NATIONALISM AND FIELDWORK   § 9560

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In the 1960s, anthropologists began to respond to the crisis in the discipline created by the post-World War II emergence of new nations from the old colonies and dependencies of industrial nations. The ideologies of nationalism, self-determination, and cultural separatism which mobilized formerly colonized peoples were neither predictable nor understandable in the paradigms that had served anthropologists in a world held together by a few dominant imperial nations. As a consequence, anthropology has been subject to a decade of severe criticism by its practitioners, by natives who have become anthropologists, and by nationalist leaders who treat anthropological investigation as the last trace of the colonial presence. This growing body of literature is the subject of my review.

Kathleen Gough posed the problem in the most global terms in her article "World Revolution and the Science of Man" (44). She describes the new context of fieldwork as one in which 2.3 billion people live in underdeveloped countries which were former colonies of industrial centers. Of these, some 773 million have become communist or socialist, 1.5 billion live in "client states" depending on US aid, and 837 million live in nonaligned states, while armed revolutionary movements exist in 20 countries with 266 million people (44, p. 140). One could add to these figures on the political demography of the anthropological field what Banajo (6, p. 85) assesses as one part decimated- Australian aboriginal populations and the indigenous groups of the American hemisphere—and the other part—Africa, Asia, Southeast Asia—suffering from the impact of changes initiated in the industrial centers. These facts seem to show that the "raw natives" for whom Malinowski (72) and others of his generation expressed a preference are no longer available. The tribal microcosm has vanished.

Anthropologists who enter into fieldwork in this context are likely to encounter the message "Yanki go home" at the airport, and should they persist in fieldwork, may find themselves identified with the CIA agents and military advisers who have preceded them or remain in the country (Nash 84). When they come to the point of analyzing field material, they are likely to be plagued with doubts about the ultimate ends their results might serve in highly charged political situations (2, 9, 42, 47) and feel that they must suppress or withold

information that might endanger their informants (38). Then, too, they might react in a defensive attack on the subjects of their field study. Publications may now be criticized not only by anthropologist colleagues but also by native political leaders and informants alert to ethnocentric biases or suspect funding agencies (12). Gough (43, p. 405) poses the alternatives for anthropologists "dependent on a counter-revolutionary government in an increasingly revolutionary world" in blunter terms than most practitioners are prepared to answer: Will they study the ethnic unit as a part of the world system, or will they persist in treating it as an enclave responding only to internal dynamics?

The crisis of fieldwork has stimulated a radical review of our discipline's past, our ancestors who formed the field in the height of colonial dominance, and our elders who continue to guide policy (55, 58, 101, 107). This criticism has brought to light the supremacist assumptions which underlie such dichotomies as primitive/civilized and traditional/ modern which are built into our models of social change and unilinear evolution. It has revealed the inadequacy of a comparative framework which fails to take the industrial centers into its purview and consistently uses the cultures of dark-skinned peoples as evidence for an earlier historical period. Malinowski (71) made a step forward when he called upon his students to "come down off the veranda," but his descendants are dissatisfied with the "view from under the mosquito tent."

The critique can be analyzed in three historic eras which parallel those that Wolf (106) uses but which I will call the colonial period, liberal reform and indirect rule, and nationalism and anti-imperialism in order to focus on the issues related to fieldwork.

ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The dominant paradigm for the anthropologist of the nineteenth century was that of unilineal evolution, with native inhabitants of the colonized world taken as examples of the early conditions of the human race. Talal Asad (4, p. 16) speaks of the encounter between the West and the Third World as

> an historical moment . . . that gives the West access to cultural and historical information about the societies it has progressively dominated, and thus not only generates a certain kind of universal understanding, but also reinforces the inequalities in capacity between the European and non-European worlds (and derivatively, between the Europeanized elites and the "traditional" masses in the Third World).

At the manifest level, anthropologists contributed to the "sympathetic recording of indigenous forms of life, but also to maintaining the structure of power" (4, p. 17).

The anthropological encounter in the early period was second hand, consisting of gleanings from travelers' accounts by the founders of the field, Tylor and Frazer. This facilitated that objectification of culture which became the *modus vivendi* of the early anthropologists. Their deductive, evolutionist principles ranked the Western world as the civilized pole of an historic continuum in

which other contemporary cultures were only examples of earlier stages of savagery or barbarism. Vilakazi (100, p. 31) notes that the image of Africans and other subject peoples as savages served to justify colonial rule. The ideology of social Darwinism reinforced the mandate to rule in colonial areas (Balandier 5). Manners (74) summarizes the main thrust of all Western agents of change in the period of colonialism as one of maximizing profit for the industrial centers.

LIBERAL REFORM AND INDIRECT RULE

Some of the key concepts developed in the earlier colonial encounter served anthropologists in the decades of reform when anthropologists rejected the ethnocentric bias of unilineal evolution. The concept of "primitive" was still used as the counter to "modern," "civilized," or "Western" cultures, but diffusionism was substituted for evolutionary biases (Willis 105). The aim of fieldwork was often described as using the world as a laboratory to discover truths about human nature and hence the solutions for one's own cultural problems (Mead 77). Since they had no objective of influencing the future, anthropologists were left free to pursue their own interests defined by their culture (Barnes 7).

Like their predecessors, anthropologists of the liberal reform period described cultures without reference to the structure of power and control which contained them (Wolf 106). Malinowski, in recognizing the need to "take account of European stupidity and prejudice," explicitly rejected the treatment of the colonial situation as the "well-integrated whole" on the basis that "it obscures and distorts the only correct conception of culture change in such areas: the fact that it is the result of an impact of a higher, active culture upon a simpler, more passive one" (73, p. 1).

This tendency to atomize the unit of observation and universalize the data from single societies superceded earlier methods of eclectically choosing the evidence from the grab bag of travelers' accounts, but like their mentors, anthropologists persistently ignored the basic contradictions in which they and their informants were caught. Some of the key words defining the anthropological perspective of this period were functionalism, holism, relativism, and acculturation. The summary of the critique of these concepts in the light of new national consciousness of formerly colonized people follows this order.

The contrast between indirect rule, especially in the British and French spheres of influence, and liberal reform implicit in United States AID programs is, according to Manners (74), more a matter of rhetoric than action. The "pattern of current assistance programs (as of 1956 when the article was first published) reflects the prepotent significance of political and economic considerations." "Anthropologists at best could just modify culture shock, not change the dominant institutions of the society from which they came," he concludes.

Functionalism

Asad remarked that "If classical functionalism had not existed, it would have been necessary for anthropologists to invent it, for it enabled them to analyze

primitive political systems without having to consider alternative political possibilities'' (3, p. 2). Anthropologists categorized and described alternative life styles as adaptive modes internally explicable in relation to the social microcosm. Balandier (5) points out that by locating conflict in the nature of the internal situation which generated itself, they failed to see any of the antagonisms located in the colonial situation.

The most severe attack on functionalism came from Gluckman in 1947 (39), when he criticized Malinowski for his ahistoricism and his failure to see conflict as part of an integrated colonial picture. This failure is apparent in Malinowski's statement that ''European occupation . . . has obliterated the old tribal hostilities.'' As Gluckman notes, ''The facts we have show that these old tribal hostilities are by no means obliterated, but are largely denied military expression'' (39, p. 210). Lacking a framework for analyzing tribalized and detribalized in the same context, Malinowski was unable, according to Gluckman, to analyze conflict as a motor to change. Africanists often point to the methodological weakness that Gluckman refers to in this early article, but they sometimes fail to acknowledge the ethnocentric and racial biases in Malinowski that Gluckman, a member of the white colonial society by birth, was able to discern and criticize.

Gluckman was not the only anthropologist who was aware of the need for viewing the colonial situation by an integrated approach. Schapera stated that the ''missionary, administrator, trader, and labour recruiter must be regarded as factors in the tribal life in the same way as are the chief and the magician'' (quoted in Gluckman 39, p. 213). Malinowski (73) ridiculed such attempts on the assumption that the framework would be the tribal whole, with the missionary taken to be another cult leader, the administrator a kind of chief, and the stock exchange squeezed into the simple exchange economy. The alternative model of a colonized sphere was for him untenable. Despite these early post-World War II criticisms of the tribal microcosm, the model persisted for two decades. Magubane (68) shows how an analysis which divorces figure from ground, or the townsmen and tribesmen of South Africa from the context of white dominance, reduces the analytical strength of some contemporary monographs on African urbanization.

Holism

The explanatory power of functionalism was contained within the holistic approach that was the hallmark of anthropology in the 1930s. It was, however, a holism that left out the frame in which the picture was held, since the colonial situation was seen ''as a disturbing factor, or only one of the causes of colonial change—never as a force in itself'' (Balandier 5, p. 35). Asad (4, p. 109) goes even farther in his criticism in stating that anthropologists ''obscured the systematic character of colonial domination and masked the fundamental contradictions of interest.'' Manners (74, p. 117) points to the contradiction inherent in Malinowski's attempt to introduce systematically anthropological theory that stressed functional integration into programs of applied change. It resulted in what Manners called a policy of ''quarantining those elements which should not

be disturbed." He would convince administrators "not to tamper with native brideprice while observing that the colonial office had levied a poll tax on the native which forced the young men to migrate to labor scarce areas."

Clammer (19) provides an excellent example of how functionalist analysts served to reify native cultures for purposes of colonial administrative apparatus in his case analysis of Fijian land tenure. Maxwell, the British administrative agent, ignored the ambiguities that had plagued his predecessor and constructed a simple agnatic structure which became enshrined as official doctrine. If the Fijians could not categorize themselves properly, he attributed it to native stupidity. Later W. R. Goeddes accepted the colonial administrator's model as the traditional structure, marveling at its structural symmetry and logical simplicity. Clammer uses this example to illustrate the ahistorical quality of anthropology in the reform period and the simplification of administrative models that ignored local diversity. This was often combined with a tendency to romanticize a putative "communalistic" base among "primitives" when no such evidence existed. Kenyata (60) points to the same error in his analysis of land-holding practices among the Gikuyu, whose land was in fact parceled out with no communally held lots.

Cultural Relativism

The nonevaluative approach cultivated by anthropologists of the 1920s and 1930s was consistent with an approach unconcerned with the solution of native problems, according to Willis (105). Barnes (7) points out that relativism was based on a double standard of morality—one for informants and one for ethnographers. The cultivated romanticism of the "primitive" and "tribal" blinded anthropologists to the fact of sophisticated governmental and economic institutions. Lowie labeled the Ugandans as "tribals" in 1950 at a time when, as Mukhergee (80) pointed out, travelers and administrators recognized that they had developed a state based on class domination. The ethnocentric bias contained in the paradigm "primitive/civilized" with appropriate codes governing each is even more apparent in Malinowski's (72) rejection of Kenyata's usage of the terms "state," "church," "economy," and "religion" in reference to Gikuyu institutions, and he was heartily amused by Kenyata's analogy of a Gikuyu female physician to a Harley Street surgeon. Malinowski's rejection of these rubrics, especially "economy" and "religion," reflects the ethnocentrism Leclerc (63) refers to when saying that anthropologists prefer the reductionist terms of "culture" and "custom." Owusu (89) directly attacks the "normative and behavioral equilibrium model of a single tribal system" for ignoring the nationalistic tribal movements.

Closely related to the cultural relativism of North American scholars is the *indigenismo* or Indophile perspective of Latin American anthropologists. Like their North American colleagues, who trained many of the Mexican anthropologists, indigenismo cultivated a respect for the indigenous roots of contemporary Latin American nations. However, as Bonfil Batalla (13, 14) and Nolasco Armas (85) point out, culture, reified as a mythic and symbolic representation of past grandeur, became the ideological basis for national re-

vitalization in the postrevolutionary period. It was however, devoid of political activism directed toward self-determination for Indian populations that had resisted deculturation and, in the very programs it generated, served to break down their resistance to ethnic extinction. Gonzales Casanova (42) analyzed the enclaves of ethnic resistance as "internal colonialism," a metaphor that helps delineate the structure of domination but at the same time denies the positive aspects of cultural autonomy as a potential base for autonomy and even rebellion (20, 94).

The fundamental paradox of relativism is, as Manners (74) points out, that in order to preserve the status quo, tradition must take precedence over relativism. This paradox could only be overcome by rejection of a position which is opposed to sociocultural change (Willis 105).

Acculturation Model of Social Change

A logical outgrowth of structural functional analysis based on an ethic of relativism that ignores power relations in intercultural exchanges was the acculturation model of social change. According to Hechter (46), the anthropological image of acculturation was a kind of osmosis which was considered to be universal, automatic, and irreversible. Leclerc (63) excoriates anthropologists for treating the native as a passive recipient in a nonreciprocal situation and for neglecting the violence attendant on much of the "donor" activities. He accuses anthropologists of providing moral arguments for the marginalization attendant on modernization. Current evidence of the ideological role played by acculturation theory is provided by Davis (23):

> Disguised ideologies of forced acculturation and assimilation, euphemistically called "programs of national integration," which legitimize state Indian policy in Brazil and other countries of the Americas . . . at present, various so-called "scientific theories of acculturation" are being used as a defense for government programs of directed cultural change . . . they implicitly assume the universal validity of our own way of life and values, and coerce Indian peoples, in the name of "national integration," into a state of colonial wardship and dependence.

Anthropologists tend to treat as "rational" those natives who choose the path of modernization, while resistance to change has been treated either as "tension-relieving mechanisms whose main function is to ease the strain of the acculturation process," as Clemmer (20, p. 214) points out, or as an obstacle to development (Erasmus 29, Foster 36). The role of anthropologists in Point IV and other technical aid programs was more one of "prediction of cultural resistances," according to Manners (74), than of guided change.

The Herskovitz, Linton & Redfield (48) definition of acculturation, which treated culture change as a unilateral process with goods and services moving from advanced to primitive societies, according to Clemmer (20) and others, ignored the ideological roots of political confrontation involved in the encounter between native and beneficiary. As a consequence, this paradigm of change,

according to Clemmer, made it impossible for anthropologists to detect, let alone analyze, the gathering storm of nationalistically defined protest moves in the case of both red and black nationalism in the United States, Latin America, and Africa. The assumption that traditional modes must give way to modern is a nideology, Magubane (68) asserts, which facilitates such change. He prefers to see urban and tribal Africans as two sides of a development/underdevelopment coin, a product of the uneven intrusion of the forces of capitalism.

Alienation of the Anthropologist

While the position of relativism may "put the soul of the anthropologist in jeopardy," as Diamond (28) has pointed out, it is more often sorted out as a professional ideology and serves to defuse the potentially dangerous character of anthropological inquiry. Personal involvement in the lives of the people studied brings one to the brink of commitment, considered unscientific by many of the profession. Those who have seen the abyss, like Lévi-Strauss (64) or Nadel (see Faris 31), preferred to draw back to the distance of a stranger or to glorify the illumination that comes from alienation. Undoubtedly the view of the stranger enables one to see beneath the appearance of things, and as Leclerc (63) indicates, some of the best observations of the French were done by the British or, as others would add, on the Americans by the French (deToqueville) or Swedish (Myrdal). However, the persistent status of stranger may just enable anthropologists to impose dual and triple divisions on the society more easily (Jongmans & Gutkind 57). Those anthropologists who, like Radcliffe-Brown, used native police or administrators to round up informants may have found the role of stranger compatible because of a necessarily fast turnover.

Awareness of the potentially hostile attitude of natives to anthropologists gradually became a conscious aspect of training. A committee of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland commented on the caution one should take when approaching a field:

> The attitude of the native to the European observer must inevitably be influenced by the type of contact he has already had with Europeans and it must be remembered that such contacts have often been very unfortunate. The investigator must take this into consideration and adapt his behavior accordingly. The unsophisticated native is often suspicious of all strangers. If a stranger comes with attendants who can be regarded as an armed guard, he may expect a hostile reception, and should he consider it necessary to carry a weapon, he should do so unostentatiously (90, pp. 28-29).

For the most part, anthropologists accommodated at least minimally to colonial administrators who made their field stay tenable. Both Rosemary Firth and Kalvero Oberg (35, 87: see also 61, 86) speak of the necessity to adjust to British expatriate populations, alert to any signs of going native or letting down the side. Laura Bohannan ate custard pudding; Oberg refrained from drinking before the sun went down and then had the same brand of Scotch as the British (87). He found that their pattern of rounding up 20 bearers for the least expedition had the

latent function of enabling a district commissioner to control the movements of anthropologists and other visitors, and he conformed to the point of letting his friend beat his bearers to shape them up.

Despite the overt conformity to the colonizers' standards, maintained because of their dependency on the administrators' authority, most anthropologists could be described as "reluctant colonists" (see James 56). In the interwar period, anthropologists provided a radical criticism of colonialism that made them increasingly suspect to administrators (56), and as a consequence, in the 1950s anthropologists were not subject to the general indictment of Europeans who had served as informers in the wars of liberation (Brown 15, Lackner 62). According to Maquet (75), the existential situation of the anthropologist, regardless of his sympathies, was alienating since it was linked to the interest and fate of the colonist.

> The existential situation of the anthropologist was in the colonial situation one in which he shared the life of the native, but with a higher salary. They remained members of the white minority. They were scholars whose material and professional interests lay in their home countries but who participated in the privileges of the dominant caste during their stay in Africa....Their group interests were not significantly different from those of other middle level specialists . . . (75, p. 48).

NATIONALISM AND ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The turning point for the profession was a delayed response to the new nations' reaction against former colonial administrators and their analogs in dependent client states. Nationalism, as Lackner (62) shows, was a product of colonialism and finally its antithesis. The artificial borders created by colonial administrators exacerbated the sentiments of nationalism and provided the people with a basis for mobilizing support against the colonizers (Despres 26, 27).

Maquet signaled the need for change in his call for "decolonizing the profession" (75, p. 47). The favorable attitude shown toward anthropologists in the colonial period because "they had prevented traditional cultures from falling into oblivion and had stressed the value of ways of life alien to the West" was waning as "the very term 'anthropology' and its French counterpart, 'ethnology' . . . are frowned on in many quarters . . . (as) suspected of being tinged with colonialism." The attack on "the superstructure of racial colonial domination" summarized in the presence of "the gun and the anthropologist" (Vilakazi 100) is a simplification which rejects the earlier sympathetic view of the nationalist striving for liberation that was often expressed in the 1960s by anthropologists. However, as Maquet points out (75), because anthropologists were linked to the power structure of the industrial centers they were, following independence, judged in terms of that relation rather than on their ideological expressions.

A recurrent bone of contention in the newly self-conscious nations is the use of the term "primitive" or "tribal" to designate indigenous people of formerly colonized areas. Feuchtwang (34) states that such usage was essentially left

unquestioned "until their conversion into 'new nations' was imminent." The use of "primitive" was (and still is for many) a means of evading the moral dilemma of criticizing the system, according to Goddard (40), or even mentioning the colonial structure, as Balandier (5) notes. Hsu (51) sums up the political implications of the term in modern usage:

> However, over and above the empirical and theoretical reasons just outlined, there is a practical necessity today for pause before using the term "primitive" in describing cultures 'and societies. There was a time when anthropologists from a Western society could write about the "primitive" Bantu or the Maori without the fear of being challenged. The peoples who were objects of study could not read the ethnographic reports nor were they in any position to challenge them even had they read them. Today many of these once voiceless peoples have become members of independent nations taking their places as equals with their most powerful brothers in the international arena . . . . Among every one of these newly independent peoples the zeal for national pride runs high. None of them will regard with delight the designation of "primitive" applied to any aspect of their culture, far less to their way of life as a whole, no matter how the concept is defined. The overall psychological and political climate of the world today is simply unfavorable to the continued application of this term to any people who have a voice (51, p. 176).

Perhaps in response to rising nationalism in Africa and among Afro-Americans, American Indians began to reject their "colonial" treatment, and one of their targets became the anthropologists. Vine Deloria (24, 25) expressed the growing cultural nationalism, stating that "If Indians fully recaptured the idea that they are tribes communally in possession of this land (53,000,000 acres to which they have title) they would realize that they are not truly impoverished." His resentment against anthropologists is a corollary of the growing Indian consciousness of their cultural heritage. He asks that they seek matching grants for Indians they study (24, p. 136).

As early as 1951, Fenton (32) found the longhouse closed to him when he returned to the Six Nations Reserve. Hypothesizing that there had probably been a surfeit of anthropologists, Fenton remarked that the Iroquois, like the Navaho, "may have come to feel that they scarcely had a breather from being 'studied,' and perhaps they tired of answering questions or trying to guess the ulterior purposes of seemingly well-heeled, middle class white observers. They protested that continued study made them self-conscious and that their privacy was being destroyed." Reflecting on the changes from his earlier study, Fenton goes on to say:

> Twenty years and a new generation had brought changes in attitudes with dimensions and intensity that I had not forseen; unwittingly, I had walked into a hornet's nest. Field work is difficult now, yet research is still possible. The ethnologist's work matters to people who care about preserving the old lore (32, p.118).

This kind of frank discussion indicates the need for a change in orientation. A field site in which anthropologists have given nothing in return for information and have not involved informants as collaborators should be treated with the

same concern as a disturbed archeological site with its attendant loss to future generations of anthropologists.

The reaction of those anthropologists who have dedicated a lifetime to research to the critique of "radicals and young nationalists" is expressed by Margaret Mead, who says:

> Many of us who worked very hard to establish full membership in the human race of primitive people with whom it was a long and arduous task to establish such a relationship are inclined to feel somewhat bitter when young nationalists and young radicals accuse anthropologists of having collaborated with colonialism—because they necessarily worked within colonial framework—or of having insulted primitive people by treating them as "guinea pigs" or merely ·objects of study, or of having laid too much emphasis on the primitive past instead of the progressive present . . . (78, pp.131-32).

But, with the kind of abrupt reversal which characterizes her best work, she rises above the criticism with the dignity of a tribal elder and states:

> But it may well be that this contemporary uproar promoted in most cases by those who are ignorant of the conditions of real field work, may be simply one more expression of the basic premise of anthropology—that we do not have subjects, we do not treat people as objects, we do not experiment with human beings, and we treat those with whom we work as full collaborators. However, definitions of treating others as full collaborators change through the years . . . .
> It is perhaps inevitable that some of the very justified furor about the rights of youth, black people, American Indians and young nations should spill over into a reexamination of anthropological methods and the legitimacy of the premises on which we have built our research both among primitive peoples and in contemporary society. In such a period we need every ounce of sophistication we can get as we try to combine research with action.

As a first step, it might be good to divest ourselves of the term primitive.

In the changing context of fieldwork, there is a demand for a statement of ethics that takes into account collaboration with informants. In the old days when Radin, as his student Lurie (65) discovered, wanted information from old men on sacred matters which they held secret, he would systematically get their nephews into debt and then require them to get the information from their uncles. Radin expected the old culture to die out and, according to Lurie, felt that the old people with information "should be exploited by any means." This is the kind of relationship that sowed seeds of resentment which the present generation must harvest. In this new context there is growing emphasis on responsibility to the anthropologist's constituency (Jorgenson 58, Weaver 103).

The old stance of non- or apolitical involvement with informants is, as Berreman states, "as political as a challenge to it."

> The context in which anthropologists are being called to account by Third World peoples is the post-colonial and neo-colonial world—in which social science is perceived as a product of Western culture which grew out of colonial interests and which served those interests, consciously or not, leaving a legacy

of colonialist attitudes and assumptions to many of its practitioners (10, p.112; see also 9).

The assumptions that went with fieldwork in the past, i.e. that observation and recording would not disturb the people, is no longer tenable when, as Barnes (7) points out, the population is literate and tribesmen are their own agents of change. The "double standard of morality—one for informants and one for ethnographer" is inadequate once the ethnographer is forced to admit that all are part of one social system. Publications must maintain a high degree of responsiveness to the population being studied in this context since the new sanctions may involve cutting all anthropologists out of the field.

In Africa, the new context of fieldwork
workers are increasingly subject to what Gutkind (45, p.160) alludes to as "surveillance by African government officials, trade union leaders and other political leaders . . . (while) in pre-independence days, the research worker worked under the protective umbrella of the colonial officials and much of their work reflected the ideology of colonialism, i.e. the subordinate status of Africans." Gutkind's only advice in the new context is for the student to "proceed with caution and obtain understanding and support of local leaders."

Far more serious from the point of view of future fieldwork abroad is the conscious or unwitting involvement of workers in espionage activities under the guise of research. The revelation of project Camelot's study of rebellion and counterinsurgency served as a warning for those who were not aware of the implications of Department of Defense supported work in foreign areas. This and other abuses of the role of investigator culminated in the executive board of the American Anthropological Association issuing a "statement on the problems of anthropological research and ethics" passed by the fellows at the council meeting in 1967, which noted that researchers should be concerned with funding and advising members that "sponsorship by the Department of Defense can jeopardize future access to research opportunities." While North Americans emphasized the funding aspect of the problem in the wake of the exposure (50, 92), European and Latin American social scientists criticized the asymmetrical nature of studying abroad since American institutions were not subject to a similar scrutiny by foreign scholars (Galtung, noted in Horowitz 50). When American institutions abroad are studied, the results may never be published; Huizer (54) refers to failure by *Human Organization* and *Economic Development and Culture Change* to publish articles with research data on American financial interests.

A more subtle aspect of ethics in scholarship is raised in Saberwal's (91) discussion of the problem. Even when money is "sanitized through respectable organizations and carried out by responsible investigators, the information can be used by the Department of Defense and other agencies." A study group he quotes advises the National Association of Scientists "to maintain an adequate base for planning and for the conduct of military operations when and where they occur." He phrases the problem in most urgent terms as: "The academics within each Afro-Asian country in turn have to confront the question: how does

the stimulus of communication with the international intellectual community balance against the hazards resulting from the flow of data concerning our societies into the US war machine?"(91, p.175). Given this state of affairs, Saberwal raises the issue of what our options are for improving the balance sheet. The issue has been handled under these approaches: (a) professional review board of research activities undertaken abroad and issuance of codes of behavior by the professional associations; (b) reciprocate informants with applied anthropological programs in response to demands by native Americans and other groups studied; (c) representation of Third World people on boards, study groups, and as researchers; (d) turn the focus of study to the analysis of the dominant groups at home and abroad as a means of balancing the understanding of the world social system.

Professional Reviews and Codes

The statement on professional ethics adopted by the council of the American Anthropological Association on May 1971 clarified the earlier statement of 1967 referred to above, defining responsibility to the public, the discipline, students, sponsors, and the government. At the same time the role and function of the committee on ethics was defining grievance procedures empowering it to issue credentials. Rules and procedures for its members were refined in a statement approved by the executive board in April 1973. These acts are a response to increasing awareness of the critical value of information and responsibility by professsionals for keeping channels of communication open if not balanced.

Adams (1) goes beyond the official statement to suggest responsibilities that scholars have to foreign scholarly communities. The guidelines he proposes are aimed at balancing the flow of communication and funding, encouraging collaboration with foreign scholars, and responding to locally defined needs. The Social Science Research Committee on Latin American Research has for some years incorporated Latin Americans on its granting board and instituted collaborative research grants. As yet what has been ignored is research by Latin American students in North America.

Feedback from foreign scholars on a questionnaire circulated by the Council on Educational Cooperation with Latin America sponsored by the Latin American Studies Association (93) indicates some favor to US scholarship but adds that the ethnocentric definition of the problem limits its usefulness. Most countries were reported to exercise surveillance over researchers (Street 96). This has probably increased since the coup in Chile.

Applied Anthropology as an Adjunct to Theoretical Research

The "license to practice the irrelevant" [Fred G. Burke, quoted by Berreman (11, p. 391)] has expired for anthropologists. American Indians have been particularly forceful in demanding that anthropologists make a positive contribution when they enter a reservation to study (Deloria 25). But it is increasingly apparent that applied anthropology along with theoretical anthropology is subjected to criticism in the countries to which it is exported

(21). The role of "playing God with natives," as stated by Van Baal (98), himself an administrator in the Dutch colonial office of Indonesia, is of the past, since

> there is no longer a role to fulfill in colonial areas such as the one which we were privileged to undertake . . . We had tasks to which we could devote all of our energy because they set us in the very midst of events and developments . . . Yet where we were and where we acted we felt we were part of a whole, members of a society in which we had a function. No longer can any of us have such a function today, but thirty years ago we could (98, p. 101).

British social anthropologists were more integrated into colonial administration than were their American colleagues in the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the presidents of the Royal Anthropological Institute called for even greater involvement in the 1920s and 1930s (Lackner 62). Except for the period in which John Collier was agent for the BIA, American anthropologists have been left outside of administrative roles. Latin American anthropologists have served as an important branch of the institutes for indigenous affairs.

Bonfil Batalla (13) draws the material for his critique of applied anthropology from his Latin American experience, but directs some of his attack to North American influence in the field. In a succinct article published in *Human Organization* (1966), he focuses on the following points:

1. Emphasis on the local and particular, emphasizing psychological causes for poverty and underdevelopment; disengages the analysis from a frame which embraces power.
2. The tendency to direct changes that adjust to the general status system, with favor shown to slow, long-term changes; small and partial reforms are preferred to radical changes.
3. Cultural relativism rejects a moral and ethical outlook which is the essence of applied anthropology; hues to a case-by-case approach that defeats general understanding.
4. Problems of such societies are blamed on internal characteristics.
5. Attempt is made to raise the levels of living without touching the institutional structure that causes impoverishment.

Bonfil Batalla calls for a break from dependency on North American models and development of an independent stance:

> The magnitude of the problem with which we are faced and the scarcity of our resources place us in a situation far different from that of wealthy and highly industrialized nations like the United States of America. We need to establish hierarchies for our problems; we cannot permit ourselves the luxury of turning our efforts to the acquisition of knowledge about inconsequential aspects of problems. Thus as we do not believe that our poverty has a psychological origin, nor that it results from the ideas and images peculiar to our cultural tradition, nor that our basic problems can be explained by "deficiencies in channels of communications," so we do not believe that studies on these themes will give us the knowledge that we fundamentally need to face our problem (13).

In forging their own role, activist social scientists of Third World countries

have found even more pressing the need to break out of the mold of "objective" science and admit to a partisan approach (Stavenhagen 95). Fals Borda (30) calls the Ninth Latin American Congress of Sociology the turning point in defining a new social science adapted to the needs of revolutionary change. The break with what Fals Borda calls "European and North American formalism" was possible, he asserts, only with the recognition of the collapse of reformism and the revelation of the "implications and consequences of imperialist colonialism" (30, p. 34). He echoes the proclamation of the participants in the Ninth Congress calling for a rejection of studies of status, roles, functionalism, small groups, diffusion of innovation and a turn to processes of liberation and change over time. This calls for an interdisciplinary approach that responds to the complexities of the countries undergoing change. It also calls for a reassessment of the relations of social scientists with informants and redefinition of the objectives of research. He concludes that direct participation in the process is the only way for social scientists to contribute to change in the social structure.

Minority Group and Indigenous People's Involvement in Social Science

In an introduction to Kenyata's monograph on the Gikuyu written in 1938, Malinowski (72) stated that "The educated, intellectual minority of Africans usually dismissed as agitators are rapidly becoming a force. They are catalyzing an African public opinion even among raw tribesmen." He felt that their demands for change and improvement of their conditions required the attention of the Europeans if they "were not to be driven into Bolshevism."

Kenyata's monograph reveals a full awareness of the dangers of bias involved in an inside view of the culture. At the same time he expressed the advantages to be gained:

> I can, therefore, speak as a representative of my people, with personal experience of many aspects of their life. Finally, on the vitally important question of land tenure, I can claim to speak with more than ordinary knowledge . . . . The Gikuyu have chosen me as their spokesman before more than one Royal Commission on land matters (60).

The groundwork for a partisan anthropology was laid, but it was more than three decades before it became an explicitly espoused platform for fieldwork.

Kenyata also expressed awareness that his view of his tribe would be a challenge to the "professional friends of the African" who are prepared to maintain their friendship for eternity as a "sacred duty, provided only that the African will continue to play the part of an ignorant savage so that they can monopolise the office of interpreting his mind and speaking for him. To such people, an African who writes a study of this kind is encroaching on their preserves. He is a rabbit turned poacher."

Later Malinowski (72) expressed fear of "extreme" nationalism and the political danger of its spread and commented that:

> The African is becoming an anthropologist who turns our own weapons against

us. He is studying European aims, pretences and all the real and imaginary acts of injustice. Such an anthropology is no doubt mutilated and misguided, full of counter-prejudices, and charged with bitter hostility. It is often blind in its intransigence and sweeping in its wholesale attack. But it cannot be ignored by the man of science . . . . For on the whole it contains a great deal of truth, and it foreshadows the formation of a public opinion, or a national and racial feeling which, sooner or later, will have to be taken into account by the practical contact agent.

One might add . . . by the professional anthropologist as well, who is forced to admit that the members of the culture have a special insight that cannot be captured by years of field

The criticism of anthropological biases stemming from ethnocentric definitions of

an article that surpasses Malinowski's in its fears of what a native anthropology will claim for itself:

The autonomy of scholarship, of scientific anthropology cannot survive in these circumstances except in terms of a grand critical synthesis of the facts of man's sufferings and the ideals of human dignity . . . . The old dominant Eurocentric view of anthropology is now pitted against an emergent Afrocentric perspective. This dialectical development might hopefully provide the necessary corrective for dismantling other one-sided pseudo-scientific and intellectual imperialism of Europe and eventually produce the salutary synthesis of genuine human knowledge—a common stream of knowledge and understanding about man free from oppression, deprivation and the weight of privilege.

Assessing the changes that would come about as a result of natives entering into ethnology, Leclerc (63) says that, while the "objectivity" of an outsider is lacking, the trend would be away from behaviorist lines of social relations to a reevaluation of profound values. The advantages that a native anthropologist has should be maximized: an intuitive comprehension of the sense of the system by members of that system. Certainly it will mean moving away from what Leclerc typifies as a "colonialist view" which "perceives men and groups only as objects" and "social facts as things" (63, p. 196).

Awareness of the difficulty of correcting ethnocentric perspectives seems to be more prevalent among the natives turned anthropologist than among those who assume that by going abroad they are divesting themselves of culturally acquired expectations. Martin Yang (108) said that, ". . . it takes a native born person more than thirty years and a large amount of effort and good fortune to accumulate the necessary knowledge and experience to write objectively about his group." Hsu (52) advocates for himself and others in doing *any* field work, whether of his own or an alien culture, the cultivation of marginal manship by involvement in the comparative method in all his work. By criticizing one's own way of life at the same time one is trying to understand another culture, he hopes to reduce the tendency to "judge the actions of his own society by reality needs and those of others by high ideals." Nakhleh (82) sees the advantages of being a native anthropologist outweighing the disadvantages, and like Vilakazi (100)

notes that a greater sensitivity to people of one's own culture is incumbent on the part of the native anthropologist since boorishness, excused in a stranger, would not be tolerated in a native son. Hsu (53) questions the objectivity of Western anthropologists who, he says, are so "Engulfed in their own particular civilization . . . they are unwilling to subject their own culture to scrutiny" (53, p. 2).

Hsu raises the question of what the chances are of a minority person getting his intellectual contribution accepted once he has been admitted into the profession. He feels that white American anthropologists make very limited reference to theoretical aspects of nonwhite views.

This view was substantiated by the Committee on Minorities and Anthropology (22), which found that though minority respondents felt they were accepted in the field and that they performed a service or liason role, they also felt that their theoretical positions either were not accepted or were ignored. In response to a question of whether anthropology had performed a service or disservice to their people, 21 of 36 respondents said it had been largely a disservice.

In comparing North American and western European anthropologists with eastern European ethnologists, Tomas Hofer (49) says that the former often view the eastern European ethnologists as "underdeveloped anthropologists," while the latter are amazed at the willingness of American and western European anthropologists to investigate themes too familiar to eastern European ethnologists for them to investigate.

The inside view is a necessary corrective for the unconscious ethnocentric projections found in the dominant social sciences. However, just to be a native or member of a minority group is no guarantee of ridding oneself of these models, as Szwed (97) points out, since "acculturation to predominant white models has made black social scientists as incapable of dealing with a major portion of lower-class Afro-American life" as those they imitate. Both indigenous and nonindigenous anthropologists share the problems of the "marginal native" (Freilich 37).

Reacting to the failure of the African Studies Association to include greater representation of Africans in African studies, the black caucus at the ASA meetings in Montreal in 1969 (18) established the African Heritage Association. The objectives of the group were to reconstruct African history and cultural studies along Afro-centric lines at the same time that they tried to bring about an "intellectual union of black scholars the world over." The actions of the caucus evoked an accusation of racist bias by Pierre L. van den Berghe (99), who saw in the move an attempt to define the constituency in black and white lines. In support of his position, van den Berghe pointed to the reaction of African participants who viewed the black caucus as just "another neo-colonialist attempt by outsiders to speak on behalf of Africa." Wallerstein (102) felt that quotas demanded by the black caucus may be an essential weapon in restituting social imbalances, but failed to address himself to the issue of Afro-American vs African national representation. The reactions in the African Studies Associ-

ation reflect at a distance the crisis Magubane (66) points to in African social science.

Refocusing Studies on Dominant Groups

In reassessing the future role of anthropology in light of the criticism from within the discipline and from those who formerly were the objects of study, I shall deal first with the self-criticism and the outlook for North American anthropology and then the view from formerly colonized areas.

The question of "reinventing anthropology" provides the title for a book edited by Del Hymes (55) on the critical evaluation of our past and future. Nader (81) proposes a shift from studying the poor and oppressed to analyzing elites. Willis (105) calls for research programs selected for their "socio-political" relevance.

The pose of objectivity in social science was sharply criticized by a panel of activists and analysts from Third World countries in Toronto at the 1971 American Anthropological Association annual meeting (Jorgensen & Lee 59). Belacourt (8) advocated turning our attention to modes of dominance over oppressed groups and studying the means of overcoming them. Cardinal (16) envisions the role of anthropologists in relation to native peoples' struggles as one of "technicians who will help us analyze, who will help us interpret the data that we get from our research efforts, who will be able to share with us their knowledge of the experiences of other peoples who have undertaken similar challenges with us." In the ninth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Society meeting, Caulfield (17) envisions joint studies by activists and anthropologists so that both sides might gain knowledge. This approach typified the group studies undertaken by Chilean scholars before the coup. Goldstein (41) earlier had advocated a program of applied and pure anthropological research on one's own national culture in order to "turn the lessons of ethnocentrism" back home. He supports Henry Dobyns's comment on the need for the study of US culture by anthropologists from other countries. Those who have studied US culture at home and abroad report a greater self-awareness of the anthropological enterprise (D. Nash & Wintrob 83).

Third World anthropologists face quite different problems in defining their post independence role. Majumdar predicts:

> It is more than likely that we will be facing a period of the construction of nationalist ethnologies comparable to that of nationalist histories in India when indigenous scholars reacted to the histories constructed about their past by British who tried to overcome the error of reading the present into the past, denying past glories, and belittling the value of indigenous cultures (70, pp. 18-19).

Since many native people do not have a literate tradition, the new investigations will require oral histories. Thus Onwuachi & Wolfe (88) advocate the writing of a cultural history of Africa as a first priority. This role approximates what Hofer (49) sees as part of a "revitalization movement" in which native ethnographers

promote a "conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture." Posing anthropology, or the "view from the outside," as the contrasting opposite of ethnology, or "the view from inside," Hofer predicts that:

> The formerly primitive peoples now on the way to becoming new nations more and more emphatically refuse to remain subject matter for anthropologists (Lévi-Strauss 64). For anthropology is the science of culture as seen from the outside, and the first concern of people made aware of their independent existence and originality must be to claim the right to observe their culture themselves from the inside (49, p. 313).

Not all nationalistic researchers reject the scholarship of Europeans as irrelevant to their problems. West (104, p. 649) says: "We must be grateful for the facts which Europeans collected, but look elsewhere for their significance before they can be used to help the writing of colonial history—look to the social anthropologist who can provide a conceptual framework."

According to Ajayi (2), one danger in native ethnography is the possibility of linking nationalism to localism so as to contribute to the divisiveness inherent in tribal traditions. He warns that "Those nationalist leaders who have tried to rally the masses and instilled self-confidence by appealing to their heritage soon realize that the more each cultural group takes pride in its own heritage, the more difficult it is to achieve common unity." The new and unstable nations do not want to explore maladjustments or discontent (Fernandez 33), but prefer to seek universal features of human culture as an important instrument of political regroupment.

The possibility for a true collaboration between ethnologists and anthropologists of the new nations and of the former colonial centers is probably the most significant aspiration of concerned scholars in both areas. Magubane's (67) phrasing of the problem is both a warning and a promise: "If anthropology is not to die with the death of colonialism and imperialism, then it should find itself a new responsibility: our struggles should be the struggles of anthropologists."

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