Greek Orthodox church, the swearing in of the president, school graduation ceremonies, and the special talismanic actions taken by a pitcher as he gets ready to throw a baseball [are all different forms of ritual behavior]. This is not to say that scholars do not see any differences among these rites but imply that what they share has become of greater theoretical interest rather than what seems to distinguish them—at least for the time being. (Bell 1997: 52)

Joseph R. Gusfield and Jerzy Michalowicz (1984) reviewed studies of secular ceremonies, symbols, and events in modern society from the perspective of symbolic anthropology. They used the term secular rituals and stressed that like religious rituals secular rituals must also have symbolic significance when performed, if they are to be denoted rituals at all (Gusfield and Michalowicz 1984). Formalized, repetitive forms of secular practice which resemble rituals in their form do exist, but they do not qualify as rituals (Snoek 2006). Such repetitive acts, for example when an air pilot performs a prescribed safety test procedure before take-off, should not be called rituals because they serve no wider purpose than their objective goal. The same considerations apply for repetitive personal habits which have no symbolic value and which sometimes are also seemingly without purpose.

Thus, the present position in ritual theory is that there is no strong theoretical argument for distinguishing between religious and non-religious rituals; both may be approached using theories and concepts which are already developed in the study of religious rituals.

Christel Lane's work on rituals in Soviet society is an example of how theories of religious rituals can be used in the study of a ritual system based on a strictly Atheist ideology (Lane 1981). Compared to secular rituals in other modern societies the Soviet ritual system had a totalitarian and much wider scope (Gill 2011: 15–16), today, it probably finds its parallel only in the state cult of North Korea. Frequent organized rituals referring to revolutionary ideals or principles of Marxism-Leninism were an integral part of everyday life of Soviet citizens. Apart from the usual family life-cycle rituals in their Communist version there were numerous labor rituals; one example mentioned by Lane was an initiation rite for new workers in a factory in Leningrad, another example was the widespread celebration of Harvest Day with processions and display of agricultural tools and products (Lane 1981: 110–11, 122–4).

According to both Lane and scholars from the Soviet Union itself, the formally secular Soviet ritual system shared its core functions with religious rituals (Lane 1981: 19). However, she concluded that the official system of Soviet rituals could not be called a substitute religion if

religion was defined substantively (Lane 1981: 35). So when Lane posed the question whether the Soviet rituals were secular, her answer was an ambiguous yes and no (Lane 1981: 36). She argued that the rituals contained sacred elements, because the foundation of the ritual system was based on Marxism-Leninism, which was not negotiable unlike any democratic, secular political ideology (Lane 1981: 36). She convincingly gave examples of how revolutionary traditions were celebrated in the same way as religious ceremonies, and Soviet authors frequently described places and traditions as "holy." Lenin's mausoleum in the Red Square was the ritual center of Soviet Marxism-Leninism, where the dead Lenin was worshipped in a manner very much like that of saint worship (Lane 1981: 210–20; see also Tumarkin 1997).

In her analysis Lane drew upon Geertz's definition of religion and concluded that Soviet Marxism-Leninism was partly religion and partly political ideology and was best described as political religion (Lane 1981: 39–42). Political religion shares with civil religion (see later) the role of legitimizing the nation and the social order by reference to transcendental principles, but while civil religion refers to transcendental entities, usually called God, political religion is based on a sacralization of the existing political order itself (Lane 1981: 42–4; Cristi 2001: 144–7).

Studies of Rituals Specifically Denoted Secular

In the introduction to their edited book *Secular Rituals*, social anthropologists Sally Moore and Barbara Myerhoff established the term secular rituals for non-religious rituals such as graduation ceremonies and installations (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 3–24). The term soon caught on, and in the years to follow a considerable number of case studies were published in which the authors specifically used the term *secular ritual* and usually, but not always, with reference to Moore and Myerhoff's works. A number of such studies are briefly reviewed below. It should be adduced that the ritual aspect of the different cases is often more broadly conceived of than is usually the case in the study of religious rituals, and the ritual analysis itself is correspondingly limited or even absent. The inclusion of several of these publications in this small review is primarily motivated by the fact that they represent the broad genre where the authors themselves have used the term secular rituals.

David A. Kideckel (1983) reported from a general assembly meeting at a collective farm in Romania. The general assembly was statutorily the supreme organ of the Romanian collective farm, and the regular meetings were laid out in a systematic and ritualized way with much symbolism referring to Romanian Socialism and a clear hierarchal order of leadership versus the ordinary members of the collective. Kideckel showed, surprisingly, that in the studied case the ritualized meeting did not fulfill its intention of justifying the manner of operation of the collective farm—the participants did not behave as intended, but quarreled and objected to several of the agricultural practices introduced from above. Though passive in organizing the meeting, by their actions the members shaped it to express political opposition. Thus, the ritualized meeting did not any longer reproduce an existing social order but attempted to change it, in accordance with Geertz's view on the function of rituals as drivers of social change.

Karen Fog Olwig discussed the game of netball in the Caribbean and called it a secular ritual (Olwig 1987). Netball is a version of basketball invented in England in the 1890s and it is predominantly played by women. The rules of the game prescribe positions and roles of the individual players on the court, and the rules also aim at preventing physical contact and rough play between the players. In many respects the game is a ritual enactment of cultural values attributed to respectable women of the late Victorian age (Olwig 1987).

The game was introduced to the British colonies, in this case St. Kitts and Nevis in the Caribbean, and here it was also intended as a respectable sport for girls and young women. Netball tournaments were highly structured, and proper uniforms for the players were important. However, Olwig showed that the players of a certain village team also cultivated anti-structural aspects, such as breaking down traditional boundaries of class and gender. In this way, netball reflected contemporary changes in St. Kitts and Nevis with regard to the social position and role of women in particular.

Art historian Carol Duncan has argued that visiting one of the great art museums is to be participant in a ritual, in which the design of the building and the art collection guide the visitor on a kind of a mental journey the purpose and intention of which purposely is to enlighten and improve the visitor morally, socially, and politically (Duncan 1995: 12–20). Inside the building the visitor is in a phase of liminality in Victor Turner's sense, in which ideally the visitor steps "out of the present into a universe of timeless values" (Duncan 1995: 8). When special buildings were constructed to house the great art museums of the nineteenth century, they were nearly always designed in classic Greco-Roman style to signify pre-Christian, secular roots in accordance with the Enlightenment ideals fostering the establishment of the great museums and galleries (Duncan 1995: 8). The art museum was meant to be a secular institution, and its visitors to embark on a secular ritual.

Walter Armbrust (1998) studied the movie theatre district in Cairo and gave a detailed account of the different types of people going to the different theatres and their choice of films. He argued that in particular the young male audiences in the cinemas were often in a state of liminality in which the "experience, in a way, is an extended rite of passage from the realm of the family to that of the state" (Armbrust 1998: 432). With reference to Moore and Myerhoff's introduction he therefore called going to the cinema in Cairo a secular ritual.

Joachim Knuf and John Caughlin analyzed a number of advertisements for dieting regimes and slimming agents. With reference to van Gennep—but not to Moore's and Myerhoff's *Secular Rituals*—they proposed that dieting can be seen as a secular rite of passage in which the ingestion of special slimming products could be ritualized as a form of control over the dieting process from an overweight "before" to a slim "after" (Knuf and Caughlin 1993).

Other authors adopted the term secular rituals without much discussion of the relevant literature—perhaps because secular rituals was an appealing and self-evident term that did not warrant many speculations about the characteristics of rituals nor of the adjective secular. Three illustrative examples are presented in the following.

In a well-researched chapter Michael Berkowitz described the importance of Zionist-organized Jewish mass tourism to British-occupied Palestine in the inter-war years (Berkowitz 1997). The purpose was clearly to advance the acceptance of the Zionist enterprise among European and American Jews, and the idea was to "establish a secular-Jewish pilgrimage ritual, to endow the ancient historical sites with new national-Jewish meanings, and to delineate a secularized 'sacred geography' for Jews in Palestine" (Berkowitz 1997: 74). The tourism became a considerable success for the Zionist cause, and the chapter thus deals with an important topic not much studied before; however, apart from using secular ritual as a convenient label the work does not contribute to the discussion of secular rituals in general.

The same considerations apply to a study of the sociology and economy of the organ transplant industry in the USA (Healy 2004). The work carefully discussed means and strategies for increasing the availability of organs for transplantation, in particular the issue of introducing various pecuniary incentives to the relatives of the deceased. The current donation practice was viewed as an altruistic gift from the donor to unknown recipients, and the author found that the exchange had "sacred" aspects because it transgressed

cultural taboos about death and utility of the human body. The donation was called a secular ritual several times, but there was no prescribed form of this ritual and the secular aspect occasionally contrasted with for example two parents' belief that somehow their dead daughter lived on in another body through her transplant.

The final example is a chapter by Nelson Graburn (2001) theorizing on tourism. He regarded a tourist trip as a rite of passage from the everyday life back home to the "extraordinary/voluntary metaphorically 'sacred' experience away from home" and then back to home again (Graburn 2001: 43). Graburn convincingly used Victor Turner's concept of *communitas* to characterize, for example, guests at one of *Club Med*'s holiday facilities. As support for his theory that a tourist trip itself is a secular ritual he quoted from Edmund Leach's essay "Time and False Noses" on calendric festivals as rituals (Leach 1961: 132–6). A crucial point made by Leach, however, is that one very important function of these festivals is the ordering of time of society (Leach 1961: 134–5). Tourist trips are not collectively scheduled by the calendar, but are individual choices, and Graburn did not address this point.

In the three last examples secular ritual has been used either as a buzzword to theorize on sound empirical work (Berkowitz 1997; Healy 2004) or used as a platform for claiming to have developed a general theory for a broad field, *in casu* tourism (Graburn 2001: 43). However, it seems unsatisfactory from the perspective of ritual studies if the term secular ritual eventually develops into a convenient but hollow buzzword. It thereby loses all possible analytical value. I am hereby not saying that secular ritual has such value *a priori*— but at least an attempt should be made to restore it to a position of academic usefulness. To do this I shall in the following scrutinize Sally Moore and Barbara Myerhoff's original arguments for using the term secular rituals. In fact, their book has been so influential that nobody studying secular rituals can avoid taking a position on their arguments.

Secular Rituals as a Category of Rituals

In order to distinguish between secular rituals and other rituals, Sally Moore and Barbara Myerhoff argued for distinguishing the religious from the sacred (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 20). They then proposed that the term "sacred" should be extended to cover more than "religious":

> *If sacred is understood in the sense of "unquestionable" and traditionalizing, then something may be sacred, yet not religious. A four-fold set of categories, religious/ non religious, sacred/non-sacred provides a framework for considering non-religious sanctity, and for noting that religious symbols are sometimes exhibited on inherently non-religious occasions. (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 20–21)*

In dialogue with Durkheim and his broad conception of the sacred, Moore and Myerhoff elaborated further on the "unquestionable" as sacred, but not necessarily religious (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 22–3). The authors began this dialogue by stating:

> *The four-fold categories we propose are capable of generating more combinations than Durkheim's sacred/profane, and are susceptible of less confusion …. (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 21)*

Table 7.1 **A grouping of the four-fold categories proposed by Moore and Myerhoff (1977: 21)**

	Religious	Non-religious
Sacred	1	2
Non-sacred	4	3

The first two combinations, (1) religious and sacred, and (2) non-religious and sacred, are mentioned above and are Moore's and Myerhoff's basis for distinguishing between religious rituals and secular rituals. The third combination, (3) non-religious and non-sacred, is logical, and it may cover non-ritual repetitive behavior, such as following a safety procedure. But how do we interpret the fourth combination, that of (4) religious and non-sacred? My answer is in brief that it is in logical conflict with Moore and Myerhoff's considerations of "religious" as a subcategory of "sacred." It might be added that it is also against common sense that something should be religious and non-sacred at the same time. Therefore, only the first three combinations among the "four-fold set of categories" may exist, as I have indicated in Table 7.1.

From a reading of Moore and Myerhoff's discussion of sacred versus religious it seems that religious refers to elements that can be recognized as such—"religious symbols are sometimes exhibited on inherently non-religious occasions"—and therefore implicitly covered by a substantive definition of religious. In contrast, their understanding of sacred seems to be in line with Geertz's functional definition of religion, which does not make a Durkheimian sharp distinction between sacred and mundane but allows for the idea that "all of life may be sacralized" (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 23).

Operating with religious as a subcategory of sacred immediately seems to run against established conventions in the study of religion, where the two terms today are largely used interchangeably and broadly cover the same empirical phenomena. By implicitly applying two different types of definition for religious and sacred respectively, Moore and Myerhoff succeeded, however, in letting the more narrowly substantively defined term religious become a sub-category of the more broadly functionally defined term sacred. Moore and Myerhoff did not address this issue of functional versus substantive definitions. I will later argue that a functional definition of sacred in practice complicates the distinction between religious and secular rituals.

As mentioned above, a considerable number of authors writing about secular rituals have referred to Moore and Myerhoff's *Secular Rituals*. However, as I discussed in an earlier study of a Danish graduation ritual Moore's and Myerhoff's distinction between sacred and religious had to my knowledge not been discussed before nor applied in *concrete* studies of secular rituals (Warburg 2009b). Nor did Moore and Myerhoff themselves apply the distinction in their own chapters in *Secular Rituals* but used other characterizations of secular rituals as will be discussed below.

Moore's chapter dealt with a political meeting in Tanzania in 1973, and she argued that the meeting was analogous to a religious rite by drawing "attention to the general symbolic and doctrinal representations made in the course of business" (Moore 1977: 151). The political doctrines of the ruling TANU party in the young socialist one-party state were promulgated at that meeting and meant to have some permanence. This permanence was aimed at by mixing mundane and practical activities with ceremonial activities throughout the meeting. The ceremonies and their formalities served a purpose, as Moore wrote:

> *Formality in such contexts can convey the message that certain things are socially unquestionable (the secular equivalent of the sacred) and by so declaring in such a form, formality helps make them unquestionable. (Moore 1977: 153; the emphasis is Moore's)*

Here, Moore states that being socially unquestionable is the secular equivalent of the sacred. In the introductory chapter Moore and Myerhoff proposed, as quoted before: "If sacred is understood in the sense of "unquestionable" and traditionalizing … ." Apparently, the "unquestionable" is both the same as sacred and also the secular equivalent of the sacred, which seems to harbor a self-contradiction in the understanding of sacred.

Barbara Myerhoff is the other editor of *Secular Rituals*, and her chapter is on a Jewish graduation ceremony. It contains the term secular ritual in the title, "We Don't Wrap Herring in a Printed Page: Fusion, Fictions and Continuity in Secular Ritual," and is often referred to in works on secular rituals. The chapter is introduced by a two page section, entitled "A Working Definition of Ritual." In the last paragraph of this introduction she concludes:

> *Rituals are not either sacred or secular, rather in high rituals they are closer to the sacred end of the continuum, entirely extraordinary, communicating the mysterium tremendum and are often associated with supernatural or spiritual beings. Or, they are closer to the mundane end of the continuum, …. (Myerhoff 1977: 200)*

Here, Myerhoff proposes that rituals make up a continuum spanning between the religious and the mundane, which would probably be the end representing secular ritual. This may well be a useful approach, but it leaves an apparent contradiction between the view of ritual as a *continuum* in the above and that of *classifying* rituals as either religious or secular, as proposed by her and Moore in the introductory chapter to *Secular Rituals*.

Myerhoff showed in her concrete, illuminating ritual analysis that the graduation ritual was designed as a fusion of a graduation ceremony for college students and a Jewish ceremony, *siyum*. *Siyum* was traditionally held in the synagogue to mark the fact that a man had completed a course of self-assigned study of the Torah or Talmud. The particular graduation ceremony studied by Myerhoff was called a graduation-*siyum* and it was held in a Californian city. It was a complex event with 18 consecutive elements, some of which were open for improvisations while others were closed. Myerhoff carefully described the three-hour-long ceremony, judging each of the elements as secular or sacred and as open or closed. Eight of them were sacred, six were secular, and four were both.

The criteria for designating some elements as sacred and others as secular are, however, difficult to deduce from the analysis. For example, the graduation-*siyum* ceremony began with the reciting of The Pledge of Allegiance:

> *I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.*

It is a little surprising that a ritual text containing the phrase "one Nation under God" is characterized as secular. It is rather an example of civil religion, as I will discuss later. Another example from the graduation-*siyum* was that Myerhoff called singing the *Hatikvah* (the Israeli national anthem) sacred, while singing the *Star Spangled Banner* (the American national anthem) was secular. When comparing the two this choice is not immediately obvious:

The National Anthem of Israel

As long as the Jewish spirit is yearning deep in the heart,
With eyes turned toward the East, looking toward Zion,
Then our hope—the two-thousand-year-old hope—will not be lost:
To be a free people in our land,
The land of Zion and Jerusalem

The National Anthem of the United States of America, last stanza

Oh, thus be it ever, when freemen shall stand
Between their loved home and the war's desolation!
Blest with victory and peace, may the heav'n-rescued land
Praise the Power that hath made and preserved us a nation!
Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto: "In God is our trust":
And the star-spangled banner in triumph shall wave
O'er the land of the free and the home of the brave.

Both anthems praise the freedom of the people above all. To call the Israeli anthem sacred may be justified by the reference to Zion, but it is then difficult to accept that the American anthem is called secular with its last stanza referring both to the "Power" with a capital P and to God. Like the Pledge of Allegiance, the lyrics of the two anthems are civil religious texts.

In addition, at least one of the eight sacred elements in the graduation-*siyum*—a blessing in Hebrew said before eating a light meal—is clearly religious, if we apply Moore's and Myerhoff's own distinction between sacred and religious from the introduction to *Secular Rituals*. In this light there is no obvious reason for Myerhoff's choice of denoting the blessing sacred and not religious.

The examples above indicate problems in the definitions of "sacred," "religious," and "secular" in *Secular Rituals*, which makes it difficult to delimitate secular rituals as a meaningful subset of rituals. As far as I can see, these problems are rooted in a broad, functional definition of "sacred" for the "unquestionable" and traditionalizing elements in a ceremony; this definition is clearly inspired by Geertz's definition of religion which allows for the idea that "all of life may be sacralized" (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 23). I shall resume this issue towards the end of this chapter.

Civil Religion and Secular Rituals

Many public ceremonies include one or more elements with a tribute to the nation, or as in Barbara Myerhoff's example above, a tribute to both the United States and to Israel—the two significant nations for many American Jews. It is quite common that this tribute is emphasized by claiming that the nation stands under a special divine providence, and this is the core of civil religion. Civil religious rituals often comply with Moore and Myerhoff's notion that "many of the ceremonies which take place in modern situations use a variety of symbols, having both religious and non-religious referents" (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 21). A brief excurse on civil religion is therefore relevant in a discussion of secular rituals as they are understood by Moore and Myerhoff. However, I find that civil religious rituals are not secular rituals, because the religious reference is important in the understanding of the rituals.

The term "civil religion" was coined by philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) in an attempt to find place for a "higher" or religious legitimization of the state within a frame of Enlightenment thinking which stressed religious freedom (Rousseau 1997: 142–51). The concept of civil religion was reinvigorated by sociologist Robert N. Bellah in 1967 in his classic article "Civil Religion in America" (Bellah 1967). Referring to Rousseau, Bellah proposed the existence of an American civil religion that overarched the diverse creeds of Americans and expressed their common belief in America's special relation to God.

Bellah's understanding of American civil religion has been met with criticism, but the concept of civil religion is generally accepted in the sociology of religion (Gehrig, 1981; Cristi and Dawson 2007). I consider civil religion to be primarily an academic, abstract construction for analyzing a conglomerate of myths, rituals, symbols, and texts which have in common that they hallow the people or the nation by reference to something transcendental, usually called God (Warburg 2008).

Civil religion has some similarity to political religion by its worship of the state; however, (Western) civil religion also differs from totalitarian political religion by referring to a non-sectarian, ecumenical divinity separate from the state, while political religion is based on a sacralization of the ideology of the state itself (Cristi 2001: 136–56).

An example of civil religion is the celebration of Fourth of July in Denmark in a national park donated by Danish-Americans and dedicated to the United States and her Danish immigrants (Warburg 2009a). The festival was established on the initiative of a Danish-American businessman and has been held since 1912. It is the biggest Fourth of July celebration outside the USA, and in particular in the first decades after World War II it attracted tens of thousands of spectators. The festival is endorsed by both the American and the Danish governments, and both countries are officially represented. The festival opening is a typical official national ceremony:

- hoisting of the Danish flag, saluted by Danish and American military personnel
- community singing: *Der er et yndigt land* (national anthem of Denmark)
- hoisting of the American flag, saluted by Danish and American military personnel
- community singing: *The Star-Spangled Banner* (national anthem of the USA)

Some 50 years ago a common prayer was introduced as part of the program. In this prayer God is asked to protect the two heads of state, the Danish Queen and the American President. In the third line of the prayer God is thanked for "the country and the people to which each of us belong." It is evident that the Danish Fourth of July festival is a civil religious ritual, with the hoisting of the flags, the singing of the national anthems and the prayer with its third line claiming that the two countries and their people are God-given (Warburg 2009a).

An address from the American president is usually read by the American ambassador to Denmark, and the address from the Danish government is read by one of its senior ministers if not the prime minister. Again, these two addresses show that the festival is not just any private rally but an event of considerable political significance. High-ranking American politicians and celebrities have participated as speakers or special guests, including Richard Nixon, Hubert H. Humphrey, George Romney, Ronald Reagan, George Bush senior, Danny Kaye, Victor Borge, Pat Boone, Walt Disney, and most Danish Prime Ministers.

The celebration of Fourth of July is not the only ritual which superficially appears to be secular but shows the characteristics of civil religion after a closer analysis. As an example, I have elsewhere analyzed graduation rituals for students completing high school in Denmark (Warburg 2009b). The entire sequence of rituals is typical of a rite of passage culminating in the incorporation phase, which is a tradition-laden ride through town with the graduates sitting on the platform of an old truck richly decorated with several national symbols, such

as Danish flags and beech branches (the national tree of Denmark praised in the national anthem). Virtually all graduates wear a traditional cap with a white crown and on its front a red-and-white cockade with a silver cross. The cap is a central icon of graduation, and the cockade with the emblem gives the cap a clearly religious dimension. However, the cross is not any Christian cross but the concave-armed cross of the Danish royal coat of arms, the Dannebrog Cross, named after the Danish national flag. The emblem thus refers both to Christianity and to Denmark, and it is therefore a civil religious symbol. The graduates' behavior is typical, that of a *communitas*, and for this day only they are allowed to transgress codes of normal decent behavior, drinking, yelling, and singing loudly. A highlight during the ride is a ritual dance around a symbol of fertility in a public space, such as a fountain, or in Copenhagen a royal equestrian statue called the Horse. The graduates' ride is a civil religious ritual which marks the rejuvenation of the nation and the personal transformation of youngsters into a generation of responsible future students (Warburg 2009b).

Secular Rituals Resumed

My discussion above of Moore's and Myerhoff's characterization of secular rituals concluded that a functional definition of sacred/secular in line with Geertz's functional definition of religion makes it difficult to delimitate secular rituals as a meaningful subset of rituals. I therefore propose that a substantive definition of religion should be applied when analyzing a ritual with a view to classifying it as a secular or religious ritual.

In the following I shall introduce some examples of ritual behavior, in which, apparently, there are no references or other connections to a realm of transcendence; therefore, when using a substantive definition of religion these rituals should qualify for the designation "secular rituals." After the presentation and using one of these rituals as an example, I shall discuss whether this ritual is also secular when Geertz's functional definition of religion is applied instead.

An example of a secular public ritual is the inauguration of a bridge or the opening of an exhibition, which is often marked by cutting a string that symbolically bars the entry of the public. This ritual is usually performed without referring to any transcendental powers. Sports have given rise to literally hundreds of individual secular rites in the hope of improving the players' performance (Voigt 1980). Other examples are the ritualized behavior of audiences, be they the standing ovations in the concert hall or the daring crowd surfing ritual at rock concerts (Schwab 2005; Fonarow 1996).

The traditional baptism of sailors at the crossing of the Equator can be traced back to the 1500s, and from the 1600s it became a tradition among most European seafaring nations (Henningsen 1961: 15–63). In its established and usually very elaborate form it follows van Gennep's three phases of rites of passage, bringing the novices, who are to cross the Line for the first time, into the rank of deep sea sailors. The ritual is performed by senior sailors and officers dressed up as Neptune with his queen Amphitrite and entourage, and the novices are subjected to different treatments before they are thrown into seawater, either in a tub on the deck or until the end of the 1700s by being ducked into the sea from the yard-arm (Henningsen 1961: 63–84). After baptism the sailor gets a new name and receives a certificate which allows him to travel both the Southern and the Northern Hemisphere under Neptune's protection. The folklorist Henning Henningsen's meticulous study of the baptism at sea indicates that it has no connection to any religion but has always been a secular initiation rite in the maritime professions; in fact, the ritual was regularly denounced as mockery of the Christian baptism (Henningsen 1961: 147–50). The ritual in a less hardy form is today a popular part of the entertainment of cruise passengers.

A small secular ritual is the "love padlock." It is inspired by a romantic novel *Ho Voglia di Te* (I Want You) by Italian writer Federico Moccia (Kingston 2011). He features a young couple in love who puts a padlock on Ponte Milvio in Rome as a sign of eternal love. The ritual rapidly became immensely popular and soon spread to many other European cities. In Copenhagen, the place of ritual is a new pedestrian bridge spanning the inner harbor. The small ritual is usually performed at sunset; the couple puts the padlock on one of the wires serving as a rail, locks the padlock and then throws the key into the water. It is a secular ritual with a simple symbolism.

My final example of a secular ritual is that of the "pacifier tree." The ritual is used by parents as a culminating part of a process persuading the child to give up the dummy or pacifier. The child is taken to a particular tree in a park and is asked to give the dummy to the tree. The parents and the child together tie the dummy or sometimes a whole plastic bag of dummies to one of the branches. The tree eventually becomes full of dummies, and it is often a local attraction. Children may pass and point out their particular pacifier. The tradition of pacifier trees in Denmark is said to date back to the 1920s and has spread from Scandinavia to other countries. One example of a pacifier tree is found in New York, and as the title of the blog describes it: "Borough Park Pacifier Tree Becomes Rite of Passage for Local Kids," the use of the tree is, indeed, perceived as a ritual act (Simpson 2013). Giving the pacifier to the tree is a secular ritual when defining religion substantively, because there is no element of reference to any transcendental powers.

As indicated before, I shall now also apply Geertz's functional definition of religion in a small analysis of the pacifier tree ritual. There are five elements in the definition (Geertz 1993: 90):

1. A *system of symbols*: The dummies which are iconic symbols of baby and toddler age are the central ritual artifacts, and they are not simply discarded but are ritually given to a particular ritualized tree, not to any tree. Because the tree is a living thing, it can receive the dummies as gifts and keep them.
2. Establish *powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations*: The child is motivated by the ritual to give up the dummy forever.
3. Formulating *conceptions of a general order of existence*: The pacifier tree ritual marks an important boundary between two age sets, that of the toddler and that of childhood; thus, the older children in kindergarten age do not use dummies, and every child knows that.
4. Clothing these conceptions with such an *aura of factuality*: The act of tying the dummy to the tree is an irreversible act; it is unthinkable that that child would be allowed to take back this particular dummy from the tree.
5. The *moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic*: Everyone can see that the dummy now belongs to the tree.

Apparently, the pacifier tree ritual complies with Geertz's definition of religion and might therefore be regarded as a religious ritual. However, in my view we should not jump to that conclusion. Instead, I conclude that this small ritual analysis of the pacifier tree ritual illustrates what I have proposed above—that a functional definition of religion is too broad to use if *secular* rituals are to constitute a meaningful category of rituals. Instead secular should be understood from a substantive definition, which also implies that religious/sacred should be substantively defined.

Conclusion

Among scholars of religion there seems today to be general agreement that analytically there is no difference between religious and non-religious rituals—they are just rituals. Furthermore, methods for studying secular rituals in contemporary society are also not different from the study of religious rituals and call on well-proven methods of participant observation, interviews, and studies of the written sources to elucidate the history of the ritual and its associated myths or explanations.

The basis for a ritual analysis is a careful empirical description of the ritualized persons, the ritual acts, artifacts, and the entire setting of the ritual, including the spectators if any. The spectators may be more or less ritualized themselves, depending on their involvement in the ritual acts. The analysis identifies the individual elements or rites in the ritual sequence from beginning to end, such as exemplified by Barbara Myerhoff (1977) in her analysis of the Jewish graduation ceremony. These elements can, however, only be fully interpreted when seen as a whole in their particular context (Turner 2006). This applies for both religious and non-religious rituals.

From the perspective of ritual studies the theoretical-analytical value of operating with a special category of rituals denoted secular rituals is tenuous. The argument for upholding a category of secular rituals is based more on pragmatic empiricism. With Catherine Bell I agree that secular rituals seem to be a meaningful *empirical* category of rituals, because people in general find that there are important differences between a religious ritual and a non-religious one (Bell 1997: 139). The criteria for distinguishing between the two hinge on the definition of religion. As I discussed above, a functional definition of religion is broad and inclusive—this may be useful in other cases, but with regard to secular rituals, a functional definition of religion leaves little or no space for secular rituals as a meaningful subset of rituals. Applying a substantive definition of religion is preferable in this case which means that ritual elements explicitly or implicitly should refer to a transcendental frame of understanding in order call the ritual a religious ritual. In addition, a substantive definition dispenses with the problematic distinction between sacred and religious proposed originally in the introduction to *Secular Rituals* (Moore and Myerhoff 1977: 20–21)—the book that sparked off the scholarly interest in this category of rituals.

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Anthropology of Sport

John W. Traphagan

It is somewhat odd that despite its ubiquity in the modern world, sport has been a topic given only limited ethnographic and theoretical attention by anthropologists. In a chapter from the book *Theory, Sport, and Society*, Alan Klein (2002) argues that anthropology has generally failed to direct its analytical capabilities on the study of sport as it relates to broader aspects of culture and society. While sociologists and historians have given quite a bit of attention to sport, anthropologists seems to have been largely disinterested in this aspect of culture and have often failed to recognize how sport intersects with other aspects of human social organization such as parenting or economics. This is interesting because sport, like other areas of human activity such as religion or marriage, can be viewed as an institutional structure worthy of analysis in its own right while at the same time being integrated with other institutions within any cultural context and thus demanding attention if we are to take a holistic look at any given society or, in the contemporary world, at processes of globalization that both link and divide geopolitical and transnational structures (Blanchard 2000:145).

In this chapter, I am interested in exploring one facet of the anthropology of sport by considering processes related to the construction of the moral self among youth baseball players and associated contesting practices of fatherhood in Japan. Baseball is one of the most popular sports in Japan and is played in numerous recreational and professional environments, including amateur and semi-pro corporate teams, amateur adult leagues, youth leagues, high school and college, and professional leagues. Baseball is also an important element in Japan's transnational culture, with top players from the Japanese professional ranks routinely moving to Major League Baseball in the US and becoming internationally known and followed and, in cases like Ichiro Suzuki or Yu Darvish, becoming transnational idols. There is little question that the most popular sporting event in Japan is the annual high school baseball tournament, known as *Kôshien* (甲子園), in which public and private high school teams throughout the country compete for a national championship. And baseball has a history, particularly prior to World War II, of being represented by Japanese as an important pedagogical tool in the construction of idealized moral and distinctively Japanese selves (Reaves 2004).

I will begin this chapter with a brief general discussion of the anthropology of sport, considering the limited development of sport studies within the discipline. It is important to recognize that the anthropology of sport is a fairly small segment of the study of sport by scholars—other disciplines, such as sociology and psychology, have devoted considerably more attention to the study of sport than has anthropology. Following this, I will explore youth baseball in Japan from an ethnographic perspective and consider how the ethnography of sport can be applied to broader theoretical questions within anthropology. The specific questions about which I am concerned here are: (1) How does baseball form a context for the

employment of pedagogies of self for young Japanese? And (2) How does youth baseball in Japan represent a context for considering and contesting a dominant discourse of fatherhood for the dads involved? It is important to keep in mind that the observations I discuss here are limited and the ideas I develop from those observations are tentative. In many respects, I view this chapter as a prolegomenon for future research in the anthropology of sport, particularly in relation to youth sport—an area of research for which there is a significant need of ethnographic attention.

The Anthropology of Sport

Despite limited interest in sport among contemporary anthropologists, sporting and gaming activities represented one of the earlier areas of investigation by European anthropologists in the nineteenth century. E.B. Tylor (1832–1917) was among the first anthropologists to discuss games with an eye to considering how the study of games might have theoretical import for understanding the diffusion of human cultures. Tylor's interests focused upon issues such as the geographical distribution of different types of games in part as a way of tracing the origins of specific games, such as patolli (Tylor 1880), which he notes was played in pre-Columbian Mesoamerica. Tylor focused on analyzing the presence of similar games which appear in various parts of the world as evidence of cross-cultural communication and as a means of tracing the spread of "civilization" across different parts of the world and specifically the movement of Asian cultures into Polynesia (Tylor 1880:29).

Tylor's work on the history of games covers a very broad range of recreational activities including backgammon, hockey, chess, tennis, ball tossing, and wrestling. Not surprisingly Tylor sets his short study of games into an evolutionary framework, associating the historical development with a process of increasing complexity and progress. Tylor ends this article with the rather condescending comment: "We may depend upon it that the great world-game of evolution is not played only by pawns moving straight on, but that long-stretching moves of pieces in all directions bring on new situations, not readily foreseen by minds that find it hard to see six moves ahead upon a chess board" (Tylor 1879:747). The tone notwithstanding, Tylor makes a useful point in raising the idea that sport and games represent one way of looking at how people from different cultures interact and in some cases transmit ideas through participation in game-related activities, although intriguing questions such as how understanding of rules is transmitted are not considered with any depth.

Early in the twentieth century, there was increased interest in games and sport in pre-literate societies and several works were published by Stewart Culin including his book *Games of the North American Indians* (2012 [1907]). Culin also explored games in other parts of the world such as Japan and Hawaii and elsewhere (1893, 1899, 1925) in a variety of publications that placed games and sport as the central stream of his research. Among the more fascinating aspects of this early period of the study of games/sport is that scholars like Tylor and Culin did not usually distinguish between the two. From an analytical perspective, games and sport seemed to fall into the same category of human behavior—little attention was given to variables such as the physical nature of sporting activities as opposed to non-physical activities such as chess or cards. Largely, both games and sports were understood as forms of entertainment and the ways in which these activities intersected with other areas of human behavior was not deeply explored.

Indeed, most of these early studies focused on the description of sport or games in preliterate and non-Western societies, with very limited theoretical consideration of issues such as the function or meaning of these behaviors. But, by the middle of the twentieth

century, anthropologists had become much more interested in questions such as the function of sport and the relationship, and potential for differentiation between sport and play, in part on the basis of the fact that in the twentieth century it became common for sport to also be work in the form of professional leagues. Within anthropology, the awareness of a need to consider the relationship between play and other forms of behavior arose not only among cultural and social anthropologists but also among some primatologists and biological anthropologists looking at the behavior of our primate relatives and other mammals as a model for understanding the function of sport and games in human societies (Bekoff and Byers 1988; Stone 2008). The interest in how non-human primates engage in play is evident in the work of cultural anthropologist Gregory Bateson in the early 1970s, who pointed toward the issue of how sport and play are related to each other, a question that arose in his mind via his observation at the zoo in San Francisco of monkeys engaged in games of fighting. At the zoo, Bateson (1972:179) saw:

> *Two young monkeys playing, i.e., engaged in an interactive sequence of which the unit actions or signals were similar to but not the same as those of combat.*

Bateson argues that the behavior of the monkeys—which in his observation clearly distinguishes actual combat from a playing form of combat—shows that other primates, at least, are capable of a form of meta-communication in which their actions convey information that allows them to interpret similar actions as play vs. non-play, in a way similar to how humans can see that the context (including rules, presence of spectators, venue, prior knowledge, etc.) of a game like American Football, that involves physical actions such as tackling, allow us to recognize that an action might be play in one environment such as a sport, as opposed to an act of violence in another context.

Figure 8.1   Defining sport
Note: This chart is adapted from a similar chart in Blanchard (1995:46).

147

This raises the issue of how, from an analytical perspective, we can develop a useful definition of sport that differentiates sporting activities from play. In what ways is golf different from chess, or baseball different from bowling? Are all four sports or are some only games? To Americans, it seems obvious that ice hockey is a sport, but is curling a sport or a game? It's in the Olympics, so it must be a sport, right? Is inclusion on ESPN an indication that something is a sport? If so, then professional poker is a sport, which seems an unlikely activity to include in the category.

It seems fairly clear that we can define all sports as games, but it is much less clear that all games are sports—the term game represents a much broader category that includes activities that overlap with sport, but that we cannot really equate with sport. One way to approach the problem is by thinking about different types of games in terms of two axes that relate four components of sport and games: work vs. play and athletic vs. nonathletic behavior (see Figure 8.1). The same type of activity—such as baseball—may reside more on the play side than the work side for some participants (such as amateurs as opposed to professionals) depending upon the attitude one has about the nature of the game. Games like chess or poker lack the athletic factor associated with sport, thus we can have professional chess, but we would not likely think of it as a sport because it lacks athleticism. A game like tennis has a high level of physical activity, making it relatively easy to define as a sport, but the level of physical activity may be lower for a non-professional than it is for a professional player.

In short, no single game is going to be located in any one spot—the definition of whether or not a game can be considered a sport will involve consideration of how elements of play and physical activity interact, as well as the role of strategic thinking involved with winning. What does seem to be fairly constant is that for something to be sport, it must involve some sort of physical exertion. But, clearly, not all things that involve physical exertion are sport and the level of physicality varies in relation to who is playing and the attitude they bring to the court/pitch/table/field/rink. Put another way, there is no single way to define what is sport and what is not sport—games that can be classified as sport, such as bowling in some contexts, may not represent sport in other contexts. Games involve rules and strategy and incorporate an element of play (even among professionals). Sport involves these as well, but with the added dimension of athleticism or physical activity; thus, one way to think about this is to view sport as a subset of games.

It is important to recognize that the presence of rules and strategy alone do not indicate that an action such as tackling represents play. Warfare involves rules of engagement and definitions that specify who is a combatant and who is not—thus, indicating who can and cannot be attacked. Bateson (1972:183) argues that one of the key features of play, as opposed to other areas of human interactions that may involve similar ruled behaviors, is that there is a common understanding among participants that in the context of play the signals and messages exchanged do not represent "true" expressions of meaning, whereas in the context of warfare or simply a fight, they do represent true expressions of meaning. In other words, when the Yankees fan trash talks and tells the Red Sox fan that he hates him, there is a common understanding that the meaning of "hatred" is confined to the context of play. Of course, intent can be quite problematic here and there are numerous cases in which rivalries in the context of sport/play transform into actual violent behavior or become representative of other features of human interaction such as political conflict. In these cases, the context of play and its associated meanings can transform into non-play contexts where the content of meaning of actions related to the game/sport becomes intertwined with other meanings from realms such as politics and religion, such as those expressed through soccer in Ireland and other parts of the world (see Foer 2005).

The issue of how rivalries in sport represent the identities of both participants and fans and take on meaning for those involved has also been relevant to study of the relationship

between ritual and sport. Much of the work in this area has focused on the idea that sport forms a context of secular ritual through which humans engage in behaviors common in other ritual contexts, such as employing magic by fans and athletes for the purpose of helping one's team succeed (see Blanchard 1988; Gmelch 1972). And it is important to recognize that sporting contexts such as baseball or football games or the Olympics also represent cultural frameworks through which broader secular rituals are performed, such as the singing of the national anthem at the beginning of sporting events in the US or the performance of patriotic rituals at times of crisis like the attack on the World Trade Towers in 2001.

In the past 20 years, corresponding to the increased interest among scholars in understanding the human body as a locus of cultural imprinting (in many cases through ritual performance), anthropologists have paid some attention to the relationship between sport, the body, and embodiment. However, this remains an area of limited research, which is somewhat surprising given the overall interest in the topic of embodiment and also gender among anthropologists over this period of time. Some notable examples of research in this field of study include Spielvogel's (2003) work on gender and health club participation in Japan and Howe's (2004) work on sport and pain among professional athletes. Much of this research emphasizes less the nature of sport as an institution in human societies than it focuses on the manner in which physical activity and understandings of health and fitness point to underlying conceptualizations about the relationship between mind and body that exist in various cultural contexts or the manner in which people from a given culture think about the meanings of health and fitness and, as a result, build bodies—through sport and other physical activities—that reflect those ideas.

One area within the anthropological and more general social scientific study of sport that has been quite limited has been examination of youth sport—particularly youth baseball. Despite the presence of youth baseball in a variety of both developed and developing countries in the Americas and in Asia, studies of Little League and other forms of youth baseball are surprisingly sparse. A limited amount of work has focused on the role of mothers in American Little League (Golombisky 2001), some work looks into attitudes related to the purpose of baseball among young male athletes involved in elite (tournament and touring) baseball programs (Pugh et al. 2000), and there is one ethnographic treatment of preadolescent culture and Little League (Fine 1987). Research is even more limited when it comes to youth baseball in Asia; Sundeen's study of nationalism and Little League in Taiwan being among the few examples (2001). As a result, youth baseball is an area about which relatively little is known from an ethnographic perspective; the vast majority of scholarly work on youth baseball concerns sports injuries or sports psychology.

For the remainder of this chapter, I will offer a very preliminary exploration and discussion of youth baseball in rural Japan. As noted above, the data here are limited and there is considerable room for further research; indeed, given its prevalence in many parts of the world, there is a basic need for scholars to develop research programs that delve into the complexities of both youth baseball and youth athletics more generally.

Youth Baseball in Japan

Baseball in Japan has a very long history, dating back to the early years of the Meiji Era (1867–1912), when an American named Horace Wilson introduced the sport at Tokyo's Kaisei Gakkô, which is now known as the University of Tokyo. The first formal baseball game was organized in 1873 by American Albert Bates, a teacher at Kaitaku University in Tokyo. Baseball interest continued to develop and the sport took on elements of nationalism

when the members of the baseball team at Ichikô, or the First Higher School of Tokyo, played the first game between Americans and Japanese in 1896, soundly defeating the members of the Yokohama Country Athletic Club 29–4. Embarrassed by the loss, the Americans (who were casual players) demanded a rematch, only to lose by a score of 35–9 (Reaves 2004:50). Indeed, the initial baseball teams in Japan were basically youth teams who played at the high school and college levels. Shortly into the twentieth century, the sport had become so popular that the *Asahi* newspaper company started a national middle-school tournament in Osaka in 1915 (Kelly 2004:80), which continues to be played annually to this day.

Although imported from the US, baseball quickly became seen as having elements that captured ideals of Japanese identity including the notion of the "fighting spirit" which symbolically is frequently represented in stories of extreme endurance in practice or game play where ball players, for example, who pitch until their fingers blister and bleed, are revered as exemplary of the deepest elements of that fighting spirit. Today, junior high, high school, and Little League baseball are thriving concerns throughout the country, a fact that is punctuated by the enormous popularity of the two high school baseball tournaments held in Osaka at *Kôshien*, one of Japan's oldest and most revered baseball stadiums.

Little League, which is my interest here, dates back to 1955 and there are several hundred teams spread throughout the country, making Japan second only to the US in the popularity of the activity (Japan Little League, http://www.japanlittle.jp). The various forms of youth baseball feed into college-level sport in which there are widely recognized and followed traditions—such as the rivalry between Waseda University and Keio University in Tokyo which began on 21 November 1903—as well as professional baseball that can be traced back to 1934 with the formation of the first professional team in Tokyo. In other words, baseball has long been one of the primary professional and amateur sports in Japan although in the past two decades the growing popularity of soccer has decreased the fan base among many younger Japanese, which, in turn, has led to financial problems for the professional level of the sport.

During the summer of 2004, I spent two months participating as a father with the Little League organization in a medium sized city (*shi* 市) that I will call Takehara, located in the Tôhoku region of northern Japan. My primary reason for becoming involved with Little League was because my son had been active in youth baseball in the US and wanted to continue playing while we were in Japan for the summer. My experience with Little League draws from both my involvement as a parent in Japan and also, for comparative purposes, my role as a father and coach in youth baseball activities in the US. Although several years have passed since I was directly participating in Little League in Takehara, I have continued to have regular contact with parents who were involved with the baseball organization, as well as with other baseball groups in the area. More recently, my son played with an adult baseball team in Takehara (he was in high school at the time), which allowed me to observe the continuation of baseball into higher levels following Little League. In short, the basic structure and patterns of involvement in Little League in Takehara remain consistent with the time period I observed and participated with the team as a parent.

The region in which Takehara is located is widely characterized as rural and agricultural by Japanese, although it is important to recognize that "rural" in Japan cannot be simplistically equated with agricultural. As noted above, Takehara is a city of about 60,000 people and, in addition to farming, contains a variety of industrial facilities, including a Hitachi plant, and the city has long been known for its iron works. This is a part of Japan in which families lead a lifestyle perhaps surprisingly similar to that of suburban Americans. Most families own more than one car (often a minivan or SUV), shop for food at large supermarkets, visit the local Takeda Sports (a large sporting goods chain akin to Dick's Sporting Goods in the US) to purchase equipment for baseball and other athletic activities, and regularly go out

to restaurants such as McDonald's, Denny's, or Sushi Gourmet, which is a fast food sushi restaurant common in northern Japan (Traphagan and Brown 2002). Kids growing up in the area cheer for the Rakuten Eagles, the professional baseball team located in Sendai (about 150km to the south) which won the Japan Series championship in 2013, while also following Major League Baseball teams in the US that have Japanese players. Indeed, it is just as likely to see a player or dad wearing a baseball cap from an American team like the Red Sox or Cardinals as it is to see a cap for a Japanese team like the Eagles or the Tokyo Giants.

When I arrived in northern Japan for the summer, I contacted the local government office that deals with youth sport activities and was directed to the Little League group in Takehara. As in other parts of Japan, Little League is one of two forms of baseball available for youth in Takehara. The game played by Little League is traditional hardball, or *kôshiki* (公式), in which the players use regulation baseballs and aluminum bats. The other option, known as *nanshiki* (軟式), is a form of baseball that I have not seen in the US. It is played with a hollow rubber ball and light-weight aluminum bats; *nanshiki* is considerably more popular in Takehara than *kôshiki* and the government worker with whom we initially talked about my son's involvement tried to steer us in the direction of *nanshiki*, rather than traditional hardball, because she was afraid *kôshiki* was too intense.

The intensity of Little League may be part of the reason behind the popularity of *nanshiki*, but it also may be a result of expenses related to involvement in the two sports. Equipment for *kôshiki* is several times more expensive than for *nanshiki*; *kôshiki* gloves can easily costs more than $400.[1] By comparison, a *nanshiki* glove costs around $50 to $80. Aluminum bats designed for hardball are also more than twice the cost of those for *nanshiki*, although the team in Takehara provides the players with bats to use during practice and tournaments. Even a baseball costs more than $8, about twice the cost of a *nanshiki* ball. Finally, in the Takehara area, there is a gap in the ability of players to participate in *kôshiki*. For reasons for which I have never been able to get a clear answer (although a few people have cited the dangers of hardball), middle schools in the area only play *nanshiki* and Little League baseball ends after sixth grade. Thus, there is a gap until high school where players do not participate in hardball.

The Little League team in Takehara, known as the Cubs, is a devoted group. Unlike American recreational youth baseball, where teams for younger children (under age 10) often practice only one or two hours a week and have one game per week, in Takehara practices are held every Saturday and Sunday from 9:00am to 12:30pm—a total of seven hours a week.[2] Rather than regular weekly games as is common in the US, the team has about one tournament per month and practices become more intense as the tournament approaches. It is not unusual for the Cubs to practice from 8:00am to 5:00pm on the Saturday before a tournament. The ratio of practices to games is very different from what is found normally in the US. For example, in Takehara in one summer month the team may play three games after 28 hours of practice; by contrast, in Austin TX, a similar PONY League group plays roughly one game for every 90 minutes of practice.[3]

There is no strict division of players into teams on the basis of age. In Takehara there are two divisions and at the time there were a total of three teams, although this varies in relation to the number of players involved. There is the broad division of the entire organization into the "minor" and "major" teams as is common in Little League; this division is related to both

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1   This is not simply a matter of high prices in Japan. The cost of a professional level baseball glove in the US is comparably expensive.
2   While this comparison works for recreational baseball, it is not accurate for select or travel baseball, in which teams in the US may practice as much as seven nights a week.
3   It should be noted that there are some significant differences between PONY and Little League in the US, however, in Austin, at least, there is a similar ratio of practices to games and games are seen as a regular part of weekly baseball activities.

age and ability. The minor team in Takehara is further divided into two teams (a result of growing numbers of players), one of which consists of players who have been involved for some time (the A Team) and, thus, are more advanced. The other team (the B Team) is for newer players who have either just started baseball or for players who are still at early levels of skill development. Both A and B teams have members who range in age from elementary school grades 2 to 5, although the A Team consists largely of older players. Altogether, the minor division of Takehara Little League had a total of 35 players when I was involved, one of whom was a girl, and the major division had about 15. Although most of the Little League programs in the region consist largely of boys, it is not uncommon to find girls involved as well. In fact, one of the teams against which the Cubs competed in the summer of 2004 had a girl who was the catcher and also team captain.

The Takehara Little League is fortunate in the fact that it has an indoor practice facility that is sponsored by a local semiconductor company, which also purchased the team's uniforms and has provided other financial assistance. This facility is shared with the company team and also with the local high school team. In general, the Little League team only uses the indoor facility during inclement weather; otherwise, the team practices at its two ball fields, which are located about three miles from the indoor facility. These fields are not maintained by the city, unlike the adjacent soccer fields, which are well-groomed grass fields with good drainage; the lack of city help is a source of consternation for the Little League parents. Both baseball fields consist of hard-packed gravel and have weeds growing in the outfield, making it difficult to deal with ground balls. The fields are muddy when it rains and very dusty when it is dry. Maintenance of the fields is taken care of by the fathers; who drag the fields and pull weeds on a regular basis, as well as making sure that the bases are secured properly and the equipment is safe. The backstop and screens are old, and somewhat rusted, but in generally good condition.[4]

Practices for the team are serious business. In general, players begin by running laps around the field, spend hours on fielding drills and batting practice, and have limited breaks. There are few complaints, as these players tend to be very devoted to baseball. There is a strong emphasis on showing respect to the coaches and to the other players. For example, players are required to remove their hats when speaking to an adult and will be reminded by a father when they fail to do so. During breaks, after drinking some water, players will often begin playing catch with a teammate until practice resumes. The following is an excerpt from my field notes that gives a good indication of the nature and intensity of practice for the Cubs.

> *The coach arrived at least a half-hour early for a 2:00pm practice. We arrived at 1:30pm and there were already four or five boys practicing and the coach was getting ready. The team practices in their uniforms. As each player arrives, he or she runs over to the head coach, removes his hat, bows, and says a phrase that asks for support and guidance for the day's practice. The ages range from 2nd grade to 5th grade. They all play on the same team, although the coach tended to break them up by age during the practice. They formed groups with their age peers. Most of the kids were very well behaved and seemed to be quite into baseball. There wasn't much fooling around, although there was a bit among the younger kids.*

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4   It should be noted that this is not different from what one finds in the US. Parents are usually very involved with maintenance of the fields. However, there is no organization in Takehara to deal with regular maintenance of the fields, unlike in many US programs where there is a budget for maintaining fields that comes from donations, government support, and from the fees parents pay for their children to participate in youth sports.

The practice started with a lap around the field. I noticed that when a kid came late, he did a lap on his own. Then they broke into lines for playing catch, divided up, again, by age. There was an odd number, so one of the father/coaches played catch with my son. Like in the American approach, there were several fathers there (about five) who were helping with the practice. There were also several mothers around at various times. They watched, but did not help.

The kids got breaks after each drill so that they could get water, and the coach encouraged them to drink lots of water. The temperature today was 26C, although it felt very hot due to the humidity. The overall atmosphere of the practice was very serious. The kids worked hard and the coach did not leave a lot of time for relaxing. Just enough for a break and some water.

In one drill, the kids shouted something "sa kochira e" (さこちらへ) indicating that they wanted the ball to come their way. They all yelled this in unison and as each kid made an infield play, he went and lined up along 1st base. When a teammate makes a good play in the field, the others usually comment, saying "nice play" in Japanese-English.

Drills included throwing, fielding, and running. They did a variety of things that included basic patterns. For example, they had a drill in which the runner is on third, starts to run, stops and returns. They are told that the ball went in the outfield and to go home, so they take off. This is done in twos. In general, most of the running drills were done in twos. Prior to the drills, there was a warm-up of stretches.

Practice ends with the players huddling around the head coach, the coach saying a few words of encouragement and a few practical issues about what time to meet for the tournament the next day. Then all of the players remove their caps, bow, and thank the coaches and fathers for their efforts.

Father-Coaches

Since at least the early 1960s, Vogel's (1963:241) observation that fathers in middle-class Japanese families play "a minor role" in child rearing and generally do "not share the responsibility of caring for and training the children" has been one of the more enduring images of contemporary Japan and a basic theme in much of the literature on the Japanese family among Western scholars. Fathers are often portrayed in both the media and in social science literature as leaving the house early for work and coming home late (cf. Allison 1994), perhaps even living apart from children after having been assigned to another city by their companies. By contrast, the raising of children is represented as the domain of mothers, who devote most of their time to helping with school and extracurricular activities. As White notes, the idea that there is a strong gendered division of labor in the family has been problematic for some Japanese scholars who are concerned with the nature of the family structure; psychologists have raised worries that a mother-centered/absentee father approach to child-rearing can generate children who are not well adjusted socially (White 2002:108).

There is a sense that these images of the Japanese family and father-less child rearing apply to the vast majority of Japanese; a sense that stems from wide reporting in the Japanese

media and both Western and Japanese scholarship, some of which generates a stereotype that as much as 90 percent of the Japanese population is middle-class (Kelly 1986:604).[5] Recent research, such as White's (2002) study of the current state of the Japanese family, provides examples of more multifaceted looks at the contemporary Japanese family, but in general, only limited attention has been given to how images of mother-centeredness and the absentee father may or may not be applicable to families outside of the white-collar, urban salaryman context (or even within that context). Nor has there been research that explores how the involvement of men in the lives of their children may vary in relation to the particular types of activities in which their children are involved.

Contrary to the image of child-rearing as a largely exclusive domain of mothers, Little League in rural Japan is very much a domain of fathers, many of whom are deeply concerned with being involved in the raising of their children and view Little League as part of that process. Most of the fathers who are active with Little League in Takehara are employed by local, family businesses or work in government offices, while a few are employed in national corporations with plants or offices in the Takehara area. Some of the fathers work on the production line for the Toyota plant that is located in the town just north of Takehara.

In some cases, the players' families also are involved with part-time rice production, as is common throughout the region. Unlike white-collar fathers in larger cities, many of the dads in Takehara have sufficient time to be directly involved in the lives of their children and, thus, are active participants in the Little League team's activities. To some extent, mothers are visible—particularly at drinking parties for the parents that involve both mothers and fathers and at games to cheer on the players. But fathers are at the center of parental involvement. Fathers are not only involved in the management of the Little League operation, but also in the daily operation of practices and tournaments. In other words, Little League is a domain of child-rearing that largely belongs to the dads.

Coaching of the Cubs is completely managed by fathers. The head coach, who is an experienced baseball player who plays for a local company team, is also the father of one of the players from the team. He has a high level of skill and knowledge, and his son moved through high school baseball to become a star player in the Japanese professional leagues. Like in American youth baseball, there are several other fathers who are either official or unofficial assistant coaches and who participate in most practices. Most of these fathers have had some level of experience playing baseball either in their youths or continuing into adulthood. One father, who functioned as a primary assistant coach, was also a physical education teacher at a high school and coached the high school baseball team. Only one of the fathers who participated in practices had had virtually no experience with organized baseball earlier in his life; he had become involved in baseball largely due to the interest of his son.

The head coach and other coaches are very encouraging to the players, even while being tough. I saw the head coach on several occasions give a kid a pat on the head or on the belly after a chat about a good play or some discussion about how to work on a particular skill. When a player makes a mistake, the coaches usually joke about it or gently tell him that he can do better. But there is no attempt to embarrass players or to make them feel that they have performed poorly. There is a fairly strong sense that the purpose of baseball is for the players to enjoy themselves—particularly with the younger and more inexperienced players on the team. Some of the fathers indicated that they were concerned that to be too strict and intense would discourage kids from becoming involved.

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5   Another problem rests in the fact that a great deal of the research on Japan has focused on urban or suburban areas, but then been generalized to represent all of Japan. Patterns of life in rural areas can be quite different from those of urban and suburban areas.

The Moral Self: Fathers and Child-Rearing

The questions that I want to focus on for the remainder of this chapter are: What motivates interest in youth baseball for the fathers who are working for the team? And, how do these fathers conceptualize their own involvement with Little League in Takehara? The answers to these questions were varied, but tended to emphasize the importance of being involved with child rearing. Most of the fathers with whom I talked felt it important to play a proactive role in raising their children and youth baseball represented one way in which to insert themselves into the process of helping their children develop a moral identity.

Dad One: Yamazaki Kosuke, who is in his late forties, has one son in Little League and another who is active in baseball at the middle school level. Yamazaki played baseball when he was young and is very active as a coach on the team. For every practice, he brings a table and umbrella for the dads to sit under when resting and supplies iced tea for them to drink. During practices, Yamazaki regularly pitches batting practice and also helps as a cut-off man during fly ball drills in the outfield. During the summer of 2004, he was at every practice I attended and played an important role as a coach in these practices. In addition to coaching, Yamazaki takes care of hiring a microbus for trips to tournaments and drives the bus. When I asked him about his involvement with youth baseball, he told me:

> *I've got two sons involved in baseball—it's expensive! My older one is in Jr. High School and it is getting very expensive with trips to various places for games and hotels, etc. It seems to cost 20,000 or 30,000 yen per week. Little League is a real bargain at only ¥2,000 per month. But you do anything for your kids.*

As our conversation drifted beyond the specific issues of the costs of youth baseball, Yamazaki began to talk about his work, in the city government, and placed this directly in the context of his children.

> *I want to have time to spend with my kids. I don't like the salaryman lifestyle, where you come home late and your kids are sleeping and you spend all day Saturday and Sunday sleeping to catch up so you never see your kids. I want to be involved with my kids.*

Yamazaki went on to tell me that the most important thing about baseball is that it gives the players a chance to make friends. Rather than being limited to friends in the small world of their neighborhood or school, the players learn to make friends with kids from other areas in the region, as well as with kids in other regions, not just from their own school.[6] He said that he thinks this is a very healthy thing for a kid growing up, because it makes them more outgoing and able to deal with various situations in life.

Dad Two: Miyagi Ichiro works for a company that maintains the sewer and water systems in Takehara. He described his position as being a company worker, but also being similar to a government worker (*kômuin* 公務員), because it involves close interaction with the city government. Miyagi's son was one of the newer members of the team and only has limited skills in baseball. Miyagi explained that his son became involved in baseball after some of the neighborhood fathers encouraged him to do so because he is left handed. He

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6   It is worth considering the extent to which my son's presence on the team influenced this comment. It was extremely unusual to have a foreign player on a Little League team in the Takehara region—in fact, I never saw another team with this type of arrangement. Some of this may have been said for my benefit, although I think it was also a genuine perspective.

said that he didn't particularly like having his son in organized sports, particularly in Little League, which is very competitive, but his son enjoyed it. Miyagi never missed a practice or tournament game while I was involved with the team. Although he had never played organized baseball, he regularly helped with practices, in ways ranging from shagging missed balls during warm-ups to dragging the infield during and after practices. Miyagi explained that he wanted to be involved with his son and also that he wanted to "protect" (*mamoru* 守る) his son in a very competitive context. He is clearly closely involved with the raising of his son and I saw him on occasion at local restaurants after games enjoying a meal with his wife and son.

Of course, not all fathers of players are deeply involved with the organization, but beyond the core group of about 10 dads who are regular participants in practices, other fathers are involved sporadically. One father who is very actively interested in his son's baseball is unable to attend most practices because his own company team has practices at the same time. But he always is there to pick up his son and he practices with his son regularly at home during the week. Mothers would come to watch the end of practices and helped with the refreshments and prepared lunches for the players for tournaments, but they were not involved with the activities specifically related to baseball—that was entirely the domain of the fathers. Furthermore, the activities of fathers were not limited to specifically baseball related activities. One of the more comical events of the summer involved several fathers attempting to set up a tent for the players to sit under while they awaited their games. The father who brought the tent, Yamazaki-san, had failed to bring the directions, which led to a protracted discussion (and a fair amount of laughter) about how to put the thing together. As the dads were figuring this one out, the moms had quickly put up another tent on the other side of the area where they had put down their gear and were already enjoying some tea.

Contesting the Dominant Discourse of Fatherhood

The examples here are obviously limited, but the comments of the dads I presented above are indicative of the attitudes of many fathers with whom I've spoken in Takehara—baseball is important. The fathers with whom I talked viewed their role in the Little League not simply as helping to teach the players baseball, but as an important element in the upbringing of their children. Yamazaki-san clearly sets himself apart from other fathers who choose to spend most of their time at work, rarely seeing their children. He believes that it is important for him to be involved in the lives of his children, and is unwilling to work in an environment that prevents him from doing so. Miyagi-san, too, sees his role as an important one—but in his case, he stated that he was there in part to protect his son from the intense environment of baseball, even while he, himself, had very little interest in the game.

There are, of course, other motivations operating with these fathers. When I asked him how his sons became involved in Little League, Yamazaki-san, as did other fathers, smiled and said, "Well, I kind of pushed him into it." Unquestionably, because many of the fathers had their own experiences of youth baseball, and because they loved the game, they had encouraged their sons to become involved. One father was not only the father of a player, but was the coach of an adult amateur team located in Takehara that has been successful in tournaments at the national level, he also owns a sporting goods store in the center of Takehara that specializes in baseball equipment. Baseball was at the center of his life and he encouraged his son to follow that interest—in fact, it would not be at all surprising if he was grooming his son to eventually take over the family business.

What became clear to me during the course of the summer is that Little League for these men is not simply about baseball, but is about their own involvement in the raising of their children—involvement in a domain of child-rearing that largely excludes mothers. These men are involved with teaching their children to compete, to play fair, and to work hard at what they do; and they believe that the experience of baseball influences other realms of their children's lives. In other words, the men involved with the Cubs baseball team see themselves, and the context of sport, as important in helping to develop the identities of their children.

One of the most common comments I heard from fathers related to removing hats when speaking to coaches. One dad, Yamamoto-san, commented as we watched the end of practice, "see, they all remove their hats and bow to the coach to show respect. This is very Japanese, right? You don't do this in the US, right?" While it is not all that common for ball players in parts of the US, like Texas, to remove their hats when talking to coaches, they actually do follow a similar behavior in that they are expected to use "sir" or "coach" when referring to any coach (including a dad-coach) as a show of respect. However, what is important here is that Yamamoto-san saw this as being a distinctively Japanese behavior—and an important one—that was central in the learning of how to be a polite, respectful person in Japanese society. In other words, the actions of bowing and removing caps represented part of the pedagogy of self that is employed and learned in the context of youth baseball in Japan—just as players embody the motions of how to field and catch a baseball or swing a bat, they also embody identities appropriate for being Japanese and recognizing relationships of authority and respect.[7]

Indeed, athletic activities of various kinds play an important role in the process of education and development of self in the Japanese context. Children routinely participate in athletic activities in school, normally culminating in the annual field day (*undôkai* 運動会) through which children compete in various ball tossing, running, and other games from as early as preschool. Cave (2007:63) notes that these events are typically viewed as being important experiences through which young people learn to persevere through hardships and help to build a sense of willingness to endure (*gaman* 我慢) within the context of sporting events that can be applied well beyond the athletic sphere. In other words, the context of sport provides a framework for the embodiment of core values in Japanese society and, through that, the development of healthy, moral selves in children. This is not uncommon nor unexpected in Japan, where physical challenges—particularly those endured with others—can represent a central pedagogical tool in the process building moral selves not only for children, but also for adults, via exaggerated experiences that teach abstract moral principles (Kondo 1987:258). In the context of Little League, the long practices represent one means of building a moral self through endurance and through the shared and collectivized experience of hardship that comes with difficult and tiring exertion as a team.

What is perhaps most interesting here is that the moral discourse associated with sport and self-building is intertwined with another moral discourse related to the role of fathers in the process of child-rearing. For the fathers involved with the Cubs, the team provides a locus of contesting broader cultural assumptions—the dominant discourse related to gender roles and child-rearing—about how fathers are expected to be involved with raising their kids. In my conversations, fathers often set themselves apart from mainstream parenting ideologies in which dad works and mom raises the kids. Instead, these fathers focus on their

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7   It is worth noting that there is much to be explored in relation to the mimetic actions of learning to play baseball and showing respect in Japanese youth sport. The pattern of behavior I observed on the ball field was very similar to what contributors to Singleton's (1998) edited volume observe in the pedagogies associated with apprenticeship in Japan, where observation and copying on the part of the learner is much more important than overt instruction.

role in raising their sons and their desire to be directly involved—rather than functioning as an absentee father often portrayed in the Japanese media and represented by critics in Japan as an indication of a dysfunctional culture of fatherhood operating in that society, although one that also is increasingly being described as changing (Yasumoto and LaRossa 2010:612; Hashimoto and Traphagan 2004).

The context of the baseball diamond in Takehara is for some fathers a locus of politicization, through which the dominant discourse of fatherhood is contested and reshaped. These fathers respond to a discourse that dominates the descriptive and political representation of the role of fathers in the raising of their children in Japan (Bauman 1996:188), by situating themselves in a position of centrality in the raising of their children and also in a position of power vis-à-vis their wives, who usually only have a very limited role within the context of the diamond. What is important here is that this is not simply done at an intellectual level; the process of contesting the dominant discourse of fatherhood is carried out through the context of youth sport as a means of imprinting not only a moral self that reflects Japanese values related to social interaction, but also a self-concept as involved father upon the boys on the team. The bodies of the children who participate in the Little League team become not simply baseball players, but reconstructed and reconceptualized models of the male social body (Lyon and Barbalet 1994:55) in which the process of socialization into Japanese cultural tropes of fatherhood are at once reinforced through the emphasis on endurance and giving it one's all, and contested through the direct involvement of the fathers in the teaching and operation of the baseball club.

As noted early in this chapter, the ideas I present here are preliminary. There is a great deal of ethnographic research to be done not only on Little League baseball in Japan, but on youth sports in general. When we look around the world at the prevalence of youth sports such as soccer, baseball, hockey, American football, etc., it is quite surprising that anthropologists have given so little ethnographic and theoretical attention to this very important part of human social organization in the modern, globalizing world.

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Gender

Victoria Goddard

The Anthropology of Gender and the Limits of Dichotomies

Since the 1970s a critical strand within anthropology has taken gender identities as a central research focus to explore the social arrangements and practices through which women and men are allocated specific roles, attributes, and resources. The research has furthered discussions on fundamental questions about social organization, and in particular social asymmetries and inequalities. Sometimes explicitly, and at other times in a muted dialogue, much of the debate questioned whether gender differences and gender hierarchies are universal. Early work in this area faced an empirical deficit arising from androcentric analyses and gender bias in the dominant research agenda within the discipline. An urgent task was therefore to redress the gap in the literature regarding the roles and values of women through new research and re-studies from a gender perspective[1] (Goodale 1971; Weiner 1976) which highlighted the wide range of social arrangements and differences reflected in women's lives and perspectives. This chapter will outline these debates focusing on different arrangements regarding labor and their implications for claims to universal patterns of gender organization and inequality. Through an ethnographically grounded discussion of production and reproduction, the chapter engages in a critical exploration of key concepts within dominant economic paradigms, in particular the notion of *homo economicus*, and their implications for analyses of work and households in the global economic system.

The task of casting light on women's lives through ethnographic research was complemented by wide-ranging explorations of analytical frameworks capable of dealing with the empirically rich variation in the social relations of gender and sexuality (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Reiter 1975a). Largely in response to the economist Ester Boserup's (1970) *Women's Role in Economic Development*, attention was also drawn to the distortions and shortcomings of development policies resulting from the lack of recognition awarded to women's labor, even where this was particularly significant, as in Sub-Saharan "female farming systems." Boserup's work initiated intense debate and rethinking about both how gendered divisions of labor played out in specific societies and regions, and how this knowledge not only "brought women back in" to development and research agendas, but also contributed new insights into articulated critiques of dominant economic paradigms. The debate has been the locus for productive dialogues across disciplines and between theoretical, methodological, and policy-oriented work (Nelson 1981; Mitter 1986; Elson 1991; Young 1989, 1993; Heyzer 1994; Nelson and Wright 1995; Cornwall and Pratt 2003; Benería 2003; Momsen 2010 [2004]; Jones and Nelson 2005). Alongside anthropology's

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1   There are a number of excellent ethnographies that addressed women's roles or gender relations more broadly such as the work of Kaberry (1939, 2004 [1952]), Richards (1939, 1956), Mead (1935).

theoretical shift away from a focus on women and towards a relational understanding of gender, the emphasis on integrating women into development promoted by the "Women in Development" (WID) perspective gave way to a focus on gender and social relations, as in Gender and Development (GAD) (Kabeer 1994; Jackson and Pearson 1998).

During the course of the 1970s and 1980s theoretical progress was largely shaped by discussion of the relevance of dichotomies such as nature and culture (Ortner 1974), public and private, production and reproduction, male and female (Rosaldo 1974; Sacks 1974; Reiter 1975b). Sherry Ortner's (1974) bold attempt to explain the subordination of women in terms of universal dichotomies that linked women to the natural order and men to the more valued sphere of culture provoked a vigorous and productive critique. In particular the collection edited by MacCormack and Strathern (1980) used historical and ethnographic data to challenge what were seen as ethnocentric categories that were rooted in Greek philosophy and rearticulated in the European Enlightenment (Bloch and Bloch 1980; Jordanova 1980). In addition to the problems raised by Ortner's categories, her analysis failed to establish the social and cultural conditions producing gender identities and spheres, so that the analysis suffered from a lingering biological determinism. This critique is fundamental because, as Stolcke (1981) argued, naturalizing discourse effectively legitimizes and fixes boundaries and hierarchies, rendering them simultaneously invisible and inevitable. This point was developed through a range of ethnographic cases in a later volume edited by Yanagisako and Delaney (1995), while alternative frameworks were explored, for example in considering how gender identities were implicated in and reproduced through kinship relations (Collier and Yanagisako 1987) or through systems of prestige (Ortner and Whitehead 1981).

The rejection of biologically grounded explanations of gender differences and relations of subordination resituated the burden of explanation within the emergence of distinct social spheres, an idea that has deep roots in Western political philosophy and which found strong support, particularly in the version put forward by Engels. Engels' hypothesis that it was the emergence of private property that gave rise to public and private domains as unequally valued spheres of activity was explored in a number of interesting ways, for example in relation to historical transformations amongst band societies and other apparently egalitarian social forms (Draper 1975; Leacock and Lee 1982; Sacks 1974). In the 1960s empirical research on hunter-gatherers challenged widely held views about contemporary forager societies and unsettled understandings about the systems of organization imputed to early human societies. In particular the notion of "man the hunter" and its role in human evolution was undermined by clear evidence of women's contribution to livelihoods (Lee and De Vore 1968; Slocum 1975; Dahlberg 1981). The flexibility of the social organization, including the division of labor, in band societies and the crucial role of women as providers reshaped the terms of the debate about egalitarian social organization and led to more nuanced approaches to gender (for example in Shostak 1981 and Bodenhorn 1990) and to different systems of production and exchange in foraging societies (Woodburn 1982). The analyses that developed from these new insights excluded biological explanations, seeking answers in wider social, economic, and political conditions, and thus allowed for the possibility of egalitarian social relations, including gender relations, while documenting their fragility in the face of historical changes associated with colonialism and capitalism.

While the public-private framework had the clear merit of recognizing the interdependencies of production and reproduction, the contingent and historically specific character of gender relations and the connections between gender hierarchies and broader systems of inequality, it also faced serious challenges. These were largely related to the critique of the dichotomy as a historically and culturally specific construct, unsuited to the tasks of ethnographic analysis and cross-cultural comparison (Moore 1988, 1994; Yanagisako 1979, 1987; Strathern 1984; Comaroff 1987). Further, an inherent problem with

dichotomies as analytical tools lay with their tendency to limit the scope of the phenomena being scrutinized and over-simplify the range and quality of significant spaces, actors, and relations which might sit uneasily between or across the dual categories proposed by the framework. In the specific case of the public-private distinction, these problems are exacerbated because the private, domestic domain and the actions and persons associated with it tend to be naturalized (Fraser 1989). The private sphere is represented as the space of reproduction, of nature, and of universal humanity, in contrast with the cultural, historically constituted public sphere, as exemplified in Rosaldo's claim that motherhood defined women's identification with the domestic sphere and their relationship with the realms of politics and work (Rosaldo 1974).

A parallel critique of distinctions between public and private is put forward in Harris and Young's examination of the range of different determinations of women's subordination through a critical engagement with the concept of reproduction. Harris and Young (1981) reject reductionist approaches to reproduction and distinguish between social reproduction, which relates to the general reproduction of a social formation, and the reproduction of labor, which is in turn different from biological reproduction. The conflation of these in many analyses of social systems, such as Meillassoux's analysis of West African lineage societies and his concept of a domestic mode of production (1980), replicated the problems of ahistorical and naturalized conceptions of labor, rendering them opaque. In their critique, Harris and Young aim to locate "the problem of being women, and understanding the position of women, as deriving precisely from the multiplicity of pressures to which women are subjected, and the ideological mystification that is produced by the unproblematic unity of such categories as women, marriage, the domestic" (Harris and Young 1981, 112). Harris and Young deconstruct the categories of woman and man, which are not useful as a priori categories and must be defined in relation to specific empirical contexts. They also emphasize the importance of studying specific relationships, rather than building the analysis on conventional terms, such as marriage, or the domestic. Likewise, their focus on reproduction rather than women is aimed at avoiding "the apparent finality of gender distinctions" to discuss instead "the complex variety of ways in which women and men are bound in social relationships" (Harris and Young 1981, 111). The attention drawn to the autonomy of, and complex relationships between, different levels of reproduction and their relationship to production stresses the importance of historical, contextual analyses; the deconstruction of categories of woman and man is equally valuable in drawing attention to the intersection of gender, class, ethnicity, age, and life cycle in constituting different subjectivities and social actors.[2] While much of this work was centered on women, the deconstruction of categories was extended to the category of men to produce nuanced approaches to diverse masculine identities and performances (Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991; Cornwall and Lindisfarne 1994; Vale de Almeida 1996; Connell 2005).

As di Leonardo (1991) pointed out, much of this work not only took place in response to challenges internal to the discipline but also reflected significant social and political change across the globe. These included feminist critiques of the status quo, student and worker mobilizations in Europe, black power and civil rights mobilizations in the United States, and widespread contestation of dominant configurations of world power such as the war in Vietnam, repressive regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and apartheid in South Africa. Developments in the discipline at this time were highly sensitive to current political debates, and it is unsurprising that anthropological work on gender relations and power overlapped with and informed debates outside the discipline, as in

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2   See Caplan (1985), Hirschon (1984), Stack (1974), and Zavella (1991) for ethnographically informed discussions of the intersection of gender and class and ethnicity.

the case of highly politicized debates about domestic labor. The changes leading up to and following from the collapse of the socialist states and their centrally planned economies in 1989 brought a new urgency to debates, not least in relation to understanding the effects of economic and institutional change (Bridger and Pine 1998; Humphrey 2002; Verdery 1996; Hann 2006).

The themes that arose out of the early debates were subsequently developed to address—directly or indirectly—the gendered dimensions of informal work, precarious employment, and care work. From Keith Hart's reflections on urban economic activities in Accra published in 1973, the concept of the informal economy provided a focus for research on a wide range of activities that fell outside the scrutiny of conventional studies of the economy and which frequently included high percentages of women and children (Arizpe 1977; Moser and Young 1981; Heyzer 1981; Benería 1989), often transgressing the boundaries between public and private, formal and informal in household and family based production of commodities and services in the household (Nelson 1979; Allen 1981; Goddard 1981). Indeed, this work highlighted the difficulties inherent in attempting to draw distinctive boundaries between different activities and forms of work, given the complex webs that linked formal and informal systems of production. Finally, much of the work explored questions raised by Hart regarding the place of the informal economy in the wider economic system and its capacity for growth, feeding into critical approaches and new perspectives in the field of development.

Systems of Inequality—Universals Revisited

A fundamental and unresolved question underpinning much of the anthropological debate about gender relations relates to the question of universal versus historically specific definitions of gender, gender roles, and gendered spaces. Anthropologists have largely discarded universalizing explanations, although the questions regarding the pervasiveness of inequality remains important. A way forward was found by eschewing questions of origins, shifting attention from universal explanations towards systemic analyses, and analyzing gender relations in relation to broader sets of relationships and institutions. A question that then arises is the extent to which we can explain such inequalities in terms of historical capitalism or whether an analysis beyond capitalism, or indeed beyond the economy, is called for. We might also enquire whether the exploration of gender and gender relations might provide alternative conceptualizations of the economy (Harvey 2000; Gibson-Graham 2006).

Carol Pateman's influential analysis of the social contract identifies what are, in her view, the mechanisms through which inequality is inevitably inscribed in social exchanges. For Pateman (1988) "the original contract is a sexual-social pact." But what is most significant about the sex-based contract is that those aspects of the contract that pertain to the body, sex, and sexual difference have been suppressed. This, she suggests, results in a modern form of patriarchy that is simultaneously affirmed and rendered invisible. The contract, along with the invisibility of its roots in sexually constructed inequality, have profound implications for how contemporary societies are organized and indeed for how models of society and of the economy are articulated, circulated, and assimilated in a variety of contexts. The individual, as a key concept in contemporary political and economic theory, is founded on the existence of a range of dichotomies, between natural and civil, private and public, sex and gender. The articulation of these serves to support ideas of the individual as already inscribed with gender identity, already defined as a male or female subject with circumscribed

characteristics and potentialities. This crucial piece of the analytical framework is highly problematic, as an ideological construct that reproduces the entire edifice of inequality from which it also derives (Pateman 1988).

Pateman's argument, that sexual difference as a hierarchically organized principle is inscribed within the very foundations of society means that the conceptual framework that is built on this basic assumption and encompasses the distinctions between public and private and between men and women, is deeply flawed, being similarly inscribed with the foundational hierarchical organization that underpins social relations. Anthropologists may find her arguments provocative but would almost certainly be reluctant to extend the model to non-capitalist social forms. Yet anthropological debates do overlap with Pateman's concerns, and ethnographic records provide multiple examples showing how dichotomies are reproduced and in turn produce invisible and devalued bodies, labor, and goods, at the same time that they illustrate the numerous ways in which such dichotomies may be unraveled and contested. From an anthropological perspective Rubin (1975) was, like Pateman, engaged in devising a general theory of systemic sexual and gender inequality, though her analysis is more encompassing and inclusive.

Rubin sees capitalism as the heir to a long tradition in which women have been excluded from property inheritance, political leadership, and religious or ceremonial expertise. The task is to uncover the conditions that, underlying capitalism and other social systems, generate structures of sexual and gender oppression. Just as all societies have a form of organized economic activity, so too do they have a sex-gender system: "a set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied" (Rubin 1975, 159). Conversely, she states that "Gender is a socially imposed division of the sexes. It is a product of the social relations of sexuality" (Rubin 1975, 179), closely bound to the requirements of kinship systems. Through a critical engagement with Levi-Strauss and Freud, Rubin addresses the deep structures of sex oppression; her analysis in turn demands an agenda for change that is radical, indeed revolutionary, if the systems of inequality are to be overturned.[3] While both Pateman and Rubin locate the roots of gender inequality deep within social and cultural structures, Rubin goes further than Pateman's notion of the sexual/social contract by offering a perspective that is at once cross-cultural, and deeply embedded in structures of kinship that are in turn shaped by historical processes. In fact, history (and politics) are fundamental forces in shaping the structures that Rubin refers to as the sex-gender system, pointing out that these are "not immutably oppressive" (Rubin 1975: 203). In her later work, Rubin (1989) is critical of her earlier analysis, which unhelpfully collapses sex and gender. She proposes to decouple these terms to reflect the fact that sexuality and gender have distinct social forms and trajectories and each constitutes a system of stratification. Her recognition of the historicity and the political qualities of sex echoes her earlier arguments about the autonomy of sex and gender systems, while the decoupling of the terms enhances the possibilities of accounting for contradiction, change, and transformation of the system and its constituent elements.

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3   Rubin observes that "equal pay, equal work, and all of the female politicians in the world will not extirpate the roots of sexism" (Rubin 1975, 51).

Production, Exchange, and Inequality

From their different perspectives, Pateman and Rubin propose that inequalities are systemic and deeply interrelated, though the specific outcomes of these inter-relationships cannot be defined a priori. Other questions arise, such as what particular shapes these inter-relationships may take and, crucially, how they might be known, understood, and represented. The different approaches proposed by Marilyn Strathern and Lisette Josephides illustrate these questions from the perspective of Melanesian ethnography (Strathern 1988, 145–51; also Graeber 2001, 37). Josephides' analysis of exchange and inequality among the Kewa (1985) is based on the assumption that "all social systems, whatever their structure, contain the seeds of inequality" (also Ortner and Whitehead 1981). She proposes that what appear as egalitarian exchanges among the Kewa in fact reproduce inequalities through a concealment of the connections that exist between exchange and production, and between production and domestic relations. Ultimately, these masked connections can be understood as effects of the equally invisible process through which the labor of women is appropriated by some men, who are also in a position to appropriate the labor of less prominent men in Kewa society.[4]

Josephides proposes an analysis of the inequalities that emerge from social interaction based on the mystification of production and exchange, whereby the latter becomes the recognized site for the conversion of labor and its products into prestige. Mirroring Bourdieu's (1977) argument about Kabyle forms of generosity and kinship as misrecognitions of relations of domination, Josephides locates gender relations within the gift economy, which disguises unequal exchange and represents all transactions as if they were free gifts, and the transactors as if they were the wealth creators. She explains that: "Every transaction must be euphemized as a gift, because what is formally stressed is always the relationship between people transacting, rather than the acquisition of goods" (Josephides 1985, 217). The ability of some men to benefit from a transfer of value or to monopolize the potential for conversion of value from the domestic to the political sphere is supported by their position within agnatic and patri-virilocal groups that control the means of production. Ultimately, euphemization distorts the "real" relations of appropriation of labor and value, so value appears to be produced by prestigious men.

Strathern is critical of Josephides' assumption that work is the site of value production, which she sees as perpetuating ethnocentric ideas regarding the nature of property and the relationship between property and persons. Her main objection relates to "the unitary identification between persons (as subjects) and the products of their activity (work)" (Strathern 1988, 140). This, she argues, is a profoundly Western notion of persons and their relationship to their own labor and is not appropriate as a basis for the analysis of non-Western contexts. Indeed, the risk is, she claims, that it unhelpfully and unexpectedly introduces neoclassical economism. She concedes that a superficial comparison can be made between the Melanesian case and the mechanisms of alienation of labor under capitalism, but the concept of alienation itself is too closely enmeshed in a historically specific critique of capitalist relations of production to be useful in a non-capitalist context. Furthermore, such assumptions about property, persons, and alienation contradict "the indigenous premises of Melanesian social action" (Strathern 1988, 147). Strathern notes observable asymmetries in the relations between husbands and wives but argues that

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4   Both Kewa men and women were involved in the domestic sphere of social reproduction and in production. Men, however, also played a part in the public spheres of social reproduction, including war and religion, from which women were excluded as active participants; there was no reciprocal arrangement of social space that privileged women and excluded men (Josephides 1985).

they do not easily map on to the dichotomies of anthropological analysis. For example, "domestic" labor includes the labor of both men and women. This means that the conversion of value that may take place in the political sphere of prestige claims involves an eclipse of the domestic labor of men as well as women. And rather than producing a concealment of labor, the prestige arena brings about an eclipse of the social (including the activities and relations of the domestic and the relations of dependence amongst kinsmen) by the political. It is therefore the visible gift that effects the transformation of a product of labor, an animal, into something other, conferring different value on the successful transactor.

From the debates regarding inequality and gender in the diverse social systems recorded in the rich ethnography of Papua New Guinea, Kelly emphasizes the significance of a fundamental contradiction between hierarchy and egalitarianism in the Etoro social system. Kelly (1993) rejects explanations of inequality based on the production and circulation of wealth and also argues that in Etoro society there is no process of appropriation of women's labor by men. Indeed, in a broader critique of the anthropology of exchange he argues that there is no inevitable link between wealth and inequality. In the Etoro case, it is not unequal access to material wealth that produces hierarchy, but the unequal distribution of prestige. While the gender division of labor is a fundamental aspect of the unequal distribution of prestige, since men rather than women are able to have access to larger game, which then enables them to build moral superiority through widely expressed generosity in the distribution of the hunt, Kelly emphasizes that this circuit of prestige must be understood in relation to a cosmological framework. It is the cosmological system that endorses the association of male generosity with systemic reproduction across generations, as it is the actions of generous men that ensure the transmission of life force.[5] The spiritual value of what men produce (through hunting), distribute (game), and consume (certain foods that are taboo for women and are imbued with spiritual content) underpin their moral superiority over women and place them in a position where they can accumulate moral worth and achieve highly prestigious status. Their participation within moral and prestige hierarchies also places them—or some of them—in an advantageous position regarding witchcraft accusations. Highly prestigious men or *tafidila* are immune to witchcraft accusations and therefore to stigma, moral, and social debility; women on the other hand are vulnerable to witchcraft accusations and depend on such men, as husbands or brothers, to intervene on their behalf in situations where they may be at risk.

Kelly's emphasis on the cosmological bases of social reproduction in the Etoro social system draws attention to the limitations of economism and in its place he proposes:

> *It can thus be argued that the cosmologically derived system of moral evaluation—of which the prestige system is one component—is central to the organization of production, distribution (including exchange), and consumption. The cosmological system not only constitutes the source of morally evaluated social differentiation, but also shapes the relations of production, modes of distribution, and terms of exchange that generate further social inequalities pertaining to these socially differentiated categories. (Kelly 1993, 514)*

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5   Interestingly, generosity is the quality that encapsulates women's role in ensuring success in the hunt by attracting the prey for Iñupiak hunters, thus defining the women as the great hunters (Bodenhorn 1990).

He questions the usefulness of embarking on a quest to identify a single generative locus of inequality. Rather, the entanglements between the gender division of labor, generosity as a male attribute grounded in the cosmological system, and the competitive arena of witchcraft accusations, highlight the complexities and irreducibility of social reproduction (see also Edholm et al. 1977; Harris and Young 1981).

Weiner invites us to reflect further on exchange theory and the primacy of reciprocity in anthropological analysis. It is the latter that prompts her main critique of Marilyn Strathern and what she describes as Strathern's commitment to the "tenacious anthropological belief in the inherent nature of the norm of reciprocity" (Weiner 1992, 150) which leads her to underestimate the significance of inalienable possessions. A focus on giving while keeping, whether of people and relationships evident in the enduring importance of sibling intimacy, or wealth, suggests a different interpretation of gender relations and above all, allows us to recognize how women might devise "their own strategy and manipulation" (Weiner 1992, 13). Weiner also challenges the reduction of gender relations and women's roles to the spheres of production and exchange, arguing that in the Trobriand case a broader approach to social reproduction reveals woman's fundamental role in the reproduction of kinship and cosmology.[6] One important aspect of this broadened approach and emphasis on the strategies available to retain while giving relates to the brother-sister bond, and how it may be sustained in the face of competing obligations and allocations of time, labor, and sentiment. This is a point that is also highlighted by Stewart and Strathern in their analysis of female spirit cults, which illustrate the "overlapping facets of gendered identities" (Stewart and Strathern 1999, 358). Against much of the literature on male cults that has tended to stress the exclusion of women, Stewart and Strathern show the importance of gender-based collaboration and complementarity. They thus propose a "collaborative model" to capture what they describe as the "collaborative-procreative-nurturant" emphasis of the cults they describe. Significantly, gendered collaboration was expressed in the symbolic texture of the rituals as well as in the active engagement of men and women to secure their successful completion. These insights shift our attention towards agency and forms of cooperation and alliance that, perhaps, can only be understood through recognition of the overlapping qualities of gender identities, and the multiple spheres in which they may be realized or expressed.

The analytical work of engaging with ethnography shows, albeit from different perspectives, that the boundaries of the economic, the social, and the cosmological are too permeable, and the activities pertaining to public and private too entangled, to allow for clear demarcations. Nevertheless, the ethnography also highlights differences in the validation and evaluation of labor, persons, and objects that may be mobilized to support hierarchies, if not inequalities. Josephides' analysis of how both labor and value may be appropriated through social and cultural mechanisms that hide the "real" sources of wealth is undermined by Strathern's claim for priority to be given to actors' models and concepts.

Similar questions to those raised in Strathern's critique of Josephides emerge in other ethnographic contexts. In her study of kinship and work in Istanbul, White (1994), like Josephides, refers to the euphemization of exploitative relations. The labor of women is incorporated through the hierarchical relations of the patriarchal family and through the kinship-based demands for reciprocity in support of petty commodity production for a capitalist market. In Naples, women outworkers in the late 1970s and early 1980s often described themselves as "*casalinghe*" (housewives) despite clear evidence of dedication to the production of gloves or shoes. It was as aunts, sisters, and wives that many women "gave" their time and labor in support of the artisan and his enterprise (Goddard 1996). Arguably,

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6   For a critical Marxist approach to social reproduction and ideology see O'Laughlin (1974).

the crucial point here is that when the women of Istanbul and Naples invested their time and labor in furthering the interests of their kinship collectivity, they were also implicated in producing commodities for local, national, and global markets. The difference between the conversion of euphemized or eclipsed labor and value into wealth and/or prestige and the conversion of labor and value in the production of commodities that enter wider economic circuits represents very different mechanisms and effects, not least in relation to social reproduction. The comparison highlights the importance of broadening the scale and historicizing the analysis to allow different kinds of relations of production, exchange, and conversion to become evident across time and space, while retaining a focus on the practices and ideologies that inform the ways in which men and women contribute to the household, neighborhood, and wider community.

Homo Economicus, or *Femina Economica*?

This very general overview of anthropological research relating to gender and inequality provides a useful perspective from which to consider contemporary critiques of market economics and to contribute to such critiques from the perspectives offered by anthropological analysis. Marilyn Strathern's insistence on confronting the analysis of gender relations with indigenous categories and practices offers a challenge to systemic approaches to gender inequality. At the same time, it enables her to produce a radical critique of a historically specific yet highly universalized notion of a unitary self, that of the "possessive individual."[7] This critique is fundamental, in relation not only to non-capitalist economies, but also in supporting a critique of the assumptions underpinning the unitary possessive individual expressed in the notion of "*homo economicus*" and informing social and political theory, as claimed by Pateson. Yet, as we will see in later sections, there are tensions between actions that might be understood as individualistic, i.e. responding on the one hand to individual interests, perhaps in antagonism with the interests of the collective, and on the other hand, the privileging of collective interests, a tension that is addressed in Strathern and Stewart's (2008) concept of the "relational-individual."

These analytical points are highly relevant to feminist critiques of contemporary economic theory, which identify the limitations of the theory with two of its fundamental conceptual premises: the notion of *homo economicus* and its associated behavior based on rational choice, and markets as the defining space for the economic, indeed substituting for the economy in many instances. As a response to the limitations of this focus, McCloskey's concept of *femina economica* provides an alternative agent that is primarily motivated by solidarity, bringing so-called feminine values into the economic arena. However, as Longino (1991) points out, the reliance on—and therefore the perpetuation of—stereotypically feminine or motherly traits are undesirable and ultimately unhelpful. A better option, Longino suggests, is not a feminine alternative to *homo economicus* but a different model of the economy altogether, such as an economy that is created through collaborative action. In fact, one of the central problems for feminist economists is the continuing emphasis on the individual as the privileged explanatory focus to the detriment of social explanations of economic behavior.

These critiques raise the question of what features, activities, and persons, such as household labor and the labor of care, become invisible through the emphasis on *homo*

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7   See Morris (2013) and Brown (2003) for a discussion of individualism in relation to the different assumptions and implications entailed in the contrasting notions of the possessive and the existential individual.

economicus. Becker's theory of the allocation of time attempted to draw attention to the productivity of nonmarket work while preserving the basic tenets of neoclassical theory.[8] However, his commitment to preserving the basic conceptual tools of the model obscures those factors that contribute to inequalities in the household and that affect the marketability of labor, such as differentiated access to education and training. Furthermore, the model was unable to determine whose preferences prevailed in the decision-making process of the household, an opacity that turns the household into a "black box," and sustains a lack of concern about the composition and workings of households in specific empirical situations (Kabeer 1998, 92). The model, with its limitations, had significant implications for policy in relation both to preserving a focus on overall household levels of welfare and to ignoring internal divisions and differences, given the assumption that the exercise of power by household heads was fundamentally benevolent (Kabeer 1998).

This opacity can be attributed to the relegation of the household and its activities to the sphere of biological reproduction. By collapsing family and household these are naturalized (Harris 1981) and, consequently, relations of production, exchange, and consumption as well as the potential inequalities they may harbor are rendered invisible. Household and kinship are placed beyond history and politics, as an enduring, static arrangement of roles embedded in biological needs and reproductive requirements, a process that also contributes to the circulation of simplistic and stigmatized notions of "deviant" families and "other" households, such as single parent families, female headed households and variously ethnicized household and family forms (Whitehead 1981; Stack 1974; Gittins 1985; Weston 1997).

The focus on *femina economica* proposed by McCloskey would arguably include some of the terrain obscured in current economic models, such as households, kinship and friendship networks. It would also accommodate a broader range of values and motivations. But while it is important to recognize the significance of individual agency, there is a problem with the focus on individual choice, as it distracts us from the multiple ties that influence behavior in the labor market, as well as the forces that constitute that market. It is by locating individual agents within their social context that we can best understand individual and collective investment in a range of activities and forms of labor such as provisioning (Narotzky 2005), their motivations and choices regarding work, consumption, how they distribute income and resources, in ways that may be tangential to, or even opposed to, the market (Zelizer 2005), all of which are fundamental to the question of "the complex and sometimes tense relationship between 'personal' and 'collective' benefit" (Morris and Ruane, 1989). The focus on "deliberately considered rational action and choice" neglects everyday life and experience. These shape common sense understandings of the world that in turn inform recognizably "economic" phenomena such as consumption, savings, and work practices (Hudson 2008).[9]

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8 Hardt and Negri (2000) aim to draw a more inclusive category of labor under capitalism through the concept of "immaterial labor." This would include all work carried out under the logic of capital, whether paid or unpaid, in industry or the service sector, on the basis that all are socially productive. As Yanagisako points out (2012), their argument echoes the feminist debates about domestic labor during the 1970s. As she also points out, their proposal of a more inclusive concept of productive labor is analytically interesting for anthropologists but is undermined by its reliance on a problematic dichotomy between industrial and immaterial labor.

9 While the recommendation is directed particularly at economists, there is also a case to be made to anthropologists, as Carsten (1997) suggests when she highlights the value of ethnography of domestic life, of the everyday, of non-ritualized life, often neglected in favor of what are seen as more salient or spectacular features (also Bloch 1991).

Recent anthropological research on consumption illustrates many of the tensions between individual and collective interests, while enhancing our understanding of both the economy and its subjects. Many elements of the Melanesian debates, including Stewart and Strathern's concept of the "relational-individual" are echoed in ethnographic approaches to consumption. Miller understands consumption as a social phenomenon "which shifts goods from alienable to inalienable" (2012, 64) and relates to practices that are "saturated with issues of gender" (Miller 2012, 64; Miller 2010). Although shopping is in many respects an individual activity, research in London suggests that, like consumption, it is a relationally constructed endeavor in which individual actions and motivations are entangled with commitment to significant social relationships and persons. For example, Küchler and Miller (2005; also Miller and Woodward 2011) illustrate the gendered and relational context within which the acquisition, consumption, and display of clothing take place. This suggests, contra Butler's critique of relational notions of gender (Butler 1999), that gender is constituted simultaneously through relations and performance (Miller and Woodward 2011), a perspective that moves the analysis further from the terrain of *homo economicus*.

The Domestic Sphere: Households, Cooperation, and Conflict

A historically sensitive approach to households and other kinship and residential groups is required to account for the diversity of arrangements, the tasks carried out under the aegis of the residential group, and the variable permeability of these units to local and global circumstances and conditions (Colen and Sanjek 1990). Stoler (1989) shows how the entanglements of the domestic and the public sphere of work in the Sumatran plantation economy of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflected the ongoing tensions faced by planters, and later government managers, in offsetting the need for labor with the imperative to drive down costs. This tension was played out as much in the ways in which the domestic sphere was constituted and reconstituted as in the struggles between the plantations and the workers and their unions over pay and conditions at work. While women were paid to provide for the domestic needs of male workers, including sexual services, their male customers became permanently indebted to sustain access to these services. Indebtedness connected the men to the plantation. Women struggled to establish stable wage relations with the plantations and typically received lower wages when they were employed. Stoler suggests that the planters' and later state managers' manipulation of gender hierarchies enhanced the political and economic vulnerability of the workforce as a whole, through a process she describes as denigration through prostitution of women and indebtedness of men. In the 1930s, in response to labor shortages, pro-family strategies based on the family wage aimed to stabilize the workforce but meant even lower wages for women and their increased dependence on male wage earners. It was the collapse of the plantation economy during World War II and the Japanese occupation that resulted in new opportunities for subsistence production through the emergence of subsistence agriculture on abandoned plantation land.[10]

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10   The subsistence cultivation of squatter plots continued after the war and the reinstatement of the estates under government administration, and although wages declined in the 1950s, this period was remembered as one of stability and financial security. This, Stoler (1989) concludes, was because workers benefited from informal exchanges and subsistence activities on squatter plots, which supplemented their wages. Women's position as wage-earners remained weak. Despite high levels of participation of women workers in the trade unions, their wages continued to trail far behind those of men, and they, along with child workers,

As the Sumatran example shows, the domestic sphere is subject to both institutional pressures and changing social, economic, and political conditions. It is also a site for very diverse relationships, including free and paid labor in relation to care, sex, and production. Hartmann (1987) argues that although households may well be constituted as sites of kinship, family, and affectivity, they are also sites of struggle, of competing interests and obligations, compromise and potential conflict (Moore 1994; Kandiyoti 1988, 1998; Hochschild 2003). Such struggles are primarily framed in terms of gender but may also reflect other inequalities framed in terms of class and/or ethnicity or race (Hartmann 1987; Dill 1987; Rollins 1990). A significant basis for differentiation within households, which is fundamental to understanding unequal allocations of care, food, and resources, relates to generational dynamics and the place of children, as gendered subjects, within them. Divisions of labor and differentiated attributions of value associated with adult divisions of labor are replicated in the underestimation of certain categories of children, typically daughters, and their contributions to the family.

Croll describes the different familial entitlements in rural China that result in lower chances of survival for girls, inferior access to health care and education, and greater vulnerability to sexual and economic exploitation. Croll explains that in addition to gender differences whereby "familial allocations and investment in daughters may be quite different from those conferred upon their brothers" (Croll 2008, 117), the intersection of gender generational hierarchies means that daughters are devalued in relation to adult women. In a context of patrilocal residence, daughters are considered transient members of their families of birth[11] and as such are less valued than daughters-in-law, wives, and mothers (see Salaff 1995). But generations are themselves subject to change, responding to different institutional pressures and opportunities and different gender and family ideologies, as Yanagisako (1987) demonstrates in the case of Japanese-Americans. Yanagisako found significant shifts across the generations in the conceptualization of work and space that reflect the changing conditions affecting not only Japanese Americans, but industrial capitalist societies as a whole (see Lisón-Tolosana 1983; Rofel 1999).

In many Neapolitan working-class homes gender divisions of labor affected adults and children, though there was no predictable or standardized set of practices. Divisions of labor between adults and children, and between children according to gender and order of birth resulted in different arrangements of work and educational outcomes. These had significant implications for individuals, and also generated different capabilities, from unskilled to professional, within a single generation. This suggests that an individual's predisposition for work cannot be understood except in the context of the social relations that support or impede her or him in defining and attaining specific goals. This is also shown in the wide range of arrangements between kin and across households and, where available, with institutions and services, that enable the pooling of resources, care of children, cleaning and feeding of family members, and generally providing support in exceptional and everyday circumstances of life. These multiple networks of relationships entail different reciprocities, duties, and obligations and inform people's motivations and their ability to engage in wage work of one kind or another. As we will see, it is also the case that their motivation and their desires cannot be understood except in relation to these networks, whether it is in an effort to sustain them or to break away.

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filled the ranks of what was an increasingly casualized labor force. Stoler notes that by 1960, up to 48 percent of workers on the palm oil estates were workers on temporary contracts.

11 This question of transience recalls Josephides' analysis of women's position in kinship groups, when she describes women as sojourners, whereas Strathern describes Hagen women as being in between.

Mollona (2009) describes widely varying household arrangements in a steel town in the United Kingdom, where patriarchal relations, relations of cooperation, and pooling of income, time and effort of kin and non-kin combine in response to changing economic and political circumstances. The different strategies pursued by individuals in the formal and informal labor markets and the pooling of effort within variously constituted households must be understood in the context of historical economic and political conditions. Changes in the steel industry and in state social policy encouraged flexible arrangements at home and at work. At times of contraction in the steel industry and in state services, households respond by increasing flexibility, for example through sharing childcare and food and in the labor market through a combination of formal and informal activities. In contrast, in periods of economic expansion there is a reverse tendency towards centralizing social networks and privileging nuclear household organization. But these adaptations to socio-economic conditions do not take place without tensions and Mollona points to the difficulties experienced as a result of conflicting pressures, in favor of dependence or autonomy, and the emotional ties of the household, commitments to pooling and cooperation as against the pressures of an increasingly casualized, flexible labor market.

The changing circumstances of employment have many ramifications, as Mollona shows. This is because, as Wallman pointed out (1979), work is to do with more than gaining an income. Even under conditions of capitalism and alienated labor, there is an intimate connection between the ways in which people go about making a living and the ways they position themselves in the world. Aronowitz (2004), commenting on the pioneering work of Paul Willis, drew attention to the implications of recent changes for working-class male solidarities, often forged on the factory shop-floor and in what he refers to as "sites of working class public spheres." The loss of secure employment impacts on households and on public space, particularly where there is a historical association with male labor, highly masculinized notions of work, and with the family wage. Such economic shifts that bring about loss of income and economic security re-signify the very contours of gender identities within and beyond households. Older workers and young men confront a future that can offer little in terms of stable gendered roles and divisions of labor; the new jobs, offering little in the way of security and pay, fall short of satisfying a sense of appropriate masculine working-class work. Arnot (2004) suggests that the crisis induced by the dissonance between expectations and reality and from the displacement of people and jobs, may find an outlet in performative expressions of hyper-masculinity. These may break from household and work based identities through an exploration of alternative spaces and expressions of masculinity (Arnot 2004; see also Loizos and Papataxiarchis 1991; Vale de Almeida 1996).

Households in the Global Division of Labor

Significant attention has been paid to profound changes in global capitalism since the oil crises in the 1970s that are reflected in differences in the scale and composition of capitalism. The discussion of the household, its naturalization and invisibility provides some degree of purchase on the transformation of the global labor market since households play an important role in subsidizing wages and providing alternative resources to support household members in conditions of precarious and unstable employment. These transformations also reflect classifications of work and persons in highly gendered ways. Mies (1998) proposes that capitalism is founded on two conditions: the need for cheap, docile, and flexible labor, typically associated with peripheral regions of the world system, and the need for sustained levels of consumption of the commodities produced, which she associates with wealthy

sectors in the core, embodied in the figure of the affluent housewife. The topography of capitalism changes as heretofore key industrial sectors, including those closely associated with male employment, have been streamlined and restructured, while new industries and the new international division of labor have resulted in the feminization of the industrial workforce. New configurations of gender and work emerged, for example with the rise of the electronics industry, characterized by highly gendered and regionalized divisions of labor that located so-called unskilled, low pay assembly workers—largely women—in the periphery and highly specialized and highly rewarded—generally male—tasks in design, product development and organization in locations close to centers of research, finance, and power (Henderson 1989). The phenomenon of the *maquiladoras* in Central and North America (Fernández-Kelly 1983; Nash and Fernández-Kelly 1983; Benería and Roldán 1987; Kopinak 1996; Lugo 2008), global factories in Malaysia and elsewhere in South and South East Asia (Ong 1987), as well as the relocation of textiles and garments and service industries (Freeman 2006), all contributed to the growth of a (generally young) female workforce. The availability of young, docile, and "unskilled" workers can be broadly understood in terms of patriarchal kinship structures that socialize young women in the household where they learn skills and internalize models of authority that may prepare them for the discipline of the work environment, although they may also provide symbolic and embodied resources through which they might resist authority and exploitation (Elson and Pearson 1981; Ong 1987, 2009; Pearson 1998). The naturalization of women's dexterity and demeanor deprives them of recognition as skilled workers and devalues their labor, condemning them to the lower ranks of the international division of labor.[12]

While the naturalization and racialization of workers emerges as an important feature in the global division of labor in line with Mies' analysis, some researchers challenge her dualistic model. Freeman for instance challenges the simple dichotomy between producers and consumers, third world and first world women, arguing that there is a growing convergence between these, as first world women engage in paid employment as well as in consumption, and third world women workers increasingly engage in consumption practices. In the informatics industry in Barbados, consumption is a vehicle for the making of gendered worker identities and women workers aim to surpass the already high expectations of management regarding their feminine and "professional" dress and demeanor. They invest considerable resources in putting together the desired image of an elegant, educated, and modern worker, achieved largely through self-awareness and self-discipline to create a persona that is clearly differentiated from the factory workers (Freeman 2006). Freeman claims that in Barbados we see "the emergence of a new West Indian woman who moves within a transnational arena, both as a producer, through the data she processes, and even more literally as a consumer, as she increasingly seeks out imported goods and invents new styles to mark her status" (Freeman 2006, 403).[13]

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12   In a salutary counter to current fetishizations of skill, Elson and Pearson (1981) observe that it is not the skill that confers value on the person, but rather it is the person as bearer of the skill that confers value. The question of whether widespread changes in the labor market and the employment of large numbers of young women will result in transforming or indeed in overturning patriarchal structures has been the subject of much reflection and debate. There can be no straightforward conclusion to the debate, not least because women continue to cluster in highly precarious and flexible sectors of the global economy. Women may draw on their resources as workers to negotiate a more advantageous place within the home, and may conversely draw on resources that are grounded in family life and in kinship values to redefine their place of work (Lamphere 2006).

13   The low wages of women in the Barbadian informatics industry mean that they must resort to the informal sector to sustain their carefully crafted consumer status, by supplementing their income and increasing their purchasing power. But Freeman notes that it also serves to enhance their enjoyment, and the creative possibilities open to women to create new goods and new styles for

In her call for a feminist analytics of the global economy, Saskia Sassen (1998) outlines the need for a new perspective on globalization in which she stresses the significance of the global city as the materialization of the forces and contradictions of the global system. Here the concentration of economic power and its reproduction takes place through the incorporation of largely invisible immigrant workers in low pay sectors. Workers in the financial sector are the actors of the global economy par excellence and the beneficiaries of increased stratification and hierarchy in what Sassen describes as the re-gentrification of higher paid workers. This process of gentrification is, crucially, dependent on the devalorization of the labor of immigrant—and largely women—workers. The home and office cleaners, nannies, cooks, and the army of underpaid workers, contribute to the accumulation of wealth and prestige by a minority. As in the global factories described by Ong and others, workers are gendered and racialized, their "natural" compatibilities with domesticity and child-care constructing them as eminently suited to the tasks demanded of them. As with the women in the global assembly line, the migration of (largely) women workers is a key feature of the global reorganization of reproduction. The concept of the new world domestic order (Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001; Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003)[14] points to the connections between production and reproduction, which are dynamically related on multiple scales (Morokvaśic 1984). Furthermore, those providing care and services in homes and institutions in cities and core regions of the global system frequently sustain households in rural areas and in regions in the periphery of the system, forging and sustaining transnational flows of money, commodities, and persons.

The global economy does not derive only from flows of capital seeking strategic opportunities or people seeking work and new futures. It is also constituted through institutional interventions that are carried out by global bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These have attracted criticism because interventions such as Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) are seen as spearheading changes that align local economies with the precepts of the neoliberal economic model. Feminist critiques of SAPs focus on their detrimental effects on local economies, disproportionately affecting the poor and increasing the vulnerability of children and women through pauperization (Sparr 1994). The effects of SAPs can be attributed to the analytical opacity of neoclassical economic models regarding the work of women and children, the labor invested in subsistence and informal sector activities and the inequalities that affect the distribution of resources. Sparr concludes that "Everyone is not the free agent required by the theory" (Sparr 1994, 18); the values of *homo economicus* are as closely entangled with adjustment and austerity as they are with the idea of the entrepreneur. As Labrecque (2012), quoting Bessis (2003) argues, the social and economic crisis unleashed by SAPs highlighted the role of women in coping with reductions in services and jobs leading the World Bank to identify them as key economic actors and resourceful agents in the struggle against poverty. As Labrecque and others argue, gender became an important building block within the Washington Consensus, targeting women for inclusion in the market economy through policies such as microcredit schemes. On the basis of her study of microcredit schemes in Mexico, Labrecque concludes that women's participation in the market economy has increased, but gender disparities persist—and may prove to be a fundamental condition for the ongoing operation of global capitalism.

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themselves, their friends, fellow workers, and family. Freeman also points out that the emphasis on style, dress, and demeanor respond to the need for visibility of their work in a situation in which it is relatively invisible, as is often the case with emotional labor and work in the service sector (Freeman 2006).

14   Sassen's second strategic focus is on sovereignty; fragmentations of state sovereignty produce openings, insterstitial though they may be, that can become sources of visibility for migrant workers (reflecting a strong anti-statist perspective, not always borne out by empirical examples).

Public, Private, and *Homo Economicus* revisited

In her conclusion to a study of family businesses in Italy, Yanagisako (2002) suggests that entrepreneurs across the Como silk industry, from the most successful and independent to those that are most dependent on larger firms, share an entrepreneurial ethos that cannot be explained simply in terms of a universal capitalist logic or by an essential Italian logic of family and reproduction. Instead, both capitalism and kinship are produced through "culturally meaningful actions" (Yanagisako 2002, 188). Similarly, the desires, identities, and aspirations of the men in her study are entangled with the trajectories of families and firms; their pursuit of success in the capitalist market is fully entangled with their role as fathers and their desire to ensure "the continuity of their families and the independence of their sons" (Yanagisako 2002, 14).

Like Yanagisako, Narotzky and Smith (2006) refuse to reduce the complexities of regional economies to universal values or abstract rationalities. They draw on Williams' notion of "structures of feeling" in their discussion of Vega Baja, Spain and it is these structures of feeling, alongside people's practices, that shape the economy of Vega Baja. Arguably then, it is culture that regulates the regional economy, but culture understood as historically constituted, multiscalar and, furthermore, as inevitably involving power relations. Power is central to the practices of enterprises and the economy. After all, the ability of an entrepreneur to command the labor of kin is based on the power derived from his place in the kinship and wider social structures through which and in relation to which he builds his firm.

The irreducibility of people's understandings, values, and actions (to capitalism or to culture) and the multiple factors they contend with, including differences in power and resources, suggests the untidiness and heterogeneity we can expect to encounter in any ethnographic setting. This complexity and messiness are important in order to rethink the status of economic actors within anthropological analysis, not only by re-gendering or de-gendering; rather, we need to place men and women within real, ongoing social, economic, and political conditions. What ethnographies show is not an absence of the individual, or of entrepreneurial motivation or skill, but their expression within the social, economic and political complexities which people confront on a daily basis. This is exemplified in Pine's discussion of the social and economic relations of the Polish Górale (Pine 1999).

Under socialism the Górale house was a core metaphor and central point of reference. The house and, by extension, the village were the source of positive identities and moralities, of a legitimate economy based on appropriate relations of authority and sociality. This contrasted with the outside, represented by the state and the state economy. But while the Górale emphasize the centrality of the house, of kin, family and house membership and reciprocal labor, they also recognize, and value, individual enterprise, "which although individualistic can also be seen as being for the benefit of the house" (Pine 2000, 90). A collective morality underpins village social and economic organization but when Górale leave the village for the outside world as traders and migrants, they operate according to different, individualist values that contrast with the collectivist orientation of the house and the village. Under socialism, the informal economy offered an important third space between the house/village and the state for the performance of these entrepreneurial skills. With outsiders they were and still are legitimately and playfully tricksters and entrepreneurs, using skill, humor, and deception. However, unlike the *homo economicus* (or *femina economica*) of neoliberal theory, this entrepreneurship was morally sound because its ultimate purpose was to provide for the house, rather than satisfy the entrepreneur's self interest. Here too there is a process of euphemization, which highlights what is valued (the domestic sphere, the economy of the

house and the village, kinship labor) and subverts the status quo (the state) by emptying it of meaning, legitimacy and value.[15]

Day describes the ways that young sex workers in London negotiate and manage clearly distinct public and private spaces and, in so doing, are compelled to operate through what the author describes as a "divided self" (Day 1999). At home, women are located within and bound by their commitments to home and family; "the self is stretched, as it were, in several directions and internalized or even dissolved inside other people through roles such as 'partner' or 'mother'" (Day 1999, 138). Work on the other hand consists of "hustling," highly valued for the opportunities it offers women to show initiative, skill, and good business sense. Unlike wage employment, sex work allows women to work independently and was valued as a source of wealth and independence. Day suggests that the sex workers in her study build their lives through dislocation as much as through connection and find spaces in-between the law and the market. Their highly valued independence at work, derived from their ability to read and manipulate the market rests on a contradiction, since to some extent independence is illusory. They navigate what is a precarious and volatile market but rhetorically, in claiming the market as their own, they deny a role to the client and to the real constraints imposed by the law and the risks of robbery, assault, murder, exploitation, and imprisonment. Although work belongs to the public sphere and is the space of hustling, volatility, and producing wealth, it is also the means to build a home, to sustain at least the illusion of home and the desire for domesticity and motherhood, which often remained an elusive goal.[16]

In her critique of Hardt and Negri, Yanagisako (2012) challenges their opposition between industrial and affective labor, since affect has always been a constitutive part of relations of production in the production and reproduction of social networks—of kin, friends, colleagues—that sustain entrepreneurs such as those she encountered in the Como regional silk industry. Entrepreneurial motivations and endeavors in these economies cannot be reduced to instrumental rationality. Rather, their motives are complex, involving affects, propensities, and possibilities that are all to do with kinship, masculinity, and place. Similarly, working-class men in Naples aspired to be independent, to be their own boss and in order to do so some were able to rally the resources and recruit the labor—unpaid or poorly paid—of family, kin, and neighbors. Their independence was largely illusory, as they inevitably resorted to self-exploitation to meet the deadlines and requirements of subcontracting firms. Like Melanesian big men, they eclipsed their own labor along with that of wives, sisters, children, and other relatives, in striving to achieve something worthy. Women too could aspire to independence and some highly-skilled outworkers came close to achieving it. But women were hampered by the implications of gendered divisions of labor, at home and in the industry, which deprived them of crucial skills and the labor of sons, brothers, husbands, and fathers. As Narotzky and Smith pointed out for the case of Spain, power, which is entangled with the affect, reciprocities, and loyalties of kinship and friendship, is required to build such possibilities. However, in Naples as elsewhere, women and men recognized the eclipse of their labor, or the

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15   The house was "a stage on which the hidden economy could be performed and its profits presented, particularly through elaborate and expensive ritual and ceremonial, in disguised form." Since Poland's transition to the capitalist market economy the Górale express their individualism in an extended arena; nevertheless, although rituals and practices of local identity change, they continue to be a source of attention and elaboration (Pine 2000).

16   A minority of women that Day describes as "radical individualists" were amongst the most successful and had also managed to dissolve, at least in part, the distinction and separation of private and public. For such women "the whole of life, private and public, is an achievement" (Day 1999, 153).

continuous absorption of their time and their efforts, when they referred to the sacrifices they made on behalf of their kin. In particular, children and the future they represent, provided the horizon through which much of what they did and strived for was given meaning and legitimacy.

Conclusion

From early efforts to recover women's perspectives, debates within the anthropology of gender revolved around the deconstruction of analytical and common sense categories, relating to notions of the domestic, of work, value, of male and female. The ethnographic and analytical attention paid to the native point of view, to local categories and meanings, provided the means to engage critically with analytical concepts and common sense notions embedded in contemporary economic and political systems. Gender is a structuring feature of the global economy, in conjunction with class, ethnicity, and race as ideologies that define specific persons and institutions. The ethnographic and theoretical challenge facing the anthropology of gender, and the discipline as a whole, is to grasp the material possibilities and limitations, the motivations, hopes, and sentiments and the social relations that prompt and shape the behavior of men and women in a changing world. Individual actors, increasingly under pressure from the shift to the casualization and flexibilization of labor, cannot be reduced to the logic of possessive individualism; rather, men and women navigate ever changing circumstances with reference to others, supporting and supported by relationships and aspirations that cannot be understood except in the context of their existence as social beings.

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Gender and Space

Susan Rasmussen

Introduction

One striking memory from my early field research in a rural Saharan, then semi-nomadic Tuareg community was the sound, during late night visits, of women weaving strips of palm-fiber for their tent construction and repair, often accompanied by their telling of tales depicting female founding ancestral culture-heroes. At that time, both men and women visited freely outside households, and attended late-night musical concerts together, only avoiding certain places haunted by spirits of the wild, such as tombs on roads connecting villages and camps. I also recall being startled by many unexpected visitors casually wandering into fenced circular compounds surrounding tents. Later, household compounds became enclosed by solid mud walls, often surrounding both the female-owned tent and the male-owned house, and visitors were expected to clap their hands once, or greet, to gain entry. In sedentarized and urban centers, gendered spaces are now even more contained: walls tend to be higher, metal doors stronger, men and women usually depart for musical concerts separately in gender-based groups, and visit at different times: women in the afternoon and men at night.

Anthropologists have devoted much attention to how human beings perceive, construct, and represent space, and how they use space in practice, especially in movement, including gendered mobility (Bourdieu 1977; Low 1996:861–79; Moore 1996; Prussin 1995). The present chapter critically reviews anthropological studies of gender and space, drawing on recent and current approaches in analyzing a case study: Tuareg gendered space and mobility, expressed in female actors' performance space in urban Tuareg plays in northern Mali, as impacted by some residents' transition from rural and pastoral nomadism to sedentarized and urban communities.

In performance spaces of modern urban theatrical plays presented in and around the town of Kidal, both women and men participate, but women often appear in more attenuated, subdued, and less physically mobile roles than they have in their more prominent roles in older Tuareg (Tamajaq) verbal art performances. For example, in the new plays, women's dialogical "lines," tend to be fewer, their bodily postures and gestures more restrained, and their motions less fluid and extended than those of men actors. Rather than walking about, female actors tend to sit straight and still, and speak very softly.

But do apparently restricted spaces and subdued motions in new performance space imply subordination and marginalization, or some other meaning? Beyond performance, many Tuareg women are not at all timid. They have always, like men, attended and participated actively in public verbal art performances outside home. The central question examined here is the apparent (and perhaps deceptive) contradiction: why is it, exactly, that Tuareg women, who have played central roles alongside men in longstanding "traditional"

verbal art performances of poetry, songs, tales and riddles, now appear more peripheral in the emergent new genre of theatrical plays called *des sketches* performed in urban spaces, often produced by NGOs, aid agencies, hospitals, clinics, and youth centers? The puzzle here is two-fold. Many Tuareg women enjoy relatively high social prestige and economic independence, and there is relatively free interaction between the sexes, persisting in urban settings, despite some socioeconomic and religious-driven changes in these more sedentarized communities. What is the significance of connections and disconnections between social and performance spaces? Both women and men compose play plots and scripts. How do these actions in the aesthetic performance space relate to wider gendered spaces (in built form, in socioeconomic power, and in symbolism), as many Tuareg experience transitions from rural and nomadic toward more sedentarized and urban spaces? Do these uses of the performance space indicate more peripheral emergent performance and social spaces generally for Tuareg women actors, or not? Is there an alternate meaning in these spatial practices?

Relevant here is the wider context of Tuareg transition from rural and nomadic to more sedentarized and urban social, economic, and symbolic spaces. In this, I am inspired by a number of important works on socioeconomic and symbolic gendered spaces, built-forms, and movements within and across them.

Gendered Spaces: Physical, Socioeconomic, and Moral

Public and Domestic Spheres/Domains

In 1974, Michele Rosaldo (1974:18) proposed an opposition between the "domestic orientation of women and the extra-domestic or public ties, that, in most societies, are primarily available to men," and suggested that women's status is highest in societies where the public and domestic spheres are only weakly differentiated. In contrast, women's status will be lowest in those societies where there is a firm differentiation between domestic and public spheres of activity, and where women are isolated from one another and placed under a single man's authority, in the home. Later, Rosaldo (1980:394) said that although male dominance appears widespread, it does not in actual practice assume a universal content or shape, have the same consequences, or express the same cultural constructs.

The domestic-public opposition in anthropology is heir to nineteenth-century European social theory, rooted in a dichotomy contrasting home and women to workplace and men, which emerged from the industrial revolution separating home and workplace (Brenner 1998; Moore [1986] 1996). Social life dichotomized into static domestic and public domains does not apply across all eras or cultures. In her important longitudinal studies of space and gender among the Marakwet in Kenya, Moore ([1986] 1996) analyzes how shifts in household organization and space from economic and social changes, such as wage labor and education, affect relationships between women and men. More broadly, this pioneering study shows the importance of reinterpretations and varying uses of space in practice and context.

Suzanne April Brenner (1998) shows that home and market, both associated with women in Javanese thought, are sites of economic production, but local cultural ideologies devalue women precisely because of their commercial pursuits, which detract from prestige. Yet domestic/public is not a rigid split, given the home batik industries, and women' activities are central to production of the family's economic-based status in broader Javanese society.

Rasmussen found further complexities and more nuanced spheres among pastoral nomadic Tuareg, where household work is public work (Rasmussen 1996). Despite some sexual division of labor, women are responsible for the creation, maintenance, and transport of nomadic architecture and its related artifacts. In many, though not all contexts, contained space is women's space, and extended space is men's space. The tent is part of the dowry institution, built on marriage (Brett and Fentress 1997). The tent and its furnishings are inherited from mother to daughter, and owned by the married woman. Adolescent boys and adult men are often absent from the nomadic camp and tent; women and girls work mostly within them, except in light herding, though they are not secluded or veiled (only men are veiled), domestic space is public space, and the work of each gender is equally necessary. In more nomadic rural communities, Tuareg women make important contributions to subsistence: they own herds, milk them, and control their products. Women's tasks are more likely to take place in camp than men's tasks, but they do not isolate or restrict women. Women gather plants, herd small livestock, and tan hides. The tent represents control over space. Since so much of women's creativity is directed toward setting up physical requirements for a household, this space is the scene of her creativity and control, as she transforms much of the natural environment into the cultural built-form. The nomadic tent is also a centerpiece of rites of passage (Rasmussen 1997). Both men and women participate in collective work patterns with other members of the same gender, and camps are typically divided into women's spaces and men's spaces, but almost all activities are carried out in the open, thereby avoiding development of private domestic spheres for women versus public spheres for men.

In Saharan towns, there is somewhat greater division of the sexes in physical interior domestic space, as well as in public sociability outside the home (especially on the urban street), and in labor. Married Tuareg men often eat, drink tea, and gossip with male kin and business partners, and at Friday and daily mosque worship. Because of new dangers from armed violence in Tuareg regions, most women vanish from the streets after dark (contrary to the past practice, of both sexes visiting at night). Women usually go out together (for chatting, hairdressing, rites of passage, and mosque activities) during the afternoon instead, with a few exceptions involving evening musical festivals during peaceful interludes. In an emerging urban evening male street culture, at sundown, marginally employed young single males gather in threes and fours, smoke cigarettes, and chat, and later congregate outside small shops in groups listening to recorded music. Many urban Tuareg men disapprove of parents who allow young girls to wander around visiting alone freely, and parents arrange earlier marriages now for daughters, explained as from fear of scandals from illegitimate births by girls who are no longer busy herding. Yet with technology, urban youths find ways of circumventing these gendered spatial restrictions in sociability: whereas in the past, a suitor needed to first approach a girl directly in person with her father present, now, the girl and her suitor can call each other on cell phones. Where home and workplace are clearly demarcated, therefore, the domestic-public opposition retains some explanatory value, but not with identical meanings or outcomes.

Cynthia Nelson (1974) and Lila Abu-Lughod (1993) challenge the idea that social worlds of men and women in the Middle East are reducible to private and public domains, with power limited to the public arena. Women's groups play a crucial role as structural links between kin groups, channel information to male kin, influence men through ritual, and impact decision making about alliances, thereby participating in public activities. These findings challenge longstanding associations between political power and a public domain that excludes women

Other studies show how time and space interweave. In India, who belongs outside at night and who does not is determined by multiple categories such as gender, caste, age, and

religion (Patel 2010:3). Areas perceived as safe during day transform into spaces of danger at night, and stories about dangers of going out at night are used to control women's mobility. Women who work nights in transnational call-centers break rules about their place, and some view them as "asking for" violence (Patel 2010:4).

Thus it is important to understand how perception of gendered space affects women's and men's statuses and powers in diverse social contexts.

Symbolic Gendered Spaces

Inside and Outside; Nature and Culture

Context is particularly important in the symbolic associations of women and men with both abstract and concrete spaces, pervasive in many societies. Among the Gabra people in the Chalbi desert on the Kenyan border, geographic and moral fields are coterminous and overlapping (Wood 1999). Women characterize and define the main camp, the social and moral center. Yet virtually all ritual activity is performed by men, but supervised by an elderly man who has culturally and ritually become a woman, called *d'abella* (Wood 1999:40). Men tend to locate their interests and identities outside main camps. Young men, for example, are given difficult jobs and tests, as the "women" in the satellite camp, serving older men. Later in life, men shift their attention from outside to inside when they become *d'abella* (Wood 1999:42).

Thus there are different semantic readings and shifts in gender, expressed in literal and non-literal places and spatial concepts. In China prior to 1949, only women who had left the family and its rules of respectability appeared openly in the streets (Rofel 1999). This cultural schema applied to women factory workers before the revolution, who, like beggars and prostitutes, were unmarriageable because they had transgressed the appropriate sexual spatial boundaries of where women should work (Rofel 1999:72). Silk factory prep work done at home, inside family silk workshops, was neither construed as domestic nor opposed to work. Later, in the Chinese Marxist revolution, women working in the outside silk factory could become political models, no longer "fallen women," but working-class exemplars. In post-Mao China, with economic reform, there was objectification of the individual worker through spatial arrangements with a position-wage system based on one's station on the shop floor.

Thus inside-outside concepts in gendered space have multiple and changing readings in relation to political-economic transformations, the life course, and modifications in built-form.

Consider the built-form and domestic households prevalent in an upper middle-class, predominantly Tuareg urban neighborhood of many formerly rural-based families who have moved to town. There, many compounds are surrounded by very high walls with strong metal gates, often painted blue or red with art motifs. Inside, doors separate buildings' interior rooms. One finds much more enclosed and geometric space than in the rural nomadic tent-dominated circular compound. In town, the emphasis is upon the nuclear household headed by a male breadwinner. In many households in this neighborhood, the everyday domestic work of a wife is demanding: cooking, laundry, cleaning, and child-care—unless the family can afford to hire a cook and/or water carrier (most local residents lack stoves and many lack running water), or can engage an adolescent relative to do the heavier tasks. The wife usually no longer herds livestock, depends more on her husband, and often is more isolated from her kin here than rural women, though she is not forcibly confined to home.

Other studies focus on more abstract principles and contrasts that structure each sex's relationship to their psyche, their bodies, and their sexuality in space. In his classic structural analysis of the Kabyle house in central Algeria, Bourdieu (1977:92) found an opposition between a centrifugal, male orientation and a centripetal female orientation. The interior of a Kabyle house is divided into two parts. The low dark part is opposed to the upper part as female is to male; it is the most intimate place. Thus the house is organized according to a set of homologous oppositions (Bourdieu 1977:90): fire:water—cooked:raw—high:low—light:shade—day:night—male:female—nif:hurma—fertilizing:able to be fertilized.

Bourdieu's classic analysis prefigured and inspired structural and post-structural analyses which have engaged contrasts between male and female relationships with nature and culture. Sherry Ortner suggested that women's position in the symbolic order (i.e., space) implies that they are ideologically viewed as less transcendental of nature than men (Ortner 1974;73). Women, she argued, are seen as closer to nature (i.e., natural spaces); they represent a lower order, symbols of something every culture devalues.

A problem with the nature vs. culture approach, however, is that ideas of nature and culture are not universal. In an important poststructuralist critique (Strathern in MacCormack and Strathern 1980:174–222), it is argued that one cannot attribute the same translations of nature and culture or the same polysemy or hierarchical gendered symbolism to others in an unanalyzed manner (Strathern in MacCormack and Strathern 1980:186). For example, in New Guinea, many Hageners oppose domestic, social, and exotic spaces, but neither male nor female matches a single overarching ideational principle (Strathern in McCormack and Strathern 1980:203). The domestic sphere is the heart of nurture, the place where food is prepared and consumed. Females and household represent particularistic, personally-oriented interests against males' public interests.

In rural semi-nomadic communities of northern Niger, Tuareg herbal medicine women's spatial practices disrupt many academic symbolic classifications and bridge standard structuralist binary oppositions (Rasmussen 2006). In their historically commemorative and socially mediating roles, herbal medicine women bridge domains often represented in anthropology as separate and discrete, such as nature and culture, domestic and public, and inside and outside. Tuareg medicine women and more broadly, much local cultural ideology, cannot be compartmentalized according to neat body/mind dualism, natural/cultural, or public/domestic spaces (Rasmussen 2006:ix). These specialists' work includes not only herbal and massage treatments, but also psycho-social counseling, and a few divine through dreaming, thereby treating non-organic as well as organic illnesses. Moreover, tent and wild, though contrasted, are not always rigidly dichotomized as opposite domains. Tuareg medicine women mediate between the tent (in their Tamajaq language, *edew* or *ehan*, also denoting marriage) and the wild (*essuf*, also denoting solitude and nostalgia, and *tenere*, denoting desert), and between the living human world and that of the deceased matrilineal founding ancestors, who are distinct from, but also overlap with some non-Qur'anic spirits (Rasmussen 2006:129). These specialists are not marginal in the sense of other nature/culture mediators.

Tuareg medicine women therefore illuminate the broader issue of how cultures as symbolic systems construct meanings largely from natural elements, and how human beings re-structure natural categories. As simultaneously mothers and professionals, these specialists bring together disparate elements, but local notions of nature and culture are not rigidly opposed in every context of practice. True, in some contexts the female-owned tent where medicine women treat illnesses stands for culture, and the wild outside it stands for nature, and men usually venture farther into the space of the wild/desert. But medicine women also venture to distant wild spaces to gather medicines (Rasmussen 2006:119).

Tuareg medicine women's mobility offers valuable preliminary insights into built-form, gendered space, and movement in rural nomadic Tuareg society. Fundamental to understanding gendered spatial elaborations in the urban play performances is a closer examination of these rural nomadic spaces and their transformations on sedentarization and urbanization.

The Tuareg Case: Rural Nomadic, Sedentarized, and Urban Spaces

Gendered Spaces and Movements in Residential, Socioeconomic, and Ideological/Symbolic Spaces

Tuareg regional confederations are comprised of descent groups and clans who, prior to French colonialism and national independence, were nomadic and dominated by aristocratic and tributary groups who collected tithes from client and servile peoples who performed domestic, herding, and gardening labor in return for military protection. Tuareg converted to Islam between the eighth and eleventh centuries CE, but vary widely in their adherence to Qur'anic law and extent of Arabic cultural influences (Norris 1975, 1990). In general, most women enjoy considerable rights and privileges, and have much social and economic independence and freedom of movement. Men and women travel independently, represent themselves in legal cases, and socialize in public. Both sexes of diverse social origins can become singers, musicians, and organizers of social and performance events, which feature much flirting and courtship. Married women may have unrelated male visitors (Claudot-Hawad 1993; Lhote 1953:33; Nicolaisen and Nicolaisen 1997; Worley 1992). Direct expression of a man's anger toward a woman is shameful, and in most rural areas wife-beating is rare (Rasmussen 2006).

Most descent groups combine Arabic, Qur'anic and state patrilineal with longstanding Tuareg matrilineal legal and ritual practices: for example, alternative non-Qur'anic property forms compensate women for male bias in Qur'anic inheritance, and herbal medicine women's healing is widely viewed as complementary to Islamic scholars' Qur'anic healing. Even within more devout Tuareg *ineslemen* (Islamic scholar/marabout) clans, women own some property, and although extra- and pre-marital affairs are less tolerated, men, not women, are usually fined or punished, except in parts of northern Mali where the Islamist Ansar (E)dine briefly seized control in 2012 and administered beatings to both sexes.

Tuareg women accumulate livestock through *akh hudderan*, an endowment of livestock passed to daughters, sisters, and nieces; through (*alkhalal*) from both parents and other relatives; and the husband's bridewealth (*taggalt*) and wedding presents (*temegi*). Women's herds therefore constitute their traditional source of wealth, but many animals have been lost in droughts, thefts, and wars since around the mid-twentieth century. Although these losses affect both sexes, gardens predominantly owned and farmed by men are easier to reconstitute. Some NGO and UN agencies compensate for lost herds, and others encourage sedentarization and newer occupations. Women's bases of property are increasingly altered by all these processes. For example, much property in large Saharan towns is not independently owned by the married woman, but merged together with that of her husband in civic records.

Built-Form in Rural Nomadic and Semi-Nomadic Communities

Rasmussen (1996:14–26) has described how, in a rural community that was more nomadic earlier in her research, many men traveled much of the year on salt and date caravans, and many women herded and gathered at that time. Each household consisted of one compound, usually an uxorilocal postmarital residence and nuclear household, and mothers, daughters, and sisters resided next door to each other and shared food, cooking facilities, and herds.

Today, rural communities vary along a nuanced range of herding and/or oasis gardening emphasis. With increasing shifts toward gardening, many couples have moved to reside nearer the husband's kin and his oasis garden. Some have moved into large towns near the husband's business.

In rural communities, the married woman's traditional nomadic tent (*edew* or *ehan*), constructed by the bride's relatives gradually during her week-long wedding, is still important. But increasingly, husbands build and own houses inside the same compound. Women still refer to the compound enclosure (now often mud-walled) as the *gara*, where the household unit eats together, and identify tents by their married woman owner's name. Men refer to the entire compound by the name of the male house-owner. On divorce, men tend to leave, and women tend to move back into their parents' compound, allowing their nuptial tent to gradually collapse (Rasmussen 1997).

In rural nomadic and semi-nomadic communities, the tent remains central as social, symbolic, and ritual space, particularly weddings—in many dialects of Tamajaq, the term for to marry is to make a tent (Rasmussen 1996:16). As already noted, in the countryside, local cosmology and mythology contrast the space of the nomadic tent and its associated moral feminine civilization to the space of the wild and solitude (*essuf*, also denoting nostalgia). Married, tent-owning women are seen as the moral anchors of society. The *oeud* or dried riverbed (*egoghas*) is intermediate. While not as desolate as the closely-related, sometimes conflated wild (*essuf)* and desert (*tenere*), the *oeud* nonetheless is a space outside constraints (Rasmussen 1995, 1996:17, 2008), the scene of anti-social behavior: begging, illicit love trysts, and recently, banditry. Spaces outside the maternal tent are therefore viewed with ambivalence.

In more nomadic rural camps, women are discouraged from performing what is defined as "heavy" physical domestic labor: grain-processing and planting, previously performed by servile and client persons, and, until recently, disdained by aristocratic and tributary persons. There are regional and rural/urban variations and social stratum, age, and kin-related transformations in these patterns, however. There are also changes from men's cultural encounters in labor migration, political exile, and armed conflicts: the intermittent Tuareg rebellions of the 1990s, and the most recent war, beginning around 2012, in Mali between the militant Islamist-reformist (mostly Arabic-speakers from Algeria), the more secular Tuareg nationalist/separatist MNLA (Mouvement national pour la liberation de Azawad) who declared Azawad in the northern Kidal region independent, and the Bamako-based Malian army supported by French troops.

Some Tuareg men returning from travels have brought back alien gender constructs, for example, favoring women's virginity on marriage and women's covering up more. But few advocate women taking up the enveloping veil, and most oppose the Islamists' efforts to ban mixed-sex gatherings and musical performances. The urban theatrical plays, which emerge from longstanding and changing verbal art performance genres, convey memories of a yearned-for but marginalized nomadic cultural space, as well as new predicaments of women and men in settled and urban spaces.

Effects of Sedentarization and Urbanization on Gendered Spaces and Mobility

With increasing sedentarization and oasis gardening over the past several decades, rural women no longer change the directions of their tent-doors outward to face female kinspersons' compounds (Rasmussen 1996) which conveyed older matrifocality during men's absence on seasonal caravans. Now, travel is less predictable, many men have settled down to garden or open shops, and the more patrifocal residential arrangement (i.e., buildings' and tent-doors facing inward toward the interior of the compound) remains permanent year-around. Furthermore, whereas in more nomadic camps, men are guests in their wives' tents, and may be ejected from it on divorce or quarrels, men's houses now complicate property relationships, and predominantly men own and farm oasis gardens, as well (Rasmussen 2009).

In towns such as Agadez, Niger and Kidal, Mali, raw materials for tents and feed for herds are expensive, or no longer available to women. One must rely on paid, non-kin labor. Productive and processing labor moves to other spatial and behavioral realms. As Prussin (1995) points out, once the reconstruction and reassembly that reinforced meanings of nomadic ritual space no longer exist, some rituals lose their socio-economic efficacy. Symbolic furnishings associated with marriage, for example, may persist, but are no longer created by the bride and her family. In Agadez and Kidal, unrelated men's carpentry is an important emerging occupation in the demand for bedroom-sets as new *tamegi* gifts from groom to bride. Some echoes of nomadic symbolism in weddings persist: when friends bring the groom to the home of the bride's parents, they circulate in cars decorated like camels around the entire town, rather than the rural circling of a single compound or tent. In socioeconomic practice, sedentarization and urbanization entail a gender shift in creation, ownership, maintenance, and control over domestic building, hence over spatial technology, and by extension, property relations. Thus, to borrow Prussin's (1995:202) term, the art of memory requires another system of mnemonics.

I argue that this process—of memory making—occurs not only in creation of a new domicile that continues to be associated with marriage, but also in sociability and performance, though I contend that these performances are also forward-looking in some respects. Some Tuareg leaders believe that settled and urban environments endanger Tuareg culture and the Tamajaq language. In response, they promote unity in language, arts, and dress. This system of mnemonics, I show presently, is one goal of the urban plays, but some plays, I soon show, are also didactic and future-oriented. The actors in gendered performance space express dilemmas, contradictions, compromises, and transformations in the urban space.

In more sedentarized rural and urban Tuareg communities, some married women are described as housewives (French *menageres*, tellingly, with no precise Tamajaq equivalent). In more sedentarized communities, *taneqait* (transfer of a married woman's herds from her mother's after the latter approves of the groom and his bridewealth payments are completed) has ceased since around 2002. Bridewealth is monetarized. A few gardeners' and merchants' wives have given up their tents. Few women individually inherit or own gardens or houses. In some rural oases, some wives now grow their own crops, since around 2008, within a smaller space inside the husband's garden. But men occupy higher managing positions in regional agricultural cooperatives, and predominate as town market merchants, though some women own small shops and restaurants, and some belong to tailoring and leatherwork cooperatives.

Town market and performance spaces are considered public, and though not forbidden to women, are regarded with ambivalence for higher-status women (i.e., those of non-servile and non-smith origins, who still attempt to embody and practice qualities most closely associated with the pre-colonial nobility: dignity, reserve, and restraint). Tuareg women of aristocratic background have only recently begun selling items in urban markets (formerly

done by former slave women). More devoutly religious persons in Islamic scholar clans, of noble descent, explained that, "the reason for this is not opposition to (our) women conducting trade, but rather, concern about their displaying themselves so openly in public." Babies' namedays, held inside urban compounds, are considered private (inside/domestic) space, and female guests bring products to sell to each other there, in "hidden" trading networks, thereby maintaining their dignity and reserve, and also obtaining some income.

Although Tuareg women of diverse origins shop at markets, and dance and perform in public urban spaces, there are limits to how women of aristocratic (*imajeghen*) and tributary (*imghad*, who traditionally raided and traded for *imajeghen*) origins should do this stylistically. Their gait should be slow and measured, and their gestures few. A man of noble origin commented disapprovingly of women in an urban musical concert who danced, in his view, "too freely, with too many loose (uncontrolled) motions and gestures."

Thus there are changes and continuities in gender constructs, related to religious and social backgrounds, in rural nomadic, sedentarized, and urbanized spaces and movements in them. On the one hand, nomads' mobility has been curtailed, through colonial and post-colonial state censuses, schools, and taxes. Pastoral border zones have been farmed, disrupting ecological and political balances. On the other hand, many urban residents frequently travel, transhumant-like, between town and countryside, where many have relatives and some property. There is not a diametric, polar opposition or rigid dividing-line between rural and urban, or nomadic and settled spaces or lifestyles. Gendered spaces are therefore continually re-constructed socially and culturally, and are usefully understood as relational, comparative, and fluid. But clearly, there are profound contrasts and transformations in spatial experience over the full range of these settings.

In town, multi-ethnic, bureaucratic, and religious influences, and escalated regional violence, curtail women's mobility. Thousands of refugees returned from labor migration in Libya during the 2011 war overthrowing Gadhafi, and many remain armed and/or unemployed. Armed conflicts in border zones of Algeria, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria have interrupted tourism and disrupted commerce. In these uncertain circumstances, one rural space remains salient, though modified: the cosmological space of the wild or *essuf*. No one, particularly a woman, should sleep alone in a compound, so others also sleep there if other kin are away on travel for protection against, not solely Kel Essuf spirits of the wild, who have always entered empty spaces, but also new dangers from violent humans. Women are also vulnerable to spirit attacks if they return home unaccompanied late at night from an evening musical event. In another context, *essuf* now denotes nostalgia: a woman married to a prosperous Tuareg merchant in town lamented, after her mother and aunts left for their rural area following their visit, "I am in *essuf* now, since our elderly women (*chimghaghen nena*) are all gone!"

In sum, urban spaces and movements in some respects compartmentalize, fragment, and segment, if not restrict, gendered and class-based practices. Yet surface practices do not tell the whole story. Attitudes toward women are generally respectful, and men are still not supposed to give orders to women, make them angry, or insult them. Moreover, some women find new economic opportunities denied them in the past. Women can use the urban setting to escape from a stressful extended household, can gain access, in more settled centers, to schooling. Finally, many alternate between these spaces.

The Body in Urban Spaces

Contradictory forces at the interface of nomadic-sedentarized life, and class, religious, and ethnic encounters are expressed in battles over the female body. These forces are embodied and reflected upon in the "modern" (i.e., new verbal art genre) urban theatrical

plays, thematically and stylistically: in plot themes, dialogues, motions, and gestures in the performance space. Many Tuareg prefer "fat" (not muscular, but rather fleshy) women. In the past, some adolescent noble girls in nomadic camps underwent elaborate coercive fattening rituals inside their mother's tent, but today these rituals have much declined because of diminished resources and more health education. Female fatness traditionally has positive meanings: dignity and prestige in exemption from heavy physical labor (an ideal attribute of aristocratic and, to a lesser extent, tributary status); complementary differences between the sexes (women should be seated inside their tent, men should wander farther afield); beauty and fertility; and authority and control over subordinates and resources (in women's independent property ownership, and their commanding, in the past, clients and slaves, but also, their being generous toward them) (Rasmussen 2010a, 2010b).

In the town of Kidal, the ideal of female fatness encouraged by women's limited mobility persists, but is challenged and debated. Many adolescent men are jobless and unable to raise bridewealth or purchase extra food. During peaceful interludes, aid agencies, schools, the hospital, NGO businesses, job-training programs, and media promote the integration of rural "nomads" and unemployed youths into the urban infrastructure by addressing health and education concerns. These organizations sponsor the new urban plays dramatizing these concerns in didactic messages, which stereotype rural and pastoral nomadic people as naïve "peasants," and youths as irresponsible, for example, as resisting hygiene and schools, who need to be re-educated. Re-shaping the female body is part of this wider agenda. Some school and hospital programs instruct on nutrition and diet, warning against diabetes and high blood-pressure, and encourage literacy and hospital births.

Many female actors in Kidal's "modern" plays are of noble or tributary backgrounds, and have rural relatives who herd, albeit with fewer livestock. In responses to the "modernizing" agendas, some exalted longstanding local cultural values emphasized contained female movement in space, but others embraced change. Some women, particularly young elite women exposed to media and performances, expressed an emerging consciousness of the more slender new bodily aesthetic ideal. A few female actors, for example, mentioned to me their attempts to lose weight. Others refused to walk long distances, regarded European exercise videos as ridiculous, and defended the older aesthetic: the embodiment of values of dignity, reserve, and restraint enacted by a non-servile, non-smith woman, who walks slowly, remains seated inside her home as much as possible, and keeps gestures to a minimum.

Many plays and other media reveal "dueling" old and new ideas, verbally and non-verbally, concerning women's bodies and bodily motions in gendered spaces. Others expressed compromises over contending ideals. For example, a local beauty contest for Miss Kidal was very controversial, and initially resisted by many elders and religious scholars since it might feature women's physical mobility (strutting, expansive dancing with abandon, and effusive gestures) and the wearing of scant clothing (such as Western-style bathing-suits) in public before an audience. Eventually, the organizers convinced them to allow the contest, agreeing to omit bathing-suits, and appealing to longstanding male and female contests in verbal art performance in Tuareg society.

Reasons for the elders and religious scholars' concerns were complex. Even prior to the 2012 Islamist-reformist militants' establishing Shari'a law in some northern Malian towns until driven out by French and Malian troops, politics played a role. Many residents feared that the town's elders and more devout Muslims would ban scanty dress, but there were also cultural concerns. Women considered "beautiful" should in local viewpoint also be well dressed and bejeweled; the overexposed, unadorned and underdressed female body valued in occidental media was not valued there. Tuareg cultural and aesthetic values place great emphasis upon layered and voluminous dress and modesty for both sexes, and

finely-worked silver and gold jewelry. During courtship, these qualities are given great importance, along with witty conversation and poetry (Loughran and Seligman 2006).

Thus dress acts as an extension of Tuareg bodily gender aesthetics of dignity and reserve. Persons of aristocratic and tributary origins traditionally dress in ways that restrict their movements, iconically convey their lesser need to perform physical labor, and speak and otherwise act in ways that display their (former) monopoly over resources and conspicuous consumption, but also their reticence and subtlety from fear of evil eye jealousy (Rasmussen 2013). This aesthetic, not oppression, is partly why female actors tend to restrict their verbal and non-verbal expressions in the new urban plays analyzed next, though some marginalization also occurs.

Aesthetics, Mobility, and Politics in Tuareg Performances

Gender and Mobility in Longstanding "Traditional" Verbal Art Performance and the Modern Urban Plays

As already noted, Tuareg women are not new to public performance. Traditionally, both sexes composed and performed poetry and songs, played musical instruments, and recited tales, with different genres and styles associated with each pre-colonial social category. Women's acting style and roles in the newer urban plays and these plays' gender-related plot themes, reflect complex encounters: between older local verbal art, nomadic gendered and class spaces and movements, state and urban bureaucracies, media, and NGO and aid agency policies, sporadic wars, and religious and secular viewpoints.

In particular, there are transformations and disputes over the longstanding prevalent Tuareg preference for a "respectable" (high-status) woman who is sedate and dignified in social and bodily comportment, and who does very minimal hard labor (and by extension, little physical activity—herding and tent-construction defined as "light," and often done by former slaves, children, or in communal work parties). A female musician playing the *anzad*, a bowed one-stringed lute associated with nobles and tributaries, in the past often remained seated inside her tent, and male guests conveyed a complex etiquette emphasizing respect for women through metaphor, euphemisms, and subtle hand gestures (Gast 1992).

In contrast to these older local cultural ideals, and also in defiance of Islamist-reformists' agendas, many young men and women now dance in couples "rock-style" to guitar music; whereas in the past, only men danced, often with lances, approaching a line of women who sang praises and social criticism judging them. Town officials now stage performances featuring a medley of musical genres, interspersed with plays, in a family compound, near a market, or on a raised "Western"-style stage/platform (the latter new to Tuareg performance), with diverse specialists of different origins performing in ensembles. Some plays and concerts are still organized by individual families, but many are orchestrated by outside authorities. Depending on venue, audiences vary from small close kin, friends, and neighbors inside a compound, to students at lycées (high schools) where an educational play is presented, to large groups at official events and individuals casually passing by, as at market performances.

In the plays, taboos on high-status women's bodily motions (should not be too unrestrained or rapid) and gestures (should not be too expansive, explicit, or effusive) in public spaces restrict female performers to predominantly seated dialogues, singing, and musical instrument playing. By contrast, male actors tend to speak more dialogues

and longer poetic monologues, and to enact more physical actions than female actors: for example, male actors walk quickly, draw water from wells, and engage in sword-fighting in disputes. Moreover, although youthful male actors usually perform roles of characters their own age and gender, they sometimes play elderly and female characters. But elders and women actors do not perform in disguise the roles of youthful and/or male characters.

Women performing in the "modern" urban plays often participated in the dialogues in very low, soft voices, and usually remained seated and still during much of the performance. This standard is in keeping with the older ideal of aristocratic women in nomadic camps, who though not secluded, are supposed to remain as often as possible seated inside their tent, since this bodily habitus conveys dignity, reserve, and high status, as "mistress" of tent and herds, able to entertain and generously support visitors and subordinates. As Tekres (pseudonym), a talented female actor, singer, and playwright, explained,

> *Other women and I tend to play more subdued acting roles in the modern plays' sketches; most women prefer to perform solo in songs and poems, since sketches/plays involve more bodily motions such as gestures (sikbar), which are shameful for women of aristocratic and tributary origins, who, in contrast to smiths and former slaves, emphasize the cultural value of reserve, in public. Performance (per se), however, is not a problem for us, only gestures and body motions are.*

These orientations, gender and class-based, express two divergent influences, however: the longstanding Tuareg nomadic emphasis upon noble, tent-owning women as centers of "civilization" who awaited men's return from trading and battles, and judged them according to their success or failure; and also some recent constraints of town life with its unknown strangers, violence, and economic and religious changes.

Indeed, also at play here are political conflicts: there are some male attempts to control performances by women, and there is evidence that some female actors may offer low-key performances in reluctance, resistance, even subversion, in order to indirectly express their disapproval of such interference. One female actor complained that, at one Kidal radio station, a male staff member wanted only rural girls to act in sketches there because he preferred "traditional" (rural) clothing over "modern" (urban) dress. His preference derived from aid and NGO organizations, rather than from the female actors' own self-concepts or concepts of their cultural "tradition."

Instructive here is the history of acting in northern Malian Kel Adagh Tuareg society. Another female actor explained: "The first actors were all men. But actors respected women; they were not, in principle, at least, supposed to be their lovers; rather, they gave gifts to aristocratic women for God." This role recalls that of the troubadours in medieval Europe. Tuareg women became actors in the modern urban plays later, with the consciousness-raising programs of state and NGO agencies in the towns.

Yet as noted, in pre-colonial society, both men and women composed and performed poetry and songs and played instruments, and some female actors today compose plays. Gendered performance is still mediated by social stratum origin in some rural areas. There, each social category still dances in a distinctive style at rural rites of passage (Casajus 2000; Rasmussen 2003, 2013). For example, a smith/artisan woman's "griot-like" comic repartee performed at her noble patron families' weddings in some regions, called *tebateq*, features abundant and vivid gestures, often cupping the hands in a manner miming begging, conduct reflecting smiths' general lack of nobles' reserve, as well as reminding the latter of their obligations to give smiths/artisans remuneration in food and cash for their services. Smiths, like griots, simultaneously mock as well as praise their patrons, conducting an amusing critical social commentary. Many rural smith performers also remind guests of the

importance of women and female kinship relationships, in images of eating, the mouth, and the stomach (Rasmussen 2003:498). Female comedians of aristocratic origin are rare; most comedians, called *kel seghsegh*, tend to be male.

Many play plots, characters, and acting styles express negotiations over gender and class more broadly, in domestic and extra-domestic spaces, as in the following selections.

Selected Plays: Summaries, Discussion, and Analysis

A play entitled "Girls' Education," performed by a local acting ensemble called Voices of the Desert, has the goal of promoting education for women, and convincing parents, in particular rural nomads, to send their daughters to school. Ironically, however, there is an all-male cast (all men actors portraying all men characters), with three actors including the script's playwright, also a renowned poet. One actor played In Hinan, who tries to convince another character, also a rural nomad and a father, named Igra, who at first opposes girls' schooling, but later is won over, and another plays another nomad named Mahmoud, who is somewhat ambivalent, but less opposed to girls' schooling.

Although attitudes are changing, many Tuareg initially opposed secular, in particular girls', schools. The French colonial and independent state governments of Mali and Niger forcibly enrolled children in the early twentieth century, and used schools for censuses and taxes (Keenan 1976). Also, many parents fear that some teachers harass female students, and that secular schooling will destroy their culture and religion.

Mahmoud's and the father Igra's principal concern here therefore mirrors a more generally held Tuareg concern: that girls in school will abandon their culture, and also become "wild," for example, Igra states, "If you leave a girl in school, there are no rules, they are going to do what they want … (and also) … because my daughters are beautiful, (and) I nourish them well, so no need for school." Mahmoud states, "When girls go to school, they must dress in an appropriate (correct) manner and keep to the customs … I do not want them to look at (be influenced by) other girls because they are nude: nothing, breasts exposed outside their clothing." (Here, he refers to not literal nudity, but some Malian girls' Western fashion of tight knit tops, camisoles, etc.) Also, Igra fears, "If you put girls in school, they become Christians (*ikofer*). Watch out! Even if you bring school here, they will be spoiled."

Thus there are fears of secularizing urban space, less modesty, and Christianity (*ikofer* can refer to both Christians and Europeans) (Rasmussen 2004). In Hinan reassures Igra and Mahmoud that when his own daughters return from the distant school, "… they return without problems, they dress correctly, they pray, they wear appropriate clothing, a large dress, robes and scarves, (so) follow (my) advice." He goes on to describe the advantages of girls' schooling, for example, working in an office, but advocates parents' supervising and advising enrolled daughters and sons.

In another play, entitled "Exile (Labor Migration) in Libya," a family dispute over a son's plan to travel to Libya to earn money reveal gendered themes in the character portrayals. In this play, also performed by the ensemble Voices of the Desert, inside a family compound, a male actor played an older woman in the family where two sons dispute with elderly parents over migrant labor travel plans. Both mother and the father assert their opposition to this plan, and refuse to bless their sons before travel. The father even brandishes his sword. The mother exclaims, "What will we do with the livestock? There is no one to watch them. There is only you (father) left here. Others (in the family) have left for Libya." They must disperse their animals among different people. The old father falls ill, and dies. Mourners and others lament that, since the son has neither returned nor sent money from Libya, they need to sell the family's livestock to pay for others' herding, and to finance the mortuary

ritual. At the ritual, during the Qur'anic reading, mourners discuss how the father's illness was caused by the sons who went to Libya.

In this play, therefore, although a male actor played the old mother, and her lines were fewer than those of other characters, nonetheless, her role was not passive: she voiced the family's important economic concerns. Also, she, not her husband, survived the stress of the sons' departure from the maternal tent and its consequences.

In another play, called "Marriage in the Past," first performed in order to convince audiences not to fight too much in marriage and bridewealth negotiations, the cast included a male actor playing two female roles: an old woman and her daughter. There is some duplicity by a go-between suitor who "steals" the girl's affection, and resistance in the girl's rejection of a suitor initially preferred by her parents. The girl here surreptitiously allows the go-between, an urban man on a motorcycle, to court her. The old mother appears more cautious than her husband, the old father, in asking who this man is, exactly, and takes an active part in negotiating the bridewealth, speaking with other female relatives and influencing the outcome.

Here, despite the portrayal of both female characters by a male actor, note that the plot and theme still represent Tuareg women, particularly older, rural, nomadic, and married, tent- and livestock-owning women, as very respected and assertive, and others value their opinions. The young girl also asserts influence on her marriage, subtly, behind the scenes.

Thus women's roles stylistically and thematically here are complex Interestingly, there are several female actors in the ensemble "Voices of the Desert," but they did not appear in the two plays above, because they were at the time out of town, following their herds at pasture! But the reverse is not the case: females never portray male characters, even when male actors are gone. At other performances, these and other female actors did perform, albeit with restrained actions and gestures.

Thus the style of acting, rather than the acting profession per se, is the primary context in which women are more subdued, but in other respects, their roles are not always passive.

For example, in another play, also on "Labor Migration to Libya," broadcast on local radio and also presented live in its courtyard before predominantly youths, by an ensemble called The Visionaries, written by a journalist and actor, a female actor played two roles: the mother and the sister of a son who wanted to go to Libya. During the series of droughts, unemployment conditions, and political tensions with central governments of Mali and Niger, particularly since the 1970s, many young Tuareg men have migrated to Libya for work in herding, gardening, and occasionally, in the oil industry and other factory work, often of uncertain remuneration and even dangerous. Even prior to the civil war there, some employers were rumored to refuse to pay migrant workers upon their completion of work. After the overthrow of Gadhafi, many suffered stereotyping as his mercenaries, and had to flee for their lives. This play, like some others, is didactic edutainment. It opens with a young man and his sister herding animals and fetching water, and the son complaining he is tired of doing this work. He wants his sister to do all of this work, but she resists his orders. His mother actively participates in family discussion of the Libya migration plan, taking the father's side, and believing the son will regret going to Libya; "many who go to Libya, will go crazy" because of their rumored misfortunes and disappointments there.

The intergenerational, kin, and gender dynamics here are complex. The son is anti-social, someone who does not respect either his elderly parents or his sister, and eventually he pays the price: he is taken advantage of by employers, since he cannot count in the local (Libyan) monetary system, his pay is stolen, and he goes insane. Women "talk back" here, despite having fewer lines than the men. As in some other plays, a son's misfortune is explained as caused by the son's disobeying his parents and not obtaining their consent or blessing before travel. An Islamic scholar must cure him with Qur'anic verses, and the family must pay

him five goats, all they have left. The mother laments, "What (use) is money?" underlining the importance of herds until recently as wealth, and illustrating the ambivalence of many rural nomads toward monetarization and their distrust of cash-based labor for strangers in distant spaces.

Thus women's acting appearances (even if fleeting) and performance styles (even if subdued) are often detached from gendered meanings (women can be assertive and influential) in the plots of many, though not all, plays. Their performance styles, furthermore, are not exact representations of audience composition or conduct. For both women and men attend public performances (plays, songs, music, poetry) and socialize very freely there, though ages vary depending on the venue. Many plays are held at youth centers, school courtyards, and markets. Sometimes, officials or NGO agencies organize them to mark special occasions or disseminate messages. At a play I saw held at a lycée (high school), for example, adolescents of both sexes tended to predominate in the audience, and there, plays are most didactic, though others are, as well. Other plays are held inside private compounds, organized by a family, with more intimate atmospheres and smaller audiences, mainly kin and neighbors. Some plays broadcast on radio were interrupted by the political violence that broke out between Tuareg separatists, Islamist reformists, and the Malian and French armies in northern Mali in 2012.

Other plays present more contradictory themes, even when female actors play more central characters (but still act with subdued speech and restrained motions). In these "high-profile" roles, women are in fact portrayed negatively as anti-social, as the following two plays illustrate.

In a play entitled "Revolution," performed by an acting ensemble called Travelers of the Desert, written by its actor/founder, a female actor plays a young rural girl, engaged to marry, in an arranged marriage. She visits her uncle in town, and there she is tempted by consumer goods in the store of a merchant who attempts to discredit her fiancé with false rumors, and to seduce her. The female actor (male actors portray her father, her uncle, the merchant, and her wronged fiancé) takes a more active role than usual, though she remains seated throughout, never moving around, and her lines are very few. Others, mostly, talk about her in "reported speech," in effect, relating her story for her. Even her actions in town, which involve walking "around" (taboo), are only related by others; for example, her uncle-host critically comments to her, "You are starting to walk (around town) too much," thereby reflecting thematically the more general fear for women's endangered safety and dignity in the urban street space, and reflecting stylistically the continuing taboo against (non-servile and non-smith) women moving about too freely in public. But he does not seclude her forcibly inside his home. She purchases items on her own, suggesting that, on the one hand, some women still enjoy economic independence in monetarization, but on the other, that they are prone, in stereotype, to spend money quickly on temptations in town. In the conclusion, her fiancé and a friend disprove the merchant's false rumor that the former stole some cows, and repair his reputation with the girl's (rural) father. The family welcomes their daughter back home in their nomadic camp, suggesting a happy ending but also a didactic warning: of dangers to young women in the town.

Although the female actor plays an important, central rather than peripheral character here, her character is less assertive than some female characters played by male actors in some other plays. And she is presented didactically as a negative example (though also sympathetically, as a victim of unscrupulous, seductive urban merchants). Perhaps this unflattering portrayal reflects women's less powerful position in town. In some other plays, by contrast, there are more peripheral roles for female actors, but those roles portray strong women, as in the Libyan migrant labor plot. Hence the frequent disjunctions between plot, character, and performance style in portrayals of relationships between the sexes.

Similarly, in another play, entitled "The Well," performed inside a family compound by the Travelers of the Desert, a female actor plays a (female) witness during a property dispute hearing held by a marabout. She sits, silent and dignified, dressed in her best indigo clothing and headscarf, among the men there (all played by male actors). The play concerns a fight between two men: one, the true owner, inherited the well from his grandfather, and the other, lying, claims to have purchased it legitimately. The female among the witnesses at the Qur'anic judgment is eventually revealed as a false witness supporting the liar. Although she encourages a swearing on the Qur'an that each is telling the truth, the liar refuses to do this, admits his lie, and the presiding Islamic scholar/judge recognizes the true owner's right to the well.

This woman character, as a witness, illustrates Tuareg gender equity (women may represent themselves and be witnesses), but since she is discredited, by implication, also reveals ambiguity in Qur'anic law, and some Islamists' view that a woman is a less reliable witness than a man.

Conclusions and Wider Implications: Gendered Uses of Space in the Plays and Beyond

In some respects, the aesthetic style of most Tamajaq plays in Kidal continues a longstanding Tuareg cultural and linguistic emphasis upon verbal, rather than the kinesthetic, "action-oriented" skill emphasized in some other African performance traditions (Arnoldi 1995; Cole 2001; Hale and Sidikou 2012; Reed 2003). At the beginning of each play, actors always greet each other, though not the audience; much less emphasis is placed upon audience response, and more upon actors' conversational verbal wit, plot complexity (some built on old tales, others on monologues or poems), and for male actors (usually comedians), some gestures and other bodily movements, though there are also a few serious action-oriented sketches: as for example, in the sword-fight in "The Well." The Tuareg cultural emphasis on indirect, metaphorical verbal expression applies to both male and female actors of high social prestige (i.e., formerly, noble and tributary), but with much greater reticence in speaking and less physical mobility by female actors. Yet some women also write scripted plays.

Thus on one level, women's performance style of verbal and bodily restraint reflects class, not solely gendered ideals, recalling linguistic patterns in some other stratified African societies, for example, the "cool speech" expected of Wolof of aristocratic background, as contrasted with the "hot speech" of Wolof griots (Irvine 1974), as well as close parallels among Bambara aristocrats as contrasted to smiths and griots (McNaughton 1988). Tuareg ideals of dignity and reserve in speech and motion are a mark of prestigious conduct of upper-class persons, albeit more so on the part of women, and in distinctive spatial contexts over time.

This gendered spatial and kinesthetic restraint in acting style enacts the longstanding Tuareg etiquette of courtship in rural nomadic camps, in which a woman "receives" a man in her tent space, who respects her. Tent space, recall, is domestic and public at once, owned by women. Although men of noble and tributary background, too, are somewhat constrained by reserve and respect, they express these attitudes differently: in their face-veiling and their gallant and protective conduct toward women and elders, as warriors and long-distance traders in "wild" spaces beyond the tent.

The plot themes are more ambiguous in meanings. Some influences derive from Tuareg cultural interpretations of Islam, as well as newly intruding reformist Islamist piety movements. There are also, as shown, hints that some female actors feel reluctant or unenthusiastic about some roles assigned them in the new urban theater.

Yet a question remains: given that most women in local cultural values should be respected, then why were women in a few plays so negatively portrayed? In the Qur'anic Islamic idea (as interpreted by more "devout" Islamist-reformists) of the woman as an unreliable witness (of lesser importance than a man as witness), a dilemma was highlighted, since the woman witness, accepted in Tuareg culture, was later discredited in her supporting the false claimant to the well ownership. Multi-ethnic urban influences may also be at play in this portrayal. In "Revolution," a view of women as weak, materialistic, and tempted by consumer goods and wealth recalls a similar view of women in some Hausa folktales.

Thus struggles and contradictions enacted by some plots and characters in the play space reflect, albeit not in a simple or direct manner, those encountered in the urban space. Some men feel threatened by the opportunities offered to women in urban public spheres, and others worry about their safety. Woman as cultural tent-owner is in effect, wandering into a new space of *essuf*, a new wild: of unpredictability. Acting reveals and even disrupts not solely gendered, but also class-based, contradictions—between new opportunities and expectations in urban spaces, and challenges to maintaining longstanding prestigious noble values of reserve and dignity, to which many persons of diverse origins aspire today.

In settled centers and towns, as shown, women and men experience increasingly separate divisions of social and economic spaces from Western, central state, secular, Islamist, and multiple ethnic and class influences, and the plays remind audiences of (at least, the organizers', actors', and playwrights' versions of) "traditional" gendered values from pastoral nomadic spaces that remain, in their view, crucial to maintaining the high social prestige of many Tuareg women. The new urban plays didactically modify gendered constructs of performers compared to older Tuareg verbal art performance, convey some continuity between them, and reveal modifications and challenges.

More broadly, these plays illustrate the importance of relationships, practice, and contextual meanings in cultural constructions of gendered spaces—socioeconomic and symbolic—and mobility within and across them.

Acknowledgements

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PART IV
Studies of World Religions

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Christianity:
An (In-)Constant Companion?

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This chapter is about the shifting relationship between anthropology and Christianity. Any relationship has different dimensions—some that are openly acknowledged, and some that are concealed; some that may reflect imbalances between two parties, and others that express ideals of equality. Relationships can go through periods of harmony or occasionally descend into mutual incomprehension or enmity. A common view of anthropology is that it developed as a secular discipline, actively distancing itself from theology and the latter's Christian associations. Up until at least the 1980s it was common to hear anthropologists say that they had encountered Christian missionaries in the field but had tried to ignore them while they studied the "local" culture.[1] Christianity in many conventional fieldwork contexts was seen as a troubling remnant of colonial times, while its presence in Western societies was regarded as of little interest. Nonetheless, these comments do not tell the whole story of the relationship. The fact that for much of the twentieth century anthropology paid relatively scant ethnographic attention to Christianity may suggest a combination of hostility and indifference; but it also reflects a more complex, ambivalent set of interactions. The term "companion" derives from the Latin word *compania*, which in literal terms means "one who eats bread with another," implying not merely separate identities but also mutual bonds expressed through proximity, parallel practices and even a hint at consubstantiality. It points in other words to both conjunctions and distinctions. In this chapter, we shall explore examples of both.

What, then, of my use of "constant" and "inconstant"? In its mathematical sense a constant implies a non-varying value, but I do not suggest that either Christianity or its connections with anthropology have remained unchanged. One reason to introduce this temporal metaphor is to indicate how the relationship between Christianity and anthropology has so often been defined by their respective relationships to time, change, and historical process. In his famous work *The Golden Bough* (1890) the Victorian anthropologist James Frazer tried to consign Christianity to the same dustbin of history that he reserved for other forms of religion; but a century or so later anthropologists have actually been observing striking increases in Christian adherence and practice across large parts of the world. More and more, they have come to understand the need to analyze how the spread of Christianity raises questions over the supposed disruptions of modernity. But this new analytical impulse does

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[1] Famously, Susan Harding (1991) wrote of how she was perceived by fellow ethnographers as studying the "repugnant cultural other" when studying Christian fundamentalists in the 1980s and 1990s. Compare her comments with John Barker's much later argument (2008) that scholars can no longer dismiss Christianity as a Western imposition into local contexts.

not involve a simple assumption that Christian influence produces a uniform, linear model of Westernization. The task is rather to develop a critical and nuanced understanding of whether and how encounters with Christianity have produced transformations in cultures around the world. This new focus on Christianity also involves anthropologists taking a more historically informed look at themselves. The aim has been to understand whether anthropological conceptions of cultural coherence, of transcendence, of divisions between sacred and profane time and space, have links with Christian roots in ways that have not hitherto been fully acknowledged.[2]

Following on from such points, categories of time, history and identity will help to form the structure of this chapter. Over the last 15 years or so, a self-conscious sub-field has emerged within the discipline dedicated to studying Christianity. In acknowledgement of this development, I divide my analysis into three periods. The first—with apologies to archeologists—I call "B.A.C." (Before the Anthropology of Christianity); the second "A.C." (the era of the Anthropology of Christianity); and finally, I provide some suggestions of possible futures for studies of the religion. However, I invoke such categories with irony. I approach them critically, especially their linear assumptions, and show how they represent only a limited view of how anthropology can continue to approach this religion.

Particular understandings of history and temporality have informed one of the most influential contributions to the anthropological study of religion over the past two decades or so. Talal Asad's *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* explores the influence of Christianity's "conceptual geology" on how religion has been perceived (1993:1). Influenced by Michel Foucault, Asad argues that every historical period is marked by specific relationships between religious power and knowledge. In this view, no "universal" definition of religion can stand the test of time, since it will always be an ideologically charged product of that particular era. Thus the contemporary tendency in the West to regard religion as ideally separated from politics as well as reducible to coherent doctrines and practices is itself the product of a specific Christian history. Whether or not we agree with all of Asad's arguments, his attempts to bring both historical and political consciousness to bear on our understandings of religion as a category of study deserve consideration. We might adapt his genealogical method to the recent growth in anthropological attempts to study Christianity, and ask: How is the self-conscious anthropology of Christianity a product of its time? If it represents another phase in the relationship between Christianity and anthropology, what are its intellectual and political implications? To begin to answer such questions, we need to trace our own history of that relationship.

Before the "Anthropology of Christianity" (B.A.C.)

Christian ideas played an important role in the development of early social theory. In her introduction to a volume on the anthropology of Christianity, Fenella Cannell (2006:14–15) cites the German philosopher Hegel's assumption that Judeo-Christianity was distinct from other religions in its viewing of the divine as transcending earthly time and space. She argues that Émile Durkheim, founder of the *L'Année Sociologique* School of the early part of the twentieth century, echoed Hegel's perspective and also saw Judeo-Christian religions as constituting an important stage in the development

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2   See also Sahlins's (1996) comments on the connections between Christianity, social science, and
     modernity (also Bialecki, Haynes and Robbins 2008:1143).

and progressive abstraction of the "conscience collective." Durkheim's colleague Marcel Mauss's history of the self (1985; see also Hollis 1985) drew on a view of history that was inflected by Christianity as he moved from examining the first use of ceremonial masks to the development of a private sense of one's own uniqueness. As Bryan Turner puts it (1986:4): "For Mauss, the modern self emerged directly out of the Protestant emphasis on the individual liberty of interior consciousness which liberated the isolated individual from the disciplines of the confessional." While Karl Marx did not focus on religion *per se* in much of his work, he is famous for his depiction of it as both opium and justifier of oppression. We should also remember, however, that Marx's colleague Friedrich Engels perceived early Christianity as the socialism of its time (McLellan 1987:50–51): he believed that both cultivated "a common constituency in oppressed people, a common promise of salvation, a common opposition to the prevailing society which led to persecution, and a common assurance of ultimate victory" (McLellan 1987:51). Max Weber was wary of Marxist materialism and associated attempts to link social theory to the promulgation of social change. While he denied that any single sphere of activity (political, legal, economic, or religious) could be seen as dominant in society, his work nonetheless accepted the interconnectedness of such spheres (Morrison 1995:216) in the workings of human history. His analysis of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, originally published in 1905, showed how it continued to have effects even in apparently secularized, disenchanted times, acting as both illustration and product of processes of rationalization that were at the core of what it meant to be modern in much of the Western world.

From what has been said so far, we can already see some significant issues beginning to emerge. How might analysis of a religion that is so culturally hegemonic in the West separate itself from some of the basic assumptions of that religion? Are we to associate "modern" Christianity most closely with Protestant and nonconformist rather than Catholic or Orthodox forms? Finally, is it possible to reconcile anthropological tendencies to focus on the local with understanding and tracing missionary Christianity's translocal, world-conquering impulses and tendencies?

We might also ask how Christianity has been addressed in ethnographic works that were produced "B.A.C." The relative lack of such work is symbolized by the fate of one of the first pieces of research to be carried out. Robert Hertz, a close colleague of Durkheim and Mauss, carried out brief fieldwork just before World War I on the small pilgrimage site of St. Besse in the Italian Alps (1913; see also e.g. Boissevain 1999). Though he published a study of the pilgrimage, any further research he might have carried out was cut short by his death. The same global conflict that kept Bronislaw Malinowski in the remote Trobriand Islands, with such implications for the discipline's extensive examination of the "remote Other," was also responsible for the demise of one of the earliest ethnographers of European Christianity. That is not to say that ethnographic studies relating to Christianity have been absent in the intervening years. At the risk of over-simplification and numerous sins of omission, I focus on what I see as five of the more significant strands of such work, and indicate how they illustrate anthropologists studying Christianity, but do not constitute an Anthropology of Christianity in its most recent sense.

My first strand refers to a regional specialization that initially occupied a peripheral ethnographic position in the anthropological world compared to more "classical" fieldwork areas such as Africa, Papua New Guinea, and Asia. The Anthropology of the Mediterranean, emergent after World War II, established its credentials by carrying out research on rural, relatively remote areas. Such work drew on Christianity as a significant context without making it a prime focus. For instance Jean Peristiany's edited volume *Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society* (1966) located values of "honor" and "shame" within a region rather than a specific religion. These values and their associated gender politics clearly

resonated with Catholic and Orthodox practices, but also operated in non-Christian parts of the Mediterranean, and were seen as emerging from the small-scale, face-to-face relations regarded as characterizing certain parts of southern Europe and North Africa.[3]

Later work on Christian populations in the Mediterranean has shifted much of the focus to urbanization, migration, social change, and relations with broader European political and economic structures (Boissevain 1975). Jeremy Boissevain's edited book *Revitalizing European Rituals* (1992) brings together work from all parts of Europe, while indicating how ritual revival can be linked to social, political and material transformations. Jon Mitchell's monograph *Ambivalent Europeans* (2002) is by an author steeped in the study of Christianity, but explores Maltese attitudes towards both Europe and modernization through exploring how Catholicism interacts with gender, kinship, and wider community and political structures. Such approaches represent good anthropology, but the point is that they use Christianity as one analytical context among many rather than foregrounding it as *the* object of analysis.

A rather different analytical strategy is evident in a text that forms the basis of my second strand of research relating to Christianity: Victor and Edith Turner's *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (1978). This book is deservedly celebrated for the fact that it provided the theoretical catalyst for a new sub-field in anthropology: a focus on pilgrimage that has continued to flourish to the present-day. Above all, the book is known for its elaboration of the concept of *communitas*, which the Turners claim is a central feature of the pilgrimages that they examine—Catholic sites located in Mexico and Europe. In their terms, a pilgrimage parallels many of the characteristics of a rite of passage, and the central, liminal (or "liminoid," "threshold-like") phase opens them up to experiences of direct fellowship with each other and with the divine. This sense of temporary transformation is reinforced by the powerful physical, emotional and spiritual experiences of travel to a site that is often remote: a religious "center out there" (Turner 1973).

Image and Pilgrimage's arguments have been criticized by some writers for being too influenced by Christian ideals in their separation of religion from politics (e.g. Cohen 1992). However, in other respects the book's radical attempt to think anthropologically about Christianity has received far less attention. The concept of communitas has been applied to numerous other, frequently non-Christian contexts, so that its theoretical utility has come precisely from the stripping *away* of its specific religious associations. The Turners' case-studies of sites such as Walsingham, Lourdes, Guadaloupe, and Lough Derg have rarely been examined in detail by other scholars, and nor is the fact that the Turners saw themselves as moving away from a traditional focus on a single case study in order to understand a much wider frame, that of a world religion manifested through a common institution—pilgrimage—spread across very different cultural and historical contexts (Coleman 2014). John Eade and Michael Sallnow's edited volume (1991), *Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage*, provided a significant counter-argument to *Image and Pilgrimage*, inserting the central trope of contestation in place of that of communitas in characterizing the activity evident at religious sites. But, again, the key theoretical hook of the book did not rely specifically on the Christianity of its case studies.

One inspiration for the Turners was a theoretical orientation that constitutes my third strand of studies relating to Christianity: Symbolic Anthropology. This style of analysis

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3   For a critique of aspects of the Honor and Shame school, see e.g. Dubisch (1995). An influential work related to Catholicism is Taussig's (1980) *The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America*. The main thrust of this book is its analysis of the material and moral life of informants as they are caught between precapitalist and capitalist economic regimes. Another important book using Catholicism as a backdrop is Nancy Scheper Hughes's *Saints, Scholars, and Schizophrenics* (1979), chronicling the decline in community in an Irish village.

turned to the interpretation of cultures through focusing on key rituals, symbols, and cosmologies. It encouraged some researchers to juxtapose analyses of Judeo-Christianity with those of other cultural systems. The most obvious example was Mary Douglas, trained at Oxford but active in both British and American anthropology departments, whose work in such books as *Purity and Danger* (1966) and *Natural Symbols* (1970) traced the ways in which different social formations, whether Western or non-Western, literate or non-literate, led to different patterns in perceiving risks, boundaries, and threats to social order. One of Douglas's most famous analyses (1966:69–70), although one that she herself later criticized, involved interpretation of the laws of Kashrut and the associated biblical abominations of Leviticus to explain why certain animals were deemed impure by the ancient Israelites—a people attempting to distinguish themselves behaviorally and cosmologically from their neighbors. Douglas's argument was that they subscribed to a cosmological schema that expressed their acute concerns over boundaries, insides and outsides, and membership of groups, and could be seen as a self-reinforcing system. Those animals deemed inedible and polluting were those that did not fit into the categories created by the schema.[4] Overall, such work juxtaposed different cultural systems in its analysis, including the ancient Israelites but contemporary Irish Catholics, Hindus and the supposedly "commonsensical" assumptions of seemingly secular Western urbanites. In these terms, Christianity became one cosmology among many, and certainly fair-game to the analyst.

Another anthropologist who used this comparative technique to good effect, sometimes including discussions of the Bible, was Edmund Leach. Indeed, Leach's 1982 Frazer lecture, finally published in 2011, examined a well-known feature of Frazer's *The Golden Bough*: its juxtaposition of the crucifixion of Christ with other ethnographic examples of the slaying of the Divine King. Under attack from Christians of his time, Frazer had withdrawn this comparison from the main text of later editions of his book. Leach re-visited the claim in some detail, locating it in the context of Christian cosmology and myth. On the whole, then, in the work of Douglas and Leach we see analyses that provide a powerful means of "de-exceptionalizing" Christianity as an object of study, bringing it down to the level of other cosmologies, though without going into ethnographic detail or conducting extensive field studies.

If work on the Bible carried out by scholars such as Leach and Douglas indicated the possibilities inherent in studying Christian biblical narrative, much effective research on Christianity B.A.C. has been carried out by scholars examining Christian language (who constitute my fourth strand). For instance, Richard Bauman's (1983) *Let Your Words Be Few* was an influential work on Quaker discourse by a scholar of narrative. A fascinating essay by Malcolm Ruel, "Christians as Believers" (1982), somewhat anticipated Asad's works by tracing shifts in the concept and designation of belief within Christian populations at different points in the Church's history. He demonstrated not only the unstable character of what is meant by belief, but also the difficulties in applying it to other religions such as Judaism and Islam. Susan Harding's article, "Convicted by the Holy Spirit" (1987), examined the language of Baptist conversion and its capacity to push the listener/reader—including the researcher herself—into a liminal state of potential receptiveness to conversionist discourse. This piece was followed in 2000 by Harding's *The Book of Jerry Falwell*, focused on the construction of a fundamentalist preacher's persona through forms of language deployed by Falwell and his followers. Peter Stromberg's works, especially his *Symbols of*

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4   For instance, in a worldview where "proper" fish have scales and move using fins, a crab or a lobster does not fit the classification; but nor are they mammals, and are therefore both anomalous and to be shunned because they fall between categorizations that distinguish between animals of the sea and those of the land.

Community (1986; on a Swedish congregation) and *Language and Self-Transformation* (1993; on American testimonies and conversion narratives) explored the ways in which Christian discourse helped to constitute forms of religious commitment, while Thomas Csordas's publications (1994, 1997) on charismatic Catholics deployed a phenomenological approach to the lives of believers within and beyond the church, analyzing the very act of speaking as an embodied and orientating practice. James Peacock and Ruel Tyson's *Pilgrims of Paradox* (1989) is a beautifully written ethnography of Calvinist, Primitive Baptist believers in Blue Ridge of North Carolina and Virginia. The paradox referred to in their title points to tensions they find in believers' lives between a theology that stresses the importance of spontaneity in sacred speech alongside mistrust of worldly affairs on the one hand, and these Baptists' love of both routines and the natural world on the other: thus a valorization of the transcendent and immaterial nature of the divine co-exists with a rather more earthly aesthetic. Peacock and Tyson's work, which—along with Stromberg (1986)—displays influences from Symbolic Anthropology, reveals the power of ethnography to explore the deployment of language rooted in its historical, theological and physical environment.

These, then, are just some examples of studies dealing with Christian discourse. As we can see, a focusing of the analytical gaze on words seems to have prompted much interest in Protestant, non-conformist manifestations of Christianity. This strand also indicates a movement towards Christianity as an object of study in its own right alongside a shift towards practicing anthropology "at home." It therefore challenges the idea of a strict boundary between the periods "B.A.C" and "A.C." However, on the whole we do not see such authors attempting to elevate their case-studies to a wider analytical scale—to that of Christianity as a whole. Ruel's essay probably comes closest to such an overview, though he follows the trajectory of Christian belief in order to explore its considerable shifts in use and meaning over time.

Finally, mention must be made of studies of Christian mission.[5] Some work on the interaction between indigenous peoples and Christianity has focused on Roman Catholicism, and a relatively recent example is Fenella Cannell's *Power and Intimacy in the Christian Philippines* (1999), where the history of colonial and post-colonial encounters is brought into an analysis of how culture, tradition and religion have developed in the Bicol region. However, attention has tended to focus more on broadly Protestant examples of mission and its after-effects. Bengt Sundkler, an Africanist and missionary, produced a well-respected study *Bantu Prophets in South Africa* in 1948. Twenty years later, John Peel—versed in sociology and history as well as anthropology—published *Aladura: A Religious Movement Among the Yoruba* (1968), with the focus again on indigenous churches, though this time in Nigeria. Among the most influential publications have been volumes by Jean and John Comaroff (e.g. 1991), presenting mission in South Africa as part of world-historical events involving both supposedly "civilizing" colonizers and civilized. One of their strategies was to place European as well as African Christianities under the analytical spotlight (see also Van der Veer 1996; Meyer 1999, 2004), while indicating the embodied forms of resistance created in the interactions between colonizers and colonized (e.g. Comaroff 1985; see also Kiernan 1988). While the Comaroffs have tended to mistrust conversion as an analytical trope to describe the spreading of missionary power, it was central to a volume edited by Robert Hefner, *Conversion to Christianity* (1993), bringing both social scientific and historical perspectives to bear on the question of how indigenous peoples become encompassed by "world" religions.

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5   As early as 1928, the anthropologist and administrator R. Sutherland Rattray wrote a piece "Anthropology and Christian Missions," where he expressed the hope that anthropology would soon cease to be the study of "primitive" peoples. Intriguingly, he borrowed a decidedly Christian metaphor in noting that "the anthropologist's task should be to discover 'the idiom of the soul' of the people among whom he is working" (1928:1).

From the 1990s onwards an increasing number of works began to address the powerful re-emergence of contemporary Christianity in different parts of the world, ranging from politically aggressive evangelicals in the United States (Crapanzano 2000; Harding 2000) to the growth of Protestantism in Latin America (Stoll 1991; Chesnut 1997), to the increased influence of Pentecostals and evangelicals in many spheres of life in Africa (Meyer 1995; Van Dijk 1999; see Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001). Karla Poewe's edited *Charismatic Christianity as a Global Culture* (1994) was an early attempt to consider how this newly confident, proselytizing culture was operating across geographical, ethnic and class boundaries.[6] From an anthropological point of view, the sheer visibility of Christianity in civic and political as well as domestic contexts could not be ignored. An apparent shift in gravity in the weight and authority of Christianity worldwide was becoming increasingly evident. Lamin Sanneh (2013:xiv) notes that in 1950, 80 percent of the world's Christians lived in Europe and North America; but by 2005 the vast majority of the world's two billion Christians lived in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Thus the stage was being set for an investigation of Christianity as a vibrant and powerful culture, and one manifested across a very wide scale of operation. Such an approach might therefore have the potential to bring together some of the rather disparate approaches examined up to now.

Before we examine this next "stage," however, we must mention a further, vital dimension of the relationship between anthropology and Christianity, B.A.C. For while the discipline as a whole attempted to define itself through avoiding taking a faith position, this stance did not preclude individual scholars from being both believers and scholars, or from negotiating fascinating relationships of accommodation between the two. Thus we might refer back to many of the scholars mentioned so far and speculate as to how to take account of their personal convictions. Mary Douglas—chronicler of ordered cosmologies—was brought up in a Roman Catholic setting, and was trained at Oxford by Evans-Pritchard, himself a convert to Roman Catholicism, and a scholar who regarded "believers" as capable of understanding religion in a way denied to their non-religious colleagues (e.g. Evans-Pritchard 1965). The Turners' move towards Christian pilgrimage as a field of study was in part a reflection of their own shift towards Roman Catholicism, thus giving the idea of communitas something of a sacramental character as a concept. On the evangelical side, Sundkler, as noted, was a missionary, while Poewe has identified herself as a charismatic Christian. Or again, there are some notably ambiguous cases. John Eade's interest in pilgrimage emerged from his experience as a volunteer at Lourdes for many years, though he later became disillusioned with the workings of the Roman Catholic Church. Edmund Leach, seemingly a non-believer, had nonetheless grown up in a family steeped in biblical knowledge. Malcolm Ruel's academic exploration of belief was in part paralleled by a more personal attempt to understand his relationship to the faith. We therefore see in this period of study B.A.C. some notable biographical connections with Christianity that go beyond a mere understanding of the religion as background cultural context. Of course, such connections persist among many scholars in the present; and yet, with the current move towards making the study of Christianity a recognized sub-field, the topic is opening up still more to scholars of all faiths and none. The relationship between the religion and the discipline is changing, and it is time to see how and why.

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6   We begin to see in such self-consciously comparative works something of a contrast to Barker's 1990 edited *Christianity in Oceania: Ethnographic Perspectives*. One review of Barker's excellent book, while praising its content, also noted that "*Christianity in Oceania* is not an overview of Christianity in the Pacific, nor does it claim to be representative of Oceania. Rather, it draws on what anthropologists do best, namely, ethnographic description." This comment indicates the gap between the use of such a volume to provide ethnographic *juxtapositions* of case studies, and a more explicit and self-conscious attempt at wider comparison. Mention should also be made of James and Johnson's *Vernacular Christianity* (1988), which includes an essay by Asad, though the emphasis is again on local appropriations of Christianity.

The "Anthropology of Christianity": A.C.

What, then, of the recent shift towards a focus on Christianity itself as an object of study—Christianity *per se*, as Hann (2007) puts it? Does it signal a notable difference from earlier work? I think the Anthropology of Christianity involves new forms of recognition in a number of respects. The first relates, by definition, to the assertion that Christianity contains a sufficiently coherent cultural logic to encourage focused discussion on issues of common and cumulative interest. A leading figure in developing this point has been Joel Robbins. Robbins (2004a) lived for 26 months among the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea, a group of some 390 people who, before he arrived, abandoned much of their traditional religion and underwent a charismatic revival in the 1970s. Robbins moves from a focus on the Urapmin towards much wider temporal and spatial scales of analysis in his piece "What Is a Christian? Notes toward an Anthropology of Christianity" (2003)—both a reflection on anthropology's current relationship with Christianity and a manifesto for future research. He invites the reader to consider the possibility of the Anthropology of Christianity as a self-conscious project (2003:191–2) and identifies both cultural and theoretical reasons for the absence of such a project hitherto. Cultural hindrances include rivalries between anthropologists and missionaries but also the fact that Christians have often seemed too familiar to be worth studying and yet too "different" to be understood through standard ethnographic analysis (2003:192). After all: "Neither real others nor real comrades, Christians wherever they are found make anthropologists recoil by unsettling the fundamental schemes by which the discipline organizes the world into the familiar and the foreign" (2003:193). In theoretical terms, Robbins sees the broader ambition of studying Christianity as rousing anthropological anxieties over deploying comparative methodologies that risk suppressing recognition of local cultural difference.

In a slightly later piece Robbins (2007) presents what he calls "continuity thinking" as a further significant reason for the previous failure of an Anthropology of Christianity to develop. While he sees Christianity as often emphasizing radical change in the life of its converts, anthropology by contrast is a "science of continuity" that seeks to understand how informants perceive even novel experiences through more local—and in effect largely conservative—cultural lenses. So a further reason for the incommensurability between Christianity and anthropology has been that they appear to retain rather different models of both time and belief; and only by shifting its current conceptions of culture can anthropology fully acknowledge and understand the effects of Christian transformation. This shift involves a second form of recognition that I see as important to the Anthropology of Christianity. Thus, Robbins argues (2004b) that an emphasis on *discontinuity* plays an important role in the ways that much evangelical and Pentecostal Christianity globalizes, as it pits itself against aspects of "local" culture while also accepting the reality of already existing spiritual forces. This use of locally meaningful idioms for talking—and reclassifying—the past and thus continuing ritual engagement with local spirits not only distinguishes such Christianity from other forms, but also encourages varieties of rupture including denial of the obligations involved in kin relations, challenging the traditional power of the elders, and so on. So (2004b:129) "even as it absorbs local content" it "maintains its globally recognizable shape as a struggle between the divine and the demonic."

A third form of recognition is highlighted clearly by Fenella Cannell. Ironically, given what has just been said about Robbins, she urges anthropologists to recognize a particular *continuity* that they have repressed or ignored in their own academic culture: the enduring salience of Christian intellectual roots. In Cannell's view, the desire "to separate from Christian metaphysics" has co-existed with the assimilation of key ideas from those metaphysics (2006:5). Both she and Robbins, then, point towards temporal themes in their reflections on the Anthropology of Christianity, though in rather different ways.

Perception of the possibility of cultural transformation among informants (Robbins) is juxtaposed with recognition of a certain lack of transformation among anthropologists (Cannell). Both of these temporalities and their associated forms of recognition thus revolve around the success or otherwise of forms of separation, distinction, and change.

These themes have echoes in other work on Christianity that has also sought to subject both researcher and researched to the analytical gaze. Study of mission is an excellent way of accomplishing this task, and here Webb Keane's work has been highly influential (e.g. 2006, 2007). In a contribution to Cannell's book aptly called "Anxious Transcendence" he argues that Christianity still lurks at the core of much of what is seen as general Western culture (2006:308), and that: "Transcendence … haunts modernity in three unrealizable desires: for a self freed of its body, for meanings freed of semiotic mediation, and for agency freed of the press of other people" (2006:310). According to this logic, when a Western person expresses worries over the debilitating effects of materialism or hopes of being able to relate to others in sincere and direct ways, the semantic and moral load of their sentiments bear traces of "a religious genealogy in which Protestantism plays an important role" (2006:318). Parallel concerns have been discernible when Western missions have encountered non-Christian populations, as "these clashes align Christianity with modernity in opposition to paganism and the past. In this alignment, Christianity and modernity both seek to abstract the subject from its material entanglements in the name of freedom and authenticity" (2006:321).

Keane's characterization of Christianity highlights its continued influence in the West even at a time of supposed widespread secularity. He presents a religiously-inflected view of a modernity that is almost at war with its own ideology: pure freedom and sincerity cannot ever be fully realized in a world of actual social relations, physical and material imperatives, and disjunctions between what is thought and what is said. At the same time, this is an ideology that gains momentum through challenging the religious assumptions of others, who represent tradition, paganism or, potentially, the wrong kind of Christianity. In the context of Sumba (Indonesia) where Keane works, Protestant anxieties over native "idolatry" have historically centered on the latter's supposed confusion between the divine and *images* of the divine, between spirit and matter (see also Cannell 2006:35). Keane's work therefore examines troubled missionary encounters between Reformed Dutch Calvinists and Sumbanese in order to indicate the moral and political charge associated with "semiotic ideologies" that contain both linguistic and nonlinguistic components, and which often produce situations of mutual cultural misrecognition in contexts of encounter.

Reflecting on broadly similar issues, Matthew Engelke's (2007) work on Friday Apostolics in Zimbabwe contains a striking example of Christians who take their search for immateriality as far as expressing a mistrust even of the Bible itself. The believers he studies desire a faith in which God's presence is experienced directly, as a form of immediacy unhindered by the static physicality of scripture (2007:2–3). Engelke considers that this case, unusual though it is, nonetheless points to the wider cultural logic of Christianity: "I propose that one of the central dynamics of Christian thought is the paradoxical understanding of God's simultaneous presence and absence" (2007:12). Thus, while the details may differ from tradition to tradition, Christianity is premised in a notion of absolute difference between creation and fall, God and humanity.[7] And yet this is a difference whose absoluteness must be bridged: "Simply put, the problem of presence is how a religious subject defines and claims to construct a relationship with the divine through the investment of authority and meaning in certain words, actions, and objects" (2007:9).

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7   Reinforcing the point made by Cannell (2006), Engelke (2007:13) presents Hegel as one of the more influential philosophers to articulate the "stakes of absence," given the latter's emphasis on the transcendence of the Christian divinity as his defining feature.

Engelke's reference to the religious "subject" points to the recent widespread exploration of what is meant by personhood, self and individual in Christian contexts. This is a topic relevant to Keane's focus on how sincerity and a sense of freedom can be cultivated by the believer, but it also inevitably leads back to debates over conversion. In the 1990s, Peter Van der Veer's important edited volume had explored links between conversion and modern notions of personhood (1996; see also Hann 2007:391). In a summary article Bialecki, Haynes and Robbins (2008:1147) suggest that Christian conversion shifts the primary locus of obligations away from "lateral social bonds among consociates" towards dyadic bonds between individual believer and the divine. For them, such conversion may have political as well as personal implications, encouraging subversion of existing authority structures, as for instance when Protestant conversion seems to challenge traditional gender relationships in Latin America (2008:1148). They note further that some discussions of Pentecostalism in Africa have also emphasized its role in severing kinship ties and traditional economic obligations, thus freeing believers to participate more "freely" in market economies (see also Meyer 1999; van Dijk 1999).

At the same time, Bialecki, Haynes and Robbins accept that it is not feasible to construct a simple, linear story of individualization out of examining conversion to Christianity. For instance, some scholars of Pentecostalism present its adherents as re-embedding themselves in new social networks rather than becoming unencumbered autonomous agents (Bialecki, Haynes and Robbins 2008:1150: see van Dijk 2002), Even those forms of Christianity that seem most committed to individual capitalist accumulation, such as the so-called Prosperity Gospel, may involve exchange relationships among believers that confound simplistic stories of self-oriented religious practices (Coleman 2000, 2004).[8] Analysis of Christianity has therefore roused some debate as to whether it may provoke not only forms of individualism, but also notions of "dividualism" that do not correspond with conventional notions of modernity.[9] Indeed distinct ideological orientations within the overall "cultural logic" of Christianity may prompt different understandings of the Christian subject. Bialecki (2011) argues that an "unstable" subject is discernible within Protestantism (see also Bielo 2007). Of course, one of the points that these discussions reveal is that the latent ambiguities in Christian understandings of the person may result in different dimensions being emphasized in different contexts. Strathern and Stewart (2009:6; see also Stewart and Strathern 1998) prefer to talk of the relational-individual in order to navigate between extremes of emphasizing individualism or dividualism.

I have now provided a broad sketch of some of the main themes that have characterized the current period I am calling "A.C." This is a period, as Strathern and Stewart have remarked, when study of Christianity (and associated religious change) has come together with the pursuit of in-depth ethnography (2009:4). I hope that I have provided enough context to justify some more general remarks on this shift within the field, and to discuss some of the criticisms that it has attracted. The first point must by now be rather obvious. The emergence of the Anthropology of Christianity as a self-conscious enterprise has been dominated in its early years by studies of evangelicalism and Pentecostalism. This is not to say that work on other forms of Christianity has not been carried out in recent years, but such work has often not come under the A.C. rubric, in the sense that it has not contributed to the conversation that Robbins and others have been trying to encourage on closely related themes.

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8   Hann (2012) uses comparative historical reflections to question pervasive assumptions concerning Christianity and Western individualism, while Hirschon (2010) explores personhood in the context of Eastern Christianity.

9   Questions of dividuality, discussed in Coleman (2004), have also provoked Mosko's (2010) survey paper, as well as works by Van Dijk (2002), Daswani (2011), Klaits (2011), Vilaça (2011), and Werbner 2011. See also LiPuma (1998) and Luhrmann's important book (2012).

Indeed, some work on evangelicalism itself, such as the Comaroffs' (2001) influential discussions of how it links with wider global economic shifts, has been produced largely independent of much of the debate. Their placing of the seemingly magical aspects of much religious practice in the context of a wider argument about the advent and diffusion of "millennial capitalism" is in line with their much longer-standing interests in global inequalities. Indeed, it is striking that the Comaroffs' work seems anomalous from an A.C. perspective: whether justifiably or not, Robbins (2007) sees their work as pushing the specifics of Christianity into the background in favor of analysis of economic imperatives.

The tightness of the conversational networks gathered around A.C., while important in establishing a new sub-field, brings with it some obvious disadvantages. As Cannell has pointed out (2006:38): "It may be that the history of modernity is inextricably bound up with the history of Christianity, but this does not mean that the meaning of Christianity is sufficiently explained by the history of modernity." Indeed, the evident anthropological preoccupation with "modernity" may derive ultimately from a Christian temporality that emphasizes discontinuity (Hann 2007:385). It certainly has the effect of granting the study of Christianity a kind of exceptionalism—shared by many Christians themselves, especially in their more triumphalist moments—through seeing this religion as somehow more significant than others in determining the course of human history.

Ironically, despite the broad family resemblances that allow us to recognize missionary forms of Protestant Christianity in different part of the world, any strong assertion that it has an inherent and consistent cultural logic may take anthropologists closer to theology than they intend.[10] Debra McDougall (2009:186, 197) thus worries about making sweeping generalizations regarding the essential nature of Christianity, expressed through a limiting focus on transcendence, rupture, and the interiority of truth. Strathern and Stewart note (2009:31) that the implications of apparent Christian "rupture" can vary considerably cross-culturally: thus in Taiwan "Christianity has become a kind of marker of Aboriginal differences from the majority of the Han speakers" (2009:31), whereas in Papua New Guinea it serves more to link local people to their original colonizers. So, in practice, Taiwanese Aboriginal groups have been keen to identify similarities between Christianity and indigenous religious forms, whereas in Papua New Guinea more emphasis has been placed on the potential for cultural transformation.

The very dialectic between transcendent and immanent as the central feature of Christianity is questioned powerfully by Cannell (2006; see McDougall 2009:188; Coleman 2004). Cannell's point is partly that anthropologists may falsely interpret encounters between Christianity and "local" culture as encounters between transcendent and non-transcendent religious conceptions (2006:44), but also that the dominant Christian paradigm of transcendence of necessity carries with it other possible, opposing visions of Christianity (2006:42). Anthropologists should not therefore regard transcendent or ascetic visions of Christianity as inherently orthodox or ideal, while dismissing others as debased or heretical.

A potential solution to the problem of focusing so much on one wing of Christianity is simply to widen our ethnographic and analytical gazes to other denominations. Indeed, Robbins argues (2003:198): "Anthropological studies of other Christian traditions also need both to develop their own comparative conversations and to find ways of breaking into the Pentecostal and charismatic one." This suggestion seems an urgent one, as roughly half the world's population of Christians are Catholic (adding up to perhaps a billion in number), while the reforming policies actions of Pope Francis are currently encouraging transformations within the Church. Indeed, in the very appointment of a Pope from Latin

10 Though the A.C. has also involved seeking a new rapprochement with theologians and philosophers, as represented for instance in Engelke and Robbins (2010).

America we see an example of a demographic shift that is reflected in much Christianity as a whole, that of a "Southernization" of influence and power (Jenkins 2002). Recent works by Csordas (2009) and Napolitano (2009) link studies of Catholicism to questions of globalization and translocality. Important works on Roman Catholics relating variously to sexuality and gender have appeared (e.g. Scheper Hughes 2003; Lester 2005; Mayblin 2010).[11] Meanwhile, Hann and Goltz (2010), Doug Rogers (2009), and Bandak and Boylston (2014) represent a new wave of writing about Christian Orthodoxy.

Yet, to respond to the efflorescence of writing about Protestants simply by arguing that scholars are "filling in the gaps" in our knowledge of contemporary Christianity still begs the fundamental question as to whether the very notion of an Anthropology of Christianity, defined by its "cultural logic," *should* in fact exist. Of course it is useful to compare the growing and varied numbers of ethnographies that are being produced, but we still need continually to question the sometimes idealist assumption that there is a discursive coherence to Christianity that can be expressed through the findings of ethnography. Strathern and Stewart (2009:10) point out that a ritual can be regarded as Christian from one point of view, while from another it may continue to contain elements of a non-Christian cosmology. An alternative response, articulated for instance by Hann (2007; see Bialecki, Haynes and Robbins 2008:1152), is to argue that Christianity should be understood not *per se* but more as part of engaging in problem-oriented comparative questions with anthropologists of other religious traditions. Of course, even that approach involves consciously using certain parameters to frame and focus our fields of interest, though it does not assume that Christianity in itself will furnish sufficient coherence to justify our comparisons.

All of these criticisms, and more, can be leveled at the latest phase in anthropology's study of Christianity, and at this stage they should be seen as helping us to explore a still young sub-field rather than damning it out of hand. Arguably the floodgates have now been opened or, to deploy the metaphor underlying much of this paper, the existence of a kind of companionship has now been acknowledged. But two further, temporal questions remain. How does the Anthropology of Christianity itself reflect broader and deeper concerns within anthropology in the present, and what is it likely to look like in the future?

The Anthropology of Christianity: Towards a Diagnosis and Prognosis

One way of characterizing the move from B.A.C. to A.C. is to see it as involving a Kuhnian paradigm shift, albeit a modest one; in other words as signaling a shift in perspective prompted by a new generation of anthropologists, operating under rather different institutional and demographic conditions to their predecessors. Of course, if this is a Kuhnian shift, it is a distinctively anthropological one, emerging dialogically from transformations not only in the thinking of anthropologists but also in relation to the new generation of Christian informants whom they have been studying. And it is a shift where many of the concerns maintain family resemblances with those expressed by earlier generations: how to think about modernity, about personhood, about the "immanent" in relation to the "transcendent," and so on. What has changed, however, is the recognition given to Christianity as a companion

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11   Mention should also be made of Mosse (2012), who focuses on interactions between Catholicism and ideas of caste, as well as Scheper Hughes (2012), who argues that, despite the growth of Protestantism, Roman Catholicism remains the primary field of religious innovation in Mexico. Mahieu and Naumescu (2008) examine the blossoming of Greek Catholic churches in recent years.

in the past and most probably for the future; it has moved to the foreground of ethnographic and analytical attention as a cultural force, no matter how coherent it may or may not be.

If we are invoking the language of paradigm shifts then we must also note how the Anthropology of Christianity derives the language of disciplinary transformation from what it often claims to see in the field. The very imagery of rupture, of breaking from one state or category to another, is made to speak back to how anthropologists should view culture. And this approach is not only responding to shifts in the profile of Christianity across many parts of the world, it is also responding to changes in the way anthropology as a whole has been practiced in recent decades. The Anthropology of Christianity, in other words, has come of age when the discipline has begun to understand the need to incorporate historical perspectives into analysis; to study "at home" as well as in remote places; to carry out multi-sited ethnography and not merely assume that local contexts can be analyzed as self-contained units of culture. Importantly, while the interaction between missionary and "native" took place in colonial contexts, Christianity now inhabits not only a post-colonial landscape but also a diasporic one, where many of the most successful missionaries in London, Amsterdam, or Toronto come from West African regions originally proselytized in the nineteenth century (see e.g. Krause 2008; Knibbe 2009). All of these background factors have helped Christianity to become noticeable and a worthwhile subject of study. To deploy the language of Mary Douglas, the study of Christianity has ceased to be anomalous, an anthropological abomination, in part because it now corresponds closely with the analytical categories that contemporary scholars wish to deploy: it "makes sense" in a way it never did before within disciplinary parameters. It has become good to think with, and not just against.

Such arguments reveal the complex ways in which anthropologists frame but are also formed by their fieldwork experiences. Remember that Robbins, a strong advocate of the A.C. perspective, is an anthropologist who has carried out fieldwork within a population that experienced quite a dramatic, collective conversion to Christianity. The forceful character of Urapmin conversion, clearly evident among such a small group of people who had never encountered a "world religion" before, may have encouraged Robbins to see Christianity as a coherent cultural package, with measurable effects.[12] In turn, Keane's emphasis on the linkage between sincerity, freedom and immaterial transcendence fits his Calvinist informants well, but provides a less satisfactory description of the much more materially oriented forms of religious practice studied by Cannell (on Mormons, 2006) or Coleman (on Prosperity Christians, 2011; see also O'Neill 2010). The latter two expressions of successful contemporary religion are arguably forms of "modernity" where freedom from physical bonds is not valued in the same way as the ascetic Protestant model would suggest. Coleman (2000; 2011), indeed, indicates that an examination of Prosperity Christianity might encourage us to rethink—certainly to expand—what is meant by the Protestant subject, even in the context of supposed Western modernity.

In seeing Christianity, of whatever form, as "good to think with" we must therefore remember that the Anthropology of Christianity *per se* is not Christianity itself: it is, perhaps, a co-construction of scholars and believers (see Garriott and O'Neill 2008), but it is still a response to the intellectual and institutional imperatives of an academic discipline. In the future, we might therefore learn much from systematic comparisons not merely across religions, but also across the respective developments and intellectual concerns of the Anthropologies of Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, and so on. We are also likely to learn much from continuing to try to uncover repressed or simply unnoticed gaps

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12   Compare with Stewart and Strathern's (2009:xvi) discussion of the need to examine the temporality of conversion itself, in other words whether adaptation occurs quickly or more slowly. They also note the need to examine forms of partial conversion.

in our perception. Even as we move towards producing more studies of Catholicism and Orthodoxy we should not forget what may be one of the most ethnographically overlooked forms of Christianity, that of liberal Protestantism (Klassen 2011; cf. Jenkins 1999)—so immanent, in many manifestations, as to be almost invisible. Evangelical Protestantism, with its powerful articulations of conviction, may well have been the denominational form best suited to an incipient Anthropology of Christianity that needed to proclaim its legitimate place in the wider landscape of the ethnographic study of religion; but one challenge is now to relax the boundaries of the sub-field again, to ask what happens when much more implicit forms of religious practice are studied. Are they any less "Christian" than proselytizing missionaries or pious priests?

In any case, just as the demographic context of Christianity has been changing, so has that of anthropology. We can assume, or at least hope, that the dominant anthropology of the future will no longer come only from Euro-American backgrounds. As practitioners of the discipline increasingly come from environments where the relationship between religion and institutional authority is negotiated in a very different way, we might expect new ways of thinking about Christianity.[13] More anthropologists of the future might be Christian (Howell 2007), but many might also be Muslims, Buddhists, and so on. Christianity is likely to remain a constant companion, but one whose relationship with anthropology will never cease to change.

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13   We might also consider here the possibility of new approaches emerging through cooperation between anthropology and other disciplines. In recent years, cognitive approaches to religion, including Christianity, have brought fresh light to bear on psychological and evolutionary approaches to ethnographic case-studies (e.g. Whitehouse 2004).

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On Muslims and the Navigation of Religiosity: Notes on the Anthropology of Islam

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In the end, there are no inherent differences in the context of either folk or formal theology to suggest that one is more objective, reflective, or systematic than the other. If Islamicists and theologians privilege the formal discipline, they do so only upon preconceived criteria of validity linked to their concept of truth.

—Abdul Hamid el-Zein[1]

Islam is both a path and a purpose. What that means, of course, is the heart of public and private debates on the topic and the challenge people face in engaging with the religion. For many in the West, Islam as a descriptive category has come to awareness, especially post-September 11, through media coverage portraying political and militant actions seen to be dangerous and in opposition to Western political agendas. The discourse of danger common to Islam has obfuscated a more sympathetic understanding of how Islam is lived and how the religion frames the moral world of 1.6 billion people who self-identify as Muslim.[2] The trend within the anthropological study of Islam, however, has been an ongoing exploration of how best to characterize Muslim life and, in a sense, contextualize how the path and purpose of Islam inculcates everyday life.

Islam, of course, began with the revelation of the Qur'an given to Muhammad in 610 CE and evolved into one of the world's major religions. For most if not all Muslims, the basic framework of everyday life references back to these Qur'anic revelations and the *sunnah* (tradition) of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the *hadiths* (recorded sayings and acts of Muhammad). The sunnah prescribes the normative way of life for Muslims and, through the process of *fiqh* (jurisprudence)—drawing upon the Qur'an, sunnah, *fatwa* (rulings), and *ulema* (jurists)—a moral framework emerges that instantiates how life should be lived.

It is this concern—for "how life should be lived"—that animates the world in which we all live and gives context to disagreements between neighbors and those who observe them.

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1   el-Zein (1977, 248).
2   Pew Forum Religion and Public Life Project, available at: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/07/worlds-muslim-population-more-widespread-than-you-might-think/. Last accessed July 2, 2014.

Community and society (Tönnies 2002) emerge from the frameworks—the categories—in which our lives are lived (Durkheim 1984; 1995). But from the beginning, so too emerges differences that demarcate one group from another. As fiqh addresses the rituals, morals, and social norms within Islam, there are different *madahib* (schools of thought) that offer varying interpretations on the role reason, free-will, and tradition should play in directing one's life.

Like all religions, the presentation of what Islam is can come across as normative and straightforward. It is considered to be universal and often introduced as having five pillars of faith summarized in the Hadith of Gabriel:[3] 1. *Shahadah*—the confession of faith: "There is no god but God, Muhammad is the messenger of God" (*la 'ilaha 'illa-llah, muhammadun rasulu-llah*); 2. *Salat*—ritual prayer done five times daily; 3. *Sawm*—fasting during Ramadan; 4. *Zakat*—giving alms (2.5 percent of one's savings) to the needy; and 5. *Hajj*—pilgrimage to Mecca once during a lifetime, if one has the ability to do so. While these pillars of faith are the foundation for Muslims the world over, foundations are only the beginnings from which communities emerge. While even in their most basic form there are variations—generally the performing of differences of fiqh—in how Muslims understand and enact the pillars, one argument for the utility of an anthropology of Islam comes in how the practices and moral lives embedded in them are imbued with meaning, socially navigated, and lived.

Approaching Islam

> *No one has ever seen your face, and yet a thousand*
> *Doorkeepers have arrived. You are a rose still closed,*
> *And yet a hundred nightingales have arrived.*

—Hafez[4]

Islam has meaning in how it is lived. Thus, when anthropologists talk about Islam, the focus is not so much the religion as it is on those who practice the religion: Muslims. Certainly one indexes the other, but this is also part of what differentiates various approaches to the subject. The academic exploration of Islam has roots in religious studies and history, with early research focusing on the origins and expansion of the religion (see, for example, Gibb 1970; Hodgson 1974; Lapidus 2002) and the unified nature of the tradition (Levy 1969). Introductory texts lean toward a civilizational survey of Islam as concept, movement, practice, and tradition (see Ayoub 2002; Reynolds 2012; Ruthven 2012; Saeed 2006; Shepard 2009; Turner 2006) and the teaching of Islam is often relegated to studies concerned with the past—i.e. history—or quasi-marginalized classes essential to a liberal education but often viewed as ancillary to studying for employment in a "secular world"—i.e. religious studies.

Central to the histories have been events deemed significant to either national, regional, or global groupings of Muslims, be it the creation of nations—e.g. Algeria, Pakistan, or Palestine (Ruedy 2005; Khan 2008; Krämer 2011); the emergence of the Middle East (Fromkin 2009; Mansfield 2013); or a more global sense of Islam (Roy 2004). And inherent to many

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3   The Hadith of Gabriel is generally considered, at least within Sunni Islam, as the most important hadith, for it summarizes the core of Islam. See Sahih al-Bukhari 1:2:48.
4   Hafez (2008, 11).

of these early approaches has been an implicit orientalist understanding of events, i.e. that the events are significant in relation to Western perspectives as opposed to readers being interested in events of primarily local interest, i.e. Muslims were either exotic others (Sonbol 2005) or objects of imperialism (Karsh 2006).

This is, of course, an issue of approach. Methodologically, Islam is analyzed as a "religion," a term for scholarly inquiry that has become conceptually ubiquitous yet is linguistically imprecise (Smith 2004; Dubuisson 2003; Nongbri 2013). Categories, of course, allow us to make sense of events and knowledge of the world, but it is right to remember that not all categories are universally shared.[5] Understandings of religion, for example, are often framed in Christian terms, such as "belief" (Pouillon 1982; Ruel 1997), but the problem of such categories becomes evident as soon as one attempts to translate the term into other languages. In Arabic, religion is often translated as *dīn* or *madhhab*, neither of which is an exact corollary of religion. Madhhab, as noted earlier, refers to the schools of thought within fiqh; *dīn* represents something of a "way of life."

The relevance of this is seen in how we approach Islam, the categories we use for analysis. It can be a category of scholarly study—either as a narrative of historical significance or as a focus on text, theology, and practice—and one should not discount this, for in part this is the focus of many Muslims. Talking with Muslims, one often hears references to "authorities," to elites seen as knowledgeable of Islam. But this is only part of how one might best appreciate Islam, or at least what it means not as a scholarly category but rather, as is more often the case, as a lived category.

Islam is, as Rahman reminds us in discussing shari'a and din, "a Way-to-be-followed" (1979, 100). While one can analyze Islam as a religion, the Qur'an denotes it as akin to a path: "To Allah belongs the east and the west. He guides whom He wills to a straight path" (Surah 2:142). The distinction is between a frame of analysis and a way for guiding life. In looking at it as a way for guiding life, Islam is both fully integrated and wholly separate; quotidian yet also set apart; realized as the interpretative lens for the domain of experience and something that makes interpretation unnecessary.

It is in this context that anthropology contributes to the exploration of what it means to have Islam as a lived category, where beliefs are not defined as separate from the community in which people live but rather integral to guiding actions for how people live. Within anthropology, there has been a rich debate on the best approach to characterizing the lived nature of Islam, or how to convey what people do with "Islam" as part of a Muslim's conceptualized world. Geertz's was, in a sense, central to the emergence of the subfield of Anthropology of Islam, for it is in response to his *Islam Observed* (1968) that el-Zein (1977) and others move the study of Islam from a universalized notion of the religion to one of particularities, where Islam is not viewed as theologically (pre)determined but containing

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5   Nor are all categories universally applied. *Jihad* (struggle), for example, is often discussed as a holy war against infidels, fought in the name of Islam. This may, at times, be the case, but its more frequent injunction—especially in Sufism—is as a struggle against the *nafs* (ego). There is both a greater- and lesser-jihad, with the lesser-jihad being the taking up of arms against another and the greater-jihad being the struggle to resist the evil inherent in the self and live a moral Muslim life (see, for example, Bonney 2004; Cook 2005; Afsaruddin 2007; Gerges 2007; Devji 2008).

    There is, of course, a broad literature on aspects of violence in Islam (see, for example, Lawrence 1998; Asad 2007; Antoun 2008; Juergensmeyer 2003; Euben and Zaman 2009; Juergensmeyer and Kitts 2011; Duncan 2013). This overview of anthropology of Islam takes into account that such narratives of violence and conflict do influence the understandings and experience of Islam, but the focus here is less on violence in Islam and more on the everyday constructions of moral life in Muslim communities. It is here, in these everyday constructions, that we can better understand the context of Muslim life as both a response and solution to conditions of struggle (see Verkaaik 2004; Ring 2006; Bennoune 2013).

cultural and religious variability, and a methodological critique that influences both the comparative nature of Islam and the nature of questions and engagements between the fieldworker and his/her interlocutors.

In *Islam Observed*, Geertz draws upon field work in Indonesia and Morocco to offer a model for the comparative study of religion, focusing on the cultural incorporation of Islam—not what people believe, but how they act, and subsequently the causes of differentiation of practice. While Geertz is well known for putting forth a definition of religion (Geertz 1973, 90), here he states his interest being not the definition so much as the challenge of how to find religion (Geertz 1968, 1). His concern is the cultural manifestations of Islamic practice as situated within a relativistic and particularistic anthropology of religion, where Islam, and religion more generally, is both a world-view and ethos made socially relevant because people are born into worlds with shared symbols and meanings (Geertz 1968, 97–8).

El-Zein challenges the presentation of Islam as a seemingly unified religious tradition through extended critiques of Geertz (1968)—where "each individual experience contains the universal characteristic assigned to the religious form of experience" (el-Zein 1977, 232); Crapanzano (1973)—where a Freudian analysis of Islam in Morocco assumes "diverse cultural expressions do not distinguish different human realities, but merely provide an imaginary mode by which man escapes a single and universal reality" (el-Zein 1977, 233); Bujra (1971)—where Islam is viewed in instrumental terms, reduced to "a set of ideas created by an elite and accepted by the masses, which enables its producers to enforce and manipulate social, economic, and political hierarchies" (el-Zein 1977, 236); Gilsenan (1973)—where he "explores the power of religious meaning, through charisma, to create and define the nature and historical sense of social life" (el-Zein 1977, 238); and Eickelman (1976)—where history is "a real sequence of empirical events … [and symbols that individuals manipulate] in order to realize his social goals and interests, justify or acquire a social position, or accumulate power" (el-Zein 1977, 240). Central to his questioning of the universal concepts implicit in the monographs he reviews, el-Zein argues that their own ideological precepts lead the authors to "begin from certain fundamental, theoretical premises concerning the nature of human reality, conscious or unconscious experience, history, and religion … [and] as an isolable and bounded domain of meaningful phenomena …" (el-Zein 1977, 241). What emerges from the categorization inherent to ideological differences is a theological valuing of the tension between a "folk theology" and the theology of the elites, the *Ulama* (el-Zein 1977, 246). Theology is, according to el-Zein, like the ideologies that frame anthropological assumptions, based upon preconceived conceptions of truth (1977, 248). In other words, he questions the concept of Islam as an analytical category. Recognizing religion as a category constructed for analysis rather than a unified extant form, to say anything meaningful about religion "we have to start from the 'native's' model of 'Islam' and analyze the relations which produce its meaning" (el-Zein 1977, 251).

One of the tasks of anthropology, of course, is to show how the particular helps to explain the universal. While el-Zein in many ways initiated the debate out of which emerged the subfield of an anthropology of Islam, the role of the local Muslim engaging in his/her own production of meaning has never been far from the concerns of the anthropologist. The idea of the local being central to understanding individual experience is important both for el-Zein (1974; 1977) but also critiques of his work. Recognizing the multiplicity of Islamic countenance and orientalist essentializations to find the "essence" of Islam (see Said 1994), el-Zein, in essence, suggested "that the term *Islam* be replaced by *islams*" to more accurately represent the quotidian nature of local religion (Eickelman 1984, 1). Insights do come from the stories of what Islam means to an individual—such as Loeffler's *Islam in Practice* (1988),

where his Iranian interlocutors speak for themselves on issues of individual particularity, religious practice, and the socio-economic environment in which they find themselves, and Fluehr-Lobban's *Islamic Societies in Practice* (2004) that seeks to humanize the societies in which Muslims live in attempt to counter the prejudices and misconceptions a good number of Westerners have about Islam in the Middle East.

One should note, however, that despite appreciation for variability of experience, "most Muslims quite consciously hold that their religion possesses central, normative tenets and that these tenets are essential to an understanding of Islamic belief and practice" (Eickelman 1984, 1). So merely recanting the attempt to universalize the local, risks ignoring the fact that individual Muslims are often the very ones advocating the universality of their beliefs and practices. The local is seen both as unique and in relation to the global. To this end, Gilsenan is helpful, for he encourages the study of Islam "to examine the practices and everyday lives of persons describing themselves as Muslims and the discourses of authority that are taken for granted or struggled over" (2000 [1982], 5). It is experience that constructs meaning and thus one should situate Islam within the framework of life and the context in which societies develop (Gilsenan 2000, 19).

An aspect of the local and global that came to be central in early critiques of anthropology of Islam was colonialism, both from the perspective of how colonial thought influenced the ethnographer and how colonial experience influenced the interlocutor's life-world. Asad situates his programmatic essay, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam" on the question of power, a question central to post-colonial critiques (1986; see also Asad 1993). Proceeding in a fashion similar to el-Zein, Asad looks at the works of his predecessors in defining an anthropology of Islam, noting three common answers: 1. "there is no such theoretical object as Islam" (see el-Zein 1977); 2. it is an "anthropologist's label for a heterogeneous collection of items, each of which has been designated Islamic by informants" (see Gilsenan 2000); and 3. "a distinctive historical totality which organizes various aspects of social life" (see Gellner 1981) (Asad 1986, 1). For Asad, since the description of a social context affects one's understanding of religion, an anthropology of Islam "should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and relates itself to the founding texts of the Qur'an and the Hadith. Islam is neither a distinctive social structure nor a heterogeneous collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a tradition" (Asad 1986, 11, 14). Seeing Islam as a discursive tradition places it firmly within a political understanding of context and the contestability of representation, anthropological and otherwise. As such, Asad urges a move toward the textual foundations of Islam.

Around the same time, Ahmed more directly criticizes what he sees as the colonial heritage of anthropology (Ahmed 1986). Here he seeks to locate anthropology within relation to theology and Islamic history and takes issue with el-Zein's proposition that there are many *islams*. Rather, Ahmed sees that "there can be only one Islam, but there may be many Muslim societies" (Ahmed 1986, 58), therein arguing not for a complete dismissal of anthropological work but the advocacy of two separate charges: that anthropologists do their best to transcend their biases in writing on Islam and that Muslims themselves should acknowledge "the vigor of the Islamic revival … [and] prepare to discover what 'the right path' means today and should mean in the future" (Ahmed 1986, 68).

At issue here are various ways of *knowing* Islam, both as practitioner and as observer (see Horvatich 1994; Starrett 1997; Montgomery Forthcoming). In an attempt to re-contextualize the debate between "Islamic anthropology" and "anthropology of Islam"—a debate that asks: "can Islam (and the culture and society of Muslims) be studied and understood by non-Muslims? [and, in turn,] what is the nature and possibility of an anthropology of Islam?" (Tapper 1995, 186)—Tapper reminds us that the agenda of an anthropological study of Islam, or religion more generally, is not the same as (or necessarily opposed to) theology

(Tapper 1995, 192). Thus, the possibility of an anthropology of Islam rests in the observations of how Muslims draw upon their discursive traditions and religious practices to develop and present themselves.

However, as Varisco argues forcefully in his *Islam Obscured* (2005), the influence of earlier scholars can belie the centrality of Muslim experience to the anthropological agenda. As others before, he critiques the work of Geertz (1968), Gellner (1981), Mernissi (1987), and Ahmed (2002) to claim the direction to which an anthropology of Islam should be oriented is one that probes the "very powerful discursive traditions through this description of ethnographic contexts" (Varisco 2005, 160). He is, in essence, arguing the concern should be an anthropology of Muslims rather than an anthropology of Islam, for it is Muslims and their various representations that can rightfully be the subject of anthropological analysis.

As mentioned earlier, it is the local experience, often in relation to the global, that matters most to those who self-identify as Muslims (and this is much the same for religious individuals of any faith). But this is not, however, to suggest that religion is an all-encompassing aspect of life. The local may loom large, as individual attempts to make sense of the universal are done within a local context, but Muslims have a myriad of identities counterposed to "religious," be they identities connected to culture, class, tradition, or some other affiliation of distinction (Bowen 1998). As Schielke perceptively notes, sometimes there is too much "Islam" in anthropology of Islam; that too often Islam is taken as the central point for (anthropological) analysis when it is not always the case from the perspective of Muslim(s) being analyzed (2010, 2).

It is thus, as the debate around anthropology of Islam gets more formalized in readers (Kreinath 2012), textbooks (Marranci 2008; Bowen 2012) used in classrooms, and edited volumes advocating ways to *see* Muslims (Donnan 2002; Marranci 2010; 2014; Dupret et al. 2012; Dahlgren and Schielke 2013; Marsden and Retsikas 2013), that we find the contemporary anthropological approach to Islam emerge. The challenge of how to see Muslims interacting as Muslims, and the various prejudices with which they are viewed (Lukens-Bull 1999; 2007; Montgomery 2014), necessarily solicits a response that acknowledges the centrality of emotions—Muslims are not merely products of Islam but individuals who *feel* what it is to be Muslim (Marranci 2008, 6–9)—and recognizes that while religion has a normative character, how people live religious lives is a complex, inconsistent, and variegated affair (see Schielke and Debevec 2012). As such, Bowen offers a middle ground approach to Islam, one that sees the cultural emphasis of Geertz and the political focus of Asad not "as irreconcilable opposites … [but rather contributions that, when combined, advance] an approach to Islamic traditions that takes seriously both religious thinking and social frameworks" (Bowen 2012, 7). The analysis begins with Muslim individuals attempting to meaningfully make sense of their world, the resources they use to do this, and the historical and contemporary contexts in which all this is—or can be—done (Bowen 2012; Montgomery Forthcoming).

Explaining Islam

> *Then I recalled the qualities of God: compassion, generosity, elegant intricacy, luminous wisdom, mercy, beauty. I became grateful that I know the taste of some of these qualities, according to my limited capacity, and even beyond it.*

> —Bahauddin Valad[6]

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6   Baha' al-Din (2004, 4).

Islam is often explained in relation to something else. As a moral foundation for life, Islam is not fashioned by most who identify as Muslims as a fragmented aspect of life, but rather a fully integrated explanation of life and requisite behavior. This makes sense, for frameworks that guide behavior tend to be rooted in a narrative outside of the self, be it communal ethics or what is understood as moral universals. A sensitized and nuanced anthropology of Islam recognizes the influence of religion's moral framing on individual and collective life, but the task of anthropology is to explain, or at least better make sense of, life. Ethnographic engagement is about telling a story wherein the preceding debates on how to approach an anthropology of Islam is a question of how best to see, and subsequently tell, a story. Thus, the arguments made in various ethnographies of Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam are stories that have a purpose and particular context that the author is trying to explain. Despite the author's purpose, however, the reader engages with the ethnographies on his/her own terms, in relation to his/her agenda and what he/she seeks to understand. There are many ways one can categorize ethnographies to explain a location, population, and a particular context. Turning to explanations around regional, topical, and emotive categories, we see some of the rich work done by ethnographers to make sense of Muslim life.

Regional Explanations

Islam begins with an event and a place: the revelation of God's message to Muhammad in 610 CE in the mountains of *Jabal an-Nour* outside of Mecca. The year zero in the Islamic calendar begins with the *hijra* in 622 CE, when Muhammad fled Mecca to Medina. By 629 CE his army conquered Mecca and prior to his death in 632 CE, he had united the tribes of Arabia into a single polity. As such, modern-day Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East more generally, is central to the Islamic imagination.

Likewise, the Middle East has been central to ethnographic engagement with Islam. Works have sought to characterize everyday life (Bowen and Early 2002), anthropological approaches to the region (Eickelman 2002; Lindholm 2002), and the experience of Arab life (Gilsenan 2000; Rosen 2008; Jung et al. 2014). Here, we see the roles of preaching (Antoun 1989; Gaffney 1994; Hirschkind 2006), textuality (Messick 1993; Shryock 1997), intimacy (Hoodfar 1997; Abu-Lughod 1999), political engagement (Roy 1994; Bayat 2010; Taraki 2006; Shehata 2010; Hegland 2013; Roy 2013), and the social negotiation of futures (Meneley 1996; Wikan 1996; Deeb 2006; Al-Rasheed 2013). Together, we see the characterization of a region where Islam is central to analytical attempts to understand the struggles and aspirations individuals face.

The influence of the Middle East on the imagination of Islam is part of the relationship between local and universal that ethnographers and Muslims themselves are constantly seeking to reconcile. The culture of the Middle East is integrated into the hadiths, and missionary legitimacy is often situated in relation to the everyday example Muhammad lived, an example lived in Meccan and Medinan culture. But as most Muslims do not live in the Middle East, anthropology has been central to the characterization—on their own terms—of the different environments in which Muslims live.

Africa was the first continent outside of the Arabian Peninsula to see the spread of Islam, as some early Muslims sought refuge from Meccan persecution in Abyssinia (Robinson 2004; Loimeier 2013). As Islam spread, it became dominant in the northern African religious landscape, yet not without contestation (Lewis 1998; Brenner 2001; Masquelier 2001; Dilley 2004; Soares 2005; Spadola 2013). Characterizing Islamic life found discussions of traditional cultural and religious systems (Holmes-Eber 2003; Regis 2003; Mommersteeg 2012) situated in debates of Islamic knowledge (Eickelman 1985; Lambek 1993; Salomon 2013), missionary

activity (Janson 2013), and a questioning of what it means to live on the periphery of the Islamic world (as typically imagined) (McIntosh 2009).[7]

Such issues resonate in Asia, as well, where we find the highest concentration of the world's Muslim population.[8] Islam spread to the continent most successfully through a process of integrating Sufi networks with local religious understandings (Eaton 1985; 1990; 1993; DeWeese 1994; Levi and Sela 2010), and trade of both goods and ideas (Chaudhuri 1985; Reid 1993; Foltz 2010; Hansen 2012). Islamic militancy is a common association with the region yet one sees in ethnographic studies of Afghanistan and Pakistan a more nuanced understanding of Muslim life, one filled with diversity of religious views and well-being found in communal engagement (Marsden 2005; 2012; Verkaaik 2004; Haroon 2007; Barfield 2010; Bano 2012; Khan 2012). In India, one can see Islam's role in making the modern state vis-à-vis nationalism (van der Veer 1994; 2013), democratization (Ahmad 2009), and technology (Blank 2001), while at the same time a quotidian picture (Banerjee 2008) of healing (Flueckiger 2006) and social relationships (Simpson 2006; Mohammad 2013). And in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia where the majority of the world's Muslims reside, we see the relationship of colonialism and engagement with other religious traditions as formative in creating a character of Muslim life that is culturally and politically distinct from Muslim life elsewhere (Geertz 1968; Hefner 1985; 2000; Barth 1993; Bowen 1993; 2003; Farhadian 2005; Lukens-Bull 2005; Gibson 2007; Woodward 2010).

Europe and the Americas account for approximately three percent of the world's Muslim population,[9] and thus have long seemed the Western periphery of Islam. As such, a great deal of the discourse in the West has been consumed with a fear that Islamic ideals compromise or undercut Western values (Cesari 2006; Bowen 2007; Ewing 2008; Wikan 2008; Davidson 2012; Dessing et al. 2013; Norton 2013; Hafez 2014). Thus, whether questions of immigration in Western Europe (Kabir 2010; Laurence 2012; Yukleyen 2012; Bendixsen 2013), Muslim polities at the edge of Europe (Bringa 1995; Duijzings 2000; White 2002; 2013; Ghodsee 2010; Hart 2013; Hendrick 2013), or difficulties of integrating in America (Karim 2008; Smith 2009; Bilici 2012; Grewal 2014), ethnographies of the region have largely been concerned with characterizing the challenges of a marginalized population.

Topical Explanations

Taken together, the ethnographic works above give a feel for the various regions in which Muslims live. But what allows for the characterization is, of course, that the analyses emerge out of particular experiences in local environments. There are a myriad of ways understandings of Islam can be categorized to say something about Muslim life. Among the most commonly addressed topics to explain the relationship of Islam to Muslim life include: politics, gender, globalization, and danger. All of these topics are, of course, interrelated, but in grouping them one sees the generalities used by both Muslims and non-Muslims to make sense of daily life.

Among the most contested topics associated with Islam is that of politics. Part of the tension in politics is in direct relation to the fact that it is a modern artifact to separate Islam

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7   This, despite 15 percent of the world's Muslim population living in Sub-Saharan Africa. See Pew Forum Religion and Public Life Project, available at: http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population-graphic/#/Sub-Saharan%20Africa. Last accessed July 2, 2014.

8   Pew Forum Religion and Public Life Project, available at: http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-population-graphic/#/Asia-Pacific. Last accessed July 2, 2014.

9   See Pew Forum Religion and Public Life Project, available at: http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/. Last accessed July 2, 2014.

from politics while the seemingly interconnected nature of the contemporary world is filled with secularizing forces. Certainly some Islamic groups that oppose the state do so in belief that political order and the state have become too far removed from Islam (Mitchell 1993; Norton 2007; Feldman 2008; Rubin 2010; Volpi 2010; Lacroix 2011; Lybarger 2012; Wickham 2013). Debates of what constitutes a good relationship between Islam and politics have centered on questions of secularism (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Asad 2003; Göle 2006; Roy 2007; An-Na'im 2008; Hashemi 2009; Agrama 2012; Kuru and Stepan 2012; Tambar 2014) and how good Muslim leaders (should) lead (Hashmi 2002; Barfield 2005; 2008). As with everything else, the political in Islam and the Islam in the political are dynamic, evolving relationships that draw upon both understandings of the past and aspirations for the future (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996; Brown 2000; Hefner 2005a; Osella and Soares 2010; Bayat 2013).

Politics is the contestation of a particular vision of society. And one area where ethnographic engagement has given insight to the varied understandings of social order within Muslim societies is that of gender and sexuality. Who sleeps with whom is a question of control within community and has been largely embedded within the cultural environments in which all of us find ourselves. While Islam is largely viewed as a sex-positive religion (Ali 2006), discussions of gendered oppression have become almost endemic to debates in the West about Islam (Ahmed 1993; Bowen 2007; Al-Rasheed 2013). But here ethnographers have given clarity to the debates by suggesting that the varied contexts in which Muslim women live are not always powerless (Fernea 1965; Delaney 1991; Mir-Hosseini 1999). Rather, what is perceived as powerless can actually be more appropriately contextualized as a projection of a Western construction of equality and order than a culturally aware appreciation of Muslim women on their own terms (Abu-Lughod 2002; 2013). Women living a religious life may incorporate piety as an aspect of their own negotiation of the world without seeing it as oppressive (Mahmood 2005; Hafez 2011) and likewise use this piety to bring about change in men's behavior (Snajdr 2005). The misreading of the gendered experience is often tied to political representations of the public and private space of women's power (Brenner 2011). Likewise, homosexuality and other forms of sexual relations seen by some as deviant and threatening reveal how such debates among Muslims are dynamic, evolving, and representative of the lack of uniformity on issues deemed by some as theological non-negotiables (Boellstorff 2005; Kugle 2014).

What influences many of these topical debates of politics and gender are questions of modernization and globalization; in essence, questions about what the present and the future should look like. Those who resist globalizing forces are not necessarily opposed to coopting modern advances to forward traditional values (Sedgwick 2004; Mahmutćehajić 2005), but what does come out of ethnographic work on the topics of modernization and globalization are questions about the evolving nature of political discourse and the state (Hefner 1998; 2005b; Meuleman 2002; An-Na'im 2006; Kamrava 2006; Lawrence 2008), the transnational boundaries of Islam (Karam 2003; Mandaville 2003; 2014; Roy 2004), the role of technologies in shaping message and meaning (Eickelman and Anderson 2003; Bunt 2009; el-Nawawy and Khamis 2011), and the nature of youth engagement with the present (Kirmse 2013; Jung et al. 2014). As such, modernization and globalization play a role not only in debating the nature of polity (Fischer and Adebi 2002; Peletz 2002; Tibi 2009; Silverstein 2011), but in discussions of identity (Meuleman 2002; Steinberg 2011) and economies of practice beyond the local (Rudnyckyj 2010; Fischer 2011).

Faced by an ever-changing world marked by the need to reconcile local needs with globalizing forces, Muslim missionaries have worked to (re-)educate people on the utility of Islam as a grounding moral framework with which to approach the challenges of contemporary life (Poston 1992; Balci 2003; 2012; Janson 2005; 2013; Ahmad 2009; Hendrick 2013; Özyürek 2014). While there is little wrong with seeking to live a more religious life,

increased religiosity and the ongoing global expansion of Islam has fostered fears about the dangers of Islam (Tibi 1998; Cook 2005; Martin and Barzegar 2010; Shryock 2010; Esposito and Kalin 2011). This has been at all levels from media coverage and post-September 11 anxieties (Said 1997; Cesari 2009; 2013) to questions about what constitutes a "good" Muslim (Mamdani 2004; Schulz 2013) and humanizing contextualizations of Islamists' goals (Devji 2008; Hafez 2010). What is found is that many of the dangers proffered about Islam do not actually play out, thus forcing us to reassess the threat Islam poses (Kurzman 2011; Boubekeur and Roy 2012; Montgomery and Heathershaw 2013; Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014).

Affective Explanations

While ethnographies of place and topic play a role in explaining Muslim practice, there has also been a turn to exploring the more affective aspects of Muslim life. This includes discussions of morality and the ways struggling with how to act are played out (vom Bruck 2005; Schielke 2009a; Rasanayagam 2011; Dahlgren and Schielke 2013; Deeb and Harb 2013). This includes not only the performative expression of emotions (Basu and Werbner 1998) and quotidian feelings associated with ambiguity and well-being (Schielke 2008; Borbieva 2013; Louw 2013; Werner et al. 2013), but also the incorporation of dreams and the unconscious into decisions made in and about the world (Louw 2010; 2014; Mittermaier 2011). In many ways, these aspects of Islam are more difficult to observe, and can only be observed through long-term ethnographic engagement. But it is also this move toward explaining the affective drive that better explains the Islam behind the practice.

Practicing Islam

> *Every section of road seems amazing because of the one they go to see. … Pain gets lived through, because somewhere nearby there's a Friend.*

> —Jelaluddin Rumi[10]

Religion is what people do, and do in an ongoing sense. Islam, like all religions, is utilized to varying degrees in varying contexts as a resource to guide life decisions. Anthropological literature noted above attests to the diversity of approaches and explanations, as well as the dynamic environment in which Islam is lived. And as with all ways of being in the world, Islam is a practice: it is both an ongoing process of engagement, assessment, and contextualization of experience within frameworks of meaning denoted as sacral, as well as part of the ongoing effort some make to find purpose and direction in the face of mortality (Montgomery Forthcoming). We see the practice of Islam in the rituals people do, the ways they engage with each other, and in the way social relations come to be.

The rituals people do are at one level the most straightforward identifier of religious (or non-religious) preference. Yet these are not only practices of identity-making but also sites of contestation (Stewart and Strathern 2005; Seligman et al. 2008; Dupret et al. 2012). This as well exposes the limits of turning to the pillars of Islam to explain Islam. For it is in the very move to universalize that we see the manner in which interpretation leads to differences of

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10   Rumi (2001, 223–4).

practice, even if practice is done within the same register. Thus, prayer, Ramadan, hajj, and almsgiving all have lived variations that ethnographers help make sense of in local contexts (Mahmood 2001; 2005; Henkel 2005; Frankly 1996; Schielke 2009b; Scupin 1982; Cooper 1999; Werbner 1988; Bowen 1992; Benthall 1999; Maurer 2002; Weiss 2002). While it is the case that the rituals people do help define community and one's sense of Muslimness, it is also these differences of practice that divide some communities (Seligman et al. Forthcoming).

So what comes to matter is how people live in the everyday, lives that are inconsistent yet striving—through practice—to be more consistent. Or at least more able to cope with the mundane pressures of life. Social structures aid with this and education is central to the process by which Islam guides and explains, though here too differences of interpretation and experience lead to differences of practice (Starrett 1998; 2006; Brenner 2001; Hefner and Zaman 2007; Bano 2012; Lukens-Bull 2013; Mir 2014; Ware 2014). And despite the variety of ways Muslims live in the world (Trix et al. 2008), it is ultimately the *doing* of life in a local context from which Muslims explain their faith and behaviors (Marsden 2005; Ring 2006; Rasanayagam 2011).

Among the charges before an anthropology of Islam is to give context to the practices—religious and otherwise—in which Muslims engage. There is then a sense in which understanding the practices of Muslims must draw upon a *longue durée* of experience seen most formative to creating the life-worlds of the population being investigated. One case in point would be that of Central Asia, a place in the Muslim world less familiar to the Western public. Despite being central to the development of Islam outside of the Arabian Peninsula and one of the most important centers for Islamic learning (Frye 2007; Levi and Sela 2010), the region's suzerain annexation under Russia and its later incorporation into the Soviet Union deeply influenced Islamic understanding and practice (Saroyan 1997; Khalid 1999; Crews 2006; d'Encausse 2009). While the historical social structures of the region integrated Islam as a largely accepted aspect of identity—though certainly there remained degrees of understanding and differences of opinions as to what role Islam played in people's lives—the Soviet experience sought to control the transmission of learning and transform the previously ubiquitous public character of Islam to a more individual practice relegated to the private sphere (Keller 2001; Khalid 2007; Sartori 2010; Igmen 2012; Abashin 2014).

It is out of this past that Islam began to reemerge with nationalist saliency as a distinguishing characteristic of the new post-Soviet Central Asian states. To varying degrees, the new Central Asian governments tried to support visions of Islam that would not interfere with the dictates of the state, accepting a state secularism, wherein Islam could be part of the traditional and ceremonial personality of the population while Islamic content would remain private and individual. At the same time, the end of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to an opening of relations to the outside world and an ongoing interest in the role of Islam in everyday life. Some sought to renew traditional Islamic practices (Louw 2007; Aitpaeva et al. 2007; Aitpaeva and Egemberdieva 2009; Aitpaeva 2013)—seen to have been practiced by the ancestors and to resonate a unique Central Asian local character—and others turned to the broader Muslim world to (re)learn how to practice Islam. Muslim missionaries came to the region (Balci 2003; 2012) and Muslims from the region went elsewhere to be educated and learn a form of Islam as interpreted and practiced in a different culture (Abramson 2010).

Within this context, researchers have offered various ways of making sense of Islam by contextualizing the experience of Islam in the region (Zanca 2004; Rasanayagam 2006b; 2011; 2013; 2014; Montgomery 2014; Forthcoming). This includes debates on ways of being Muslim (Sahadeo and Zanca 2007; Montgomery 2007; Kehl-Bodrogi 2008; Hilgers 2009; Louw 2011; Zanca 2011); encounters with missionaries and modes of learning about Islam (McBrien 2006; 2013; Pelkmans 2007; McBrien and Pelkmans 2008; Schwab 2011; 2012; 2014); the role of youth and women in transforming the religious environment (Snajdr 2005; Harris

2006; Peshkova 2009; 2014a; 2014b; Stephan 2010; Kirmse 2013; Roche 2014); and the way Islam is put forth as a means to heal the sick—be it the individual or nation (Jessa 2006; Rasanayagam 2006a).

Yet despite all of the post-Soviet Central Asian states having Islam as an integral part of national identity, states have seen Islam moving into the public sphere as threatening and thus something needing to be controlled. This is generally done by alluding to the threat of "foreign" Islam, situating Muslims that speak out against the state within a narrative of danger and international terrorism. Often, however, such claims do not play out as the threat the state claims (Montgomery and Heathershaw 2013; Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014), but do result in the restriction of certain practices. Debates on the relationship between state power and Islam can be rife with conflict and present a myriad of challenges to Central Asians (McGlinchey 2005a; 2005b; 2009a; 2009b; 2011; Abashin 2006; Rasanayagam 2006c; Hann and Pelkmans 2009). For the everyday in which Central Asians are practicing is dynamic and responsive to the strictures felt oftentimes at the hand of the state (Montgomery 2015).

Thus, though some turn toward formalized practices feared in conflict with state visions of Islam and some to state-supported practices with origins in the region like Sufism (Privratsky 2001; Louw 2006; 2007; Dudoignon 2011; Gatling 2013), all do so in effort to negotiate the proper balance in being Muslim (Louw 2013). Alongside the struggles are reminders that well-being is an attribute of the appeal of a Muslim life (Borbieva 2013; Mostowlansky 2013; Werner et al. 2013; Schwab 2015). Taken together, what emerges is an anthropology of Islam that builds upon a synthesis of approaches described above, where the relationship between textual and experiential aspects of Islam are situated in the environment in which Central Asian Muslims find themselves living.

Navigating Islam

> *Another bird said: "Hoopoe, you're our guide.*
> *How would it be if I let you decide?*
> *I'm ignorant of right and wrong—I'll wait*
> *For any orders that you stipulate.*
> *Whatever you command I'll gladly do,*
> *Delighted to submit myself to you."*

—Farid ud-din Attar[11]

The epigraphs from Hafez, Bahauddin, Rumi, and Attar come to Islam from a Sufi perspective. While I began with discussions of the role of fiqh in setting the moral foundations of the lives Muslims live, it is only one approach. And in socially navigating life, there is a certain fluidity in individual preference that leads some to be more orthodox and orthopraxic in approaching fiqh and others more inclined to integrate local traditions and spiritual connectedness into Islamic practice. The pursuit of spiritual connectedness can go to the extreme—such as Al-Hallaj, a Sufi mystic who while in trance purportedly uttered "I am the Truth" (*Ana l-Haqq*) and was subsequently executed for heresy[12] (Mason 1979; Massignon

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11   Attar (1984, 124–5).
12   "The Truth" (*Al-Haqq*), is one of the 99 names of God and it was seen by some that in this claim, Al-Hallaj was calling himself God. Others, more oriented toward a mystical sentiment of there being

1994)—but more commonly sits as part of the discussion of integration and what it means to negotiate the religious world with the mundane.

Sufism was influential in the expansion of Islam because it allowed for more fluidity to incorporate local traditions into the Islamic environment (Eaton 1993; Privratsky 2001; Abdullah 2009). It complimented the more jurisprudential nature of Islam by giving opportunity for individuals to explore mystical ways of having a personal relationship with God (Schimmel 1975; Abun-Nasr 2007). And it became central to keeping alive certain aspects of cultural and traditional life that felt repression by changes in acceptance of Islam in the public sphere (Trix 1993; Ewing 1997; Werbner 2003). But Sufism has also been a space of contestation in Islam, where some see it as a way to know God and some see it as heresy (Schielke 2012).

Muslims make sense of such tensions individually and collectively through a process of social navigation, wherein they respond to the restrictions and potentials before them (Montgomery Forthcoming). The idea of navigation is not new, but rather inherent to anthropological engagement with the local. One's interlocutor is always found negotiating within a context of experience; what we see is people living within a network of obligations through which they constantly bargain and negotiate (Rosen 1984). With negotiation comes both adaptation and change (Rosen 2004) and we see this wherever we see Muslims, anthropologically. This can be found among immigrants attempting to form communities of meaning in new environments (Yukleyen 2010; 2012), or in state's efforts to control the space in which change takes place (Bowen 2007; 2010; Laurence 2012).

In debating the various approaches, explanations, and practices engaged by—or on behalf of—Muslims, the anthropological task is to shed light on the ways Muslims are navigating religiosity and the world in which they live. This is, in some ways, a terribly difficult challenge, for it suggests the need to theorize movement which is never linear and always contains some degree of inconsistency and contradiction. This is also, however, where the insights of ethnographic engagement excel, for how individuals live the local and global, struggle to find meaning, and face mortality and loss are life-stories that resonate of temporality and change. Seeing this, is seeing the path and purpose behind Islam.

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a personal relationship with God, saw this as Al-Hallaj's recognition that all which is good in the world is of God, i.e. not a statement of Al-Hallaj being God so much as an acknowledgement that God exists in everything.

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PART V
Perspectives on Violence and Globalization

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Ethnographies of Political Violence

Sami Hermez

Between 2005 and 2009, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in Lebanon that would ultimately result in a dissertation that looked at some of the ways an anticipation of war impacted people's everyday lives, and what this said about the way people were experiencing violence. During this time, I worked with political activists and with former militia fighters from Lebanon's war (1975–1990) to gather their stories of past experiences with war, and to observe them as they dealt with present and future political conflict. Aside from recording interviews, I engaged in a wide array of activities that included attending political, religious, and social events, hanging out at political party offices, participating in relief efforts and in demonstrations (and helping to organize them in a few cases), and living through several armed conflicts.

In this chapter, I will reflect on my early days in the field, and retell stories of my arrival, to shed light on questions and issues that consumed much of my thoughts and conversations during my years of fieldwork. The chapter deals with ethnographic method. I am most concerned, first, with the positioning of the so-called native anthropologist, and second, with how to conduct fieldwork in a militarized site that is burdened with suspicion. I then turn to conceptual issues that came up often in the field that related to how one studies violence and what it means to do so. Here, I am concerned with the invisibilities of armed conflict. In other words, I ask about the type of violence and the ways in which violence might be present behind what is visible to the naked eye and our immediate senses. My focus will be to conceptualize what I call the "intensities of conflict" that shift our thinking of conflict as either absent or present, to think instead about its varying intensities. My goal is to push us to be attentive to the moments of calm, to the invisible suffering (like the dead and disappeared), and to the violence seemingly past in conflicts of all kinds, so that we might collect the most mundane data and observe the banal, hoping this will produce spectacular insights when the ethnographer sits to write.

Arrival 1: Questions of Positioning

My position as a researcher in Lebanon, like that of many anthropologists elsewhere, is fraught with confusion. I am local, a Lebanese citizen, yet I grew up abroad, being one of those migrant Lebanese who come in the summer and winter holidays to enjoy the "beach, snow, and nightlife," as they say. My position, during fieldwork, of being inside or outside to the communities I studied really depended on people's moods and motivations at specific moments rather than ever being fixed. But it is important to note that I was never in the field studying people "over there," somewhere far away that I may never

return to after fieldwork; this impacted the questions I asked and the way I approached the field. In fact, despite the twists in my life, I was initially convinced, with a sort of youthful naiveté I suppose, that I was returning to both do research and to settle down in my home country forever.

I began treating home as my field site on my trip back in March 2005; perhaps that trip is as good as any to date my arrival to the field. With the anthropologist studying a country in which they have long familial and intimate connections, the arrival is somewhat undeterminable, and what constitutes material for ethnography can also often be blurred. For example, do I dismiss the stories my grandmother and aunts used to tell me as a child? Or the wartime experiences I remember, such as the uncertainty of a mother being lost in an explosion at a supermarket (circa. 1985)? Can we even speak in terms of arrival when our field research is not about being "over there"?

In any case, I returned to Lebanon about two weeks after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005. The timing was coincidental. I was in my first year of graduate school at Princeton University and preparing for a summer of pre-dissertation fieldwork to scope out a topic of research. When Hariri was assassinated and the country broke out in protests demanding the government resign and the Syrian military withdraw, I saw it as an important moment to be there and witness what I felt to be historic changes. I spent two weeks on this visit attending various protests, recording the news from different media stations, and getting caught up in the euphoria of the moment. During this time, I observed and participated in the two largest protests the country has seen to-date. The first was on March 8, when political parties allied with Hizballah marched downtown to the Riad el-Solh square adjacent to the UN building, and billed their protest as a thanks to Syria for all it had done. In response, a week later on March 14, political parties opposed to the Syrian presence, including Hariri's Future Movement, came out in approximately equal size or greater to demand Syria's withdrawal and a full investigation to hold responsible the perpetrators of the assassination. Soon after, the two dominant political coalitions that would emerge from these protests would be called March 8 and March 14. I was present at both demonstrations, and while I had a personal investment in the political trajectory of the country, in those early days I was confused. I was too skeptical and turned off by some of the racist and exclusionary rhetoric of the March 14 movement, but I couldn't help sympathize with some of its early appealing ideals of freedom, independence, and sovereignty. On the other hand, March 8 seemed to appeal to more inclusionary political ideals, but I could not relate to Hizballah's social project.

I mention all this by way of introduction to the context of my ethnographic work. In April 2005, Syria pulled its troops out of Lebanon. After the withdrawal, the country was witness to incessant bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts, of which I was present to observe reactions for a few in 2005 and all of those between 2006 and 2008 (see Knudsen (2010) for a list of assassinations from 1950 to 2009). These events influenced my fieldwork by contributing to an overall feeling of anticipation of war amongst my interlocutors (Hermez, 2012), and because the events impacted the daily lives of my interlocutors, shaping their conversations, their emotions, and their mobility in the country.

In between these attacks, and on several occasions, I experienced what people in Lebanon would call "war." Elsewhere, I defined war in the following way: "*Al-ḥarb* [war], in a sense, and as seen here, is perhaps more a metaphor for uncertainty rather than having a monolithic definition or bounded meaning. An understanding of war, then, becomes differentiated by the various ways people experience it and anticipate it" (Hermez, 2012:330). In the Lebanese context, this might mean that "a coming war can refer to a war with Syria or Israel or internally between Lebanese political factions" (Hermez, 2012:330). War, for example, occurred in July 2006, when Israel waged an aerial and ground assault

on Lebanon, and attempted to eliminate the Lebanese resistance movement, Hizballah (this was called the July war or *ḥarb tammūz*). Later, in 2007, the Lebanese army waged a war on the Palestinian camp of Nahr el-bared [*ḥarb nahr el-bāred*], attempting to eradicate a militant group named Fateh el-Islam, and in the process destroying the camp and displacing its 40,000 (already refugee) Palestinian residents. Finally, in May 2008, I was also witness to street battles between several political parties from the March 8 and March 14 coalitions that lasted for a few days in Beirut (May 7–10) and continued for two weeks in other parts of the country until the Doha agreement was signed on May 21, 2008, temporarily reconciling the two coalitions. This armed escalation was ambiguously defined as an "event" and called "the events of May 7" or *aḥdāth sabʿa ʿayār*,[1] although depending on political affiliation some would venture to call it an "invasion of Beirut." All this suggests that there was no consensus about the scale and type of battle this was.

For many, 2005 was a moment that broke the illusion of peace or post-war that they had been living ever since the end of Lebanon's 15-year war, in 1990. That war had begun in 1975, and although it was interrupted by long periods of calm, it is generally considered as one event ending in 1990 when the Syrians subdued remnants of the Lebanese Army operating under the command of General Michel Aoun and forced him to flee. The war was initially between Christian rightwing factions fighting Palestinian and Lebanese leftwing factions. The former wanted to rid the country of Palestinian armed groups resisting Israel, while the Lebanese leftwing groups wanted a redistribution of power and resources—these reasons were further complicated as the war progressed and more ambiguous rationales were given for why people came to fight. In 1989, the Taef Accord was signed, which ushered in the end of the war, and gave Syria de facto control of the country. The war, however, only ended if one takes a limited view of what that might mean. The country remained occupied by Israel in the South, with constant clashes; the rest of the country was controlled by Syria, with the presence of its troops all over; and the economy still resembled a war economy (Picard, 2000). The war was over, it seemed, so long as people imagined it was over. In 2005, that fantasy seemed to be shattered with the Hariri assassination.

Ethnographies of Violence

Given the instabilities of my field site (Greenhouse et al., 2002), it has been natural to claim that I do fieldwork in a conflict zone, and in some cases literally "under fire" (Nordstrom and Robben, 1995), and that what I do is an ethnography of violence. Yet, in reflecting on my fieldwork, I find all my reference points falling apart. Research on, about and during war often assumes some expertise on the part of the researcher. Yet, I remain torn, confused, and unknowing when it comes to what I observed and experienced. The notion of a distinct "conflict zone" separate from social life itself becomes questionable. And if we are to agree with Bourdieu, then violence is everywhere in social practice (Scheper-Hughes, 1997), and perhaps we may have to conclude that the category might be empty. If we are to do an ethnography of war, conflict zones, and political violence, and catalogue these experiences in specific ways, we have to first acknowledge that these are not exceptional zones for many of the people whose lives are defined by them. I will get to these issues shortly.

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1   The entire 15-year war in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 is also referred to as *al-aḥdāth* (the events), giving one the sense that there is a collective effort to downplay internal armed conflict in order to work together afterwards. War, after all, occurs between enemies, and one cannot live with enemies.

There is no shortage of works dealing with questions of doing fieldwork specifically in conflict or dangerous zones (Nordstrom and Robben, 1995; Nordstrom, 1997; Warren, 1993; Sluka, 1990, 2000; Mazurana, Jacobsen, and Gale, 2013; Richards, 2004; Scheper-Hughes, 1992, 1995, 1997; Green, 1994; Bourgois, 2001; Ghassem-Fachandi, 2009; Rodgers, 2007; Winlow et al., 2001; Jessee, 2011, 2012; Goldstein, 2009; Hermez, 2011; Hume, 2007; Kovats-Bernat, 2002; Bornstein, 2001; Avruch, 2001; Mahmood, 2001; Das et al., 2000; Das and Poole, 2004; Diphoorn, 2013; Walsh, 2008; Sriram et al., 2009). Many issues have been tackled, from the sensitivities of taking field notes in militarized situations (Bornstein, 2001), to the importance of intimacy and the face-to-face encounter (Bornstein, 2001; Zulaika and Douglass, 1996), to the need for "deep listening," and oral history, when confronted with communities that have suffered great trauma (Jessee, 2011).

Some have defended the notion that ethnographers need to get into the shoes of their informants, as in the case of Rodgers (2007) who becomes a gang member, or Winlow et al. (2001) who deceive their informants to study the nightclub bouncer scene. I was troubled by similar methodological questions. In the field, I found myself frustrated by the idea that I could never understand former militia fighters unless I participated as a militia member myself, and until I carried a weapon. However, it would be absurd to think that we can only write about subjects we directly experience given all we know about representations always being just that. Yet, it is only a small step to go from the wanting of "being there" to "being them." And if "being there" is so important to witnessing (Borneman and Hammoudi, 2009), then why not become one of them to truly understand? The issue haunted me as I questioned the type of data I should be collecting as an ethnographer, and how to write with depth about my interlocutors.

The ethical position of the ethnographer to the people facing precarious situations has been a central question ever since anthropology's turn towards deep self-reflection and its role in colonialism. Avruch (2001) maintains, as a counterpoint to Scheper-Hughes' (1995) militant anthropology, that there needs to be a balance between ethnography and political engagement. It is important to consider this debate in light of differing positions between the native and non-native ethnographer, with the latter more easily able to fall into the traps of civilizing missions, and assumptions of knowing who are "the people" on whose behalf they are intervening. Mahmood (2001) finds a nice balance to this dilemma. She deals with the question of research interventions in policy by offering expert testimony to influence Canadian legal outcomes on the question of terrorism. In this way, she draws on her research in India to effect change of policy in Canada.

There has been, for some time, a turn away from looking at violence head on, as just a fixation on death, pain, and suffering (Robben and Nordstrom, 1995:4), to exploring the way it rears its head in everyday life in intergroup relations (Neofotistos, 2012), in rumors and gossip (Stewart and Strathern, 2004), as ordinary (Kelly, 2008), and through elisions and silences of systemic violence (Scheper-Hughes, 1992). A number of works have tried to complicate the way we understand the state in violent contexts by focusing on the margins of the state (Das and Poole, 2004; Obeid, 2010; Tsing, 1993). Implicit in these explorations is a focus on the invisibilities of violence, trying to make sense of how this plays into the overall experience of suffering and the full scope of violence. Anthropology has always been well positioned to explore this nuance with its focus on ritual, and all the meaning it has been able to gather from other worldliness, spirits, magic, ghosts, and other forms of the unseen. For ethnographies of violence this has meant, for example, studying healers and spirits of people who died violently (Finnström, 2001).

In addition to the unseen, there has also been an interest in investigating the unsaid—the silences—and to understand how such silences are used in order to protect people, to empower them, or to forget trauma. The unsaid might create a space for a sense of self

rather than imply a lack of voice (Brun, 2013). Alongside this is a connection between the study of violent contexts and notions of safety. Ethnographers have been interested in the way their interlocutors produce "safe spaces" (Avruch, 2001; Brun, 2013; Jok, 2013), but also with how the researcher maneuvers through precarity (Jok, 2013; Sluka, 1990). Jok makes the counterintuitive point that foreigners are sometimes less suspicious in the field than the native born, and are more powerful. The native/local anthropologist is supposed to know the answer to things, and his or her questioning may appear strange at times. This resonated with my experience as I found it difficult to enter people's homes and spend time with their families. For one, it was assumed that I did not need to learn the culture, try new foods (often a good excuse for being invited into a home), or need the care of new family. Second, it was difficult to find reasons to invite myself over. I was also told, point blank, by someone trying to help me meet militia fighters from the Amal Movement (a Shi'a political party affiliated to Speaker of Parliament Nabih Birri) that if I had an American passport it would be better to introduce myself as American as my potential interlocutors would be more willing to talk—many of these people wanted to show Americans that they had a legitimate cause while Lebanese researchers would be viewed as potential spies for the other side.

There is also an emerging literature on emotion and affect that has thus far not been explored sufficiently in ethnographies of violence (Diphoon, 2013; Beatty, 2010; Hume, 2007; Hage, 2009; Davies and Spencer, 2010). Diphoon considers the concept of "emotionality of participation" and argues that "rather than viewing our experienced emotions as obstructive, we must recognize that they are crucial empirical data and are interrelated to other data that we regard as knowledge" (2013:203). Furthermore, she suggests that "emotions are thus not merely research tools, but they frame data, are a part of other data, and function as data on their own" (2013:203). Hume (2007) argues that the definition of violence is itself unfixed and needs to be developed through the research process. Violence depends on the identity of the researcher in interaction with the field site and with interlocutors. Hume suggests we pay attention to the emotions of violence in order to understand its essentiality.

Beatty's scope is broader than the ethnography of violence, and calls on us to explore emotions in the field not solely through intersubjective experience, but through a narrative approach "because it locates emotion in practice; in the indivisible flow of action, character, and history," that it "can reveal the dimensions of emotion hidden by other methods" (2010:440). Beatty has spectacular advice for ethnographers, no matter their field site. It is worth quoting at length:

> *Fieldwork is less like two years of a life than a life in two years. And if, as the cliché goes, the early stages reprise childhood, then we also grow up in the field: we become competent adults, and our feelings about doing fieldwork—about being there—mature. By the end, we hardly credit what once bothered us; we see things in the round; we have come through. To write about the past, to recreate the trials of fieldwork, is therefore not to reexperience those fieldwork emotions, except in a trivial sense. Our feelings about what happened are informed by everything that happened later in the field, by everything we now know, and by the different person that we have become. The evocation of feelings is an exercise in imaginative recovery: a fiction but one based in fact. Depending on how diligently and candidly we kept our diaries, the facts may be in some sense recoverable. Depending on our imagination and memory, we may be able to project ourselves back into that frame. But the narrator, the "I," is the instrument of fiction, neither me-now nor me-then but a creation of the text, a bridge to the reader, not a real person. He is there to lend credibility, to show where the story came from, to show the limits of what could be observed. (2010:440)*

Beatty is making a case for narrative retelling of our field experience, whatever that experience or context may be. But more to my point, writing about methods and how to conduct ethnography in wartime is riddled with the complexity of time-passing. Any interpretation of questions I had asked once upon a time, or that felt meaningful in the moment, and any interpretation of field notes taken in the midst or directly after an armed conflict are all subject to the passage of time. In this article, we are talking about interpretations seven years later. All this is an old question of representation, but the qualification is important because the reader may forget that a blistering gap exists between my experiences and observations on one hand, and my interpretations of them on the other. Emotions get in the way.

In light of this review, in this chapter I place myself specifically within emerging questions that relate to ethnography's turn towards the role of emotion in the fieldwork experience, and to questions on how conflict can be understood through the unseen and unsaid, or through the invisibilities of violence.

Arrival 2: Suspicion

I returned to Lebanon to begin a long stretch of research in Summer 2006. I arrived through the *masnaʿ* border crossing (between Syria and Lebanon) a few days after the beginning of the July war with Israel. The airport had been bombed and shut and this was the only entry point into Lebanon. I had been observing the war from a distance in Palestine when it first broke out, and my anger grew with my paralysis at not being able to help in any way. I spent the first few days after arriving connecting with activists in Beirut, and involving myself in relief operations. I spent my nights writing about the political situation, but also trying to take notes of daily encounters and experiences, and hoping to make my ethnography matter to the public (Fassin, 2013). Staying focused on my work as a researcher (few around me were going to work) was challenging, and often near impossible. This was especially so because the fruits of the ethnographic data would not be realized till years later, whereas I was experiencing the current moment as an emergency.

After a week of being in Lebanon, I was picked up by the military for naively taking pictures near a military base in my neighborhood.[2] As I had been in Palestine that same month, and being that it is occupied by the same Israeli regime that was waging a war on Lebanon, I was subsequently suspected of being a collaborator, a charge that, if found guilty, would be punishable by death.[3] I spent one night in prison and many hours of interrogation, blindfolded and handcuffed at times, but was finally released with the help of family connections. Later, I was tried for the lesser crime under civil law code 285: "visiting enemy territory," which carried with it a brief prison sentence or a monetary fine. I paid the fine after my trial and was off.

Much can be said about this episode. I recount it briefly here to raise a methodological problem of doing fieldwork in one's home country. When I had gone to Palestine a month before, and knowing I had to go through Israeli border security, I had taken precautionary measures by deleting all files from my computer and pictures that would suggest I was in an Arab country. Now, on my return, I did not expect to be suspected by my own government,

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2   A version of what follows was published at Electronic Intifada (August 3, 2006): http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article5383.shtml (accessed September 15, 2010).
3   It is illegal under Lebanese law for a Lebanese passport holder to visit occupied Palestine. This was the first suspected violation, and led the authorities to suspect me of collaboration with the enemy. I had entered Palestine with an American not Lebanese passport.

and felt secure at home. I let my guard down. I did not delete pictures I took in cities such as Jafa, Jerusalem, or Ramallah, and I was careless in protecting my pocket notebook. After all, I was home. Suspicion was both visible and invisible, but it was only visible "over there," as something we projected on foreigners, journalists, and foreign researchers. No amount of training could have prepared me to feel insecure in my own home.

This entire ordeal, the looming suspicion, took its toll on my years of fieldwork. Philippe Bourgois (2003), a year later, helped me think through my own experience of being arrested, imprisoned, interrogated, and tried in military court. In response to his informants telling him, at the end of his research, that they initially thought he was gay because, for one, he was "always asking a lot of questions," Bourgois writes that:

> In retrospect I am relieved that during the first few years of my fieldwork I thoroughly misread street cues and did not suspect I was giving off "dirty sexual pervert" vibes. Being self-conscious about my sexual image in the homophobic context of street culture might have interfered with my ability to initiate comfortable relationships with the crack dealers. (Bourgois, 2003:44)

My dilemma, in many ways, was the exact opposite. I would soon discover that my hypersensitivity and self-consciousness of what it means to be suspected of being an informer or collaborator was hindering me from pursuing certain relations, asking too many questions, or moving around the country, as I would have liked. Rodgers (2007) writes that the violent experiences he encountered, and were enacted on him,

> are important to consider because they precipitated an "existential shock" (Robben and Nordstrom, 1995:13), which profoundly affected [his] relationship with both [his] own self and with Nicaragua. Violence is a powerfully formative phenomenon, which shapes people's perceptions of themselves and how they interact with their social and physical environments in the most immediate and urgent of manners (see Feldman, 1991). (Rodgers, 2007:447)

Indeed, the experience was transformative in subtle ways, and I found myself to be relying on friends for company to feel secure as I encountered people for my fieldwork.

For example, on the day after shootings at the Mar Michael Church on January 27, 2008, I had to make sure I could find people to go with me to the Shi'a funeral in the neighborhood of Chiah, where members of Hizballah and the Amal Movement were burying their dead. Even when I did go, accompanied by three friends, I was more paranoid about carrying a camera than anyone in my group—some of whom were taking pictures and one being a fellow anthropologist. My encounter with the military and experience of being suspected of gathering intelligence made me unconfident, as though I suspected myself. It did not help that sometime later a two part article would appear in the Arabic daily *Al-Akhbar* newspaper about Anthropologists and the US Human Terrain System (HTS),[4] under the title, loosely translated as, *Spies as Scholars: Anthropologists in the field of war* (4/30/2008 and 5/1/2008).

Over the years my friends would tease me, and "Sami, how do we know you are not a spy?" was a usual refrain I would hear. There were a number of reasons for this. Partly it was because I was a researcher whose task of data gathering resembled the work of spies, and also due to a state security apparatus that had laid the groundwork for others to

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4   The HTS program launched in February 2007, and "embeds anthropologists and other social scientists in military teams in Iraq and Afghanistan." See American Anthropological Association: http://www. aaanet.org/issues/AAA-Opposes-Human-Terrain-System-Project.cfm (accessed October 2009).

suspect me (Borneman, 2009). Additionally, I felt that people's gaze of suspicion, whether as humor or serious accusation, came about within a historical context of colonial and postcolonial interventions, where Western governments often used both local and foreign agents to manipulate political and social affairs. In light of this historical record, I could be seen as a local agent working for a foreign institution with anonymous "bosses" whose intentions were unknown to my interlocutors. How could one argue with that? And yet, most significantly, my interlocutors just teased. To my knowledge, they did not suspect me, and this was more about my own self-perception and the scenarios I built in my head. I internalized the suspicion and felt it deeply because of the incident that took place early in my fieldwork, an incident that would govern the way I would feel, and come to think about and approach my entire field.

Reflections

After the war ended, there were many moments of self-reflection as well as ruminating amongst friends and activists about our role in war and vis-à-vis the ongoing political struggles surrounding us. I questioned my responsibility as an activist and what it meant to do ethnography when there seemed to be more pressing political and social concerns (like supporting people displaced by the July war). I suggest elsewhere that these positions should not be mutually exclusive, nor placed in hierarchical opposition, and thus, we may want to see that the ethnographer *is* activist rather than the two being separate (Hermez, 2011; see also Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 1995).

I was not alone in my line of questioning. Anthropology has come a long way from those days when one would go off to field sites where they were the first or only ethnographer in the field. Today, one often finds oneself alongside several (if not tens) of anthropologists (and their students) working in the same country, same city or village, and even on similar topics within a nationally bounded geographic space. In fact, when it comes to communities that have experienced war, there is the problem of "over-research" (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2013), with researchers using communities to build research agendas.

Two months after the end of the July 2006 war, a group of anthropologists, including myself, gathered to discuss how to make sense of our work. We met as part of the Anthropology Society in Lebanon (ASIL) in a café in the neighborhood of Hamra to conduct a roundtable discussion "to discuss the war's effects on anthropological research in Lebanon, and to discuss how anthropology [impacts] our understanding of war."[5] ASIL had been formed well before I arrived for fieldwork, and there had been several meetings but then a long hiatus due to the war. The members were regrouping now that there was a ceasefire after the July war. At this particular meeting there were several Lebanese anthropology Masters students, an American Masters student, a Greek doctoral candidate, an American-Lebanese professor from the American University of Beirut, and a European doctoral candidate working on Lebanon and Egypt. Some of our ethical dilemmas were not unique.

While anthropologists who study war are often accused of being attracted to danger, and of romanticizing conflict, we were ourselves reflecting on the idea of being aroused by our presence in war, and the problem of trying to build our careers on questions of human conflict, death, and destruction. The anthropologist as witness is pained by defining an ethic of responsibility, one which, as Zulaika tells us, should transform us into a witness

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5   Direct quotes have been taken from the ASIL meeting minutes.

"horrified not primarily by some evil out there in the world but rather by the abyss of one's own participation in the murder" (2003:107). Indeed, the very idea of being witness sat uncomfortably with me as it could easily fall into war tourism, especially since my witness reporting would not see the light till years later.[6] It was a time when some were accusing international activists as being war tourists for coming to observe the effects of war, and it was difficult to separate the researcher from this group, however much we tried to convince ourselves otherwise.

What was striking was the overlap in the questions we were asking and the anthropological attention to the margins of war. We were also concerned with the way war is made visible in moments of conversation (Scheid, 2008), such as in the way the dead and disappeared are made present as we invoke their memories and commemorate them, or in how the war to come manifests in certain acts, embodiments, and calculations in the present. The invisibilities are hard to capture, hence invisible, even when one is trying to be attuned to them. I came closer to a productive way of thinking of the invisibilities of war through self-reflections at a time when war seemed to be on the horizon. The moment I retell below highlights the questions and emotions one might encounter in relation to an ever-evolving field. I retell it to arrive at a new way of thinking about the ethnography of violence in terms of "intensities," which allows me to move away from violence and conflict as either present or absent, and to think about it, instead, in terms of intensities of presence.

Intensities of Conflict

I was sitting in a café in Hamra, sometime in the late afternoon, writing notes of observations from the previous days. This episode took place around the same time as the ASIL meeting above. I looked up from my computer, scanned the scene around me, and wondered, neither for the first nor the last time, about the state of normalcy that I was experiencing. I gazed back at my screen and began to jot down scattered thoughts: "Life has returned to 'normal' in Beirut, so they say. But then, I wonder which is more normal: the 'state of war' or the 'state of capital excess …'." As I sat sipping on coffee and listening to Arabic music, there did not seem to be anything resembling conflict in my field site; life was moving along as usual. In this moment of supposed normalcy, the ethical questions, related to how I was moving within the country, the money I spent, and how I was using my time, so long as I chose to pause for a moment to acknowledge these questions, seemed more striking than at any time during the war. This is quite different than a quote I am reminded of in Cramer, Hammond, and Pottier, "In research on or during conflict, ethical issues do not dramatically change but they get sharpened and become more difficult to resolve" (quoted in Mazurana, Jacobsen, and Gale 2013). Looking back at my notes, I find myself grappling with a similar question:

> *I look around and I wonder about the difference between all this drinking, listening to music, talking, spending, spending, and more spending [at this time versus during wartime]. For the majority not engaged in acts of killing, I feel as though life in war*

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6   Stewart and Strathern argue that, "the moral responses of witnesses are integral to the task of analysis itself, and are highly important for understanding the secondary consequences that flow from violence" (2002:158). In this case, one of the moral tensions circumscribed in the act of witnessing came about because the public reporting of what was witnessed would not happen immediately. This could give the impression that one was in the field simply to observe the suffering of others.

> *heightens their sense of morality. During wartime, many of these people are either helping the war effort through relief work, are trying to fight for peace resolutions, or if they are doing nothing, their thoughts are consumed by a sense of moral responsibility that they are not sure how to resolve. In wartime, people go out, drink, spend, but they are thinking of those dying around them—either with concern or to dismiss them—or they are thinking of whether they are targets or not. They might go out because they are fed up, they want to forget, or they have forgotten (until they hear an explosion or come across someone who reminds them). No matter their position in a time of war, they are constantly reminded of the moral questions. Even when they take discriminatory positions, they do so consciously, and having thought of why they do so. (Field notes—October 4, 2006)*

The issues I was grappling with here suggest that war does not make ethical issues more or less difficult to resolve because we never really resolve these ethical issues in the first place, not even in a time of not-war. What does happen during wartime is that the ethical issues become more visible and we are forced to confront them rather than resolve them. In essence, when we live in those periods of not-war, we are unable to see the ethical issues for what they are. They are invisible and masked by what we come to refer to as the "normal." In such cases, our actions are not driven by conscious moral decisions, instead, many of us just act, just are. We have not resolved anything, we have just made them absent.

In this moment of reflection, I was still living within a context of instability and conflict, but if I was to believe many around me, we had returned back to normal. The war had ended and the conflict, in one sense, passed. This "returning back" to the normal suggests a break from ethical issues past, it places me out of the conflict in a position of doing research "on" rather than "during" conflict. It also implies a notion of synchronic time and events. In this sense, conflict and the normal appear on parallel fields, never intersecting, and we can jump back and forth between them: returning to the normal, falling back into conflict, experiencing them consecutively, always living towards one or the other, but never occupying the spaces in mutual time.

The practical question facing me was how to think of my position in the overall condition of the social life I was living in and engaging with. Was I situated within a conflict or had I (and we) just overcome one? And if I was present within a conflict, what type of conflict was it? By what name do I refer to it? How do I categorize it? Was it a war, was it something more ambiguous as political conflict, or was it a conflict inherent in capitalism (as I questioned in my notes)? And what type of politics would be produced, embodied, and entrenched through whatever classification I settled upon? Questions of whether the situation was "normal" continued to haunt many of my interlocutors and me for the entire period of my fieldwork and till this writing. There always seemed to be a discrepancy between, on one hand, what people believed about the "normal" [*al-ʾādi*]—they had complex analyses about its fluidity and its meaninglessness as a category in the changing contexts of everyday life— and on the other hand, how they produced the idea of the "normal," and reinscribed its discourse by setting it up against an ambiguously defined conflict that was then imagined as "abnormal" (Macek, 2009). While the "norm" might be a life interrupted by declarations of war or assassinations, the "normal" is understood in context, and it is influenced by local and global knowledge about how the world should be. This overlay of local and global makes normality always hard to define.

Ethnographers talking about violence have often situated themselves in zones that they described as conflict or war ridden. But what does this mean and what is made invisible in such all-encompassing frameworks? The dilemma of categorizing my field site as experiencing war, armed conflict, or political violence is that none of these were constant

states.[7] More importantly, thinking of myself as doing an ethnography of such zones made me feel like an imposter. Was I really in the thick of war? At the time, many of us thought so, but thinking about it now, I am torn.

One way to think about this is to consider what I call the "intensities of conflict." I do not mean this as a description of the severity of an armed conflict, whether it is low intensity or not. Rather, this is about both the emotional and experiential intensity of conflict as it is felt viscerally. In some cases, one's distance from an event, such as a bombing or armed combat, might define or determine a person's intense presence in a conflict. At other times, the intense presence might be determined in the way a person relates to those who are being targeted, or in how one understands oppression. Thus, the "intensities of conflict" refers to the differing ways in which people feel, experience, and locate themselves in a particular event. These differing ways are the intensities, and the particular event is what people then self-define in terms of conflict. How intense, then, does one feel a specific conflict to be? And what kind of acknowledgments, dismissals, positions, and overall meaning, political or otherwise, about conflict does this intensity generate? In describing and interpreting the reception of war in people's lives, we often forget the way these intensities are felt and received, experienced and embodied. And if the researcher is not careful, if these intensities are dismissed, then the invisible is lost and something about the way conflict is felt escapes us.

We are in the realm of affect here. Affects can escape us. As potentialities they are often beyond the grasp of easy interpretation, and in their fluid intensities they become difficult to categorize. To say that conflict is delimited through intensity is to remark on the way both territory and time are felt and folded to bring us closer or further from events (Massumi, 2002:15). Massumi writes that a "matter-of-factness dampens intensity" (2002:25). People are able to imagine themselves out of a conflict through appearances of normality and matter-of-factness, and this is especially easier when physical destruction is either absent or made invisible to the subject. The normal mutes intensity and masks conflict. In this way, what researchers, journalists, military strategists, combatants, and civilians call the frontlines can be complicated. These lines are constructed and they are lived through intensity. Thus, it might be the case that my grandparents' home was exposed to a designated frontline that separated two opposing militias during the 1970s and '80s, but it would be mistaken to argue that those living away from such dividing lines were not also experiencing the war firsthand. Not only are frontlines multiple and shifting, but physical frontlines may not always correspond with experiential ones. More to the present, in the July 2006 war, who was at the frontlines of war? Who was closest to it? Was it the people of the South while in the South, or also in their displacement? Was it all Lebanese, even those partying every night?

The frontline in such cases is a matter of perception. It is where you perceive it to be, and we feel it with degrees of intensity. Like the frontline, our presence in or out of conflict follows similar logics, and it may no longer be useful to talk about our presence in conflict per se, but rather, to speak in terms of zones of intensities of conflict, and to be more specific, with reference to "heightened threat" (Scheid, 2008:185), amplified anxiety, or levels of fear. We are always present, as ethnographers, in the invisibilities of conflicts that our interlocutors live with everyday. It is the degree to which we are attuned to them, and to which they affect us, that may determine our own presence within them.

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7   The idea of the shifting meaning of a field site is a variant of a larger question about anthropological locations (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997), and how to think of methods as anthropology takes on an "awkward scale" as it encounters globalization, and as social and cultural geographies transform (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2003).

During the 2006 war, it was not unusual for people to go out to night clubs, and to party while those in the South of the country were running for their lives. Faraya, a village with mountain resorts, and Broumana, with its strip of shops and restaurants in the mountains, became hot spots for many wanting to escape the target zones. Scheid writes:

> One of the most notable things about the Israeli assault on Lebanon during the summer of 2006 was how it immediately highlighted the stark contrasts in Lebanese society. While people whom I was later to meet in villages [in the South] like Zibqin were crushed by concrete as they sought secure sites, people whom I had planned on summering with [in Faraya] were comfortably ensconced in their rental chalets and smug sectarian status as non-targets, innocents, viewing the war, via aerial transmitters, as little more than a continuation of the World Cup matches. (2008:177)

Being in the mountains, tucked away from the bombing, one could think of oneself as not being a target or a party to the conflict. As a researcher, you might also feel yourself not doing ethnography of conflict or violence, but it is the intensity of conflict that you would personally feel, intersubjectively with or in opposition to those around you, that will determine the imagined contours of your field site: to be or not to be in conflict, or how intensely present conflict is. The intensity is a way for people to form affective communities. That is, communities that share a sense of emotional connection and understanding vis-à-vis an experience. In this case, an affective community forms as people feel together that they are not targets, not threatened, and share an experience of dealing with war in specific technical ways—going to the beach, to a party, staying home, engaging in relief efforts, or fleeing the country. The way each person lives the intensity of conflict will help explain how they might position themselves.

Returning to my moment in the café, we can now explain some of my dilemmas and the sharpness or dullness of the ethical questions one faces in times of war and not-war through the lens of feelings of intensity of conflict. The day before, sitting at the café, sipping on coffee, had not fired up any self-doubt or reflection, yet now, the intensity of what, in my notes, I called the "state of capital excess," or the conflict inherent in capitalism, flooded inexplicably into a zone of visibility. There may have been places in the country where this conflict, or even war, could be objectively felt, but there were far more places where the only indication of conflict was subjective, intersubjective, and felt through ones own emotional self-relation. The ethnographer must remain constantly attuned to these subjective spaces where conflict is invisible, where it rears its head through an intensity that may prove indistinguishable for people going about their everyday lives.

One Final Thought

This chapter has explored issues that arise when trying to do an ethnography of violence (broadly defined). I have tried to foreground a few methodological and conceptual issues, whether this was the ethnographer's position, issues of suspicion, or how we define conflict. I ended the discussion above by arguing that we should think of conflict as ever present, but consider its intensities in order to understand the way it is lived in people's everyday lives. I point to two turns in the study of violence that we should continue to pursue. The first is studying the ordinary and everyday life of violence, and the conditions, dispositions, practices, encounters, experiences, and dialogues that are produced. The second is to consider emotions in the field that circulate between the researcher, the field site, and the

interlocutors (Hage, 2009). I find these to be two productive avenues of exploration to deepen our knowledge of armed conflict.

A final thought. There is an absence of the word ʾ*unf* [violence] in daily conversations and usage in Lebanon that makes me want to question and rethink the importance of the concept of violence, which researchers try so hard to understand. Could it be that a people having been through war and continually expecting it would rarely employ the word for violence in their daily speech? This realization complicates the terminology I have been using as an unconscious translation from English. It is not that people don't have other words they use for violence, such as *katl* [killing], *damār* [destruction], *ḥarb* [war], *kasf* [bombing], but that these terms are more specific, and suggest that people are more descriptive in the way they remember and converse about the phenomenon of violence [ʾ*unf*]. The phenomenon itself is brought to life, made tangible and experiential, through the specificity of other experiences. In some ways, knowing this makes the study of violence as a category reductive as well as detached from people's actual experiences. The concept has eluded so many researchers because, I fear, we have held onto the concept as a signifier for a diverse set of practices and experiences that have filled it to the point of emptiness. I say this to argue that we may have to rethink the very notion of an abstract ethnography of violence as a discrete body of thought. We may need to begin our points of inquiry with a set of specific terms picked up from conversations in the field. No doubt these will present their own problems, limitations and ambiguities, but this may at least drive an analysis that is founded in more local lexicon and, thus, localized meaning, which could very possibly recover the meaning of violence itself. I see this as a more productive and grounded beginning than to start with violence as the initial point of reference. In my case, it might be to first think of "war," both real and imagined, or practices of killing, destruction, and fear, as local categories that people invest with meaning and emotion. Another option is to think of the recent turn towards the category of precarity as a useful alternative to connect the struggles of people all over the world (Muehlebach, 2013). Whereas armed conflict, often subsumed under the notion of an ethnography of violence, tends to happen "over there," precarity faces people "over here" and "all over." Beginning with this category could productively connect the global with the local, and place them together in an important conversation.

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Warfare and Ritual in Anthropology

Bryan K. Hanks

Introduction

We can begin with a question that has persisted through the ages. Why war? In our modern world each day's news brings renewed evidence of violence, conflict, and warfare from around the world. One might question just how deeply into time we would have to travel to find a single day when a human individual has not being harmed or killed at the hands of another. Perhaps, one might speculate, no such day has ever existed.

Humanity has witnessed almost unimaginable leaps over the past century in technology, demographic growth, and interconnectivity through the rise of telecommunications and the Internet. Indeed, the terms *society* and *culture* have taken on completely new meanings as technology has transformed the way in which people interact and information is generated, dispersed, and consumed across the world; frequently, in mere seconds of real time. Incredibly detailed knowledge of our world, and even that which lies beyond its limits, can be found simply at one's fingertips by many millions inhabiting the planet today.

Yet for all the great technological advancements, potential for multi-cultural and ethnic awareness and understanding, and deep historical knowledge of the human past, conflict, violence and warfare remain consistent and vibrant elements of the human condition. Why? Are these actions and social practices so embedded within what it means to be *human* that disentangling them is an intractable goal? Is the world that we live within today, hyper-stimulated as it is by globalization and large-scale geopolitical economies and politics, so permeated by these sets of conditions that this actually inhibits human societies from developing in ways that might lead towards less hostility and more peaceful conditions? There are no simple and straightforward answers to these questions and the fact remains that human societies will continue to face such dilemmas well into the twenty-first century.

The concern over human violence, and its origins and persistence, has plagued the minds of great scholars for centuries and in many ways stands as an enduring challenge to contemporary and future scholarship. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) are both renowned for having produced early and critical treatises on aggression and warfare and their relationship to the origins of humanity. These scholars took opposite stances on the "natural state of man" and what they saw as the driving conditions for human aggression and conflict. In the twentieth century, the specter of warfare and its impact on humanity was addressed in a famous exchange of letters between Sigmund Freud and Albert Einstein in 1932[1] (Einstein and Freud 1933a; 1933b). This exchange, by arguably two of the liveliest minds of the twentieth century, started with the simple premise;

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1   English translations of this correspondence are archived at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=3864.

"Why war?" Ironically, this important exchange preceded the outbreak of World War II, which ushered into history the greatest loss of human life through conflict that humanity has ever known.

Throughout centuries of intellectual and scientific development, violence and warfare remain pressing concerns and the persistence of these within human societies is undeniable. What we do acknowledge now is that human violence and institutionalized warfare are connected to multivariate causes and changing historical conditions and patterns of human behavior. Thus, it is a complex and ever changing set of human, material and symbolic relationships intertwined within unfolding historical contexts that have shaped the past and continue to shape the destiny of the human species. This chapter will not seek to contribute to the question of, "why war," rather, it focuses on highlighting what the study of the past can do to bring a more nuanced view to violence, conflict, and warfare in the present day. One could argue that the study of how humans make war, and have made war in the past, undoubtedly contributes to a more robust and empirically informed appreciation and understanding for the emergence of aggression and conflict. But just as importantly, it helps to recognize the development of longer-term tropes of warfare practices and how these become culturally sanctioned, institutionalized, and ritualized. Thus, allowing violence to become deeply entangled in culture, identity, and ritual practice. Over the past two decades, a number of important publications have encouraged the investigation of such matters (Ember and Ember 1994; Carman and Harding 1999; Martin and Frayer 1997; Arkush and Allen 2006; Nielsen and Walker 2009). These contributions inspire comparative study that throws into relief both similarities and differences in the way warfare is socially and culturally embedded. Much of this work builds and extends on studies of the origins of human conflict, which has been a popular arena of academic discourse within many academic fields. Within the discipline of anthropology, the search for universal models to account for warfare has dominated as scholars have examined the role of demography, environment and ecology, and social hierarchy in early societies around the world (Carneiro 1970; Johnson and Earle 1987; Chagnon 1988; Redmond 1994). This trend has resulted in largely overturning earlier twentieth-century perspectives that pacified the deep human past to reveal that conflict has existed since the earliest of times and played a substantial role in the emergence of social and political complexity in many regions of the world (Keeley 1996).

This chapter, which focuses on the late prehistoric period of the Eurasian steppes, is defined through archaeological study. That is, what can be determined and understood from our study of the material past. Without question, the ravages of time significantly alter these traces but through a variety of techniques and theoretical interpretation archaeology in tandem with bioarchaeology can reveal a fascinating narrative of past human lives and the material conditions produced and reproduced through the actions of individuals and collective groups. Anthropological archaeology has gone some good way in investigating such issues through its unique diachronic, cross-cultural approach. Much research has focused on the long-term effects and conditions that emerged out of large-scale empire expansion and colonization—historical dynamics that have been evaluated anew by anthropologists through post-colonial theory (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992; Arkush and Allen 2006).

In the historical era, such dynamics began with the voyages of geographical discovery starting in the eleventh century AD (Christian crusades). The following centuries of European domination and colonization throughout Africa, Asia, and the Americas laid the foundation for large-scale social, political, and economic development and stimulated incredible diaspora through violence, warfare, and slavery. A number of classic ethnographic and ethnohistoric case studies, in particular, have documented the impact of expanding empires and states on indigenous groups and the dynamic role of conflict in such settings (Ferguson

and Whitehead 1992). These important studies have highlighted fascinating diachronic shifts in conflict, violence, and ritual practice that are embedded within large-scale socio-political and economic processes. More recent intellectual trends utilizing practice and agency theory advocate attempts to move beyond objective materialist and environmental factors, traditionally seen as core stimuli for warfare, to examine "fields of action" relating to warfare practice and ritualization (Nielsen and Walker 2009, 6). This has led to a number of important theoretical insights on individual and societal scale responses to human conflict and the role of agency in both contributing to and structuring new traditions of ritual practice relating to violence. What seems clear is that the anthropological study of warfare has become a robust subject of inquiry advocating a more nuanced theoretical perspective in order to understand both the scale and variability of human responses to conflict in the past and present and how warfare contributes to long-term patterns of technological development, social organization, and the ritual and symbolic practices surrounding inter-personal practices of violence.

Characterizing Early Warriors in the Steppes

The vast Eurasian steppes contain an abundance of prehistoric sites and one of the most important categories has been the ubiquitous burial mound form known in the Russian language as *kurgan*. Earth, stone, and wood were common building materials and even though the use of funerary mounds developed in some areas of the Eurasian steppes by the early fourth millennium BCE kurgan burial took on new prominence in the first centuries of the first millennium BCE among many cultural groups (Figure 14.1). Some of the most impressive examples contained substantial animal sacrifice, wealthy grave goods, and new types of weaponry linked to mounted warfare and political dominance (Hanks 2002; Hanks 2012). The largest tombs required a substantial effort of labor to construct and contributed importantly to the political processes linking the living with the dead as individuals came together to commemorate the deceased and to reaffirm social, economic, and political relationships.

These monuments, many of which still stand today, left their mark on subsequent generations of steppe inhabitants as symbolic manifestations of power and wealth across the landscape. In fact, some have taken on a particularly vibrant role in modern day nation-state building and its use of cultural heritage. For example, in 1969, an archaeology team led by Kemil A. Akishev made a significant discovery while excavating a large earthen tomb in the Issyk region of Kazakhstan. What this team discovered has come to be known as the *Issyk Golden Warrior* burial. Within the tomb the archaeologists recovered the skeleton of a young individual approximately 16–18 years of age[2] furnished with a remarkable set of artifacts, including golden costume adornments and an extraordinary golden headdress (Chang and Guroff 2006). Dating to the third–second centuries BCE,[3] this tomb and the individual it contained have become important national symbols of the Republic of Kazakhstan since this country gained its independence in 1991. These cultural relics effectively encapsulate the antiquity and vibrancy of pastoral nomads in the region and the efficacy and wealth of these groups through time.

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2   Scholars have debated the biological sex of this individual and ancient DNA analysis has not been completed because the bones are no longer available for study.

3   Originally dated to the fifth to fourth centuries BCE, recent re-calibrations of radiometric data now place this between the third to second centuries BCE.

Figure 14.1   Map of Eurasia detailing the conventional distribution of Iron Age cultural groups

The Issyk Golden Warrior, even though laying undisturbed for over 2,000 years, stands today as an important symbol of the past and present for Kazakhstan and embodies the important role that archaeology and the past play within the articulation of contemporary ethnicity and nationalism in the decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While archaeological interpretations of the past were significant elements of Marxist ideology during the Soviet Period, ethnic roots to the past also have factored importantly into the emergence of statehood and cultural heritage in many CIS countries since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Klejn 2012; Trigger 1989; 2006). In addition to the important role that the Issyk Golden Warrior plays within present day Kazakhstan, the tomb also is significant in the context of Eurasian prehistory. Even though the tomb is just one of many thousands within the northern Eurasian region, each of these burial complexes represent remarkable *events* that contributed to broader dynamic social processes over the first millennium BCE in a period that has largely been defined in terms of the widespread development of mounted pastoral nomadism in the grassland steppes (Davis-Kimball et al. 1995; Koryakova and Epimakhov 2007; Wagner et al. 2011).

The vast Eurasian steppe lands have stood as something of an enigma since the dawn of written history. Scholars have customarily viewed this immense ecological zone as peripheral and of little consequence to major developments such as agriculture, metallurgy, and the first towns and cities—key developments that were embedded within the rise of Old World civilizations in China, Africa, the Near East, and Europe (Figure 14.2). This perspective, at least from the point of view of Anglo-American scholarship, changed little during much of the twentieth century as the impenetrable "iron curtain" concealing the Soviet Union largely prohibited international opportunities for

collaboration on the archaeology and early history of the vast Eurasian steppes. Soviet archaeology, on the other hand, received strong state support and a resilient tradition of excavation and publication was realized. Perestroika and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late twentieth century led to remarkable new opportunities for international collaboration and research in territories formerly controlled by the Soviet government.

DATES	European Steppe	Western Siberia	Asiatic Steppe	Middle Asia	Central Asia	China
BC 800	Transitional Kimmerians (pre-scythian period)	**LBA**	Arzhan Transitional period	Yaz1 Cities-oasises Achae-menidian	**LBA** Plate Grave Culture	**BA** Tcheou dynasty
700	**EIA**	Transitional period Pre-Sargat	Early Sacians			
600	Early Scythians Sauromatiea		**EIA**	Yaz 2 **EIA**		**Iron Age**
500		**IA1 (EIA)** Sargat-Gorokhovo	Sacians			
400	Scythian Kingdom				Hun Kingdom	Chzhan-Go (combatting kingdoms)
300	Early Sarmatians Aorsi	**IA2 (EIA)** Sargat		Alexander the Great	Huns-China wars	Tsin Shih Huandy dynasty
200	Roxolany		Hunnic conquest	Greco-Bactria		
100				Parthians		
0			Alans			
AD 100	Western Alans	Huns **IA3**		Kangiui period of Khorasmia Kushan Kingdom Huns	Huns separation Syanbi	
200	Goths	Late Sargat				
300						China division
400	Huns	Sargat separation		Sassanians		

Figure 14.2   Eurasian Iron Age chronology by region
Source: Adapted from Koryakova 1996, 252.

As a result, the past 25 years have led to a much greater awareness for the important prehistoric and historic developments that occurred within the Eurasian steppes and adjacent territories (Boyle et al. 2002; Popova et al. 2007; Hanks and Linduff 2009).

The Eurasian steppes also have come to be synonymous with the emergence of nomadic tribes and empires that were the curse of more "civilized" neighbors to the south. Indeed, scholarship on the Iron Age has focused frequently on culture historical interpretations of tribal groups connected with the descriptions handed down to us from ancient authors of the Classical world since the fifth century BCE (Davis-Kimball et al. 1995). One of the most frequently cited sources is Herodotus of Halicarnassus who in Book IV of his Histories (1996) wrote extensively of Scythia and neighboring regions and tribes. Ethnonyms, such as *Scythians*, *Sarmatians* and *Saka*, were penned by Herodotus and have been routinely mapped onto specific geographical regions of the North Pontic zone and Central Asia by modern scholars. The Issyk Golden Warrior tomb described above, for example, is argued to be representative of Saka populations within Central Asia.

Archaeological evidence from the first millennium BCE is largely associated with the excavation of the numerous kurgans that dot the vast Eurasian steppes. Little evidence has been recovered from settlements or seasonal occupation areas connected with Early Iron Age pastoralists although this is beginning to change as a result of more intensified surveys and excavation (Chang and Tourtellotte 1998; Chang et al. 2003; Murphy et al. 2013; Spengler et al. 2013; 2014). Nevertheless, funerary monuments and grave furnishings have provided the fundamental data archaeologists have utilized in reconstructing social, economic, and political change during the first millennium BCE. In more general terms, scholarship over the past three decades has highlighted the problems associated with the use of mortuary data, which is strongly conditioned by ritual practice and the dynamic processes of the living as individuals within their societies are laid to rest (Parker Pearson 1993; 1999). This mortuary data does, however, provide an outstanding resource for considering in more detail the nature of ritual practice over time and the role of material culture and social memory in structuring relationships between the living and the dead. These issues have received increasing levels of theoretical treatment by archaeologists and this has formed more nuanced understandings of mortuary ritual practices (Treherne 1995; Sofaer 2006; Hanks 2008a; 2008b; Williams 2006). Such studies are especially important for examining the increasing scale and intensity of violence and warfare in the Early Iron Age and related ritual practices seen through monument construction and burial of the dead. To understand key developments that occurred during the Iron Age it is important to first set them within a broader temporal context in terms of the development of key warfare technologies and associated social and cultural attitudes and behaviors.

Time, Event, and Historicity

As set out above, this chapter examines patterns of mortuary ritual associated with warfare practices over nearly a millennium. This period represents the emergence of historically documented contact between literate societies of China, Persia, and Greece and non-literate neighboring populations to the north. The record of this contact is patchy at best and historically conditioned by presenting only the views of the state societies to the south. It is for this reason that archaeology must be turned to in order to assist our understanding of the social, economic, and political developments among the northern pastoralist populations.

In considering this, one of the most important theoretical concerns must be our conceptualization of time and its relationship to patterns of change in ritual practice. In our

analysis of mortuary evidence it is particularly the relationship between *mortuary events and their materiality*, the impact of these on the *structure of society*, and the *longer term influence of burial monuments* in articulating connections between the living and the dead and the efficacy of ritual action. In essence, then, the need for a coherent theoretical structure by which to understand these different temporal processes, and how they build upon one another, is of paramount importance for understanding such long-term patterns of ritual practice.

For the remainder of this chapter, select archaeological evidence from the Eurasian steppes will be considered broadly within a temporal structure put forward by Fernand Braudel (1949) that utilized: *histoire événementielle* (short term, events), *conjunctures* (medium term), and the *longue durée* (long term). The influence of Braudel's 1949 publication, and further elaboration and development by members of the French Annales School, has been felt in numerous disciplines for decades. The approach has become well trodden in many disciplines and received substantial criticism as theoretical paradigms shifted in the latter half of the twentieth century. Yet, Braudel's approach continues to be discussed and elaborated upon and has provided some fresh utility within archaeological discourse. This is particularly so for the analysis of short-term events and their role in structural change (further discussion below).

The use of Braudel's temporal structure in this chapter is undertaken as a heuristic instrument to identify some key relationships between archaeological patterning and the temporal duration and intensity of what we may interpret as important shifts in cultural and ritual practices surrounding violence, warfare, and burial of the dead. Eurasian archaeology is fascinating when considered from this perspective. Material remnants of single funerary events, where the dead were placed within elaborately constructed tombs, are well attested through archaeological study. Broader scales of ritual practice and tradition are visible within archaeological patterning and drastic shifts can be seen taking place over only two or three generations. And, finally, longer-term trends stand out vividly through the use and reuse of specific cemetery locales over periods of several thousand years leading in some cases to the vibrant appropriation of the past within the present day.

Events, Spectacles, and Performances

We begin the discussion on temporal cycles by focusing on the smallest scale offered by Braudel, the *event*, which connects so effectively with human action and intentionality and their immediate material outcomes. Archaeologists have been attracted for some time now to the French Annales paradigm in attempts to develop more systematic approaches to time scales and their relationship to human agency (Hodder 1987; Bintliff 1991; Knapp 1992). More recently, archaeologists have renewed emphasis on the short-term scale and the role of *events* in structuring human agency (Beck et al. 2007; Bolender 2010). These approaches have utilized William Sewell's (2005) *eventful sociology* in order to examine the role of the material within the interplay between event and its longer-term impact on social structure (Bolender 2010, 4). Importantly, Sewell's approach draws on the *theory of structuration* put forward by Anthony Giddens (1979; 1984), which emphasizes the recursive relationship between human action and structure and thus underscores the key role of events in this process. Since events (either through natural forces or through human agency) frequently challenge structural order, these play a particularly important role in shaping the flow and effect of human action within such disjunctions. As Bolender usefully summarizes:

> *Structural disjunctions occur when the schemas once used to mobilize an array*
> *of resources lose their capacity to reliably order the world. The social disarray*

engendered during episodes of disjunction cannot be tolerated for significant periods of time and the failure of previously reliable structures opens the opportunity for novel articulations of schemas and resources that may not have been possible in the previous order. (2010, 4–5)

This emphasis on the potential that exists during events to reconstitute action and intentionality, in effect, reordering previous structure and order, would seem especially potent in the context of death and burial events within societies. As scholars have emphasized that death and context of death of an individual can trigger a host of responses. In many cultures around the world the death of a group member represents a substantial tear in the social fabric of the community thus giving way to extensive emotional response and culturally sanctioned traditions of bereavement and treatment of the corpse (Tarlow 1999; Williams 2006). Other scholars have underscored that death, burial, and commemoration events provide crucial opportunities for the articulation and rearticulation of ideology and political agenda (Parker Pearson 1984; Verdery 1999). Mortuary events by their very nature, then, represent a crucial disjuncture in the life of the everyday. While they frequently reflect tradition and cultural practice, there is still some level of opportunity for renegotiation as witnessed historically through distinct changes in patterns of ritual practice.

Archaeology of the Early Iron Age of the Eurasian steppes has unearthed numerous grandiose burial tombs that coincide with the emergence of widespread mounted warfare in the first centuries of the first millennium BCE. These tombs are frequently among the largest documented throughout Eurasia and reflect considerable efforts in their construction and the disposal of wealth in the form of rich grave goods and the sacrifice of both animals and, in some cases, humans. Several publications document these discoveries in detail and so for our purposes here it is only necessary to set out some of the key characteristics of these tombs and highlight their importance in the context of eventful funerary contexts (Bokovenko 2006; Parzinger 2008).

Scholarly discussions of such elaborate mortuary practices frequently turn to a description of the death rite of Scythian kings by Herodotus. It is worthwhile quoting this at some length to highlight the emphasis that Herodotus places on these events and their effect on the larger community:

> *When a king dies, they dig a great square pit, and, when it is ready, they take up the corpse, which has been previously prepared in the following way: the belly is slit open, cleaned out, and filled with various aromatic substances, crushed galingale, parsley-seed, and anise, it is then sewn up again and the whole body coated over with wax. In this condition it is carried in a wagon to a neighboring tribe within the Scythian dominions, and then on to another, taking the various tribes in turn; and in the course of its progress, the people who successively receive it, follow the custom of the Royal Scythians and cut a piece from their ears, shave their hair, make circular incisions on their arms, gash their foreheads and noses, and thrust arrows through their left hands. On each stage of the journey those who have already been visited join the procession, until at last the funeral cortege, after passing through every part of the Scythian dominions, finds itself at the place of burial amongst the Gerrhi, the most northerly and remote of Scythian tribes. Here the corpse is laid in the tomb on a mattress, with spears fixed in the ground on either side to support a roof of withies laid on wooden poles, while in other parts of the great square pit various members of the king's household are buried beside him: on of his concubines, his butler, his cook, his groom, his steward, and his chamberlain—all of them strangled. Horses are*

buried too, and gold cups (the Scythians do not use silver or bronze), and a selection of his other treasures. This ceremony over, everybody with great enthusiasm sets about raising a mound of earth, each competing with his neighbor to make it as big as possible. (1996, 237)

This description by Herodotus provides a lively narrative of the funerary practices surrounding the disposal of an elite member of Scythian society and the social response to this event. Whether Herodotus is referring to a specific historical event or has combined elements of different narratives of such events is unknown. Archaeology, however, has provided evidence of similar practices but also has shown numerous variations on tomb construction across the Western Steppes, Central Asia, and Western Siberia during the first millennium BCE.

In some very extreme examples, such as Arzhan I, over 100 horses were sacrificed and the tombs themselves were elaborate constructions of wood, stone, and soil requiring the efforts of numerous participants. This level of investment in tomb construction is rare and seems especially linked to some of the earliest Iron Age kurgans constructed within specific regions stretching from Mongolia to Ukraine in the west. Many of these examples date to the first half of the first millennium BCE and appear related to early political dynamics surrounding the emergence of mounted warfare and what may have been large scale territorial conflict involving populations in the hundreds if not thousands. As underscored above, the death, burial, and tomb construction of prominent members of these societies provided an exceptionally important opportunity for the burial event and renegotiation of social, political, and economic relationships. As Herodotus' narrative describes, the outpouring of grief by the living members of the society hints at the importance of emotive display during this time and the transport of the individual's body throughout various territories ensured that the death event could be shared by many more than may have attended the actual burial procedure and construction of the tomb. These considerations are especially important in the context of psychological responses to dramatic events through what is termed "flashbulb memory" (Conway 1995). Such cognitive responses anchor individuals to specific moments in time, *events*, and thus serve to structure temporality within one's individual narrative and more broadly within collective social memory (Hanks 2008a). Given that these were non-literate societies the importance of witnessing such events, either in part or in whole, would have contributed importantly to social and political process and the memorialization of specific individuals, their lives, and role within these early societies. These events, then, would have played an important role in both maintaining and renegotiating what Benedict Anderson has termed "imagined communities" (1991, 6). Those social structures situated beyond routine face-to-face encounters of the everyday.

Herodotus' description also hints at the important role that spectacle and performance may have played during the ritual transference of the corpse and ultimately its deposit within the mortuary locale. Both the impact and potential for modifications to ritual practice in this context should be more closely examined as archaeologists have taken an increasingly more enthusiastic approach to the study of performance in such ritual settings—particularly in connection with ritual architecture. As Inomata and Coben have noted, "As monuments provide stages for theatrical events, their physical presence creates ordered space that defines social relations of participants. Moreover, monuments mediate the construction and negotiation of the meaning associated with landscape and time in a unique manner comparable to spectacle because of its extraordinary nature distinct from buildings tied to daily lives" (2006, 17). This perspective underscores both the value and role that the construction of tombs had during this period as other forms of ritual architecture are unknown among early pastoralists of the Iron Age.

Moreover, Herodotus notes the continued ritual use of Scythian kurgans by describing the additional sacrifice of 50 of the kings' remaining servants and 50 horses (1996, 238). All are sacrificed and placed together at the tomb one year after the initial burial of the deceased. Archaeological evidence to fit this exact narrative has not been found but many Iron Age tombs do reveal that additional ritual deposits and burial did take place. Unfortunately, conventional archaeology of the Eurasian steppes has rarely considered kurgans as loci for continued and structured ritual practice and has instead chosen to view these mortuary complexes as static reflections of the rank and status and cultural affinity of the interred (see Hanks 2001 for discussion).

Another important locus for examining the temporal scale of the *event* among Iron Age societies is that of the human body and its modification. Fortunately for archaeology, the discovery of frozen tombs (permafrost conditions) in the Altai Mountains by Soviet scholars brought to light incredibly well preserved remains including human corpses, tomb furnishings, and sacrificed horses (Rudenko 1970). One of the most interesting aspects of these astonishing finds was the elaborate tattooing identified on the human bodies.

The tattoos frequently represent a variety of motifs connected to the animal world. This form of artistic expression was widespread during the Iron Age and has been termed Eurasian Animal Style Art (Rostovtzeff 1922). Some scholars have argued for the deep temporal meaning of the deer motif, in particular, as being connected to traditions stemming from Siberian shamanism (Bayarsaikhan 2005) and stretching back to the Neolithic (Jacobson 1993). Such imagery typically depicts cervids, horses, and felines and can reflect great agency in the hybridization of animal species and their parts. This is often structured in ways that evoke transition or metamorphosis. Motifs also frequently reveal "predator-prey" dynamics with felines attacking cervids. I have suggested previously that these representations, and the vibrant symbolism they illustrate, were intertwined with social display and identity negotiation connected with new structures of conflict and violence during the Early Iron Age (Hanks 2010, 184). Moreover, the act of tattooing represents a fascinating connection with individual biography and memory (Kuwahara 2005, 17–18). Research also has emphasized that tattoos can reflect particular life events and important *rites of passage* for individuals who wish to inscribe the importance of such events on the body (Thomas et al. 2005; Hanks 2010). Therefore providing a temporal record of individual identity and the signification of important events within the individual narrative.

The discussion of events in this section has ranged from emphasizing the importance of mortuary spectacle and the construction of tombs in underwriting not only political process but also in the formation and maintenance of social memory among non-literature societies. Archaeological excavation has revealed the importance of the context of violence and warfare practices in this through the ubiquitous deposit of weaponry and horse-riding gear within Iron Age tombs. While tombs clearly represent important events within such historical processes the probable role of individual life events and rites of passage have also been emphasized through the identification of tattoos in exceptional cases of organic preservation. Archaeological evidence, therefore, has yielded a variety of interesting perspectives on how short-term temporal scales were structured through the ritual practice of warriors and the conspicuous mortuary traditions of this period. These important events marking the death of significant members of society also provided important opportunities for the renegotiation of social structure and the development of new forms of ritual practice—thereby contributing to the longer duration of tradition and tropes that emerged during the first millennium BCE. This next section extends this to consider a broader span of time and very distinct shifts in ritual practices and warfare technologies between the second and first millennium BCE. This comparison between the Bronze Age and Iron Age sets into relief major transitions in what Braudel termed *mentalities* or, worldview.

Conjunctures and *Mentalités*

In a 1998 paper, Colin Renfrew highlighted key "horizons" of regionally widespread early technologies in Europe and Eurasia. The chronological sequence stemmed from the earliest domestication of horses for food, wheeled traction vehicles pulled by draft animals, followed later by spoke-wheeled chariots pulled by horses, with a later development of widespread mounted warfare on horseback (Figure 14.3). Renfrew argued that each of these "horizons," spanning several millennia of human social and technological development, could be linked to "cognitive constellations," which he argued were specific choices about the kinds of symbols chosen according to choice of expression and intent that contributed to broader scales of patterning seen through archaeological study (1998, 265). Of particular importance in Renfrew's view was the role that the horse played not only in warfare technology but also in broader fields of symbolic association. While archaeological evidence supports early horse domestication by the fourth millennium BCE (Outram et al. 2009) the scale and importance of mounted warfare took several more millennia to emerge as a dominant force across Eurasia (Drews 2004) as iconographic and physical evidence supports that this did not happen until the first centuries of the first millennium BCE.

This long-term trend and geographically widespread technological development of the Iron Age is an extremely important one as it indicates that even though mounted warfare was an exceptionally potent technology, it also was one that was bound up in social and cultural attitudes surrounding horse symbolism and was the result of a very long development of horse-human relationships and broader social conceptualization of warfare practice. This is perhaps why chariot technology, as a "horizon" and "cognitive constellation," if following Renfrew's terminology, preceded the wider scale development and adoption of cavalry warfare.

Renfrew's theoretical approach, if understood in temporal terms, can be compared to Braudel's middle range time scale and the concept of *mentalities*. When considering only the Eurasian steppes, nearly all of the evidence for these developments comes from the excavation of kurgan complexes. It is thus important to try to untangle warfare and associated technologies from the complex ritual and symbolic domain of human action and intentionality connected with treatment of the dead. To do this, it is useful to first summarize early evidence for the use of horses by humans in warfare and in funerary rituals.

Prehistoric warriors from the steppes and mounted warfare have been long connected with the enduring question of where and when the Proto-Indo-European language (PIE) emerged (Gimbutas 1970; Renfrew 1987; Mallory 1989; Anthony 2007). Marija Gimbutas' "Kurgan Culture" theory dominated scholarship for much of the second half of the twentieth century.

Period	Calendar Dates	Key Horizons
Neolithic–Eneolithic	*6000–3500 BCE*	horse domestication and wheeled vehicles
Bronze Age	*3500–900 BCE*	wheeled vehicles; spoke-wheeled chariots by 2100 cal. bc
Early Iron Age	*900–300 BCE*	cavalry warfare

Figure 14.3 Key warfare technologies and related social and culture historical changes

Gimbutas attributed the so-called downfall of peaceful Neolithic Europe to several waves of marauding warrior horsemen that swept in from the steppes of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. New forms of burial (*kurgans*) that appeared in Central and Southeastern Europe were evidence, she claimed, of these nomadic populations and their culture, language, and religion. These developments were connected with the Eneolithic, or Copper Age, and horse domestication and mounted warfare were seen as crucial elements of a new social, political, and symbolic order across Europe ushering in the catalyst of change required for the emergence of Indo-European languages (Hanks 2014). From the 1980s onward, scholarship challenged this traditional view and a much more nuanced picture has emerged regarding the early domestication of horses as a food source and probably for riding by the fourth millennium BCE. The next important phase saw the widespread use of horses for pulling chariots in warfare in the Bronze Age (late third millennium and second millennium BCE) and the subsequent spread of cavalry warfare by the Early Iron Age of the first millennium BCE.

In one of the most engaging and recent studies of Proto-Indo-European language and subsequent development and spread of Indo-European languages, David Anthony has tied this to the appearance of Yamnaya (Pit Grave) populations in the western steppes and their gradual spread both to the east across the Eurasian steppe region to the Urals and westwards into Eastern Europe and through the Danube River basin into the Great Hungarian Plain (Anthony 2007). While scholars still debate these important developments it has become much clearer that human-horse relationships and the role of mounted warriors in Eurasian and European prehistory are connected with a much longer trajectory of development that occurred over several millennia. This emphasizes the important role that existed between warfare and social practice and the way in which ritual activities, including death and burial, articulated with changing forms of technology and its symbolism. In the next section, it is helpful to focus a bit more intently on the evidence for chariot warfare and warriors as this accentuates the very substantial developments that occurred in the Early Iron Age with mounted warfare.

The Chariot Horizon

The role of chariot warfare in the ancient Near East, China, Egypt, and Europe is well known the world over. The discovery of spoke-wheeled chariots in the Eurasian steppes by Soviet archaeologists in the 1970s, then, came as a very shocking surprise to many scholars around the world. These discoveries were largely unknown until more recent times with wider publication and AMS dating of several chariot burials in the Ural Mountains and Volga River basin of Russia (Anthony and Vinogradov 1995; Kuznetsov 2006; Hanks et al. 2007). These important studies now place the beginning of spoke-wheeled chariot warfare in the Eurasian steppes at around the beginning of the second millennium BCE, thus occurring in the steppes before China, the Near East, and Europe. While there has been debate over whether these spoke-wheeled vehicles were simply status symbols or truly functional battlefield instruments of warfare, David Anthony has argued quite convincingly that the "birth" of chariots in the steppes came as part of a package of warfare technology that included new forms of other weaponry, such as spear tips and arrow heads, and a transition in the very way in which battle was performed (Anthony and Vinogradov 1995; Anthony 2009). Such developments, as he suggests, also were linked to the rise of new fortified settlements in the Southeastern Ural Mountains during the Bronze Age in which nucleated, enclosed settlements were built and communities appear to have adapted to conflict over natural resources with climate and environmental shifts (Zdanovich and Zdanovich 2002; Anthony 2007).

Interestingly, the perseverance of the chariot as a warfare technology seems to have been relatively short lived within the steppes of Russia and Kazakhstan as the deposition of these vehicles dwindles substantially within only 200–300 years. At this time, the technology appears to have radiated beyond the region towards the Near East and Europe and later in China (appearing first at the site of Anyang by the thirteenth century BCE). In fact, we should consider the possibility that the actual use of chariots as an effective battle technology in the steppes declined before they disappear from Bronze Age mortuary sites of the second millennium BCE. For example, a well preserved chariot burial from the site of Kamennyi Ambar 5 in the Southeastern Urals of Russia contains not only a single male young adult but also three additional children aged nine years, four-to-five years, and a neonate. Furthermore, burial pits at the Bronze Age cemetery of Solntse II in the Southeastern Urals indicate an interesting mix of grave goods combining chariot components for harnessing to horses, horse remains, and artifacts connected with copper metallurgy. Such graves are not widespread in the region and it can only be surmised that the combination of grave goods is highly symbolic in terms of articulating the identity of the individual and their relationship to the wider community that buried them.

Therefore, chariot technology and its assumed use in new forms of conflict and violence factored importantly into local attitudes of status and prestige and local variation and symbolism connected with burial rites. Little is known currently about the actual scale and frequency of warfare among these communities during the Bronze Age but there seemed a clearly expressed concern with protection of houses and resources through exhibited nucleation and enclosure of settlements within this region of the Southeastern Urals. It is possible that the intensity and character of warfare escalated quickly in the early second millennium BC. Earlier cultural traditions of wagons and carts connected with Early Bronze Age Yamnaya groups presumably formed the foundation for cart to chariot technological development and as Anthony has argued this formed a very potent technological advancement. However, the burial evidence discussed above also indicates a wider symbolic resonance with the community and the use of chariots and/or chariot tack may have become less effectual in warfare and more of an enduring symbol in the mortuary traditions of particular families and lineages.

These patterns stand in stark contrast to the rise and development of mounted warfare, which has been largely understood as connected to the greater seasonal mobility of pastoralist groups and their needs for reliable access to pasture and other resources for their herds. Territorial competition and conflict arose over such resources but also in connection with the more prominent role that inter-regional trade played as the movement of goods and people over vast distances escalated due to the Silk Road and other major conduits of trade and movement across Eurasia. Mounted warfare constituted a new realm of social action and new forms of bodily technique and practice were associated with this. As summarized above, horse domestication and riding began in the late prehistory of the steppes, however, the effective use of horse and cavalry constituted a completely new form of warfare on a much larger scale than previously witnessed. Again, this technological innovation was accompanied by a corpus of new arms and armament and the horse became an extremely effective medium for displaying social affiliation and status and prestige. In addition, the human body was also an expressive medium for symbolic treatment as frozen burial chambers from the Altai Mountains region have produced truly astounding preservation of organic artifacts and bodies of humans and horses sacrificed to accompany the dead in the afterworld. This was very important for how individual and group identities were constructed and articulated through material culture and bodily aesthetics. Such patterns take on great effect when viewed over longer periods of time and what appear to be significant transitions in ideologies, worldview, and associated ritual practices (*mentalities*).

Conclusion: Conceptualizing the *Longue Durée*

Our final temporal focus in this chapter considers an understanding of the long-term patterning of social practice and the meaning of the past within the present. Braudel's third temporal scale emphasized the extensive long term or, *longue durée*, of human history. Such a view sits comfortably within archaeological analysis as we frequently engage with long spans of time encompassing centuries and millennia. Of crucial importance is an understanding of how different temporal cycles, and their duration, relate to one another to produce what we identify as trajectories of historical change. Archaeologists depend on the material reflection of these processes and analogies and interpretive theories that provide structure and meaning to both temporal and spatial patterning. Museums themselves provide an entertaining projection of this as an ordering of past peoples and the materiality of their lives—allowing one to "move through time" to experience the long duration of the human past. The State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, Russia, for example, is one of the finest museums in the world. Containing over three million works of art and other culturally significant artifacts it is one of the premier destinations for an examination of the archaeology of the Eurasian steppes that this chapter has discussed.

Field archaeology offers a particularly unique opportunity to carefully sift back through the past. This chapter has examined the significance of the widespread pattern of kurgan burial relating to the Bronze and Iron Ages of the Eurasian steppe. In my own recent field research in the Southeastern Ural Mountains of Russia our team has come to appreciate the enduring power of such monuments within the landscape. At the site of Solntse II, situated in the Southeastern Urals of the Russian Federation, an especially enduring *place* within the landscape has been created through mortuary ritual activities of various peoples for over 4,000 years (Figures 14.4 and 14.5). The site today is the location of a contemporary Muslim cemetery used by a village that is ethnically Kazakh that was settled during the early Soviet period when such practices were widely enforced on pastoral nomadic groups. This cemetery is set directly within a prehistoric mortuary complex comprising 27 kurgans dating to the Bronze and Early Iron Ages and dating back to the first centuries of the second millennium BCE. In fact, Middle Bronze Age burials at this site were noted above as containing both chariot technology and metallurgical implements. Directly across the river from the site is located the remnants of a Middle Bronze Age enclosed and fortified settlement dating to the Sintastha-Petrovka period (Hanks et al. 2007).

Figure 14.4   Aerial photo of Solntse II cemetery with view towards south showing fenced contemporary Muslim cemetery and Bronze Age and Iron Age kurgans to the west
Source: Photo by Roger Doonan.

Figure 14.5   Plan of Solntse II cemetery
Source: After Hanks et al., forthcoming.

While this cemetery is large by comparison with other prehistoric cemeteries within the region, the number of dead actually buried here in prehistory is probably not greater than 100 or so with Bronze Age kurgans containing up to a dozen burials at most and Iron Age kurgans containing no more than a handful of skeletons each (many of the kurgans have not been excavated). The archaeological evidence indicates that the cemetery was used sporadically for at least two millennia before being appropriated by early Turkic populations from Central Asia in the Medieval Period and more recently Kazakh groups during the twentieth century. Burial of the dead, or at least certain members of the societal dead, obviously played an important role in a number of different societies over a huge span of time. Why? Our recent research within this valley has indicated that this particular location is exceptional in offering water and grass even at the height of the dry season in the late summer. While this may seem an overtly functional explanation there can be no denying that access to such resources is especially crucial for pastoralists in any region in any time period. In fact, cattle are brought from the local village (8km away) to this day and herded for the duration of the late summer at this location when the steppe grasses are at their driest. This village also utilizes the contemporary Muslim cemetery located within the site.

Is the Solntse II cemetery a useful example of the *longue durée* and of the important role of ritual practice in the context of violence and warfare? I believe this to be so as it offers an especially vivid example of the importance of place within the long duration and flow of previous cultures, traditions, and historical contexts. It is precisely the kind of locale from which archaeologists can learn a great deal and not only in terms of the excavation and analysis of prehistoric features. Rather, the changing importance of such *pasts* and the appropriation of such histories in the contemporary reveal how our relationship to history and the ordering of different scales of time bring meaning to our present and future. An archaeology of this past is at once one of the event, the duration of a human life, and longer-term ebb and flow of tradition and cultural practice written across the landscape and shaped through the materiality of the human condition. As this chapter has sought to address, much of the archaeological record for the Iron Age of the Eurasian steppe seems strongly conditioned by the role of violence and warfare within people's lives. If we were to ask, why did war exist at all during this time, one could draw on ample evidence to show that such a dynamic seemed very widespread and was deeply embedded within the ritual practice that is visible to us through the archaeology of mortuary sites from this time. One wonders that if given the opportunity to travel back in time to ask, for example, the young individual known as the Issyk Golden Warrior, "why do you make war?" The response might be … "why make peace?"

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Globalization and Its Contradictions

Thomas Hylland Eriksen

Never before has humanity placed its stamp on the planet in ways even remotely comparable to the situation today. Human domination of Earth is such that natural scientists have suggested naming the current geological era, starting with the fossil fuel revolution, the *Anthropocene*, a nomenclature which would, if widely adopted, make the Holocene (which began just after the last Ice Age, 11,500 years ago) a brief interlude in the history of the planet. We live in an era which, since the onset of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, is marked by human activity and expansion in unprecedented ways (Steffen et al. 2007). It is an overheated world, a volatile world of accelerated change in which new opportunities present themselves for comparative anthropological research.

The anthropology of transnational connections and global processes is not new. Although the Malinowskian revolution after the First World War resulted in an increased passion for the assumed functional integration of small-scale societies at the expense of the earlier focus on historical diffusion, there has always been an interest in translocal and global processes in anthropology. Even if it has periodically been marginalized, the anthropology of connections and of world historical processes existed throughout the twentieth century alongside the mainstream focus on small-scale societies and sociocultural integration. As a matter of fact, Malinowski himself, trained in diffusionist theory at the LSE, went out of his way to place the Trobriand islands in a broader, regional context (Malinowski 1984 [1922]). Yet, in practice, research tended to emphasize the community as the locus of research and the focus of analysis. Wolf (1956) therefore felt the need to emphasize, in a seminal article about group alliances and conflicts in Mexico, that 'communities which form parts of a complex society can … be viewed no longer as self-contained and integrated systems in their own right' (Wolf 1956: 1065). Quoting earlier work by Julian Steward, he pointed out that it would lead the researcher astray to assume that parts of a system, such as local communities, were independent units. In the same period, Wolf's close colleague Mintz (e.g. 1953) produced important analyses based on his doctoral research in the late 1940s, where both the ethnography and the analysis hinge on an understanding of the historical and transnational processes that had created and shaped Puerto Rico. Many others could have been mentioned, such as Goody, whose decades-long work on literacy and the state has led to a series of ambitious, large-scale, historically informed, comparative studies contrasting the Eurasian world with that of Africa (see Goody 2010 for a recent, concise statement). Many anthropologists were nevertheless sceptical of the broad palette and occasionally sweeping perspectives characteristic of much of Goody's work. By the final decade of the last century, research on transnational processes had nonetheless become an integral part of mainstream anthropological research, thanks to the efforts of scholars such as Hannerz (1992), Friedman (1994) and Appadurai (1996). The world of anthropology had caught up with the world of transnational connections.

In practice, research on local communities was given first priority in most twentieth century anthropological research, arguably for mainly methodological reasons, although the division of labour between anthropology and sociology, where sociologists took on the study of complex industrial societies, also played a part. The work of the ethnographer consists in penetrating local life-worlds and their connections through networks, institutions and cultural universes, and although multi-sited fieldwork has become increasingly widespread, there is a looming danger that it may lead to decontextualized ethnography, and multisitedness is therefore rightly treated with some caution. This chapter will not advocate multisited fieldwork for the sake of it, but will instead argue the need to connect ethnographic materials with an understanding of large-scale processes, such as global neoliberalism or the global environmentalist movement, and I also intend to indicate some possible rewards of comparative anthropological research in an increasingly interconnected world.

The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part argues that twenty-first-century globalization is characterized by the acceleration and intensification of networks compared to that of earlier historical periods. It then develops an analytical perspective and a few research questions which may direct research on the twenty-first-century hyperglobalized world in a fruitful way. The second part applies this approach to an empirical case, namely local responses to accelerated industrial growth in central Queensland, Australia.

Overheating and Neoliberalism

As argued by Charles Tilly in an early critique of methodological nationalism in sociology (Tilly 1984), the period in which he wrote was more interconnected than any earlier humanly produced world, including the strongly globalized period before the First World War.

> *A sensible rule of thumb for connectedness might be that the actions of powerholders in one region of a network rapidly (say within a year) and visibly (say in changes actually reported by nearby observers) affect the welfare of at least a significant minority (say a tenth) of the population in another region of the network. Such a criterion indubitably makes our own world a single system; even in the absence of worldwide flows of capital, communications, and manufactured goods, shipments of grain and arms from region to region would suffice to establish the minimum connections. (Tilly 1984: 62)*

Thirty years later, we may safely confirm that the tendency invoked by Tilly has continued. No matter how you go about measuring degrees of interconnectedness in the contemporary world, the only possible conclusion is that many more people today are much more connected than ever before in history. There are more of us, and each of us has, on average, more comprehensive and far-reaching links to the outside world than our predecessors, through business travel, information, communication, migration, vacations, political engagement, trade, development assistance, exchange programmes and so on. The number of transatlantic telephone lines has grown phenomenally in the last few decades; so has the number of websites and international NGOs.

In the context of anthropological research, it may be pointed out that the same increased connectivity which is the focus of research on transnationalism was, slightly earlier, a cause of decolonization and the emergence of a postcolonial sensitivity which in turn led to what many saw as a crisis of representation in anthropology (Fabian 1983; Clifford and Marcus

1986). A source of regret for many anthropologists, it may also be seen as a situation which creates new opportunities for comparative research, as people across the world cease to be mere consociates, but become true contemporaries (cf. Geertz 1957), aware – however dimly – of each other and of the broader processes within which their lives unfold, sharing a seamless world not only with each other, but also with the anthropologist writing about their life-worlds. To this topic we shall return shortly.

The most striking graphic representation of the processes of change characteristic of the current era is the exponential growth curve (Eriksen 2001). In its most familiar version, it depicts world population growth, brought to the attention of policy-makers not least through the neo-Malthusian Club of Rome's report *Limits to Growth* (Meadows et al. 1972), which advocated population control as one of several methods for preventing serious resource scarcity in the future. From a global environmental perspective, the concern expressed by the Club of Rome is easily understandable. From the time we were anatomically modern, it took us about 200,000 years to reach the first billion around the year 1800. It subsequently took only a little over a hundred years to reach the second (achieved in 1920) and less than another hundred year to increase world population from two to seven billion. Many have argued that it is unlikely to be possible, economically and ecologically, to offer the majority of these – and world population is expected to reach nine billion in 2050 – resort holidays by jet, a family car and everything they might desire in the realm of iGadgets and the like. Alternatives pursued by activists, politicians and planners include acceptance of widespread poverty, bracing for an ecological catastrophe, promoting population reduction, or replacing consumerism with one or several alternative views of the good life.

However, growth is exponential in a number of realms, and population is growing less fast than a number of other phenomena. It is trivially true that the proportion of the world's population with access to the Internet has grown extremely fast since 1990, since only a few million used the embryonic Internet at the time. But even the fast growth of the online world has accelerated since the turn of the century. As late as 2006, it was estimated that between 1 and 2 per cent of the Sub-Saharan African population (with the exception of South Africa) had reasonably regular access to the Internet. By 2012, the proportion was estimated at slightly over 15 per cent (Internet World Stats 2013). The simple explanation is that millions of Africans now have smartphones with easy access to the Web and email.

Or one could look at transnational migration in areas which 'feel the heat' of heightened mobility: when, in 1990, I began to write about cultural diversity in Norway, there were 200,000 immigrants in the country (which had a total population of 4.5 million, now greater than 5 million). By late 2013, the figure was 700,000 (including children of two immigrants), and the growth curve of the last decade is – accordingly – steep. In the same period, urbanization in the global south has also set in a new gear, and cities like Nouachott (Mauretania) and Mogadishu (Somalia) have grown from a couple of hundred thousand to a couple of million inhabitants; in other words, they have grown 1,000 per cent in about 25 years (Davis 2006).

Or, again, one could look at international tourism as an indicator of accelerated change. As early as the late 1970s, there were North Europeans who spoke about parts of the Spanish coast as being 'spoiled by mass tourism'. However, in 1978, soon after the end of Fascism in the country, Spain received a grand total of 15 million tourist arrivals a year. In 2013, the figure is estimated at 60 million; in other words, tourism in the country has grown fourfold in 35 years. On a global basis, the UN organization WTO (World Tourism Organization) has estimated the number of international tourist arrivals to surpass a billion in 2013.

Websites, international organizations (as well as international conferences and workshops), mobile telephones and television sets, private cars and text messages: the growth curves point sharply upwards in all of these domains (and many others). In 2003,

Facebook did not yet exist. Ten years later, the platform reached 1.1 billion user accounts. The figure is all the more impressive considering that the Chinese, who alone represent 17 per cent of the world's population, are for political reasons not represented.

Of course, everything everywhere does not accelerate in the early twenty-first century, and not everything that grows fast has profound local consequences. Local or regional deceleration is also a possible consequence of globalized acceleration, and to this I shall return later (see also Eriksen 2014). Moreover, although phenomena such as text messages and tourism, Facebook and cable television have transformed contemporary lives in ways which are still only partly understood by researchers, it is the interrelationship between two processes of change which are especially consequential for the present and near future of humanity, namely population growth and the growth in energy use.

Since we are now seven times as many as we were around the time of the Napoleonic Wars, it comes as no surprise that we use more energy today. However, the growth in global energy use has been much faster than the growth in population. In 1820, each of us used, on an average, 20 gigajoules a year. Roughly two centuries later, the figure is 80 GJ, chiefly owing to the technology making it possible to exploit fossil fuels on a large scale. As is well known, energy use is far from evenly distributed between and within societies, and it has been estimated that those who live in rich countries have access, on an average, to machine power equivalent to a situation where every individual had 25 slaves.

The fourfold growth mentioned represents, in real figures, a growth by a factor of 28, since there are seven times as many of us now as in the early nineteenth century. Between just 1975 and 2013, world energy consumption doubled. The unintended consequences are well known. Those which are visible and subject to immediate experience are pollution and environmental deterioration. The long-term, large-scale effects, more difficult to observe and understand, are changes in the global climate.

One may well speculate that if world population had not started to grow exponentially in the nineteenth century, we might have evaded the most serious unintended consequences of the fossil fuel revolution. Lovelock (2006) once remarked that if world population today had only been around a billion, we might have been able to do 'pretty much as we liked', and the planet would still have recovered. Similarly it is possible to speculate, even if the scenario is unrealistic, a sevenfold increase in world population without the fossil fuel revolution. In that case, the climate crisis would also have been avoided, but instead, the majority of humanity would in all likelihood have eked out a living only barely covering their basic needs. Instead, our shared planet is one where modernity has gone into overdrive, where there is full speed ahead in many, interconnected domains. The human consequences of this accelerated change should be an area of priority for anthropological research.

Neoliberalism in the Overheated World

In describing the contemporary world, it is difficult to avoid using the term neoliberalism. Although it has some unfortunate ideological connotations, it can be defined accurately in an effort to explain the global economic shift leading to the widespread occurrence of overheating effects.

Neoliberalism refers to a particular kind of disembedded economic ideology and practice characteristic of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. It is commonly agreed that it began in earnest with the policies of deregulation and privatization instigated in the United States and the United Kingdom around 1980, under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher's respective leaderships. The structural adjustment programmes implemented by the IMF (International Monetary Fund) in the global south in the 1980s and 1990s conformed

to the same principles, cutting down public expenditure and encouraging the development of competitive markets wherever possible. This set of policies, widely known as the Washington Consensus, was at the time the outcome of an agreement between the IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department.

David Harvey defines neoliberalism as follows:

> *Neoliberalism is … a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. (2005: 2)*

Neoliberal policies have since the 1980s been pursued by governments in most parts of the world, fully or partly privatizing formerly public enterprises, such as railways and postal services, and encouraging, at least in theory, an unfettered market economy (although restrictions are usually placed on imports in the form of tariffs, and key industries are often heavily subsidized). The origin of neoliberalist thought is generally traced to Friedrich Hayek and his successors, notably Milton Friedman, whose finest moment may have been in the early 1980s with the implementation of this economic ideology in the US and the UK. However, there is an immediate precursor to these 'freshwater economists' who should be interesting for anthropologists. Hayek's teacher in Vienna, Ludwig von Mises, was an enthusiastic libertarian, an enemy of socialism in all its forms, and a believer in the deregulation of markets. Mises's most important critic was the economic historian Karl Polanyi, whose *The Great Transformation* almost immediately caught the attention of anthropologists upon its publication in 1944. This book in fact was the main source of inspiration for the subsequent 'great debate' in economic anthropology between substantivists and formalists, a debate which continues to this day, in new guises, across the field of economic anthropology (Hann and Hart 2011).

The Great Transformation begins on a dramatic note as the author states, as a matter of fact, that '[n]ineteenth century civilization has collapsed'. What he has in mind is the ultimate outcome of nineteenth-century industrialization and colonialism, whereby the market principle became predominant and pervasive in Western societies. In what is virtually an *avant la lettre* criticism of neoliberalism, Polanyi argues that the values and practices of sociality, based on reciprocity and solidarity, are more fundamental to the human existence than the disembedding and ultimately dehumanizing market principle. He predicts that they will prevail in the long term. A non-Marxist socialist, Polanyi argued against the commodification of labour and more generally the limited vision of mainstream economics. His main target was Mises, the father of neoliberalism. Polanyi was not opposed to the market principle as such, and was well aware of the existence of functioning markets in non-capitalist societies. What he objected to was its spread into social domains which should be governed by principles of sociality. Just as *Gemeinschaft* is ontologically prior to *Gesellschaft* in Tönnies' analysis of the transition to urban, industrial society, a 'human economy' based on reciprocity and redistribution (Hart et al. 2010), is fundamental to social life, and people living in communities everywhere will therefore resist market dominance.

Polanyi predicted that unfettered market liberalism, which had been tried before the First World War, would be defeated by the principles of reciprocity and redistribution. During the first decades after the Second World War, it seemed as if he had been proven right; however, the market principle as the sole or main regulator of human economic activity would return with a vengeance in the 1980s, this time in an increasingly globally interconnected world.

Beyond Postcolonial Anxieties

In this kind of world, it becomes abundantly evident that anthropological research must entail research on frictions, encounters and hybridities. Increased interconnectedness does not entail homogeneity. Even if all the trappings of accelerated modernity should happen to be found everywhere (an unrealistic scenario), every place and cultural universe remains distinctive and in important ways unique. However, accelerated and intensified interconnectedness, and the near-ubiquity of the common denominators of neoliberal capitalism, imply that classic anthropological comparison – comparison as a quasi-experiment – has become impossible; there are too many impurities in the test tube, too much noise affecting the instruments of measurement. If the ideal for theoretical development were to be the classic comparative method in anthropology, initially developed by the likes of Tylor and Morgan, later refined in various directions by Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss, Harris, Leach and others, then the dissemination of the social, cultural and technological forms of modernity would be a disaster; it would truly spell the end of anthropology.

Decades ago, many people – and peoples – in the traditional heartlands of anthropological research began to perceive the need to protect themselves against the unwanted attention of anthropologists, by demanding intellectual property rights to their myths and rituals, or else criticizing anthropology for exoticizing their culture in condescending ways (see Deloria 1969 for an early critique along these lines). They no longer needed us to identify who and what they were, since they were perfectly capable of doing the job themselves. Moreover, the art of cultural translation associated with modernist anthropology (Ardener 1985) could now be undertaken by 'the Other' without the interference of foreigners who were often seen as tiresome parasites. It would appear as if anthropology had lost its historical mission and was condemned to die or become ironical (Kearney 2004). Geertz and Sahlins, the last great defenders of twentieth-century cultural relativism, each wrote an essay during this time of transition from modernism to postmodernism (or, as I would prefer to see it, towards a more equitable, dialogical anthropology), both in an ironical vein and both seeming to intimate that the party was over. In 'Goodbye to Tristes Tropes', Sahlins quotes a man from the New Guinea highlands who explains what *kastom* is and why people need it: 'If we didn't have *kastom*, we would have been just like the white man' (Sahlins 1994: 378). Geertz, for his part, describes a global condition where 'cultural difference will doubtless remain – the French will never eat salted butter. But the good old days of widow burning and cannibalism are gone forever' (Geertz 1986: 105).

It is a striking observation, but it is possible to draw a conclusion very different, perhaps opposite, to what Geertz and Sahlins do. Precisely because societies around the world are now interwoven in so many complex and often paradoxical ways, it can be argued that the comparative project is more alive than ever. The early twenty-first century may indeed be seen as a privileged moment in which to establish a global, comparative anthropology, for the very same reasons that some seem to have concluded that the magic is gone. Interconnectedness and hybridity create new dimensions for comparison: you may do research on ways in which human rights are being understood and dealt with in different societies (Wilson 1997; Goodale 2009), you may contribute to comparative research on McDonald's (Caldwell 2003), study development ideology comparatively (Ferguson 2006), or explore how climate change is dealt with in different societies (Crate and Nuttall 2009). In addition, the former 'radical other' can now be an accomplished collaborator, since s/he shares some ideas and interests with the anthropologist. Recently, an environmental activist in Queensland told me, with a short laugh, that he had never been an anthropologist's informant before, and did not know how to go about it. I could assure him that we were in this together. I didn't have the answers either, and in my current research I hope to co-write several texts with locals.

Many years earlier, a friend in Trinidad used to call me 'Boswell' because of my tendency to walk a step or two behind him with a notepad, jotting down half of his utterances. The reference was to James Boswell, author of *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, a book with which we were both familiar, just as we shared an admiration for Keith Jarrett's piano improvisations and the Guyanese intellectual Walter Rodney's writings on underdevelopment. In this kind of world, postcolonial resentment is less likely than it was at the time when local people were often treated as radically different from the anthropologist.

When the erstwhile natives began to resist anthropological interference, they effectively demanded the right to participate in the same moral universe as the foreign academics. This historical situation, where a considerable part of humanity takes part in a global conversation about what it is to be human and the future of the planet, breaks down the distinction between 'us' and 'them' more efficiently than any French philosopher has so far been capable of doing. This is not tantamount to saying that Hegel's world-spirit (*Weltgeist*) has finally been realized thanks to Facebook and transnational migration, or that Habermasian *Herrschaftsfrei* ('free of domination') dialogue has become manifest on a global stage. The perspective does not imply that everything is now comparable with everything else, but that bridgeheads of comparability have been produced by large-scale empirical processes. The contemporary world of humanity is neither flat nor seamlessly integrated, but humans across the world are now exposed to some of the same tendencies, react to them and discuss comparable aspects of the world, and are partly connected to each other through dense and fast networks of communication and transportation. The Baktamans studied by Barth (1975) in the late 1960s lived in a world which was cognitively and physically small and bounded. They travelled rarely and on foot, had no money or script, and had been contacted by Australian officers only a few years before Barth's fieldwork. Two decades later, they – and other mountain Ok peoples – had become partially integrated into the world of global capitalism, largely as a result of the opening of the Ok Tedi mine nearby (a venture which may have brought short-term prosperity to some, but which led to a huge environmental catastrophe). The peoples in this remote part of Papua New Guinea thus became familiar not only with wagework and money, but also formal schooling, Christianity and industrial protest (Hyndman 1995). The establishment of bridgeheads of this kind arguably represent both new possibilities for comparison and a viable alternative to the postcolonial problem of representation.

There exists no hegemonic master narrative about this world, which is sometimes labelled global information society (Castells 1996). Partly, this is because change simply takes place too fast – it has been estimated that people born into the North Atlantic culture area after the Second World War experience 17 times as much as their great-grandparents, but without having developed an improved apparatus for digesting and understanding their experiences. In this part of the world, and in mainstream academia, lucid, didactic stories exist about the transition from foraging societies to agricultural society and on to the industrial revolution (see Gellner 1988 for an anthropological version of this story). As late as the 1970s, a relatively uniform, hegemonic narrative, officially recognized in many parts of the world, told of social evolution. It existed in socialist and capitalist variants, and told about enlightenment and inventions, development, progress and welfare. In *The Science of Culture* (1949), Leslie White produced a quantification of this story, by defining the degree of cultural evolution as the amount of energy a society was capable of extracting from its surroundings and harnessing for human purposes. In this, White was consistent with his great predecessors Marx and Morgan, but he also – probably unwittingly – recounted the hegemonic modern view of the essence of development and progress.

Then, in the space of a few years, events took place which suddenly made both the present and the future more open, ambiguous and uncertain.

The World after 1991

If there is a need for a date demarcating the transition to the contemporary era, I should propose 1991. Of course, various parts of the world had been interconnected long before the concept of globalization was invented (Chanda 2007; MacGregor 2011), and it has often been pointed out that *la belle* époque, the decades before the First World War, were an era of intensified globalization (see e.g. Anderson 2005). Yet, as suggested earlier, there is something distinctively new about the present age.

First, 1991 was the year in which the Cold War was called off once and for all. The two-bloc system which had been in place since the end of the Second World War and which had defined international politics in the postwar period, vanished (albeit not without trace) in the space of a couple of years. Ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism appeared to have been replaced with the triumphant (but somewhat vacuous) sound of one hand clapping. The social and economic future of the whole planet (save a few pockets of resistance) now seemed to be a version of a now globalized neoliberalism, that is a strong version of capitalism using state apparatuses to facilitate profit maximization. Social inequality nevertheless grew, and societies in the Global South did not evolve along the lines predicted by the economic models. Poverty did not disappear in Africa, and towards the end of the century, the de facto standard of living declined for many Africans.

In other parts of the world, politicized religion and other forms of identity politics flourished, contradicting predictions that education and modernity would weaken these forms of political identity, still widely seen as pre-modern. The wars in Yugoslavia, which erupted in 1991, and the subsequent genocide in Rwanda in 1994, were reminders that identities based on notions of kinship and descent did not belong to history, but were in some ways more relevant, and more consequential, than ever in a modern context. Both identity politics from above (states demanding homogeneity or engaged in ethnic cleansing) and from below (minorities demanding equal rights or sovereignty) entered the international agenda and that of the social sciences with full force around this time. Multiculturalism, a non-territorial variety of identity politics, similarly became a major political concern in many parts of the world around the same time. The Salman Rushdie affair erupted in the autumn of 1988, the numbers of immigrants in northern cities grew, increasing numbers of refugees settled precariously in southern countries as well, and in a short space of time, questions to do with migration and cultural diversity became major preoccupations both in politics and in academic research. Vertovec (2007) has, accordingly, proposed the term *super-diversity* to denote a shift and to describe the new, intensified, accelerated forms of migration and cultural diversity characteristic of cities after the turn of the millennium.

Around the same time, mobile telephones and the Internet became widespread, at first in the affluent societies, but soon almost everywhere. In 1991, the Internet was commercialized in the US, in the sense that anybody could buy a subscription to America Online, enabling them to go online easily. Until then, the Internet had largely been used by military networks, computer enthusiasts and the intellectual descendants of hippies. The GSM networks, enabling mobile telephony without an accompanying suitcase of transmitter equipment, began to spread at the same time. *Flexibility* was in some ways increased. Soon, you could work anywhere and whenever; but both of these technologies also contributed to fragmentation. Life, according to some critics, began to stand still at an enormous speed (Eriksen 2001), a tendency which seemed to spell bad news for the slow time of coherence and linear growth.

Comparable forms of flexibility characterize tendencies in the world of labour, and according to its critics, it is not the good flexibility which offers alternative courses of action (Bateson 1972), but a pernicious form of flexibility which creates insecurity and uncertainty

(Castells 1996; Sennett 1997). Some companies that used to distinguish between short-term and long-term planning have ceased to do so, since 'everything' is now short-term. For employees around the world, the most perceptible change is the shift from predictability to uncertainty. Some years ago, the concept of the *precariat* was introduced in the social sciences, simply because it was needed (Standing 2011). It consists of those millions of employees who have a temporary, short-term arrangement with their employer, who do not know whether or not they will have work next year. They can be found as easily on a Norwegian construction site as in a Danish university or a shipyard in the Philippines. This new flexibility benefits capital, but not labour.

Finally, it was in the early 1990s that another new way of conceptualizing global questions entered transnational and domestic discourse, from political speeches and UN declarations to reports, school curricula and academic conferences. The concept was *sustainable development*, and it was introduced by the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) in their report *Our Common Future* (United Nations 1987). The commission was more optimistic than the rather dystopic Club of Rome had been. Unlike Meadows and her collaborators, who proposed to turn on the brakes, the Brundtland commission (as the WCED was popularly known) proposed technical solutions to the environmental challenges, arguing that growth and sustainability could be reconciled, as long as the technology was environmentally responsible.

It was, in brief, in the 1990s that modernity shifted into a higher gear, and acceleration has continued in the new century. The so-called 'social media' (or Web 2.0), that is that version of the Internet which is mainly based on communication, not on information, emerged after the turn of the millennium. Both Julian Assange and Edward Snowden are children of a technology which did not exist in the year 2000. The rise of China to economic world prominence is perhaps the most dramatic story about current global overheating. It has long been predicted that China should attain a leading role in the world economy, but it is only recently that it has in fact happened. By 2013, China represented a full quarter of global emissions of greenhouse gases, and built two new coal power stations every week. China was then also the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) globally, and Chinese companies have acquired significant assets abroad since the turn of the millennium, not least in mining.

Indicators continue to point upwards. In addition to the growth curves mentioned earlier, one may look at paper consumption, motor vehicles, urban population (both in percentage terms and in absolute numbers), water use, fertilizer consumption or direct foreign investment, just to mention a few more areas where global growth has been extraordinarily fast in the last few decades (Steffen et al. 2007). Creating a coherent narrative based on causal or contextual explanation, with an intrinsic logic and a direction, is difficult and contentious. Just after the First World War, another period of great uncertainty, the sociologist William Ogburn proposed the term *cultural lag* (Ogburn 1922). It referred to the fact that cultural representations and institutions may 'lag behind' when fast changes, especially technological ones, take place in society. Perhaps social theorists like Urry (2000) are right in arguing that academics and other intellectuals continue to cling desperately to explanatory models which were fully developed in the early twentieth century, but which are inadequate for coming to terms with the early twenty-first century. Fundamental aspects of the world, and the societies it contains, change very fast, but there is no hegemonic narrative about the historical direction of humanity. This is in itself a recipe for uncertainty, and in such a time, there is also a growing demand for simple answers to complex questions. Fundamentalists of all kinds, from genetic determinists to religious fanatics, may achieve large and grateful audiences at such a time. When there appears to be turbulence everywhere, the perceived need for stability becomes very noticeable.

An Overheated World

The world after 1991 is an *overheated* world, above all defined through tensions and frictions. The networks connecting people are denser, faster and more consequential than before. The transnational Islamist movement, the green movement and critics like ATTAC and Occupy all attempt to show that another world is possible, while being fully aware that accelerated change is a reality and that globalization cannot easily be reversed. The first rule of urban traffic planning is that speed requires space, and traffic is gradually becoming denser on the global highways, increasing the risk of collisions. Moreover, there is not always agreement concerning which highway code to refer to.

Speed creates heat; in physics, the two are synonymous. When, in everyday language, we speak of a person as suffering from a burnout, the metaphor is apt: he or she has done too many things too fast. But the metaphor of overheating is also used, unwittingly, in other domains. When the stock exchange crashes, Wall Street speaks of a 'meltdown' in the market, and when rates increase above what is seen as a viable level, they may talk about the need to 'cool down the market'. Riots and violent demonstrations are frequently associated with 'hotheaded' emotions. Moreover, climate change is associated with overheating in two ways: temperatures are de facto rising, and the cause is accelerated change, particularly with respect to energy use.

Perhaps the unconscious use of the overheating metaphor can contribute to explaining why the story of global warming has recently become a central narrative about the present era. It follows the same intrinsic logic as several other widespread narratives, and confirms the view that history no longer means progress. Through its focus on heat as an unintended consequence of modernity, the stories about global warming function as a natural science version of familiar stories about ethnic, religious and cultural frictions, urban population explosions and fast, but directionless technological change.

Several tensions of a generic type can be linked to overheating. In addition to previous, perhaps universal lines of conflict – power and powerlessness, wealth and poverty, autonomy and dependence – new conflicts, frictions and tensions arise in this world. Let me mention a few of the most important:

- neoliberal globalization versus alterglobalization – various kinds of social movements, often locally anchored, seek viable alternatives to the TINA doctrine ('There Is No Alternative');
- ecological sustainability versus growth – a real, but often undercommunicated contradiction nearly everywhere;
- cosmopolitan values versus identity politics (including xenophobia and religious fundamentalism) – a basic dimension of politics nearly everywhere these days, which cuts across and often supplants the right/left divide;
- uniformity versus singularity – the standardization of modernity and globalization versus that which is local and unique;
- inclusion versus exclusion – walls, both physical and metaphorical, effectively prevent the free movement of people and/or their equitable inclusion into a large-scale society.

This world is interconnected, but as these tensions indicate it is neither seamless nor homogeneous nor harmonious. Rights and obligations, opportunities and constraints are very unevenly distributed, and the global system itself is chronically unstable and self-contradictory. The most basic contradiction, familiar to anthropologists, is the chronic tension between the universalizing forces of global modernity and that which is locally unique, demands to be autonomous and is by its essence 'nonscalable' (Tsing 2012). The tendencies

towards standardization, simplification and universalization characteristic of a global neoliberal regime are almost universally met with a defence of local values, practices and types of relationship. Globalization highlights a typically modern contradiction between the system world and the life world, between the standardized and the unique. Of the recent anthropological studies of this tension undertaken with a global canvas as a backdrop, the most influential has arguably been Tsing's *Friction* (2005), which combines a detailed ethnography of conflict between logging companies on the one hand, and indigenous groups and environmentalists on the other. The strengths of the book are many, and it notably shows that a main source of friction consists in the fundamentally different perceptions of the environment represented by the business interests and the locals, respectively; but the book also shows that not only is global neoliberalism a globally interconnected enterprise, but so are local resistance groups. The Indonesian environmentalists and indigenous groups focused on are not merely concerned with their life-world and their local environment, but also find inspiration in accounts about Brazilian rubber tappers and Himalayan forest activists, in this way connecting their local cause to broader transnational concerns.

A meta-narrative illustrated by Tsing's ethnography is the chronic contradiction between economic growth and ecological sustainability, and it may be argued that it constitutes the most fundamental double-bind (Bateson et al. 1956) of contemporary civilization. Trade-offs between economic growth and sustainability are ubiquitous, but – as Tsing (2005) shows in stark ways – not always in such a way that the polluter pays. The global consensus concerning the causes of climate change is well known among the economic and political elites in the world, yet politicians continue to prioritize growth, sometimes in ways that lead concerned citizens to suspect that we humans are about to undermine the conditions for our own survival.

A further, important conceptual distinction is that sometimes described in terms of the formal and the informal, or the system-world and the life-world, the universal and the particular, or just the abstract and the tangible. (Structure and process, *langue* and *parole* are related dichotomies.) Since globalization entails standardization and homogenization (which does not have to mean 'Westernization', cf. 'Nipponization' in East Asia, the popularity of Hindi films in northern Nigeria etc.) – just as capitalism entails the integration of a variety of economic activities within a uniform system where everything is comparable with everything, or ethnicity amounts to making cultural differences comparable by developing a shared language for talking about difference – reactions stressing the virtues of autonomy, tradition, self-sufficiency or independence are inevitable. The right to define oneself, one's past, present and future, one's livelihood and relationship to other people and to nature, becomes a scarce resource and a series of political issues in an era of overheated globalization. Although change may be welcomed, only the changes that do not challenge or upset established notions of personhood, sociality and continuity, are welcomed. The equilibrium between 'roots and boots', change and continuity, is always sought in locally specific ways. In a fundamental sense, the dialectics of globalization concerns the tension, not between 'the global and the local', but between the abstract and formal, and the tangible and informal, the universal and the specific, the disembedded and the embedded.

These contradictions evoke a world of unfulfilled promises.

But everything is not the same. Not only do places remain different, but people living in particular places need not share a common outlook or understanding of local conditions. People perceive, understand and act upon the changes in widely differing ways depending on their position in the locality (class, age, gender etc.) and on the characteristics of the locality as well as its position within regional, national and transnational systems. In order to understand globalization, it is necessary to explore how its crises and contradictions are being dealt with in local contexts – how people resist imposed changes, negotiate their

relationship to global and transnational forces, and which strategies for survival, autonomy and resistance are being developed. These explorations must take the genius loci of the locality seriously, situate the locality historically and connect it to an analysis of global processes. Finally, in order to demonstrate the ubiquity of overheating effects, systematic comparison between otherwise very different localities is necessary.

Global crises are rarely perceived locally qua global crises. Their local repercussions or more immediate effects are usually perceived, rather, as crises of reproduction and as a threat to, or representing a loss of, autonomy, although large-scale concerns may also be perceived as immediately relevant. We now move to an empirical field shedding light on and adding substance to the discussion.

Coal, Gas and the Australian Dream

Mining is an important contributor to the Australian economy, although the sector only contributes 10 per cent to GDP. Only 2.2 per cent of the labour force are employed in mining, but it contributes indirectly to other sectors by generating a demand for services and auxiliary industries, and through taxes and royalties to the states and the federal government. About 80 per cent of the electricity in the country is generated by coal.

Australian identity is also to a considerable extent connected with mining. The successive Australian gold rushes from 1851 brought European (and some Chinese) immigrants to the country and created fortunes locally. Rags-to-riches stories made their way into local folklore. The vast outback and desert areas, which make up much of the continent, tickle the collective imagination through their vast repositories of invisible wealth in the form of gold, uranium, oil, coal and other scarce and valuable resources. Since 1960, manufacturing has declined in economic importance (from 30 per cent to 12 per cent of GDP in 2007), while the extent of mining has grown steadily. In recent years, the extraction of unconventional fossil fuels (shale oil, coalseam gas) has added new sources of wealth to the existing resources.

Some of the richest coalfields in Australia are in Queensland, and much of the coal is shipped from the port of Gladstone, which is a small city of 30,000 inhabitants, but which boasts one of the world's largest coalports. Until 1967, however, the town was integrated with the surrounding countryside and had no fossil-fuel related industry. The cornerstone enterprise was the meatworks, which grew in importance and prosperity as a supplier of tinned meat to Allied forces during the Second World War. The meatworks were closed down in 1963, and on the very same site, one of the world's largest alumina refineries was opened in 1967. It would eventually get its electricity from the new coal-driven power station on the edge of town, opened in 1976; and the alumina would be turned into aluminium at the nearby Boyne Island Smelter from 1982. With the opening of the Moura railway line for transporting coal from the interior of Queensland in 1968 and the construction of a coal terminal at Barney Point, Gladstone had, in the space of a few years, become a fully-fledged industrial city.

Industrial and coal-related developments in the Gladstone region have continued at an uneven pace. A second alumina refinery has been opened in Yarwun west of the city; Cement Australia (formerly Queensland Cement & Lime) operates a factory north of Gladstone and a mine to the north-west; there is a quarry, a chemical factory and many auxiliary activities – scaffolding, mechanical workshops, transport companies etc. – adding to the industrial, and industrious, face presented by Gladstone to the visitor.

Since the early 2000s, industrial change has accelerated in Gladstone. Three plants for the liquification and storage of coalseam gas were under construction on Curtis Island across a

narrow strait from the city, beginning in 2011, the first liquid gas shipped in 2014. Ground was cleared and pipelines stretched several hundred kilometres to transport the gas from the interior of the state. Simultaneously, a new coal terminal was built at Wiggins Island just north of the city, increasing the port capacity considerably. To facilitate exports of LNG (liquid natural gas), the western, shallower parts of Gladstone harbour were dredged from 2011 to 2013, removing 36 million cubic metres of sediment in the process.

The ownership structure in large industrial operations in Gladstone is complex. Although the Gladstone Ports Corporation is state-owned, the actual projects are owned by consortiums consisting of several companies, which in turn tend to have a complex and transnational ownership structure. For example, the LNG plants are being built by the American corporation Bechtel, but the three plants are owned and operated by others. One is owned by QCLNG (Queensland Curtis Liquid Natural Gas), which in turn is owned by BG (British Gas); one is jointly owned by the Australian energy company Santos and the Malaysian oil and gas company Petronas; and the third project, Australia Pacific LNG, is operated jointly by the Australian company Origin, the American company ConocoPhillips and the Chinese company Sinopec. A fourth LNG plant, which has not yet been built at the time of writing, will – if constructed – be managed by the apparently Australian company Arrow Energy, which is actually owned jointly by the Anglo-Dutch owned Shell and PetroChina. Many subcontractors have, moreover, been involved in various stages of the construction of pipelines and the plant itself, from large engineering companies to small, local actors like a local transport company which moved trucks by boat from the mainland to the island and back.

The overarching research question raised in my fieldwork (2013–14) in Gladstone concerns local responses to changes that the city's residents did not instigate themselves. There are, naturally, many different views, but there is a broadly shared indignation over the large corporations' failure to engage in a direct and sustained way with the local community. Many claim that Gladstone has received far too little in return for allowing large-scale industrial developments; one went so far as to describe the city as 'the sacrificial lamb of Queensland. If it is noisy and dirty, they just put it here.' Decisions to approve or reject proposed industrial developments are taken by the Queensland Government unless they affect natural features of national significance (such as the Great Barrier Reef), in which case they are moved upwards to the Federal Government in Canberra. The Gladstone Regional Council has little influence on these decisions, and royalties from gas, mining and factories are paid to the state. As a result, many in Gladstone argue that the wealth generated in the city is a major contributor to the economy in south-eastern Queensland (Brisbane), but not to the economy in central Queensland.

The examples to follow demonstrate the tensions described in a general way earlier, between growth and ecological sustainability, and between standardization and local autonomy in a world where global neoliberalism is a major driving force affecting livelihoods and communities through its effects. The final example indicates that overheating in one place may amount to cooling down in another.

The Dredging of Gladstone Harbour

There is broad agreement that the removal of huge amounts of silt and mud from the seafloor immediately west of Gladstone had direct consequences for the fisheries. The harbour, in effect, covers a large area between Facing Island to the east and the city, stretching north-west towards the strait between Curtis Island and the mainland, appropriately called The Narrows. For many years, local fishermen benefited from large catches of fish and crabs in

the harbour area. Since the dredging began, nobody fishes in the harbour. Fish with lesions and swollen eyes were caught in the early days of dredging, and more than half of the mudcrabs have been proven to be affected by shell disease.

A group of local fishermen decided to document the effects of the dredging on the fisheries and to demand compensation. They hired a marine biologist, Matt Landos, to prepare a report, which was completed in October 2012 (Landos 2012). His report, based on samples of fish and crustaceans, but also water quality, seagrass and coral, concluded in no uncertain terms that the dredging had been ecologically disastrous and had inflicted severe damage on the fisheries. It is estimated that should his findings be accepted by the Queensland Government, the fishermen could claim up to AUS$20 million in compensation (Berry 2012).

However, several reports from the Queensland Government published in the same period concluded that dredging did not have the severe ecological consequences claimed by local fishermen and Dr Landos (Queensland Government 2012; 2013). The official view, shared by the Gladstone Port Corporation, was that the cause of fish and crab disease was the massive flooding which had affected the state in 2010–11, and which had washed large quantities of sediments and chemicals from riverbeds and mineral-rich inland areas into the sea.

The debate between the fishermen's organization and Landos, on the one hand, and the political authorities and the Ports Corporation on the other hand, has been reignited regularly. Landos repeatedly pointed out that flooding had occurred all along the Queensland coast, whereas the diseased fish and crabs were chiefly to be found in the Gladstone harbour area. Spokespersons for the government countered this argument by pointing out that local conditions differed from those elsewhere in that the dam at Lake Awoonga, which supplies Gladstone with its freshwater, had overflowed during the severe flooding of 2010–11, leading to large numbers of fish (mostly barramundi) being washed over the rim, many of them killed or injured as a result. In addition, barramundi moved from freshwater to saltwater might be particularly vulnerable to disease.

This did not, however, explain the prevalence of mudcrab disease in Gladstone harbour. Landos' report indicates high levels of metals in the water and connects shell disease in mudcrabs to this. Government reports nevertheless conclude that the water quality is acceptable. Yet, it was revealed by the local *Gladstone Observer* (14 Dec 2013) that dredging had begun without the required prior environmental assessment, and that later such assessments had failed to comply with federal standards.

A scientist at the University of Central Queensland describes Landos' report as not based on 'very good science', and points out that by 2013, the seagrass seemed to have recovered (personal communication). On the other hand, the biologist Jon Brodie, an experienced and esteemed researcher on the ecology of the Great Barrier Reef, argues that flooding was far less damaging than dredging (Brodie 2013). Among other things, he points out that cloudy water makes feeding difficult for a number of species depending on visual contact with their food. And although the quality of the water and the effects of dredging on fish health are disputed, simple observation suffices to confirm that the harbour water is indeed murky.

There is nevertheless no general agreement among experts about the effects of dredging on the fisheries. For the general public, it is impossible to evaluate the quality of the research undertaken. They are not biologists, but they are aware that there are vested interests on both sides, the fishermen seeking compensation, the Ports Corporation and the government trying to convince the public that every precaution has been taken and no lasting damage inflicted.

Local people, who are not experts but live in Gladstone, base their judgements largely on experience, hearsay and personal observation. A skipper on a local boat, who has been plying the waters of Gladstone harbour for many years, says that the area is for now

unattractive for fishing. He says that it is well known that industrial waste was dumped more or less indiscriminately into the sea for many years in the past, and that the dredging was likely to have stirred up metals and chemicals from the seafloor. However, he adds that he has spotted dolphins recently in the harbour basin, where they had been absent since the beginning of dredging.

A local woman who walks with her dogs in a park by the foreshore every morning says that she recently spotted several large, dead fish that had been washed up on the beach recently (December 2013). She has also seen dead turtles. Her conclusion is that 'there is something they are not telling us', 'they' referring to government and port authorities.

Finally, a city councillor admits that there is too much complexity for anyone to be able to see the full picture. The question concerns whose expert knowledge to trust, when there are opposing findings and conclusions.

The rationale for the dredging was the building of the coal terminal at Wiggins Island and the transportation of LNG from Curtis Island. The corporations involved in these operations, several of them transnational, played on a different field than the fishermen, whose businesses were tiny and locally anchored. The little man, says one, had been sacrificed for the sake of big money.

This kind of conflict can also be analysed as one of diverging scale: the investors, with no local attachments, represent substantial economic power, but with no immediate interest in local conditions. Seen from the state level, the coal terminal and LNG plant would clearly contribute far more work and wealth to Queensland than a few dozen fishermen, however industrious, in Gladstone. It is against this background that many Gladstone residents feel that they receive few benefits from the expanding industry in the area.

LNG on Curtis Island

'You know, people may just shrug and express dismay when something happens to the environment, and they then move on without engaging themselves. But the fact is that five years ago, I was them.' With these words, an environmental activist, a middle-aged woman, sums up what she has spoken of as her 'awakening'. She readily admits that her engagement began with the NIMBY syndrome (Not In My Back Yard). A resident of Curtis Island, she was directly affected by the accelerated changes, as they took place in her immediate surroundings beginning in 2011, with the dredging of the harbour and the construction of the LNG plants on the island. The construction led to increased traffic to and from the island, noise and an indisputable aesthetic deterioration of the area. Curtis Island is fair-sized (580 sq. kms.), and it had a distinctly pristine identity before the LNG developments, mostly covered in forest and surrounded by crystal clear waters. Dredging and construction ruined the character of the island for her.

She points out that she could have left her engagement there – like, one might say, the fishermen of Gladstone – by focusing exclusively on the immediate effects of the changes on her own life. Instead, she joined a fledgling environmental organization based in the region, reading and learning about the threats to the Great Barrier Reef further out, the place of coal and gas in the Australian economy, ecological processes and the relationship of fossil fuel to global climate change. In this way, her initial NIMBY motivation was expanded to a world-view incorporating not only her own life-world, but also Queensland, Australia and ultimately the planet. Thus, she has latterly become interested in the tar sand industry in Canada, seeing similarities with Australian extractive industries. The LNG plants thereby were transformed from being a nuisance and an eyesore to a symptom of a world on collision-course with a livable future.

Regarding criticism of the dredging of the harbour, large-scale perspectives are also invoked. Notably, the Save the Reef campaign, a coalition of environmentalists led by Greenpeace Australia, have used the example of Gladstone as a way to draw attention to the connection between Australian mining, the threats to the Great Barrier Reef and global climate change. In this way, they enter the same level of scale as the corporations and politicians they confront. The environmental activist on Curtis Island, and the local group of which she is part, similarly connect their local concerns to a global analysis.

Locally, it is nevertheless far easier to mobilize interest in the local effects of dredging and mining than to invoke the spectre of global climate change. The extent of environmental activism in Gladstone is limited. During a nationwide campaign against fracking in November 2013, a participant in the online discussion commented on the absence of any activities in Gladstone by pointing out that the vast majority of the city's residents made their living, directly or indirectly, in the mining industry. However, further north in Queensland, where comparable developments are being planned, engagement is more vivid. In December 2013, the federal government approved plans to dredge a section of the coast off Abbot Point near the city of Bowen to enable a doubling of the coalport's capacity. This is an area more dependent on natural beauty for tourism to the Great Barrier Reef than Gladstone, and the immediate local reactions concerned fisheries and tourism, that is local economic and aesthetic interests. Like in Gladstone, people living in the area argued that their livelihoods were threatened, and that nobody had asked for their opinion before going ahead.

For large-scale industrial developments to take place in Queensland (and elsewhere in Australia), an environmental impact assessment has to be produced beforehand. The draft reports are made publicly available – online, in libraries and in government offices – for the general public to make comments and suggestions. Sometimes, they come in eight volumes including appendices. Meetings with stakeholder groups are also organized if the project is a major one. However, at one such hearing in Rockhampton in December 2013, a participant representing environmental interests exclaimed, slightly exasperated, that the Queensland Government was wasting their time – they would never follow any of the suggestions from the public anyway.

Concerning the development of LNG operations on Curtis Island, the residents of Gladstone tend to see it as the result of complicity between politicians and corporations. They were never asked, and the general view is that they reap few benefits, but are made to pay the cost in the form of environmental and aesthetic degradation. The construction workers live in temporary accommodation on the island and rarely venture into town; they are spoken of, slightly condescendingly, as 'fly-in fly-out workers'. Shopkeepers say that they have had no increase in sales whatsoever following the flow of several thousand workers through the city. There is a widespread view that the industry does what it likes with the complicity of council and state politicians, disregarding community values and local needs.

These two brief examples demonstrate not only power discrepancies between local communities and corporations/state government, but also divergent scales of operation and engagement. Although critics of dredging and LNG often invoke large-scale effects of the fossil fuel industry, their primary source of engagement is that of the local, as is their primary source of knowledge. However, what of the local politicians – should they not see the welfare of the community as being paramount?

There are three partial answers to this question. First, regional councils are comparatively poor and powerless in Australia, since major decisions are taken at the level of the state government. Second, investments bring growth and royalties to the council coffers, which is a reason for local politicians to encourage developments such as the Curtis Island LNG plants. Third, it is possible that politicians enjoy, as one informant puts it, 'basking in the

glory of power and industrial development'; that prestige projects in their constituency adds to their own prestige.

The next two examples are slightly older, but they belong here as cases of local responses to large-scale industrialization.

East End Mine and Cement Australia

Since 1995, an organization called the East End Mine Action Group (EEMAG) has been campaigning on behalf of farmers demanding redress and compensation from Cement Australia (formerly Queensland Cement & Lime). The bare bones of the story are as follows.

The cement factory at Fisherman's Landing about 10 kilometres north of Gladstone is Australia's largest, and a fair proportion of its products are exported. In addition to the factory, Cement Australia owns a limestone mine at the foot of Mount Larcom, supplying the factory with raw materials. The open-cut mine has operated since 1964. Farmers living in the area were wary of later expansions of the mine at an early stage, principally because they claimed that the water consumption of the mine was already too high and threatened to lower the water table, making agriculture and livestock raising – already precarious due to relatively low rainfall – very difficult. Moreover, they argued that the depletion of underground aquifers due to an overexploitation of groundwater could make the soil subside into cavities in places.

Early in 1974, local farmers were surprised to discover that mining companies were under Queensland law allowed to drill boreholes on private land. This when exploratory drilling took place; later in the year, the cement company purchased 2,200 hectares 'of the district's most productive land' in order to expand the mine (Lucke 2013: loc. 720). A protest group was formed immediately, but the Mount Larcom farmers were disappointed to learn that their acquaintances in Gladstone were strongly in favour of the mine expansion, as it would bring jobs and prosperity to the region. In its way, the mine was also sustainable. As an historian of Gladstone writes, in a book which celebrates the progress and development that industrialization finally brought to the city after a hundred years of thwarted hopes, the lime was transported to the factory in the form of slurry, 'through a twenty-four kilometre underground pipeline from East End to Fisherman's Landing, thus producing no environmental hazards' (McDonald 1988: 351). It was nevertheless pointed out time and again by the local farmers that the use of prodigious quantities of water at the mine did, in fact, produce some undesirable side-effects, notably by lowering the water table.

Alec Lucke, who lived and worked on a farm in the area until his retirement in 2006, is one of the rural activists who has for decades been engaged in battle against Cement Australia and political decisions which, in his view, have been grossly misguided. In his meticulously documented self-published book *Road to Exploitation* (Lucke 2013), he describes meetings with politicians and bureaucrats, lawsuits against the company, independent studies documenting water depletion, and the slow encroachment on the community by the expanding mine. Having moved to another state after selling the family farm at a low price ('after all, it was now virtually surrounded by the mine', he explained to me), he continues to invoke hydrogeological studies and law in order to call the company to account. Throughout its existence, he admits, EEMAG has achieved little. Twenty-four landowners have received replacement water supplies from Cement Australia. Their greatest achievement, perhaps, consists in continuing to exist and continuing the struggle. He adds, not without pride, that the lawyers and scientists commissioned by the farmers' organization to assist them, worked without pay half the time. To Lucke, this fact testifies to the existence of a community bent on representing the interests of 'the little man' facing powerful, transnational adversaries.

In the book, Lucke makes some observations of a more general kind. A man of little formal education, his long career as a rural activist has sharpened his analytical acumen and stimulated his thirst for knowledge. He argues that the specific, unique circumstances of Mount Larcom are relevant for people elsewhere who are affected by expanding mining, since the logic of corporations confronting locals is similar everywhere. He also writes, based on his own experiences, that

> [t]here is an enormous distinction between investments in yesterday's 'local scale' activity as opposed to today's mega scale open cut coal mines with railways and shipping and tomorrow's coal seam gas investments with their conversion plants, shipping, wellheads and pipelines spanning much of the state. (Lucke 2013: loc. 220)

This is a very perceptive observation. It was the expansion of the limestone quarry, not the mine itself, that killed the farming community at Mount Larcom. Although the expanding mine is the main cause, it is not the only one. The centralization of certain services, notably the abattoir, led to the isolation of the area. There remains a local community, but those who now live in the area, work elsewhere.

Cement Australia, at the same time, takes great pride in its environmentally sound practices and its deep community involvement, which includes sponsorships and support of a variety of activities around Gladstone. This does not preclude the possibility, substantiated in great detail by EEMAG, that its activities made agriculture in the area ultimately impossible.

Deceleration: The Death of Targinnie

At a time characterized by accelerated change, certain places, activities and processes slow down. In the global neoliberal economy, the principle that investments, production and transactions should be based on calculations of comparative advantage inevitably lead to the downfall and marginalization of places that were formerly significant. A big fish in a small pond easily becomes so small as to be nearly invisible or else eaten by larger fish in a large pond; this is a direct effect of the expansion of systemic boundaries, and affects economic activities that are incorporated into larger systems. Changes in transnational terms of exchange, or market fluctuations, may also render boomtowns into abandoned backwaters. In a study of the Zambian Copperbelt in the 1990s, Ferguson (1999) depicts an urban population yearning for a modernity they have lost, reminiscing about the very period when anthropological studies of the Copperbelt depicted a region, and a continent, about to enter the world stage. With the recent Chinese investments in the Copperbelt, the region may be entering a new boom period, doubtless with a different set of outcomes.

Acceleration takes place at the sites which at any given time count as centres, while peripheries may become even more peripheral than they were. Such was the story of Targinnie, a rural community north of Gladstone, east of Mount Larcom.

Settled in the late nineteenth century, Targinnie was never a large community, but it had a school, a community house and for a time a shop. There were partly successful attempts to mine gold in the area, but the mainstay was agriculture. Until the late twentieth century, the community was integrated at a regional level. The fruit – papayas and mangoes were local specialties – was sold in nearby towns or tinned at the nearby Golden Circle Cannery (at a time when papaya accounted for over 50 per cent of the content in tins of 'tropical fruit salad'), meat and dairy products likewise marketed locally. In the 1960s, more than 100 families in Targinnie were full-time farmers. By the mid-1970s, only 18 were left. By 2013, there were none, and the place was all but deserted. What had happened?

First, Targinnie became integrated into larger systems of production and exchange. This meant, first, that the small-scale fruit producers would have to compete with the larger producers further north, which was economically difficult. Second, an improved infrastructure made mobility into Gladstone easier from the mid-1960s. Third, new job opportunities due to the industrialization of Gladstone lured many away from agriculture to factory work. This in itself could explain its marginalization, a situation shared with rural areas in many countries, but this kind of change would not be sufficient to depopulate the place completely. When I mentioned Targinnie to a woman in Gladstone, she exclaimed: 'Well, they were poisoned!' Others mutter, wistfully, that it was a shame what happened to Targinnie.

In the 1990s, the Canadian company Suncor successfully made an application to extract and process shale oil near Targinnie. The factory was built, and experimental extraction began. This new industrial adventure started on a positive note, with an open day for the local residents in August 1999. However, the project seemed to be doomed from the start. Already in October 1999, the factory malfunctioned and emitted foul gases throughout the area. Residents began to report a regular occurrence of loud noises, emissions and air pollution. Many complained of headaches and dizziness. A Citizen Group was formed, to little avail, and noise and air pollution remained considerable problems throughout 2000. As early as 2001, Suncor withdrew, and the plant closed down. By then, many local residents wished to leave amid concerns over environmental health risks (Blake 2005).

In the next year, the Queensland Government offered to buy the land owned by Targinnie residents, with a view to later inclusion into the Gladstone industrial area. By 2007, nearly everybody had left. Where the village used to be, only a few dilapidated houses, one or two inhabited by squatters, remain. Along the main road, there are a couple of new houses, whose residents work elsewhere. The pawpaws and mangoes are now rotting on the branches. However, Cement Australia runs its thriving factory nearby, and several new industries have established themselves on Fisherman's Landing. Even more significantly, perhaps, the LNG pipelines connecting the coalseam gas fields of the interior with the refinery and port facilities on Curtis Island run just north of Targinnie. Thus, Fisherman's Landing a few kilometres up the road is overheating, brimming with industrial energy, while Targinnie has become one of those places that were left behind by accelerated change.

Conclusion

In the Gladstone region, the city itself and its surrounding rural and semi-urban communities have been affected by growth and change in many ways. Occasionally, children have to be fetched by their parents from a primary school near QAL (Queensland Alumina Ltd) because of white alumina dust blowing into the schoolyard. When you rise from an outdoor chair, you may notice that your backside has been soiled by coaldust. These are everyday occurrences. The discovery of a colony of non-endemic fireants, presumably from the USA, at an industrial site in late 2013, raised a few eyebrows, but nobody appeared to be deeply surprised. The population of Gladstone is accustomed to living with vulnerabilities resulting from industrial operations and transnational flows. When, around the same time, I took part in a Conservation Volunteers Australia project to clear an oceanic beach of rubbish, and we came across Chinese and Korean water bottles, a Japanese Pepsi can and an empty juice carton from Cyprus, this was all routine. On the horizon, we could glimpse the contours of a veritable queue of coalships from many countries waiting for their turn to moor at Tanna Coal Terminal.

The recent, accelerated change in Gladstone – dredging, LNG plants, new coal terminal, expanding limestone mine and so on – is contingent on Australia's integration into a changing global economy, a key factor being the growing demand for minerals due to the Chinese industrial expansion (and, to some extent, the Indian one). Scarcely anybody in Gladstone is against coalmining or industrialization *per se*, perhaps because they are all entangled, but perhaps also because they see the difficulty of promoting a credible alternative; but many argue that local needs and community interests should be given first priority, and that this is not the case. The two fundamental contradictions resulting from accelerated growth in a neoliberal world economy are highly visible and lead to a series of tensions and conflicts locally: the double bind between growth and sustainability, and the disjuncture between small-scale community concerns and large-scale corporate interests. These are, at an abstract level, the major contradictions of contemporary globalization, and as I have shown, they are enacted, with high stakes on several sides, in a booming industrial town such as Gladstone, Queensland.

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PART VI
Emergent Themes

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Languages in Change

Jonathan D. Hill and Juan Luis Rodriguez

Five centuries of European and Euro-American state expansion across South America have diminished indigenous populations of the Amazon Basin and adjacent regions by upwards of 90 percent. Yet in spite of these traumatic losses of population and the extinction of hundreds of indigenous languages, the 400 or so existing languages of Lowland South America encompass greater internal diversity than those found in any other region of the world with the possible exception of Papua New Guinea. The 34 language families into which these languages have been classified are equal to approximately one-third of the total number of language families in the world, and the 20 "language isolates" (i.e., those that do not belong to any recognized family) comprise 60 percent of the total number (36) in the entire world (Dahl, Gillam, Anderson, Iriarte, and Copé 2011). Clearly, for there to be this much linguistic diversity in a region that has undergone such historical violence there must exist deeply rooted cultural and linguistic ideologies and practices that generate linguistic diversification as well as mechanisms for creating political-economic spaces that allow for effective communication across language barriers.

Amazonian indigenous groups are entangled in dynamic historical processes that not only entail the imposition of political and social circumstances on them but also the rise of new forms of political agency and consciousness. These entanglements affect the politics of land demarcation, self-governance and political representation, and the transformation of cultural practices at large. Since colonial times indigenous groups in South America have been marginalized both physically and socially by being pushed to the hinterlands of newly created national territories, and being excluded from political representation and participation (Hill 1999). This has produced a dramatic reduction in the sheer number of languages spoken in Amazonia and also importantly for this chapter in the number of speech genres and communicative practices. These transformations are not only the product of changing economic and political circumstances but also of a changing linguistic ideological landscape (Rodriguez 2008). Confronted with these circumstances indigenous peoples are increasingly forced to make decisions about the viability of their languages and communicative practices. These are decisions about what language should the next generation of speakers learn, what ways of speaking should survive, what communicative practices and discursive contents/forms are compatible with new life styles, and how Indians should speak in the new political landscape (Graham 2002). These challenges are not unique to Amazonia. They are part of global trends of language and cultural contact which have been in effect all over the colonial and post-colonial world for the last several hundred years (Fabian 1986; Mannheim 1991; Rafael 1993; Durston 2007; Errington 2008; Makihara and Schieffelin 2007).

We are not arguing that colonial encounters and interaction with nation-states are the only form of history that has changed the linguistic landscape in Amazonia. Actually, an increasing number of studies on language contact in Amazonia demonstrate the *longue*

durée character of the historical interaction among indigenous languages (Epps 2009; Hornborg and Hill 2011b). This literature addresses the interactions between indigenous languages and tries to project these interactions into the past by establishing patterns of linguistic contact and genetic relations (Epps 2009; Everett 2010). But we think that the study of language contact in South America should also be expanded to account for the colonial encounter following the lead of this approach in other areas of the world (Mannheim 1991; Kulick 1992; Errington 1998; Durston 2007; Makihara and Schieffelin 2007; Heggarty and Pearce 2011). Studies of language contact are necessary for our understanding of language change before colonial contact, and we celebrate its current growth and development in Amazonia. But we argue here that recent developments in the study of South American discursive practices inspired in areal typological linguistics are starting to show the way for an integration with insights into transformations of Amazonian communicative practices vis-à-vis encompassing national societies.

Beier, Michael, and Sherzer's (2002) recent attempt to put forward a comparative areal typological study of discursive practices in Amazonia is one of the most exciting proposals in this regard. Theirs is an inspiring take on the potential link between the tradition of discourse-centered approaches to culture, and comparative ethnological and ethnohistorical studies in Amazonia. Ours is an attempt to expand this perspective giving historical dynamism to this insight on the areal distribution of discursive practices in Amazonia.

Discourse-centered approaches to culture have a long tradition in the study of discursive genres and ways of speaking (Sherzer 1987; Urban 1991). Central to this tradition is a methodological commitment to using naturally occurring instances of discourse as data. These discourses are publicly performed utterances which can be categorized by the speakers of a discursive community as belonging to specific speech genres. These large linguistic units are complex semiotic expressions and their value lies not only in their semantic content but also in their poetic form. By mastering the poetic form and semantic content of recognizable discourse genres indigenous people can integrate new ideas and transform them in complex ways to produce historical transformation (Hill 1993). In Amazonia we have striking examples of the use of discursive practices in cultural/political mobilization among speakers of the largest language families such as Arawak, Carib, Gê, and Tupi. For example, we have now in-depth descriptions of how the use and transformation of discursive practices influenced millennial movements among Tupi speakers and how this was linked with the transformation of indigenous speech genres (Clastres 1995).The study of discursive poetic forms as verbal art has also produced great insight into the ways in which discourse is structured and entextualized in South America. These studies have proven essential to our understanding of issues of authenticity and discourse circulation in new political environments. One of the most interesting examples on how discourse form is linked to the semiotics of authenticity and identity is Laura Graham's work among the Xavante and indigenous groups from the Xingu area in central Brazil (Graham 2002). Graham's work shows that attention to how different generations of speakers translate and interact with the state, NGOs, and the media is part of a complex process of semiotic and poetic interactions in which code switching and discursive form are the markers of political positioning and intergenerational difference among Xavante leaders (Graham 2002).

In this chapter we argue for an understanding of Amazonian languages in change as a complement to the study of language change which refers only to changes in language structure over time. By language-in-change we understand the complex interconnection between changes in language as a code and semiotic system, and the broader context of social and cultural changes linked to historical and ideological process. We do not advocate for a turn away from the study of comparative linguistics and language typology. On the

contrary, we believe that the study of language-in-change is a necessary complement to the study of language change in Amazonia. Studying language as embedded in social and cultural transformations is nothing new in linguistic anthropology. What we want to emphasize here is the comparative turn that studies based on discourse form and content can take in this area of the world. Before we proceed to illustrate the benefit of this approach we will turn to the ways in which Amazonian languages have been studied in the past.

Modes of Studying Linguistic Diversity in Amazonia

The study of Amazonian languages has come a long way in the last 30 years (Manelis Klein and Stark, 1985). The area has changed from one of the least known linguistic areas in the world to a plethora of studies in language description, language contact, and linguistic classification (Epps 2009; Everett 2010). Some of this work has come in the form of protestant missionaries' efforts on Bible translation but also the area has seen increasing attention from academics in both linguistics and linguistic anthropology.

The study of indigenous languages in Amazonia has a long history and we can discern some historical trends and academic/ideological emphasis in the study of languages in this area. We can also identify connections with larger global processes and historical changes in this respect. Here we want to survey some of these trends and how they have influenced the study of language change in Amazonia.

Language Description in the Colonial World

Since the beginning, language description in the New World was part of a larger project of political subjugation. The tremendous linguistic diversity of indigenous languages in the New World was a challenge that the conquistadors dealt with by picking certain languages or language varieties to make them *lenguas generales* or *lingua geral*, and by relying on a created elite of bilingual individuals (Heggarty and Pearce 2011; Durston 2007; Adeelar 2012). Examples of these general languages are Quechua (its Cusco dialect), Tupi in coastal Brazil, Nheengatu (also known as Geral or Yeral) in northern Brazil and southern Venezuela, and Guaraní in Paraguay. The work of dealing with linguistic diversity was left to the missionaries. Not only were the missionaries more educated, but also the work of conversion exposed them to more intimate relations with the new colonial subjects.

On the other hand, it was official policy of the empire that indigenous subjects not be instructed in the language of the empire (Adeelar 2012). Spanish was considered a higher form of communication that primitive Indians could not and should not master. The missionaries then were left with the task of learning the languages of their newly acquired flocks. Their approach to this problem was as ideological as every other aspect of the colonization process. They resorted to the heuristic tools that they had at hand. The newly created grammars of Castilian and Latin by Antonio de Nebrija, not coincidentally released in 1492, was one of the greatest achievements of the Reconquista's court intellectuals. *The Grammar* was a modern representation of linguistic description and had the very explicit purpose of being at the ideological forefront for the unification of the realm. Of these two the grammar of Latin was considered a modern blueprint for the study of language. Different from Castillian, Latin was the language of highest intellectual achievements, and the priests read it and spoke it as the language of rituals and official businesses within the church. Latin was also considered a universal model for all languages of the world.

In terms of language ideologies[1] this meant two things for the study of indigenous languages of the New World. First, they were now susceptible to be reduced and analyzed following Nebrijas' model. They could become the object of scientific study. Second, comparison with Latin and Castilian inevitably meant that all indigenous languages were deemed as lacking one or more of the features of Latin. This deficiency model for the study of language was well established by the eighteenth century and lingered well into the twentieth century (Rodriguez 2008).

Studies of individual indigenous languages during this period give us a glimpse into the linguistic diversity that was lost during the colonial period. The purpose of these descriptions was pedagogical. They were used by missionaries to learn the languages of the subjects they were supposed to convert to the Catholic faith. They were neither language documentation projects nor systematic studies for comparative purposes. These were instruments of domination and conversion, not instruments of scientific inquiry per se. The study of language change was far from the missionaries' imagination. They were less concerned about whether these languages were valuable examples of universal human capacities than with the fact that these languages stood in the way of conversion and the spread of the faith.

Among other agents of colonization the commitment to the study of indigenous languages and cultures during colonial times was limited. At the same time that the Jesuit priests were learning and describing indigenous languages and cultures, the conquistadors had very different ideas about the value of these languages. This became evident when the Jesuit missionaries, the ones most interested in the description of languages, and the ones with the most intimate contact with native populations, were expelled from the Americas in 1767. After their expulsion much of their linguistic work was destroyed or lost. After the Jesuits were expelled from the New World linguistic description became scarce and in many cases was reduced to glossaries, vocabularies, and word lists collected by travelers and explorers who did not have the same intimate contact and time that the Catholic priests had had. In consequence, the linguistic materials collected in Amazonia during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries consisted mainly of brief collections of assorted linguistic materials. To be sure, there were exceptions to this general trend, such as the insightful works by Fillipo Gilij, an Italian Jesuit whose work in linguistic classification and insights into language structures was ahead of its time. Gilij was the first linguist to recognize that the Maipure language that he studied was related to many other languages, and this discovery led to the classification of the Maipuran branch and eventually to the classification of Arawak as the largest indigenous language family in Amazonia. Nevertheless, the norm after the Jesuit expulsion was that travelers and explorers collected language samples to bring to Europe to be circulated among the scientific community that was increasingly interested in the diversity of the world's languages. Most of these new scientists resided in Germany and/or were coming from the peripheries of the British colonial world. Many of these linguists participated in the transformation of text-based philological studies into language typology and historical linguistics (Errington 2008).

Historical Linguistics and Language Classification

There have been several attempts at classifying South American languages. Nevertheless, by far the most widely accepted classification during the twentieth century was Çesmir

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1   In this chapter, the terms "language ideology" and "communicative ideology" refer to "Implicit and explicit signaling about language-in-use" (Woolard 1998: 4). These practices include explicit commentary about the meanings of speech terms, unspoken communicative habits resulting in differential powers, and meanings implied by named speech genres.

Loukotka's *Classification of South American Indian Languages*. This classification recognized most of the linguistic families and isolates that we recognize nowadays and it is the basis for most of the discussions on comparative ethnology in the area. Loukotka updated his classification several times but he left his last update unfinished when he died in 1966 (see Loukotka 1968). Anticipating his death he sent his work to Johannes Wilbert at the Department of Anthropology at the University of California, Los Angeles. Wilbert then finished the last of update and contributed the introduction to this work (Carneiro 1970).

Loukotka's comparative work was based on unpublished materials and vocabulary lists collected in the *Musee de L'homme* by Paul Rivet and it expanded over the years as more information about languages of South America became available. Yet Loukotka's work had a tremendous methodological constraint. Since it was based on the work of travelers and short-term explorers it depended on lexical items disconnected from their grammars. He selected 45 lexical items that served as the basis for his comparison (Carneiro 1970). Reliance on vocabulary lists was the main characteristic of comparative linguistics in South America for most the twentieth century, and it was the norm for the work of the most influential linguists during this time, including Morris Swadesh and Joseph Greenberg.

For all the usefulness of Loukotka's work on language classification his main goal was not to produce a historical picture of language differentiation in South America but a snap-shot of the languages' geographical distribution. This had three consequences. First, his comparative work did not emphasize lumping languages into stocks (in contrast with Greenberg's approach) but rather the identification of as many branches and isolates as possible. Second, Loukotka's attention was not directed to understanding etymologies and producing language reconstructions but to the physical representation of language distributions on a comprehensive map. Finally, the emphasis on geographical distribution made Loukotka's work very appealing for archaeologists and comparative ethnologists who were free to interpret the geographical distribution of indigenous languages in terms of migration patterns and correlating material culture, cultural practices and linguistic families in complex patterns of cultural influence and distribution across South America (e.g. Lathrap 1970).

Two other influential approaches to language classification followed Loukotka's work. Morris Swadesh's (1952, 1955, 1971) lexicostatistical or glottochronological approach[2] and Joseph Greenberg's (1987) mass comparison or multilateral comparison effort were the two most influential works in South American historical linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century. Both of these approaches influenced not only the field of historical linguistics but also the works of cultural anthropologists and historians. Their approach relied heavily on comparison of lexical items and some grammatical components.

Greenberg's mass comparison depended on some 400 lexical items and some 50 grammatical categories (Kauffman 1990). It included all sorts of materials form all available sources. Greenberg thought that linguistic reconstruction was secondary to the task of categorizing and comparing languages. According to him, before attempting reconstruction the researchers need to know what is it that they need to reconstruct and for that they need to know what languages are closer and more likely to be related. Greenberg argued that the neo-grammarians did not start with reconstruction from the phonological level up, but by recognizing what languages were related and then working to reconstruct proto-languages.

Terrence Kauffman pushed back against Greenberg's approach in the 1990s. He criticized Greenberg's rejection of linguistic reconstruction as inapplicable to the study of languages of the New World. He argued that even when the neo-grammarians started by recognizing

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2   For a similar concern with the deep history of linguistic contact in comparative perspective between Asia, the Pacific, and the Americas see Wurm, Mühlhäusler, and Tryon (1996).

relations between languages in Europe that approach was possible due to the small number of languages and the familiarity of the neo-grammarians with the languages they studied (Kauffman 1990). Greenberg on the contrary was dealing with a much larger number of languages and he could not be familiar with the vast majority of them. This resulted in the inclusion of poorly understood etymologies due to his lack of knowledge of the semantic and structural changes on a great number of his proposed cognates. Also very importantly, he was ill equipped to rule out linguistic borrowings which he disregarded as a problem, and he included materials of very different qualities which had been collected under unknown circumstances. This prompted Kauffman to call Greenberg's work a "probabilistic approach" (Kauffman 1990). He added that Greenberg was likely to bring hypotheses to the table but not able to prove any kind of genetic relation among languages. In this regard Greenberg was most controversial because he proposed that all of the New World languages are related and belong to a macro-family that he named Amerind. The only exceptions to this family were Na-Dené and Eskimo-Aleut.

Morris Swadesh had a different concern from Greenberg's. For him, absolute temporality was the most important thing. Swadesh had great confidence in the main principle of the neo-grammarian revolution. Sound change is constant. Therefore, if we can calculate the rate of sound change we can come out with absolute dates for the diversification of daughter languages from their proto-language. Swadesh proposed to make this calculation based on a set of vocabulary items that were less likely to be borrowed. This list started as a 100 word sample and was subsequently reviewed and expanded to 200 words. Some of the calculations based on this approach have served as support for archeological and ethnological interpretation of migration and processes of ethnogenesis in South America. Nevertheless, it remains a controversial method due to its assumption that linguistic change is relatively independent from other historical factors.

Since the 1990s the comparative study of indigenous languages and the study of language contact in Lowland South America have come out of their reliance on comparing restricted lexical lists and little understood grammatical facts. The increasing number of reliable language descriptions has now made possible comparative studies that can start with the reconstruction of proto-forms from the phonological level and work their way up to the level of grammar and syntactic analysis. It is now more feasible to adopt the approach prescribed by Kauffman (1990), who insisted that genetic relations be established based on reliable data collected by professional linguists who could provide lexical lists of some 500–700 lexical items and some 100 grammatical points. Anything below these standards would be unacceptable for him and these prompted him to write: "Do not imagine you are doing serious comparative work if you do not conform to these principles" (Kauffman 1990: 18). Nowadays we are more able than ever to rise to these standards as the works of many linguists have demonstrated (Derbyshire 1985; Manelis Klein and Stark 1985; Derbyshire and Pullum 1986–1994; Payne 1990; Key 1979, 1991; Dixon and Aikhenvald 1999; Aikhenvald 2002, 2012; Dixon 2004; Epps 2009; Everett 2010; Rodrigues 2000).

Linguistic documentation has experienced tremendous growth in Amazonia since the 1980s. Documenting indigenous languages spread from Central America to South America in the hands of SIL missionaries who had a religious agenda behind their language documentation program. These missionaries were, at least at the beginning, more interested in the prospect of Bible translation than in understanding language contact or language typology. But over the last 30 years or so the project of documenting indigenous Amazonian languages has fallen more and more into the hands of professional linguists funded by First World-based organizations like the DoBES program of the Volkswagen Foundation, the Endangered Language Fund, or the Endangered Language Program at SOAS in the UK. These sources of funding and others have made possible the documentation of rapidly

disappearing languages with methods that make good quality language descriptions available for historical linguistic research. We now have descriptive studies of almost all indigenous languages of Amazonia and the challenge set up by Kauffman in 1990 is now more attainable than ever before.

Even more interesting for our purposes in this chapter, the task of documenting and preserving indigenous language is increasingly recognizing that the documentation of indigenous languages is not complete unless we have a grasp on the genres of traditional speech present in the communities of speakers that linguists study. This recognition has led to the establishment of data bases, such as the Archive of Indigenous Languages of Latin America (AILLA, www.ailla.utexas.org), where traditional discourse forms recorded in field research are archived with the consent of indigenous speakers. This archive and others of its kind is a definite step into providing comparative materials for the study of discourse in Amazonia. Now we are also in a position to assert that it could be possible not only for us to have a better understanding of language change and contact in the area but also a better understanding of how these discursive and communicative practices interact dialectically with broader historical processes.[3] In other words we are now closer to integrating the study of language change with the study of language-in-change which requires us to understand language as social action, and culture as discourse-centered.

This chapter builds upon the argument that indigenous Amazonian discourse forms, such as ritual wailing, ceremonial greeting, dialogicality, mythic narrative, speech reporting, special languages, and shamanistic uses of language, play a key role in processes of creating new linguistic forms and meanings. These discourse forms allow speakers of different languages "to interact intensely, borrowing discourse forms and processes from one another, such as myths, songs, and even entire ceremonies" (Beier, Michael, and Sherzer 2002: 137). The ubiquity of these specialized discourse forms across Lowland South America, even in the context of tremendous losses of population and centuries of external political processes designed to eradicate indigenous expressions of ritual power, attests to the antiquity of their use in situations of trade, intermarriage, warfare, and contact between linguistically distinct groups. Nevertheless, the deep pre-Columbian roots of specialized discourse forms must not be allowed to overshadow the many dynamic and creative ways in which they have entered into and continue to influence indigenous ways of dealing with colonial encounters, expanding nation-states, and the forces of contemporary globalization.

The following sections will identify and survey some of these indigenous Amazonian ways of managing and creating linguistic diversity among indigenous communities and in long-term historical processes of interethnic relations with expanding colonial and national states in South America. The survey will include historical examples as well as recent and ongoing ethnographic studies of specific languages focusing on the emergence of discursive hybrids, bi-or multilingual culture brokers, translators, and other linguistic means for communicating within broader national and global contexts. We have selected two regions within Lowland South America—central Brazil and the Guyana Shield—where the literature in linguistic anthropology and ethnography of speaking has produced studies with detailed descriptions of specific discourse forms that will allow for the emergence of a comparative perspective on long-term historical trends as well as current processes.

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3   The volume of essays on *Expressive Genres and Historical Change: Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Taiwan* (Stewart and Strathern 2005) explores similar processes of historical changes in expressive genres among speakers of Austronesian languages as they navigate political and economic changes, new forms of religion, and other facets of modernity. Our chapter shares the view that expressive genres—songs, dances, folktales, rituals, literature—provide a rich source of insight into the "inner sensibilities of people" as well as the multiple ways in which these "sensibilities undergo change and are also creatively reshaped over time" (Stewart and Strathern 2005: 3).

Survey of Discourse Forms and Processes in Two Regions of Lowland South America

Gê-speaking Communities of Central Brazil

The Gê-speaking communities of central Brazil became a major focus of comparative social research during the 1960s and '70s in what came to be called the Harvard Central Brazil Project (Maybury-Lewis 1979). During this same period, an entire generation of anthropologists—along with scholars in comparative literature, folklore, linguistics, and other disciplines concerned with the formal properties of mythic narratives—learned about the Kayapó, Xavante, Bororo, and other Gê-speaking communities through the structuralist works of Claude Levi-Strauss. In his brief sketch of Bororo social organization in *Triste Tropiques* (1973b), Levi-Strauss introduced the complexities of Gê social organization to a broad scholarly audience, and in the four-volume *Mythologiques* (1969, 1973a, 1978, 1981) he selected the Northern Kayapó myth of the origin of cooking fire as a point of departure for a neo-Frazerian analysis of mythic thought among native peoples of the Americas.

Ethnographies of speaking and discourse-centered studies among the Gê commenced in the 1980s with works on Shokleng (Urban 1981, 1985, 1986), Xavante (Graham 1984, 1986), and Suya (Seeger 1986, 1987), as well as an edited volume comparing discourse genres among Gê and several other language families in Lowland South America (Sherzer and Urban 1986). A rich set of ethnographic studies of discourse forms continued to emerge in the 1990s, including an ethnography of Xavante discourse genres (Graham 1995), an attempt to synthesize discourse-centered studies into a coherent theoretical approach (Urban 1991), an edited volume (Sherzer and Basso 1990), and a special issue of *Journal of Folklore Research* (Basso 1990). With few exceptions, most of this research focused on description and analysis of discourse forms as these operated *within* indigenous Amazonian societies rather than how such forms and processes emerged in the conflicted arena of interethnic relations between indigenous communities and the broader national societies of South America.

Starting in the 1980s and originating mainly as a critique of the ahistoricism of Levi-Strauss's structuralist portrayal of indigenous Amazonia as a region of "cold," "mythic" societies, a number of scholars began to pay close attention to the strategic uses of indigenous discourse forms as cultural tools for negotiating long-term historical processes of political-economic inequality. These early studies focused on how mythic imagery, traditional forms of oratory, and other discourse genres served as key ingredients of indigenous political speeches made to audiences consisting of other indigenous leaders and a variety of non-indigenous political activists. In stark contrast to the ahistoricism of structuralist analyses of myth, such studies of political discourse found that the pervasive influence of non-indigenous political cultures had "contributed to the renewal of Indian traditions" and that "no Indian society has endured contact without exercising some sort of creative reaction" (Ramos 1988: 227). The study of indigenous political discourses challenged anthropologists "to perceive and express a holistic, undifferentiated, semantically blended universe of cross-cutting messages" and to do "an intelligent and intelligible rendering" of the social context in which this blending occurs (Ramos 1988: 229). Far from being frozen into mythic forms of discourse, the Northern Kayapó related important historical events from the mid-nineteenth century in both poetic narratives about sexual intercourse between a mythic snake and a human woman and in fully historical narratives about humanly-fashioned ritual and political events. This alternation between distinctly different mythic and historical forms of discourse was "a function of contextual factors, in this case the distance and hostility of the relationship between the speaker's group and the group that is the object of discourse"

(Turner 1988a: 207). In confrontations with national political figures, Kayapó political leaders demonstrated a similarly creative ability to switch between more mythic and more historical forms "in a dialogically sophisticated performance in which different modes and levels of consciousness are synthesized into an effective rhetorical unity" (Turner 1988a: 211).

Studies of the politics of indigeneity in Brazil continued to appear at an accelerating pace in the 1990s in the aftermath of the 1987 meeting of the Forest Peoples Alliance in Goiãna and the Kayapó-led multiethnic coalition of indigenous peoples to protest the building of a hydroelectric dam at a city called Altamira along the lower Xingu River (Turner 1991a, 1991b, 1992; Ramos 1994, 1998; Conklin and Graham 1995). At the Forest Peoples Alliance, the speech by a Xavante elder named Warodi exemplified the power of special discourse genres to reach across cultural and linguistic boundaries. In this situation, Warodi addressed an audience of about 100 journalists, professors, intellectuals, and college students who did not understand a single word of Xavante language but who nevertheless sat in rapt attention through his entire performance of traditional political oratory (also called "plaza speech" or "elders' speech," Graham 1986, 1993) due to its interesting uses of parallelism and intonational contours. "Although the referential content of Warodi's message was opaque, the aesthetic value of the acoustic performance was unmistakable" (Graham 2002: 196). Following Warodi's masterful performance, a young Xavante man named Paulo addressed the same audience and translated Warodi's speech into Portuguese but "omitted precisely the material that might have had the most symbolic value for this sympathetic audience" (Graham 2002: 196), the references to mythological beings and events that had given Warodi's speech its distinctively Xavante character. The stark contrast between the efficacy of Warodi's highly poeticized performance of elder speech and Paulo's more prosaic translation into Portuguese demonstrated with great clarity that it was the "creative blendings and blurring of discursive genres—such as myth, history, politics" (Graham 2002: 197) that were at the heart of indigenous discursive strategies for creating new alliances, both among themselves and with the larger population of non-indigenous people making up the national Brazilian society.

The film *Kayapó: Out of the Forest* (Beckham 1989) demonstrated how mythic narratives, ceremonial dancing and singing, and other discourse forms employed by Kayapó, Xavante, and other indigenous groups served as ways of expressing and recovering cultural identities in situations where these had been ignored, suppressed, or denigrated by outsiders. The use of special discourse genres was not merely a representation or story about the process of building a political alliance. Rather it was a collective singing-and dancing-into-being of an indigenous alliance in opposition to the proposed building of a hydroelectric dam on the Xingu River at Altamira in 1989 (Turner 1992; Graham 2002). What are the processes of linguistic and cultural change that unfold in such moments of history and across such massive movements between radically different regimes of value? How do indigenous discursive practices change when the purpose of performing them is no longer primarily that of connecting a community of people to ancestor spirits or other symbols of the origin of their social world but also to create, with ever-increasing urgency, new political and interpretive spaces for such sacred connections to persist in the globalizing nation-states of South America?

Another dramatic illustration of how well the Kayapó have been able to use their discursive genre of political oratory to engage with national and global power was the indigenous filmmaker Mokuka's recording of a 1991 meeting between chiefs in the village of A'ukre. "Overtly framed in traditional Kayapó political forms of oratory and conflict resolution, it was a polyphonic dialogue of different voices, including those of Kayapó and non-Kayapó others" (Turner 2002: 239). The resulting film, called *Peace Between Chiefs*, shows that indigenous leaders are capable of using the linguistic frame of traditional political

oratory to blend together indigenous and non-indigenous voices in ways that empower their local communities by actively engaging alien forms of power.[4]

As the aforementioned example of Warodi, the Xavante elder, has shown, discursive genres that are overtly musical can often be highly efficacious in interethnic situations. Such performances have 'symbolic capital' that is lacking in more prosaic discourse forms, especially when the latter are expressed in national languages rather than indigenous ones (Graham 2002). Ritual wailing is another highly musicalized discourse form found among most of the Gê-speaking peoples (Urban 1988) and in many neighboring Tupian groups, such as the Tapirapé (Wagley 1983) and Karajá (Maia 1997). Ritual wailing is a semiotically rich form of discourse which expresses, among other things, deep feelingful iconicity (Webster 2009). It is a culturally specific way of conveying personal grief and is an appropriate emotional response to specific social situations. But the cultural specificity of ritual wailing can also make it the target of misinterpretation in inter-ethnic situations. In 2011, the photo of a weeping Kayapó Chief Raoni burst into the media spotlight in the early moments of the legal stand-off between Brazil and its indigenous peoples over the building of a massive hydroelectric dam at a place called Belo Monte on the lower Xingu River. The photo later went "viral" on Facebook as the conflict dragged on and Brazil's government doubled down on its refusal to protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of its indigenous citizens. Chief Raoni's photo circulated with the caption that he cries "when he learns that brazilian [sic] president Dilma released the beginning of construction of the hydroelectric plant of Belo Monte, even after tens of thousands of letters and emails addressed to her and which were ignored as [also happened with] the more than 600,000 signatures" (Daily Kos, September 29, 2011). This caption was clearly intended as an empathetic statement of support for Chief Raoni and his people, but the real cause of his public act of crying was actually quite different. As pointed out first by Amazon Watch and published later in the Daily Kos, "he was not crying in reaction to the Brazilian government's announcement of the license to build the Belo Monte Dam. He was crying because he had reunited with a family member, a common practice among the Kayapo." The Daily Kos article attempted to close the gap between popular and anthropological interpretations of Chief Raoni's weeping by stating that "Even so, the loss these people face should make you cry because it will be devastating and it should be stopped" (Daily Kos, September 29, 2011). In this case, the political efficacy of ritual wailing was completely independent from the activity's meaning within its indigenous social context as well as from its individualistic, culture-bound mistranslation by non-indigenous observers.

The Guyana Shield Region

The Guyana Shield region of northern South America is the ancestral homeland of the Carib language family (Durbin 1973) as well as a smattering of Arawak and Tupi languages and two relatively large unclassified languages, Yanomami and Warao. The Guyana highlands form the central portion of a larger geographic region called Guayana that includes not only the three Guianas (Guyana, Suriname, and Guyane) but also adjacent areas of Venezuela south of the Orinoco and Brazil north of the Amazon. Guayana's history reflects the expansion of several colonial European states—France, England, Holland, Spain, and Portugal—competing for control over indigenous peoples and their territories.

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4   See Graham (2005) for an interesting study that reaches similar conclusions about Xavante performances of ceremonial singing and dancing for non-indigenous audiences in urban Brazil and Europe.

The Guyana highlands of the interior are often depicted as an anarchical space of wild savagery, sharply contrasting with the more culturally developed coastal floodplains and downstream river basins. To a large extent, national societies of Guayana can be understood as products of the dialectic between "the historically settled coasts and a still-unexplored or unconquered interior" (Whitehead 2009: 1). This ideological view of history as the West taming the "uncivilized" rest, or what is sometimes called the colonial mode of producing reality (Taussig 1987), continues to play itself out in regional and national politics (see e.g., Hill 1994) and finds additional justification in exoticized ethnographic depictions of "fierce people" (Chagnon 1992) leading violent lives in a remote forested heart of darkness. Lurking beneath this veneer of neo-Hobbesian anarchy, however, is a far more complex and interesting array of indigenous histories in which major linguistic and sociocultural transformations unfolded in even the most remotely situated headwater areas of Guayana.

The Watunna, an elaborate cycle of creation narratives performed in rituals among the Carib-speaking Yekuana, offers a highly poeticized vision of the arrival of Spanish-speaking European colonizers in the Upper Orinoco basin during the late eighteenth century (de Civrieux 1980; Guss 1986). The Watunna is most notable for the way in which the historical arrival of Spanish colonizers is constructed as a narrative cycle that continues the mythic struggle between forces of creation and destruction. In earlier parts of the narrative cycle, the battle between good and evil is expressed through a series of violent interactions between Wanadi, the mythic creator, and Odosha, the evil twin brother and destroyer. In later parts of the cycle, this mythical dualism is projected onto the Spanish colonizers, who are at first greeted as good, generous white people (the *Iaranavi*) but who are later defeated and replaced by zealous missionaries (*Fañuru*) who violently suppress Yekuana religious practices. Like the Yekuana themselves, the Iaranavi are regarded as children of Wanadi, whereas the Fañuru are considered to be children of Odosha.

The Yekuana occasionally narrate specific episodes of the Watunna outside of ritual contexts, but

> the best and most complete examples are those sung in the long ademi epics and the shorter, daily aichudi. The ademi, composed in a special sacred language, are performed in a type of syncopated responsive at the large collective festivals that inaugurate a new roundhouse (the Atta ademi hidi), celebrate and purify the new gardens (the Adaha ademi hidi), or welcome back a group of travelers who have been away for an extended period of time (the Wasai yadi ademi hidi). All of these chants require a full 72 hours to sing and are the occasion for the most complete and faithful rendition of the Watunna—the "story" or "tradition" of the tribe. (Guss 1986: 416–17)

The aichudi are small, personal rituals more akin to magical spells through which individuals use lists of powerful spirit-names to detoxify or cleanse foods and other everyday objects and substances. The Yekuana regard both ademi and aichudi to be important parts of the Watunna creation cycle.

The Watunna provides insight into how an indigenous people living in the Upper Orinoco basin have used a restricted genre of ritually powerful discourse to remember the lessons of colonial history and to imbue those historical events with cosmological meanings and social values. The Watunna is not only performed in a special ritual language; it also recapitulates historical events from the eighteenth century through a series of highly

condensed mythopoetic images that juxtapose indigenous ritual power with the Spaniards' alien forms of military, political, and religious authority.[5]

When the Spanish first arrived in Yekuana territory in the 1760s, they bribed the Yekuana with lavish gifts of steel tools, firearms, and other trade goods. In response, the Yekuana helped the Spaniards to set up mission settlements and forts at key locations. However, the Yekuana were not prepared for what was to come next, as the Spanish began suppressing their ritual practices and forcing them to work on the building of a series of forts that would connect the lower and upper Orinoco basins via an overland trail. Faced with conditions of genocidal enslavement and fanatical missionization, the Yekuana organized a multi-ethnic coalition of indigenous groups who succeeded in driving the Spaniards out of their territory. Yekuana story-tellers compress this complex act of resistance into the supernaturally powerful figure of Mahaiwadi, a great shaman who shape-shifts into an anaconda and a jaguar and who drives the Spanish out of Yekuana territory.

Wanadi, the mythic creator, was preparing to leave this world of ceaseless bloodshed in the hands of Odosha's Spaniards, promising to return from heaven when Odosha died. However, Wanadi did not want to leave his people without any defenses, so he created a heavenly city called Amenadiña, the Dutch trading center at the mouth of the Essequibo River.

> *Wanadi went to the edge of the Earth, to the shore of the sea, to find Hurunko [the Dutch] and his village, Amenadiña. Hurunko was wise and powerful. He was a good man. Odosha hadn't come to his village. … "Good," Wanadi answered. "You're good. You did what I asked. You told the truth. The 'Doer,' that's what they'll call you now. Now I'll pay you." … Wanadi went to his house in the Sky, in the North, on the other side of the sea. He got shotguns, hooks, machetes, knives, shirts. He brought it all back and gave it to Hurunko. Then he started walking again. He made more houses. He made the other tribes. He made the Piaroa, the Maku, the Yabarana, the Warekena, the Haniwa, the Makushi. He made them all. He made lots of people to fight Odosha and his Fañuru. Then he said: "Okay. I'm going to leave the Earth now. I'm going to go back to Heaven. I'm going to say goodbye to my people." (de Civrieux 1980: 160)*

Wanadi's final act of mythic protection, the creation of Saliban, Arawakan, and other indigenous peoples to help fight Odosha and the Spaniards, offers a poetic vision of a profound historical truth. The Yekuana-led uprising of 1776 created a social barrier that gave indigenous peoples of the upper Orinoco and Negro rivers a chance to survive Spanish colonialism in the late eighteenth century. And conversely, the formation of a multi-ethnic alliance with relatively large Arawak-speaking groups along the Casiquiare and Negro rivers to the south allowed the Yekuana a pathway for safely conducting long-distance trade for steel tools and firearms by traveling southward into Brazil before turning east and north up into the Branco and Essequibo rivers to reach the Dutch trading post at Amenadiña. Even though the Yekuana had defeated the Spanish in 1776, they still needed firearms to continue defending themselves against the Spanish living in colonial settlements in downstream areas to the northwest and against their Yanomami neighbors along the upper Orinoco to their south and east.

These Yekuana stories offer a rare instance of how an indigenous people of the Guyana Shield region interpreted the events of early European contact in terms of a mythic polarization between Wanadi and Odosha, or creative and destructive spiritual powers.

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5   Elsewhere I have written in greater detail about the historical significance of the Watunna (Hill 1999).

Like other indigenous peoples of the late eighteenth century, the Yekuana were caught between their admiration for the material possessions and military strength of the Spanish and their contempt for the coercive and cruel behaviors that revealed the Spanish to be destroyers of life and autonomy.

While the Yekuana-led uprising of 1776 ushered in a century-long period of relative autonomy from Spanish colonialism and Venezuelan nationalism, Carib-speaking peoples living in interior regions of Guyana suffered increasingly harsh forms of exploitation in the course of the nineteenth century. British colonial administrators had abruptly terminated the Dutch system of postholders that had given the Akawaio, Makushi, and other groups access to firearms and other trade goods in exchange for their political allegiance, and by mid-century Anglican missionaries were actively converting many indigenous leaders to Christianity. At the same time, Brazilian slave traders captured entire villages and took them to work as unpaid laborers in agricultural settlements along the Rio Branco (Staats 1996). The indigenous religion known as Alleluia emerged in this historical context of mid-nineteenth-century revitalization movements among Akawaio and Makushi of the Guyanese interior.[6] By the early twentieth century, Alleluia practices had developed under the influence of powerful religious prophets and spread among many indigenous communities of Roraima and the Guyana highlands.

> *Native Guyanese felt that white priests were hiding the spiritual sources of wealth and power and so they borrowed elements of Anglican teachings to construct a religion that permitted them immediate access to Christian spirits Kad, Jises Kurai, and Ori Got among others. They used shamanic techniques of spirit flight to visit heaven in dreams and in visions and learned eremu (hymns) and spoken verses such as esegungang (prayer) and maiyin (memory verses). (Staats, n.d.: 2).*

In 1985, the Guyana Council of Churches granted official status to the Alleluia churches, allowing indigenous leaders to conduct legally recognized baptisms and marriages.

All three genres of Alleluia ritual discourse—hymns, prayers, and memory verses—have detailed historical genealogies that identify the original prophet-composer as well as the pathways of intercommunity exchange across linguistic and cultural communities throughout the region. A basic principle governing such historical transmission of musical genres and verses is that the discourses must only be performed in their original language in order to remain powerful.[7] Hymns (*eremu*) are of course the most clearly musical of the three ritual genres in Alleluia, and they are the only genre in which performers employ second person pronouns as ways of instantiating the close personal relations between the singers and the names of spirits being addressed. *Maiyin*, or memory verses, share with hymns the underlying chiasmatic structure of returning to the original point of departure. Although memory verses are not as obviously musical as hymns, the verses move in progressions across increasingly powerful categories of spirits and are performed in a call-and-response style with a steadily accelerating tempo.

In contrast to hymns, memory verses do not contain second-person pronouns but consist of taxonomic listings of substances and spirits that people use or have contact with in everyday contexts or that they hope to receive at the end of time. Memory verses move across an increasingly dynamic and powerful set of categories, beginning with a group of natural animals and plants that form the basis of subsistence in the Guyanese

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6   See Butt Colson (1985, 1998) and Staats (1996, n.d.) for more complete descriptions of Alleluia history and current practices.

7   As Staats explains, "There is, for example, a legend in which the first Akawaio prophet, Abel, explains that songs cannot be translated from one language to another in performance" (n.d.: 2).

rain forests and ending in a heavenly geography of sacred places. The overall progression goes: (1) natural sources of food, (2) indigenous cultural artifacts, (3) manufactured trade goods, (4) human agents with sacred power, and (5) heavenly places. The first two categories can be taken together as a pair of spirit-beings that embodies a transformation of natural into cultural being. Categories three and four make a similar pairing that outlines a transformation from mythic power (i.e., the overdetermined significance of trade goods as cargo for the end of time) to historical agency (i.e., the creative power of religious prophet-composers). Finally, the fifth category of heavenly places stands alone as a transformation of the present world of life, sickness, evil, and death into a future world of immortality, perfection, abundance, and purity. At a general level, the dynamic movement across categories of spirit-names in the memory verses can be interpreted as an indigenous construction of historical engagement with the objects and agents of colonial and national power.

Another highly important feature of memory verses is the belief that the categories of spirit-names "are the words they will need to know in heaven. … Everyone expects to communicate in heaven using these words, but no one yet knows what the corresponding meanings will be" (Staats n.d.: 6). Semantic, or referential, meanings will not carry across to the millennium on the other side of time. Instead, the words as forms or sound images will persist to the end of time. Perhaps with the slate wiped clear of existing meanings, these sacred linguistic and musical forms will be free to start over again by taking on new meanings. The millennium, or heaven will be a place in which new worlds of meaning will be constructed from the ashes, or empty linguistic and cultural forms, of the present world.

The memory verses are thus an indigenous model for constructing history that allows for the persistence of highly specific linguistic and cultural forms through embracing radical changes in the realm of signification. In this regard, memory verses are like mythic histories of the Yekuana and other indigenous Amazonian peoples: they are specialized, musically performed genres of ritual discourse that open up new spaces for meaning construction even as they reproduce received linguistic and cultural forms (see Hill 1988 for various Amazonian and Andean examples). At the same time, this re-opening of meaning construction creates not only new interpretive spaces for revitalizing indigenous communities but also new political-historical spaces for indigenous communities to move forward, toward the end of time, within the broader context of globalizing national states.

The historical development of interethnic relations between indigenous peoples and expanding nation-states of South America has prompted the invention of hybrid discourses that blend culturally specific meanings with language and concepts familiar to Western audiences. Indigenous leaders have met this need by creating new communicative practices that simultaneously speak to the cosmological knowledge of native speakers and to the political categories of Western political discourse. At a time in their history when the Yanomami had recently suffered the massacre of an entire village at the hands of illegal gold miners, the Yanomami leader, Davi Kopenawa Yanomami, demonstrated a reflexive awareness of this dual communicative competence in an interview with Terence Turner:

> *"I like to explain these things to the whites, so that they may know. … This sacred place, the high mountains, the beautiful mountains, are places of spirit [emphasis added]. Now 'spirit' (espirito) is not a word in my language. I have learned this word spirit and use it in the mixed language I have invented [to talk to whites about these things], but my own indigenous word is hekurabe; [also] saboribe [literally, 'old gardens']. These are the spirits of shamans (shabori) who live in the mountains."* (Turner and Kopenawa Yanomami 1991: 63) (quoted in Graham 2002: 204)

This double articulation of cosmological and interethnic competence (Albert 2000) shows how a new hybrid discourse can draw upon different universes of cultural experience by weaving the Western concept of "spirit" together with highly poeticized themes that are culturally specific to the Yanomami.

Napoleon Chagnon, an American anthropologist who has done ethnographic fieldwork with the Yanomami of Venezuela, has publicly criticized Davi Kopenawa as nothing more than a parrot for NGO agents. "When I read his [Davi's] proclamations, I am moved—but I am also sure that someone from our culture wrote them" (Chagnon 1992: 276). As Graham (2002: 184) has observed, Chagnon's criticisms reflect a specifically Western language ideology (e.g., the naturalness of monolingualism). Moreover, Chagnon's criticisms demonstrate a profoundly inaccurate underestimation of indigenous linguistic and cultural creativity in the face of horrific violations of their human rights.

These accusations of parroted speech miss the point of the agentive quality of these new forms of political oratory and the incorporation of new themes and topics in indigenous narratives. Among the Warao of the Orinoco Delta there are clear examples of a double articulation in their narrative traditions in which Warao language ideologies transpire to explain their interethnic situation. These ideological and semiotic processes link Warao discursive forms with the rest of the Guyanas. It is important to note here that from the point of view of language typology and historical linguistics both Warao and Yanomami languages are seen as isolates in this area. However, if we pay attention to the way in which the Warao incorporate historical processes into their discursive practices we can see common trends with the Yanomami, Yekuana, Makushi, and other indigenous peoples of this area.

Take for example the narrative explanation of the origin of foreign commodities recorded by Briggs (2000) and analyzed in Rodriguez (2008). In this narrative the Warao explain their economic inequality vis-à-vis the *criollo* population as the product of a mistranslation. In the story about the emergence of non-indigenous peoples the first Waraos are presented with the opportunity to have everything in abundance—horses, cows, houses. But they relied on a parrot that understood Spanish and English. They are offered everything that the criollos will have in the future but the parrot mistranslates the offer. The Warao are then stuck with the meager possessions that they currently have. They are cheated in the process of dealing with a people whose language they do not understand. Thus, since the beginning, inequality has been the product of failing to master the language and symbols of the Western world. Later in this narrative recorded by Briggs the narrator explains that nowadays there is a linguistic shift from Warao to Spanish and that is how the Warao have managed to deal with historical transformations and the emergence of economic inequality.

The incorporation of themes such as economic inequality and the use of narratives to produce meta-pragmatic commentaries about language use and language shift is something that the Warao have in common with other indigenous peoples of the Guyana Shield. At this level, the common experience of colonial and modern historical subjugation has fueled the need to produce similar symbolic and discursive responses in the area. These hybrid communicative practices indicate that in spite of the typological and genetic differences among the Warao and the predominantly Carib and Arawak languages of the Guyanas, the Warao have resorted to discursive mechanisms that are widespread in the area. Here the process of language-in-change overrides the process of language change to produce similar semiotic strategies where there is no clear common ancestry in the linguistic code.

Discourse Genres and Language Histories

The study of traditional discourse genres such as the ones outlined in this chapter draws our attention to the permeability of boundaries separating indigenous languages in Amazonia. In many regions of Lowland South America, anthropologists have documented the ease with which traditional forms of discourse move across language barriers in ways that preserve or enhance linguistic distinctiveness even as they result in formally homologous communicative practices. In the Upper Xingu region of Brazil, for example, we find nearly identical complexes of male-controlled sacred flute music and women's ritual singing among the Arawak-speaking Waura (Piedade 2004, 2011, 2013; Mello 2005, 2011) and the Carib-speaking Kuikuru (Franchetto and Montagnani 2012; Montagnani 2011). Although Waura and Kuikuru communities have developed these ritual complexes in linguistically and culturally distinct ways, they have synthesized these masculine and feminine forms of lexical-musical creativity into virtually identical overall patterns of collectively enacting the powerful beings of myth. The Upper Xingu demonstrates how ritual communication is better understood as a process that simultaneously supports external linguistic differences within multilingual discursive areas (Basso 2009, 2011) and complex internal differentiation with deep historical roots (Gumperz 1996). In the case of the Upper Xingu, the arrival of Carib- and Tupi-speaking groups during the late colonial period (Basso 1995; Heckenberger 2005) means that these processes of intercultural relatedness have been unfolding over a period of approximately two-and-a-half centuries.

In other areas, such as Northwestern Amazonia, ethnographers working in a variety of different linguistic settings have documented how closely related genres of personal drinking songs, or sung dialogues performed by pairs of men and/or women, have flourished in communities affiliated with Arawak (Hill 1983, 1987; Journet 2000), Tukano (Chernela 1993, 2003; Hosemann 2013), Saliba (Girón 2005), and Makú (Epps 2008) families. These parallel traditions of ceremonial drinking songs are centrally important features of social interaction in contexts of intercommunal feasting between groups that are either actual or potential affines. The use of these musical, dialogical speech genres in such widely divergent linguistic settings suggests that they form part of a regional discourse area (Hosemann 2013) that most likely has deep historical roots dating back well before the arrival of expanding Portuguese, Dutch, and Spanish empires into the lowlands of northern South America in the sixteenth century. The fact that a single discourse genre, or a set of closely related musical and dialogical speech genres, is performed in a variety of languages from at least four different families once again supports Basso's argument (2011: 156) that researchers need to focus on multicultural social networks rather than culturally homogenous sodalities and to recognize that multilingual discursive areas are more useful in approaching indigenous Amazonian linguistic diversity than an assumption of monolingualism.

Our focus on discursive genres that cut across linguistic boundaries raises significant questions about classifications of indigenous Amazonian languages based on lexical and other formal features. The arrangement of languages into groupings, or "families," can provide extremely valuable new information and insights about the long-term historical relatedness of indigenous languages. However, it is important to cultivate a critical reflexive awareness of the historical roots of such Western scientific concepts as "language family," the use of which historically coincided with the political subjugation of New World and other non-European peoples and with the Enlightenment project of rationalist social theories. The very notion of "family" is based on a metaphor of biological relatedness[8] that

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8   In Linnaean taxonomy, "family" is the level between order and genus. For humans, "family" is hominid and occupies the space between the primate order and the genus Homo. In any case,

tends to place emphasis on exclusivity, fixity, and boundedness and to shift attention away from inclusivity, fluidity, and historical engagement across language differences.

The role of language documentation and classification as tools for political subjugation cannot be overestimated, and they have continued in that historical role throughout the modern period of nation-state expansion in Latin America. To say that "the work of dealing with linguistic diversity was left to missionaries" may sound like a relic from some distant colonial era, but it is just as accurate for the use of SIL and other foreign missionaries as surrogates of state power as recently as the late twentieth century struggles between Cold War superpowers (Hill 1994). It is no mere coincidence that modern linguistic classifications of indigenous Amazonia emphasized the splitting of languages rather than their lumping into broader groupings and that these classifications resulted in spatializations, or mappings of discrete languages into specific geographic territories. As we pointed out in an introductory section of this chapter, such essentialized mappings of linguo-geographic space gave archaeologists and ethnologists free rein to interpret these spatial patterns in terms of migrations of language groups and for constructing hypothetical correlations among material cultures, language families, and other sociocultural practices. Recent collaborative efforts among archaeologists, linguists, historians, and ethnologists have attempted to probe into the possible correlations between linguistic affiliations and sociocultural practices in ways that avoid the essentializing and spatializing of such correlations and that rigorously embrace both reflexive awareness of power relations inherent in the construction of scientific knowledge and the central importance of studying and comparing language histories (Hill and Santos-Granero 2002). There is an emerging consensus among South Americanists that the massive geographic distribution of Arawak-speaking language groups is better understood as the result of processes of long-distance trade that unfolded over many centuries through multilingual discursive areas and interregional (diasporic) social networks rather than demic migrations of groups of Arawak-speaking peoples across an empty landscape (Heckenberger 2002; Hornborg 2005; Hornborg and Hill 2011a). Adherences among material cultures, language families, and other markers of ethnicity can be discerned in archaeological, linguistic, and ethnohistorical records, but it cannot be assumed that such correlations are inevitable or unchanging. A more nuanced, historically dynamic perspective "suggests that language affiliation and material culture tend to stick together, not because there is any sticky glue involved but because both are transmitted over similar channels. Depending on circumstances, this 'null' condition may be reinforced, actively resisted, or casually ignored" (DeBoer 2011: 95).

The critical, historical approach to linguistic diversity we are proposing in this chapter acknowledges the importance of language typologies based on lexical or other formal properties but seeks to place such typological studies into a broader comparative model of language histories. From the outset, this new understanding of languages-in-change must deal with the fact that external differentiation *between* languages cannot be understood in isolation from internal differentiation of discursive genres *within* languages. As we have demonstrated in this chapter, internal differentiation of specialized discourse genres within languages plays a key role in the long-term historical persistence of multilingual discursive networks. The latter can take the form of relatively small regions, such as the neighboring language groups living in the Upper Xingu region of Brazil, or much larger, macro-regional networks of long-distance trade, such as the entire northwestern region of Amazonia or the vast span of rivers connecting the Upper Orinoco to the Guyanese coast. In Figure 16.1, we have diagrammed one possible way of visualizing the language histories approach to multilingual discursive areas in Lowland South America.

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a metaphorical extension of this biological typology into the realm of language differences implies profound evolutionary differences between languages placed into different families.

The diversity of specialized discourse genres within languages acts as a source of creativity and resilience that has allowed indigenous South American peoples to historically engage with both indigenous and non-indigenous political communities throughout the colonial period and on up to the present day. Conversely, the loss of specialized discourse genres and traditional forms goes hand-in-hand with the loss of indigenous languages due to language shift. Once languages lose their internal diversity and richness, they risk becoming mere tools or instruments for everyday survival rather than arenas for creative expression, performance, and historical interaction across linguistic differences. Indigenous communities can recover at least some of the internal diversity of their languages if they choose to do so. Collaborative research based on the method of attending to the indigenous experience of verbal artistry (McDowell 2000) can play an important role in sparking local interest and producing resources for grassroots efforts at cultural recovery. The Arawak-speaking Wakuénai of Venezuela, for example, have recently gained access to the internet and were able to download three entire collections of ritual speeches, musical performances, and narrative discourses from the Archives of Indigenous Languages of Latin America (Hill 2008). These digitally archived recordings were based on analogue reel-to-reel and cassette tape recordings from fieldwork in the early-to-mid 1980s when the last generation of non-literate ritual specialists and story-tellers was still actively practicing their verbal and musical arts in the Upper Rio Negro region of Venezuela. Such efforts to rekindle components of oral traditions must be understood as a process of authentically remaking traditional discourse genres rather than "a wholly new genesis, a made-up identity, a postmodernist 'simulacrum'" (Clifford 2004: 20).

Language Histories

DL = Daughter language

ML = Multilingual areas

DV = Dialect varieties

CP = Communicative practices

SSDG = Shared specialized discourse genres

Figure 16.1   Visualization of the language histories approach to multilingual discursive areas in Lowland South America

Concluding Thoughts: "Then He Started Walking Again"

The language-in-change processes that we have discussed in this chapter cut across a diversity of indigenous language families and geographic regions of Lowland South America, and they span two-and-a-half centuries of interethnic relations between indigenous peoples and expanding colonial and national states in South America. Whether communicative practices of this kind will thrive or perish depends upon changing structures and epistemologies of power as well as the historical contingencies in which indigenous peoples are enmeshed. Documentation and comparison of these language-in-change processes requires a three-dimensional focus on (1) changes happening in languages as semiotic systems, (2) broader social and cultural changes related to historical and ideological processes, and (3) the complex interconnections between these two types of change. Comparative analysis of language-in-change processes is crucial for understanding how indigenous groups creatively respond to the challenges of their political reality, whether it be in the context of current hydroelectric dam-building that threatens to literally submerge one of the most linguistically and culturally diverse regions of the world or in the enslavement of the Yekuana's historical ancestors in the eighteenth century.

"Then he [Wanadi] started walking again" (de Civrieux 1980: 160). In this highly condensed mythopoetic imagery, the Yekuana interpret the profound historical shift taking place as the colonial world ruled by Spanish priests and soldiers began to collapse. In its place, Wanadi created a new world of trade relations with the Dutch and alliances with indigenous peoples living to the south and east. "He made the other tribes. He made them all. … He made lots of people to fight Odosha and the Fañuru" (de Civrieux 1980: 160). Just as the Watunna is ritually sung today in long *ademi* epics, performances of ritually powerful singing and ceremonial speaking must also have been prominent features of the Yekuana's historical ancestors' ability to "start walking again" by allying themselves with neighboring indigenous peoples to overthrow the brutal tyranny of Spanish colonialism.

The use of mythopoetic forms and ritual singing in Yekuana historical discourse is only one of many examples showing how indigenous peoples of Lowland South America have constructed culturally specific ways of remembering the past (see Hill 1988). What these mythic histories have in common is a concern for representing alien forms of power—military, political, economic, and religious—that threaten the persistence of local communities. To the extent that these outside forces have become internalized into social consciousness at the local level, indigenous leaders must engage them by developing communicative practices that explain how such alien forces are to be expelled, contained, reinterpreted, or otherwise socialized in ways that accord with local cultural values (Turner 1988b; Hill and Wright 1988). The language-in-change process at work here is one of attending to both the form and content of discourse in order to create meaningful historical interpretations by and for indigenous peoples, resulting in hybrid discourse genres that blend the clarity of mythopoetic imagery with the fuzziness of historical contingency.

The interconnections between changing communicative practices and broader social and historical changes have become even more complex and fluid in recent decades as traditional discourse genres have grown increasingly important to the ways that indigenous leaders seek to recruit the help of powerful non-indigenous allies. As Graham (2002) and others (Conklin 1997; Ramos 1994, 1998; Oakdale 2004) have argued, discursive genres that are highly poeticized and musical can be quite effective at gaining the attention of non-indigenous audiences because they can index Indian identity. The case of Chief Raoni's welcome of tears shows how quickly and globally this process of false objectification can play out, even if the traditional meanings of ritual wailing were mistranslated into the political meanings of current events. With the rise of new media comes heightened dangers

of misrepresentation, essentialized or romanticized depictions of indigenous identities, and what Ramos (1998) has referred to as "hyperreal Indians" who make themselves look and act in ways that conform to non-indigenous images and ideals. But if the hyperreal Indian is a construct that has little to do with the actual lived experiences of indigenous peoples, it is equally the case that "these very interactions—in national and international arenas—are increasingly part of native Amazonians' lived experience" (Graham 2002: 210).

The same new media and other technologies can just as easily lead to new forms of indigenous self-representation that creatively translate between different cultural worldviews. Davi Kopenawa, for example, skillfully and deliberately used key terms and concepts, such as "spirit," to communicate Yanomami cultural beliefs to non-indigenous audiences. Or Mokuka, the indigenous film-maker who made a video of peace-making between two Kayapó chiefs (Turner 2002), demonstrated how the adoption and reinterpretation of new media techniques can support forms of communal politics that are deeply rooted in traditional political oratory and ritual while at the same time capturing the attention of a broader, non-indigenous audience. Such cases demonstrate the sheer complexity embodied in contemporary politics of indigenous identities and language-in-change processes that rely heavily upon the symbolic capital of traditional forms. Discourse genres and styles are not automatically or intrinsically linked to meanings but are contingent upon social action situated in the time and space of local communities, relations among diverse indigenous communities and language groups, and relations with nation-states, NGOs, and other non-indigenous entities. Anthropologists who are studying these complex communicative practices need to be aware of the potential dangers of cultural essentialism, yet they must also keep an open mind about the ability of indigenous peoples to successfully navigate these new historical conditions. Perhaps like Wanadi, the Yekuana mythic creator, indigenous peoples of Lowland South America have begun learning how to use new media technologies so that they can "start walking again."

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Indigenous Knowledge

Paul Sillitoe

On the face of it, indigenous knowledge (IK) in development should call to anthropology, as an area where the discipline may have relevance and influence outside academia. Development is one of those fields where those trained in anthropology should see a clear application of their knowledge, particularly with the emergence of participatory approaches. Yet strangely enough this is not so, with the IK initiative flagging instead of burgeoning. This contribution to the *Ashgate Research Companion to Anthropology* asks why this should be so, and explores the current status of IK research. The chapter gives a brief overview of IK work, which seeks a place for local cultural heritage in development contexts. The rationale is that people's understandings and views should feature in any interventions that impinge on their lives. This work seeks to promote development activities to better fit with local aspirations than top-down impositions, such that they may prove appropriate and thus sustainable. Why is this view not more widely accepted? An avenue explored here is that politically correct (PC) concerns may be inhibiting the up-take of IK research opportunities. For instance, the interfacing with capitalist informed development (as an activity generally concerned with improving material standards of living and demanding economic growth) may imply that people treat their cultural inheritance differently, for example as a commodity. This may open the way to unwarranted exploitation of their cultural heritage and takes us onto politically contentious issues. The associated process of globalization is throwing up various contradictions. For instance, some members of local communities think that IK or local traditions should serve as models of development, some even reinventing traditions in the context of their contemporary understandings of previous ways, whereas others are more concerned to achieve higher material standards of living, thinking that the capitalist model offers the best route. Consequently, while some persons think of IK as something that they need to maintain, even preserve, to guide future development, others think of it as either a barrier to change or a resource that may be exploited to access the market and its products. Researchers consequently find themselves in an ambiguous moral position. On the other hand, it is possible that other ways of being in the world allow populations to resist the capitalist political-economic agenda, with a different view of knowledge and its application. Indeed it is arguable that such alternative cultural perspectives may offer us a way forwards, particularly with the current "crisis of capitalism." This may further recommend anthropology to the public, drawing attention to one of the subject's central tenets, namely that we have something to learn from other cultural traditions; it is certainly not all one way as economic development suggests.

When the editors of this volume asked me to contribute a chapter on indigenous knowledge, commonly abbreviated in development contexts to the ubiquitous IK acronym, my initial reaction was to decline. Why? The IK initiative is flagging, as I have previously observed (Sillitoe 2010a; Sillitoe and Marzano 2009), and it seemed unwarranted to comment

on something that, to my perplexity, has faltered. I am puzzled because I thought that the emergence of interest in IK in development contexts in the late twentieth century signaled an unparalleled opportunity for socio-cultural anthropology, which I predicted the discipline would seize on, particularly with the increasing political pressures on universities to demonstrate the relevance of their activities (such as the "impact" component in the UK's latest Research Excellence Framework (REF 2012) assessment of university research).

After some further thought I decided that the invitation offered an opportunity to reflect on the current arrested state of IK research, which I shall frame around concerns about politically correct (PC) issues, which have emerged in tandem with postmodernism and its bother with subjectivity. These warn about political naivety and remonstrate with us to mind our Ps and Qs, which arguably inhibits frank discussion. The PC lobby advocates language, attitudes and behavior that seek to minimize distorted views, even prejudice, particularly when referring to politically sensitive issues such as gender, race, occupation, age, religion and ethnicity, by promoting alternatives that represent more positive qualities, although excessive application of its philosophy, such as referring to "failure" as "deficiency achievement," has given it ironic connotations and led to humorous parodies, such as calling a "bald" person "follicularly challenged" (Bruce 2001; Hughes 2010).

Duck or Rabbit: IK or Science

Indigenous knowledge research promotes the inclusion of local views of the environment, livelihoods, health and illness, social behavior, and so on, in the development process (Antweiler 1998; Purcell 1998; Sillitoe 1998; Briggs 2005). It does so, on the grounds that development needs to jive with local values, needs, and aspirations, to comply with what people already understand about the world, which is rooted in local circumstances, critically shaped by cultural and historical context. IK is the heritage of everyday life, based on experience, often tested over generations. It is the stuff of anthropology. Adapted to local conditions and focusing on provincial interests and concerns, it is often communicated in foreign idioms, which we understand to varying extents. It includes all knowledge held more or less collectively by a population that informs understanding of things. While not replicating one another's knowledge, persons of the same cultural background share an indeterminate amount, having a common history, language, values, and so on. Although it is more widely shared generally than specialized scientific knowledge, no one person or social group knows it all. Its distribution is uneven (often according to gender, age, etc.). It has a range of sources and is subject to continual revision in the light of information received from elsewhere; it is a dynamic mix of past "tradition" and present invention with a view to the future, yet it maintains its distinctive character (Sillitoe et al. 2005: 3–7; Johnson 2012).

In development contexts, IK research involves the interfacing of local knowledge and practices with the interventions planned by development agencies, whether international, national, or NGO, which are frequently informed by outside science and technology. It does so in the spirit of the song in the Disney film *Pocahontas* that points out: "if you walk the footsteps of a stranger. You'll learn things you never knew you never knew," which will indubitably lead to more relevant development initiatives that are more likely successful. A project among the Bhils tribal people, who live in a semi-arid area of southern Rajasthan (India) that comprises eroded low hills, illustrates how failure to consult the local population—not trying to walk in their footsteps, however imperfectly—may lead to inappropriate action based on inapposite knowledge and assumptions (Stocking 1996). A government agency paid local people a subsidy to build earth bunds across the denuded

hillsides to catch silt run-off and to wall in areas to protect them from over grazing, actions that make sound sense from a soil science perspective. People built the earth embankments in return for the payment, in a region where wage labor opportunities are scarce, whereas left to their own devices they would not bother; some even dismantled the bunds subsequently in anticipation of the project paying them again to build them. Why? The traditional land management strategy is to erect barriers across the valleys so as to catch the soil that erodes from the hills, which ensures replenishment of valley bottom cultivations with new arable soil, maintaining their productivity. In terms of labor input and food returns, this is a sounder way to manage resources than working hard to enclose hill slopes for some trifling grazing returns for livestock.

The Bhils episode indicates that IK research demands a commitment to interdisciplinarity (Sillitoe 2004), which probably contributes in part to its faltering progress. During an interview for a university post, someone on the panel (who seemed insecure in his disciplinary background) asked me "isn't anthropology enough?" I replied "no," which probably contributed in part to me not getting the position. It is invaluable, I argued, to have some knowledge of the field informing interventions, be it medicine, agriculture, engineering, or whatever. Here is the source of a PC misapprehension that causes problems. The implication is not, as my interviewer assumed, that we seek to translate IK of farming or health into that of agriculture or medicine, devaluing it in all probability in the process. It is to acknowledge the central part such applied disciplines play, without which there would be no development. In-depth understanding of them furthers interfacing with local knowledge. While arguing for a place for local knowledge and practices, we should not overlook—PC anxious to avoid IK's devaluation—how natural science underpins unprecedented technological advances by humanity and that many people in the world desire to share in the resulting increase in material standards of living.

It is equally unwise for scientists to do the reverse of such anthropologists and deny the validity of IK in development contexts, as it can breed defiant localism, even conflict if those in power undervalue local place-centered knowledge. While IK is more circumscribed than scientific knowledge, it often matches and sometimes betters science-based understandings of, for instance, land use. We have many examples of the soundness of local science and practices, and the need to respect them—some previously considered "primitive" and in need of change. It is increasingly realized, for example, that local knowledge of natural resources is an integral aspect of any environment; notably in biodiversity management and conservation, where its demise may be as damaging as the loss of species (Posey 1999; Knight 2000; Anderson and Berglund 2003).

In IK work we seek to further understanding in both directions of the others' views, and so illuminate the implications for any development interventions. The duck-rabbit image of Jastrow (1900: 312), made famous in Wittgenstein's (1958: 194e) discussion of "seeing," illustrates the point (Figure 17.1).[1] To ask: "What do you see, a duck or a rabbit, and which view is 'correct?'" is wrongheaded. What you see may depend on what you are familiar with: if you are not acquainted with rabbits, for instance, you will see a duck. If you can see alternately a rabbit and then a duck, you are aware of two different aspects of the image. This is what we seek to promote in IK research, in advocating competence in scientific-technical domains that inform development interventions *harnessed* to anthropological awareness.

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1   While Wittgenstein acknowledges Jastrow (1900: 312) as the source of the image, Jastrow took it from a picture published in *Harper's Weekly* (November 19, 1892, p. 1114), which in turn came from a cartoon published in *Fliegende Blätter* (October 23, 1892, p. 147), a humor magazine published in Munich. It is probable that Wittgenstein's (1958:194e) simple duck-rabbit line drawing is seen more often than the Victorian lithograph because it is easy to reproduce.

Figure 17.1   The duck-rabbit
Source: Lithograph image from Jastrow 1900: 312.

The duck-rabbit image captures the spirit of such work and its ambiguity, where we are trying to get local and scientific understandings, which represent different views of the same world, to match up in some way, or put another way, to complement one another. Many local communities do this for themselves, showing the inadequacy of portraying IK as in opposition to scientific knowledge, rather than seeing it interacting to yield hybrid and multifaceted knowledge. In this view, IK is "a mix of scientific and practical knowledge, being site specific and often involving a belief component" (Olsson and Folke 2001: 87). People assimilate relevant aspects of scientific knowledge, adapting new information coming from without and also generated within (Dove 2000; Thomas and Twyman 2004; Reed et al. 2007; Mercer et al. 2010).

The gnomic duck-rabbit comments of Wittgenstein—which pick up on Jastrow's use of the image in arguing that stimuli alone are not responsible for perception but also mental activity, seeing involving both the eye and the mind—further question any privileging of science that worries some critics (Agrawal 1995, 1999; Jacobson and Stephens 2009). If we are unaware that there are two ways to view the image and see only a duck, we may *report* "I see *that's* a duck," whereas if we can see both, we may *interpret* the image "I see it *as* a duck." In the first instance, oblivious to alternatives, we just see the duck without any call for inference, which is how we regularly perceive familiar things. But in the second, the process is ambiguous, are we making different *interpretations* of the same thing when we see the image *as* either a duck or a rabbit or are we *seeing* different aspects, that is do we "see" a duck and then a rabbit (Denneson 2011)? In the commonsense view that the duck-rabbit is one picture amenable to two interpretations, we nonetheless experience seeing two different images. And we cannot see both at the same time, only the duck or the rabbit, which is to see them *as* something, distinguishing between the unconscious act of seeing and the conscious one of interpreting.

When seeing—a duck for instance—there is no call for verification, we just accept what our visual sense tells us. It features tacit understandings that are prominent in everyday life,

which are notoriously difficult to access "for our talk *passes them by*" (Wittgenstein 1980: 17e)—we do not routinely say "it is a duck because it has a beak, a duck shaped head and beady eye, like a bird seen on a pond etc." It signals the limits of scientific understanding that some fear may trump IK. Biological science, for instance, may give an account of the physiological processes that occur in vision—such as the structure of eyes and nerves, electrical activity in different brain regions, chemicals released in stimulating synapses, and so on—and track perceptual neural networks that feature different activity states when we see something ambiguous such as the duck-rabbit image (only one such activity state informing conscious experience at any time, either the duck or the rabbit aspect). But it cannot penetrate the experience of seeing the image as a duck and a rabbit, what it is to interpret, understand, or believe. This relates to Wittgenstein's warning about scientism, presupposing that we can reduce sensory and mental experiences entirely to physical processes.

The Tacit Limits

The prominence of tacit knowledge in our understanding of and interactions in the world relates to a major challenge, as much local knowledge and practices of interest in development contexts is tacit. The social sciences generally are contending increasingly with the issue of tacit understanding, which is internalized knowing informed by personal experience and intuition (Polanyi 1958; Wagner and Sternberg, 1985, 1986; Collins 2001). It relates to things that we know how to do without consciously being aware of what we know, acting without having to think about our actions. We all behave in this way, drawing on bodily-acquired skills and culturally-mediated social experience of which we have no clear awareness, engaging daily in many acts that we are not focally aware of, which are informed by such taken-for-granted presuppositions—how many of you deliberated over your behavior in picking up and opening this book? The issues are phenomenological, actors drawing on embodied dispositions and practices in appropriate contexts, their interaction informed by direct experience and behavioral cues inculcated via social relationships.

Tacit awareness is predicated on socially formed expectations that are so embedded in our psyches that we assume them questioningly (Bourdieu 1977: 27), unless something brings them to our attention, such as PC criticism of attitudes. We pass on such socio-culturally imbued values largely unconsciously from one generation to another such that they incline us to behave in ways predictable to other actors (Collins 2001: 110–11), what Wittgenstein referred to as "following a rule" (Gerrans 2005: 55). While we collectively pressure one another to conform to such value-laden rights and responsibilities, this does not so constrain behavior as to rule out maneuvering by actors for perceived advantage, personally and for associates. And variation in actors' emotional responses adds to the fickleness of human behavior. Individual experience may modify an agent's understandings; for instance, events may challenge their beliefs. If sufficient persons have experiences that challenge their way of doing things, they may lead to changes in the canon of values and beliefs passed on to the next generation with no need of spoken consensus.

The challenge for social science, and by extension IK research, is that while communities imbue individuals with such shared values about appropriate ways to behave, the actors themselves are apparently unaware of what they are doing with respect to picking up and passing on behavioral regularities and their implications. In short, actors do not apparently know what they know. It is difficult, arguably impossible, to communicate much of this knowledge verbally to another person, as the Latin root *tacitus* "silent" implies (Polanyi 1958; Wagner and Sternberg 1985: 438–9). We more feel than think about such motivations

of our actions, often unable to verbalize them, acting on intuition and empathy, not reason and rational thought.

While actors may be unable to voice their thoughts, are even unaware of these issues, social researchers it seems can reveal such collectively held tacit knowledge and associated stratagems as propositional knowledge. Through observation of social interaction and actors' comments on their behavior, they claim to uncover the tacit knowledge embodied in everyday actions, using these data to support their theoretical arguments about the character of social arrangements. The deficiency, cognitively speaking, of the actors' subjective, mechanical-like experience is striking with respect to the fullness of the researchers' objective insights into their behavior. It reveals a contradiction at the heart of the social sciences, and by extension IK enquiries, and relates to a largely unacknowledged PC issue, namely by what right observers presume to represent people in this way, assuming to interpret what they do not know is in their behavior.

It seems that outsiders know more about the behavior of actors than they know themselves, when what they study is of the actors and manifest in what they do and say. Whatever strategies researchers use to uncover the implications of tacitly informed social behavior, these are open to challenge without the mandate of the actors' voice, which is improbable if the implications of their tacit social-convention-following are apparently inaccessible to them. Claims that there are parallel indigenous explications are dubious (Holy and Stuchlik 1981), communicated in unfamiliar ways featuring, as in structuralism, exotic symbolic codes such as designs on things, ritual sequences, and myths (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 281–2; Schneider 1965: 28). The way those with the necessary insight maintain they expose such cognitive structures is obscure, depending on unverifiable metaphysical leaps of imagination. They scarcely take us beyond the problems and solutions that have occupied social philosophers for generations, often disguised under off-putting new jargon.

It is hard to see how social science as practiced to date can get beyond theoretical supposition to firmer intellectual ground given the intangible character of the evidence, which, comprising actions and words, has a brief existence "out there," such that its import, even actors' purposes, are open to various interpretations, even misunderstanding after any social interaction. In order to secure a firmer hold on behavior and further understanding of the tacit aspects of learning and perception, it will be necessary to "get inside" actors' heads, which implies the integration of social research with cognitive psychology and neuroscience (Gerrans 2005; Bloch 1998, 2006). There are currently increasing moves in this direction, with the complex connections between conscious and unconscious dimensions of social behavior poorly understood and ripe for investigation, albeit the prospect may exacerbate worries about science not only trumping IK but also social studies. But progress is slow, which has probably contributed to the stalling of IK enquiries where tacit knowledge features prominently.

One way to tackle the tacit problem is meaningfully to include local people, the tacit knowledge bearers, in any research. This is what the participatory turn in development advocates, which has afforded anthropology an unparalleled opportunity via IK to contribute to development. While participation accords with the PC ethos, it presents further challenges. This bottom-up approach argues that people can analyze their own problems and would-be developers need to learn from them, on the assumption that if they, the targets of development, contribute to deciding goals and strategy, these may better address their priorities and problems (Chambers 1997, 2001). It reflects a profound questioning of conventional ethnographic research (Sillitoe 2012), seeking to work "with" rather than "on" people, all parties equal partners in any project, with community members playing a prominent part, from project design through data gathering and analysis to presentation of final results, in defining and contributing to the research they want to see (Cervone 2007; Lassiter 2005). Such collaborative research, grounded in the perspectives and interests of

local people, reaffirms their rights to have a say in work that purports to represent them and that may inform decisions that affect them (Dei, Hall and Rosenberg 2000: 16).

The participatory turn also offers a response to the postmodern dilemma, which has unsettled anthropology for the last two decades or more, casting doubt on the validity of our observations relative to actors' understandings, arguing that we can never really know other communities beyond our own subjective experiences of them. Collaborative research may help us address this critique by meaningfully involving other points of view, avoiding the imposition of Western concepts and values, so achieving a more appropriate representation, rather than appearing to know people better than they know themselves. We can again expect some resistance from the anthropological status quo to these changes, which imply handing over control of research and "knowledge production," with diminution of claims to expert status. Not to mention the unsettling demands to hammer out new ways of working and engagements with ethnographic reality that threaten current theoretical preoccupations and interpretations. While participation addresses contemporary postmodernist concerns, post-theorists are likely deterred as it inhibits the imposition of current ideological preoccupations on others. Whatever, we may assume that including local people in the research process will lead to the incorporation of their tacit knowledge too, for while they may not be able to talk about it, they know it and hence it will feature by default.

The Adjectival Mire

While the "knowledge" noun in IK poses problems, the "indigenous" adjective gives rise to more heated PC debate. Some persons (academics in particular) are unhappy at its use, arguing furiously over the propriety of employing it in any context, development or otherwise (Kuper 2003; Kendrick and Lewis 2004; Barnard 2006; Guenther et al. 2006; Agrawal 2009). Detractors argue that history shows that it is a difficult adjective to define, if not meaningless. "How can one define it in the modern cosmopolitan world?" they ask. No one is truly indigenous to anywhere. There is, for example, no such thing as a thoroughly native Englishman because those who inhabit that part of Britain called England are a mix of immigrants and invaders including Celts, Romans, Angles, Saxons, Vikings, Normans, with repeated influxes of Irish, Scottish, Jewish, Huguenot and more recently various Commonwealth and other citizens, resulting in a cosmopolitan if not mongrel culture. There is anxiety from a liberal perspective that use of the term may encourage disagreeable xenophobic even racial emotions. Also, unsurprisingly, some colonially founded states, such as the US and Australia, do not wish to draw attention to indigenous issues and rights given their history of domination, ethnocide, and even genocide (e.g. Wolfe 1994; Povinelli 1998; Battiste 2002; Four Arrows 2006).

Arguments over the correctness of the indigenous adjective have led some commentators to suggest alternatives such as traditional, local, people's knowledge, and citizen science, to name a few. But they have their problems too. Traditional faces disapproval (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Douglas 2004), for archaeology and history show that all cultures change, albeit some apparently faster than others, and so an interest in tradition, conceived as static custom passed between generations, is wrongheaded, as again there is no such thing. Critics of the local adjective (Pottier et al. 2003; Bicker et al. 2004) argue that the forces of globalization and migration make definition of the local problematic. It is noteworthy from this chapter's technology-acknowledging-development perspective that transnational migration, which some cite as evidence of hybridity and dubiety of distinguishing IK, is motivated largely by persons wanting to improve their standard of living by sharing in the fruits of scientific

driven technology. But they do not amnesiac-like leave their cultural heritage behind on departing poverty stricken communities, illustrating the contrary complexity of processes at play. And other terms—such as peoples' or citizens' knowledge—are too woolly to mean anything; for example, who are the people in question and how much knowledge do citizens have in common?

While some intellectuals warn against the use of indigenous and associated adjectives, many people around the world—often marginalized and victims of racist discrimination—use them to describe themselves. Attempts to discourage their use could arguably inflame tensions, some people fearing loss of identity or the right to think of themselves as native to, that is belonging, somewhere where they can relate to the values and way of life. Some populations are increasingly marking themselves off as native to certain regions in their fights for their rights and interests, of which national governments seek to dispossess them (see for instance the debate in *Anthropology Today*—Bowen 2000; Colchester 2002; McIntosh, Colchester and Bowen 2002; Rosengren 2002—also Niezen 2003; Asch 2004).

Many of these ethnic minorities refer to themselves as tribal, and they have long fascinated, even until recently largely defined anthropology, the only discipline to esteem their lifeways highly enough to study and understand them. The critique of adjectives such as indigenous, traditional, or local is of a piece with anthropologists' shift of interest away from their "traditional" tribal subject matter, where time may have a circular dimension, towards their own society's linear concept of time and history and concern with modernizing change. While ideas of circular tradition may reflect the local view in some places, it is argued that such a synchronic focus (represented by notions of structure and questionable ethnographic present) is, as history shows, an error. It is an overstatement, even misrepresentation, as often occurs with radical changes of perspective. While the critique of tradition, conceived as static custom passed between generations, may be correct from a Western historical perspective, it does not apparently stop some people talking about tradition and their wish to keep it intact, the way they think some aspects of life have always been for them. The differences bring to mind the distinction between so-called hot and cold societies (Lévi-Strauss 1962).

Similarly, many people seem to have no problems talking about the local, identifying strongly with particular regions and communities. There is a strong connection between connection to place and environmental knowledge (Bell et al. 2008), understandings of locale depending on unique relations between humans and their region's ecology, which is not to imply that such place-centered knowledge is bounded or static, for changing economic and social circumstances influence it, including global scientific knowledge. While some residents may move away and blur ideas about what constitutes the local, maintaining social and emotional links with their place of origin, the majority who remain living there throughout their lives experience little confusion. They readily identify with their place and those who live there, likely considering themselves indigenes who have traditions.

People express a need to maintain local traditions in the face of current global pressures and some even search for "lost," often suppressed, traditions. They may seek to distinguish unique attributes of their views in contrast to Western scientific epistemology. Not all, it would appear, are enthusiastic about the prospect of change, often glossed optimistically as development or globalization (for many, code for Western world domination). They point to possible alternative views of development, taken up later. These forces are ironically pushing some in the opposite direction, seeking to reaffirm or even reinvent their traditions and associated indigeneity, as they see what they value increasingly threatened by liberal capitalist domination. It seems that they wish to, and can in their minds, distinguish the indigenous, traditional, or local—categories that overlap considerably with such anthropological ones as culture, custom, and society, used widely until theoretical fashions alighted on humanity apparently merging into a global gloop.

Why Not Indigenous?

The term indigenous is becoming increasingly popular and heard from local through to international levels. There are various indigenous movements, for instance, currently seeking a voice for their views internationally, sometimes holding alternative world summits (Sillitoe and Bicker 2004). There are many locally rooted NGOs, some of which comprise self-styled indigenous knowledge networks seeking to represent such interests in development (Sen et al. 2000; Shepherd 2005). Even the UN, arbiter on global political issues, sanctions the use of the term indigenous with its Decade of the World's Indigenous People and concern for Indigenous Peoples' Rights (United Nations 1993; Minority Rights Group 2006). While no institution has the authority to legislate on such issues globally, it is at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and related international bodies such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (e.g. Article 8(j): Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices) and the World Bank (e.g. Bank Procedure 4.10: Indigenous Peoples, July 2005) that interested parties have negotiated a workable international definition. And the document resulting from the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20)—*The Future We Want*—recognizes the importance of indigenous peoples' participation in achieving sustainable development. Finally, the development community uses the word indigenous widely, notably in the IK context, and seems to have fair agreement over what it means. I use it to signal engagement with agencies—the power brokers in development contexts—and further recognition that we have interests in common.

Criticisms of indigenous and similar adjectives appear to have more to do with Western intellectual PC concerns than those of people to whom they are regularly applied and who happily use these labels for themselves. The arguments against such terms may be well intentioned, reducing the "we" and "them" distinctions that often characterize misuse of power, also possibly offensive racism, by encouraging us to concede that all of us should have equal rights and so on. But opposing their use, while presumably holding associated ideas in one's head, comes close to sounding like the colonial authorities so roundly condemned by and large. The argument seems to be "we know better than you how dangerous such terms can be in fostering nasty sentiments, so let's stop using them." In other words, "trust us, we know best," when history probably makes those using these terms understandably distrustful of such assertions. These labels often feature in communities' fights against historical wrongs, the rights of many tribal peoples in particular having been grossly violated from a liberal standpoint (as highlighted regularly by NGOs such as Survival International and Minority Rights Group, see for example the on-going struggle of the San people in Botswana—Minority Rights Group 2005; Survival International 2006). They surely have a right to use such labels in relation to themselves, if they so wish, if they think it will help their interests?

Also ironically, if you think that such adjectives are inappropriate, this implies that we cannot distinguish between communities, which presumably means agreeing with modernization approaches to development. After all, if it is illegitimate to differentiate between populations in these ways, the implication is that they are all the same, and so top-down identification and solutions to development problems should presumably apply universally (Sillitoe 2002: 133). Few of those arguing against the use of these adjectives would probably go along with this let-modernization-rip reasoning, but if we are not to distinguish between people, or are unable to do so, then logically the same "solutions" should work everywhere, which they patently do not, as several decades of failed development show.

While there is some disagreement over appropriate terms, the assumption is that we find something akin to IK everywhere, whether in the New Guinea highlands, floodplains of Bangladesh or the Durham dales of North-East England. It is equivalent to assuming that all humans have subsistence regimes, technology, and language, that they politic over

power, acknowledge kinship relations, and entertain supernatural ideas etc.—namely the presumption of certain universal attributes subject to varying socio-cultural interpretations that has long underpinned any ethnographic enquiry. It is the assumed universality of IK that contributes to it featuring on the development agenda in the first place, as agencies seek generic solutions to global poverty that accommodate to different cultural contexts. It could possibly contribute to answers, if only we can figure out how to link it with the dominant technological and market view.

It is possible that humankind may eventually develop a harmonious global culture where common solutions to problems will be appropriate, but it is a long way off on current evidence, an aspect of which is the way people keenly defend their identities—as indigenous, traditional, local, etc. Belief in the process of globalization suggests another reason why interest in IK has failed to take root deeply in development, namely that it has no future, either for insider custodians or outsider researchers. The forces of globalization will drive it to extinction, according to the development-as-modernization view. The evidence suggests otherwise. Since anthropology's Victorian founders, observers have warned about the disappearance of cultures and need for salvage ethnography. Yet, regardless of large lifestyle changes in many small-scale societies, hunter-gatherers continue to hunt and gather, shifting cultivators to shift and cultivate, communities to believe in local deities, clan obligations to inform social life etc. Local ways, albeit subject to considerable change, continue against the apparent odds. They are stubbornly resistant to the blandishments and threats of global capitalism and modernism.

It is unhelpful, even arguably ethnocentric, for privileged, globe-trotting, cosmopolitan academics to foist their PC concerns and worries on others, arguing that they should not talk in certain ways because divisive, especially when the concerns and worries of these populations are often pressing, involving basic human rights issues, and even on-going survival. We need to get back to the ethnography to further understanding of why and how people use such terms to label themselves, particularly in development contexts. This relates again to participatory approaches to research that seek to make communities' voices heard, allowing them to define issues according to their cultural and historical experiences and priorities.

The question of which adjective to use appears irreconcilable to the satisfaction of all parties. Whatever, regardless of the interminable and sometimes heated debate, all the terms place us at the same address if in different rooms, such that we have a fair idea what we are talking about anyway. Perhaps we need a new adjective such as the adroit neologism "glocal" (Robertson 1996) with its clever play on the local influenced by global forces. But it has yet to catch on. If we take the disagreement over adjectives together with the prominence of tacit knowledge in people's understanding of the world, perhaps "glocal perception" is a more appropriate label than "indigenous knowledge" for our field of interest that seeks to allow scope not only for what people know but also for values and aspirations.

The Commodification of IK?

Another PC concern, arguably even more contentious, is that IK research might promote the commercialization of others' knowledge, given development's focus on promoting economic efficiency through various capitalistic market interventions. Ethnobiology, which has featured prominently in the IK initiative, comes to mind with pharmaceutical companies prospecting local knowledge of plant medicinal properties to find new drugs (Shiva 1997; Greene 2004; Wynberg et al. 2009). It may be difficult to predict the commercial potential of any knowledge—which underlines the need for holistic enquiry—as illustrated

by Bob Newhart's comic telephone conversation skit with Walter Raleigh (YouTube 2010), incredulously learning about tobacco, an unpromising leafy plant smoked by American Indians that became a multi-billion industry. The prospect of foreign agents, such as companies, drawing on the cultural heritage of others to make a profit is disturbing, without the permission of the owners and/or without them receiving a fair return. It is doubly worrying in these times of the ideological dominance of the market, with universities seen as wealth generating corporations obliged to prioritize making a financial profit: imagine so styled "senior management" in higher education institutions hitting on the possibility of exploiting the commodification of culture as a way to turn anthropology departments into more profitable earners of income.

While IK research does not necessarily reduce knowledge to a commodity in the capitalist market sense of something to trade at financial profit, we need beware of it being treated commodity-like in development contexts, as bits of targeted information thought to have developmental relevance (e.g. about farming, illness, or whatever), which divorced from wider socio-cultural milieu may potentially have distorting effects, violating anthropology's key holistic premise (Berkes and Berkes 2009). We know that we cannot understand cultures by looking at individual parts in isolation, as complex systems they manifest emergent properties that we can only appreciate when seen in wide context, and IK research seeks to introduce such a wide perspective into the narrowly focused work of specialists. It is not restricted to the topic of interest to development agency/project—acting as knowledge broker on farming or health care knowledge and practices, for example, so that agricultural or medical specialists can appreciate these as necessary to furthering any intervention—but employs the principle of holism so that people can make their knowledge count, by situating it within wider socio-cultural context as necessary to understanding the particular "bits" of knowledge of interest to development. Again, meaningful participation is central here, which comes down to formulating methodologies that allow local people to drive enquiries.

While the integrated approach, which allows expression of wider cultural views of being in the world that may extend to the supernatural (Berkes 1999; Sherry and Myers 2002), contrasts with the disconnected one, which views IK as factual knowledge that can be matched with that underpinning technological fixes, they intriguingly compare in another way in respect of open approach to enquiries. Just as it is not possible to predict which cultural domains might relate intimately with others; often unexpected practices impinging on one another, so Enlightenment informed scientific method, responsible for the technology that features in much development, maintains that no unnecessary restrictions should be placed on any field of research because we cannot know what might be significant before we find it out. Science is littered with examples of unexpected connections, pure accidents even, leading to advances in understanding; for example, Alexander Fleming's discovery of penicillin in his Petri dish cultures and more recently Tim Hunt's of cyclin proteins in parthenogenetic sea urchin eggs. It is necessary to allow space for such unforeseen insights to emerge, albeit the open pursuit of knowledge has its downsides, a point taken up below.

It is a balancing act, as with so much in life. While supporting the tradition of open intellectual enquiry, not knowing beforehand what might be significant, it is necessary in IK research to keep an eye on development context. It is not pure research for its intellectual sake that allows holistically chasing any hare but applied research that seeks to assist the development endeavor, which sets out deliberately to make knowledge available, for others to draw on in intervening in people's lives. The problem that such applied research brings into sharp relief is how to achieve the positive aspects of increasing our understanding of other ways of being in the world to the benefit of poor communities caught up in development without the risk of putting knowledge into the public domain that other's might make unfair use of, for instance, treat as a commodity and exploit for profit.

The problem is not new. For decades anthropology has faced criticism for facilitating unwarranted access to others' cultural heritage; for instance as a "handmaiden of colonialism," albeit the evidence suggests that it was a pretty poor handmaiden with colonial administrators by and large unable to make much use of anthropological intelligence (Sillitoe 2006). In the discipline's defense, facilitating any such misappropriation of knowledge was largely an unintentional outcome of curiosity-driven intellectual enquiries. These are the only sort of researches that many anthropologists will countenance, who assert with a certain PC-ness that any others threaten uninvited intrusion into, and possible profiting from, peoples' lives, which amounts to a firm put down of IK enquiries with their applied aims. This attitude is a legacy of the discipline's uncomfortable relation with applied work; although the possible misappropriation of any publicly available ethnographic data belies the stance that ivory tower academic work can be purely disinterested and politically neutral (the implication that somehow the academics' nosey presence is not intrusive is questionable too; as is the avoidance of profiting, even if only in career advancement terms).

Ethnographic Enquiry or Exploitation?

The problems of unwarranted exploitation of others' heritage go back considerably further in time. They start with the Enlightenment five centuries or so ago—when colonialism, development's predecessor, got under way—with Europeans setting out to explore the world—firstly, the Portuguese and Spanish, and subsequently the Dutch, French, and British. The reasons for exploration were complex, and varied with nation and time, but material profit was one (for instance, the search for the mythical Eldorado "gilded place," which the Spanish reckoned to have discovered in Mesoamerica with its gold and silver) and plain curiosity too (particularly in later centuries, such as the Pacific voyages of exploration). Other nations also voyaged widely at this time and earlier, largely in trade, such as the Chinese and Arabs, but they did not aspire to explore the entire globe or colonially annex foreign lands.

The explorers encountered strange people and it was perhaps inevitable that they should be curious about them. We have some of the first anthropological reports (if we discount the writing of some classical scholars, such as Tacitus on the barbarians of northern Europe); for example Bernardino de Sahagún's (1545–90) 12 volumes on the Aztecs, André Thévet's (1557) description of the Tupinamba of Brazil, Thomas Harriot's (1588) account of Virginian Indian life, and Filippo Pigafetta's (1591) account (after Duarte Lopez) of the Kongo Kingdom. It was the start of an ethnographic literature that would treat people elsewhere with dignity and respect, and seek to further understanding of their lifeways. It challenged the prevailing view at the time that such people were sub-human, for being non-Christians they lacked souls. An early, classic confrontation of these different views was the Valladolid debate of 1550 (at the behest of Charles V of Spain) between two Dominican friars: Las Casas, who argued that the natives of America (of whom he had firsthand knowledge as the Bishop of the Chiapas) should be treated as fellow humans and not enslaved or killed, and Sepúlveda, who thought them less than human and argued that they required civilizing through forceful subjugation and conversion.

The racist views justified colonialism and, what today we see as crimes against humanity, such as seizing peoples' land under the *terra nullius* fiction and even committing acts of genocide (Posey 2002: 24). They certainly promoted ethnocide, such that the ethnographic accounts that we have are the only surviving evidence of many other ways of being in the world, today's accumulated ethnographic record representing knowledge of lifeways that would otherwise be lost with culture bearers passing away with rapid social change during

subsequent centuries. It serves as a valuable source of information that descendants may subsequently draw on in securing their identity in engulfing colonial-cum-multicultural contexts, as in "reinventing traditions" mentioned earlier. Such use of the anthropological record can arguably empower otherwise marginalized communities to claim their rights. In this respect, regarding commodification of culture, I think that we can be relaxed about the heirs to any cultural tradition cashing in on their heritage, whether it features in the ethnographic record or not, to "earn a buck" from tourists or whoever and so participate in the global marketplace. Such is perhaps inevitable, if people see it as a way to gain access to goods and services otherwise out of their reach.

Furthermore, anthropological endeavors have subsequently contributed significantly to demonstrating the error of racist assertions that populations elsewhere were simple and intellectually inferior, by showing the richness and complexity of their cultures. The IK in development initiative is in this tradition—regardless of the worries of some with respect to the possible racist overtones of the adjective indigenous—in seeking to demonstrate that people in poor communities are not stupid, waiting to be developed, that their ways are sophisticated and have something to contribute with respect to progress, however defined.

It seems, contrary to the PC thrown down glove about unwarranted exploitation of others' knowledge, that contributing to the ethnographic record is, on balance, a positive thing, including IK research. Or am I special pleading to justify my actions, as I have contributed (unwittingly) to the accumulation of ethnographic data that could potentially be treated as a commodity, having expended much energy seeking to further understanding of cultural ways—particularly those of a Papua New Guinea mountain valley community—and also advocating consideration of local knowledge in development? Such research certainly complies with the Enlightenment assumption, which underpinned curiosity driven exploration, that the advancement of knowledge and understanding of the world and our place in it is indubitably a good thing. It is the origin of the term Enlightenment after all. This value is at the core of contemporary scholarship; our university statutes enshrine it in the principle of academic freedom. But the PC glove is weightier than my comments so far suggest, in pointing out that any knowledge has an upside and a downside, here potentially benefitting cultural heirs as valued intelligence or foreigners as an exploitable entity, as became clear to me when I engaged in IK work.

A View of Development

It was through a conviction that we should do something if we can to help poor and marginalized communities, often the focus of anthropological interest, that I became involved in IK research in development. If we think that we have the wherewithal to assist in the alleviation of chronic poverty and people wish to avail themselves of assistance, we surely have a moral obligation to help, even if only able to make a small contribution to tackling such an enormous problem. The politically savvy may consider concern with poverty somewhat half-baked as it is such a complicated matter, difficult even to define let alone identify what is responsible, having complex causes. It seems an unintended, almost inevitable consequence of today's capitalist world order. But as Douglas points out, in a scalding commentary likening twenty-first-century tolerance of extreme poverty with eighteenth-century condoning of slavery, those who turn a blind eye to "the ghastly poverty that reduces millions to hopeless indigence and starvation, will be … counted as accessories to one of the major crimes of human history" (2004: 85). In such circumstances, it seems an indulgence to pursue an anthropological career for academic purposes only.

A particular view of development informs this applied engagement. Development implies progress, of a sort that we can assess, depending largely on technologically driven change. It is a view that many Euro-Americans assume to be universal. And it is undeniable that scientifically informed technology has made astonishing advances in respect of human capacity to intervene in the world and increase material standards of living—computers and communications, airplanes, transplant organs, etc.—that have both good and bad potentials. Development discourse gauges such material-related progress in terms of economic measures targeted at reducing poverty, questionably assuming that the capitalist market is the most effective political-economic arrangement to ensure the "efficient" production and distribution of the fruits of progress. In basic terms, the aim in this materialistic view— usually expressed in economic-speak—is to ensure that people enjoy "food security," that is have sufficient to eat, and "basic health rights," that is do not suffer and die from preventable illnesses. These are goals to which I assume most humans can sign up whatever their culture as few of us likes to go hungry or be ill. In other words, our basic needs are universal, whatever our religion, politics, social order, etc. This is significant from an anthropological perspective, for if we cannot agree with this proposition the discipline would likely have no truck with development. This largely technological view of development informs the activities of agencies that seek to intervene and promote what they consider positive change. Their current aim, for instance, is to halve poverty globally by 2015, if we can believe the Millennium Development Goals and if we can agree how to measure poverty, which as noted is notoriously difficult to assess.

The majority of Western funded agencies, from large international organizations promoting high-tech interventions to small NGOs advancing low-tech ones, can conceive of approaching development in no other way. It is with this dominant view of development that much IK research has unavoidably to connect if it aspires to have any real world impact currently. The limited co-operation that occurs sees some valuable work, even if largely restricted to the margins, for instance on local farming in programs seeking to improve food security and local medicine in those seeking to improve health (Bentley and Baker 2005; Shepherd 2004, 2005). It features the advancement and refinement of effective methodologies, seeking for example to further the potential of participation and to demonstrate the value of "process" as opposed to "blueprint" approaches to development. It addresses several issues, among them: making socio-cultural issues more accessible, delivering relevant research promptly while maintaining ethnographic integrity, overcoming prejudicial IK versus science discriminations, and advancing interdisciplinary work.[2] Regardless of some hard work on the methodological front (I.I.R.R. 1996; Grenier 1998; Emery 2000; Sillitoe et al. 2005), we have seen no significant breakthrough to new ways of working with development. To-date practical IK work has largely tried to relate local practices and ideas to whatever technological-cum-economic interventions agencies think will advance development aims, together with advising on the implications of associated political and social changes. There is some merit in this work—whatever its problems, and there are several—for those who wish to see an improvement in the standard of living of poverty stricken families.

Is this view of development too rosy? Whatever the criticisms of development in the material-informed sense—and they are many—it is only approach that allows us legitimately to talk about progress. We can objectively measure such changes; if we wish to communicate faster, further, and more fully, for example, then going from fork-stick runner and smoke signals to telegraph, mobile phones and virtual-conferencing is an improvement. Indeed this materially focused view of progress arguably offers the only moral grounds for assuming

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2 Notably by facilitating meaningful communication, promoting a collaborative atmosphere etc. (Sillitoe 2004).

to interfere in the lives of others. If we have nothing to offer in this technological-material sense, what are we doing intervening in the name of development, unless it is, as some left-wing commentators suggest, cynically to further exploitative relations? But technology is not socially neutral; any change will, as intimated, have social implications, often difficult to foresee; consider for instance, the changes in social interaction resulting from internet communication and mobile phone use. And seeking to change social arrangements, as PC leaning critics rightly point out, is not so defensible or measurable (such as encouraging profit-seeking market arrangements because thought more efficient at utilizing available resources, or interfering in political structures because thought undemocratic). Here is an enduring source of confusion about development. While we can agree objective measures of changes affecting phenomena "out there" in the world and talk of progress with respect to them, any social implications are beyond such assessment, for wellbeing as it relates to our socio-cultural expectations is a subjective phenomenon "in there" in our minds and features abstract ideas that inform our communal behavior as human-beings, such that we can only assess any social changes on subjective grounds that my culture and life experiences prompt me to think they are progress or not, that one is better than another.

The current trend for development to focus increasingly on human rights issues, as seen for instance in "good governance" initiatives, underlines the pertinence of these comments on the social dimensions of development. In the future it will be necessary for IK to address some contentious questions such as the possible cultural relativity of some of the assumptions being made, for example the existence or otherwise of universal rights and who defines, and what constitutes, good government. On the plus side, the human rights approach, which parallels the earlier basic needs approach, will more likely make participation and taking IK into consideration mandatory development practice, as anything less may be construed as a violation of human rights. It increases the urgency for us to figure out how IK can meaningfully interface with development, notably the dominant technology-with-economics approach that underpins material advancement, increasingly linked with a tendency to intervene directly in socio-political affairs.

Politics in Development

The social implications of change, particularly the political dimensions, are the focus of much IK criticism (Agrawal 1999; Pottier 2003). It relates to the good and bad potential of knowledge mentioned earlier, as the aphorism "knowledge is power" captures; a point that poststructuralists after Foucault (2001) elaborate on at length. It questions the soundness of IK work, or any ethnographic research come to that, because the more powerful, such as governments and multinational companies, may then access the knowledge and exploit it; as cases of biopiracy illustrate. These are burning concerns in development contexts where the intervening agency that "does the developing" is invariably in a more powerful position than the "beneficiary" party that "is developed," consequently allowing the agency to impose its views of development. While IK research seeks to combat these asymmetric relations, seeking to advance empowering participatory approaches, according to some it not only fails but is a sell out.

Personally, I am disappointed and tired of some colleagues, even students, telling me that I am naive in promoting IK work because the problems of development are political—for instance the root of chronic poverty is wealthy minorities monopolizing power—and demand political action. Some even argue that development is a guise by which powerful governments and corporations maintain and extend their power, and question the propriety

of involving ourselves in development at all, for to engage in IK work with development "business as usual" is to support a rotten status quo. While this view may sadly be apposite in some places, not all development is subject to such Machiavellian manipulation; in my experience much development effort genuinely seeks to relieve poverty. Those who believe otherwise presumably think that all development should be discontinued, holding out no hope of improving the lot of poor communities except by improbable revolution, which is a strange position for self-styled political sophisticates, when history tells us that such rapid change is frequently a violent and bloody disaster. I am more optimistic, although not wildly so, believing that IK work in development can contribute to incremental change to improve the lives of the poorest, arguably from a realpolitik perspective the only practical way to do so, given current unfair global arrangements that we seem powerless to change (in the foreseeable future anyway).

A further point of difference concerns involvement in politics to further the interests of poor communities, as urged by those who advocate action research. It is necessary to distinguish between advancing understanding of the political issues and engaging in dubious politicking on others' behalf. In advocating that IK research may assist development, it is with regard to furthering knowledge about, and between involved parties. This is a time-honored position, for instance following in the tradition of Ibn Khaldun, the Arab scholar who pioneered sociological thought over half a millennium ago, who thought it unwise to offer moral advice about "the social cosmos as to how it should comport itself. Things are as they are. The thinker's job is to understand them, not to change them" (Gellner 1975: 203). We are academics not politicians, albeit we seek to engage with applied issues. We have to beware of interference. While I think that I have a right to express the value I put on fairness in England (for instance opposition to the class system and the ascendancy of capitalist values since the 1980s with an increasing gap between the rich and poor), I should refrain from making similar criticisms of the South Asian caste system or Gulf employment of migrant labor, seeking only, as dispassionately as possible, to further understanding of caste and migration and development implications. In acknowledging the postmodern stricture that our background and values inevitably intrude into our work, we need to control the urge to make PC-like value judgments and recommendations for action on behalf of others.

It is arguable that IK's promotion of participatory research, which seeks to empower communities, amounts to a certain political involvement (Sillitoe 2012). But it is indirect, aiming to improve peoples' ability to represent their own ideas and interests. It seeks to advance participatory ways of working such that local communities not only inform enquiries but also control the flow of information, avoiding the charge of uninvited intrusion into their lives and unsanctioned passing on of knowledge, and impropriety of acting as surrogate representatives of their views. Albeit it is necessary to be aware that participatory research has shortcomings: it can encourage shallow understanding, is not culturally neutral, and is subject to manipulation, persons often using participation as a guise to ventriloquize their intentions, employing the word "participation" as little more than a catchword to give them credibility (Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004). While we may attempt to further empowerment and overcome tokenistic participation, it would be naive to imagine that it is possible to eliminate political dealing. The powerful are likely to manipulate—often subtly—any attempts to secure community consensus on issues, and encouraging the expression of different views may increase the chances of conflict. And people may have good reasons for not wishing to participate, being deeply suspicious of such invitations; having experienced colonial domination and exploitation. Even the assumption that they can participate as equal partners is questionable (understand what research is and what is at stake); taking part may even do violence to local knowledge and worldviews. In this respect, researchers' claims to access tacit knowledge, professing to know more about the behavior

of actors than they know themselves—which underpins their claims to expert status—may afford them scope covertly to exercise power.

In advocating IK we find ourselves in an awkward position, simultaneously both supportive and subversive of development. On the supportive side, we seek in IK to focus on issues from the perspective of development agencies whatever their complexion—national or international, NGO or government, bilateral or multilateral, etc.—on the grounds that this is an effective strategy in getting local views and practices on the agenda, whereas criticism from the outside is not. But we seek to introduce other possibilities and perspectives, which relates to the subversive side of IK work. The narrow capitalist idea of development—that it amounts to technical fixes, market integration, and "good governance"—hampers involvement of IK, which has to challenge this hegemony to meet its potential. The implication is that we engage with development on the terms of agencies with a view to changing these, creating space for alternative local ideas of development to emerge.

It is difficult to confront such entrenched and powerful interests and simultaneously promote a positive change of terms. In order to begin we need to imagine what shape such alternative views of "development" might take, which in large part is, for those whose lives are affected by interventions, facilitated by empowering participation. While a clash with agency views is unavoidable if one of our goals is to suggest radical alternatives, we need to proceed cautiously and not appear "too off the wall" to be taken seriously. Agencies seek approaches that they can apply globally—such as integrated rural development, basic needs, sustainable livelihoods, etc.—and we need beware of alienating them (as those with power in development contexts), in arguing that development is a culturally relative idea. It is IK's inability to play a part in formulating universal solutions that has in some measure inhibited its impact on development. It is a problem long encountered in applied work with IK varying greatly from place to place, which inhibits it contributing to general answers to development problems as opposed to suggesting the need for specific culturally tailored ones.

Runaway Knowledge

The foregoing view of development equates progress largely with passing on the benefits of modern technology, which has depended in large part on the scientific pursuit of knowledge, which is consequently cast as a positive activity. But the above comment about knowledge having an upside and a downside suggests caution: do current events challenge in a fundamental sense the assumption that advancing knowledge is necessarily a good thing? This is not a new question. It appears that the ancients had problems with knowledge, as evidenced for instance, in the Bible's opening verses that attribute all of humanity's problems to Adam eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge (which we might now interpret as a mythical allusion to passing from an instinctive animal-like state to a reflective self-aware one). The result was misery and portended disaster. We have evidence today of a portentous kind that the ancients could never have dreamed of, even in their worst Armageddon nightmares, that questions the virtue of the unbridled quest for knowledge that has characterized our society since Enlightenment times.

Nuclear physics, for instance, has come up with a way to generate power that produces highly toxic radioactive waste that remains dangerous for millennia, which in Britain we are depositing in underground silos where only a few thousand years ago there were valley gouging glaciers. It has also given us atomic weapons of awesome destructive power which in the hands of fallible politicians are terrifying enough let alone the prospect of a maniac obtaining one (Koestler 1967). Or take advances in genetic engineering that allow us to play

god in manipulating reproduction and intervening in nature. The prospect of gene therapy curing and even eliminating some diseases is optimistic but on the pessimistic side is the prospect of transgenic organisms (such as goats that produce spider's web protein in their milk for use in the materials industry), which could have unknown impacts on the globe's ecology. While the *Brave New World* prospect of a totalitarian regime using eugenics to manage the composition of a population may seem unlikely, the possibility of the wealthy paying for designer children to maximize their physical and mental traits is imaginable, ensuring "superior" offspring to out compete and dominate others more effectively than enrolling them as currently in private schools. Or, if these threats seem too outrageous to imagine, consider the environmental problems that we face, such as predicted climate change, which some forecast as potentially catastrophic. These are the direct effect of industrial technology resulting from the application of Enlightenment borne scientific enquiry. It has given some of us a standard of living unheard of previously but which may be short-lived, as we seem incapable of managing our subsequent activities so as not to damage the environment irrevocably, for instance curbing those responsible for the atmospheric pollution that is causing climate change.

Our apparently out-of-control quest for knowledge is an aspect of what Leach (1967) called in his Reith Lectures a "runaway world." We have to ask if we have the wisdom to manage the knowledge that we have, of, for instance, nuclear physics, genetics, and industrial engineering? To what extent should we continue to support related enquiries, and what can we do better to manage the knowledge that we have currently? Questioning the post-Enlightenment assumption that the scientific pursuit of knowledge is a good thing is a poser, scarcely addressed. It goes way beyond PC framed criticism of IK in development, which seeks to facilitate local participation in interventions based on such knowledge to reduce poverty. It challenges the very wisdom of such an aim. It is arguably to hasten the visiting of poverty on all humanity, as ecological footprint or global carrying capacity calculations indicate (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). According to these, it would require some four planet Earths for everyone to enjoy our standard of living, and on top of that the atmospheric pollution would take climate change calculations off the scale.

IK beyond Development

Not all cultural traditions necessarily subscribe to the view that all enquiry that furthers our understanding of the world is good, such as those that believe there are long ago divinely revealed truths that it is blasphemy to question. A contemporary example is the Boko Haram (literally, "western education is sinful") movement among the Hausa of northern Nigeria, a little-known Muslim group that prohibits engagement with non-Islamic society and thought (it supports a loosely organized local insurrection that seeks to establish *sharia* law government by any means, including terrorist violence—Bartolotta 2011; Freeman 2012). While I should not wish to advocate, being a Western academic inculcated with Enlightenment values about open-minded enquiry, a return to medieval scholarship with its Inquisitions to root out heretical views, it is noteworthy that other cultural traditions may have different ideas about what amounts to legitimate knowledge, returning us to the knowledge noun and duck-rabbit image issues.

The taken-for-granted assumption that our understanding of what knowledge comprises is universally relevant is debatable. In the New Guinea highlands, for instance, the absence of recognized authorities to affirm what is legitimate knowledge qualifies understanding in significant ways. The signaling of trust in intelligence is a central issue in everyday

conversation (Sillitoe 2010a). The use of evidential markers in verb conjugation signals an attitude to knowledge similar to that of skeptical philosophy except, intriguingly in view of previous discussion, it is tacit, involving the unconscious use of language. Here I elaborate on this argument from another perspective. If knowledge is a culturally relative concept, it is possible that other intellectual traditions, where it has different connotations, may have something to teach us about erudition, what it is and what to do with it. And if so, maybe would-be exploiters of ethnographic knowledge can learn from, rather than misuse such knowledge—by for example commodifying it—allowing it to modify their practices positively in all our interests.

The premise that other cultural traditions may have something to teach us about the status of knowledge could productively challenge the largely unquestioned assumptions of scholarship since Enlightenment times, which themselves ironically inform anthropological enquiry into these other traditions. The Islamic world, for instance, is wrestling to square the findings of natural science with the *Koran*'s teachings; as has Christianity with the *Bible*'s teachings. The tension is evident in several universities across the Middle East, which are keen to establish high-profile international reputations as centers of learning and research. In teaching sustainable development at the University of Qatar, for example, I found it unwise to mention the theory of evolution as its challenge to the teachings of *imam* confused and upset students leading to awkward, contentious discussions. It is possible that wrestling with such ideas will show new ways to relate to and use scientific knowledge, which comes down to a question of values and ethics.

A prominent capitalist value is material profit, one of the motives behind much European colonization; the commodification of knowledge is an aspect of this esteeming of profit. The problem is not only the value we accord to all intellectual enquiry that increases our understanding of the world but also the increased harnessing of such enquiry to the market place (prominent in universities today, which seek to facilitate the conversion of scientific findings into marketable technological innovations with insufficient attention to wider environmental and social implications). It appears that the democratic-capitalist system with its lauding of such self-interested values could be taking the world to the brink, promoting the destructive exploitation of resources for economic gain, a process that much development seeks to promote. We need to prioritize a more sustainable outlook, tempering individualistic profit-motives with a more collectivist focus on sustainability, where values of co-operation and mutual benefit feature more prominently, balancing equitable collaboration with competition for personal gain.

While the values of liberal-capitalism sit uncomfortably with sustainable ways, other socio-culturally informed views of human-environment relations intimate viable alternatives, premised on using and safeguarding resources for mutual benefit. It is a tenet of anthropology that we have something to learn from such other views, however improbable at first sight. We have an obligation to put them in the public domain and promote their understanding (even exploitation to the possible benefit of all). My favorite example is the forager lifestyle, which according to those who subscribe to so-called social development is the least evolved in human history. People such as Australian Aborigines and Canadian Inuit see themselves as intimately related to the natural world, which informs their use of resources. Their communal approaches to land custodianship, which contrasts starkly with capitalist property relations, intimate how we might reform our ideas. They evidence concern for long-term environmental and social stability, their beliefs promoting inherently sustainable relations with the world. The Australian archaeological evidence, for example, confirms a highly sustainable adaptation extending over 50,000 or more years, whereas Europeans have brought parts of the continent to the brink of ecological collapse in a mere 200 years. The ways in which such people seek to protect their rights from encroachment

by commercial interests have further lessons, their responses founded on cooperative values tied to the long-term health of locality contrasting markedly with competitive global corporations whose priority is short-term profit.

Contrary Knowledge

After reading a draft of this chapter, the editors suggested that "it would be helpful if you could add more detailed discussion of your own extensive substantive work on IK among the Wola." The request took me by surprise because I do not think that I have conducted IK research in the highlands of Papua New Guinea. Subsequent reflection led me to realize that the suggestion indicates a further issue that accounts for why IK has not taken root as I initially expected: there is lack of agreement within the discipline of anthropology as to what it constitutes. The differences relate to the deep-rooted, albeit not always helpful, distinction between academic and applied research (Sillitoe 2006). While any anthropological research, by definition, concerns investigation of local knowledge, IK has a development connection to my mind; it seeks actively to promote consideration of local knowledge and ways in development contexts. My work in New Guinea seeks, in the broad anthropological tradition, to further our understanding of humanity through the holistic study of a local community where socio-culturally mediated being-in-the-world contrasts markedly with our own way of being-in-the-world; albeit social change has occurred and is occurring, often glossed as globalization, arguably reducing the contrasts, but nonetheless my friends in the Was valley have yet to be the targeted beneficiaries of any development project.

In retrospect, it is arguably arrogant for anyone to assume to undertake such anthropological research today, particularly someone who advocates IK that promotes participatory approaches (Sillitoe 2012) that seek to incorporate local people meaningfully into the research process as equal partners not informants, by enabling the collaborative co-formulation and undertaking of research. In my defense, when I first went to live in the Was valley there was scant awareness there of the notion of research to further understanding of human socio-cultural arrangements, let alone persons to undertake it. If I had not engaged in the work, much knowledge of Was valley culture and ways before the actual intrusion of the outside world would now be lost (Sillitoe 2010b: 468–9). Whenever cultural formations disappear we lose forever unique examples of ways that humans have come up with for being in the world (as when languages become extinct and we lose associated knowledge), which is not only a loss in itself but also diminishes the evidence by which we may further comparative understanding of humanity. And my friends seem grateful to have some record, however partial, of the ways of their *shumbaen* "ancestors."

The holistic approach featuring long-term participant-observation, which I have labeled ethnographic-determinism with deliberate irony, also differs from targeted short-term IK research that focuses on particular topics of developmental interest. A key feature of ethno-determinism is that the ethnography drives enquiries, not outsider defined concerns, research going wherever local interests lead, not seeking to fit it (up) to some theory. It strives, like all good anthropological research, to further our understanding of issues foremost from a community perspective, which may take us in unexpected but culturally relevant directions; albeit our socially conditioned prior experience and knowledge inevitably informs and modifies to some extent our understanding of whatever we hear and encounter. Others similarly argue for an inductive evidential focus, so far as practicable, acknowledging limitations and seeking where possible to control distortions. The causal approach of Vayda

(2009), for instance, is critical of work that is sloppy or indifferent to rigorous methods and evaluated evidence, arguing against approaches that impose ideological concerns rather than substantiating the causal forces behind actual actions and events with data. The advocacy of pragmatically focused causal investigation of both human actions and environmental relations, on the other hand, sits well with IK research with its focus on particular target issues such as deforestation and forest fires.

In conclusion, it is not simply that IK should inform "their" development but "ours" too, with its potential constructively not only to destabilize our idea of development but also of knowledge and how we use it, necessary to get onto a sustainable path. The Enlightenment informed view of progress—a process that improves peoples' standard of living, assessed largely in material terms, through advancing understanding and deployment of knowledge—is a culturally relative value-loaded Western idea, not a universal one as many Euro-Americans assume. In seeking to promote material advancement, we have harnessed science to technological innovation, with capitalist market competition thought as the most efficient way to distribute the products (an assumption based on the perfect market myth). It has led to rampant commoditization of most aspects of life in recent centuries, which has recently gone globally viral. While some people may see an opportunity to treat their cultural heritage as a commodity to profit from and secure the wherewithal to get on the materialistic bandwagon, others are more concerned to protect their cultural heritage and its associated values. They have something to teach us about the virtues of "non-commodification," a lesson that we need urgently to learn and act on, to bring us back into balance with the planet.

To mix (mangle?) my metaphors: having eaten of the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge, we cannot put the genie back in the lamp. The contradictory issues hinted at in the Book of Genesis partly explain my somewhat contrary and paradoxical tone (Proudhon 1888: 403–39). The simultaneous capacity of knowledge for both good and bad is an aspect of humanity's contradictory character, which several Asian religions elaborate on, as do the philosophy of dialectical materialism and structuralism. Perhaps the impression is of handwringing over the impossible, for we cannot unknow what we know. It is a question of balance, for as William Blake commented, "without contraries is no progression" (Keynes 1969: 149). We seem currently to be out of whack with our store of knowledge. We need to bring our quest to understand the world and our place in it into a more balanced relationship with how we use the acquired knowledge, and think about what we are doing in passing it on to others in the name of development with the laudable aim of reducing poverty, when we may be inexorably inching the entire planet towards poverty.

It is not just "we" who advance "their" development but vice versa too. This advocacy of a more equal two-way flow of knowledge is a challenge. It may result in people saying things that are disagreeable to the Western liberal-capitalist intellectual tradition, and probably unwelcome things about neocolonial domination, but we should not allow PC concerns to smother them, just as we should not let these hinder advancement of the IK agenda, which is not to argue that we ignore them. While we should "mind our Ps and Qs" to avoid unnecessary quarrels, we need to allow open debate. It inevitably has a political edge, even if not overt, whatever those who advocate more activism argue. The "Ps and Qs" warning, by the way, is shorthand—a snippet of English local knowledge—for "mind your pints and quarts," once a commonly heard call in taverns, when fierce arguments broke out, to patrons to look out for their mugs of ale. It captures something of the conciliatory ethos of IK work, which seeks to promote better understandings of what other parties know and reduce conflicts between different standpoints, without suppressing any. Frankly confronting our own differences in the same way, we may halt IK's faltering steps and get it more widely recognized in development contexts than currently.

Acknowledgements

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Philosophy in Anthropology

Nigel Rapport

Man's dignity demands that he be seen (every single one of us) in his particularity, and as such, be seen – but without comparison and independent of time – as reflecting mankind in general.

—Hannah Arendt: Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy

The Human and the Individual

'Philosophy in Anthropology' might seem a redundant title. Surely 'anthropology', the 'writing of humankind', already and always encompasses the philosophical? Indeed. A number of prominent anthropological voices have made this point, stipulating the discipline's necessary comprehensiveness as a kind of paradigmatic human science, or master humanity. Anthropology is an 'interdisciplinary discipline', Gregory Bateson (1959:296) surmised, non-specialist, for only through processing all manner of information, however amateurishly, can it hope to do justice to the immense intricacy of human experience. And again: anthropology must deploy an 'intellectual poaching license' (Kluckhohn, cited in Geertz 1983:21); it must practise as a 'virtual anti-discipline' (Hart 1990:10); it must recognize that it was 'born omniform' and refuse to be bound by any merely conventional narrowing of what 'the human' represents, entails or allows (Geertz 1983:21). Our experience is a complex whole: its science likewise.

There is, however, a question of emphasis. Enlightenment voices such as Immanuel Kant might have declared that anthropology's proper study was humankind – in its complexity and in its singularity – but then the 'Romantic' riposte of the likes of Johann Herder and Joseph de Maistre insisted that there was no such thing to know as 'humankind': only Germans and French, and so on, ensconced in specific communities of blood and soil. This, according to George Stocking (1992:347), was to give rise to a 'history of anthropology [that may] be viewed as a continuing (and complex) dialectic between the universalism of "anthropos" and the diversitarianism of "ethnos"', between human*kind* and communitarian *kinds*. Do we become human only by virtue of particular cultures or does our humanity (consciousness, creativity, individuality, dignity) transcend cultural specificities?

Stocking may view this question as a 'dialectic', but the situation should, I feel, be more accurately portrayed in terms of the orthodoxy that a relativistic 'culturalism' has come to represent in anthropology in recent decades. Critiques of Enlightenment humanism from post-colonial and post-structuralist standpoints have made a Kantian vision of anthropology as part-and-parcel of a cosmopolitan project – studying specific individual lives in order to

make universalist claims to knowledge and to morality – a submerged line of argument, to say the least (cf. Theodossopoulos and Kirtsoglou 2010). Hence the titling of this chapter, and its logic. 'Philosophy in anthropology' reasserts the discipline's universalist and humanist and cosmopolitan credentials. It recognizes 'the human' as a phenomenon transcendent of the particularities of culture and history and of superficial differences of social status and affiliation.

This transcendence is taken to be of vital significance, both scientific and ethical. Anthropology furnishes us with knowledge concerning human capacities to create meaningful worlds: this is a capacity lodged in individual bodies and more precisely in consciousness. Moreover, we find individual human beings exercising the imaginative and practical capacity to create their own meaningful worlds, to make sense, universally, whatever the local norms concerning personhood and identity (Burridge 1979). It could not be otherwise since our sense-making is an individually embodied facility and the perspective of others is one thing we can never know. Jean-Paul Sartre described this as being 'condemned to be free' (1975:352): in our freedom, it is inevitable that we will construe world-views and enact life-projects by virtue of our distinct individual bodies.

How we live with this truth is, however, not predetermined. Our freedom, our creativity, is such that we invent all manner of metaphysical systems, ideologies and symbologies – in a word, 'cultures' – in whose terms the ontology of individuality comes to be framed. It might be celebrated, as 'individualism', for instance; it might be excoriated, as a pathological departure from a collective homogeneity and 'dividualism'. We might, in other words, live our human individuality in a 'phantasy of groupness' (Laing 1968:81), imagining our sameness to certain others and our immersion in certain cosmologies to which we affiliate; or we might practise our individuality as singletons, refusing affiliation or ever engaged in 'alter-cultural actions' (Handler and Segal 1990) that deny conventional systems their normative weight. The point of a transcendent vision – and why anthropology should be imbued with a liberal sympathy – is that it can be no one's decision but the individuals' own how they will choose to inhabit their bodies, to practise their freedom. Human beings are individuals, and exercise their individuality, irrespective of the cultural idioms, the symbolic languages and classifications, in which they perforce express themselves. This is an ontological truth of the human condition, something pertaining to the nature of our being. Again in Sartre's terms, 'existence precedes essence' (1975:348). In other words, the need and the capacity to make sense of one's life precedes any actual sense that comes to be made: no identity is essential; no identity is binding; and no 'authentic' identity or decision on being can be externally imposed. In this 'identity work' (Stewart and Strathern 2000b), we are consigned to our own consciousness of self and world.

To write this truth is necessarily for anthropology to have a liberal or cosmopolitan mission (Wardle 2000; Rapport 2012). One would emancipate the human individual universally so that it might live in accordance with its own ongoing will for itself, able to fulfil its capacities for self-invention and self-satisfaction – whether this entails living against the weight of convention and tradition and community expectation or voluntarily aligned with these (Rapport 1997; Amit and Rapport 2002).

Human Capacities and Individual Substantiations

'The Nazis were a great falsehood, life's greatest falsehood', according to novelist Vasily Grossman (2010:90), for the lie they propagated concerning collective identity, exceptionalism and superiority. Theirs was a false philosophizing of communitarian particularism: 'German

blood, the German character, and the mission of the German race'. Nor is it an irresponsible comparison to adduce here the 'rabblement of postmodernist relativists and Foucauldian true believers' (Sass 1999:1) who would similarly deny a universalist, rational and moral vision. 'Liberalism must, in the end, be ready to be a fighting creed', writes Kwame Appiah (1994:159), considering the contemporary rise of fundamentalist and fascist movements. If the coercive imposition of collective identities threatens to inculcate a banal or unconscious essentialism, Appiah goes on, then liberal governance is needed to protect the autonomy of individual human beings so that they may author their own identities, life-projects and stories (even against their parents, their churches and their communities), and they may not be compelled to live as 'Quebecois' or 'Muslim', nor even as 'feminist' or 'gay', and this governance must be universal, or cosmopolitan, in ethos and scale.

But what then of 'false philosophizing' as a phenomenon? Even amid the act of murder, Grossman (2010) recounts, the Nazis would attest that Treblinka was a eugenic necessity and morally correct. How, then, can one be assured that the introduction of 'philosophy in anthropology' assists towards an overcoming of particular and conventional culturalist bias as opposed to its propagation? This is where the true dialectic of 'philosophy in anthropology' comes into play, I contend: ideally this is a tensile relationship. Philosophical claims concerning the nature of the human are there to be tested, critically investigated, potentially refuted, by anthropology. Philosophy portrays human being in the abstract: it is the duty of anthropology to translate this into the concrete of individual lives (Rapport 2010). What emerges from the dialectic is an appreciation of the relation between a general truth and its particular instantiations.

More precisely, I would describe 'philosophy in anthropology' as the relationship between universal human *capacities* and their unique individual *substantiations*. The human species shares certain capabilities and certain liabilities: we can all, for instance, imagine what is not physically present, while we may all die from heart failure. But how common human capacities come to be substantiated in an individual life is a unique coincidence of inheritance, circumstance and will: every life is finally indeterminate and unique. 'Philosophy' delivers certain insights into what it is to be human: 'anthropology' deploys ethnographic methods to put these to the test and delivers insights in turn into the particularities of what it can be to be an individual human being. The relationship is ongoing, bi-directional and incremental.

In apprehending human being in this dual aspect – as possessing the particularity of an individual embodiment and (as such) as instantiating humankind in general – we have heard from Arendt (1982:77), we give testimony to human dignity. It is through a recognition of individuality that we inscribe a human belonging, the integrity of the species. I see the work of anthropology as substantiating Arendt's claim: helping secure the human/individual and general/particular relationships both scientifically and ethically. The individual life comes to be appreciated – proved, celebrated – as a particular substantiation of universal human capacities. This dual work – generalizing and particularizing, rationalizing and moralizing – is the fulfilment of anthropology's Enlightenment heritage.

The structure to this chapter follows this logic. I offer a case-study of the dialectic between universal human capacities and particular individual substantiation: I bring the voice of one Rickey Hirsch into conversation with voices of philosophical generality.

A Close Reading of the Human: The Story of Rickey Hirsch

Reflecting on the Writing Culture Debate and its implications, Pamela Stewart and Andrew Strathern (2011:26) conclude that 'ethnography emerge[s] again as a prime instrument of

anthropologists, as it was before'. Moreover, the collecting of life-histories has played a significant if contested role in this ethnographic practice (Watson and Watson-Franke 1985; Stewart and Strathern 2000a). But again, it is a question of emphasis: providing a close reading of other lives is, I would suggest, what is primary in ethnography.

The phrase 'close reading' is originally associated with the Cambridge literary critics I.A. Richards and William Empson, and later F.R. Leavis. In their work they urged an orientation to a subject in its own terms and as a thing-in-itself; for instance, in a literary text one accorded absolute respect to the author's choice of words. As Leavis wrote: 'everything worth saying in criticism of verse and prose can be related to judgments concerning particular arrangements of words on the page' (1948:120). One recognizes a text as a self-sustaining phenomenon – whose reason for being exists inside itself – and one prescribes its reading as optimally deriving from the careful, sustained interpretation of its individual arrangement of words. In affording the text its own identity, one recognizes the text as providing its own context.

I would construe 'close reading' as more than an approach to literature narrowly conceived, however, and as concerning the authenticity of identity as such. It is commensurate, then, with the insistence found in the philosophical criticism of Søren Kierkegaard that one reads a human life in terms of its authentic specificity. 'People', Kierkegaard wrote (1958:1847), 'still consider it proud and haughty and presumptuous to talk about the individual when it is of course the really human attitude, namely, that everyone is an individual'. By 'people', here, Kierkegaard referred to adherents of a methodology derived from G.W.F. Hegel and whose popularity, even orthodoxy, in the mid-nineteenth century, Kierkegaard deeply regretted. According to this method, all that exists can be construed to be part of an encompassing, spiritual-cum-organic whole, or 'Geist': only in terms of this collectivity does the individual realize himself or herself. Under the influence of Hegel, human science was preoccupied with illusions of objectivity which had the paradoxical effect of smothering the vital core of human experience: subjectivity. Contrariwise, Kierkegaard insisted, to make an individual life incidental or accidental, only recognizable as part of a larger body or process, was to transform existence into something indifferent. Yet, there was nothing indifferent, incidental, about an individual's life to himself or herself, and any attempt at deciphering and inscribing the truth of human existence ought to begin from this point: existence was a narrow, inward, personal adventure, each person by himself or herself in the face of others and the infinite. This 'brute' existence had itself infinite depth and could not be reduced to or assimilated by 'surface' phenomena such as Zeitgeist, or conventional systems of norms, categories and social structures. The major failing of Hegelian (and other) systemicism was that it allowed abstractions to stand for concrete realizations and so transformed the latter's nature. It was not that systematic kinds of question – concerning human existence – did not have relevance, but that they made sense and had purchase on reality only in terms of existing individuals. Only living was like living and therefore an individual's personal experience could be reduced to nothing else but was a thing-in-itself: 'subjectivity is the truth' (Kierkegaard 1941:118). A human science must treat live issues in their appropriately living form.

Act I. Rickey and the Making of Circumstance

> *'So I'll tell you my story. My name is Rickey Hirsch, I am 84. I was born in 1924 and I grew up in Bucharest, Romania.'*

I am sitting in Rickey Hirsch's apartment, with views over downtown Montreal. Rickey (Figure 18.1) is an elderly man but he looks thin and fit and his voice, while gravelly, is

strong and full of animation. Rickey knows that I am an anthropologist; for a number of years he has himself been taking psychology courses offered by Concordia University of Montreal. We have met via mutual acquaintances and he has agreed to recount his life-story, since the circumstances might interest me and he feels what he has to say is worth recording. I sit with a tape-recorder and camera, but Rickey needs no prompting; indeed, he is remarkably fluent. Caught up in the excitement of his own tale, his voice often rises to squeaks and gives way to chuckles.

For reasons of space I must abridge his account here, but my effort is nevertheless to give an account of Rickey's life in his own terms. At the same time I wish to see in the particular substance of that life a wholly human set of capacities. That is, I would traverse a dialectic between the concrete particulars of Rickey's life and resonances in a 'philosophical' register concerning human being in its universal aspect.

Figure 18.1   My name is Rickey Hirsch

'Before the Germans came, Romania was still a free country. People from Poland even came there – immigrated – when Germany invaded Poland in 1939: all those who had money, they ran to Romania to escape. To Constanza. There's a harbour there, on the Black Sea, where big ships can come. People went wherever they could, to escape the Germans. I was still in school. And then, all of a sudden, Romania gave in: became an ally to the Germans. Because they didn't want to be occupied, I presume. It was very confusing at this time. Especially when you're a youngster: you don't know where you're going, you don't know what's happening. But they introduced a law that all the kids, all the boys, when they reached the age of 16, they had to come to work. Jewish people, I mean. And what jobs did they have for us? Either cutting wood for fire – and then they sold it or whatever, I don't know. Or else cleaning up the streets. We went in twos: one boy had a big broom almost the size of the kid – for me it was a gigantic thing – that you had to handle and brush the streets. And then because this was too hard for me, they put me to … they had public toilets in Romania: so this was the job of the weaker people, to clean up the toilets. Only Jewish people. We had to do that. But then, among the Jewish people there were some with connections: they could connect to somebody who was in the military or wherever. At that time, my father, again through a connection, was hired to work for the Postal Office. And working for the Postal Office, he had a uniform – distinguished that he is! So when they brought in the rules that we have to wear a sign that we are "Jew", my father was exempted because he had a uniform.

'I am not sure what my father was doing before the Postal Office. I think he was an interpreter but I'm not sure. He left my mother when I was three and my sister was four. He left us and he remarried when I was in my youth … Very confusing, and nobody was really taking care of either me or my sister. … They were poor, they were

workers, my parents. In my memory I don't see anything rich there. My mother was working, and I don't know what my father was doing. "Existing". I don't know what. … So my mother made a commitment to her mother, to take us in, and that's what happened. She took us in and she lived till she was 104, my grandmother. And what I am, who I am, how I am, how I survived: I say it's thanks to her. She was really our mother, our parents! That one woman. I don't have the reason for why my mother and my father behaved like this, because it's not there … I think their marriage was not solid to begin with. I think we children came unexpectedly to them and they could not handle the situation: they were probably young and wanted to make their own lives. I don't blame them.

'But I do blame my father for … he made a grave error towards me. He's dead now. I respect his name because I carry it, but there were moments where I wanted to kill him. Because, when he was working at the Postal Office, and he knew that I had to go to labour work – as "Jew" – he said to me: "You should run away, escape. If they catch you, get them to bring the case to me, the policemen, and I'll arrange it with them, and you can escape again." So I escaped. And they caught me. … Anyway, I convinced a sergeant, a policeman in the Gendarmerie, a soldier. They were supposed to take me to a court martial – because I had escaped – but I promised them that if they took me to my father, that my father would take care of them, make it worth their while just to turn their head and I'd disappear … When we came to my father – he was already married to another woman by then – I knocked on the door. Finally he came, opened up, and I remember my words to him: "Dad! You promised me: I've come now. Help me." He said: "I don't know this person. I don't know who he is!" So I got a slap in the face from the policeman. He thought I was the liar. I began to cry: I didn't know what to do.*

'They took me away, this time to the court martial, and they condemned me to 25 years of hard labour … Now there was another guy who was in the same situation as me: he was arrested, he was condemned, and we both decided we had to escape … You're young – we were both about 17 at the time – you dream, you have all kinds of inventions in your head that you're going to apply, and it's all going to work out well. Now, at the time, for transporting prisoners, they didn't have those trucks like now: if there was a distance to go, you travelled by train. And the trains were all full with soldiers – it was during the war, the war had started – and they were going towards Crimea, to Russia. And they didn't have any handcuffs for prisoners at the time, they had rope and a small piece of wood to secure it, and the hands were tied in front, not in the back. So, I know that we travelled, but I don't know where exactly. We travelled by horse and cart and by train. Not electric train, they were coal. And with all the smoke and the fumes and everything, we were black … We reached the place where we had to change trains for our destination. I don't remember: we'd been condemned to go and work wherever bridges had been destroyed by bombardment from the air. We were to stand in the deep water and carry whatever it was to try and rebuild the bridges … So, when we reached the stop to change trains, we had to go from one station to another station, through the streets. Me and the other guy who was handcuffed, we walked first with the soldier behind us. Suddenly, a lieutenant came towards us, an officer. And the rules were, whenever a soldier sees an officer, he must salute. This guy who was guarding us, he was so tired – his eyes were closed, I think – he didn't see him. So the lieutenant stopped him, slapped him and put him under arrest! Took him away! And we were free!*

'… The second night or the third night on the run, we were so tired … We were in the train station, looking for empty cars that we could sneak into and sleep. … There was a train going to Constanza, and we went on it. And now, again, we have to survive; in Constanza. … So we go into a bar and we see a sign for "Liberty Ships". Because it was still possible to get out of Romania at that time, from Constanza, if you have money. Aristocrats. Even rich Jews going to Palestine – it was still "Palestine" at that time – and Liberty Ships were taking them. And Polish people, too … Well, I don't remember how, but I ended up in one of those ships, as a dishwasher. … For a time when I was on the ship I wore the American uniform with the other sailors: the little white cap, and blue pants … A coloured sailor had drowned himself by jumping into the sea and an acquaintance of mine took his chain, with the number and name on it, and gave it to me. So that I appeared like a … so that nobody was going to touch me. I did other things too: I used to take bed sheets from the ship, tie them around my body, take them out of the harbour, and sell them. And with the money I bought guns, revolvers. … Say I got 100 dollars for the bed sheet, then I bought a gun for 100 dollars and I gave it back to the sailors: I was getting nothing, I didn't make any business: I was just making the exchange for them. And they were hiding me and keeping me, as long as the ship was in the harbour. I guess I was doing the sailors a favour and they were doing me a favour. To the point where I think there were no more bed sheets in any of the cabins!

'The guts I had as a child! … But before all this I had to go to school; when my grandmother was taking care of us, the mother of my mother … My sister and me: we were brilliant in school. We had this gift of learning very quickly. Not because we were Jews, but because the other Romanian children were not so smart, so intelligent: understanding a lesson, how to learn, how to provide yourself with information from the teacher. At the time we had one teacher for practically the whole day, teaching Math, English, all subjects, and they would grade you, on the benches, according to your intelligence. If you were in the first row, you were okay: if you were put in the last one – you know how bad you are! So one day, the door is opened and a lady with a kid comes in. But the kid looks a little strange to me. And I see the lady talking to the teacher, and the teacher pointing to me, and it was decided: they brought this child to sit by me so that I could help him at anything. His name was Levio Edelstein. I didn't know but he had polio. I saw the way he was moving his body and his legs – and when you're a child you're afraid of somebody who is not as normal as you think you are. But my fear disappeared because he made a great exchange: every day he brought me a ham sandwich. Which was unheard of! Because he was the son of a famous engineer, and his grandfather was a colonel in the army, so they were very rich. And this friendship continued for about three years, I think, in the class. Every Saturday, also, I was invited to their house for lunch, where I learned my manners, learned how to behave, how to eat with a fork and a knife. Meanwhile it helped them that their son absorbed what they were teaching me in school – so not minimizing his potential but the opposite. …

'You know, Nigel, I think I might make your life bitter: all these stories of mine! … Heh, heh! … But then during the wartime I was sleeping wherever. Any hiding place I could stay in. I slept in a bordello: I was hidden by some of the girls there who were sleeping with German soldiers. One of them brought me a Parabellum, and I said: "With this I'm going to kill my father." And I wanted to. But I didn't find him. Maybe it was his luck and mine both, because my conscience would have been even worse … But like this now: I'm happy the way I am. I went through all this … Ehhhhh, when I take you back now … I grow up again myself.'

375

Barring Rickey's allusion to his parents' youth and poverty and his pondering of their motives, which might as well be an aside to himself, this is the first time that Rickey has broken the flow of his narrative to address me directly. It is also an apposite point for me now to interrupt him and to consider the character of his narration. For while I must shorten Rickey's account, all the words transcribed here are his and they admit a close reading.

Rickey is an animated and captivating narrator. But I am also struck by the way in which he himself lives or relives the account as he tells it, so that he 'grows up again himself'. There may be gaps in the narrative – 'I don't have the reason for why' – and there may be moments when Rickey finds it hard to reconcile his present and former selves – 'The guts I had as a child!' However, the overriding impression I receive as listener is that in his animated narration Rickey is present to himself: the character I am hearing about is the character whom Rickey feels himself to be. I feel he is being truthful to himself and to me too.

Who is this character? An image of philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson's (1981:275) comes to mind: 'We live amid surfaces, and the true art of life is to skate well on them'. The image appears in an essay ('Experience') where Emerson identifies life's 'inscrutable possibilities' (1981:271). To be healthy, Emerson advises, is, insofar as it is possible, to anticipate and accept the unexpected: life is a series of surprises, and it is this that gives it its value. Rickey's capacity and his character, I suggest, is to skate 'healthily' across the landscape of his history: war-torn Europe, a broken nuclear family, anti-Semitic discrimination are the surfaces, but there is a centre of consciousness, of feeling, dream, capability and will, that exists apart from the helter-skelter of difficulty. I mean I am conscious of Rickey as a skater, keeping himself balanced above happenstance, even above relationality. For not only is he at home with himself, he has a home in himself: ultimately Rickey is home in himself.

Related to 'Experience' is an essay Emerson entitles 'Society and Solitude'. His theme here is that there is a sense in which society is 'vulgar' and petty so often, concerned with conventionalism, gossip, back-biting and currying the good opinions of others and this can be fatal to a person's independence and pride, Emerson concludes (1981:393). As he elaborates elsewhere: 'Let the glory of the world go where it will, the mind has its own glory. … I feel a joy in my solitude that the merriment of vulgar society can never communicate' (1958:37). ('My idea of a home', Emerson admits (1958:318), 'is a house in which each member of the family can on the instant kindle a fire in his or her private room. Otherwise their society is compulsory and wasteful to the individual'.) And yet Emerson also recognizes that solitude is impracticable: society is inevitable and necessary, and the source of animal pleasures and sympathies. The solution, Emerson concludes (1981:394), and the skill, is to 'keep the diagonal line': 'keep our heads in the one [solitude] and our hands in the other [society]'; this way we 'keep our independence, yet do not lose our sympathy'.

Rickey would seem to me paradigmatic of Emerson's 'diagonal line'. Skating across physical landscapes, slipping in and out of relationships, assuming and dropping roles and personae, Rickey's practical dexterity is balanced by an independent consciousness. The social is necessary and often pleasurable – Rickey finds comradeship in his escaping from hard labour, on the Liberty ship, and receives valuable help from the sailors, from prostitutes, from Levio's family and from his maternal grandmother – but it is as if the social remains distinct from the self-conscious project of Rickey ensuring his survival, as himself and on his terms and conditions. The social is a surface and he shows himself adept at negotiating its demands while retaining his independent stance.

The details of Rickey's account have so far evinced a mix of cunning, luck and kindness, of taking and making opportunity. At the core of this is a capacity Rickey demonstrates to *make his own way*. I mean that what happens in Rickey's history has a kind of dialectic quality comprised of how he attends to what is before him. The circumstances of Rickey's life emerge from a particular coming together of internal and external properties; it is as if

Rickey appropriated what was before him in such a way that he was able to make it conform to, or at least become commensurate with, his own intentionality. Emerson, once more, depicts an existential capacity for individual human beings to 'make their own circumstance' (1981:95). It comprises, he explains, a certain alertness to events, forces and structures that translates into a creating of opportunity. Here is a power of the person, an individual nature, constituted by self-balance, self-reliance, self-examination, self-sustenance, self-recovery and self-evolution, and this nature preceded, perdured and transcended, the proximal particularities of historical situations, social structures and cultural normativities:

> I make my circumstance. Let any thought or motive of mine be different from that they are, the difference will transform my condition and economy. I – this world which is called I – is the mould into which the world is poured like melted wax. The mould is invisible but the world betrays the shape of the mould. You call it the power of circumstance, but it is the power of me. (Emerson 1981:95)

It is Emerson's judgement that even under 'the oldest mouldiest conventions a man of native force prospers just as well as in the newest world, and that by skill of handling and treatment' (1981:275). Returning to his life-story, we have further opportunity to consider the ways and extents to which Rickey's 'native force' afforded him the capacity – amid social 'conventions' that were as murderous as they were 'mouldy' – to effect an identity and a life-course that were essentially his own.

Hiding out in Constanza, acquiring sustenance and shelter from any source, Rickey takes up his story again when the war takes a decisive turn.

Act II. Rickey and the Solving of Problems

> 'Then the Russians began to advance. Into Romania to get to Hungary. So I decided to go towards the Russians, so that I could come back with them. And I got affiliated with another guy: a plain-clothes police agent who wanted to escape too, to America: he wanted to go with me. And being a policeman, he had an identity card. On one side the identity card had his picture, and his status as a secret agent – or whatever you want to call him – and the other side was like a pass for all the street cars and the buses. And he also had a little insignia on his lapel, showing that he was a policeman. So, to cover me, he gave me the bus pass and the insignia, and he kept the other identity card … And the Russians accepted us – because it was part of the military code or whatever, that policemen were under protection. Whatever it was. Anyway, … Romania was nothing then, militarily. The Germans were retreating, causing what damage they could, trying to leave everything destroyed. The English were bombing: Romania was just a disaster area. In just a very short time, I think, we reached Budapest. … But we didn't hang out too long in Budapest, and we went on to Vienna. And I become sort of a translator for UNRA: United Nations refugee stuff … There was a captain, a woman captain, who got to like me, and they needed information on all the people who were now floating around Austria, from all countries. To know if they're really not intruders, or whatever. But I was young, stupid: they offer me a job like a spy, CIA, and I immediately went and told all the other boys! So the first day of my appointment there was a long line-up of people, all wanting to be spies like me! Ha ha. So they realize that I am too young, too stupid: they cannot rely on me for anything. But she kept me, the captain, just because she liked me: she kept me there and I used to get coupons for rations. Everybody with a coupon got a food package every day,

and I had several coupons, so I could sell some of the packages to make some money on the side ... But there was a lot of contraband about. ... But I didn't want to be part of it any longer. But how do you get out of there? I find out that the only way to get out is to join the French Foreign Legion, who were sending people to Belabes. The French Foreign Legion put you in locked and sealed train cars, and then when they go through Austria, nobody stops them, nobody checks them. So I got together all my possessions and went to the French Legion: Sidi Belabes, that was the place I was supposed to go to. Algeria ... Heh, heh! When I think of it now, it's a laugh, it's a joke. At the time it was very serious. Now it's just so funny. So we went the next day, in the morning.

'We were supposed to get on the train and go to Bregenz. Bregenz is a little small village on the border of Switzerland and Austria. And it was also the headquarters of the French Legion, from where they were sending people to Sidi Belabes. So I came to Bregenz, and they put us up there in a very nice house. But before getting on the train that transported us from Vienna, I had spent everything I had, all my money. All I had left was my luggage, a few German Marks, a watch, things like that. Next thing I know, I come back to the house and everything has disappeared: stolen! After all, who were in the French Foreign Legion? Bandits, criminals, all kinds of guys! I was just a puppet there. What was I doing there! I was happy to be accepted, and get out of Vienna, but the next day, in the morning, when they came to do a medical and see how strong you were, I said: "Listen, I'm a Jew. I just came from a concentration camp. Do you think I'm going to another one? I'm not going anywhere!" So they sent me down to sweep the courtyard with another guy, a Hungarian, while they discussed it among themselves. In the courtyard there were big iron gates, that you could see through. So I'm working with this guy Tibi, the Hungarian, and all of a sudden we hear voices speaking Hungarian, passing by. I look and I see two religious Jews – with the hat, and all the uniform they wear – and they were speaking Hungarian! So Tibi goes immediately to the gate, and calls them, and says: "Listen, we are Jews. Look at where they brought us! We want to get out of here." So they promised that they would do something about it, and they did. Next day, they came and took us out. I don't know what arrangement they made with the French. They took us out but they said that we could not stay there: they would get tickets for us – give us tickets – and we would get on a train. We weren't to speak to anybody, in any language. Then, at one point before the border, the train was going to slow down; we would see a man jump off, and right after him we were both to jump, too. The Jewish people were smugglers of watches, gold, diamonds. Who knows who they were? That's what they were doing: smuggling contraband over the border! But we were in good hands. Because we got taken down to the train, given tickets. And we jumped ... You know, you can cross any border any time, even today. It's easy if you find the way and you know the people. It's no problem: the problem is when you are there, not to be caught! ... So we go and sure enough Italian police surround us, and arrest us. ... It is 1945, after Italy had been liberated. So, there we are in the camp, for displaced people. But we have an address. And mail comes every day, and they distribute the mail in the camp like you are a soldier in a regiment. And say they had a friend in France and he tells them in a letter: "Come to France: in Italy there's nothing! Here, they give you this and this." But now you need to travel there: you need somebody who knows the road. So that's what I did: found the road for them, spoke the language: I was their Gruppenführer. I know my vocabulary is very poor, but I can speak enough to get across what I want to say. People understand me in most languages. (You only learn languages one way, you*

know? By force. You learn because you have no choice: if you want a glass of water, you have to communicate. And when you're young you absorb things very easily.) Okay, so I become the "Gruppenführer". … You know, we laugh, but it wasn't funny while we were doing it. But I had the guts to do it! I can't believe it myself: me, this small little kid, skinny like this, with such experiences in my mind. It's hard to believe this myself when I relive these experiences now in my mind. … Anyway, so now the year is about 1946. In '44 I left Romania, with the Russians. And I think '44 was the year the war ended. … All my struggles, just because of religion. … So now another episode: I go to Israel. And again an adventure.

'I was a Machad. Do you know what "Machad" is? It's a volunteer. I was recruited in Italy, with four or five or six other boys, and we were to go to Israel. We were promised that they were going to give us a house, blankets, everything. We're going to have a farm, it was going to be all ours. But in the meantime I have another proposition from a guy who wants me to go with him to Libya. Why? Because I had lots of girlfriends and he was intending to open up a nightclub, and I was to bring all the girls there and we would make a business together. Well, that didn't inspire me much!

'I was still living in a camp at that time, and the fiancée of the director of the camp fell in love with me. And so I was in danger of being kicked out of the camp, by the director. There was another young girl, too, a farmer, who fell in love with me. She would bring me chicken, roast chicken, leave it by the camp fence, and we would kiss and she would be happy. I don't know if I was happy! Because I just wanted to escape that camp. So, they were collecting volunteers to go to Israel. They had a kind of representative there who was looking for people to volunteer … but how did I get to him? I remember I was in Lido. I remember I was in Rome … But how? … It needs deep, deep thinking to try to get these memories that are already dead … Somehow they put us on a ship, and they sent us to Israel.

'I don't know where we landed. I know we were downloaded into inflatable boats and we were guided to a shore: there was a lot of sand. Then they said to everybody: "Stay here. Two trucks, two buses, will come and pick you up and take you to the Machaneh – how do you say, 'training camp' – where the military instruction and everything is done, and exercises, and you sleep there." So the buses came, they took us to the Machaneh, and in two days I was already a sergeant! Ha ha. They taught me and then I was instructing the other people how to utilize their arms. I had a good kop, a good head, and I learnt fast. I spoke the language. They needed me. Because the immigrants didn't speak Hebrew. They spoke Italian or Jewish or German, or French. So you have to teach these people in their own language: you can't teach them Hebrew when you need them quickly at the front with a rifle. So I was a great asset to them – I didn't realize just how much they needed me. But I have no idea where this camp was. I cannot even … Pffft.

'The English were still there, of course, at the time. That's the reason we couldn't disembark in the harbour. Anyway, I stayed in Israel about five years. Most of the time I was in the army. … But before the British left, no one suspected a war with the Arabs. The Druze were allies with the Israelis: they were both fighting to throw the English out. And only when England decided to go and they finished with Palestine, then the trouble began between the Arabs and Jews. Until then they were okay: after, they were separate. I was very upset. I worked as a waiter in Israel for a time, and there

was a guy, a barman, named Jewel, a very, very nice individual. An Arab. One day per week, when we were free, we used to go drinking together. He used to take me to Arab places – what they called "maza". They give you a bottle of arak, and all kinds of little things, sour things and hummus, and you eat and drink, and you tell stories, and you sing: a happy time. But Jewel would express his sorrow, about his family, about the loss of their property – and not only the property, also about why the Arab leaders had scared other Arab people into running away. They said: "If you stay here, the Israelis are going to kill you." And it was not true. Because the Jews had other problems to deal with: enough problems. Like finding accommodation for their people. The Israeli leaders – Ben Gurion, and then Golda Meir – they would probably have paid or asked the Arabs to support them and help them: to arrange the immigration.

'I don't know if my Arab friend is still alive or what. But in 1952 I got married, and I also quit the country. My wife was Romanian: she came with the boat Daltalena, that had gotten returned from Haifa to Cyprus. She stayed in Cyprus two years before she could get to Haifa! Anyway, I decided to quit Israel because there was no way to make a living there. They didn't have any meat, they didn't have any eggs, they didn't have anything! … So, I decided to leave. I wanted more than this. There were ships going to Europe, and I knew that there were still camps for Displaced Persons in Germany, mostly for Jewish people. (There weren't any more in Austria, or Italy, just concentrated now in Germany, the last refuge (maybe there were two still available in France).) Anyway, we decided we were going to go to Germany, but on our Israeli passports it was stamped that we were allowed to go anywhere in Europe except for Germany. Because of relations between Israel and Germany – the Germans making the People suffer so. But we found a way to cross from Austria into Germany (and before that from Italy to Austria), illegally, and so we reached the camp. We had to sneak in because we had no Acceptance Papers to live there. One night we slept with some friends we knew; another night somewhere else; and you could also buy room-space for a certain amount of money. … But then somebody squealed on us, because we weren't registered there as Displaced, and the police arrested us and put us in jail. My wife was still a minor, so they put her in a jail for minors, and I was with all the other criminals. For about three months. Until the Jewish National Fund found out about us and came and released us – on the condition that we would go back to Israel. But we didn't go back to Israel. Instead, we made an application for Brazil. Brazil was available. See, everybody was dreaming about the United States: "America", "America". That was their dream. These displaced people, they could have gone back to Hungary, Poland, wherever, after the war, but it would have meant starting life there all over again: all they had before was destroyed. But then my wife got pregnant and they wouldn't let us go to Brazil. My son was born in the camp – we even gave him a Brazilian name so he would be at home – but they wouldn't let us in. Then, my wife's sister was married to a fellow whose mother was already in Canada – in Hamilton – and she made out papers for us to go there. I don't know for what: a restaurant was going to give me a job, and I was to go work there! This was 1953.

'And so I came to Canada. And I have no regrets! You can't make comparisons with what might have happened elsewhere. You accommodate yourself. In your mind, anyway, is just how to make money. Work: make money: work. In order to have security. Because I had learned that we live in a world where if you do not have money, you do not live. With money you can buy life. Or whatever. You can buy land, gold. (If you plan on moving around, don't buy land, buy gold.) But you know,

it's uppermost in your mind when you're displaced: security. How are you going to handle yourself? You have no family, you have nobody who's going to give you any advice. Your neighbour is going to take the blanket for himself, not you. … What is more important for the individual is himself: taking care of his survival. … Maybe the first time you get a bit emotional about death, but after that … I worried for nobody but myself. Not my sister, even. …

'So, 1954 or 1955 we came to Canada, me, my wife and my son. My daughter was born two or three years later. I had no real goal: my ambition was just to make enough substance, money, that we could survive as a family, and not worry. Especially the children: not to go through what we went through. With four dollars in my pocket, and not really a profession, I had to make my way by myself. All the way through. I had no choice. I was cut off: no mother, no father, no home or family to protect me. I had no time to think, I just had to survive. I could not go back to school, I had to bring up the family. We were hungry to have everything, and they had an abundance here: furniture, television. And we had nothing. My grandmother used to say: "You're poor not if you've got an empty pocket: you're poor if you've got an empty head." Ha ha. You're poor not in your pocket but in your mind; if you're poor in your mind you can't provide yourself with what you need to survive. The story of a life is created by the individual: you create. Some people give up. They don't try. But if a life ends up being good or being bad, it's because of the individual's own decisions. I took my chances and my decisions. I knew I was capable of doing it. I try. If you ask me to hire myself out in a whorehouse, I'll be in a whorehouse. So what? What's wrong with that? I survive. If I succeed, it's good for me. …

'But I think I'll stop here for now. Can we stop? It's a long … it's years! And it's a different feeling when you say it to when you go through it. I can't believe now what I was capable of doing then.'

Rickey has been speaking for a while. The details of his story, the episodes, have seemed to me amazing, bordering on the incredible. Rickey had sensed this at one point and joked: 'You probably thought that what I was describing came from a book: you didn't believe it was me who went through it all!' His laughing admission of how incredible his story must seem was indeed disarming. One may also corroborate certain details in the topography of the tale: Sidi Belabes, 'Liberty Ships' (2,751 were built, primarily for American cargo, between 1941 and 1945), Rickey's mother working in Bucharest's 'Galeries Lafayette' (a detail I have not so far mentioned), the 'Parabellum' or Luger P08 pistol, Bregenz and the 'Bricha' (the Hebrew word for 'escape') which clandestinely organized the extra-jurisdictional movement of Jews from Eastern Europe across the Occupied Zones, ultimately to Palestine.

I have described the sense I had that Rickey, so alive to his own story, so immersed in his extremely animated narration, was most at home in himself. He passed between places and situations – skated on the surface of social relations – always keeping his own counsel and doing what was necessary to move his story forward. An image of Gregory Bateson's seems to me relevant here: the body as an 'energy source'. To be a living organism, argued Bateson, is to transform information about the world into meaningful maps of the world and this is effected by virtue of metabolic processes that are energized internally: a bodily organism is a kind of energy centre, a 'source of energy' (1973:427). There may be different logical levels to life: 'World', comprising material objects, and 'Body', comprising hardware and metabolic supplies and processual channels, and 'Mind', comprising the narrative of thoughts and ideas; but body is crucial. In order for any organism to exist in the world and

to develop a mind and formulate strategies of survival, there must be energy that is sourced from an embodied metabolism and directed towards discerning information: 'that trial-and-error system which is necessary for dealing with the environment' (Bateson 1973:426).

Rickey's environment was dangerous and changeable. Throughout his narration he evinces a capacity not just to make his own way across the landscape but to find his own way to solving the problems besetting him. He makes himself useful, to Levio as to the sailors at Constanza. He inveigles his way into the affection of the female American captain in Vienna who provides him with ration cards as of the Italian farmer who provides him with chicken and kisses. He gets money for food by selling purloined bed sheets and parquet flooring. He joins the French Foreign Legion to escape the American zone in Austria; he uses the *Bricha* to divest himself of the Foreign Legion and then the Italian DP camps, only to use a DP camp in Germany to divest himself of Israeli citizenship and acquire Canadian. All this calls for energy, perseverance and skill in sociocultural manoeuvring. Above all it evinces a form of problem-solving.

The capacity to solve problems was one that Karl Popper made central to his theorization of organic life: 'all organisms are constantly, day and night, engaged in problem-solving', he wrote (1975:242). Organic life, barring a few multicellular structures lacking single central nervous systems, is individualized, Popper elaborates. However, organisms do not represent closed systems (as, say, do crystals). Material particles and energy are exchanged across the border. Nevertheless, while dynamic, organisms remain identifiably individual, unique both genetically and experientially. Human beings know from introspective experience, for instance, that they are one, even while their attention may become divided and their experiences highly complex; each human being has dreams and dreads known only to themselves and only guessed at by others. At the same time, individual organisms are anchored in a wider world. Indeed, human beings are almost always active and acting in a world beyond themselves. They expend energy to observe this world, to plan and hope, and they also observe themselves as active centres within it. Observation entails an active engagement, both on the level of vision and on the level of perception. To see is to solve problems of visual coding; to perceive is to work to make coded information, both physical and metaphysical (or cultural) (Popper and Eccles 1977:44–6).

The nature of human engagement with the world, Popper admits, is manifold. It includes the imaginative and the intuitive alongside the empirical. The so-called irrationalism or emotionalism of art and the rationalism or intellectualism of science are both methods of exploring the world and endeavouring to articulate search-findings, extending the comprehension of experience through critical engagements. In short, living is first and mostly a process of problem-solving, Popper concludes, and it is the part played by problems and solutions in the evolution of the life of organisms that differentiates them significantly from the inorganic universe. Human beings employ an active and subjective consciousness to alter significantly their natural-selective chances:

> *By individual action, the organism may 'choose', as it were, its environment …. Thus the activity, preferences, skill, and the idiosyncrasies of the individual animal may directly influence the selection pressures to which it is exposed. (Popper and Eccles 1977:12)*

Far from the human organism passively receiving information from outside itself, problem-solving can be appreciated as the human organism instructing itself, deciding on its environment, and being rewarded for the viability of its speculations through failure or success in life. In sum, if human beings are active creators of circumstance then they create by way of problem-solving; the character of human lives, both as kinds of animal and as

unique individuals, derives from active attempts to solve problems in particular ways – whose outcomes derive from luck as well as effort and choice. 'I took my chances and my decisions', is Rickey's own summary.

Act III. Rickey and Civil Recognition

A week later I meet Rickey one further time in his apartment. The space is tidy but full of possessions, paintings too. Rickey notices me admiring them:

> 'These are my paintings. Sometimes I sign the work "Rickey", sometimes "Rickey Hirsh", and sometimes just "R"! I started with "Rickey" and then someone said, "Do your whole name". This was an art dealer and auctioneer: he said he would make me a name. "Put your full name and I will promote you. I'll make you a c.v.", and all kinds of things like that. But I think it was mostly Jews he was talking about selling to – not "The Big Time". But that's why you see different signatures. I wasn't sure about H-i-r-s-h to begin with, because in German pronunciation it's "Heersh". But in English you have to spell it with two "e"s instead of an "i" to make that sound. So people call you "Hirsh", and you feel insulted, because it's not your name. But that's it: you're stuck with it! … But a name doesn't mean a thing, really. I don't know your full name, Nigel. But I know your face: I feel your character. A name's not important to me.

> 'So, my story: you want to hear more of my story. … Where were we? 1954 or 1955 we came to Canada, me, my wife and my son. What I had seen, in my passage through life, was that the people who had money could save or prolong their life a day or an hour or a week more. Because they had something to purchase more time with. So that was what was in my head: in the end I became the President of the International Association of Driving Schools. I was powerful in the Quebec government. I appeared in a half-an-hour programme on CBC Television, with the presenter Barbara Smith (she's in Toronto now). So when somebody tells me they're poor, I question it: "What do you mean?"

> '… We never got as far as Hamilton or my wife's relatives who had signed for us. We got off the train at Montreal. Someone I met on the ship said he had a brother-in-law in Montreal who was going to help me. So I go and I meet this guy, at "The Balkan Restaurant": the brother-in-law. He invited me. So there we are, he orders his food, he eats it, and then at the end he asks me if I want a cup of coffee! Big help! But I did like the flavour of the city. Maybe a month or two later – maybe six – when we finally visited Hamilton, and I saw the city, I never regretted stopping at Montreal. At that time, Ontario was very Catholic. All the stores closed on Sunday – Saturday afternoon and Sunday – there was no liquor sold at all. All this made the place like a mortician's! A dead city. I would have gotten bored like hell.

> 'So I began work in Montreal as a waiter. Like I had in Italy, too, Germany, Israel, on the ship, all over. I worked at "Moishe's", and a short time in a deli on Park, and then finally in "Ruby Foo's". My wife got an old tuxedo and made it fit me, and the lining she made into a bowtie. I don't know how I looked – Believe you me! – but I made it. Today I probably wouldn't put on something like that. But when you're hungry, everything on the plate tastes good! Two to two-and-half years I worked as a

waiter in Ruby Foo's. Till I felt I had some reserves of money in my pocket. Because if you have reserves you can take chances, not like if you have to pay the rent next day and you have no money. Ruby Foo's was a great place: a lot of life, a lot of movement. Like a family. (Now it's different there – like everywhere else. All about individuals.) But it was fun. It was a free country, a free city in those days, everybody laughing and enjoying themselves. And warm: it was an open city, gambling all over the place. I know I did a lot of foolish things before I set up the Montreal City Motor League. But I had guts: I never had an education. But I never thought I was going to fail: I always thought I was going to win. And by trying, you find out whether you fail or not, eh? And if you don't try how can you know? Life is about trying: if you don't try something, you'll never know. "Don't say you've been unlucky in life if you've not played the Lotto!" Ha ha.

'I'll jump to another episode. I was still living on Clark Street, and nearby, on the corner of St Lawrence and Mount Royal, was a bank: "Royal Bank of Canada". And the director of the bank was Mr Smith. And people had told me that whatever money I had I should put it in a bank. But not all in one bank: a little bit here, a little bit there, a little bit there. Like this, the government wouldn't be able to follow you; and the police wouldn't follow you! Anyway, I'm a likeable person, and this guy Smith gets to like me, and one day he calls me in his office and he says: "I have some good news for you! … We have a wire, here, that says you have inherited a large amount of money from Poland! You were in Israel, yeah?" "Yes, I was in Israel." "But then you left Israel, and the banks have traced your name here and found it corresponds to the name on the will." But there was a difference: the guy they were looking for was born in Poland. I wasn't. But they were overlooking that, the banks were, and only looking at the names. But I still told them the truth. Then I came home and I told my wife, and she said: "What a stupid idiot you are! Why didn't you just say it was you, and get all the money?" But I had been caught by surprise and I couldn't fabricate anything, so I told Mr Smith the truth. So, a bit later I need a car. A Pontiac 1953 was what I wanted to buy, and it cost 900 dollars. But I didn't have any money. Now: you can get a bank loan, but for that you have to have seven signatures, seven people to guarantee you. But where are you going to get seven people? Everybody is going to say: "If I do this for you, you gotta do that for me." So I told this to Mr Smith and Mr Smith says: "No problem: you got the 900 dollars. Go buy the car!" See what I gained? I gained so much confidence – in credit and esteem – because I was honest! And that's the way I built up the driving school. Through Mr Smith.

'The first driving school was called, "Rickey's Driving School". I was the only school working 11 o'clock at night. At the end I operated 40 cars, 40 instructors. … But what guts I had in those days! The Montreal Mayor at the time I set up the driving schools' association, the Montreal City Motor League, was Monsieur Belon. So I asked Mayor Belon to become an honorary member of my association! Ha ha. Do you understand the magnitude of chutzpah to ask that! Ha ha. So, I was an inventor, a creator. …

'I take courses at the university, now. You know? Psychology, mostly. For many years. I like the scepticism of it: "Everything is changeable"; "Accept a theory for the moment only. Play with it. If it works for you, use it." … But you have to have imagination: I was the only Jew they ever had as President of the Quebec Driving Schools' Association. With access to the Legislature and to open doors in Quebec City. Never!'

I must draw this reading of Rickey's life to a close (a fuller appreciation occurs in Rapport 2012). What is of note here is the somewhat different Rickey that emerges once Canada and Montreal are reached. Elements continue – Rickey's emphasis on making his luck through trial and error, his exercising a feral stamina, 'The guts I had!' – but other aspects of his life accrue a new weighting: family, openness, trust, reciprocity, profit. Making Montreal a home is effected by responding to the opportunity it offers to the gambler and worker but also by virtue of the friendliness in the restaurants where Rickey waits on table, the helpfulness of a bank manager, the politeness of a Catholic-Quebecois Mayor willing to deal publicly with a Jew, the recognition of CBC Television. From displacement, Rickey finds a country and city 'free to everybody'.

'La politesse' was the title of a lecture of Henri Bergson's (2008 [1885]) in which he considered the relationship between etiquette and ethics. Do norms of civility speak to morality? Are good manners any guarantee of universal social recognition, of social enfranchisement and security? On the face of it, not. Politeness of manners, or what Bergson chose to call 'social politeness', comprising ready-made formulae, formal graces and habits, are to be distinguished from a 'politeness of spirit': the empathy and sympathy involved in taking on another's point of view, imagining another's unique life. Nor are either of these politenesses the same as a 'politeness of heart': deeming another worthy of trust and assuming that they will reciprocate a trusting engagement. The point for Bergson, however, was that these three politenesses, while phenomenally distinct, might be mutually implicated in practice. The formal practice of social politeness might engender a politeness of spirit and then a politeness of heart if the social practice was entered into with sufficient diligence and regularity: civility of a universal, cosmopolitan kind might indeed emerge if one was unstinting in one's politeness.

Bergson's analytic journey around 'social', 'spiritual' and 'hearty' politenesses is premised on a certain humanist universalism. Those to whom one is formally polite and then sympathetic and then trusting come to be recognized not only as social others but increasingly as commensurate to oneself. Bergson's intended moral journey is from surface to depth, also from otherness to ownness, and also from general to particular. Bergson's moral terminus is a kind of cosmopolitan ethic that recognizes any human individual as a potential member of the polite interaction: capable of interacting, worthy of sympathy and trust. Politesse, the exchange of politenesses, may indeed deliver on a commitment to human dignity. Is Rickey's journey from the Nazis' non-recognition to the French-Canadians' inclusiveness and the openness of Montreal society a Bergsonian one?

Bergson's concerns have been revisited more recently by Martha Nussbaum (1996), in her discussion of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis patriotism. Key to cosmopolitanism for Nussbaum is an ethic of universalist civility. The allegiance of the cosmopolitan is not to any *patrie* nor even to a particular social structure or system of government, but to humanity, recognized as being a worldwide community of human beings. To be cosmopolitan is to 'recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect' (Nussbaum 1996:7). The cosmopolitan ethic is more than a merely localized civility and good-mannerliness, then, for it comes into conflict with nationalism and indeed with all manner of collective particularism and exceptionalism (to recall Vasily Grossman), whether ethnic, religious, class-based or gendered. Nor is it without personal risk, which is why The Avenue of Righteous Gentiles at Israel's Holocaust Memorial in Jerusalem, Yad Vashem, is such a key cosmopolitan symbol. It publicly commemorates and celebrates those who felt empowered to save a stranger, a human being, at risk to themselves, in a work that combined a universal politeness, sympathy, empathy and trust in defiance of powerful ideologies of exclusive communitarianism. But what might it be to construct a society in which the Righteous Gentile is a norm realized as

widely as possible, even legally and institutionally promoted? It is a question not only of the morality of manners but of humanist universalism as a local practice. To be civil in this way, Nussbaum suggests, is to recognize an intrinsic contingency to human life: 'the accident of where one is born is just that, an accident; any human being might have been born in any nation' (1996:7); and again:

> The accident of being born a Sri Lankan, or a Jew, or a female, or an African-American, or a poor person, is just that – an accident of birth. It is not and should not be taken as a determinant of moral worth. Human personhood, by which I mean the possession of practical reason and other basic moral capacities, is the source of our moral worth, and this worth is equal. (1996:133)

The individual human being metonymizes a human whole. This is our ontological reality. All other allegiances – to nation, religion, ethnicity, class, even gender – are epiphenomenal, accidental. And it is on the basis of a universal ontology that one constructs a universal morality. Human personhood delivers a universal moral worth. To establish a cosmopolitan ethic is to have it recognized that 'we are all born naked and poor; we are all subject to disease and misery of all kinds; finally, we are all condemned to death. The sight of these common miseries can, therefore, carry our hearts to humanity' (Nussbaum 1996:132). To effect this, Nussbaum concludes, is to cultivate both factual and imaginative awarenesses. One teaches the facts of our universal humanity, as a species that manifests itself in an individual embodiment, and one encourages the imaginative perception of recognizing the human in anyone: the commensurate in the foreign, the known in the strange, own in other. 'We should recognise, at whatever personal or social cost, that each human being is human and counts as the moral equal of every other' (Nussbaum 1996:133).

There is a certain politesse both to Rickey's practice throughout his life and to how he came to be received eventually into his Canadian life. Rickey was open to anyone as a potential source of human interaction and mutual benefit; there was a currency of mutual facilitation when Rickey reached Montreal, a freedom, that enabled distinct life-projects to benefit from one another. In Rickey's own words, you recognized that an individual interactant, as a fellow human being, 'could do anything'; meanwhile, in your own life, 'you just kept on going'. A 'cosmopolitan politesse' is that subtle and supple social practice wherein one moved between the generality of the human and the particularity of the individual as a constant shuttling or zigzag (Rapport 2012:174–97).

Conclusion: 'Anyone'

In a close reading of one individual's life-story I have wished to identify characteristics – capabilities and liabilities – that pertain to a human story and so traverse a dialectic between particular and universal. I have effected a conversation between Rickey Hirsch and philosophical treatises concerning the nature of the human condition: Rickey as 'Anyone'.

Nevertheless, the conversation has had an arbitrary quality. Why effect a dialectic between Rickey and the insights of Kierkegaard, Emerson, Popper, Bergson and Nussbaum? The immediate response must be, 'Because one can, and one recognizes the connection as illustrative'. But a fuller response might be to say that the only absolute restriction is space: the apparent arbitrariness is rather a realization that *any number* of philosophical insights could actually and authentically have entered into this conversation. Rickey's story talks to any other human story and any other human insight. And this is the core of the argument of

this chapter. 'Philosophy in Anthropology' is a metaphor for recognizing the possibility and I would say the need to locate particularistic anthropological studies, concerning particular localized settings and relations, conventions, traditions and histories, *sub specie humanitatis*. This is both a scientific enterprise and a moral vocation.

Anthropology's particular methodology, and its unique value as science, has been the ethnographer's insistence on the possibility and the propriety of establishing elaborate relations with human others in any and every life-world. As fieldworker, the anthropologist considers *any* human being met in 'the field' to be a potential 'informant' or research subject. This is intrinsically a cosmopolitan ethos: the informant is recognized as a human Anyone. What fully distinguishes a cosmopolitan anthropology, however, is for this ethnographic engagement not to suffer from what Kierkegaard critiqued as a 'Hegelian' reduction and abstraction, a contextualization according to a supposed 'Geist'. Anyone is not to be reduced to a 'culture member', or any other incidental category or class: tribe, lineage, caste, ethnicity, religion, nation, even gender. One preserves the informant's individual integrity (cf. Stewart and Strathern 1999). There is an individual story to be investigated and a human one. Only 'individual' and 'human' possess an ontological reality as category terms: only these have scientific and ethical pertinence. The anthropologist asks: What is the particular substance of this individual life? And what general human capacities does it evince? The substance of that life may well include involvement in collective and collectivist discourses – of culture, class, kinship, caste, ethnicity, religion, nation and gender – but these are not the determining constituents of that life. To the contrary, these discourses will be animated by individual interpretations and intentions: made, maintained and remade by particular wills and to particular effects (Rapport 1993). Rickey's lifecourse has been spent amid fascism, nationalism, ethnic fundamentalism and post-colonialism: from the Holocaust through the Israeli War of Independence to Quebecois separatism. Yet, while 'caught up' in global events, forces and structures, Rickey has not been their product, cipher or pawn, plaything or dupe. Engaged with the world, his life remained always and only his own.

The anthropologist charts the location of individual lives in and between collective discourses but *the animating consciousness of those lives remains attached to individual informants: a consciousness that instantiates a human capacity*. The project of a cosmopolitan anthropology is to provide testimony of individual lives that are imbued with a universal nature.

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Anthropology and the *Iliad*

Margo Kitts

Introduction

For centuries the tale of the Trojan War has held pride of place as autochthonous European mythology. Thanks to a Greek poem of nearly 16,000 verses recounting just 52 days of a legendarily 10-year war pitting tribes of Achaians and others against the citizens and allies of Troy, and thanks to related stories by Classical poets, playwrights, and mythographers, the Trojan legend is inscribed indelibly into Western consciousness. Every educated person recognizes and most relate to the figures of Achilles, Patroclus, Hector, Priam, Hecuba, Helen, Paris and others, whose struggles and personalities continue to resonate. This is because, despite its exotic world of gods, fate, and talking horses, our first Greek epic has a timeless quality which makes it a classic.

What can anthropology add to our understanding of this timeless classic? Archaeology, most obviously, has shaped our understanding of the reputedly Trojan city on the Hellespont, of the city's 4,000-year history and nine major settlements, and of its links with Aegean and central Anatolian powers during their political heydays. The study of oral traditions, a subject claimed by ethnology as well as linguistic anthropology, is equally central, insofar as it allows us to reconstruct the poetic imaginations of successive generations of Homeric bards and their audiences, as traceable from the artifact of our written text. The broader discipline of cultural anthropology has been almost as fruitful, although its discoveries are tempered by the poetic nature of our evidence, namely by the mythic character of the *Iliad*'s broad narrative and the quasi-historical dimension of its cultural dynamics. For these dynamics, the conventions of hospitality and oath-making are particularly illustrative. Oral poetic studies and cultural anthropology intersect in the study of the ritual scene. After sketching the first three of these approaches, this chapter will explore the ritual scenes associated with the conventions of hospitality and oath-making, and the extent to which we might recognize actual performance features from these scenes within the poem.

Archaeology and the *Iliad*

No archaeological excavation has verified the precise personalities and events of the *Iliad*, but rumor since ancient times has identified the city of Troy—poetically known also as Ilion—with ruins on a mound at Hisarlik near the Turkish Dardanelles (ancient Greek Hellespont).[1]

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1   For succinct historical sketches of this identification, see Jablonka (2010, 2011).

Alexander the Great famously revered the site of Achilles' rage,[2] and the Romans so romanticized the spot that they rebuilt it as Roman Ilium, commemorating the home town of Vergil's hero Aeneas. Although the ancient site was rendered uninhabitable ca. 500 CE,[3] admirers of the *Iliad* continued to visit Hisarlik for centuries; yet no substantial excavation was conducted until Frank Calvert's intermittent efforts from 1863 to 1869. Then Schliemann brought his financial muscle, as well as controversial methods, to the excavation in 1870 (to 1879), claiming to have discovered not only Homer's city of Troy, but also a "treasure of Priam"—an apparent composite dating largely to 2400–2200 BCE, long before the reputed reign of Priam.[4] Schliemann was aided and eventually superseded by Dörpfeld (1882–1894), and the two divided the history of settlement into nine major periods which extended over 4,000 years. This division was revised carefully by Blegen (digging from 1932 to 1938), and finally again by Korfmann, who from 1988 to 2005 brought to the excavation the benefit of radiocarbon dating and geomagnetic imaging.[5] The current excavations, led by William Aylward of University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the archaeological team at Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University (ÇOMU), promise new insights, partly due to newer methods such as molecular archaeology and DNA sequencing.

Korfmann's excavations of the VIh and VIIa (also known as VIi[6]) levels—a cultural continuum[7] dating roughly from 1300 to 1180 BCE, the end of the Bronze Age—elicited special excitement and controversy, which can be sketched only briefly here. Based on evidence of a walled citadel and a lower city partially surrounded by two defensive ditches,[8] on relics of robust horse husbandry and of pottery and textile production within the lower city (Latacz 2004:42–5; Korfmann 2004; Bryce 2006:122–5), and on a pottery perimeter, including substantial Mycenaean sherds, extending some 400m east and south from the citadel,[9] Korfmann identified the VIh and VIIa (VIi) levels of Troy as comprising a large,[10] prosperous, and well-fortified settlement strategically situated as a commercial entrepôt

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2   Although Strabo contested the site's Trojan identity even then, at *Geography* 13:1. http://www.perseus. tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0239:book=13:chapter=1, accessed September 20, 2014.

3   A series of earthquakes and an apparent outbreak of bubonic plague in the sixth century emptied the site until 1200 CE, the time of the initial Nikaian Empire (Aslan and Rose 2013:27–31). The site is thought to have been abandoned also after a major destruction in the first half of the twelfth century BCE, although Aslan and Rose argue for signs of continuous ritual activity during the protogeometric to late archaic ages (tenth to mid-seventh century). These signs suggest a persistent "place of memory" with links to a heroic past (Aslan 2011; Aslan and Rose 2013).

4   Regarding the Trojan treasure, see Traill (2000) vs. Easton (1994).

5   See summary by Latacz (2004).

6   Conventionally known as VIIa, but accepted as a continuation of the culture of VIh and therefore also identified lately as VIi. Finkelberg 2011.

7   Sec. Finkelberg (2011).

8   One U-shaped ditch was 3 to 4 meters wide, about 2 meters deep, hewn from bedrock about 400 meters south of the citadel and encasing an area of some 20 hectares (Jablonka 2011)—it is paired with a fifteenth-century-BCE palisade for defence, possibly related to the Assuwa coalition's revolt against Hittite control (sec. Aslan and Rose 2013:9)—and/or paired with a likely defensive wall (sec. Finkelberg 2011); the other, later, ditch (ca. 1300–1180 BCE) is about half that size and roughly 100 meters south of the first (Jablonka 2010). Note that these are thought to have been intended to thwart attacks by chariot. However, Kolb sees them as drainage ditches (2005). For the arguments, see Latacz (2004:24–40), and Easton et al. (2002). Korfmann's finding of a lower city appears substantiated by a 2005 geomagnetic survey for the entire site, which has established that the lower town of Troy VI and Hellenistic levels extended 400 meters to the south and east. During Troy II the northeastern town was also partially enclosed (Yildirim and Gates 2007:292–4).

9   A perimeter criticized by Kolb (2005) as likely due to rain run-off and erosion, rather than an extension of the city's perimeter. For a rejoinder, see Easton et al. (2002).

10   Ca. 200,000 sq. meters, sec. Bryce (2006:62), 75 acres sec. Korfmann (2004).

between the Aegean and Black Seas and supporting a population conceivably as high as 10,000. Its relative wealth attracted sieges,[11] two conceivably relating to the time period in question. Layers of ash, weapons, and human skeletons cover parts of the VIh settlement, destroyed around 1250, and, most relevantly to speculations about an Achaian assault, the Troy VIIa (VIi) settlement was destroyed by fire in approximately 1180 BCE.[12]

So, do the VIh–VIIa(VIi) levels correspond to Priam's Ilion as legendarily besieged by Achaians? Supporters combine the archaeological data here and along the east Aegean coast with Greek historiography and studies of late Bronze Age Hittite texts from central Anatolia to argue "yes, maybe." The minimal two requisites for identifying the location of Troy long have been that the site be developed and significant enough to attract and temporarily withstand a prolonged siege and that it should show evidence of violent destruction (Finkelberg 2011:893). Not only were the VIh and VIIa settlements well developed, strategically significant, and destroyed violently (though by various causes, sec. Bryce 2006:64–8), but a consensus of ancient historians dates the Trojan war between the thirteenth and twelfth centuries[13] and over two dozen fifteenth through thirteenth-century Hittite diplomatic texts report engagement with Ahhiyawans—identified as Homer's Achaians since Forrer (1924), named Mycenaeans since Schliemann[14]—along the western coast. Three of these Hittite texts refer to Ahhiyawan involvement with Wilusa (or Wilusiya), now identified with Greek [W]ilion, which in the fifteenth or early fourteenth century BCE was named, along with Taruisa (presumed Troy), as the northernmost cities within a rebellious Assuwa league. This league, with Ahhiyawan support, resisted Hittite dominion temporarily.[15] Presumably having absorbed Taruisa,[16] Wilusa lived on into the later fourteenth century as one of four Arzawan states designated vassals by the Hittites.[17] The Ahhiyawans remained persistent thorns in the Hittite side until at least 1209 (Rose 2008:407–9; Bryce 2006:107–15; 182–3), after which they disappeared from our literary records. These data and a slew of material evidence, including solid confirmation of thirteenth-century Mycenaean settlements at Miletus and Muskebi (Kelder 2006),[18] emulation of Mycenaean

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11 Troy II and VI were particularly high cultures which, despite fortifications, fell violently.
12 Vociferous challenges to Korfmann's presentation and interpretation of the archeological data were launched by Hertel and Kolb (2003) and Kolb (2005); see responses by Korfmann and Rose (2001), Korfmann alone (2004), Latacz (2004), Easton et al. (2002). See Bryce (2006) for an overview. For an analysis of Mycenaean pottery in western Anatolia, see Kelder (2006).
13 VIh came to an end within the first 70 years of the thirteenth century, probably 1250, which happens to accord with Herodotus' dating of the war (at 2.145 of the Histories) to some 800 years before his own time (mid-fifth century), whereas Erasthones conjectures a time closer to what in our dating would be 1183 (Bryce 2002). See also Bryce (2010:476).
14 Today the Ahhiyawan-Mycenaean identification is basically accepted, or at least "increasingly difficult to dispute" (Rose 2008:247).
15 The well-established Hittite context is summarized by Bryce (2006, 2011), Latacz (2004), Cline (2013), Rose (2008), and Benzi (2002). A summary of the Ahhiyawan issue is provided by Niemeier (2011). Recent evidence verifying Mycenaean participation in the Assuwa rebellion is the Mycenaean sword found (in 1991) in the old Hittite capital of Hattusa, inscribed with Tudhaliya's boast that he dedicated it to the storm god after shattering the Assuwa countries (Cline 2013:59–60). Kelder points out reference to a-su-ja as far back as Linear A texts (possibly a Minoan designation for the Assuwa League and a-si-wija and other variations within Linear B texts (so Mycenaean) (Cline 1997)). These demonstrate Minoan and Mycenaean awareness of and likely engagement with west and north-western Anatolia in the Bronze Age (Kelder 2006:64–5).
16 Taruisa/Troy is only mentioned again once, on a silver bowl of unknown provenance inscribed with Luwian hieroglyphic associating the smiting of Tarwuiza with the Hittite king Tudhaliya, probably Tudhaliya II in the fourteenth century (Bryce 2006:109).
17 At this point, the Luwians are replaced by Arzawans in Hittite laws, and Arzawans were given special restrictions. For the possible implications see Melchert (2003:1–2) and Bryce (2003:27–127).
18 And also at Ephesus and the islands of Samos and Rhodes (Kelder 2006:72).

decoration on late Bronze Age Trojan pottery (Rose 2008, n.b., 408–9), along with chemically discernible Boeotian clays used in a fraction of the Mycenaean pottery at Troy (Kelder 2006:54–5),[19] all conjoin to suggest, minimally, that Troy VI–VIIa(VIi) and the Ahhiyawan/ Mycenaean entity—whether an organized off-shore state or a loose grouping of tribes— must have been contemporary players in the turbulent world of late Bronze Age diplomacy.

Critics point out problems with tying Trojan archaeology to the Greek war tale. Although there must be historical kernels to the *Iliad*—each of the 164 towns mentioned in the Greek catalogue of ships (Il. 2.494–759), for instance, was extant at one point or another[20]—the tale eludes the excavations, which in turn elude some of our reconstructions. Complaints include that, first, size—which itself is disputed[21]—fortification, and destruction do not in themselves distinguish Troy from many other coastal settlements at the calamitous end of the Bronze Age, and the identity of the attackers is not archaeologically apparent.[22] Second, walled settlements besieged by as mighty a force as the Hittites during the late Bronze Age did not stand for longer than six months, so how likely is it that Troy resisted a multiyear attack by Ahhiyawans?[23] Third, Troy may have been strategically located so as to exploit trade between the Aegean and Black Seas, and so an attractive prize, as Korfmann argues;[24] but our paucity of Black Sea excavations and material evidence has not supported much Black Sea trade *so far*.[25] Fourth, the majority of "Mycenaean" pottery in Troy VI is imitation (made locally) and the presence of even authentic Mycenaean pottery cannot prove direct engagement with Mycenaeans rather than with third-party traders.[26] Fifth, dating schemes of the ancient historians who pondered the war are based on oral traditions, and so arguably imprecise.[27] And sixth, recent dating of the relevant Hittite texts to fourteenth and thirteenth centuries misaligns the Ahhiyawan presence with the VIIa destruction of Troy in about 1180 (Finkelberg 2011:892–6).[28] This misalignment has triggered a renewal of attention to Thracian, Aiolian, and other cultural influences on the Troad region during ages subsequent to VIIa, to the likely appeal of charter myths linking Greek colonies in Asia Minor to the families of Homeric heroes (Rose 2008; Malkin 2003; Aslan and Rose 2013), and above all to the creative processes of oral-traditional composition and the historical mismatch of Bronze Age and other elements reflected in the poem.

Pinning our hopes for proof of the Trojan War on current archaeology is perhaps misguided in any case; a few constraints must be recognized. One is the astonishing fact that

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19   Recent chemical analysis traces some of that Trojan pottery to clay from several Greek sites (Kelder 2006:54–5).
20   The names represent an historical amalgam. See Cline (2013:44–5), Bryce (2006:25–6) and Salimbeti (http://www.salimbeti.com/micenei/war.htm, accessed August 3, 2013) on both the Greek and the Trojan catalogues.
21   See Kolb (2005).
22   On the so-called Bronze Age Collapse, see Dickinson (2010:483–90). Weapons for the Trojan attack cannot be identified ethnically (Benzi 2002), but cf. the remarkable find of a Mycenaean sword near Hattusa (see note 15).
23   The reasoning is Bryce's (2010:478–9).
24   Hence the walled and spectacular city of Troy II (ca. 2500–2300) with its paved streets, megarons, pottery wheels and advanced metal technology, supporting the manufacture of bronze. For a summary, see Bryce (2006: 40–42).
25   What limited evidence we do have for northern trade during Troy VI is summarized by Bryce (2006:122–6) and Jablonka (2011:897, 901). But see the trade route overview for Anatolia and the Black Sea region, by Andrew Sherratt at http://www.archatlas.dept.shef.ac.uk/Trade/Trade.php, accessed August 3, 2013.
26   Kolb 2005. But on the bigger picture of Mycenaean pottery in West Anatolia and how it got there, see Kelder (2006).
27   But can that be the case with so many of them? See Bryce (2010).
28   But see the new dating schemes based on Mountjoy (Benzi 2002:352–4).

up unto the 2014 season only 6 percent of the total site has been excavated (Aylward 2012)! Unfortunately, too, over the 4,000 years of its occupation, the site was disturbed and rebuilt time and again, most radically by Hellenistic builders who razed a chunk of the Late Bronze Age citadel to gather building materials for a new temple to Athena (Easton et al. 2002:76; Jablonka 2011:898). Some evidence is thereby forever lost.[29]

A third, especially disappointing, constraint is the lack of texts discovered to date within the ruins, insofar as writing might help to identify, if not the native tongue of the city's inhabitants (in the *Iliad* they speak Greek), then at least one of their diplomatic languages. Our two exceptions suffer from dating problems. One is a hieroglyphic Luwian biconvex seal inscribed with the names of a male and female scribal pair, found amidst rubble in Blegen's house 761 dating to Level VIIb (1080–1050), after the presumed fall of Priam's Troy. Luwian hieroglyphic, typically used in Hittite diplomacy with western Anatolian powers, rarely appears in inscriptions dated after the thirteenth century (Hawkins and Easton 1996), which raises the question of the seal's presence in this eleventh-century rubble. Does it verify contemporary Trojan speakers of Luwian—one of a handful of Indo-European languages spoken in ancient Anatolia and a long-living relative of both Hittite and Greek?[30] Is it a relic from a Trojan diplomatic corps from the late Bronze Age?[31] Could the seal at this historical point be a misplaced, non-utilitarian prestige item, similar to the handful of votives of Near Eastern origin found in Greek burials and shrines from the first half of the first millennium?[32] The other relic(s) was discovered during the excavations of Schliemann and is comprised of two, much older, spindle whorls. These are inscribed with signs identified as Linear A (a script associated with Minoan civilization) and dated to 2050–1900, from the time of Troy IV (Finkelberg 1998:265). If the signs are authentic, their presence here supports Troy's participation in an enduring web of Aegean trade or gift exchange, in this case stemming from almost 1,000 years before the reputed Trojan War.

In sum, the current state of archaeological research leaves us with many exciting questions and few certain answers. To get a fuller story, archaeology must be supplemented by the study of oral traditions.

Oral Tradition and the *Iliad*

Linguistic anthropologists long have pondered the verbal performances—e.g., blessings, laments, eulogies, oaths, curses, prayers, proclamations, songs—in which humans enhance or alter expressions of meaning, and the contexts for these.[33] In addition, ethnographers have studied the accumulated oral lore of particular societies, how this lore preserves and

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29   Sadly, some loss is attributable to the zeal of Schliemann, who removed material from the VI level of the citadel without documentation (Jablonka 2011:898; Bryce 2002; Latacz 2004).

30   On the historical and ethnic issues for the Luwian language in Anatolia, see Yakubovich (2011), Melchert (2003) and Bryce (2003). The names Walmu and Aleksandu, Trojan rulers referred to in Hittite texts, are not definitively Luwian (Melchert 2003:8).

31   On multilingual scribes in Mycenaean and West Anatolian diplomatic courts, see Bryce (1999). Twenty-six Hittite texts report and even translate Hittite correspondence with West Anatolian or Aegean powers (Bryce 2011:363–75; 2006:117–21).

32   For a re-evaluation of cross-Aegean prestige items and the significance of Near Eastern votives in Greek tombs and temples, see Gunter (2009:128–37), who points out a Middle Bronze Age Syrian seal found in a tenth-century male burial at the Toumba cemetery at Lefkandi (2009:134–5). Latacz points out a pierced cylinder seal used ostensibly as a bodily adornment, found in a girl's tomb in Perati, Attica (2004:71). That the Luvian seal at Troy was found in rubble is disappointing.

33   A few seminal thinkers include Tambiah (1968, 1979), Bloch (1975), and Rappaport (1999).

condenses different forms of knowledge—e.g., genealogies, cosmologies, conventions, heroic ideals, cultural memories—as well as how performers convey and audiences receive this lore. In the context of the *Iliad*, the syncretistic end product of these trends is the study of oral traditional performance and of the narrative imagination crystallized into our orally derived text, extending, hypothetically, from generations of bardic performances before generations of audiences who craved traditional legends and verbal art.

Studies of Homeric epic have been impacted by these trends since the 1930s, when Milman Parry and Albert Lord recognized in the songs performed by South Slavic bards some of the versification features found in our written texts of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.[34] The Muslim epics were composed, to some degree improvised, in a distinct metrical style and specialized vocabulary with traditional sequencings of phrases, scenes, and themes built on generations, in some cases centuries, of poetic convention. Similarly to the Odyssean bards who performed at the feasts of the Phaeacians and Penelope's suitors, the Slavic bards performed at social gatherings—e.g., weddings, bars, Ramadan evening feasts—and, with some songs extending over 10,000 verses,[35] faced the task of engaging, maintaining, and/or reigniting the interest of sometimes restless audiences. Traditional tale types, stock formulae, distinct meters and recitative registers, combined with creative flexibility in adapting the story to meet audience expectations, are tools that the Slavic performers exploited to rivet audience attention. Traditional referentiality is the coinage by which John Miles Foley described the repertoire of themes, patterned scenes, and formulae used by South Slavic bards, and also Homeric bards, to evoke for listeners a resonant field of familiar stories and personalities, eliciting listener imagination through synecdoche, poetic extension, and other verbal art (1991). Traditional referentiality also accounts for the use of famous Homeric formulae such as "swift Achilles" and "much-suffering Odysseus" in scenes where the protagonists show neither swiftness nor suffering. Rather than poor literary choices, the noun-epithet formulae signal a non-literary aesthetic. They function, as Gregory Nagy put it, "like a small theme song that conjures up a thought-association with the traditional essence of an epic figure, thing, or concept" (1990a:23). From such researches, Homerists discerned that our written artifact of the *Iliad* reflected an extensive oral traditional foundation, and that its interwoven themes might elude audiences not weaned on those themes.

One of the ramifications of oral traditional analysis was to stimulate new ways of thinking about Homeric authorship and originality. Faith in a prehistoric poet named Homer stems back to the ancients themselves,[36] who assigned his birthplace variously to the island of Chios or Ios or the city of Smyrna in Asia Minor and supposed him to be an eighth-century itinerant minstrel, perhaps akin to Demodokos or Phemios of the *Odyssey*. Yet there was, and still is, disagreement about whether a singer named Homer originated the poems, put his artistic stamp on a composite of pre-existing variants, or represented instead a style of composing and singing in a recitative register, dactylic hexameter and a specialized *Kunstsprache*, or art-language. While faith in poetic creation *ex nihilo* has faded, contemporary scholars still waver between conceiving Homer as the aforementioned artistic stamp or as the evolving style of oral traditional composition in performance.[37] In any case it is the style which stuck. By the time of Aristotle, the special meter and unique art-language,

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34 Classic references are Parry (1971) and Lord (1960).
35 See, e.g., Foley (1997) and Foley and Gejin (2012).
36 E.g., Aristotle (*Poetics* 1450–60).
37 Short summaries of the unitarian and analyst's perspectives are offered by West (2011a and 2011b), an account of neoanalysis by Willcock (1997), and a summary of the problems with timing the composition of the Homeric *Iliad* with the other Trojan War tales is offered by Cairns (2001). It is a rich field.

comprised of formations mostly in Ionic dialect but including other elements, came to represent the archaic register of epic verse.[38]

Conventional opinion still roots the crystallization of the poem in the eighth-century Greek colonies of Asia Minor. As the theory goes, amidst rising immigrant populations and intensified networks of communication and trade, shared institutions such as the Delphic oracle, Olympian games, and poetry competitions fostered for these eastern Aegean communities a Panhellenic identity, variegated locally by the adoption of eponymous hero cults (Rose 2008; Malkin 2003; Snodgrass 1980), many likely fixed on Homeric figures. Competitive poetic performances, construed as devotional rituals to the gods (Heiden 1997:232), would have been instruments in this Panhellenic socialization. The *Iliad*'s sympathetic portrayal of characters on both sides of the Trojan conflict has been hypothesized as due in part to the proximity of Greek audiences to and probably intermarriage with Asia Minor's more deeply rooted populations, whether of Greeks stemming from earlier migrations during the so-called Dark Age or just of local Anatolians (Bryce 2006:16–28). The immigrant mix might be reflected as well in the sprinkling of Homer's mostly Ionic dialect with Aiolic and conceivably Mycenaean elements (Janko 1992:18–22[39]). Another enduring argument, however, and an ancient one, is that the text was distilled into something close to its current shape during the regime of the sixth-century Athenian Pisistratids, who commissioned the inscription of the texts in order to, among other things, emphasize Panathenaic legends and assert cultural hegemony over the Ionians (Janko 1992; Andersen 2011). Others propose that the poem continued to evolve beyond Classical times.[40]

These are of course diachronic approaches to Homeric art. Currently there exists a tension in Homeric studies between diachronic approaches, which focus on the development of Homeric style, and synchronic approaches, which strive to hear the poem as a complete system. On the diachronic side, evidence for the poem's evolution, ostensibly from a war at the end of the Bronze Age, is often derived from its mix of historic features. But this mix is complicated by its poetic themes. These complications confound our ability to reconstruct Homeric society and imagination.

Diachronic Issues

For instance, it is often presumed that fixed formulae represent more archaic poetic formations than does the flexible language which describes immediate action and direct speech.[41] Janko points out that some relatively fixed dactylic formulae actually match Mycenaean artifacts of the Bronze Age (1992:10–11)! The "silver inlaid swords"[42] ascribed to Agamemnon (2.45; 11.29–30), Paris (3.334), Hector (7.303), and others match weapons found in Mycenaean shaft graves, while the large "shield resembling a tower," such as that belonging to Ajax

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38 See Aristotle (Poetics 1459b) on heroic hexameter as the right meter for epic, and Foley (1997) for an overview of the oral traditional approach to the poems.

39 See Janko also on Ionic and Attic scripts and their influences on the writing of the *Iliad* (1992:29–37). Bryce points out that the availability of papyrus, monopolized by Egypt until around 775, must be reckoned into dating the inscribing and fixing of the text, since the use of clay and wax tablets, known from the Anatolian milieu, would have made it very bulky (Bryce 2006:15; but cf. Janko 1992:32–33).

40 See Nagy (1990b).

41 On the possible reconstruction of fixed formulae from the Indo-European poetic milieu, see Nagy (1990a:7–35). On the likely later dating of direct speech, see, e.g., Martin (1989:45–6).

42 E.g., *xíphos arguróēlon* (2.45), or *xíphos arguróēlon / khálkeon* (3.334–5). For images see http://www.salimbeti.com/micenei/weapons1.htm, accessed August 3, 2013.

(7.219–23; 11.485; 17.128[43]) and a similarly huge shield belonging to Hector (6.117–18; 11.65), is represented on a fresco at Akrotiri on Thera[44] and at other Bronze Age sites.[45] Likewise, a helmet made of boar's tusks, such as the one Meriones gave to Odysseus (10.260–65), is depicted on murals at Akrotiri, Knossos, and Mycenae.[46] Some of these depictions are as old as the seventeenth century BCE![47] Yet other formulae for weapons, such as those depicting the smaller round shields (mentioned, e.g., at 13.405–7, 12.296–7, 22.273–6[48]), find ubiquitous material support, from Mycenaean murals through eighth-century Geometric vases and famously into hoplite armor in Classical times.[49] Having a broader range of referents, these fixed formulae for round shields are less supportive of the poem's great antiquity and speak to the precariousness of assigning precise historicity to a cultivated *Kunstsprache*.

The historical puzzle is illustrated as well by an analysis of Homeric feasts, which feature Mycenaean (Bronze Age) vocabulary but Iron Age utensils. Homeric feasting scenes are many in the epics and overall enjoin the values of hospitality, generosity, inclusivity, and support a probably ephemeral social equality among participants. While conceivably universal, such values have been argued to mirror commensal practices stemming from the so-called Dark Age of the tenth to ninth centuries,[50] to befit the Panhellenic ethos disseminated with the poem in the eighth century, or to mirror themes from Hesiod.[51] Nonetheless, it is apparently a much earlier Mycenaean nomenclature that stands behind Homeric *dais* (feast) and its related terms and formulae.[52] These formulae figure into a specialized semantic field which rarely appears in post-Homeric prose, and yet is insinuated in a Linear B (Mycenaean) list from Pylos. There the verb *e-pi-de-da-to* (as in Homeric *datéomai*) refers to the distribution of wine to nine centers and the noun *da-so-mo* (as in Homeric *dasmós*) refers to a share or portion (Sherratt 2004:309–10). In contrast to these Bronze Age vocabulary-clues, the utensils described in Homeric feasts, almost always spits (*obeloí*), are strictly Iron Age in material evidence. Actual roasting spits are found not earlier than the eleventh century in Cyprus and the Aegean and do not appear in warrior burials before that time.[53] Similarly with graters, such as the copper one Hecamede uses to make a mixed drink (*kukeon*) for Nestor and guests at *Iliad* 11.640: graters and spits together are found in warrior burials at Lefkandi, and not before the tenth century (Sherratt 2004:313). Mycenaean (Bronze Age) cooking tools, on the other hand, seem to consist primarily of deep pots hung from tripods, as seen in a hunting scene at Pylos; the meat must have been boiled or stewed. Tripods in Homer seem to be used primarily to boil water for bathing (e.g., for Hector at 22.443, for Achilles at 23.40). Unlike Mycenaeans, Homeric warriors never boil

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43   E.g., *sákos êûte púrgon*.
44   See image at http://www.ou.edu/finearts/art/ahi4913/aegeanhtml/cyakr5.html, accessed September 20, 2014.
45   Frequently these take on the shape of a figure eight. See at http://www.salimbeti.com/micenei/shields1.htm, accessed August 3, 2013.
46   For images see again Salimbeti, at http://www.salimbeti.com/micenei/helmets1.htm, accessed August 3, 2013.
47   Cline 2013:46.
48   E.g., *àspídi pántos' ė́ī́sē*.
49   See images at Salimbeti, http://www.salimbeti.com/micenei/shields2.htm, accessed August 3, 2013. On contradictions in the reported styles of Homeric warfare, see van Wees (2011).
50   An hypothesis attributed to Finley (1954).
51   See, famously, Detienne and Vernant (1989) and Vidal-Naquet (1986).
52   E.g., *daís*, the feast, stems from *daíō*, (I) divide or (I) distribute, appearing in the middle voice as *daínusthai daîta* to share or apportion a feast, and as a formula in *dais ė́ī́sē*, equal feast (e.g., at 1.468, 1.602, 2.431, 7.320, and 23.56). This is not to mention that the formula inevitably occurs at the end of a longer, whole line formula: [*daîta*] *daínunt, oůdé ti thumòs ėdeúeto daitòs ė́ī́sēs*, (1.468, 2.431, 7.320). See Kitts (2011).
53   These are iron; wooden spits would not be preserved, of course.

meat; they roast it on spits. Thus, Homer's Iron Age cooking utensils simply do not fit with the *Iliad*'s Bronze Age vocabulary for feasting.

Formulae for weapons and feasting scenes are but two examples of the *Iliad*'s potentially anachronistic fusion of elements and of the problems with reconstructing Homeric society based on a poem. But perhaps the most famous problem is the catalogue of Achaian ships (2.484–759). Usually thought to be a late poetic addition designed to affix prestige to the Greek mainland communities who ostensibly sent the ships (Bryce 2006:25–6), the catalogue also lists communities which were uninhabited by historical times and/or unidentifiable by Strabo (Dickinson 2011:150–55). So whose prestige does it preserve? Altogether the catalogue, the weapons, and the feasting scenes seem to represent an amalgam of Bronze Age, Iron Age, and historical elements. Given this amalgam, it is not surprising that some scholars now surmise that the *Iliad* conflates legends of three or more wars (Cline 2013:50–51), including Heracles' attack on Troy at the time of Priam's father (reported in Apollodorus), a preliminary and erroneous sack of Teuthrania to reclaim Helen (reported in Proclus' summary of the Cypria), and the tale of Agamemnon's expedition against Troy, which became our *Iliad*.

Synchronic Themes

Even if we were able to sort out diachronic elements in the *Iliad*, one of the poem's renowned storytelling themes, besides the celebrated wrath of Achilles, is the distance between Homer's bygone ages and the audience's own. This pervasive theme speaks to the synchronic side of Homeric analysis and, despite anachronisms, to the *Iliad*'s astonishing unity as an artwork. The *Iliad* creates nostalgia for bygone ages in part by reflecting on lost virtues. Famously, Nestor (1.271–2), Diomedes (5.302–4), Ajax (12.381–5), Hector (12.449–51), and Aeneas (20.285–7) all mustered strength inconceivable for the poet's contemporaries, "the sort of mortals there are now."[54] At least some of the old heroes also enjoyed a now-lost proximity to gods. Face to face engagement with the gods is argued to be restricted primarily to their first generation mortal children (Turkeltaub 2007), but even mortals with no divine genealogy used to experience the presence of gods, for better or worse. We see this when the scream of Poseidon replicated nine or ten thousand men entering battle and he instilled great strength into the Achaians (14.148–52), or when Apollo, striding in front of Hector and the Trojans, shook his aegis and screamed so terribly that the hearts of the Danaans were bewitched. They forgot their courage and ran (15.306–27).[55] We the audience, deprived of that proximity to the gods and certainly of the heroes' superhuman strength, are nonetheless privy to these divine spectacles. This is because the muses, or their impersonators, succeed in making us ignore inconsistencies and suspend disbelief. Such adroit persuasion speaks to the powerful spell of ancient mythmaking, which, like the songs of Phemios, accomplish "enchantments of mortals" (Od. 1.337) at least temporarily.[56]

Another way the *Iliad* evokes nostalgia for bygone ages is by cultivating a poetic archaeology of objects (Grethlein's "archaeology of the past" (2011)). It does this by enlightening us to generations of legendary history attached to things and by, in some cases, suggesting a rupture between the best and the worst of those generations. A well-known example is the scepter of Agamemnon. In the second book of the *Iliad*, we are told that it has changed hands seven times. The first three were immortal: Hephaestus gave it to Zeus, who

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54   See discussion in Kitts (2005:56–61).
55   For a recent summary of the religious element in battle scenes, see Kitts (2013).
56   On musical capture as one point of the poems, see Heiden (1997:222).

gave it to Hermes, who then handed it down to mortal Pelops, who in turn gave it to Atreus, who gave it to Thyestes, who gave it finally to Agamemnon (2.102–8). Brandishing this object that bridges the worlds of gods and men serves superficially to heighten the prestige of Agamemnon in Book 2;[57] yet the actual context for the brandishing degrades that prestige. There Agamemnon, based on his deceitful rendering of an already deceptive divine dream, holds up the scepter and falseheartedly invites his military forces to abandon a hopeless war. When the forces readily do abandon him and run for the ships, the poem would appear to be commenting on Agamemnon's failure of leadership, as did Achilles obliquely in Book 1, when he dashed the scepter to the ground as an icon of perverted justice.[58]

Another prestige-enhancing gift is the immortal horses Xanthos and Balios, sired by the West Wind and a Harpy named Podarge (16.148–54). Poseidon[59] gave them to Peleus at his marriage to goddess Thetis, Peleus gave them to Achilles to take to Troy, Patroklos cared for them and they carried him into the battle where he lost his life. Then they froze in grief, so that Automedon initially could not coax them to return to camp. Zeus looked down at those weeping horses and bemoaned that the gods ever gave them to miserable mortals, as immortals are not suited for grief (17.426–47). Like Peleus' immortally made armor, incapable of protecting Patroklos, like immortal Thetis, destined to suffer a mortal's grief, and of course like godlike Achilles, who will die, the immortal horses and every other symbol from that marriage seem to bespeak a rupture between an age of divine beneficence toward mortals and an age when divinities and mortals both suffer pain. It is by wistful innuendos like these that the *Iliad* transcends a war story to become a classical work of art.

Cultural Anthropology and the *Iliad*

Analyzing cultural conventions in Homeric society is complicated by the mix of historical layers conceivably reflected in the *Iliad* and also by the rendering of hallowed customs as typical scenes, an idealizing tendency of the aforementioned *Kunstsprache*. The circularity for the latter will be apparent; we can safely assume that the pressures of composition may bear on the way that some customs, instantiated often by rituals, are represented in verse, and that actual customs did not occur in dactylic hexameter, or not entirely so. We will contemplate ritual scenes in the next section. For this section, we contemplate the broader question of verisimilitude in the poetic rendering of cultural conventions. Given our imprecise grasp of Homeric traditional referentiality, verisimilitude will have to be surmised through textual clues such as special vocabulary, defining behaviors, ideological presumptions, and, where possible, matching features in the conventions of the *Iliad*'s Near Eastern neighbors. With such factors in mind, here we summarize two deeply rooted Homeric conventions, hospitality and oath-making. Both of these are established by formal behaviors, as ideologies they radiate into each other, and both intersect with other conventions. Additionally, both are supported by the Homeric gods. On the surface of the narrative, divine support matters greatly in this tale of Achilles' wrath, even though the hold of civilizing conventions is so often tenuous.

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57   In the Maussian sense, it might be deemed an inalienable gift, affixed to Agamemnon's person. But see Ann Gunter's careful discussion of the sociology of prestige objects in the early first millennium BCE, and her brief application of Arjun Appadurai's notion of incarnated signs (2009:125–54, n.b. 135).
58   For a discussion of this gesture, see Kitts (2005:102–5).
59   Or simply the gods (16.866–7).

In the *Iliad* hospitality is an umbrella category for a multitude of customs in Homeric social life. It is visible in feasting scenes, particularly those of Books 9 (the embassy of Odysseus, Ajax, and Phoenix to the tent of Achilles) and 24 (the reconciling meal of Achilles and Priam), and is reflected obliquely in Achaian leaders' generosity[60] to the rest in Books 1, 2, 9, 19, and somewhat in 23—the last five scenes intersect with sacrifice scenes. Hospitality is reflected in the warm welcome that Hephaistos extends to Thetis (Book 18), Nestor to Patroklos (Book 11), and in stories from before the war began, such as Peleus' open door to Phoenix, Patroklos, and Epigeus (a minor character, killed before Patroklos in Book 16)—in these last three instances the custom of hospitality intersects with supplication. Hospitality is the presumptive context for the aforementioned archaeology of things, at least for those things which originated as gifts. Lastly, in its formal quality as guestfriendship (*xenia*, also *xeinia*), hospitality may initiate the more personalized friendship known as *philotēs*.[61]

Of course, hospitality is a worldwide virtue in traditional societies,, including the Homeric one. It is not insignificant that the primary aetiology for the Trojan war was a violation of hospitality, when Paris, as guestfriend to Menelaos, abducted his host's wife. We see how closely guestfriendship (*xenia*) and friendship (*philotēs*) are linked in this case because Menelaos prays that Zeus punish Paris' violation of *philotēs* so severely that "a person in future generations will shudder before doing evil to a guesthost (*xeinodokos*) who provides friendship (*philotēta*)" (3.351–4). The gravity of this trespass is dire not only for the individual but for his web of social relations, who presumably are expected to check and compensate his excesses. Hence Menelaos anticipates Zeus's utter destruction not only of Paris, but of the steep citadel of Troy, because of the Trojan outrage against him and Zeus *Xenios* (defender of guestfriends) (13.622–7). Numerous times in the *Iliad*, we see that once a host (*xenos*) has accepted a guest (also termed *xenos*) as guestfriend, the bond is expected to be reciprocal and deep; it is like family. Even Paris is enraged when his *xenos* Harpalion, the Paphlagonian, is shot by Meriones, and manages to shoot in turn a worthy foe dear to the other side (Euchenor, son of a prophet; 13.643–63). Glaukos publically shames Hector because he does not defend the corpse of Sarpedon, his *xeinos* and companion (*hetairos*) (17.149–51). Later Hector is chided to fight by the shaming words of Phinops (Apollo in disguise), who is the most *philtatos* of all *xenōn* to Hector of those dwelling in Abydos (17.582–6). The bond is apparent also when a *xenos* of Priam, Eëtion, ransoms Priam's son Lykaon after he is abducted by Achilles and sold as a slave. Eëtion buys the boy's freedom and sends him home to his mother (21.39–48). Even if Zeus is involved in protecting these relationships, there is no reason to suppose that *philotēs* and *xeinia* are merely formal obligations. Repeatedly we see that emotions are aroused when misfortune strikes one's friends and guestfriends, even for Paris.

However personal the bond, it is through public acts that *xeinia* bonds equalize status and engage commitments that endure for generations. The naming of both host and guest as *xenos* has been said to reflect what happens in social fact when the guest is raised to the status of his host;[62] the social inequality between them is dissolved. This is a significant dissolution, considering the potential menace looming over the reception of a stranger by a host. All over the ancient world this menace must have been felt, and to mitigate it these encounters were formalized by commissive gestures common to both sides of the Mediterranean Sea (Kitts 2005:79–90). After rituals of supplication (e.g., clasping knees, formulaic petitions for mercy and hospitality), guestfriendship is often signaled by the clasping of right hands

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60 With all the political machinations one might suppose. E.g., the feast at 19.74–153.
61 Konstan makes this observation about the usually personalized nature of *philotēs* when *philos* refers to human relationships (2011).
62 See Reece (1993 and 2011). Priam is raised to the status as equal when Achilles takes the supplicating old man by the hand to raise him to his feet, and then they dine together (24:515).

or exchange of gifts.[63] Rappaport noted the public nature of such commissive gestures, which are metaperformative in that they establish social obligations and override personal interests. Gestures are necessary to solidify commitments made by word because words themselves are intrinsically slippery (1999:13); spoken sentences, uttered in the absence of what they signify, allow considerable room for duplicity, so must be "made heavy" by acts. The acts signal obligation and render public gestures as public facts. He noted that violation of obligation is the one breach universally held to be sanctionable across societies (1999:132).

The most famous binding gestures of Homeric guestfriendship occur in *Iliad* 6 at the meeting of Glaukos and Diomedes, who discover that the grandfather of Diomedes was once host to the grandfather of Glaukos. Diomedes is eager to fight with Glaukos because of the great presence that he emanates, but once they realize that one forefather was a *xeinos patrōios* to the other (6.215), they leap down from their chariots, clasp hands and bind each other by oath (6.232–3), presumably not to kill each other. By so doing, they effectively renew the bond of guestfriendship, and each becomes a *xeinos philos* to the other (6.224). In an earlier publication, I discussed the overlapping themes of formal hand clasping and binding oaths within the Mediterranean and Near Eastern diplomatic sphere (Kitts 2005:79–84).[64] Here let us note the personalized solidarity implied in the Homeric gesture of clasping hands as portrayed in a few examples where a relationship is already established: When the Achaians welcomed back Diomedes and Odysseus from their nighttime raid on the Trojan camp, "they rejoiced and greeted them warmly with right hands and sweet words" (10:541–2); Nestor greeted Patroklos, "taking him by the hand" into the hut of Machaon (11:646), where they shared old war stories; and Nestor recalls that the young Achilles "rose in wonder, taking us by hand, led us inside, and bid us to seat ourselves" when Nestor came as a guestfriend to the house of Peleus (11.777–8). The friendly connotation in these greeting gestures would seem implicit, as it is also when divine hands are extended to mortals all over the ancient world in more formal contexts. For instance, Athene and Poseidon take the hand of Achilles to reassure him of their pledge to his temporary safety (21.284–90); the goddess Ishtar leads Hittite king Hattusili "by the hand" to guide and protect him;[65] and the biblical god is beseeched to do the same for King David (Ps. 144). The gesture is polyvalent, surely, but connotes a combination of guidance, protection, commitment, and goodwill.

In an entirely human context, the formal feature of clasping right hands has practical implications. As in the handshake of Diomedes and Glaukos, any weapons would be transferred to the left, thereby, in a right-handed world, defusing the potential for attack and instead proffering oneself in all one's vulnerability. Ancient Near Eastern examples of this gesture are many (Kitts 2005:59–84; Weinfeld 1990). Herman notes a monument from Nimrud memorializing the pact between Shalmaneser III and a king of Babylon; the weapons of the kings are transferred to the left hands while the right hands are clasped. The men behind the kings bear gifts in their right hands, holding their swords in their left

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63   In formal contexts it might be by treaty, such as that between Hittite king Tudhaliya IV and childhood friend Kurunta (see Bronze Tablet).

64   A notable Homeric example is the hand clasp cementing the oath regarding the funeral of Hector, between Achilles and Priam at 24.670–72. Also, see Weinfeld (1990).

65   "In the hand of Ishtar, my lady, I saw prosperity. My lady Ishtar took me by the hand. She led me along" (Apology of Hattusilis I.20–21): nu-za-kán *A-NA* ŠU ᵈištar GAŠAN-ẒA LUV lu-ú-lu u-uḫ-ḫu-un. nu-mu ᵈištar GAŠAN-ẒA ŠÚ-za IṢ-BAT na-aš-mu-kán par-a-a ḫa-an-ta-an-te-eš-ta (I.20–21). Similarly, "So Ishtar my lady appeared to me in a dream. In the dream she told me this: 'Shall I, myself, abandon you to a[nother] god? Fear not.' … Since the goddess, my lady, held me by the hand, she did not abandon me in any way to the evil god"(I.36–8): ᵈištar-ma-mu GAŠAN-ẒA Ù-at. nu-mu Ù-it ki-i me-mi-iš-ta. DINGIRLIM-ni-u̯a-at-ta am-mu-uk tar-na-aḫ-ḫi. nu-u̯a li-e na-aḫ-ti. … nu-mu DINGIRLUM ku-it GAŠAN-ẒA ŠU-za har-ta (I.36–39).

hands (1987:51). Surrendering the use of one's right hand demonstrates a leap of trust, which is essential to the initiation of guestfriendship.

The swapping of armor in the Diomedes-Glaukos episode might be understood in the same vulnerability-signalling way. This swap amazes the poet because the armor of Glaukos was gold (6.234–6), but a similar swap in a different context may shed some light on this gift-exchange. The biblical example is Prince Jonathan and shepherd David, famous friends who "each loved the other as dearly as himself" and who make a solemn pact by exchanging arms as well as clothing in Jonathan's father's house (1 Samuel 18:2–4), and a second vow because "[Jonathan] loved [David] as his own life" (1 Samuel 20:17). The commitment implied here is recalled when King David later spares Jonathan's son Mephibosheth from execution "because of the oath which had been taken in the Lord's name" (2 Samuel 21:7). Although the love between David and Jonathan probably has different literary significance than the relationship between Diomedes and Glaukos, the gesture of swapping clothing and armor and the consequence for the next generation (Mephibosheth) are too striking not to have formal implications.

The clothing swap in the biblical case is particularly intriguing. It is obvious that the swap of clothing and weapons establishes reciprocity, but what of the vulnerable moment from which it begins, when both parties—in the Bible two imminent contenders for the monarchy—are relatively naked and bereft of armor, to boot? The vulnerability must be significant in both the biblical and Homeric cases. For the recognized vulnerability in lacking armor in the *Iliad*, consider pitiable Lykaon, described as "naked, without armor or shield" (21.50), when he supplicates Achilles, who refuses his former hostage and spears his neck by the collarbone (21.118). The transient vulnerability of suppliants as they grasp the knees of potential hosts has been noted by Leonard Muellner, who points out that "a suppliant, … in the formal language of reciprocity means a *xeinos* in need of his first favor" (1976:87–8). Although there probably are variations on Greek and biblical bodily proxemics and views of nakedness, one is compelled nonetheless to reflect on these common moments of armorless vulnerability before the establishment of ties that bind.

Oath-making (usually *horkia*) also binds and it intersects with both *xeinia* and *philotēs* in a number of ways. It has been suggested that establishing guestfriendship is tantamount to making an oath because both imply a pledge of trust, or at least a mutual understanding (Karavites 1992:53; Weinfeld 1973:190). *Philotēs* in fact is collocated with oaths in the expression "friendship and trusted oaths" (*philotēs kai horkia pista*) four times in the *Iliad* (3.73; 3.94; 3.256; 3.323), and the link between them is suggested by a number of revealing narratives where friendship and/or oaths are set against strife, and reckoned potentially to overcome it. We see this, for instance, in the anticipation of *philotēs kai horkia pista* (3.94) among the Trojans and Achaians just before the duel of Book 3: they stop fighting, disarm, and sit so closely together that "little was the earth on both sides" (3.114–15), hoping collectively "to stop this wretched war" (3.111–12). We see it too after the second duel to rectify the failed oath of the first (7.63): Hector proclaims that strife between him and Ajax has resolved in a bond of friendship (*philotti … arthmēsante*; 7:301–2[66]). And we see it obliquely when proffered oaths and guestfriendship fail to overcome strife: Hector wishes to swear an agreement (a *harmonian*) with Achilles by each other's gods, whereby the winner return the loser's body to his family and friends for cremation and burial (22.252–9).[67] Achilles spurns him, since neither *philēmenai* nor *horkia* (becoming friends nor making oaths) is possible for lions and men, wolves and lambs, and not for them; rather one of them will fall and sate Ares with blood (22.261–7).

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66   So let someone of the Achaians and Trojans say, "They fought in heart-rending strife, but they parted bound in friendship (philotēti … árthmēsante)."
67   "But come, and let us swear [ἐπιδώμetha] by each other's gods, for they will be the best witnesses and protectors of agreements [harmoniaōn]" (22.254–5).

Achilles' remarkable statement thrusts before us the presumed natural state resistant to civilizing conventions such as *xeinia* and *horkia*. It is a leitmotif in the *Iliad* that taking right hands, breaking bread around a common hearth, and honoring pacts are practices which soften arrogance or battle passion, and bring humans to full humanity.[68] Yet the war poem clearly is ambivalent about these values. It extols them when Nestor upbraids Agamemnon, "Without clan, without law, and without hearth is he who loves chilling civil strife" (9.63–4); but it disparages them when it praises the superhuman might of Ajax, who "would not yield to anyone who is mortal and eats the meal of Demeter, who may be broken by bronze and great stones. … In no way is it possible to contend with him" (13.321–5). The "meal of Demeter," of course, implies the civilizing custom of breaking bread around a common hearth (Kitts 1994); in his brute strength, Ajax defies that.

Horkia is not simply civilizing; it has a sinister side. Both *xeinia* and *horkia* draw religious sanction from Zeus, are endorsed by other gods, and their violation bears the same ominous consequence, which is death. Hence, just as Menelaos is certain that doom is imminent for guestfriendship-violators (3.351–4; 13.622–7), Agamemnon is certain that Zeus will impose lethal punishment on oath-violators: "In no way barren is the oath and the blood of lambs, the unmixed libations and the right hands in which we trusted. For if the Olympian does not fulfil it at once, he will fulfil it later, and with might he will avenge it, with their heads and their wives and their children" (4.158–62). What more precisely will happen is spelled out in this oath-curse from the ritual of Book 3: "Zeus best and greatest, and all the other immortal gods, whosoever should first violate the oaths, so let their brains run to the ground like this wine, and those of their children, and let their wives become the spoil of others" (3.298–301). Later, of course, Agamemnon invites a similar punishment upon himself should he be lying when he swears that he did not touch Achilles' war prize Briseis: "If I have sworn any of these things falsely, may the gods give to me pains, exceedingly many, as many as they give to anyone who transgresses against them in swearing" (19.264–6). Oath-violation is serious business, as we see by repeated Achaian imprecations against "those who were first to violate oaths" (3.300; 4.65–7; 4.71–2; 4.236; 4.271; 7.351–2, with slight verbal variations) after the failed oath-ritual of Book 3.

The painful death of a sacrificial victim at the pinnacle of the ritual cementing the oath illustrates the penalty for oath-violation and makes its finality inescapable. The expression "to cut oaths" arguably refers to several different kinds of cuttings in Near Eastern literature (Kitts 2005; Bickerman 1976:1–32). It should be noted that in the *Iliad* the recurrent expression is not entirely figurative (cf. 2.123–5; 3.73; 3.94; 3.105 and 3.252; 3.256; cf. 18.336–7).[69] After the throats of the oath-victims are cut in Book 3, the lambs die vividly, gasping and deprived of life and strength by the "pitiless bronze" (3.293–4), which is an eponym for the *machaira*, a sacrificial knife named in both of the *Iliad*'s oath-rituals, but never in commensal rituals. Across the ancient Near East, killing an oath-victim is a ritualized cruelty meant to dramatize the repercussions for violating promises and the absolute finality of those repercussions. We see this, for instance, among the Neo-Assyrians and Arameans: "This shoulder is not the shoulder of a spring lamb, it is the shoulder of Mati-ilu, it is the shoulder of his sons, his magnates, and the people of his land. If Mati'-ilu should sin against this treaty, just as the shoulder of this spring lamb is torn out … so may the shoulder of Mati'ilu, of his sons, [his magnates] and the people of his land be torn out …," and "Abba-an is under oath to Yarimlim and also he cut the neck of a lamb. He swore: I shall never take back what I gave you" (Arnold and Beyer 2002:101). The shock and awe quality to the first of these enactments

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68 See, e.g., 21.74–9 and discussion in Kitts (2005:56–61).
69 The same ambiguity may be said to underlie "pouring oaths" (4.269) and "unmixed libations" (4.158–62; 2.339–41). Both may be viewed as ritual metonyms as well as actual performance events.

and the finality of the second illustrate Rappaport's point about the fleeting quality of words, which must be "made heavy" by acts.

The formal nature of oath-making is reflected also in its formulaic language all over the ancient world. The Homeric formula "[I] cut friendship and trusted oaths" (*philotēta kai horkia pista tamnō*; 3.73, 3.94, 3.256) mimics a well-known Near Eastern idiom, as attested by the Hebrew *krt bryt*—to cut a covenant, Phoenician *krt 'lt*– to cut the oath, and the same meaning may be found in Aramaic (*gzr 'dy'*) (Weinfeld 1990:178–9[70]), and is implicated in the Akkadian/Old Babylonian expression from Mari, "to kill an ass" (*haram qatalum*), which is used in the context of concluding a treaty.[71] The Homeric "friendship and trusted oaths" (*philotēs kai horkia pista*) by itself corresponds to Hebrew *bryt šlwm*, *bryt wsd*—covenant and peace/grace, to Aramaic *dy' wbt*—bond and goodness, to Akkadian *riksu salïme, adê salïme*—bond and peace (Weinfeld 1973:191–3; 1990:176–7). In Hittite the match is *išḫiul and lingai-*—bond and the oath (Beckman 1996:2). These idioms are too frequent to be accidental. The similar oath-making formulae as well as the common gestures for hospitality and friendship indicate long-standing traditions shared across and among Mediterranean and Near Eastern civilizations.

The Homeric Ritual Scene: Commensal Sacrifices vs. Oath-Sacrifices

In the last section we saw the dynamics of the hospitality and oath-making traditions within the larger poem and in comparison with some ancient Near Eastern evidence; this section focuses on the internal features of ritual scenes. Hospitality and oath-making are associated with ritual scenes of commensal sacrifice and oath-sacrifice, respectively. Each scene type is distinctively configured while both are characterized by an unusual degree of fixity and predictability, even for typical scenes. Presuming the diachronic development of the poems, it is possible to sketch in these scenes the crystallized shape of actual performances, albeit colored by poetic constraints. This is an inductive argument, based on ritual studies and oral-traditional studies.

First, it should be noted that sacrifice and ritual are both contested categories, perhaps all the more contestable when they are used to discuss a poem. Presuming some degree of verisimilitude within the text (as argued in the last section), we can observe that the ambience varies hugely between commensal sacrifice (*thysia*) and oath-sacrifice (mainly *horkia*), which speaks to the inadequacy of the English umbrella category of "sacrifice" for the poem as well as for actual practice. Fortunately, the *Iliad*'s own ritual vocabulary does not confuse *thysia* with *horkia*. For instance, the verb for killing the animal in oath-sacrificing scenes is the very concrete *tamnō*, I cut, as opposed to the *sphazdō*, I slaughter, used in commensal scenes. Superficially, *sphazdō* may appear a euphemism for the same thing as *tamnō*, but the difference is felt: the animal's death is not acknowledged in commensal scenes,[72] whereas it is central in oath-making scenes. As for the definition of ritual, for the sake of argument and because it befits the *Iliad*, we will equate ritual with performance, albeit of a symbolic, stylized, and typically non-utilitarian kind (Rappaport 1999; Whitehouse 2004; Tambiah 1979), much like oral performances of the *Iliad* itself. Because of constraints on space, we will

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70   Also in Latin: *foedus ferire*.
71   Finet (1993:135–42) and Giorgieri (2001:421–40).
72   Funeral sacrifices have their own unique features, although the word *sphazdō* is used at 23.31 (Kitts 2008, 2011).

trace in *thysia* and *horkia* scenes only two performance features, which intersect: patterning and pace. That the two types of performances show these features so very differently will be argued to reflect actual performances or at least conceptions of performances among Homeric audiences; this is as opposed to seeing the typical scenes as simply a species of oral art. In the end, register will be shown as key to understanding the tight pattern of the performances.

Commensal sacrifices (*thysia*) show patterning and pace most evidently in Book 1, although the examples in Books 2, 7, 9, and 24 provide close matches. In Book 1's example (from verses 447 to 469), there are 15 discernible, successive moments, all very concrete, precise, and described with a remarkable plenum of indicative verbs. Discounting the prayer, there are 25 finite verbs in only 15 verses (compare to the usual dictum of one indicative verb per verse), a ratio of 19:6 aorists to imperfects, and only two participles to the whole ritual account. The commensal ritual is a very busy event! First, participants set up the hecatomb of animals, presumably bovines (1.447–8); they wash hands and take up barley (1.449); either a priest or Agamemnon prays (1.450); barley is thrown at the victim (1.458; identical at 2.421); its head is held up, its throat sliced (with the verb *sphazdō*, specifically for slaughtering), and it is flayed (all in one verse (1.459; identical at 2.422; cf. 24.622)); thigh pieces are cut out, covered in two folds of fat (1.460–61; identical at 2.423–4) ; then raw strips of flesh are laid over the thigh pieces (1.461; identical at 2.434); they are cooked over split wood and there are libations of wine (1.462–3); men stand by holding forks (1.463); they burn the thighs and taste the innards (1.464; identical at 2.427); the rest is cut into bits, skewered with spits (1.465; identical at 2.428; cf. 7.317, 9.210, 24.623); these are roasted expertly and the meat is drawn off (1.466; identical at 2.429, 24.624; cf. 7.318); after that they cease their labor and prepare the feast (1.467; identical at 2.430, 7.319); then we get the formular verse, "they feasted, and no spirit went lacking the equally divided feast" (1.468; identical at 2.431, 7.320); after which we get another one, "but when they had sated their desire for food and drink" (1.469; identical at 2.432, 7.323, 9.222, 24.628).

Of this sequence, exactly 10 verses are identical between at least two of the five commensal scenes, the last verse appears in all five, and there are variations on the number of parallels in the others. The pattern is both reified and abstract. It is reified by its concrete detail, micro-precision, and repeatability, as well as by the verses which express satiety—clearly the final point of *thysia*. At the same time it is at least partially abstract because in all five commensal scenes the victims' blood is ignored. Considering that this is a hecatomb of large mammals, the bloodlessness can only be a poetic fiction, as is the lack of attention to the victims' resistance and presumably bellowing while dying. These fictions serve to highlight the bustle and gratification of dining, all of which proceeds at a brisk pace. As I argue below, the brisk pace and fastidious sequence reflect an actual performance pattern, with just a bit of poetic sweetening—the lack of blood and resistance. The lack of attention to those elements presumably reflects what is in the forefront of the minds of the ritual participants, audience, or poet. This scene type is about gratification, not about the horror of death.

Oath-sacrifice (*horkia*) occurs only twice in the *Iliad* and is also tightly patterned, but altogether its pace is more ponderous. Of the fuller narrative in Book 3 and a shorter one in Book 19, three verses are identical, but many of the 11 steps mirror each other. Rather than signaled by a succession of finite verbs denoting busy micro-actions—remember that in *thysia* there are 25 such verbs in only 15 verses—*horkia* scenes feature slightly more than one indicative verb per every two verses, or, precisely, 14 indicative verbs in 24 verses—this is discounting the prayers. Based on these ratios, if the *thysia* ritual is *allegro*, *horkia* is *largo*.

Using the longer ritual as our model, we see that, first, oath-victims (*horkia pista*) are presented and the hands of participants are washed (3.268–70); then Agamemnon draws his

machaira, his sacrificial knife (3.271–2; identical at 19.252–3); he cuts hairs from lambs held by heralds, who distribute the hairs to the others (3.273–4); holding up his hands, he prays (3.275; quasi identical (slight word order change), at 19.254); he invokes Zeus, Earth, Helios, and the Erinyes (3.276–8; quasi identical at 19.256–7); "who punish men, whosoever should swear a false oath" (3.279; identical at 19.260); he compels them, "you be witnesses, and protect the sworn oaths" (3.280); he provides the content of the oath (3.281–91; 19.261–3); then he "cut" (*tame*) the throat of the victim(s) "with the pitiless bronze" (3.292; identical at 19.266, with the boar substituted for the lambs); in Book 3 he puts the lambs on the ground "gasping, deprived of life and strength by the bronze" (3.293–4), whereas in Book 19, the herald hurls the boar into the river to become food for fish (19.267–8); in Book 3 the victims' deaths are followed by the pouring of libations and prayers that the brains of perjurers and their children run to the ground as does the wine, while their wives are subdued by others (3.298–301).

Clearly this *horkia* is felt to be a much more somber event than the *thysia*. It is also felt to be lethal: the victim's death is highlighted, not suppressed. The gasping death mimics the fate of perjurers and is followed by a curse saying as much, at least in Book 3. Another difference is that drawing the *machaira*—a knife never even mentioned in *thysia*—gets an ominous whole verse and its killing work is inescapable: hence the epithet "the pitiless bronze" (3.292; 19.266). Rather than the verb *sphazdō* to denote slaughter, the verb for killing is *tamnō*, referring concretely to cutting the throat—no euphemisms; this is death. Whereas in *thysia*, the gods get a nod in the proffered libation (and in context surrounding Books 1 and 2),[73] in *horkia* they are invoked to sanction the oath's violation with the most painful punishments.[74]

Although they differ radically on mood and pace, the two different scene types share two features: a relative fixity of process (hence patterning, as demonstrated above) and an almost complete lack of figurative embellishment. Unlike in speeches or killing scenes, there is almost no information extraneous to the performance. In *horkia*, the two figurative phrases—"oath-victims" (*horkia pista*) and "pitiless bronze" (*neleï chalkō*), representing the lambs and the knife[75] respectively—are basically ritual metonyms. Given their poetic weight in the scene, they are arguably vocabulary flags for the entire ritual. Also note that every step of the *horkia* matters. Nothing could be omitted without the loss of religious gravity. The pace is not only ponderous but of high register, signaled by the charging of witnesses, both divine and human, with defending the oath and punishing its violation, and also by the lambs' vivid dying ("gasping, deprived of life (*thumos*), for the bronze had taken the strength (*menos*)") in Book 3.

With *thysia* rituals, there are likewise few figurative expressions, with the exception of "equal feast" (*daitos eisês*), and "shining wine" (*aithopa onion*). These too may be deemed ritual metonyms, connoting the pleasure of the feast. They are undoubtedly formulae, the first occurring six times in the *Iliad* at the end of a verse and the second occurring nine times also at the end of the verse (Kitts 2011). But formulae need not be unfelt. Parry called such adjective-noun formulae particularized epithets, with adjectives affixed to objects but not empty of significance (1971:156–65). Here they are flags for an entire convention which must have been known to audiences over generations. Also, as pointed out, every element of this ritual matters too, as signaled by the meticulous precision and preponderance of finite verbs in preparing the feast. The entire process is concrete. The whole formular lines denoting

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73   And of course gods enjoy hospitality themselves (e.g., at 1.597–604 and 18.385–410).
74   Gods too are punished terribly for violating oaths, implied at 1.524–7; 19.108–13 and 15.36–40. Discussion in Kitts (2005).
75   Once referred to also as "the bronze" (3.294).

gratification at the end of the scenes are also conceivable as particularized formulae. At least, the gratification they depict is certainly felt. Those verses distinguish this performance event from that of *horkia*, and reflect the hospitable ambience.

These features, fixity of sequence and relative lack of figurative embellishment, distinguish ritual performance scenes from scenes depicting battles or speeches, which tend to be more flexible and to contain more figuration. The fixity and lack of figuration are arguably due at least in part to actual ritual performance patterns. Thus, the tighter the cohesion of the elements in an actual ritual performance, the more likely it is that the cohesion of elements exerted compositional pressure on the imagination of the bards composing the poem, at least at some point in the poem's evolution. By that logic, the fixity in these two performance scene types reflects their significance in Homeric society; their fixity, in my view, reflects the importance of the institutions they reflect, rather than merely the frozenness of a bard's versification repertoire. This argument may be supported by some lessons of oral compositional studies and of ritual studies.

First, from the perspective of oral traditional studies, it is arguable that ritual scenes preserve older cultural formations than do scenes depicting dynamic conversations and battlefield skirmishes, as alluded earlier. As Martin has noted, conversations in the *Iliad* are likely to be cast in idioms which resonate with the latest contemporaries of the composing poet(s) (1989:45–9). Battlefield skirmishes, while certainly formulaic, nonetheless tend to be represented dynamically, with attention-grabbing, fast-paced action. The contrasting conservatism in ritual scenes would be in part an outcome of a bard's efforts, in successive recomposition in performance before Panhellenic audiences, to evoke recognition of older ritual patterns on the part of listeners who conceivably engaged in regional variations on them. Nagy has compared such a bard to an ethnographer who, in facing multiform traditions, would attempt to reconstruct back to the prototype (1990a:24). For the bard this would be in order to garner the widest possible recognition, but evoking prototypes also might inject a hallowed nuance to the bygone traditions of heroes. Homeric ritual scenes therefore are likely to reflect prototypical traditions and to be couched in less flexible, more formal, phrasing.

Overlapping with the perspective of oral traditional studies is the perspective of ritual studies. From that perspective, the fixity in these scenes might be explained by the conservative nature of actual ritual traditions. This is especially true of rituals performed in high registers, which would tend to maintain fastidious formality and thereby to resist the vagaries of change over time (Rappaport 1999:129–30). Thus, generations of audiences would expect certain performance parameters, and presumably this expectation would exert tacit pressure on the composing poet. Register is a significant factor in the persistence of ritual form. Rappaport has observed that register is likely to be proportional to the level of commitment implied in entering into the conventions established by ritual and to the danger in breaking with them.[76] On the high register and danger in oath-making, consider the divinely imposed lethal penalty for violating the oath, once one has completed the ritual for it. On hospitality, consider the danger inherent in trusting a stranger during an initial encounter. Notably, hospitality too is protected by Zeus. Oath-making and hospitality conventions are sacred—to violate them is proscribed—and hence the weightiness of the personal commitment for participants in them and the high register of their performances before audiences who still honor them. This conservatism in ritual traditions offers us a lens into the ancient world beyond the poem.

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76   On high formality and ritual persuasion see both Rappaport (1999:34; 1996:428) and Bloch (1975:6–13). On the characteristics of different kinds of speech act in Homer, see again Martin (1989:6–7, 45–6).

Based on the relative antiquity of these two kinds of ritual scenes in the poem, as well as on the conservative tendencies of rituals performed in high-registers, it is reasonable to suppose that oath-making and hospitality rituals, because of their hallowed features and high register, reflect some of the oldest cultural practices described in the poem.

Conclusion

In sum, anthropology matters greatly for understanding the *Iliad*. It relates to the archaeology of the Trojan war, it bears on the poem's composition and cultural conventions, and it helps us read beneath the *Iliad*'s ritual scenes. This chapter has endeavored to highlight some anthropological perspectives on the *Iliad*.

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Disaster Anthropology

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For a long time, anthropologists have been aware of the need to handle questions of change and history in their ethnographic studies and theoretical explorations. The increasing volatility and pace of change, often associated with migration and phenomena loosely labeled as globalization, coupled with the rise of international NGOs and the employment of anthropologists as consultants, has accelerated the urgency of dealing with types of complex and disordered change in society. Studies of areas affected by large-scale or pervasive disasters present key challenges in this context. Further, concern with global climatic change has highlighted the relevance of such studies. It is in the light of these challenges, and the growing number of empirical studies in this area, that we have found it important to define the sub-discipline of what we are calling Disaster Anthropology.

Our ongoing work in this relatively new and rapidly developing arena of research stems from our fieldwork in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and particularly Taiwan and is now extended to Samoa in the Pacific area and to Japan. Memories and traditions of disasters that have overtaken populations are widely spread throughout the world, underscoring the point that this is a salient arena of human experience (see for example, Carr 1993, on the Night of the Big Wind in 1839 in Ireland).

It is also an arena that impinges on people's consciousness through a kind of proxy experience of it. In 2012, when we were delivering a set of lectures (the De Carle Lectures) at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, we heard narratives of the earthquake and its aftershocks that had devastated the city of Christchurch to the north. We had planned to visit and give a talk at the Centre for European Union Studies there, only to find that the Director of the Centre had lost his house in the disaster, and everyone was facing stress, so that it seemed advisable to forego the visit. In Dunedin people remarked that they had felt the tremors of the earthquake. In Dunedin also, during our stay there, a warning went out over TV early one morning that a tsunami or high wave might hit exposed coastal parts, resulting from an earthquake in Chile. We hastily took some essentials and prepared to retreat to high ground, but the waves turned out to minor. Earlier, in 2006 we were due to make a return field visit to the Atherton Tablelands in Northern Queensland, and had made a booking in a forested area in the hills outside of Cairns. We found on arrival that our hosts had to put us up in another location because the picturesque setting of their own cabins had been devastated by falling trees as a result of a cyclone that had just passed through the area. In a later year we read about the huge floods that had affected Queensland including the city of Brisbane itself—cities built around the mouths of rivers become at risk with storms that bring floodwater downstream. These, then, were experiences, minor for us, major for those primarily affected, that coincidentally occurred on our field travels and through our academic connections.

Whether the incidence of disasters is increasing or not is difficult to assess. The partial globalization of communications through news media means that a wider net of information

is thrown around the world and public consciousness is raised. News is often bad news and disasters grip human attention, conveying the vulnerability and vicissitudes of life. Natural disasters bring this sense of vulnerability to the fore in a particularly compelling way. We recognize, of course, that a hard and fast distinction between human-made and natural disasters cannot be maintained, because many adverse events are precipitated by a combination of causes operating as ecological phenomena. Nevertheless, we are interested in events that are classified by those involved in them primarily as events brought on by forces beyond human agency. In the aftermath of such events, causes relating to humans and/or animal stock are often adduced, giving rise to scenarios of blame, exculpation, ideological arguments, and eschatology that are very relevant to the theme of how people deal with the fact of disastrous events.

One of our early encounters with the theme of such disasters was in the Mount Hagen area of the Western Highlands of Papua New Guinea. This was the story of the "ash fall" that suddenly overtook the ancestors of current generations of people. That the event (or events) incorporated into local legends was very widespread has been demonstrated by the research of Russell Blong (1982) who diligently recorded ash fall narratives all across the New Guinea Highlands (and later studied the risks of volcanic eruptions throughout his career). For Hagen the story was first recorded by Georg Vicedom (Vicedom and Tischner 1943–48), a Lutheran missionary stationed at Ogelbeng near to Hagen in the 1930s who compiled a massive corpus of ethnographic data (Strathern and Stewart 2007). The form of the story is broadly shared among the Highlands societies. It basically tells of a period of days in which ash fell from the sky and covered all the gardens and houses and people had to stay inside their houses. Eventually the boldest among them came out when the ash falls stopped and found their whole world blanketed with the ash and crops and trees damaged. But afterwards everything recovered, the narratives say, and in the version recorded by Vicedom it is suggested that a new set of people sprang up following the event, which turned out not to be such a disaster after all. Vicedom noted that the legend was probably based in historical reality because the gold miner Michael Leahy (a pioneer explorer of the Highlands) found thick layers of volcanic ash in mining trenches his workers made below the surface. These traces in turn have proved to be important dating devices for Prof. Golson's archaeological team at the site Kuk in the Hagen area, since different compacted layers of ash have been found at Kuk and have been dated and where possible traced to the eruptions that resulted in their deposition in the local soil over time. While the legends tend to recount a single event, the archaeological evidence indicates that there were multiple occasions of ash fall during the overall time depth of human occupation. The ash can often be sampled and identified as belonging to particular, historical dates, and sites of volcanic eruptions, and so it can contribute to the overall chronology of archaeological phases in the evidence of early agriculture (see for background Strathern and Stewart 1998). Blong identified the ash at Kuk as what he called Tibito and Olgaboli tephra deposits from the eruption of Long Island off the northern coast of PNG some 300 years BP.

From our viewpoint here the major interest of the narrative is that it contains a message of recovery. The ash that appeared to destroy everything enabled its later regeneration. The fertility of volcanic soil is the reason why populations often choose to live and flourish in such sites, thereby becoming vulnerable to future disaster if the volcanic eruptions should be renewed. In the Hagen case, it is interesting also that the narrative was preserved as legend, but not, it seems, as a warning that the ash fall might at some time come back and that people should be prepared for it. In places where such eruptions continue, and in places where tsunami events regularly recur, a different form of memory is preserved, containing the warnings and advice on how to flee and stay alive.

In the PNG Highlands more recently there was a climatic El Niño event which caused an inversion of temperatures, with colder air near to the ground bringing frost damage to vulnerable leafy vegetable crops, including the staple sweet potato. The ensuring shortages of food were severe enough for people to request aid from the government until they could replant another set of crops and harvest them, a process that takes several months. Drought, and shortages of food as well as sharp changes in temperatures caused an outbreak of illnesses, from which some people died, and numbers of suspicions or accusations of witchcraft or sorcery emerged as a result. The ecological disturbance caused a disturbance in social relations. This kind of event was not unknown to the people, however, particularly those whose habitats are in mountains above 6,000' a.s.l., and higher altitude dwellers developed exchange ties with ones living in lower more favorable places that enabled them to take refuge for short periods of time when this was needed. Valued mountain products, such as forest nut pandanus could be exchanged for lower altitude crops such as the long fruit pandanus. The El Niño, however, tended to affect gardens in the valley floors as well as on hillsides, so ordinary activities of adaptation did not work so well. Finally, when the cold air was not so severe, we ourselves noted that the crops rebounded, becoming healthy and very strong again. Large insects such as colored spiders also emerged. There was therefore a general sense of renewal and growth that mirrored the themes in the ash fall legends. (We encountered a similar phenomenon in a different cultural context, in the spring of 2013 in Ireland and Scotland where a great shortage of grass for fodder had occurred owing to bad weather. When sunshine finally came and the grass for hay and silage sprang up farmers experienced a sense of relief and appreciation for the "power of nature," as they themselves put it.)

These disaster and recovery narratives encapsulate the two main themes of our own project, on the phases of coping and hoping in people's experiences in disaster situations. Coping comes first and also has to continue over time, but is supplemented by hope that circumstances can improve or are improving. Creative actions by people foster and help senses of hope to grow. Actions that we call symbolic come into play and may operate in any sphere, intimate, public, or political, and at any stage of recovery from trauma. In Japan, the disaster known as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami happened up and down the eastern coasts around Sendai with the incursion of the huge tsunami wave on March 11, 2011 (and is accordingly referred to in some writings as 3/11).

A special edition of *Nikkei Eastern Review* of March 6, 2014, was produced to commemorate this cataclysmic event, and noted that some 20,000 people had died or gone missing and some 400,000 homes were destroyed as well as huge damage done to roads and services. Some 470,000 people had to leave their homes, in particular because of leakage from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The latter presents an especially poignant problem because of long-term pollution that makes it problematic whether some residents will ever be able to return to their homes. In the cherry blossom season of 2014 we watched NHK television programs depicting trees blooming in well-known areas where the residents were not permitted to return and view them. Given the iconic significance of the cherry blossom, this was regarded as a mark of the serious deprivation suffered by people. Annoyance with this enforced removal from their land has led to recriminations on the part of farmers. One farmer, Kenichi Hasegawa, published a book in March 2012 entitled "Fukushima's Stolen Lives," severely criticizing government handling of the nuclear disaster in his area 40 kms from the nuclear plant (*Japan Times*, Sat. April 12, 2014, p. 3).

In April 2014 we watched another NHK television program in Japan that carried the story of a mother who had borne her daughter in a hospital shaken by the earthquake on the date of the tsunami. It was her first child and she was terrified, and a nurse had told her just to keep the newborn close to her own skin and so help it to be warm. She had hidden in her

car and done so and mother and child both survived. Later she felt, as survivors often do, guilty for being alive and uncertain whether she should feel able to celebrate the daughter's birthday. A company, however, was giving out small chairs for children born on 3/11 and the daughter had grown very fond of one such chair given to her. The chairs were called "hope chairs," and the mother felt she now could celebrate the daughter's birth, because it represented the idea of hope for the future, that the daughter will grow up and help to create new life.

The model of coping and hoping, which is both processual and phenomenological in its import, applies certainly to other events in addition to those we are demarcating as "natural disasters." In the broader sense, for example, wars must be seen as disasters in terms of their natural and human effects, and recovery from war goes through the same phases of coping and hoping that we have applied here. Disorder, stress, risk, trauma, and reordering of memories, are all crucially involved. Recovery from war also has to be preceded by the conclusion of a war and the terms of making and building peace as a way of resolving issues between those who have been enemies and also within the various groups on each side. Using this point, in our work on disasters we point out that disasters often also implicate internal divisions or conflicts, as well as senses of disharmony with the environment, and disaster recovery may therefore further involve making peace between people and with the environment. It may also involve long-term arguments about responsibility, culpability, blame, and compensation. Such arguments continue to this day about the aftermaths of World Wars I and II or as far back as the Sino-Japanese war of the nineteenth century. Compensation issues can be particularly stubborn and hard to settle finally, especially in relation to events where human responsibility is involved, such as in nuclear power disasters. (Chernobyl as well as Fukushima come to mind.) In a different context, mine pollution effects often spread out from the immediate mining area to more distant places, as happened among the Duna people of Lake Kopiago in Papua New Guinea (Stewart and Strathern 2002). The big river Strickland at the border between the Duna and Oksapmin was thought to have suffered pollution from mine tailings out of Porgera in the Enga Province. The company decided to offer compensation without openly admitting culpability, and local groups all received a portion of the money offered and distributed to designated "leaders" and their networks. Mining companies seek to contain the negative effects of environmental pollution from mine tailings by agreeing to pay compensation in this way even while arguing about the objectivity of evidence for pollution.

Our interests in issues of this kind were quickened by field experiences in southern Taiwan following devastation of mountain areas among the indigenous Austronesian groups. In 2009 a powerful typhoon named typhoon Morakot slammed through many communities perched on the edges of large river systems, and the heavy, slashing rainfall precipitated massive landslides, in one case completely covering up a village (Shaolin) and burying its inhabitants. In other instances the landslides destroyed the hillside and riverine gardens of the people and/or ripped away many of the village houses built alongside a river course. A historical background to these experiences of the people is to be frond in the fact that they had often been subjected to a number of relocations unrelated to an immediate environmental disaster. In the Pingtung area the people of Laiyi village explained that they had been moved a number of times from the earliest remembered settlement site high up in the mountains. This, the true "ancestral" village site, is seen as not being subject to landslips. People can still hike up there to make a day visit. They were then relocated at some point by Japanese colonial authorities further down the mountain side to make them more accessible to governmental control. After the defeat of the Japanese in World War II Taiwan was granted to the Kuomintang (KMT) Republican leader General Chiang Kai-shek fleeing from China and it is said that the KMT authorities brought the Laiyi people further downhill to the

settlement that was recently rendered hazardous and partly destroyed by typhoon Morakot and another typhoon that followed it after 2009. This settlement sits close to a very broad path of the local river and the river broke or eroded its banks with the swell of rainwater, sweeping away riverine gardens and houses. The present KMT government then decreed that villagers should move again, this time to flat plains areas where houses could easily be built and within reasonable reach of services but without provision of significant land for gardening.

Large garden areas and some dwelling houses have been lost. The government allows people to make daytime visits to what is now "Old Laiyii" from their relocated settlement of "New Laiyii," requiring them to return to the new area by evening. However, numbers of people, who did not lose their houses and still use pieces of high-set land for gardens, remain ambivalent about the new order of things and have refused to sign contractual agreements to move. The chief's house is still in Old Laiyii.

A complication in the Laiyii situation results from a division in the community between traditionalists and Christians. The members of the leading chiefly line (*mamazangilan* is the Paiwan term for this category), as we were told by the local Christian pastor who is Han but was brought up by the chief's household, all converted to Christianity, joining the Church of the Nazarene located in the valley area beside the river but away from the areas that flooded. People of a different section of the whole group, who also claim to have chiefly leaders, opposed this move and insisted to stay in their part of the old village. Predictably, the two sides, Christian and non-Christian, had opposed explanations for why the river had burst its banks and landslides had happened. Christians said it was because some people had turned back to pagan ways and thus brought punishment from God upon themselves. The pastor had a more complex version of this story. She said that the people had reinstated an enactment of an old harvest ritual, intending this for tourists, but that instead the ritual was carried out seriously rather than just as a touristic "performance," and so there had been trouble. The non-Christian or pagan side declared, to the contrary, that the disaster occurred because the ancestors were displeased that people had turned away from the proper sacrifices to them and adopted the new religion instead. On a visit to Old Laiyii we saw the village shrine to the ancestors, just beside the chief's house, a bare structure with some space for offerings, so the ritual site was still in place, but the pagans, or traditionalists, said that it was neglected. Controversy between the two sides was spirited, and a meeting was arranged for us with the village councilor in 2012. We were told that the traditionalists had decided to find a pig and cast it into the river as a propitiatory sacrifice in order to avert further damage. The competing moral eschatologies tied in with the environment reflected similar modes of thought but dissimilar visions of the cosmos.[1]

Pagans hung on to the old village, while the Christians were at least partly relocated in the new resettlement area. We visited both the old village and the new area. Houses in the new area were built in permanent fashion, of wood or concrete-based materials in the main. Given the scope of the devastation, several other villages besides Laiyii were involved. Different aid agencies had undertaken to build blocks of houses, which accordingly caused some distinctions of appearance. The Red Cross built some blocks, World Vision (a Christian organization) others, and Tzu Chi, a major Buddhist aid NGO based in Hualien, Taiwan, built yet others. All these houses were erected without charge to those who came to occupy

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1   We have found that this theme of competing moral eschatologies has been documented in work by Judith Schlehe on parts of Java in Indonesia that have suffered earthquakes, e.g., Schlehe (2010). This constitutes a comparative theoretical issue of great interest. We suggest that cosmology is most likely to be invoked when there are in fact splits in community views and that disasters accentuate such splits. Conflict between Christians and traditionalists lends itself to this process, as it did after the tsunami that hit the northern coast of Papua New Guinea at Aitape in 1998.

them and the occupiers paid no rent but had to pay for services. The aid organizations supplied furniture and appliances such as washing machines and TVs. The drawback, as we were told, was that the occupiers could not sell or pass the dwellings to others. We were also told that they were required to sign a contract promising not to go back and resettle in the old area. The contract was signed as a pledge to government authorities. Residents were mainly middle-aged and older people at first. After another two years on return visits we noticed that there were schoolchildren, school buildings were in use, and churches were being built in various designated corners belonging to particular groups and sub-groups of people who had all been put together in a single named relocation site. The NGOs had built the houses but the churches were said to be the people's own responsibility, and they collected money among themselves to pay for the construction costs as they did in the old village areas. We observed this developing pattern at Rinari (Linali) as well as New Laiyii and Taewu. Churches that were already finished and in use had been well built and supplied with furniture and carvings for their interiors. We saw Presbyterian and Catholic churches, either completed or underway. These would form nodes of identification for people of particular tribal or local identities who wished to maintain some degree of distinctiveness while being aggregated in the new composite resettlement context.

As with Japan, there is a long history of experience with natural disasters in Taiwan. For example in the center of the island in Nantou there was a severe earthquake in 2013 and an earlier destructive one in the 1990s. We made a visit to Nantou 10 years after the earlier event and studied recovery processes, including an effloresce of craft work in bamboo for ale to tourists.

Our fieldwork has taken us in particular to resettlement places among the Paiwan speakers both in the south-east around Taitung and the south-west in Pingtung. Our visits began in 2010, on the eastern side. We already knew one village, Lalauran (Xiang-Lan in Mandarin) where there is a charismatic leader who is a Presbyterian pastor. His village just escaped the depredations of Morakot, lying to the south of the river course where most of the damage occurred. In riverine flats to the north of Lalauran we saw great swaths of land where everything was flattened and trucks were the only things operating to carry gravel from the riverbed and to build up the river's edges with concrete slabs and blocks. People living near to the coast had been relocated in small pockets of wooden housing built for them by World Vision. Some were on isolated patches of high land overlooking water, others were in the middle of urban areas wherever space was made available. People had begun to plant crops and flowers in the tiny areas of frontage on their house sites. Two separate dwellings were often combined in one unit.

One interior village on the eastern side that we visited in 2010 was Jalan. We saw how the river had sliced through a part of the village built near to its banks (as we later saw also in Laiyii). The Chief's house was upended in the middle of the new river bed. Huge spans of timber logs had come crashing down with the water, and these were piled up in various places awaiting what was to happen to them. On the further bank a sole resident had clung to his original house, refusing to move. A local doctor was trying to establish a school for young men, teaching them about hunting and the preparation of healthy foods; but the village was clearly suffering from the shock of the typhoon. Three years later, in 2013, we visited again, and found the village transformed. First, the relocation houses to replace those destroyed were situated within the territory of the village itself, not far away from it. Second, we were told that World Vision, which had built many of the houses, had given extra money to each household to enable it to have tribal identification decorations in Paiwan style to be created by artists on the exteriors of the houses. Third, the relocation area was connected by a new road and bridge system that joined together parts of the village and its gardens that had been separated by the river floods. We also saw at a distance uphill, but did not

directly visit, numbers of further new houses which were said to have been built by the government. On this same visit we were driven up to the settlement on the hillside of a local enthusiast for craft work and traditional practices. His family actually came from Pingtung on the western side of the island. He showed us the treasures of his storehouses, including the last harvest of millet that he had taken at the time of his mother's death. The survival of this pocket of traditionalism in the midst of change told us much about how "tradition" and "modernity" can coexist, depending on the availability of durable local themes. By recursive iconic references back to the integrity of the past, people can also more easily begin to craft their futures and develop hope for their creative imaginations.

Visits in 2013 to the other resettlement areas we know conveyed a similar message. Each village has shown signs of recovery and development. In Rinari, we found a new craft industry house, in which women were busy making artifacts and visitors were encouraged also to stay in a bed and breakfast style of accommodation. In another village, we saw busy sets of women working in gardens of vegetables or beans growing in bushes, used in making soup. In another, we saw that in a public building centered on coffee production and sale, the coffee shop was now open and, again, local artifacts were on sale. The transition from a gardening to a service-oriented economy geared to tourism was taking place. High up in the mountains we have studied the business of an enterprising villager who has established a coffee plantation from old stock originally planted in the time of Japanese colonial control (1895–1945), and sells his own brand in packets with a logo he designed incorporating the mountain Daewu that separates the western and eastern Paiwan areas and a star that represents the inspiration he received from his grandfather. He is already in competition with other such entrepreneurs around him, but he prides himself on retaining young workers to help him who thereby remain committed to the ancestral land rather than disappearing into the big city of Kaohsiung in the plains below Pingtung.

In December 2014 we were fortunate to be able to revisit a number of areas in Pingtung affected by Morakot, including Rinari and the nearby town of Sandimen, a center of craft industries, and there we learned from a representative of a local NGO that he was helping to advise several such entrepreneurs who were producing their own brands of high quality coffee. Coffee was clearly becoming a major focus of entrepreneurial activity as a part of the recovery from disaster. (Thanks go here to Dr Sung Shih-Hsiang for introducing us to this NGO worker and translating his account.)

Each disaster area carries its own potential for illumination on the topic of recovery and resilience. In (Western) Samoa we found a feature that is important everywhere but was particularly evident there: the significance of local social structures in determining both initial and long-term adaptations to disaster. Samoa is a society with strong and elaborate chiefly lines in which leadership is formally invested in clan titles obtained through succession. Further, each village is headed by a particular chief and each has its gathering place of *fono* in which decisions are made and communicated. Finally, Samoans converted to various denominations of Christian churches early on in colonial history (Methodism, Anglicanism, and Catholicism, for example) and each village has its own church, to which villagers are expected to belong. These three factors make of each village a unit that can quickly mobilize for action in the face of challenges. Villagers who had relatives affected by the tsunami were swiftly able to come to the rescue. Mormons have also established themselves in numbers of small communities and we were told that they institute very efficient ways of mobilizing their members, so they were to the fore in rescue operations, along with the Samoan Red Cross organization. The tsunami hit the southern coastline, wiping out all the settlements, and some inhabitants died while trying to reach higher ground and safety. In one case a church minister lost his wife in this way, and was praised for nevertheless continuing his own compassionate work among his surviving parishioners. Villagers not only had high

land to which they could, with luck, retreat, but also their land rights extended to these areas, and they had made gardens there. Relocation simply meant, therefore, resettlement on their own garden land. It is obvious that all these factors together meant that evacuation was swift and relocation easy, without any extra strain in legal, social, and political terms. The small scale of the population and their close knit ties of religion, kinship, and chiefship meant that recovery could be relatively quick. The Samoan case is instructive as an example of how social structure has a major impact on disaster recovery in small-scale contexts.

Research in Japan provides an interesting comparison with the Samoan case. Japan has suffered numerous earthquakes and tsunami incursions over a long history and memories of these are well established in stories and in stone memorials that have been set up in the past. In spite of this, settlements have continued to be established, as a result of industrial expansion and shortages of land for dwellings, in areas vulnerable to tsunami, often because of a resurgence of fishing stocks there. The Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster of March 3, 2011 revealed the immense power of a tsunami that broke over strong sea walls and destroyed many communal areas of occupation in the Miyagi and Iwate prefectures of the Sendai region. The scale involved was far greater than in Samoa, and the ensuing problems have been for many complex and intractable. Part of the problem results from the fact that the tsunami destroyed the insulation of the Fukushima nuclear power plant, adding radioactive pollution to material destruction and making reoccupation of areas hazardous or not possible. The "natural" disaster is thus compounded by the effects of human actions. Human settlement in hazardous places similarly magnifies danger. Our own work, however, is concentrated on issues of recovery where such severe, indeed crippling, results of the tsunami are not found. Hence, we can examine the complexity of decision-making about re-occupation or re-location of areas without long-term absolute blockages of choice.[2]

Political issues, nevertheless remain. A major point of contention relates to the sea walls. These walls are a prominent coastal feature and there are government plans to strengthen and raise them. In some places, however, there is resistance to, or questioning of, this policy. The resistance may have two reasons. One is that the height of the walls would have to be raised considerably, yet still might not be sufficient to hold back the next tsunami. The second form of objections, from at least one area, is that the walls block the view and experience of the city in port contexts where people see ships coming and leaving. In such areas the idea is that people "live with" the tsunami rather than trying to beat nature by human technology. If high ground is nearby, people can retreat relatively easily. In one such area, people can expect to experience, we were told, two tsunamis in their lifetime. Knowledge of this is kept alive and people are aware of the risks.

Another important issue has to do with the making of memorials (see Hayashi n.d. for an informed review of this topic). The impulse to memorialize has several aspects: the management, expression, and channeling of grief; the wish to keep memories alive on longer terms; and the often stated aim of reducing vulnerability to future disasters. The equivalent in terms of war memorials is the declaration that war should be avoided in future and peace-making should be built on the realization of the negative character of war, while still maintaining respect for lives lost in combat as well as recognizing the loss of civilian lives. At one disaster site in Sendai which we were privileged to visit we saw various stages and contexts of memorialization. One was an officially established hillock or

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mound that now stood out from what had become a flat desolate plain covered with coarse dry grasses. Here there was a war shrine previously set up, along with newer improvised Buddhist memorial shrines, added to and altered from time to time, an old pine tree, and a newly planted cherry tree. At the base there was a small shop selling artifacts and food, a hillside design in flowers with the settlement name, and at the back two old tsunami warning stones. People visit this composite memorial regularly. Some distance away there is a high school, now abandoned, where 14 students' deaths in the tsunami have been memorialized, in an array of plaques and signs at the school entrance, including a black incised granite stone with the students' names. We were told that the stone was meant to be touched by visitors and gradually worn down over time. Beside the access road, a hut had been set up which continued a more elaborate set of records, including montages created by students with images of the destruction and a vision of a future place protected from tsunami damage. Memorialization is a process that gathers into itself many facets of memory, imagination, and hope.

We saw signs of this process in many formal and informal contexts. The center we visited hosts story-tellers who give accounts of suffering, loss, survival, and positive feelings. Personal narratives in general are an important part of the records and means of adjustment including narratives that contain critical elements. Japanese newspaper and television regularly cover those. An example comes from the *Japan Times* National section for April 12, 2014, p. 3, mentioned above, where there is a report of a farmer from the Fukushima area that was affected by the nuclear accident as a result of the tsunami: The farmer, Kenichi Hasegawa, published his book in 2012 called *Fukushima's Stolen Lives* documenting tragedies and what he saw as governmental mistakes. When the order for evacuation came, he also had to say goodbye to the herd of dairy cattle he had worked with over his whole life. Farmers elsewhere would sympathize.

Anger there is, then, and angst in plenty. There is also pride in achievements attained in spite of the destruction. A young figure skater from Sendai, Yuzuru Hanyu, won a gold medal at the Sochi Winter Olympics in Russia in 2014, and he returned to the welcome of a huge crowd in his home city, saying that he hoped his success would enable him to find ways to help his fellow citizens (April 2014). We had only recently returned from a visit to Sendai, where we had also met with a former student in anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh, now on a Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Fellowship in Sendai, and she accompanied us to the railway station at Sendai to say goodbye. There she found two stalls run by craftsmen she knows who are specialists in the production of a popular traditional type of wooden doll, the Kokeshi dolls. The dolls represent stylized versions of young females, and we saw a small one which was new and had the face of the girl looking up to the sky instead of straight forward. The artist explained that this doll was made to be a mark of hope for the future after the tsunami. So hope enters in many ways, assisting people to think positively about their future.

As our work continued from April onwards we observed two further processes, both a part of the consolidated expression of hope. One was that sports personalities who excelled at national and international levels all now continuously said that they were devoting some of their efforts and resources to disaster relief and recovery. As we have noted, the figure-skating champion at the Winter Olympics, Yuzuru Hanyu, is from the Sendai area, and was given a rapturous welcome back in his home city, declaring that he wanted to help the recovery process. International organizations also declared their support. On March 11, 2014 a photo exhibition was held in Chicago which featured Chicago residents of Tohoku and Japanese students who had travelled to Chicago. The flyer for the exhibition expressed the value of giving hope to others, "thereby growing the unbroken circle of hope and human conviction."

Second, NHK also ran many programs showing two things; first, communities exercising self-help, including demonstrations of how food supplies, including sea food and fruits, can be considered safe for consumption; and second, tours of impacted areas were organized in order to draw attention to community suffering and needs, as well as their achievements. The latter process was described as "dark tourism," and is partly reminiscent of tourism in other areas of the world such as in Northern Ireland after the worst times of the Troubles in the 1960s were over following the Peace Accords of 1998.

"Dark tourism" is a part of a larger process of memorialization and encapsulation into national sensibilities that will continue long after the disaster event itself. The processes, as we learned, include the creation of museums. In Niigata prefecture, a severe earthquake caused damage and 10 years later there are plans to set up a heritage museum recording the event and the recovery from it. Museums encompass both parts of the whole sequence of coping and hoping that we have identified, a record of how people coped in the face of suffering and loss, and a demonstration of the hope that leads to recovery in the long run and a consolidation of the memory of survival and renewal.

At the practical level of government actions, however, many difficulties tend to remain. In our April 2014 visit to Sendai we saw the temporary housing units supplied to people from Yuriage, and wondered how long people would be staying in these, small and crowded as they were. On June 14, 2014 we recorded an NHK clip that described the situations of many people in Iwate prefecture who had been placed in temporary housing, and now were faced with the possibility of being shifted out to a different set of consolidated places. Authorities had placed them in an area where a sewage redevelopment had been planned. This was delayed when they were given the relocation housing, but now the land was required for the redevelopment. What was interesting was first that, as in Yuriage, permanent housing had not been provided, and second that the residents complained that after many struggles they had developed a community consciousness which they did not wish to have disrupted by a further set of shifts. Authorities promised to respect this concern, but the circumstances revealed the importance of community relations for those involved and indeed the primary significance of such relations in the whole configuration of coping and hoping. Our work will continue to focus on this aspect of adaptation and change.

There is a rapidly growing recent literature on disaster studies in anthropology, and we append here a selection of references to these: Bacon and Hobson 2014; Button 2010; de Alwis and Hedman 2009; Ehrlich 2013; Gaillard and Texier 2010; Gill, Steger and Slater 2013; Hayashi 2008, 2012, 2013, n.d.; Kawata 2005; Kimura 2012; Maly 2014; Mauch and Pfister 2009; McDowell 2013; Okada 2012; Oliver-Smith 1999, 2011; Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 1999; Samuels 2013; Schlehe 2010; Simpson 2014; Starrs 2014; Stars and Stripes 2011; Stewart and Strathern 2014a, 2014b.

The exponential growth of studies and discussions centering on problems of climate change, food security, and disasters is shown clearly by a number of sessions at the Society for Applied Anthropology meeting in Pittsburgh in March of 2015.

Conclusion

Empirical studies such as those we have discussed and others to which we have referred can be drawn on to provide two main pointers for future direction of study. The first is that we need to develop explicit comparisons between cases. Each case is unique, but comparisons among cases are vital if we are to develop greater understanding. At the most accessible and molar level of comparison, structures of social life clearly make a great difference in

terms of how effectively people can respond to, and recover from, disasters. The scale of events and differential power among social actors are equally obvious factors. The second pointer is that valid studies of responses and recovery have to be long term, with horizons of around three years, five years, or longer runs of time. Both of these pointers would also apply to the development of analysis and theory in any other branch of anthropology. With Disaster Anthropology we can take these two pointers as benchmarks from which to create a sub-discipline that is obviously important and relevant in the world of today and the future.

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Index