NATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY AND OTHER PROBLEMS

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After fifty years since its first publication in English, Ruth Benedict's *Chrysanthemum and the Sword* is still one of the best sold books in Japan today. Within a couple of years of its appearance it was translated into Japanese, and sold 1.4 million copies.[1] The people studied by Benedict thus constitute a good part of her readers. In this example, it is difficult to sustain a clear-cut distinction between "informants" out there and "home readers" over here. The ambiguity of cultural boundary is not just the issue anthropologists study, but they live through it. As marked by the publication of works such as *Writing Culture*,[2] *The Predicament of Culture*[3] and *Anthropology as Cultural Critique*,[4] the issue of anthropology's disciplinary identity has been subjected to the ongoing concern of anthropologists working in varying fields with diverse theoretical concerns. The debate is not closed as can be seen in the publication of volumes such as *Rereading Cultural Anthropology*[5] and *Recapturing Anthropology*.[6] The question of anthropology's disciplinary identity is far from narrowing down, but expanding its parameters.

In a way anthropology has always expanded itself upon encountering new trends and disciplines; it has successfully incorporated debates concerning feminism, modernity and postmodernism, to cite only recent examples. Especially reflecting the recent rise of cultural studies as a discipline closely associated with anthropology and marked by the emergence of journals such as *Public Culture*, concepts such as diaspora and postcoloniality, and subjectivities multiplied thereby are increasingly moving towards the central position in anthropological inquiries. By focusing on the issues revolving

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around native anthropology, this article aims at exploring the highly elusive positionalities of anthropologists as authors and ambiguous identities of ethnographical texts.

Auto-anthropologists

Marilyn Strathern's chapter, "The Limits of Auto-anthropology," in an ASA monograph entitled *Anthropology at Home*[7] helps us to open the discussion. According to Strathern,[8] who draws her analysis from Rabinow's contrast of writers and authors, the ethnographer in her home culture is "author" and not "writer," in relation to those being studied. The writer is more or less invisible from the text, while the author embodies her relationship with the world in her text. In the case of the ethnographer of another culture/society, she becomes first of all the writer who uses her writing as a vehicle to render others' representations and interpretations intelligible to the home readership, and then secondly, the author who controls the rendition, by influencing the reader's conceptualization of that culture/society.[9] Such a division of labor was possible in the "traditional anthropological exercise," according to Strathern, but "the challenge of anthropology at home" is different, in that the ethnographer is a simultaneous doublet of author and writer without separation of her intellectual work and social role. And, if she is still a writer, she writes mainly for her colleagues, the academic and anthropological readership.[10] One of the characteristics of such "home authors," so to speak, is closely related to the fact that the ethnography produces self-knowledge for both those studied and for the anthropologist herself. And this is how anthropologists at home fulfill the conditions of auto-anthropology through their writing. Strathern defines auto-anthropology as "anthropology carried out in the social context which produced it." Here "it" is not the anthropologist's cultural orientation, but the anthropological knowledge that is produced by the ethnography. Hence, for Strathern, the issue of auto-anthropology is not the degree of the anthropologist's familiarity

with a particular culture she studies;[11] it is about the mode of knowledge, more precisely, different modes of self-knowledge including the societal knowledge of that particular society itself.

The key concept for this argument is "contrivance." This term can be understood, following Collin's Thesaurus, as synonymous with artifice, design, dodge, expedient, fabrication, formation, intrigue, inventiveness, machination, plot, project, trick, etc. It could also be understood as something similar to critical reflexivity on one's own culture/society, in the vein of Strathern's chapter. When the anthropologist studies another society, her contrivance becomes a necessary means of "access to the unfamiliar," while when she turns home, contrivance is different in the sense that she would end up writing *about* contrivance. The difference between studying one's own society and studying another society lies in the epistemological terrain, not in a simplistic matter of cultural affinity or distance between the researcher and the society concerned. Here, the distinction between the writer and the author becomes relevant. Strathern cites the example of Bronislaw Malinowski who, as writer, made his narrative "transparent enough to be an authentic description of the Trobriands which required technical elucidation" and as author, he displaced "no Trobriand accounts . . . because he could not possibly have been an author in respect of knowledge of local social interest. Nor did his organization of material, his functionalist models and principles of social organization, participate in Trobriand modes of self-knowledge."[12] Strathern states:

> The point to stress is very simple. Anthropological accounts of exogenous societies such as the Trobriands can never be the self-knowledge in the way that a parallel account of the social world of Elmdoners [in Essex] (say) would be. It does not matter where the anthropologist comes from: it cannot be self-knowledge in a reflexive sense because it does not draw on the specific techniques by which people know themselves.[13]

There are three, closely connected points in Strathern's chapter which I wish to engae and explore further. First is the problem of

separation between the self-knowledge of the (presumably Western) ethnographer and that of the "natives." Often, "going native" dimensions are emphasized for the anthropologist in the field, but, such a phenomenon does not arise in one moment. It is a long process of negotiated relations during which the anthropologist herself learns about native others and figures out how she can approximate herself to them. Fieldwork relations are increasingly written about in today's anthropological texts as compared to the silence given to such relations in past texts. And, Malinowski's relation to the Trobrianders was a significant part of his self-shaping.[14] The fact that he kept his ethnography and diary separate, for example, should not mean that Malinowski was skillfully separated into writer and author, for the Trobrianders and for the Western readers, respectively. In most fieldwork situations, anthropologists are observed as much as they observe the people in the field, and recent anthropological texts are frank about it. Dorinne Kondo felt constrained during her fieldwork in Tokyo amidst people she met there, some of whom were her relatives, and she was influenced by them and forced to make certain reflections on herself which may not have been necessary had she stayed in the USA, where she was born and grew up.[15] At the same time, when her American conventions as a third generation Japanese-American appeared to be different and striking in the eyes of her Japanese neighbors, she was influencing them, intriguing them and fascinating them. Kondo refers to herself, viewed by them, as "a living oxymoron, someone who was both Japanese and not Japanese."[16]

Parallel to the recent spate of literature reassessing the intercourse between colony and the metropolis in cultural histories of colonialism,[17] the communication or intellectual exchange between anthropologists and people in the field is being explored in terms of mutually influencing spheres, rather than as entities that are sealed up from each other. These realms of knowledge (including self-knowledge) are not identical. Nevertheless, they may, in mediated form, be connected to each other one way or the other and, furthermore, the anthropologist's presence *can* connect them. No matter how "colonial" it may

originally have been, we know that, for example, Trobriand Islanders play cricket and Cuna curing figures in South American native people have white men among them.[18] On a different level, today we do have Trobriander anthropologists or Solomon Islander anthropologists who write about indigenous cultures of Trobriand or the Solomon Islands and conduct teaching and research in anthropology in institutions and universities in these places. Would it be too hard to imagine, too unusual to happen, or too conceited to think that the anthropologist's presence can influence the community that she studies in various ways, including personal relations and organization of academic institutions and disciplines, thereby influencing the formation of the cultural identity of the people in the field?

It would also be difficult to assume that the anthropologist herself cannot change the community due to her presence, through either personal relations she can develop with informants, or some forms of feedback in the field. Of course, if we take the Wittgensteinian proposition very far (and with some distortion) and dismiss any possibility of inter-personal understanding on the basis of the opacity of purely private languages, it would not be possible to accept the anthropologist's understanding of such a community. However, such a reasoning would simultaneously be to cancel all the possibilities of anthropological and any other forms of mutual intellectual understanding. In as much as we allow for anthropologists' efforts to familiarize themselves with the internal logic of others' cultures, it is possible, maybe not always but often, to rely on their ability to render their diversified relationship to the people they study intelligible to heterogeneous readers, including those peoples who are studied by anthropologists themselves. And if so, this is a process of self-knowledge for the anthropologist, albeit mediated by her relationship to the people in the field.

My second point is related to the phenomenon of contrivance. For example, to try to understand what Trobrianders take shell money to be, in my view, is an exercise that deals with the notion of contrivance. Such contrivance may not constitute the self-knowledge of the ethnographer because of its culture-specificity,

but it remains the same; writing about Trobrianders cannot escape writing about contrivance, as exactly as writing about an English village. Anthropology has always dealt with "contriving others." For example, anthropological studies of Japan have always been constrained by what John Lie calls "auto-Orientalization,"[19] which is manifested by an on-going phenomenon of literary production of books and other forms of writings, art and objects, generally embraced by the term "nihonjinron," the study of Japanese cultural uniqueness. In other words, Japanese do not stop talking about themselves, construing and constructing what it means to be Japanese, concocting and contriving means and methods of self-representation.[20] When anthropologists study the Japanese, it is not possible to disregard such self-representations, which are, in most cases, already in written form. Such is a very different situation from the ideal-typical "writer" of other cultures who may just have to deal with spoken data collected in the field and not the textual ones that can be read in the libraries "at home." The difference between auto-anthropology and "traditional" anthropology is notn whether the anthropologist has to write *about* contrivance or not, but exists elsewhere.

This leads to my third point, which is related to the cultural basis of knowledge—including self-knowledge. In my view, knowledges (broadly-interpreted) have cultural foundations on the basis of which they are formed. Even the seemingly neutral scientific knowledge we know today reflects material circumstances that have emerged historically and socially, within certain limits of a given cultural parameters.[21] In the modern school system, every child learns the equation 2 x 3 = 6. However, the process by which they learn the equation is culture-bound. In a particular school, the child may be encouraged to understand that when two apples are delivered three times, the sum total is six; in another context, she may be forced to memorize without any encouragement to understand the situation. These are related to Gilbert Ryle's notion of the connection between "knowing that" and "knowing how."[22] We need to know not only "that" but also "how." Some cultures emphasize "that" knowledge, while others, "how" knowledge, for example. At any

rate, both knowledges are acquired by way of a culturally posited teaching/learning system, through application of specific rules of learning. The Western anthropological knowledge, the major part of which developed during and within Victorian time and space, has its own cultural foundation.[23] If so, to the same extent that Malinowskian anthropology had a cultural bent for what Ernest Gellner called "transplanting East European practices to the West and endowing them with a Western rationale,"[24] Trobriand self-knowledge, expressed in the form of showing how to build a canoe or how to appreciate gardens, is culture-specific.

Although Strathern maintains that the definition of auto anthropology should not be about the cultural distance and degree of familiarity between the researcher and the field, if the knowledge is produced on the cultural basis—by using a particular language, through culturally institutionalized pedagogy, etc.—all the contrivances are culture-based and it is indeed Western cultural specificity that prevents the anthropological accounts of the Trobrianders of Malinowski from becoming self-knowledge of (say) English readers. But, this should be reformulated, since "reading" about Trobrianders—the act of learning—forms part of the cultural process of knowledge formation for the readers. In other words, for a Western reader to appreciate the self-knowledge of Trobrianders, such a knowledge needs to be placed within the knowledge acquisition process of that reader, which in its turn is institutionalized and organized within the cultural norms and limits of Western education. The knowledge about Trobrianders for English readers is mediated through the process of incorporating the anthropological texts and instating the act of such a learning into their own culture-bound learning system such as the courses in the anthropology departments of universities. Thus, the knowledge "that Trobrianders do A" or "that Trobrianders think they are B" will be appropriated by an English reader/learner through the culture-specific process of "how"—how they learn about the Trobriand Island in the English education system prefigures their knowledge of the Trobriand Island itself. This much would be the same for an Elmdon reader of the ethnography of Elmdon village. But, if

the ethnography of Elmdon by an English ethnographer can be regarded as a relatively unmediated form of the self-knowledge of Elmdoners themselves, it is because their epistemology pertains to a Western cultural foundation and the ethnographer can assume how things are normally understood by her villagers and readers or her villager/reader. In this sense, what Strathern regards as an epistemological question is in fact a cultural one and, therefore, it does matter *where* anthropologists come from.

Native Anthropologists

In this section I would like to focus on the debate over "native anthropology." In her recent book, Kirsten Hastrup denies the notion of native anthropology since "there is no way in which one can simultaneously speak from a native and an anthropological position . . . . We are now in a position to turn the concept of othering towards ourselves. It is for anthropology to assume the position of the 'radical other' in the world.[25] Hastrup emphasizes "the objective conditions for the production of knowledge" as something that one must epistemologically reflect upon in order for "anthropological results to be theoretically and historically significant," and that "there is no way of incorporating such an objective viewpoint" for the native person, and here "native anthropology" is "a contradiction in terms."[26]

Let us consider the notion of "objectivity." Consider the case of The Nuer.[27] Critics have already pointed out the assumed notion of equilibrium inherent in the text and the confidence arising from "self-closing discourse,"[28] or invisible and, consequentially, authoritarian "voice over" of E. E. Evans-Pritchard, whose description does not have a sense of any transformation internal to the Nuers, and altogether is blind to the colonial presence of the British, which ultimately guaranteed his research. Can we, nevertheless, credit his precision of accounts with an objective description of the Nuer? The answer is negative. First, no text escapes the angles of cultural and ideological lenses worn by the author. The second, a technical problem which is closely connected to the first, is that at the

moment when Evans Pritchard *selected* certain data, *omitted* others and *interpreted* aspects of Nuer life, he was already exercising his authorial intervention. Even if we concede to an absurd degree and say that his accounts were "objective," such a concern would have to be appreciated as a limited one and, hence, necessarily partial.[29] His claims that anthropologists are the ones who can study a society in its totality[30] sounds today rather anachronistic. Why? Because we now know that no society keeps its constitution unchanged for the sake of anthropologists; complex and diverse transformations that take place in every nook and corner of "a society" are often connected to world historical transformations—if not always in a passive, reflective manner, but at times in the form of positively securing a niche for its own in a larger system. No "society" conveniently lends itself to the anthropologist to be studied from all aspects, that is, totally.

This kind of notion of "objectiveness" is closely related to the notion of "authenticity" suggested earlier by Strathern in connection with the ethnographer-cum-writer (not the ethnographer-cum-author) capable of making "his narrative transparent enough to be an authentic description of the Trobriands;"[31] The assumption of authenticity of description is an uneasy one. Let us remember Strathern's distinction between the author and the writer. The author interprets, theorizes and scrutinizes the culture she studies, while the writer authentically describes that culture concerned. Does this mean the writer is capable of rendering the truth about that culture? Is the description of a culture free from authorial intervention—as in "objective" description? Is this distinction tenable?

The pursuit of authenticity is misleading, has misled us for decades, and is still going on, as can be seen in the concern raised by Mary Louise Pratt with regard to anthropologists' reaction to *Shabono: A True Adventure in the Remote and Magical Heart of the South American Jungle*, written by Florinda Donner, who claimed to have lived among the Yanomamis, and whose text, however, did not come up to the authenticity expected for an ethnographical text.[32] The point was, Pratt tells

us, that it was not debated according to ethnographic accuracy, but to its similarity, too much similarity, to other texts dealing with the same topic/people.[33] Pratt cites a critic of Donner, Rebecca DeHolmes, who wrote that "it must be shown that the ethnographic data on which she bases her story were actually gathered personally by her while living among the Yanomama, and not re-written from previously published works."[34] Implicit here is that ethnographical value primarily resides in the "authenticity" of the text, which should be proven by the real account of actual fieldwork. The text is taken to be something that immediately reflects the culture which is discovered in the fieldwork. In this sense, fieldwork data are taken as the pre-given; all the anthropologist needs to do is to go and find it and write (copy?) it down. And, the rest is taken as natural; the text is naturally authentic, loyally recording what actually happened in front of her. But, is such a writing authentic?

We are not discussing here the worries about "given data" being "falsified" into something different in the stage of writing. As Clifford suggested: "To treat the *Diary* and *Argonauts* together need not imply that the former is a true revelation of Malinowski's fieldwork."[35] Rather, this is to say that there is no data that are purely given and innocently reflected, textualized or described. Since by the time certain data are selected, the authorial intervention is already made, in the form of interpretation, stereotypifying, classification, comparison, and above all, the limitation of the quantity of information. This implies controlling the channel of knowledge for the readers, what Michel Foucault calls the "author function."[36] This may even have little to do with the author's intention.[37] When Evans-Pritchard omits the British colonial presence in Sudan, although he may not have intended to deliberately obscure it, and he meant to render the Nuer people *well* within the reach of academic discourse, the consequence is there beyond the authorial intention and control. Nevertheless, he, as the author, is not entirely innocent since, in the final analysis, he is the producer of that particular text of a particular people at a particular time and, maybe, for a particular type of reader, and indeed, he has been

very influential in the formulation of our knowledge of the Nuer. The role of the author is, in other words, not necessarily to give us a generous opportunity to expand our knowledge or self-knowledge: rather than making our knowledge "objective" or "authentic," in many cases it works to limit such knowledge.

Although, like Strathern, Hastrup suggests nativeness as pertaining to the epistemological issue, her emphasis on "objectiveness" as something that native anthropologists cannot reach in terms of their native cultures pushes us back to the question of cultural specificity of the anthropologist. For Hastrup's "objectiveness" is a cultural insider's impossibility which can be overcome by cultural outsiders who observe things "objectively." The fact is, no one does. As Hastrup herself says, we are all native to a certain culture/society and in this sense (following Hastrup's notion of objectiveness) we are all the products of culturally conditioned forms of learning, including Western cultural specificity. Let me try to explore this point further.

To say that one comes from a certain cultural background and to study one's own background are two different things which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. More practically, where do we end the boundary-drawing of such "culture?" In other words, "who are the natives?" On the one hand, it is true that an anthropologist who comes from a white, middle-class English background with well-to-do financial circumstances, on top of her high-level education, would find herself very alien amongst her compatriot prostitutes standing in the back of King's Cross, or to an English working-class woman whose alcoholic husband routinely beats her up, or ethnic minorities living in the UK. When Judith Okely studies Gypsy women, she is not studying her native people. She writes:

> Unlike anthropology abroad, fieldwork at home is not a matter of memorizing a new vocabulary; only slowly did I realize that I had to learn another language in the words of my mother tongue. I unlearned my boarding school accent, changed clothing and body movements. Dropping my 'aitches and throwing in swear words, I was doing an

Eliza Dolittle in reverse and without Professor Higgins to supervise me.[38]

On the other hand, there are those of us who do not have to "go native" in the field, since we are native to the culture we study. And, there are certain distinct attributes to such cases. As stated by Okely, the ambiguity of the cultural identity of the anthropologist becomes "inflated" in the case of the anthropologist doing fieldwork in her own country.[39] When Japanese-American anthropologist Kondo's professional identity was made into "a sense of vertigo" and "a fear of the Otherness—in the self"[40] in her fieldwork in Japan, there are some distinct, or at least different, experiential moments as compared to the anthropologist doing fieldwork in a culture/society where she has had no generational, familial or personal connections prior to her opting for that particular site for her fieldwork.

This difference, it seems, needs to be recognized, but should not be overrecognized. Divisions are crisscrossing across gender, race, class, age. If these divisions are recognized, it should be clear that "native anthropology" is not referring to the study of the people who are identical to the anthropologist herself; although it may be referring to the home country or home province of the anthropologist, it is infested with difference, diversity and division to the same extent as anthropology of other cultures and societies, since the self-knowledge we may obtain from studies of such a diverse "us" is as foreign as "other culture/society" is to us. This means that what native anthropology can do is not the firsthand account of "others" (addressed to the West). In this sense, the set of epistemological issues the native anthropologist is concerned with are not too different from what the so-called Western (or traditional or normal . . .) anthropologist should deal with when studying "others."

Here, I find the discussion suggested by Strathern in her more recent work on partial connections between feminism and anthropology enlightening. Strathern takes the view that feminist

scholarship "is not a discipline isomorphic with other disciplines—it simply invades and draws on them. Thus, I cannot substitute feminism for anthropology or vice versa . . . ."[41] Can we not say here that the knowledge and experience one has as a person native to a certain society can "invade and draw on" the academic disciplinary asset that one has acquired as an anthropologist?

In a similar, but slightly different vein, Lila Abu-Lughod observes that female feminist anthropologists face a similar problem to the one faced by native anthropologists in the sense that they study women.[42] This being said, as suggested by Elizabeth Grosz, the female sex of the author does not automatically render the text "feminist" or "feminine." According to Grosz, it is not their status as women that decides feminist identity of female authors' texts, since "this psychological and sociological designation is quite independent of a woman's authorial status."[43] Likewise, "native voices" cannot be automatically privileged only because the writers are native to the culture described.[44] Abu-Lughod suggests that there are ways of writing "against cultures" and that we can proceed with "ethnographies of the peculiar." According to her:

> The very gap between the professional and authoritative discourses of generalization and the languages of everyday life (our own and others') establishes a fundamental separation between the anthropologist and the people being written about that facilitates the construction of anthropological objects as simultaneously different and inferior. Thus, to the degree that anthropologists can bring closer the language of everyday life and the language of the text, this mode of making other is reversed.[45]

However, to approximate the language of the field and the language of the text is not as easy as it is hoped to be, since it inevitably involves the question of the use of the language, or a particular language—English, in this case. English is placed in a privileged position in anthropological discourse (and probably in other social scientific discourses as well) as compared to other, less pervasive languages such as (say) Japanese. When someone like myself, a Japan-born Korean who grew up as bilingual in

Japanese and Korean and received her anthropological training in English in a British university, studies Koreans in Japan, using Korean and/or Japanese, their first languages, as the language for the fieldwork, and writes about them in English, which neither myself nor they regard as their first language, my anthropological study of them is not in any sense the same as an English person studying English society and writing about it in English, expecting the English readers to read it in English.[46] In my case, although I am studying my own culture/society, my readers are primarily foreigners to me. This is a dilemma faced especially by those who are, in Abu-Lughod terms, "halfie anthropologists."[47] Hundreds of such "halfies," including myself, in today's transnational academic milieu, can be sensitive about the powerful position of the English language[48] and find the taken-for-granted transparency of it uneasy and problematical.

The matter is not simply about the use of a particular language as a communicative tool between the author and the reader. The privileged use of a particular language involves privileging of concepts and categories historically and epistemologically defined by that language, thereby simultaneously subjugating concepts and categories defined by other languages. There is a definite power relation between them. In this connection, Henrietta Moore's following suggestion is highly relevant:

> . . . non-western anthropologists—and the term here obscures more than it reveals—often have to write about their findings in terms of the West versus the Rest dichotomy which informs theoretical concepts in the discipline. For example, a Japanese anthropologist who wants to work on concepts of the person or the self in Samoa may find herself having to describe such concepts in terms of implicit, international disciplinary conventions . . . . She must, either implicitly or explicitly, orient at least part of her discussion in terms of the recognized debate within anthropology and, in so doing, she brings into play the set of contrasted and contrastive differences which depend for their existence on the imagined category of the West.[49]

Moore adds that such a constraint becomes most notable when the anthropologist is writing in English or other European languages which are presumably foreign to the ethnographer herself. In her

more recent work criticizing the monopolistic position of Western social science as "the originary point of comparative and generalizing theory," Moore refers to the illustration that if the anthropologist from the developing states were to produce theoretically innovative work, and yet if she were not to conform to mainstream Western social science, it is likely that her work would be "denigrated as partial and/or localized."[50] Such an asymmetrical relation of power applies not only to text and discourse, but also to the entire mode of training and discipline of anthropology as taught in the academia. For example, many anthropology departments of non-Western universities teach British, American or French anthropological history as " *the* history of anthropology."

If we consider these factors, postulating "native anthropology" as problematical may start looking quite ethnocentric or culture-specific to the "West." As Okely writes, it is "no accident that the geographic space which has been obliterated or defined as the ethnographic periphery for orthodox anthropology is the very same which is occupied by a centre of academic power.[51] The question of native anthropology is the issue the emergence of which reflects the Western hegemony internal to the anthropological discipline. This is also connected to the notion of "natives" itself; as stated by Arjun Appadurai, natives "are creatures of the anthropological imagination."[52] It cannot be coincidental that categories such as "anthropology at home" and "native anthropology" are registered only when "anthropology" returns to its European home. Would it be too far-fetched or resentiment-motivated to say that the discovery of native anthropology is somewhat alarmingly new only for the Western European metropoles which are stripped of their colonies—thereby more researchers are forced to study their own homes? For the colonies—broadly meant to include North America, India, Africa and Australia—anthropology has always been carried out somewhere at home during and after the colonial period, mainly dealing with "domestic others." Practicing colonial anthropology necessarily involved people whose home was no longer "pure"—Anglicized Indian scholars,

"Orientalized" English eccentrics, Westernized native bureaucrats, dislocated colonists and marginalized native intellectuals, etc., whose "native culture" was so mixed up that they would not easily fall into a neat classificatory pigeonholes, and yet they certainly had a culture with which they could feel at home or they could display native expertise and skillfulness in that culture. And if so, would it be too much to suggest that before denying native anthropology as "a contradiction in terms," those who find it contradictory should rethink why they do so and in what kind of historical genealogy of knowledge they practice anthropology?

Which brings us back to the issue noted in the previous section—the heterogeneity of the community of anthropologists. In other words, the identity of anthropologists is a complicated one, or their identities are multiple. This multiplicity is very rich and ready to be used to strengthen rather than breach the vaguely-defined orthodox rules of anthropology. When Aihwa Ong calls herself a "post-colonial, Malaysian/Chinese/American woman, triply displaced and exiled from a home culture" and credits such existence as having "no possibility of subscribing to a singular authority,"[53] it can be interpreted that she includes the authority of anthropological orthodoxy; Ong suggests, as a critique of anthropological knowledge as it exists now, that alternative modernities in less culturally hegemonic peripheries are "evolving in a series of sites, in dialogue and tensions with each other in the region, while seeking to define their overall distinctiveness from the West."[54] For such a critical work as Ong's, Ong being a complex anthropologist-in-exile is surely an asset rather than disadvantage. Similarly, when Appadurai proposes the notion of "deterritorialization" and "global ethnoscape,"[55] his own transnational career and home-making experience are part of the contribution, rather than the negative factor. When he remembers his father's biography in which his father was once the minister of publicity and propaganda in a Japanese-backed Indian government-in-exile in Southeast Asia, and connects this memory and other memories of his own childhood to his critical study of patriotism, the unorthodox

patriotism he experienced—seen from the Nehrus and the Congress party and other mainstream Indian nationalists—is positively turned into the point of departure for a more critical and original analysis.[56] It is also closely related to the fact that most radical feminist critique and cultural critique come from experiential accounts of women and men of color.[57] Of course not all anthropologists and scholars with various native or other connections can make their cultural assets useful, but at least we should be able to question the validity of the image of anthropologists as a group of scholars who as a rule do fieldwork and stick to writing about the people in the field, who are presumably different from the culture where the anthropologist comes from; fieldwork is here taken as something that is necessarily juxtaposed or counterpoised to her "native" culture. It would be all the better if the anthropologist could use her own example to explore further the society she studies, and that example does not have to be alien to, or far from, everyday practices of the studied society. Putting things this way at least enables us to avoid exoticism and other branches of Orientalism, including Occidentalism. It also allows for the coexistence of "nativeness" (in the transformative sense, as in the cases of Ong and Appadurai) with anthropology, rather than dismissing it as contradictory.

There is a downside to such a celebratory approach, however. Not all the triply displaced persons are in a position to be able to use such a personal circumstance as an asset. Millions of refugees and overseas guest workers, who are forced to move from one cultural entity to the other in search of better work or, at times, pure survival, would not put their displacement and "deterritorialization" into celebratory terms. When Jonathan Rutherford states that "home is where we speak from,"[58] we can give it only a partial credit, since the majority of homeless and stateless peoples are simultaneously deprived of language and access to speak to the world. For the language-less people, to define home as somewhere you speak from is of little use. Indeed, the image of executives in the multinational firms having breakfast in New York, lunch in Tokyo, and dinner in Sydney is

a remote picture of hundreds of malnourished laborers being carried away from one location to the other for industries that are catered to by the multinationals, although they both are the images of displacement and splitting experience of "home-making." One should not conflate the privileged deterritorialization and the underprivileged one.

The situation we face today in and around the anthropological field of discipline is a complex one and no longer particular to a (usually prestigious, Western) university regarded as some kind of a legitimate center, a "such-and-such School" and some kind of pace-setter for an orthodox and normalizing producer of anthropologists. What we see here is not just an interdisciplinary transformation of the anthropologists' training, but an interethnic and transcultural constitution of currently practicing anthropologists, including the students. If the term "native anthropology" were to be charged with this problem, it would not be as a terminological contradiction, but as an anachronism; the population of anthropologists has always had a large component consisting of "natives" who studied their own culture/society, even when such a society was ruled by foreign colonists or is being made plural and ambiguous due to the anthropologist's own displacement.

Disciplinary Identity

In closing this article, I wish to raise the issue of the future of anthropological knowledge and its disciplinary identity. As Moore wrote, anthropology "is no longer a singular discipline," but "a multiplicity of practices engaged in a wide variety of social contexts."[59] She raises questions of the role of anthropological knowledge in the "multipolar, globalized, postcolonial world" and suggests that the answer to "what is social knowledge for?" should be a series of interrogations, rather than a singular definition.[60] Starting from there, I wish to suggest that we can try to expand critical edges and explorative scopes of ethnography, including regions to cover, theoretical issues to raise and genres

to experiment with. My preceding criticism of certain approaches to native anthropology and the posture of privileging "epistemology" over "culture" should be understood in this vein.

The complex constitution of anthropologists today works for both unifying and dividing the discipline's identity. Cultural differences of anthropologists whose epistemological groundings are different also, seem to deserve more appreciation. This is not simply to celebrate such a diversity, but to recognize inequality and difference in power existent within our discipline as well. There is first of all a hierarchy in social prestige and academic maturity among them. Distinctions are made between anthropologists of non-Western background, anthropologists of interdisciplinary background, anthropologists affiliated to more or less prestigious academic institutions, or with or without such affiliation, male or female anthropologists, rich or poor anthropologists, anthropologists who study regions that are hegemonic in the discipline and those whose study areas that are marginalized, etc., etc. The problem of native anthropology and anthropology at home is not unrelated to the power relation internal to anthropology as a discipline. Such a power relation is organized along multiple matrices, including regional hegemony, personal fame, college alumni connections, current work relations, political commitment, cultural snobbery, economic situation, favoritism and seniority and so on.

On the other hand, merely to endorse the diverse composition of the anthropological population is to fall into a truism and endless regress. By the same token, to situate centrally the self-consciousness of the anthropologist or to privilege her reflexivity *vis-à-vis* the indigenous voices can be misleading, while fetishizing fieldwork and empirical findings by way of dismissing the poetics of anthropology is no solution, either. Some professors have not been able to go back to their field for decades, although they keep writing about it by using either out-of-date "data" or others' works. In the meantime, we witness that fieldwork as a method of intellectual inquiry has traveled widely and, today, most social scientific disciplines and humanities subjects can combine fieldwork and interviews to their research,

including History, Gender Studies, Area Studies, Cultural Studies, Literature, Film Studies, Communication Studies, Sociology, Political Science, Philosophy of Science, just to mention a few. Reflecting the education funding cut, anthropologists of less hegemonic regions of the discipline are facing the fate of having to shift their professional identity to Area Studies or other related disciplines. To be able to teach one's own topic or specialized field with which one dealt in one's Ph.D. thesis is becoming a luxury which is reserved for a handful of prestigious universities. Many anthropologists are pushed to make certain compromises, including that of having to reeducate themselves in an entirely different region and language, in order to keep their jobs in academia. In this mood of disciplinary crisis, how can we anthropologists try to retain anthropology as anthropology without making it a monopoly of certain institutions, thereby reducing the significance of its place within the larger system of human knowledge and learning, at the same time, without blurring its disciplinary identity to the extent that it may have to be called something else?

If we take a parallel approach to Grosz's suggestion and apply it to anthropological texts, we may be able to say that the professional identity of the author as anthropologist does not necessarily render the text anthropological. Grosz suggests for a working experiment of feminist texts that "the relations between the text and the prevailing norms and ideals which govern its milieu . . . must be explored."[61] Adapting from that, we can try to explore the scope for critical reflection on the social and theoretical milieu from which ethnographical texts were born and distributed. For that, we need to clarify where we stand in relation to both our fieldwork and text. Every anthropologist, it is true, plays a different role as an ethnographical author, since her/his relation to the people whom he or she studies is always different. However, to explore ethnographer-field relations should not mean merely to write everything about fieldwork interactions, as if the more exhaustive is fieldwork account, the fairer becomes the text. That is not the case. On the contrary, the one-sided honesty and self-righteous fairness on the part of the

author may bring about disastrous implications to the people in the field. Such an act is ultimately nothing but a selfish confession and hypocritical gesture. The act of writing is in itself a mutation of fieldwork and the relations the anthropologist cultivated with the people in the field. When one writes about someone else, even with fully acknowledged permission from them, it is already a rupture, a certain disequilibrium in the sense that the mutual relationship is being written by one of the people involved, that is, the anthropological author. The positionality of the anthropologist is made different by moving from that of fieldworker to that of author, although such a shift may occur during the fieldwork.

Neither an author's identity nor an author's intention forms the textual identity of ethnographies, since such a decision pertains to the societal level. Readers can pick it up or drop it. In fact many texts do not even get published and even when they are published, they may just sit on the library shelves quietly for decades in their initial, limited-number hardcover edition. This does not necessarily mean that they are not good. But, it means that they did not find the marketplace to exchange themselves as a distributable article. (And, I do not at all intend to suggest "fairness" of the market.) This is therefore, not just the matter of writing a "good" (but for whom?) text, but to circulate it. No text is guaranteed circulation and distribution prior to the societal option. If the author is a professor with her own courses, she can expect her book to be read within such an institutional frame by many students, by making such reading compulsory through its examination connections. But, whether to read it or not after graduation or her retirement or death, and hence, outside such pedagogical constraints, is entirely up to the social market. So, the span of fifty years or so is only an interim guarantee the guarantee that involves a lot of symbolic and pedagogical violence.

This kind of readership-focused identity of the text can enlarge the scope of its interpretation. As Roland Barthes noted:

> We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single "theological" meaning (the "message" of the Author-God) but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash. The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture.[62]

Pointing to the fact that classic literary criticism never paid attention to the reader as compared to the writer, Barthes alludes to the non-personal, sociological category of the reader.[63] It seems important that anthropological authors take the readership as a field in which meanings and interpretations are produced and reproduced on the societal level. It also means that anthropologists are both author and reader, not just as in the case of native anthropologists. They participate in cultural production of meaning in the field, which is an immediate reflection of their personal history as well as future intellectual work—in this case, we all become producer-consumer of anthropological texts.

To understand readership this way has an implication for the experience of writing, since writing is not necessarily a reduction of fieldwork and meaningful social relations cultivated therein, to the text. Textualization may not have to be the qualitative reduction of life experiences of both the anthropologist and informants, in other words.[64] It can be a creative process for both the author and the people in the field through the mediation of the act of reading the text produced by the ethnographer. Such a communication is a societal event, given that the readership is a societal milieu where social meanings and interpretations are created and recreated.

It is important to extend the regional repertoires of ethnography geographically and culturally—as in transnational or transcultural anthropology. At the same time, can anthropology extend its parameters of genre as well? It has been said that ethnography is similar to, for example, travel writing,[65] and the ethnographer was likened to the traveler[66]or the literary author such as Joseph Conrad.[67] Whether such companions are useful or not is a separate matter,[68] but can anthropological texts retain their identity after they absorb methods of fiction or travel writing, for example? There are today many anthropologists who

are also playwrights,[69] travel writers, novelists, biographers and other media-related writers and film-makers.[70] Within what are normally regarded as ethnographical texts, genre experimentation has been with us for some time.[71] Whereas to block out such experiments would do a great disservice to us, we cannot be content by calling everything "ethnographical," since "being ethnographical" and "being an ethnography" may be quite different from each other.

In a way, to keep the disciplinary identity of anthropology ambiguous and hybrid is not a bad thing. Anthropologists, as I have argued in the preceding pages, are and have always been constituted by cultural and intellectual hybrids—including native anthropologists. The same goes to the anthropological readership and composition of texts as well. The constitution of readers today is highly diverse and no longer can we talk only about anthropological readers, the ethnographer's colleagues, or even more generally, academic readers as a specified target.

To recognize this allows practitioners of anthropology to have less fixed and more movable positionalities, which becomes a useful weapon when critically approaching what is taken for granted both in academia and the society at large. To recognize this also means that we look to the productivity of non-orthodoxy such as native anthropology—if it has ever been non-orthodox—and perversion such as anthropology at home—including the lost home of "Western" anthropologists.

Notes

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8. Marilyn Strathern, "The Limits of Auto-anthropology," in *Anthropology at Home*.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
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13. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
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15. George Clifford, "On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski," in *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth Century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988b).
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