"These Are the Stories That the Dogs Tell": Discourses of Identity and Difference in Ethnography and Science Fiction

Author(s): David Samuels

Source: *Cultural Anthropology*, Feb., 1996, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Feb., 1996), pp. 88-118

Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Anthropological Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/656210

"These Are the Stories That the Dogs Tell": Discourses of Identity and Difference in Ethnography and Science Fiction

David Samuels
Department of Anthropology
University of Texas at Austin

Mrs. Benson: I was just wondering what I would do.
Mr. Carpenter: Well perhaps before deciding on a course of action you'd want to know more about the people here. To orient yourself in a strange environment.
Mrs. Benson's mother: There's nothing strange about Washington, Mr. Carpenter.
Mr. Carpenter: A person from another planet might disagree with you.[1]

—*The Day the Earth Stood Still*

Introduction

In this article, I propose to explore some of the tropes of identity and difference, naturalization and denaturalization, that similarly inform and mark both ethnography and science fiction, linking them as ways of writing. In recent years, anthropology has witnessed an important and revealing autocritical examination of the poetics and politics of ethnographic practice. By critiquing the position of the anthropological researcher, the points of juncture between anthropological inquiry and various colonialist and neocolonialist enterprises have been explored (Asad 1973), with the consequent critical deconstruction of the ethnographer as traveler or voyager (Pratt 1986), and the complementary view, developed extensively in literary criticism, that the position of the traveler or voyager provides a critical stance toward the West by presenting alternative worlds (Van Den Abbeele 1992). A number of authors have also contributed important critical evaluations of the poetics and politics inherent in the textual construction of ethnographic narratives (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Geertz 1988; Marcus and Cushman 1982). These inquiries have compellingly traced the confluence of ethnographic writing and various high literary projects of the modernist era (Clifford 1988; Handler 1986, 1989; Manganaro 1990), as well as

Cultural Anthropology 11(1):88–118.

more popular fictions of primitivism from that period (Cheyfitz 1991; Torgovnick 1990).

However, in the discourses of primitivism and modernism, with their questions about the relationship between technological advancement, social transformation, and political domination—and in the disquietude of comparing the practices of self and other undertaken to understand and naturalize the practices of the other—another popular fiction genre, arising in the same milieu as ethnography, has gone unremarked. This is the genre of science fiction. And yet, it seems to me, this last relationship has been at least casually acknowledged by anthropologists for some time: in the historical analogy ("The New World Was the Outer Space of Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe" [Brody 1981:49]), or in the heuristic device employed in the introductory undergraduate lecture ("imagine an anthropologist from Mars").

In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate that this relationship is far from casual. Sumie Seo Mishima wrote later in her life that, upon arriving in the United States from Japan to attend Wellesley College, she felt herself "a being fallen from some other planet with senses and feelings that have no use in this other world" (quoted in Benedict 1946:226). This passage, with its evocation of alienness and displacement, articulated in a way that unambiguously invokes science fiction, later found its way into Ruth Benedict's study of Japanese national character, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Benedict 1946). Decades later, in his 1983 Harry Camp Memorial Lecture Series, Clifford Geertz identified Benedict's own evocations of alienness and displacement—the unnerving of the Us by the juxtaposition of the Not-us (Geertz 1988:106–109)—as one of the foundational tropes of an ethnographic literary style.

Seen in the light of such juxtapositions, the tropological resonances of ethnography and science fiction seem neither fortuitous, accidental, nor coincidental. Rather, I contend that as literary genres, modern ethnography and science fiction share historically situated philosophical concerns within the interpretive space opened up by the dominant 20th-century discourse of culture.[2] By "discourse of culture" I refer to a paradigm, certainly not limited to anthropological theory, wherein cultures are presented as and considered to be autonomous, bounded, homogeneous entities (see Cottom 1989).[3]

Ethnography and science fiction can both trace their origins to the period of high colonialism, at the end of the 19th and opening of the 20th centuries. Each evokes alien worlds of experience. In science fiction this evocation is quite literal, and highlights further the discourse of boundedness: it is often the case in science fiction that each world is an island, containing a single culture. Furthermore, anthropology shares with science fiction a philosophical outlook—sometimes tacit, sometimes unambiguous—of charting the pan-species and species-specific attributes of what it means to be human.[4] In the words of Daniel Cottom, the discourse of culture embodies "a faith in a universal human nature that drones on through all the differences like a prolonged bass note" (1989:81). Similarly, Ursula LeGuin has written of science fiction, "This is what [it] does

best. It challenges our idea of what we see as like ourselves. It increases our sense of kinship" (1994:32).

Consequently, I argue, both genres encounter the problematic of cultural translation. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that both genres exist, in part, in order to explore just that problematic. Cultural translation—the idea that the modes of thought, feeling, and action of one culture are, at least approximately, translatable into those of another—is at once one of the central and one of the thorniest precepts in the discipline of anthropology (see Asad 1986; Mohanthy 1989). In the words of Edmund Leach, "It is difficult entirely to justify this kind of assumption [regarding the possibility of cultural translation], but without it all the activities of anthropologists become meaningless" (1952:15).

Science fiction and ethnography, then, are caught in a literary web they themselves have spun: on the one hand, there is the desire to present cultures as distinct and different from each other; on the other, there is a felt necessity to present an understandable narrative text to the reader. Because of these simultaneous desires, both genres are faced with conflicting pressures to translate and present the commonplaces of different lifeways as simultaneously commonplace *and* different. In the first part of this paper, I will argue that ethnography and science fiction have often employed similar or even, in some cases, identical textual strategies in finding resolutions to this conflict.[5] In the latter portion of the paper, I will discuss how recent science fiction has perhaps moved beyond anthropology in this regard, in ways that may be provocative when thinking about ethnographic representation.

It is not my plan to prove the primacy of one genre over the other, but rather to relate them both to a common discourse. Moreover, while the anthropologist-as-voyager clearly resonates with much that is contained in this essay, I am more interested in the textual construction of otherness manifested in the two genres.

Finally, I do not argue that ethnography and science fiction are identical. Clearly anthropologists work with real people in real societies, and thus they face issues of ethics and accountability not encountered by writers of science fiction. While science fiction is no doubt an ethical discourse, there is certainly a difference between placing such a discourse in an abstract universe and placing it in the context of being responsible and accountable to the lives, experiences, feelings, and conflicting agendas of real people in social groups.

Rather, in what follows I will attempt to demonstrate that historical and philosophical parallels exist between science fiction and anthropology (see Oliver 1974), which are emergent in certain of the narrative strategies, conventions, and naturalization practices employed by the writers and readers of the two genres. There may not be a hard-and-fast line of demarcation between the genres. What we have instead is a science that draws on the conventions of fiction for its presentation, and a fiction that draws on the conventions of science, arising in a similar historical and cultural situation. That they should resonate with each other seems unavoidable.

In the first section of the essay I will elaborate what I consider to be three main tropes that science fiction and ethnography share as common stock. These

are (1) the double-voiced narrator; (2) a delight in lovingly crafted, lingering panoptic gazes; and (3) the appeal to psychological motivation as a means of explaining, and naturalizing/humanizing, alien behavior. In the second part of the essay I pose the following question: If we accept the argument that science fiction and ethnography share common ground, is there anything that ethnographers can learn from science fiction's literary representation of other consciousness? I suggest that there is—that science fiction has, in the last 20 years, gone further in certain directions of making otherness manifest to readers than has ethnography, despite the experimental moment in which the discipline of anthropology is currently cast.

Such literary strategies as the doubled narrator, panoptic gazes, and psychologism are connected with processes of naturalization—ways in which textual constructions assist readers in relating the reality of the text to the reality of the world of everyday experience. Jonathan Culler (1975) has used the term *vraisemblance* to refer to the means by which texts refer to other discourses, other texts, generic conventions, and culturally specific narrative traditions in order to accomplish the task of naturalization.

Culler distinguishes five levels of vraisemblance: the first, the "real," is "the text of the natural attitude" (Culler 1975:140). Here, the author employs the most easily naturalizable discourses: characters have bodies and minds; they think, feel, love, hate, and so forth. The second level, "cultural vraisemblance," denotes the use of culturally meaningful stereotypes or common knowledge in order to create naturalizable depictions of characters and episodes. For example, Balzac's Count of Lanty is "as gloomy as a Spaniard and as boring as a banker" or, in the television series *Star Trek,* "I'm as healthy as a Rigalian ox!"[6] The third type of vraisemblance, "the models of a genre," refers to all of the reader's expectations of the genre itself. The models that inform the expectations of readers create the space in which the generic conventions can operate convincingly, but outside of which they cannot. The fourth level of vraisemblance is the pricking of these generic conventions in order to gain the reader's confidence: "the text shows its awareness of its own artificiality and conventionality, not so as to shift into a new mode devoid of artifice, but so as to convince the reader that it is aware of other ways of looking at the matter in hand and therefore can be trusted not to distort things while taking its own course" (Culler 1975:150). In ethnography, the institution of the "untranslatable phrase"—the admission that some things, try as we might, are simply not translatable—operates in this sense. I will return to this point later on. Finally, the fifth type of vraisemblance distinguished by Culler is that of true parody and irony, the ability to distance the reader from literary convention by revealing its artificial nature.

The notion of vraisemblance will weave in and out of the analysis that follows. Beginning with Culler's third level of vraisemblance, that of the genres themselves, I would like to turn now to three generic conventions shared by ethnography and science fiction.

The Doubled Narrator

The first convention I will discuss is the existence, in science fiction and ethnography, of two narrative voices—one that takes pleasure in disorienting the reader, the other an editor, a corrective voice that reassures the reader that the strange is not incomprehensible. The use of language to disorient the reader can take many forms, but all of them are couched in ways that allow us ultimately to reorient ourselves. Ethnography presents a world at once strange and familiar; the narrative of disorientation is augmented by the interpellation of a second voice that tells the reader how to impose an order on the events being witnessed (Bukatman 1989).[7] These twin spheres of disorientation and reorientation, simultaneous bewilderment and familiarity, may exist in many genres; but they constitute in large measure the point and meaning of science fiction and ethnography. Consider, for example, Ward Keeler's investigation of Javanese shadow plays and their interpenetration with Javanese notions of self (Keeler 1987). Language and the social distance or intimacy encoded in language levels are salient features of both domains. In introducing these language levels to the reader, Keeler at first describes them as "nightmarish." The second voice, which tells the reader to manage the nightmare by thinking of these levels as an expanded version of the French *tu* and *vous* (Keeler 1987:30), is similar to the opening sequence of *Silent Running* (1972) in which the soundtrack juxtaposes a rational, authoritative, and explanatory presidential speech (from eight years prior to the time frame of the film) over a dizzying tracking shot out from the "forest-ship"; or the science fiction voice that insists on translating all values of measurement, no matter how incredible, into familiar and easily assimilable English terms, as in the following exchange between the alien and the president's assistant, from *The Day the Earth Stood Still* (1951):

> *Harley:* Had you been traveling long?
> *Klaatu:* About five months—your months.
> *Harley:* You must have come a long way.
> *Klaatu:* About two hundred and fifty million of your miles.

We can observe this interplay of familiarity and unfamiliarity, and the practices that enable the reader to naturalize the disorienting, at the level of the complete work, the episode, the passage, or even atomized down to the level of the sentence. It is with a simple sentence, then, that I would like to open—in fact, with the opening sentence of Clifford D. Simak's *City* (1981[1952]):

> These are the stories. . . .

The sentence begins by orienting the reader to the work plainly enough. *City* will be a collection of stories. What kind of stories will they be? Funny stories? Moral stories? Will they be related to one another?

> These are the stories that the Dogs tell when the fires burn high and the wind is from the north.

And suddenly, we know we are in a different world. How will we interpret it? Will we be able to interpret it at all? What sense will we be able to extract from a pack of Dogs? Still, we are given the tools with which to naturalize the unfamiliar—the English language, for one thing. We know what stories are, after all. The word *tell* informs us that *City* is to be understood as part of an oral tradition. That they are told around "fires that burn high" lets the reader know something of the social milieu in which the tellings take place.[8] In fact, it is only the single word *Dogs* that causes the disruption between word and world. In order to naturalize this sentence, we must create a new signified for *Dogs* quite different from the conventional one. We must make *Dogs* refer to some sort of society that builds fires and tells stories. Put another way, we must open an interpretive space—another world—in which a new referent for *Dogs* will make sense. I would propose further, though, that if we were to replace the word *Dogs* with *Hausa* or *Venda,* we would have on our hands (and in our minds) a perfectly legitimate (if hardly accurate) ethnographic sentence. And, clearly, I chose Simak's sentence because it resonates so nicely with ethnography. But this is no mere coincidence or thievery; it rather emerges from the historical and philosophical unions that bind the two genres together in the discourse of culture.

It should be noted, of course, that the questions raised by Simak's sentence also have answers in the text, in part because we have a guide: an "Editor"—a canine folklorist, in fact—whose preface opens the book and who writes brief introductions to each of its eight chapters. Simak is playing, of course, both with us and with Culler's fourth and fifth levels of vraisemblance: reinforcing the natural conventions of the genre by playing with them, and full-blown parody. In "Notes on the First Tale," for example, the Editor informs us that this first story is particularly difficult to understand, because in it, "a Dog plays no part . . . the reader is pitchforked into an utterly strange situation"; but the Editor reassures us that "the rest of the tales, by comparison, seem almost homey." Here we can see a bit of ironic parody of the ethnographic convention that what originally looks strange will eventually be understood as internally consistent; that the rebus will be successfully interpreted. Stick with me, kid, and everything will be all right.

Disorientation does not depend on such radical shifts in subjectivity, however. It can occur with the merest rejuxtaposition of everyday English words. When we read "I rubbed depilatory soap over my face and rinsed it with the trickle from the fresh water tap" (Pohl and Kornbluth 1952:28), we are thrown into another world with the simplest of words. None of the words in that sentence is unfamiliar to us, yet in order to make sense of it we must imagine a world with separate fresh and nonfresh water taps, in which what issues forth from the former is a mere trickle. The strangeness of the image so conjured is naturalized, in part, by the utter simplicity of the verbal message.

The use of substitute words can also throw us into a new environment. When surprised people say, "What the tanj?" in *Ringworld* (Niven 1970), even though we do not know what *tanj* means, the situation and sentence structure

alert us to the probability that it is some form of expletive. Similarly, in ethnography, when Elizabeth Marshall Thomas writes, "It was Gai's older son, the boy who had come back with us, playing the te k'na to himself" (1958:73), we know that the *te k'na* can be only a few things, because we know he is playing it. Since the first word of the sentence, "It," refers to a sound heard in the sentence before, we are fairly certain that the te k'na is some sort of musical instrument.

What we are encountering in these sentences from science fiction and ethnography is the practiced art of *sign substitution,* by which I refer to the replacement of a set of naturalized signs with another set, less familiar but naturalizable through practices of (con)textual interpretation. Culler finds the characterization of ethnography as a branch of semiology, intimated by Lévi-Strauss in the *Leçon inaugurale,* "somewhat suspect" in the sense that such sign substitutions reduce the sign to a mere index of technological development (Culler 1975:17) , but I disagree. Culler, it seems to me, has underestimated the nuanced poetics of ethnographic presentation, the narrative form in which sign substitution works its magic with signifier and signified. In fact, I propose that it is precisely this control of sign substitution—not the identification or the distance between word and world (Eagleton 1978; Genette 1979) but the management and manipulation of the reader between the two in the building of the narrative text—in which we find one hallmark of how anthropologists create the reader's *sense* of having been somewhere else.

There are a number of classic tropes of strangeness in ethnographic writing: the first eating of native food, the first whipping out of camera, tape recorder, or phonograph (see, for instance, Connolly and Anderson 1987 on "first contact"). The one most telling for a comparison of ethnography with science fiction, and the resonances between their ways of textualizing different worlds, is the way sign substitution is deployed in a trope of linguistic disorientation. Even at the most mundane level of narrative construction, we find an intertwining of familiarity and strangeness. That is, the language of disorientation is almost always couched in ways that allow the reader to naturalize it. For example, in creating disorientation for her readers, Elizabeth Thomas wrote, "As I could not speak many words of Gikwe, she didn't even try to talk, but paused from time to time instead to show me things" (1958:108). By this construction, we know that Gikwe must be a language, since we know what *speak* means, and we know English sentence structure. It is this presentation of narrative imagery at once familiar and unfamiliar, and the manipulation, yo-yoing, alternation, or tug-of-war that the reader experiences between conjunction and disjunction of sign and referent, that I am calling a primary poetic convention of science fiction and ethnography. Here, Thomas has chosen only a mild presentation of her linguistic disorientation, by inserting a native term for the English one. But there are many ways of presenting linguistic disorientation—ways of entering a different poetic consciousness altogether. If we replace both verb and noun in the sentence—if, instead of writing "I could not speak nnéé biati'," I write "I could not bee yashti' nnéé biati' "—the reader is given somewhat less to grasp onto in orienting herself to the world created by the words. As mentioned earlier, in sci-

ence fiction, this does not necessarily depend on the deployment of foreign words or neologisms, but can be done successfully through a juxtaposition of otherwise familiar lexical items.

Moreover, in science fiction disorientation often appears as a punchline to a scene, as in the introduction to Robert Sheckley's *Pilgrimage to Earth.* A space-faring vendor has come to Kazanga IV with a ship full of books, and the people, desperate for novelty, ask him about his travels:

> The vendor told them all the latest gossip; of the price war between Detroit II and III, and how fishing fared on Alana, and what the president's wife on Moracia wore, and how oddly the men of Doran V talked. And at last someone said, "Tell us of Earth." [Sheckley 1957:1]

Thus we learn that neither Detroit II nor Detroit III is on Earth—even though we know we are in a science fiction universe from the first sentence of the story, there still remain simple strategies of disorienting and reorienting the reader.

Panoptic Views

These sentences—"I hear bike gangs and car families can be damned vindictive"; "Feuds are settled through the leopard-skin chief"; "The Men also have probability-travel"; "*Tsau si*' (women), she said"; "You're really from Earth?"[9]—are fashioned into larger systems of meaning. Prominent among these systems, and the second shared convention of ethnography and science fiction that I would like to explore, is that of the controlling, properly distanced, omniscient viewpoint. Both ethnography and science fiction are preoccupied with the construction of totalizing, aerial, panoptic gazes.[10] Much Western literature displays a similar concern. But a mystery novel, for example, does not generally contain paragraphs that begin "Earth was the third planet from Sol, with polar icecaps at the northern and southern extremes and nine climactic regions between."[11] Science fiction and ethnography, on the other hand, are full of them. We must acknowledge, of course, that there are plot conventions in science fiction—interplanetary space travel, for instance—that help readers to naturalize the existence of such sentences as "Rixa VII hung like a giant grey-green marble in the viewport." At the same time, such plot conventions in ethnography as the arrival scene described by Pratt (1986) provide similar environments for views from planes and so forth.[12] These passages locate one of the major preoccupations and recurring tropes of both genres.

In *Imperial Earth* (1976), Arthur C. Clarke treats the reader to a three-page, pole-to-pole description of Saturn's moon, Titan; and, as the main character, Duncan Makenzie, leaves for Earth to be cloned, he is treated (as are we) to an incredible vision of Saturn itself:

> In all the known universe, there was nothing to compare with the wonder he was seeing now. A hundred times the size of the puny Moon that floated in the skies of Earth, the flattened yellow globe looked like an object lesson in planetary meteorology. Its knotted bands of cloud could change their appearance almost

> every hour, while thousands of kilometers down in the hydrogen-methane atmosphere, eruptions whose cause was still unknown would lift bubbles larger than terrestrial continents up from the hidden core. They would expand and burst as they reached the limits of the atmosphere, and in minutes Saturn's furious ten-hour spin would have smeared them out into long colored ribbons, stretching halfway round the planet. [1976:70]

Here, we see the generic conventions of disorientation and reorientation, outlined above as a primary essence of science fiction, being built up by Clarke into an episode of panoramic and cognitive delight. Saturn, we are told, is immense and complicated, but neither so immense nor so complicated that it cannot be explained, or contained within ordinary language. Clarke begins by saying not that Duncan had never seen the likes of this vision before but that it could not compare with any wonder in "all the known universe." We learn in the very next sentence, however, that this singular wonder can be explained in the simple terms of "planetary meteorology"—weather patterns. From our vantage point thousands of kilometers above Saturn, we then dip down thousands of kilometers into the planet's hydrogen-methane atmosphere, in order to follow one of the enormous bubbles up from the core to the pinnacle of the clouds, then follow its bursting form halfway around the giant world as it spins furiously away along the course of its ten-hour day. Needless to say, such a totalizing view is impossible for any normal, everyday gaze. It is only in the context of the conventions and naturalizing practices of science fiction that the reader is given these tools with which to become oriented to the proceedings.

We can open many an ethnography and find something similar. For instance, *People of the Middle Place* (Leighton and Adair 1966) includes the following descriptive passage:

> The reservation of the Zuni Indians is located in the southwestern corner of McKinley county in western New Mexico. Its area comprises 342,046 acres. . . . The reservation is on the southeastern edge of the Colorado plateau. This is high, rugged country, with an average elevation of 7,100 feet. The highest area is at the northeast corner of the reservation, which slopes off from the Zuni mountains, where, at an altitude of 9,000 feet, these mountains form part of the Continental Divide. . . . A disconnected section of this plateau rises a sheer thousand feet above the valley floor to form the sacred mesa, Toyallane, known to white residents both as Corn Mountain and Thunder Mountain. On the north are two smaller mesas of comparable height called Kwilliyallane. These mesas and two buttes to the west enclose the Zuni valley on all sides of the horizon except in the southwest, where the land flattens into a broad plain. [1966:4]

In this passage, Leighton and Adair employ a number of narrative strategies almost identical to those used by Clarke: the aerial view; the depiction of immensity mixed with a dry, scientistic accuracy (those all-important extra 46 acres) that makes that immensity at once graspable. Leighton and Adair also take us, as did Clarke, from our vantage point high above the land to another—the even higher vista from which we can survey the entire Continental Divide—then swoop us down to inspect, with interest, particular mountains and buttes.

The orienting phrase, "known to white residents both as Corn Mountain and Thunder Mountain," lets us know that we will not be cut loose into a completely disorienting world, but that the narrators will give us, as Clarke gave us in his meteorological clarification, and as Keeler and Thomas gave us in their language discoveries, a steady diet of orienting explanations and narrative forms, as the means by which we will be able to interpret our reading experience.

The Explanatory Power of Psychological Motivation

Earlier I suggested that anthropology and science fiction share a philosophy of discovering the pan-species, species-specific attributes of what it means to be human. I would like to return to that suggestion now, in exploring a third naturalizing and naturalized convention of the genres: the textual constructions that allow the reader to naturalize, accept, and, in a way, "humanize" the alien subject in science fiction and ethnography. In both genres, the alien is often constructed along fairly conventional lines of Western psychologism. It is the revelation of an "underlying psychology" that helps the reader identify with the alien subject in both ethnography and science fiction, by constituting a space of common universal humanity within, and simultaneous with, the constitution of alienation. By this orchestration of the reader's desire, the manipulation of the form and placement of such psychological revelations, the author can make the reader feel greater or lesser identification with the other. In these constructions, we encounter examples of what Daniel Cottom (1989) has termed *enchantment:* the moment when we think we have come to an understanding of how to interpret the alien in the ethnographic work is also that moment when the ethnography wields its literary power most completely.

Michael Herzfeld gives us a fairly masterful demonstration of how this enchantment with the idea of underlying psychology works. *The Poetics of Manhood* (1985), Herzfeld's ethnography of the Cretan mountain village of Glendi, opens with an outline history of the village, its Greek heritage and present relations to the Greek nation-state, and the important popular memory of two centuries of Turkish rule and Nazi occupation during the Second World War. The first chapter also introduces the reader to the importance of affinal solidarity and the patriline in the village, as well as to Herzfeld's notion that the Glendiot masculine self is presented in framed performances that appear as in relief against the background of everyday life. All this takes some time, but the author lets us "beneath the surface" of his Glendiots fairly early—on page 9—in an episode that unifies history, male performance, affinal solidarity, and Herzfeld's theoretical concern with self-as-bas-relief:

> The visceral meaning of this event [the 1866 burning of the Arkadi monastery by Turks while it was occupied by Cretan rebels, including seventeen Glendiots among them] was demonstrated to me over a century later by an octogenarian Glendiot, self-consciously dressed for the occasion in the white boots and formal waistcoat of the older local costume, who declaimed his own verses about the heroism and tragedy of his ancestors' role in the defense of Arkadi. His usually robust voice cracked and faltered, and tears streamed down his cheeks, as he

> reached the point where his own relationship to the main protagonist—his grandfather—became explicit. This was not a response that could be explained away by reference to the intrusion of nationalistic rhetoric in village life; indeed, such an explanation could only succeed in sounding hollow and cheap. [1985:9–10]

Where anthropological explanations fail in their hollowness and cheapness, however, Western cultural poetics step in. Philosophical precepts of intersubjectivity (see, for instance, Morrison 1988), extending back to the moral and aesthetic philosophies of the Enlightenment, inform the way readers apprehend such literary passages. We now feel that we "know" these Glendiots through a knowledge of their psychological motivations; and when Herzfeld later tells us that they perform such alien practices as vengeance killing, this cannot change the fact that we have by then identified with that part of them that is universally human.

Jane Hill, in her examination of the narrative of the old Mexicano Don Gabriel (1995), posits the notion that there is no "core" self, that even what appear as expressions of the unmasked sensibilities we might draw on as a mark of "universal humanity" can be regarded as performed (see also Butler 1990). It seems to me that this notion is largely rejected in mainstream ethnographic writing, although it has come under increasing scrutiny: for it is just that ability to peel away the layers and show us the core of universal humanity within that is one of the master tropes of anthropological presentation. This tension between difference and identity can be traced through the ongoing rationalism-relativism debates in anthropology, and the continuing power of such concepts as psychic unity or biological predisposition (see Bernstein 1983; Geertz 1984; Hollis and Lukes 1982; Jarvie 1984; Scholte 1984; Spiro 1986). The point here is not to take sides in this dispute but rather to claim that the argument is perhaps an inevitable corollary of the central tension in ethnography between identification and alienation, and the need to evoke *both* in the written text.

Herzfeld negotiates the reader between identification and alienation throughout his book. The passage quoted above comes just before his first explanation of what vengeance killing is all about; the reader's identification and indulgence has been bought and paid for here. Throughout our introduction to the Glendiots, we are alternately given depictions of universal, deeply felt internal emotions with which to identify, and scenes of alienating violence. Herzfeld introduces the reader to two competing patrilines, Diakakis and Khloros, then spends a good deal of space exploring the meaning and importance of affinal solidarity in Glendi. Here, Herzfeld unveils the image (complete with an illustration that shows blocking and stage directions—we can imagine ourselves in the scene) of a coffeehouse owner who is "visibly upset" over a murder recently committed by his nephew (1985:59). Then, just two pages later, Herzfeld depicts the scene of a knife fight between the Diakakides and Khlorides (1985:61). A later episode regards a man who has become an embarrassment in the village because he has pitted his two sons against each other in a land dispute. Herzfeld, as a neutral third party, was sent to see this man to attempt some sort of settlement. In rejecting Herzfeld's offer of assistance, the man said, "I screw *my* Vir-

gin Mary" instead of "*your,*" thus revising a common local aphorism which, Herzfeld lets us know, "suggests a man deeply unhappy with a situation that he had made impossible for himself" (1985:78). This episode is the prelude to Herzfeld's illustration of "AN ACCEPTABLE VENGEANCE . . . a killing of clearly 'exogamous' import" (1985:79). Finally, the incident with which Herzfeld chooses to illustrate and exemplify the notion of vengeance killing is one that he, the Glendiots, and the reader clearly identify as a "disaster" (1985:84)—and one where, in the end, no vengeance killing took place. The reader, thus spared, has come by now to an understanding that the Glendiots have an underlying psychology that motivates their actions, to an identification with the Glendiots through a comprehension of these psychological motivations, and to a sense of an understanding of their "Otherness."

Science fiction draws upon this cultural poetic by similar means and for similar ends. The revelation of underlying psychology is, in some ways, more conspicuous in science fiction because, in that genre, "biology," which is to say species distinction, plays a more prominent role in the construction of difference and identity.[13] The constitution of clear surface differences (species of giant, sentient birds, for example) makes the ultimate revelation of submerged commonalities, and thus the simultaneity of identification and alienation, that much more clearly marked. One of the clearest and most familiar demonstrations of how this works in science fiction, and its similarity to ethnography, is in the half-human, half-Vulcan character Mr. Spock in *Star Trek.*[14] *Star Trek* presents, episode by episode, explorations of what constitutes "us" and "them" and of how we can come to identify with something that was initially strange. And, week in and week out, the answer seems to be that whatever we understand as psychologically motivated behavior is what allows us to naturalize the alien and to say "Oh, okay. Not so different after all." In this running commentary on how we draw the line between "us" and "them," and how we are able to identify, and identify with, the "us" *in* "them," the logical, unemotional character of Mr. Spock is crucial. Spock's value to the audience seems to be that we know he's really "just like us" beneath that overlay of logical Vulcan culture. The fact that Mr. Spock is half-human allows a continuation of the sociobiological subtext that, in a certain type of science fiction, constitutes the entire discourse on the subject of the alien. The episode I want to look at in some detail, *Amok Time* (1967), written by the science fiction author Theodore Sturgeon, concerns the cast's accommodations to the alien necessities of Vulcan mating practices.

At the opening of the episode, Dr. McCoy is describing Spock's strange symptoms to the Captain. Mr. Spock has been "restive," given to outbursts, not eating. "If he weren't a Vulcan I'd almost say nervous," the doctor reports. As it becomes clear that something is definitely wrong with Spock, he is ordered to sick bay for a physical examination. McCoy discovers that Spock has "a growing imbalance of body functions. As if in our bodies huge amounts of adrenaline were constantly being pumped into our bloodstreams." And, McCoy concludes, if Spock is not returned to his home planet of Vulcan within a week, "the physical and emotional pressures will kill him."

Captain Kirk wants an explanation, and promises his friend complete confidentiality:

> *Spock:* It has to do with . . . biology.
> *Kirk:* With what?
> *Spock:* BiOLogy.
> *Kirk:* What kind of . . . biology?
> *Spock:* VULcan biOLogy.
> *Kirk:* You mean the . . . biology . . . of Vulcans? Biology as in . . . reproduction? Well . . . there's no need to be, eh . . . embarrassed about it Mr. Spock, it happens to the birds and the bees.
> *Spock:* The BIRDS and the BEES . . . are not . . . VULcans . . . Captain. If they were . . . if any creature as proudly logical as us . . . were to have their logic . . . RIPPED from them . . . as this time does to us . . . How do Vulcans . . . choose their mates? Haven't you wondered?
> *Kirk:* I guess the rest of us assume that it's done . . . quite logically.
> *Spock:* No . . . No. It is not. We shield it . . . with ritual . . . and customs shrouded in antiquity. You humans have no conception. It STRIPS our MINDS from us. It brings a madness which . . . RIPS away our . . . veneer of . . . civilization. It is the *Ponn Farr* . . . the Time of Mating. There are precedents in nature, Captain. The giant eel-birds of Regulus Five. Once each eleven years they MUST . . . return . . . to the caverns where they HATCHED. On your EARTH . . . the SALMON. They MUST return to that ONE stream . . . where they . . . were BORN . . . to spawn. Or die in trying.
> *Kirk:* But you're not a fish, Mr. Spock, you're—
> *Spock:* No. Nor am I a man. I'm a Vulcan. I'd hoped I would be spared this. But the ancient drives are too strong. Eventually they catch up with us . . . and we are driven by forces we cannot control . . . to return home . . . and take a wife . . . or die.

Here, Mr. Spock reveals what the audience has suspected: that there is a way of coming to an understanding, at least through analogy, of his Otherness. Moreover, in his soliloquy Spock confirms the audience's further suspicion that the way to this understanding is through an apprehension of the drives and urges—proportionally more powerful to balance the normally placid Vulcan attitude—that lurk beneath the veneer of civilization. There is a particular ideological content here—partly about the parallel meanings of *biology* and *culture,* partly about civilization and control as opposed to emotion and body—and an attribution to the body of a universal humanity in which we are, as Kathleen Stewart (personal communication, April 1992) has said, "redeemed from difference."

To return to Culler's suspicion of Lévi-Strauss for a moment: we cannot simply assert, in the above scene, that salmon, for example, has become a mere index of a type of sociosexual reproduction. Rather, through the interplay of various levels of vraisemblance (including, of course, the arch play and irony in the script) we are made to feel, simultaneously, Spock's similarities and differences from ourselves. Salmon, giant eel-bird, human, Earth, Regulus Five, and Vulcan are suddenly linked, through the disorienting and reorienting moves of textual construction and interpretation, and set the viewer free in an interpretive

space in which neither identification nor distanciation provides a suitable perspective from which to interpret the world in the text. This tension is underscored, for the viewer, in the final lines of the scene. Captain Kirk asserts that his first officer is not a fish, but before he can complete his thought, he is interrupted by Spock, who reminds his Captain that he is not a man, either.

In any event, in case anyone has missed the psychological point, Kirk translates it for McCoy, and McCoy for us, when the three of them transport down to the surface of the planet Vulcan for Mr. Spock's wedding:[15]

> *Spock:* This is the land of my family. It has been held by us for more than 2,000 Earth years. This is our place of . . . *Cunat Caliphi.* (Spock walks away.)
> *McCoy:* He called it . . . Cunat what?
> *Kirk:* He described it to me as . . . meaning "Marriage or Challenge."[16] In the distant PAST . . . Vulcans KILLED . . . to win their mates.
> *McCoy:* And they still go MAD at this time. (Cut to Spock preparing to strike a gong, then cut back to Kirk and McCoy.) Perhaps the PRICE they pay for having no emotions the REST of the time.

Yet, if we cannot come to a full understanding of Mr. Spock, there must be something that we can glean from what we have witnessed. It is, I would argue, no less than the naturalization of a way of talking about culture. Science fiction and ethnography, as modern discourses on the nature of cultural identity and difference, share common narrative techniques and practices in the naturalization of this discourse. Both Herzfeld and Sturgeon employ similar strategies in order to produce empathy for the other in the reading/viewing audience. In both cases, the strategies involve the assertion of underlying psychological motivations for violent and initially inexplicable behavior (with a strong dose of hormones in the latter case) as the path to coherent comprehension. In both cases, the audience is given a sense of how to naturalize the concept of culture as an aspect of the ordering of behavior and affect. The characterization of the self as an essence wrapped in a veneer of culture ("civilization"); culture as an overlay on the universal human (or even nonhuman); the notion that we are all the same under that overlay (or at the very least able to identify with certain similarities); culture as survivals of material practice, as traditions that define and objectify our essential nature and our relationship to the world: all these things in the construction of the alien in the genres of ethnography and science fiction are part of this common space.[17]

The Common Space of Elaboration

In *The Blind Geometer* (Robinson 1987), the title character, a blind, 21st-century mathematics professor named Carlos Oleg Nevsky, presents us with a version of "seeing" that maps onto the project of ethnographic presentation, and its difficulties, to interesting effect. "I suppose," Nevsky tells us, "I have wondered all my life what it would be like to see."

> And all my work, no doubt, is an effort to envision things in the inward theater. I see it *feelingly*. In language, in music, most of all in the laws of geometry, I find the best ways I can to see: by analogy to touch, and to sound, and to abstractions. Understand: to know the geometries fully is to comprehend exactly the physical world that light reveals; in a way one is then perceiving something like the Platonic ideal forms underlying the visible phenomena of the world. Sometimes the great ringing of comprehension fills me so entirely that I feel I *must* be seeing; what more could it be? I believe that I see.
>
> Then comes the problem of crossing the street, of finding my misplaced keys. Geometry is little help; it's back to the hands and ears as eyes, at that point. And then I know that I do not see at all. [Robinson 1987:11]

Nevsky can give a rich and detailed description of the world in his terms but again and again discovers that this description is not the same as actually living in that world as a fully sighted person. The ethnographer, like Nevsky, often succeeds in creating a facsimile, a description of a culture's contours—a geometry of culture—but this description is never able fully to recreate the conventional experience (the facsimile built from the inside) of one who actually lives in the culture described.

Robinson's selection of the word *geometry,* however, is fortuitous in more ways than one. For Stefania Pandolfo, it is the "geometry" of her Moroccan informant that opens onto her discussion of "exotic codes," as defined by Todorov: "something which, because it is opaque to . . . comprehension, may provide a free space for creative elaboration" (Pandolfo 1989:4). And, if I may be allowed some license to use Pandolfo's quote in a way she probably did not intend, we might say that it is the free space opened up by the anthropologist's geometry of culture that allows for the creative elaboration we call ethnography.

That creative elaboration usually takes the form of writing. Important work over the last two decades (Clifford and Marcus 1986; Geertz 1973, 1988; Marcus and Cushman 1982) has laid out a good many of the techniques of textual construction employed in writing ethnographies. But we need to interrogate further the politics of natural realism inherent in those strategies. The fact that anthropologists write, and thus that part of what good anthropologists do is write well, is something of a conceit in the discipline nowadays. It is a conceit I would like to question. For if "writing well," in ethnographic description, is taken to mean writing in a manner that is easily naturalized by the reader, then we are faced with a theory of literature that avoids certain contemporary literary-critical problematics surrounding issues of naturalized linguistic practice on the one hand and the exploration of the potential for literary expression on the other—or, to put it another way, between tropes of what constitutes the quality of persuasive prose and the authorial power of literary experimentation (see Tyler 1986, 1987). Such a theory would also be a theory of anthropology—one that seemingly obviates the notion, held from Boas on, that there is a problematic and complex relationship between languages, cultures and consciousnesses.

Here, finally, is where we reach our point of divergence between ethnography and science fiction. To put it reductively for a moment, it could be said that science fiction is more interested in disorientation, and ethnography in reorien-

tation, of the reader. That is, science fiction is more comfortable with presenting to the reader a disorienting lived enactment of a different social formation. Ethnography, on the other hand, tends to become uncomfortable, and to pull back quickly from the disorienting move, inserting the distance of an explicitly reorienting explanation. Ethnographic writing sometimes falls back on a sort of covert prestige adhering to the ability to present an authoritative and coherent explanation of the other. This is not to say that explanation is not a crucial element of ethnography, but to suggest that such explanation, as a reliever of narrative tension and assertion of interpretive privilege by the ethnographer, is perhaps offered unnecessarily quickly. To illustrate, let us look at a recent science fiction presentation of the kind of linguistic disorientation I discussed earlier. In the *Chanur* series, C. J. Cherryh introduces us to the *tc'a,* a being symbiotic with another being known as the *chi.* The mind of the tc'a is a seven-layered entity, readable by nonnatives only on a computer screen:

> "Priority," Hilfy said. "Station transmission, general to all ships."
>
> Image turned up on second monitor. Violet light: a writing serpent-shape, gold-mottled, that dipped and wove before the lens.
>
> Methane-sector was talking to them: methane traffic control on visual output. The yellow, sticklike form of a chi raced up and down the tc'a's uplifted back, darted about its head in frenetic attentions to its—whatever a tc'a was to a chi: master; comrade; friend or pet. The tc'a wailed, the multipart harmonics of its segmented brain and speech apparatus, multiple minds, multiple viewpoints in matrix translated at the bottom of the screen.

Tc'a	tc'a	hani	hani	mahe	kif	kif
Mkks	Kefk	Kefk	Kefk	Kefk	Kefk	Kefk
give	go	go	go	go	go	fight
tell	chi	go	go	go	go	go
chi	tc'a	go	go	go	go	go
knnn	knnn	knnn	knnn	knnn	knnn	knnn

> A cold wind went up Pyanfar's back. "Hilfy: get comp on that. Tirun, go to com one." [Cherryh 1985:127]

Cherryh seems distinctly uninterested in whether the reader understands the tc'a-chi relationship. Nor is she concerned with anyone's understanding the tc'a language, with the exception of the character Pyanfar. Certainly she does not leap immediately into an extended explanation in order to comfort the reader. Rather, her goal is to allow the reader to remain in the interpretive space that would be closed by the imposition of an authoritative interpretation; to allow the reader to become engaged with difference as it emerges in an ongoing narrative. It could be argued—indeed, I would argue—that this all works because Cherryh isn't really dealing with real alien cultures and languages, but creating them, and that she thus has the opportunity to translate them into plain English concepts when the necessity arises—for example, through the convenient character of Pyanfar, who understands the meaning of the tc'a's transmission completely. I am not suggesting that anthropologists are "really" writing science fiction, or that they should. And I am certainly not suggesting the hyper-

exoticization of what, for others, is not exotic at all but everyday. Nor am I suggesting that explanation and understanding are unimportant to the discipline of anthropology. I *am* suggesting that the nature of this explanation is worthy of some increased scrutiny. And I am suggesting that, if we admit the commonality of the genres of science fiction and ethnography, then we must also admit that recent science fiction has experimented with ways of making alien consciousness materially manifest in written texts that are as yet untried by anthropologists working in the modalities of natural realism.

If Cherryh's Pyanfar seems too convenient a foil for the depiction of difference, let us turn to Russell Hoban's *Riddley Walker* (1980). In distinction to the previous example, *Riddley Walker* presents an alien consciousness without depending on the existence of a character within the narrative to act as a translator for the reader; indeed, even when such a character is desired, none is offered. The story of ten days in the life of the title character, a young man living some 3,000 years in the future, *Riddley Walker*'s most prominent feature is a completely unapologetic use of dense, difficult to comprehend language. This unapologetic thrusting of the reader into the language of the other—an enactment of what anthropology often only describes—stands as a challenge to any of the literary pretensions of the discipline. *Riddley Walker,* among other works,[18] stands as a dare to mainstream ethnographic literature. Even when Hoban's character tries to explain his "culture," the explanation inscribes mystification onto demystification:

> No 1 uses the old place names now they ben unspoak this long time but mos of them are stil there in the places. You know Cambry ben Canterbury in moufs long gone. Canterbury. It has a zanting in it like a tall man dantsing and time back there ben foun there girt big music pipes as big as fents poals peopl said. [Hoban 1980:112]

So we know that "Cambry" is "Canterbury," and not, for example, "Cambridge," and we are relieved to have been given this concrete location. But what's "zanting"? Why don't people use the old names if they are known? Why a *tall* man? Why a tall *man*? These four sentences, in their lived density, defy the best intentions of an "ethnographic explanation" or "understanding." This is a native explanation, which would be clearly violated by many of the more typical reductions of ethnography. Yet, by employing a style that emphasizes difference within a form that allows a partial reading, Hoban's work presents a possible model for a type of ethnographic writing, as well.

And, if such concepts as ethnographic explanation or interpretive anthropology mean an unproblematized translation of the other's speech into the comprehensible speech of our own culture, a new model may very well be needed. The plot of *Riddley Walker* revolves around the search for the 1 Big 1 that Eusa cooked up for Mr. Clevver in time back way back. Riddley gets caught up in the search and, when he meets up with the Pry Mincer, Goodparley, the latter shows him a gallery description of "The Legend of St. Eustace," a 15th-century fresco "depicting with great fidelity" (according to the original description in Good-

parley's possession) the second-century biblical legend. That's all clear; except that the description is written in our 20th-century English, and Goodparley's "translation" of it should give pause to any ethnographer:

> Wel soons I begun to read it I had to say, "I dont even know 1/2 these words. Whats a Legend? How dyou say a guvner S with a littl t?"
>
> Goodparley said, "I can as plain the mos of it to you. Some parts is easyer workit out nor others theres bits of it wewl never know for cern just what they mean. What this writing is its about some kynd of picter or dyergam which we dont have that picter all we have is the writing. Parbly that picter ben some kynd of a seakert thing becaws this here writing (I dont mean the writing youre holding in your han I mean the writing time back way back what this is wrote the same as) its cernly seakert. Its blipful it aint jus only what it seams to be its the syn and foller of some thing else. A Legend thats a picter whats *depicted* which is to say pictert on a wall its done with some kynd of paint callit *fidelity*. *St* is short for sent. Meaning this bloak Eustace he dint jus tern up he wer sent. *A.D. 120* thats the year count they use to have it gone from Year 1 right the way to Bad Time. *A.D.* means All Done. 120 years all done theyre saying thats when they begun this picter in 120 nor they never got it finisht til 1480 is what it says here wel you know there aint no picter cud take 1360 years to do these here year numbers is about some thing else may be wewl never know what." [Hoban 1980:124–125]

Goodparley's translation seems somewhat bizarre at first. But when we look through the other end of the telescope, we realize that his admonition, "some parts is easyer workit out nor others theres bits of it wewl never know for cern just what they mean," is precisely the one under which we read this novel; and, by analogy, under which we read other cultures, before we "claw them back" into "civilized English," to borrow Mark Twain's phrase.

The Untranslatable

If one master trope of anthropology is the revelation of the universal core of psychological humanity, another has certainly been, as I mentioned earlier, the Untranslatable Phrase—the admission that some things, try as we might, simply have no English equivalent. The Navaho concept of *hozhǫ́ǫ́* is one of these (cf. Witherspoon 1977). We can all think of them. But my point here is not that complex concepts such as hozhǫ́ǫ́ should be perceived as easily translatable; rather it is that by admitting that they are not translatable, the ethnographer gives the reader license to think that all the things that are translated *are* easily translatable. It is Culler's vraisemblance and Cottom's enchantment, once again. For if we reflect for even a moment, we realize that there are many more fuzzy, difficult cross-cultural concepts than are admitted to in most ethnographic writing. Much of this difficulty is obscured by the ethnographic move to immediate translation. Cultural translation in this sense acts as something of a prophylactic against cultural infection, a monitoring of the extent to which we allow ourselves to be infected by the voice of the other. Through this move, experience and analysis, participation and observation, are kept separate. *Riddley*

Walker offers a succinct critique of the ethnographic move to explain by way of inserting a "proper perspective":

> If you cud fly way way up like a saddelite bird over the sea and you lookit down you wunt see the waves moving youwd see them change 1 way to a nother only you wunt see them moving youwd be too far away. You wunt see nothing only a changing stilness. [Hoban 1980:163]

Riddley also has a brief and eloquent reply to the effort to maintain a strict line between participation and observation that supposedly clarifies the complexity of lived experience:

> If you cud even jus see 1 thing clear the woal of whats in it you cud see every thing clear. But you never wil get to see the woal of any thing youre all ways in the middl of it living it or moving thru it. Never mynd. [Hoban 1980:200]

Clearly one of anthropology's distinctions from science fiction is that its written works are based on human societies that are actually there to be regarded and apprehended more or less accurately. But this perhaps draws a black and white distinction where there is perhaps a good deal of gray—and again displays the same obsession with separating experience and analysis illustrated above. For, in presenting its reality, ethnography must rely on narrative and literary conventions shared by fiction in order to be comprehended. And, for its part, science fiction takes great pride in its connections with the real, out there—for instance in pointing to those material objects and practices, such as communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit and ATM machines, that were "predicted" in the science fiction of 40 or 50 years ago.

Cultural Translation

When I speak of translation, I am not really talking about the physical presentation of performance parameters in translation that Tedlock (1983) describes. Rather, I am concerned with a problematizing of consciousness; what Paul Friedrich (1986) referred to as "the language parallax," or what R. G. Collingwood (1938) called "analogical meanings":

> The analogical meanings arise from the fact that when we want to discuss the experience of other people we can only do so in our own language. Our own language has been invented for the purpose of expressing our own experience. When we use it for discussing other people's we assimilate their experience to our own. We cannot talk in English about the way in which a negro tribe thinks and feels without making them appear to think and feel like Englishmen. . . . [Collingwood 1938:8][19]

What happens to the other's voice in translation? This is a question Mark Twain explored to great humorous effect in his retranslation of a French translation of "The Jumping Frog of Calaveras County."[20] On a more serious note, Vladimir Nabokov wrote extensively on the perplexities he encountered in

translating the poeticity of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* (1964). If, as Marx wrote, language is practical consciousness, then translations of language are translations of practical consciousness. Recent debate among feminists, linguists, cultural critics (or defenders), educators, and political activists over whether the desire for a neuter third-person pronoun in English is a barbaric attempt to subvert contemporary natural linguistic practice suggests that we might also consider the linguistic barbarisms we perform in our seemingly transparent translations of other languages.

Apache, for instance, has a neuter third-person pronoun only. Both "he" and "she" in English are, in Western Apache, *ań*. Yet much literature on Apache culture presents the generic "he" as if this were an unproblematic way of saying "he or she." In Morris Opler's writings on Apache child-rearing practices, for instance, it often seems as if these matrilineal Apaches had only male children (cf. Opler 1941). Of course Opler did write of the rearing of female children, but then using the word "she" in those cases was also a mistranslation and, moreover, implies that "he" is a natural linguistic category in Apache.

Apache verbs are conjugated in singular, dual-plural and collective-plural. In the ethnographic literature, however, the latter two are unproblematically translated into "we," "you," and "they." Not to be a stick in the mud, but it seems fairly simple to cook up an English equivalent of "two" and "more than two" without doing too much damage to the language of the ethnographer (e.g., "the two of us," "y'all," and other such constructions). A further perplexity, which would seem to make such an accommodation of some consequence, is that the dual and collective forms are not only used referentially, but rhetorically and metaphorically as well. In Apache, a speaker may address a large group in the dual mode in order to make a rhetorical point (Hoijer 1938:72). This speaks directly to the problem of translating the poetic force of even the most everyday Apache utterances.

This problem of translation is felt deeply by some of my Apache consultants. Even among those Apaches who are willing to share a part of their cultural heritage with outside audiences, the problems of clawing that cultural heritage into English are often daunting to the point where silence appears as the only legitimate response. The unproblematic and disrespectful translation of language—translation of consciousness—for presentation to those who will then think they have gained an "understanding" is anathema to many Apaches,[21] and it is difficult to say that it is not rightfully so.

One of the more common things Apaches say about their language in relationship to English is that it is "backwards" or "opposite." By this they are, in part, describing word order: Apache is an S-O-V, postpositional language. For example, the sentence *túnteel hanaayú nagotł'odíí baa oshíí,* which we would interpret as "I'm reading about the troubles across the sea," is organized "the sea, across it, the trouble there, about that, I'm reading." But to some Apaches it is more than a mere description of word order; for I have been told, when responding thusly to an Apache, that I do not understand. I have come to realize that, more than a characterization, it is a warning: do not think that you can trans-

late our language into English, because whatever you do, you cannot avoid making it the opposite of what it is for us.[22] A number of Apaches have a basic sensibility that language is an important marker of the differences in cultural experience that Raymond Williams (1977) calls "structure of feeling," as well as a basic assumption that their language is not translatable into English—an assumption that stands in direct challenge to the anthropological conviction that most things can be translated and comprehended by sensitive outsiders.

Those who have written about Japanese culture (e.g., Bachnik 1987; Kondo 1990) have also commented on the frustrations of ever translating Japanese personal pronouns into a form of English that would reflect the social processes involved in the negotiation of social distance and intimacy in Japanese. Bachnik, for instance, provides "four utterances [in Japanese] of the verb 'to go' . . . all of which would be translated similarly into English, as 'Is/are (someone) going?' " but which, in Japanese, communicate crucial information about the social relation between speaker and addressee that cannot be referenced in the translations (Bachnik 1987:29). Apache, too, encodes the world linguistically in ways that are, perhaps, ultimately untranslatable into English. There are 11 separate classificatory handling verb stems in the San Carlos dialect of Western Apache,[23] each of which indicates the general size, shape, and physical state of the object being handled:

tséé nádish'aah	I will pick up a large rock
chích'il nádishjáh	I will pick up some acorns
łį́į́ bitł'oh ła' nádistsóh	I will pick up some hay
tú nádishkaah	I will pick up water (in an open cup)
tł'ooł nádishleeh	I will pick up a rope
tséé ła' nádishniił	I will pick up some small rocks
gusé nádishteeh	I will pick up a dog
gish nádishtį́jh	I will pick up a stick
goshtł'ish nádishtłeeh	I will pick up some mud
naltsoos ła' nádistsoos	I will pick up some paper
ban nádishne'	I will pick up some bread

The last verb stem is indeterminate. That is, whereas *ban nádistsoos* would refer to a slice of bread or a tortilla, and *ban nádish'aah* to a loaf of bread, *ban nádishne'* leaves the particular physical classification of the object open. As Edward Sapir noted in 1921, "in the Athabaskan languages . . . 'to carry' or 'throw' a pebble is quite another thing than to carry or throw a log" (Sapir 1921:99).[24] Indeed, in Apache it is possible to say "give me the whatchamacallit" and reference in some detail which whatchamacallit is meant. Further, and perhaps more to the point here, the sentence *nnee biyati' bigonsh'aah,* which means "I am learning Apache," also means that, in Apache, language is conceived of by metaphorical extension as a particular type of object to be handled: a single, bulky object like a rock, as referenced by the verb stem *'aah.* This is not a physical object, obviously, but a conceptual one. Another example of this metaphorical extension of handling verbs is the Apache utterance that we would interpret as "take my advice": *shi yati' nagon'aah,* "pick up my words," again

employs the handling verb stem *'aah* to reference the idea of language.[25] It would seem quite a task, indeed, to claw such verbalizations into "civilized English," while still preserving any of the Apache social reality in the utterances—more difficult still if we limit our written representation to the natural realism that has been the stock-in-trade of anthropology for the last hundred years.

Conclusion

Science fiction, perhaps, has been more known to explicitly explore its resonances with ethnography and with issues of culture contained within anthropology than vice-versa.[26] In the works of Chad Oliver (1955, 1971, 1979, 1984), Orson Scott Card's *Speaker for the Dead* (1986), Ursula K. LeGuin's *Always Coming Home* (1985), or Michael Resnick's *Paradise* (1989), such issues as culture contact, social structure, indigenous expressive forms, technological change, and linguistic reference are imaginatively explored. In this paper I have suggested that one fruitful means for anthropology to discover new ways to write about difference and identity would be to look more systematically into the commonalities ethnographic writing shares with science fiction. For, in spite of recent critical reevaluations of the political positioning of anthropology and anthropologists—the ethnographer as traveler, as voyager, as tool of colonialism and imperialism—it is arguable that a certain covert prestige remains attached to the ability to clearly and coherently make the other understandable to the reader on the homeworld.

By concentrating on language in this paper, I intend neither to divorce language from culture, to reduce culture to language, nor to propose language as the most important aspect of culture. Rather, I am proposing that language difference has been employed in ethnography as one of the most obvious tropological markers of cultural difference (cf. Wikan 1992). In ethnography, the researcher's tangible realization that he or she has entered a different culture is often portrayed in the episode of linguistic disorientation, as discussed earlier in this paper. That same marker of cultural difference is, however, often one of the earliest casualties in the process of crafting a comprehensible, naturalizable ethnographic description. It is paradoxical that writing well about difference should involve, in some sense, making that difference invisible. My concentration on language is also meant to highlight the idea that ethnographies are themselves works in language. I have suggested that, by exploring our historical, philosophical, and literary connections with science fiction, there is something for us to learn about the representation of other consciousness.

I have tried to make two points in this article. First, I have attempted to demonstrate that the relationship between anthropology and science fiction that is casually acknowledged rewards more intense scrutiny. Both genres grow out of the discourses of high colonialism at the turn of the 20th century, and both are expressly concerned with the representation of contact between alien cultures. The two use many similar techniques of representation and generate similar conventional genre expectations among their readers. These techniques include the

use of doubled narrator's voices, panoptic views, and psychologism as the means by which to apprehend identity and difference between subjects in different cultural contexts.

My second point is that the translation of language-as-consciousness in both anthropology and science fiction is of central concern within this larger discursive frame of culture. Generally, anthropology is based on some sort of theory that cultures are different from each other and that other consciousnesses are difficult to comprehend. Yet when we present our data in writing, that theory gets undermined as we immediately explain that which is supposed to be difficult to come to grips with. If it is imperious to demand that the other take responsibility to help us understand his or her "culture," it may be similarly imperious for us to suggest in our writings that such understanding is easily had through the experience of reading naturalized, everyday English. If those who read our writings have difficulty coming to an understanding themselves, well, is that not at least part of the engaging aspect of the anthropological experience?

I will add, unnecessarily I hope, that I would be quite dissatisfied with an ethnography that portrayed someone as saying, "the sea, across it, the trouble there, about that, I am reading," when what he said was, "I'm reading about the war in the Persian Gulf." I am not suggesting the donning of a shroud of mystery merely for the sake of mysteriousness. I am not endorsing an Orientalizing program of over-alienating what is everyday. It is not necessarily difference itself but rather the ease of coming to an understanding of that difference that I wish to unsettle—to reproblematize difference at every turn by consistently highlighting the reemergence of difference in the idea of translation and, through this, to make manifest the density of other worlds. This is a search for an aesthetic approach to writing ethnography that matches our theories about cultural specificity; an attempt to come to grips with the problems of naturalization in reading unproblematized representations; and to treat with cross-cultural confusions inherent in the act of translation. Recent science fiction has experimented with making the consciousness of others manifest in print, experimentation in which we may see new ways of grappling with this dilemma in our own writing. If we take seriously our areas of coextension with these works of fiction, and unapologetically immerse our readers in the worlds and voices of the other, force them to come into some relationship with the other, to figure some things out for themselves, we may bring them, as well as ourselves, closer to what anthropology is all about.

Notes

Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Fred Myers and the two anonymous readers of an earlier draft of this essay for their helpful and constructive comments. Kathleen Stewart and Calla Jacobson patiently read and commented on innumerable early versions of this manuscript. I would also like to thank Scott Bukatman, Keila Diehl, Claire R. Farrer, Steven Feld, Aaron Fox, James La Vita, Susan Lepselter, Louise Meintjes, Chad Oliver, Tom Porcello, and Tom Solomon for their thoughtful and valuable insights and criticisms. I also must thank Phillip Goode, who has patiently

exposed me to the tip of the iceberg known as the Apache language. Much as I might wish otherwise, all errors, omissions, and exaggerations remain mine alone.

1. This and all subsequent transcriptions are my own.

2. To clarify, since written descriptions of other cultures extend back to the Old Testament, if not further, by "modern ethnography," I mean the anthropology, based on empirical observation and fieldwork, that superseded Durkheimian and Lévi-Bruhlian speculations after the First World War, and which "created a demand outside expert circles for anthropological literature" (Collingwood 1938:61), that is, which opened a commercial market for ethnographies. Similarly, science fiction readers have attempted to find the origins of that genre in Plato's tale of Atlantis and even in the *Epic of Gilgamesh*. But here I agree with Isaac Asimov, who writes, "Clearly, what is responsible for [science fiction as a genre] is *magazine* science fiction . . . which began with the first issue (April 1926) of *Amazing Stories* published by Hugo Gernsback" (Asimov 1988:x).

3. Recent critiques of this paradigm include Appadurai 1990; Cottom 1989; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; and Rosaldo 1989.

4. Many will argue that anthropology focuses on cultural differentiation within the species, and of course I agree. But I think this is only one part of the problematic of alienness *and* commonplace, differentiation *and* similarity. I will return to this point later in the article.

5. In light of the foregoing, it may be unsurprising that Edgar Rice Burroughs created both *Tarzan* and *John Carter of Mars* (Torgovnick inquires deeply into the former but leaves its connections with the latter unexplored); that science fiction and anthropology both found literary voices as commercial genres in the 1920s, with the publication of *Amazing Stories, Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Coming of Age in Samoa,* and *Astounding Stories;* that the daughter of Alfred L. and Theodora Kroeber is the science fiction writer Ursula K. LeGuin; or that the science fiction writer James Tiptree Jr. (pen name of Alice Bradley Sheldon) was the daughter of the early primatologist Herbert Bradley.

6. In an interesting twist, Culler points out that for Balzac's Count of Lanty to be "small, ugly and pock-marked, as gloomy as a Spaniard and as boring as a banker" is naturalizable by the reader. But, he continues, for the Count to have been " 'small, green and demographic' would violate this first-order vraisemblance and require us to construct a very curious world indeed" (Culler 1975:141). The worlds constructed in science fiction, however, are often well populated with small, green, though perhaps not demographic, beings.

7. My description here is influenced by the film theorist Scott Bukatman, who has offered a way of reading science fiction film that seems uncanny in the way it can be applied to the reading of ethnography. Because Bukatman has influenced my thinking on this subject a great deal, it seems worthwhile to reprint that reading here:

> The scene [from *Blade Runner* (1982)] provides, as does so much science fiction, a privileged tour of a richly layered futurity in a narrative moment which exists solely to present an urban space both bewildering and familiar. . . . The gaze which enables this powerful space is augmented . . . by the constitution of a second field defined by the controls and data screens of the hovercar. These images impose an order on the movement of the gliding vehicle which is shown to be traveling through a traffic corridor whose existence is invisible to the unaided eye. The effect is one of scopic and epistemological pleasure: the viewer sees and deduces how (not to mention that) the future works. [Bukatman 1989:54]

8. In his foreword to *Son of Old Man Hat* (Dyk 1938), Edward Sapir discusses the way in which the simplest sentences can obliquely allude to the richness of the cultural system in which they emerge. Reading the life story of Left Handed, Sapir wrote, is "as though the intricacies of our economic system had to be pieced together out of such episodic hints as that 'she sent Sally to the five-and-ten-cent store to buy herself a pink ribbon' or that 'when the crash came the Joneses sold their summer cottage' " (Dyk 1938:viii). So, too, each sentence of the science fiction story can be read as the uppermost layer of a social reality.

9. The sentences come from, respectively, *Clay's Ark* by Octavia E. Butler (1984); *The Nuer* by E. E. Evans-Pritchard (1940); *The Female Man* by Joanna Russ (1975); *The Harmless People* by Elizabeth Marshall Thomas (1958); and *Nova* by Samuel R. Delany (1968).

10. This is not to argue that such panoptic gazes are inherently harmful, but merely to argue that science fiction and ethnography deploy such gazes by similar means and to similar ends.

11. One anonymous reader suggested that a comparison with a mystery novel in an exotic locale would be helpful. In *The Seersucker Whipsaw* (1967), Ross Thomas describes the fictional African nation of Albertia:

> Albertia is shaped like a funnel and its spout is Barkandu, the capital city. Along the thirty-three mile strip that forms its claim to the sea are some of the finest white sand beaches in the world and some of the most treacherous undertows. In the middle of the strip of sand is a natural deep sea harbor that divides the city geographically and economically. To the north, towards the interior, are the city's fifty square miles of squalor where the Albertians live on their ninety-six-dollar-a-year average incomes. To the south are the broad boulevards, the neat green lawns, the Consulates, office buildings, hotels (there were four good ones that year), night clubs, foreign-owned shops, department stores, and the Yacht Club. [1967:52]

Surely there are similarities here—I would never claim that such gazes are the exclusive domain of ethnography and science fiction alone. The differences lie in two areas. First is the scope of the description: there is nothing wondrous or monumental in Thomas's description of Albertia. Second is the place of such descriptions in the progress of the narrative: Thomas's description pushes the narrative forward, whereas the science fiction or ethnographic version often appears as more of a caesura, a point where the narrative pauses for a moment of contemplation. For Thomas, the panoptic map is there to push the plot forward: "There was a concrete, four-lane bridge across the tip of the curved V of the harbor and William pulled onto it" (1967:56).

12. A recent example is found in Debbora Battaglia's (1990) introduction to Sabarl Island. The serpentine shape of the island is described from the air, a view that helps provide the metaphor in the title of the book. Battaglia reflects—in a way that is not unrelated to the argument in the present essay—on the relationship between this distanced view and the desire for coherence.

13. Of course, until very recently biological distinctions were often called upon in anthropology for their power to explain differences in language, intelligence, technological development, and so forth.

14. I am referring here to the original *Star Trek,* and not the later series, *Star Trek: The Next Generation.*

15. Note here, as well, that Spock's first sentence also includes the normalization to "Earth-time" and the disorienting fragment of native language discussed earlier.

16. It might be unnecessary to point out that *Star Trek,* among other things, gives a clear idea of who it is that should be given the right to interpret events for the audience.

It is the Captain, the most "American" of the Earthlings on board, whose narrated "log" establishes both the audience's orientation and his own authority to establish it.

17. We need to acknowledge, of course, that recent explorations of the cross-cultural conceptions of self (Kondo 1990; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; Myers 1986) add a further critical layer to these arguments.

18. In science fiction, the most notable authors in this regard would be Samuel Delany, Anne McCaffrey, James Tiptree Jr., John Varley, Joanna Russ, Vonda McIntyre, and Octavia Butler.

19. Ever cognizant of the relationship between anthropology and western philosophy, Collingwood footnoted his passage with a quotation from Evans-Pritchard: "Let the reader consider any argument that would utterly demolish all Zande claims for the power of the oracle. If it were translated in Zande modes of thought it would serve to support their entire structure of belief" (Evans-Pritchard 1937:319–320).

20. Twain ended his presentation of "The Frog Jumping of the County of Calaveras" with the following exasperated conclusion:

> Such is the Jumping Frog, to the distorted French eye. I claim that I never put together such an odious mixture of bad grammar and delirium tremens in my life. And what has a poor foreigner like me done, to be abused and misrepresented like this? When I say "Well, I don't see no p'ints about that frog that's any better'n any other frog," is it kind, is it just, for this Frenchman to try to make it appear that I said, "Eh bien! I no saw not that that frog had nothing of better than each frog?" I have no heart to write more. I never felt so about anything before. [Twain 1987]

21. Indeed, at least one Apache of whom I know thinks that translation is not only impossible, but taboo (*San Carlos Apache Moccasin* 1991:4).

22. *Opposite,* the word used by my Apache informants to describe this relationship, is surely a problematic word analytically, but *different* seems too mild an alternative to evoke the sense I have been given in these conversations.

23. Basso (1968) identified 13 handling verb stems in the White Mountain dialect of Western Apache. Classificatory verb stems are a distinctive feature of Athapaskan languages. See Hoijer et al. 1963.

24. Claire R. Farrer (personal communication, October 1993) has done work for the Mescalero Apache tribe with school children that leads her to believe that Apaches classify objects differently in Apache and in English because of the classificatory verbs.

25. For an insightful and much more detailed analysis of the poetic usage of handling verbs in the Athapaskan languages, see Rushforth 1991.

26. One exception is found in Mason et al. 1974.

References Cited

Appadurai, Arjun
1990 Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. Public Culture 2(2):1–24.

Asad, Talal
1986 The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology. *In* Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 141–193. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Asad, Talal, ed.
1973 Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter. London: Ithaca Press.

Asimov, Isaac, ed.
1988 Classic Science Fiction: Short Novels of the 1930s. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers.
Bachnik, Jane M.
1987 Native Perspectives of Distance and Anthropological Perspectives of Culture. Anthropological Quarterly 60(1):25–35.
Basso, Keith
1968 The Western Apache Classificatory Verb System: A Formal Analysis. Southwest Journal of Anthropology 24:252–266.
Battaglia, Debbora
1990 On the Bones of the Serpent: Person, Memory, and Mortality in Sabarl Island Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Benedict, Ruth
1946 The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture. New York: Meridian Books.
Bernstein, B.
1983 Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Brody, Hugh
1981 Maps and Dreams. New York: Pantheon.
Bukatman, Scott
1989 The Cybernetic (City)State: Terminal Space Becomes Phenomenal. Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts 2(2):43–63.
Butler, Judith P.
1990 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge.
Butler, Octavia E.
1984 Clay's Ark. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Card, Orson Scott
1986 Speaker for the Dead. New York: TOR Books.
Cherryh, C. J.
1985 The Kif Strike Back. New York: DAW Books.
Cheyfitz, Eric
1991 The Poetics of Imperialism: Translation and Colonization from the Tempest to Tarzan. New York: Oxford University Press.
Clarke, Arthur C.
1976 Imperial Earth. New York: Bantam Books.
Clifford, James
1988 The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Clifford, James, and George E. Marcus, eds.
1986 Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Collingwood, R. G.
1938 The Principles of Art. London: Oxford University Press.
Connolly, Bob, and Robin Anderson
1987 First Contact. New York: Viking Press.
Cottom, Daniel
1989 Text and Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Culler, Jonathan
1975 Structuralist Poetics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Delany, Samuel
1968 Nova. Garden City: Doubleday.
Dyk, Walter
1938 Son of Old Man Hat: A Navaho Autobiography. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Eagleton, Terry
1978 Towards a Science of the Text. *In* Criticism and Ideology: A Study in Marxist Literary Theory. Pp. 64–101. London: Verso Press.
Evans-Pritchard, E. E.
1937 Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande. New York: Oxford University Press.
1940 The Nuer. A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Friedrich, Paul
1986 The Language Parallax. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Geertz, Clifford
1973 Thick Description. *In* The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.
1984 Distinguished Lecture: Anti-Anti-Relativism. American Anthropologist 86(2):263–278.
1988 Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Genette, Gerard
1979 Valery and the Poetics of Language. *In* Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism. Pp. 359–373. Josue Harai, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gupta, Akhil, and James Ferguson
1992 Beyond "Culture": Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. Cultural Anthropology 7(1):6–23.
Handler, Richard
1986 Vigorous Male and Aspiring Female: Poetry, Personality, and Culture in Edward Sapir and Ruth Benedict. History of Anthropology 4:127–155.
1989 Anti-Romantic Romanticism: Edward Sapir and the Critique of American Individualism. Anthropological Quarterly 62(1):1–13.
Herzfeld, Michael
1985 The Poetics of Manhood. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hill, Jane
1995 The Voices of Don Gabriel: Responsibility and Self in a Modern Mexicano Narrative. *In* The Dialogic Emergence of Culture. Bruce Mannheim and Dennis Tedlock, eds. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Hoban, Russell
1980 Riddley Walker: A Novel. New York: Summit Books.
Hoijer, Harry
1938 Chiricahua and Mescalero Apache Texts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hoijer, Harry, et al.
1963 Studies in the Athapaskan Languages. University of California Publications in Linguistics, Vol. 29. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hollis, Martin, and Steven Lukes, eds.
1982 Rationality and Relativism. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jarvie, I. C.
1984 Rationality and Relativism: In Search of a Philosophy and History of Anthropology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Keeler, Ward
1987 Javanese Shadow Plays, Javanese Selves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kondo, Dorinne
1990 Crafting Selves: Power, Gender, and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Leach, Edmund
1952 Political Systems of Highland Burma. London: Athlone Press.
LeGuin, Ursula K.
1985 Always Coming Home. New York: Harper and Row.
1994 My Appointment with the Enterprise: An Appreciation. TV Guide 42(20):31–32.
Leighton, Dorothea C., and John Adair
1966 People of the Middle Place. New Haven: HRAF Press.
Lutz, Catherine A., and Lila Abu-Lughod
1990 Language and the Politics of Emotion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Manganaro, Marc, ed.
1990 Modernist Anthropology: From Fieldwork to Text. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Marcus, George, and Dick Cushman
1982 Ethnographies as Texts. Annual Review of Anthropology 11:25–69.
Mason, Carol, Martin Harry Greenberg, and Patricia Warrick, eds.
1974 Anthropology through Science Fiction. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Mohanthy, S. P.
1989 Us and Them: On the Philosophical Bases of Political Criticism. Yale Journal of Criticism 2(2):1–29.
Morrison, Karl Frederick
1988 I Am You: The Hermeneutics of Empathy in Western Literature, Theology, and Art. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Myers, Fred
1986 Pintupi Country, Pintupi Self: Sentiment, Place, and Politics among Western Desert Aborigines. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Niven, Larry
1970 Ringworld. New York: Ballantine Books.
Oliver, Chad
1955 Another Kind: Science Fiction Stories. New York: Ballantine Books.
1971 Mists of Dawn. Boston: Gregg Press.
1974 Two Horizons of Man: Parallels and Interconnections between Anthropology and Science Fiction. Paper presented at the 73rd Annual Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Mexico City.
1979 The Shores of Another Sea. London: Gollancz.
1984 Unearthly Neighbors. New York: Crown Publishers.

Opler, Morris E.
1941 An Apache Life-Way. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pandolfo, Stefania
1989 Detours of Life: Space and Bodies in a Moroccan Village. American Ethnologist 16(1):3–24.
Pohl, Frederick, and C. M. Kornbluth
1952 The Space Merchants. New York: Ballantine Books.
Pratt, Mary Louise
1986 Fieldwork in Common Places. *In* Writing Culture. James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 27–50. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Pushkin, Alexander
1964 Eugene Onegin, a Novel in Verse. V. Nabokov, trans. New York: Pantheon.
Resnick, Michael
1989 Paradise: A Chronicle of a Distant World. New York: Tom Doherty Associates.
Robinson, Kim Stanley
1987 The Blind Geometer. New York: TOR Books.
Rosaldo, Renato
1989 Cuture and Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. Boston: Beacon Press.
Rushforth, Scott
1991 Uses of Bearlake and Mescalero (Athapaskan) Classificatory Verbs. International Journal of American Linguistics 57(2):251–266.
Russ, Joanna
1975 The Female Man. New York: Bantam Books.
San Carlos Apache Moccasin
1991 July 2.
Sapir, Edward
1921 Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Scholte, Bob
1984 Reason and Culture: The Universal and the Particular Revisited. American Anthropologist 86(3):960–965.
Sheckley, Robert
1957 Pilgrimage to Earth. New York: Ace Books.
Simak, Clifford D.
1981[1952] City. New York: Ace Books.
Spiro, Melford
1986 Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology. Cultural Anthropology 1(3):259–286.
Tedlock, Dennis
1983 On the Translation of Style in Oral Narrative. *In* The Spoken Word and the Work of Interpretation. Pp. 31–61. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Thomas, Elizabeth Marshall
1958 The Harmless People. New York: Vintage Books.
Thomas, Ross
1967 The Seersucker Whipsaw. New York: William Morrow and Company.
Torgovnick, Marianna
1990 Gone Primitive: Savage Intellects, Modern Lives. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Twain, Mark
1987 The Jumping Frog. San Francisco: Chronicle Books.
Tyler, Steven A.
1986 On Being out of Words. Cultural Anthropology 1(2):131–137.
1987 Still Rayting. Critique of Anthropology 7(1):49–51.
Van Den Abbeele, Georges
1992 Travel as Metaphor: From Montaigne to Rousseau. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Wikan, Unni
1992 Beyond the Words: The Power of Resonance. American Ethnologist 19(3):460–482.
Williams, Raymond
1977 Marxism and Literature. Oxford University Press.
Witherspoon, Gary
1977 Language and Art in the Navaho Universe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Films and Television Programs Cited

Star Trek: Amok Time
1967 Theodore Sturgeon, writer. Desilu.
Blade Runner
1982 Ridley Scott, director. The Ladd Company.
The Day the Earth Stood Still
1951 Robert Wise, director. Fox Studios.
Silent Running
1972 Douglas Trumbull, director. Universal Studios.